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Folder Title: Middle East (McFarlane) - Cables
from Secretary Shultz

Box: 53

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Middle East (McFarlane) - Cables from Secretary Shultz
Box 91407 53

Date: 11/23/99
Bowditch - F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #110416Z Aug 83, 6 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #25</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
2. Cable	Cable #110416Z Aug 83, (copy of item #1), 6 p. <i>R " " #26</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
3. Cable	Cable #130239Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #27</i>	8/13/83	P1/F1
4. Cable	Cable #150223Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R " " #28</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #150400Z Aug, 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #29</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #152330Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 4/19/06 " #30</i>	8/15/83	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #160252Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #31</i>	8/16/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #170016Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #32</i>	8/17/83	P1/F1
9. Cable	Cable #170033Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R " " #33</i>	8/17/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #170208Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R " " #34</i>	8/17/83	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #180204Z Aug 83, 3 p. <i>R " " #35</i>	8/18/83	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #181827Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R " " #36</i>	8/18/83	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #182210Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #37</i>	8/18/83	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #190321Z Aug 83, 3 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #191507Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #39</i>	8/19/83	P1/F1
16. Cable	Cable #19X213Z Aug 83, 4 p. <i>R " " #40</i>	8/19/83	P1/F1
17. Cable	Cable #200119Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R " " #41</i>	8/20/83	P1/F1
18. Cable	Cable #200231Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>PART 4/19/06 " #42</i>	8/20/83	P1/F1
19. Cable	Cable #202232Z Aug 83, 1 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #43</i>	8/20/83	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 11/4/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST (MCFARLANE) - CABLES FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

FOIA

M2008-098/12

Box Number 91407

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56631	CABLE	190321 AUG 83 [0 - 0]	3	8/19/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008			M2008-098/12

56632	CABLE	200231Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	7	8/20/1983	B1
	P	11/24/2008			UPHELD M2008-098/12

56633	CABLE	202330Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	2	8/20/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008			M2008-098/12

56634	CABLE	202330Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	2	8/20/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008			M2008-098/12

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C: Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Middle East (McFarlane) - Cables from Secretary Shultz
Box 91407 *5* Page 2

Date: 11/23/99
Bowditch - F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
20. Cable	Cable #202330Z Aug 83, 2 p.	8/20/83	P1/F1
21. Cable	Cable #210254Z Aug 83, 4 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLS F98-008/1 # 45</i>	8/21/83	P1/F1
22. Cable	Cable #222215Z Aug 83, 3 p. <i>R " " #46</i>	8/22/83	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
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 - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9428
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9307
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9066
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7665
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4625
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8811
BT

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~~SECRET~~ -----03 STATE 226445

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, US, IS
SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOP LEBANON

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WANTED FIRST TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE EXCELLENT RAPPORT YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH ALL OF THE LEADERS IN THE AREA. I AM AN AVID READER OF YOUR REPORTS AND AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY THE IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS YOU HAVE FOSTERED BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS. SINCE I DO NOT HAVE TO RUN FROM MIDNIGHT MEETINGS TO AIRPLANES AND INTO ANOTHER MEETING, I HAVE THE LUXURY OF SITTING BACK HERE THINKING ABOUT OUR STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING PROBLEMS RELATED TO LEBANON. I HAVE HAD SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU AND SOME QUESTIONS ON HOW YOU THINK WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED. MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT DISTANCES PRECLUDE SITTING DOWN FOR A GOOD SKULL SESSION, BUT PERHAPS SOME OF THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WILL PROVE USEFUL.

3. SYRIA: IT APPEARS FROM THE PRELIMINARY REPORTING I HAVE SEEN THAT YOU WERE TREATED TO THE SAME HARD-LINE INTRANSIGENT SPEECHES THAT I HEARD FROM KHADDAM AND

ASSAD. WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PATIENT SAUDI EFFORTS TO FOSTER A LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE CHANCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH ANY TIME SOON. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, WHILE TAKING CARE NOT TO IGNORE THE SYRIANS, WE SHOULD IN OUR OWN MINDS SHIFT OUR CONCENTRATION FROM ACHIEVEMENT IN THE NEAR TERM OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON TO EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT EVERYTHING WE DO, INCLUDING OUR STRATEGY TOWARD FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THAT LIGHT.

4. SAUDI ROLE: THIS SHIFT IN CONCENTRATION IMPACTS, FOR

~~SECRET~~//NODIS

STATE 226445

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 #25
BY LBT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

ENGAGING THEM HEAVILY ON THE LEBANON-SYRIA DIALOGUE, WE MIGHT LET THEM PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS WITHOUT FURTHER PRESSURE FROM US AND WORK WITH THEM INSTEAD ON LEBANESE CONFSSIONALISM AND PLO-RELATED PROBLEMS. THE SAUDIS HAVE SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT THE SYRIANS ON THEIR TREATMENT OF ARAFAT. WE MIGHT CONSIDER ASKING THE SAUDIS TO BECOME MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARAFAT LOYALISTS FROM THE BEKAA AND TRIPOLI, AN EFFORT IN WHICH ARAFAT APPEARS TO BE INTERESTED, BUT WHICH WILL REQUIRE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. I JUDGED FROM YOUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM THAT FAHD SEEMED TO BE UNWILLING TO CONFRONT ASSAD ON THIS, BUT IT WOULD BE WORTH A TRY. THIS COULD HAVE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS AND ARAFAT'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL HAVE POSITIVE FALLOUT IN THE LEBANON SITUATION. GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS COULD BE OFFSET IN THE LEBANESE PUBLIC EYE (AND IN ISRAEL) BY HIS HAVING SUCCEEDED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE PLO OCCUPYING FORCES. AN ELEMENT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A LOOSENING OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE STALEMATE; IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS WITHDRAWAL, ARAFAT WILL INSIST ON ASSURANCES OF SAFETY FOR PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS, WHICH WILL ENABLE US AND THE LEBANESE, IN TURN, TO PROPOSE AT LEAST AN INTERIM CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE. WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT DROP FROM OUR AGENDA WITH THE SAUDIS THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, INCLUDING A PRELIMINARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN, BUT IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH PURSUING THE IDEA OF SAUDI INVOLVEMENT IN FACILITATING PLO WITHDRAWAL.

5. MAKING LAF REDEPLOYMENT A SUCCESS FOR THE GOL: A SUCCESSFUL LAF REDEPLOYMENT INTO AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF WILL DEMONSTRATE THE GOL'S ABILITY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL

OVER TERRITORY VACATED BY AN OCCUPYING FORCE. A LAF-DRUZE AGREEMENT IS CRUCIAL TO THIS EFFORT--WHICH I TOUCH ON BELOW--BUT SO ARE SYRIAN ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT MOVE IN OR OTHERWISE CHALLENGE THE LAF IN THESE NEW AREAS. SHOULD WE SEEK SAUDI HELP NOW IN OBTAINING SARG ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL KEEP HANDS OFF? AT A MINIMUM, I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT WE, THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS WOULD EXPECT THE SYRIANS TO AVOID ACTIONS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH MISCHIEF-MAKING WITH THE PSP OR OTHERS, WHICH WOULD ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE A PEACEFUL EXPANSION OF GOL AUTHORITY, BEGINNING WITH THE SHUF. A FURTHER ELEMENT TO

~~SECRET~~//NODIS

STATE 226445

A GOL SUCCESS IN ITS REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE IN ENSURING FULL IDF COOPERATION WITH THE LAF. YOU HAVE ALREADY SKILLFULLY MOVED THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS INTO CLOSER COMMUNICATIONS ON THESE ISSUES, BUT THIS WILL NO DOUBT REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED INTERVENTION INTO EVEN THE MOST DETAILED ELEMENTS OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDEPLOYMENT. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE IDF AND GOI DO EVERYTHING TO HELP THE LAF AND NOT HINDER IT--A TASK WHICH WILL NOT BE EASY GIVEN GROWING LAF SUSPICIONS ABOUT IDF INTENTIONS.

6. THE SURVIVAL OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT: WHILE PLO WITHDRAWALS AND SUCCESSFUL IAF REDEPLOYMENT WILL GIVE THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT A MUCH NEEDED LIFT, BROADER ACTIONS RELATED TO "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" CLEARLY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ITS FUTURE SURVIVAL AND STRENGTH. I HAVE BECOME VERY CONCERNED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS THAT OUR VISION OF LEBANON AND GEMAYEL'S MIGHT BE SHARPLY DIVERGING. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT LEBANON CANNOT SURVIVE UNDER A PHALANGIST OR MARONITE DICTATORSHIP: THE COMMUNITY IS NOT ONLY TOO SMALL BUT IT IS DIVIDED BOTH POLITICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY. THE ONLY HOPE OF PROGRESSIVELY BUILDING STRENGTH INTO THE GOI IS TO BROADEN ITS BASE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY A TRUE POWER-SHARING FORMULA IN WHICH THE MARONITES MAY HAVE THE MORE SENIOR POSITIONS, BUT IN WHICH POWER IS SHARED IN A MORE EQUITABLE FASHION WITH THE STRONGEST REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER CONFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES. I WONDER IF AMIN GEMAYEL UNDERSTANDS THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE LUXURY OF TIME TO BUILD UP KAMAL AL-ASSAD AS THE SHIA LEADER OR THE ARSLANS AS THE DRUZE LEADERS WHEN NABIH BARRI AND WALID JUMPLATT ARE CLEARLY THE MEN LOOKED TO BY THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THOSE TWO COMMUNITIES. AS I RECALL, BOTH MEN WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH AMIN GEMAYEL AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEIR STRENGTH WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR REQUIREMENT THAT AMIN MEET THE CONCERNS OF THESE COMMUNITIES AT LEAST PART WAY, APPEARS TO HAVE FRIGHTENED AMIN, WITH THE RESULT THAT HE IS

SEEKING ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP IN EACH COMMUNITY. THE VERY DISTURBING REPORT THAT PIERRE GEMAYEL HAS TALKED HIS SON INTO DECIDING AGAINST REACHING A POLITICAL ACCORD WITH THE DRUZE IN THE MOUNTAINS IS A FURTHER INDICATION OF THIS TREND. IT COULD BE DISASTROUS FOR LEBANON AND FOR OUR POLICIES.

7. DEALING WITH CONFESSIONAL LEADERS: BECAUSE OF OUR HEAVY INVESTMENT IN LEBANON, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE AND THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP ARE WORKING FROM THE SAME SCRIPT. A CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF IDF WITHDRAWAL AND LAF TAKEOVER IS A DRUZE-LAF AGREEMENT. WE CANNOT RISK SENDING THE LAF INTO THE MOUNTAINS IF AMIN GEMAYEL INTENDS TO HAVE IT SUBDUE THE DRUZE BY FORCE OF ARMS. THERE IS DANGER OF ANOTHER LAF DISINTEGRATION, DANGER OF A LAF-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION AND DANGER OF ACCUSATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN MASSACRE OF THE

SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE, IT SEEMS TO ME, THAT AMIN GEMAYEL AND WALID JUMBLATT MEET FACE-TO-FACE TO BEGIN THE LONG, SLOW PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE DRUZE COMMUNITY THAT HE IS ENTERING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOL. I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT FAHD HAS ALSO SEIZED ON THIS AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR AMIN'S SURVIVAL. PRINCE SAUD TOOK AN ACTIVE HAND IN A SIMILAR EFFORT IN THE SUMMER OF 1981 WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE. HOWEVER, IF ARRANGING A GEMAYEL-JUMBLATT MEETING ALSO REQUIRES HEAVY PRESSURE FROM OUR SIDE, THEN WE MUST ENGAGE IN THAT PRESSURE. THIS MAY REQUIRE A "DUTCH UNCLE" TALK WITH WALID HIMSELF BY ANY ONE OF THE SEVERAL AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHOM HE KNOWS AND RESPECTS. IN FACT, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS MAY ARISE SHOULD WALID DECIDE TO COME TO THE U.S. NEXT WEEK TO BE WITH HIS VERY ILL INFANT SON. HOPEFULLY, SAUDI EFFORTS TO GET AMIN AND WALID TOGETHER WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED BEFORE THEN. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ABOUT GEMAYEL'S EXTREME SENSITIVITY ON JUMBLATT MEETINGS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT GEMAYEL COULD PROBABLY BE PERSUADED THAT A VERY FRANK TALK WITH JUMBLATT MIGHT HELP END HIS DANGEROUS ANTICS IN THE SHUF. I WILL BE VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMIN ON THIS ISSUE AND IN PARTICULAR TO HEAR WHETHER YOU ARE ABLE TO FERRET OUT WHAT IF ANYTHING POSITIVE AMIN HAS UP HIS SLEEVE. WE HOPE HE REALIZES THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE OR WITH ANY OTHER GROUP REQUIRES COMPROMISES FROM HIM ALSO. OBVIOUSLY, LEBANON CANNOT SURVIVE AS A MARONITE FIEFDOM.

9. EFFORTS WITH THE SHIA: NABIH BARRI AND OTHER SHIA

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 STATF 226445

LEADERS HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR SUSPICION THAT GEMAYEL HAS WRITTEN OFF SOUTHERN LEBANON AND INTENDS TO LEAVE IT UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION INDEFINITELY. IN YOUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS, I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT THERE IS ALREADY SOME MENTION OF THE GOI STRENGTHENING ITS PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH. I BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE HEAVILY ENCOURAGED BY US, POSSIBLY TO THE EXTENT OF NAILING DOWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LEBANESE TO FORM THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, AND FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE SOUTH TO HAVE THEIR OFFICE BUILDINGS RETURNED TO THEM AND TO HAVE SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITIES REESTABLISHED AND GREATLY IMPROVED. I DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT NEEDS IN THE SOUTH, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE SOUTH THE INTEREST OF THEIR GOVERNMENT IN THEIR WELFARE. THESE EFFORTS WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE COOPERATION FROM THE ISRAELIS, AND, MOST PARTICULARLY, ISRAEL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOALS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY THEIR BEHIND-THE-SCENES FACILITATION AND CAN ONLY BE HARMED BY HEAVILY PUBLICIZED ASSOCIATION WITH EVERY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MOVE. THE ISRAELIS SEEM VERY INTERESTED IN MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION--PARTICULARLY THEIR COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON, UPI LUBRANI. I KNOW YOU ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THIS PROBLEM ALREADY, BUT WANTED TO UNDERSCORE MY CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE AS WELL.

10. I KNOW ONLY TOO WELL THAT YOU ARE IN A VERY FLUID SITUATION, BUT THOUGHT THAT MY THROWING OUT THESE IDEAS MIGHT MESH WITH SOME OF THE THINKING YOU ARE DOING ON THE GROUND OUT THERE. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ALSO OCCUR TO ME AND I WONDERED WHAT YOUR LATEST THINKING ON THEM WAS:

-- WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE TIMING OF AN OFFICIAL LEBANESE REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL?

-- WHAT ARE THE MERITS AND PROBLEMS IN OUR STIMULATING MORE DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ON THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY LEVEL?

-- COULD OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE DIALOGUE BE UNDERTAKEN IN EXCHANGE FOR SOMETHING THE LEBANESE WANT FROM THE ISRAELIS?

-- WHAT ARE YOUR LATEST THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT?

-- ARE THERE ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON AN AD HOC BASIS WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE BY EITHER THE GOI OR GOI ON OTHER ISSUES? FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE SEEM INTERESTED IN FORMING THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH. WHAT OTHER SUCH MEASURES WOULD IT BE PRACTICAL AND SENSIBLE

FOR 03 TO 0310001
11. CONCLUSION: I WOULD PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHIFT THE U.S. FOCUS FROM SYRIA TO LEBANON, INCLUDING SEEKING SAUDI HELP ON CONFESSIONAL PROBLEMS, PLO WITHDRAWAL AND IN INITIATING USEFUL SYRIAN ACTIONS IN TERRITORIES VACATED BY IDF REDEPLOYMENT. NONE OF THE THINGS I HAVE SUGGFSTFD WILL BE EASY, PARTICULARLY THOSE PERTAINING TO ENSURING THAT WE AND GEMAYEL ARE WORKING FROM THE SAME SCRIPT REGARDING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. YOU HAVE ALRFATY DEMONSTRATED YOUR CONSUMMATE SKILLS AS A PATIENT NEGOTIATOR AND I KNOW THIS STYLE IS THE ONE WITH WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARE MOST COMFORTABLE. I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS.

12. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SFULTZ

BT
#6445

NNNN

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 226445

COVER SHEET

**SPECIAL
CAPTIONED
TRAFFIC**

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB PM CHRON

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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9428
 INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9307
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9066
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7665
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4625
 RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8811
 BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 226445

LOC: DISK 12
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 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: ROSS

NODIS
 FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, US, IS
 SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOR LEBANON

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WANTED FIRST TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE EXCELLENT RAPPORT YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH ALL OF THE LEADERS IN THE AREA. I AM AN AVID READER OF YOUR REPORTS AND AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY THE IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS YOU HAVE FOSTERED BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS. SINCE I DO NOT HAVE TO RUN FROM MIDNIGHT MEETINGS TO AIRPLANES AND INTO ANOTHER MEETING, I HAVE THE LUXURY OF SITTING BACK HERE THINKING ABOUT OUR STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING PROBLEMS RELATED TO LEBANON. I HAVE HAD SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU AND SOME QUESTIONS ON HOW YOU THINK WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED. MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT DISTANCES PRECLUDE SITTING DOWN FOR A GOOD SKULL SESSION, BUT PERHAPS SOME OF THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WILL PROVE USEFUL.

3. SYRIA: IT APPEARS FROM THE PRELIMINARY REPORTING I HAVE SEEN THAT YOU WERE TREATED TO THE SAME HARD-LINE INTRANSIGENT SPEECHES THAT I HEARD FROM KHADDAM AND

ASSAD. WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PATIENT SAUDI EFFORTS TO FOSTER A LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE CHANCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH ANY TIME SOON. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, WHILE TAKING CARE NOT TO IGNORE THE SYRIANS, WE SHOULD IN OUR OWN MINDS SHIFT OUR CONCENTRATION FROM ACHIEVEMENT IN THE NEAR TERM OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON TO EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT EVERYTHING WE DO, INCLUDING OUR STRATEGY TOWARD FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THAT LIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F98-008/#26
 BY LSJ NARA DATE 11/5/02

4. SAUDI ROLE: THIS SHIFT IN CONCENTRATION IMPACTS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE SAUDI ROLE. RATHER THAN FOCUS ON ENGAGING THEM HEAVILY ON THE LEBANON-SYRIA DIALOGUE, WE MIGHT LET THEM PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS WITHOUT FURTHER PRESSURE FROM US AND WORK WITH THEM INSTEAD ON LEBANESE CONFSSIONALISM AND PLO-RELATED PROBLEMS. THE SAUDIS HAVE SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT THE SYRIANS ON THEIR TREATMENT OF ARAFAT. WE MIGHT CONSIDER ASKING THE SAUDIS TO BECOME MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARAFAT LOYALISTS FROM THE BEKAA AND TRIPOLI, AN EFFORT IN WHICH ARAFAT APPEARS TO BE INTERESTED, BUT WHICH WILL REQUIRE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. I JUDGED FROM YOUR COVERSATION WITH HIM THAT FAHD SEEMED TO BE UNWILLING TO CONFRONT ASSAD ON THIS, BUT IT WOULD BE WORTH A TRY. THIS COULD HAVE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS AND ARAFAT'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL HAVE POSITIVE FALLOUT IN THE LEBANON SITUATION. GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS COULD BE OFFSET IN THE LEBANESE PUBLIC EYE (AND IN ISRAEL) BY HIS HAVING SUCCEEDED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE PLO OCCUPYING FORCES. AN ELEMENT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A LOOSENING OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE STALEMATE; IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS WITHDRAWAL, ARAFAT WILL INSIST ON ASSURANCES OF SAFETY FOR PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS, WHICH WILL ENABLE US AND THE LEBANESE, IN TURN, TO PROPOSE AT LEAST AN INTERIM CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE. WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT DROP FROM OUR AGENDA WITH THE SAUDIS THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, INCLUDING A PRELIMINARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN, BUT IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTH PURSUING THE IDEA OF SAUDI INVOLVEMENT IN FACILITATING PLO WITHDRAWAL.

5. MAKING LAF REDEPLOYMENT A SUCCESS FOR THE GOL: A SUCCESSFUL LAF REDEPLOYMENT INTO AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF WILL DEMONSTRATE THE GOL'S ABILITY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL

OVER TERRITORY VACATED BY AN OCCUPYING FORCE. A LAF-DRUZE AGREEMENT IS CRUCIAL TO THIS EFFORT--WHICH I TOUCH ON BELOW--BUT SO ARE SYRIAN ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT MOVE IN ON OR OTHERWISE CHALLENGE THE LAF IN THESE NEW AREAS. SHOULD WE SEEK SAUDI HELP NOW IN OBTAINING SARG ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL KEEP HANDS OFF? AT A MINIMUM, I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT WE, THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS WOULD EXPECT THE SYRIANS TO AVOID ACTIONS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH MISCHIEF-MAKING WITH THE PSP OR OTHERS, WHICH WOULD ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE A PEACEFUL EXPANSION OF GOL AUTHORITY, BEGINNING WITH THE SHUF. A FURTHER ELEMENT TO

A GOL SUCCESS IN ITS REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE IN ENSURING FULL IDF COOPERATION WITH THE LAF. YOU HAVE ALREADY SKILLFULLY MOVED THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS INTO CLOSER COMMUNICATIONS ON THESE ISSUES, BUT THIS WILL NO DOUBT REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED INTERVENTION INTO EVEN THE MOST DETAILED ELEMENTS OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDEPLOYMENT. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE IDF AND GOI DO EVERYTHING TO HELP THE LAF AND NOT HINDER IT--A TASK WHICH WILL NOT BE EASY GIVEN GROWING LAF SUSPICIONS ABOUT IDF INTENTIONS.

6. THE SURVIVAL OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT: WHILE PLO WITHDRAWALS AND SUCCESSFUL LAF REDEPLOYMENT WILL GIVE THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT A MUCH NEEDED LIFT, BROADER ACTIONS RELATED TO "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" CLEARLY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ITS FUTURE SURVIVAL AND STRENGTH. I HAVE BECOME VERY CONCERNED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS THAT OUR VISION OF LEBANON AND GEMAYEL'S MIGHT BE SHARPLY DIVERGING. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT LEBANON CANNOT SURVIVE UNDER A PHALANGIST OR MARONITE DICTATORSHIP: THE COMMUNITY IS NOT ONLY TOO SMALL BUT IT IS DIVIDED BOTH POLITICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY. THE ONLY HOPE OF PROGRESSIVELY BUILDING STRENGTH INTO THE GOL IS TO BROADEN ITS BASE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY A TRUE POWER-SHARING FORMULA IN WHICH THE MARONITES MAY HAVE THE MORE SENIOR POSITIONS, BUT IN WHICH POWER IS SHARED IN A MORE EQUITABLE FASHION WITH THE STRONGEST REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER CONFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES. I WONDER IF AMIN GEMAYEL UNDERSTANDS THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE LUXURY OF TIME TO BUILD UP KAMAL AL-ASSAD AS THE SHIA LEADER OR THE ARSLANS AS THE DRUZE LEADERS WHEN NABIH BARRI AND WALID JUMBLATT ARE CLEARLY THE MEN LOOKED TO BY THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THOSE TWO COMMUNITIES. AS I RECALL, BOTH MEN WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH AMIN GEMAYEL AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEIR STRENGTH WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR REQUIREMENT THAT AMIN MEET THE CONCERNS OF THESE COMMUNITIES AT LEAST PART WAY, APPEARS TO HAVE FRIGHTENED AMIN, WITH THE RESULT THAT HE IS

SEEKING ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP IN EACH COMMUNITY. THE VERY DISTURBING REPORT THAT PIERRE GEMAYEL HAS TALKED HIS SON INTO DECIDING AGAINST REACHING A POLITICAL ACCORD WITH THE DRUZE IN THE MOUNTAINS IS A FURTHER INDICATION OF THIS TREND. IT COULD BE DISASTROUS FOR LEBANON AND FOR OUR POLICIES.

7. DEALING WITH CONFESSIONAL LEADERS: BECAUSE OF OUR HEAVY INVESTMENT IN LEBANON, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE AND THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP ARE WORKING FROM THE SAME SCRIPT. A CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF IDF WITHDRAWAL AND LAF TAKEOVER IS A DRUZE-LAF AGREEMENT. WE CANNOT RISK SENDING THE LAF INTO THE MOUNTAINS IF AMIN GEMAYEL INTENDS TO HAVE IT SUBDUE THE DRUZE BY FORCE OF ARMS. THERE IS DANGER OF ANOTHER LAF DISINTEGRATION, DANGER OF A LAF-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION AND DANGER OF ACCUSATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN MASSACRE OF THE DRUZE. ALSO, THE ISRAELIS CLEARLY FEAR NEGATIVE DOMESTIC FALLOUT FROM THE IMPORTANT ISRAELI DRUZE COMMUNITY IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE, IT SEEMS TO ME,

THAT AMIN GEMAYEL AND WALID JUMBLATT MEET FACE-TO-FACE TO BEGIN THE LONG, SLOW PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL SIGNAL TO THE DRUZE COMMUNITY THAT HE IS ENTERING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOL. I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT FAHD HAS ALSO SEIZED ON THIS AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR AMIN'S SURVIVAL. PRINCE SAUD TOOK AN ACTIVE HAND IN A SIMILAR EFFORT IN THE SUMMER OF 1981 WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE. HOWEVER, IF ARRANGING A GEMAYEL-JUMBLATT MEETING ALSO REQUIRES HEAVY PRESSURE FROM OUR SIDE, THEN WE MUST ENGAGE IN THAT PRESSURE. THIS MAY REQUIRE A "DUTCH UNCLE" TALK WITH WALID HIMSELF BY ANY ONE OF THE SEVERAL AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHOM HE KNOWS AND RESPECTS. IN FACT, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS MAY ARISE SHOULD WALID DECIDE TO COME TO THE U.S. NEXT WEEK TO BE WITH HIS VERY ILL INFANT SON. HOPEFULLY, SAUDI EFFORTS TO GET AMIN AND WALID TOGETHER WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED BEFORE THEN. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ABOUT GEMAYEL'S EXTREME SENSITIVITY ON JUMBLATT MEETINGS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT GEMAYEL COULD PROBABLY BE PERSUADED THAT A VERY FRANK TALK WITH JUMBLATT MIGHT HELP END HIS DANGEROUS ANTICS IN THE SHUF. I WILL BE VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMIN ON THIS ISSUE AND IN PARTICULAR TO HEAR WHETHER YOU ARE ABLE TO FERRET OUT WHAT IF ANYTHING POSITIVE AMIN HAS UP HIS SLEEVE. WE HOPE HE REALIZES THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE OR WITH ANY OTHER GROUP REQUIRES COMPROMISES FROM HIM ALSO. OBVIOUSLY, LEBANON CANNOT SURVIVE AS A MARONITE FIEFDOM.

9. EFFORTS WITH THE SHIA: NABIH BARRI AND OTHER SHIA

LEADERS HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR SUSPICION THAT GEMAYEL HAS WRITTEN OFF SOUTHERN LEBANON AND INTENDS TO LEAVE IT UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION INDEFINITELY. IN YOUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS, I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT THERE IS ALREADY SOME MENTION OF THE GOL STRENGTHENING ITS PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH. I BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE HEAVILY ENCOURAGED BY US, POSSIBLY TO THE EXTENT OF NAILING DOWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LEBANESE TO FORM THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, AND FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE SOUTH TO HAVE THEIR OFFICE BUILDINGS RETURNED TO THEM AND TO HAVE SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITIES REESTABLISHED AND GREATLY IMPROVED. I DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT NEEDS IN THE SOUTH, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE SOUTH THE INTEREST OF THEIR GOVERNMENT IN THEIR WELFARE. THESE EFFORTS WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE COOPERATION FROM THE ISRAELIS, AND, MOST PARTICULARLY, ISRAEL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOALS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY THEIR BEHIND-THE-SCENES FACILITATION AND CAN ONLY BE HARMED BY HEAVILY PUBLICIZED ASSOCIATION WITH EVERY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MOVE. THE ISRAELIS SEEM VERY INTERESTED IN MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION--PARTICULARLY THEIR COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON, URI LUBRANI. I KNOW YOU ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THIS PROBLEM ALREADY, BUT WANTED TO UNDERSCORE MY CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE AS WELL.

10. I KNOW ONLY TOO WELL THAT YOU ARE IN A VERY FLUID SITUATION, BUT THOUGHT THAT MY THROWING OUT THESE IDEAS MIGHT MESH WITH SOME OF THE THINKING YOU ARE DOING ON THE GROUND OUT THERE. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ALSO OCCUR TO ME AND I WONDERED WHAT YOUR LATEST THINKING ON THEM WAS:

-- WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE TIMING OF AN OFFICIAL LEBANESE REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL?

-- WHAT ARE THE MERITS AND PROBLEMS IN OUR STIMULATING MORE DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ON THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY LEVEL?

-- COULD OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE DIALOGUE BE UNDERTAKEN IN EXCHANGE FOR SOMETHING THE LEBANESE WANT FROM THE ISRAELIS?

-- WHAT ARE YOUR LATEST THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT?

-- ARE THERE ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON AN AD HOC BASIS WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE FORTHECOMING ATTITUDE BY EITHER THE GOL OR GOI ON OTHER ISSUES? FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE SEEM INTERESTED IN FORMING THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH. WHAT OTHER SUCH MEASURES WOULD IT BE PRACTICAL AND SENSIBLE FOR US TO SUPPORT?

11. CONCLUSION: I WOULD PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE YOUR

COMMENTS ON THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHIFT THE U.S. FOCUS FROM SYRIA TO LEBANON, INCLUDING SEEKING SAUDI HELP ON CONFESSIONAL PROBLEMS, PLO WITHDRAWAL AND IN INITIATING USEFUL SYRIAN ACTIONS IN TERRITORIES VACATED BY IDF REDEPLOYMENT. NONE OF THE THINGS I HAVE SUGGESTED WILL BE EASY, PARTICULARLY THOSE PERTAINING TO ENSURING THAT WE AND GEMAYEL ARE WORKING FROM THE SAME SCRIPT REGARDING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. YOU HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED YOUR CONSUMMATE SKILLS AS A PATIENT NEGOTIATOR AND I KNOW THIS STYLE IS THE ONE WITH WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARE MOST COMFORTABLE. I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS.

12. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT

#6445

NNNN

File

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB CPO CHRON

R B UVZCZCBL0784
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHC #9238 2250420
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130239Z AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9376
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 229238

Dick

LOC: DISK 13 897
13 AUG 83 0451
CN: 07148
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

EXDIS/FOR AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND DILLON FROM THE SECRETAR

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ACOA LE
SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS FOR MCFARLANE MISSION

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE CABLED REPORTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS, AND WE WILL DEPEND MOST HEAVILY ON THIS FORM OF COMMUNICATION. AS WE HAVE LEARNED IN DEALING WITH BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE, IT IS VITAL TO BE ABLE TO REFER TO THE WRITTEN RECORD TO RESOLVE THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH INEVITABLY ARISE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, I RECOGNIZE THE VALUE OF A SECURE MEANS FOR US TO INFORMALLY EXCHANGE VIEWS. I AM, THEREFORE, INSTRUCTING THE DEPARTMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE USE OF SECURE VOICE FACILITIES IS AVAILABLE WHEN YOU ARE IN BEIRUT AROUND THE CLOCK. THE RADIOTELEPHONE (TACSATCOM) IN THE TEMPORARY CHANCERY CAN BE PUT ON LINE AT ANY TIME WITH A SHORT DELAY REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A SATELLITE CIRCUIT FROM NSA. I AM ASKING THAT NSA PROVIDE A DEDICATED CIRCUIT, ON THOSE DAYS WHEN YOU ARE IN BEIRUT, BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0700 AND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME. IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, THE KY-70 IS USABLE WHEN THE LAND LINES IN BEIRUT ARE AVAILABLE. WHILE BOTH OF US

FOUND THE VOICE QUALITY OF THIS SYSTEM TO BE UNACCEPTABLE, THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION IS WORKING TO IMPROVE THE FACILITY.

4. FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON: IT IS VITAL THAT BUD AND HIS STAFF ARE LOCATED AS CONVENIENTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR SECURE CABLE AND TELEPHONE FACILITIES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE EMBASSY CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AN APARTMENT IN THE EL DORADO BUILDING ADJACENT TO THE CHANCERY WHICH WILL SERVE AS OFFICE SPACE FOR BUD AND HIS STAFF. I APPRECIATE YOUR WORKING THIS OUT RIGHT AWAY.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT
#9238

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1#27
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

(b) ACTION ROSS4 INFO CERON

10VZCZCBL0988
 OO RUEHEL
 DE RUEHC #0014 2270245
 ZNY SSSSS ZZP ZZY SPECIAL HANDLING
 O 150223Z AUG 83 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO ZEN/OUSE IMMEDIATE
 INFO RUEHEL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9399
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9512
 ZEN/SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
 BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 230014

LOC: DISK 14 668
 15 AUG 83 0332
 CN: 07343
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: FOSS

NODIS
 SPECIAL ENCRYPTION SIERRA WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK ONLY

E.O. 12355 DECL: OADR
 TAG PRFL, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY
 SUBJ MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER TO
 PM BEGIN
 BEIRUT FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS ONLY TEL AVIV AMB LEWIS ONLY
 REFS: A) BEIRUT 8910, P) TEL AVIV 10999

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS TO CONFIRM THE SECRETARY'S SEVERAL CONVER-
 SATIONS WITH JUDGE CLARK THIS EVENING. THE SECRETARY

-- CONCURS IN THE URGENCY OF A MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
 BEGIN.

-- CONCURS IN THE TEXT PROPOSED BY FUD MCFARLANE REF A,
 BUT INCORPORATING THE MODIFICATION PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR
 LEWIS IN REF B. (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW).

-- CONCURS IN THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THIS TEXT BE
 SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT.

-- FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT, THE SIGNED
 ORIGINAL BE HAND CARRIED TO ISRAEL FOR DELIVERY BY
 MCFARLANE AND LEWIS.

3. FOLLOWING IS THE MODIFICATION RECOMMENDED BY
 AMBASSADOR LEWIS: THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE
 MCFARLANE DRAFT SHOULD BE REWORDED AS FOLLOWS:

-- QUOTE. IN LIGHT OF THE VERY DELICATE SITUATION IN
 -- BEIRUT, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT A STATEMENT BY
 -- YOUR GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSAL MADE
 -- BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT BUT
 -- INDEED TRULY URGENT IF WE ARE TO STAY ON COURSE TOWARD
 -- OUR COMMON GOALS OF OBTAINING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
 -- WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLC FORCES FROM LEBANON AND
 -- THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT YOU HAVE
 -- CONCLUDED WITH LEBANON. WHILE SOME ALTERNATE LANGUAGE
 -- CAN PERHAPS BE FOUND, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IS TO
 -- REINFORCE MORE CONCRETELY AND SPECIFICALLY THE DECLA-

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F98-008/1#28
 BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

STATE 230014

-- RATIONS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS.
-- UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN
-- PERSUASIVE IN CHANGING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN LEBANON
-- THAT THE IMPENDING REDEPLOYMENT OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE
-- FORCES WILL CULMINATE IN PARTITION. UNQUOTE

((THE REMAINDER OF THE TEXT SHOULD STAND AS IN REF A))

4. PLEASE ADVISE STATE OPERATIONS CENTER WHAT WE CAN DO
TO ASSIST MOST RAPID POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF SIGNED
ORIGINAL. DAM

BT

#0014

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

STATE 230014

~~SECRET~~

STATE 230016

Ø9) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

ID
IVZCZCBL099Ø
JO RUEHBL
DE RUEHC #ØØ16 227Ø4Ø5
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 15Ø4ØØZ AUG 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 94ØØ
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9514
INFO RUEHLC/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 8721

LOC: DISK 14 675
15 AUG 83 0404
CN: Ø7345
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 230016 TOSEC Ø8ØØ12

NODIS

E.O. 12356DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREP, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER
TO PM BEGIN

REFS: A) BEIRUT 891Ø B) TEL AVIV 1Ø999
C) STATE 23ØØ14

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT AND JUDGE CLARK IN NEW ORLEANS HAVE READ AND APPROVED TEXT PROPOSED BY MCFARLANE AS AMENDED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND AUTHORIZE ITS DELIVERY IMMEDIATELY. WE ASSUME THAT MCFARLANE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ITS DELIVERY. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE HAND CARRIED TO JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV BY MOST RAPID AVAILABLE MEANS. DAM

BT
#ØØ16

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

STATE 230016

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/#29

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

ACTION CG INFO DP1 VIP-5 7

VZCZCJM1922
OO RUEHJM
DE RUEHC #1099 2272353
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 152330Z AUG 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9411
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9529
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9113

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-0081, #30

BY: CJ NARA, DATE 4/19/26

16-AUG-83
TOR: 06:21
CN: 25957
CHRG: PROG
DIST: NODV

BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 231099

NODIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED LETTER
TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

REF: A. TEL AVIV 11001, B. BEIRUT 8936

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN VIEW OF KIMCHE'S WILLINGNESS TO REOPEN DISCUSSIONS ON A STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL (REFTEL A), AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FOR USE AT HIS DISCRETION. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW FINAL TEXT OF LETTER DATED AUGUST 15, ORIGINAL OF WHICH IS BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MENACHEM:

I UNDERSTAND FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DOES NOT AGREE IN THE NECESSITY OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR SENSE OF PROCESS AND MOVEMENT -- OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. -IN LIGHT OF THE VERY DELICATE SITUATION IN BEIRUT, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT A STATEMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSAL MADE BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT BUT INDEED TRULY URGENT IF WE ARE TO STAY ON COURSE TOWARD OUR COMMON GOALS OF OBTAINING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT YOU HAVE CONCLUDED WITH LEBANON. WHILE SOME ALTERNATE LANGUAGE CAN PERHAPS BE FOUND, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IS TO REINFORCE MORE CONCRETELY AND SPECIFICALLY THE DECLARATIONS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MADE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN PERSUASIVE IN CHANGING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN LEBANON THAT THE IMPENDING REDEPLOYMENT OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES WILL CULMINATE IN PARTITION.

YOU AND I BOTH UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING

PRESERVATION COPY

AND STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT OF AMIN GEMAYEL. I URGE STRONGLY THAT YOU RECONSIDER THE MATTER OF A STATEMENT. WE ARE AT A CRUCIAL WATERSHED, AND HISTORY WILL NOT JUDGE US KINDLY IF WE FAIL TO ACT DECISIVELY TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO RESTORE STABILITY IN LEBANON.

IN MY VIEW, WHAT IS AT STAKE IS BOTH ACHIEVING POSITIVE PROGRESS IN LEBANON AND SHOWING THE WORLD THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IS THE ROAD TO PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. I HOPE THAT WE MAY CONTINUE TO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION TOWARD THESE AFFIRMATIVE RESULTS.

WITH WARM REGARDS, SINCERELY, RON END TEXT.

4. FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE: SALUTATION CHANGED FROM "DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER" TO "DEAR MENACHEM" AND CLOSE FROM "RONALD REAGAN" TO "RON" TO CONFORM WITH PAST PRACTICE AND PER CONFIRMATION FROM EMBASSY TEL AVIV.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

BT
#1399

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

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(6) ACTION POL INFO AMB DCM ROSS PM CHRON

AFXMVZCZCBL0123
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHC #1329 2280216
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160102Z AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9423
BT
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 231329~~

LOC: DISK 01 173
16 AUG 83 0240
CN: 07477
CHRG: PROG
DIST: POL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, LE, US
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL (SS NO.8324575)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT
REAGAN TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL IS
BEING SENT BY POUCH.

BEGIN TEXT.

AUGUST 8, 1983
HIS EXCELLENCY AMIN GEMAYEL
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
BEIRUT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IT WAS A SPECIAL PLEASURE FOR ME TO WELCOME YOU TO THE
WHITE HOUSE AGAIN AS A TRUE FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES.
I WAS GRATIFIED BY OUR CONSULTATIONS ON A NUMBER OF
SUBJECTS. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO AN INDEPENDENT AND
SOVEREIGN LEBANON, FREE OF EXTERNAL FORCES. MY
GOVERNMENT SHARES THIS ULTIMATE GOAL WITH THE LEBANESE
PEOPLE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK CLOSELY
WITH YOU IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.

MRS. REAGAN ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HER WARM THANKS FOR THE
SET OF ORGANDY TABLE LINENS WHICH YOU BROUGHT FOR HER.
SHE DEEPLY APPRECIATES THE FRIENDSHIP THAT PROMPTED THIS
EXQUISITE HANDCRAFTED GIFT.

WITH OUR BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,
RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT.

2. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

BT
#1329

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PRESERVATION COPY

(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

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 OO RUEHBL
 DE RUEHC #1398 2280259
 ZNY SSSSS ZZE
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 TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9426
 BT

LOC: DISK 01 187
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 CN: 07483
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: ROSS

S E C R E T STATE 231398

NODIS
 FOR MCFARLANE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, LE, US
 SUBJECT: STRATEGIC THINKING ON LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 8930

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND YOUR PROPOSALS FOR BREAKING THE IMPASSE. I HAVE ASKED THAT NICK CHAIR AN INTERAGENCY MEETING IN THE DEPARTMENT TOMORROW MORNING TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSALS. WE CAN ANTICIPATE SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT WILL BE RAISED IN THIS PROCESS.

3. A MAJOR QUESTION, OF COURSE, WILL BE THE PROPOSED ROLES-FOR THE MNF IN THE "PACIFICATION OF THE SHUF" AND IN "DETECTING SYRIAN INTERVENTION":

-- COULD NOT UNTSO ITSELF PROVIDE "OBSERVERS" TO ACCOMPANY THE LAF INTO THE SHUF? UNTSO OBSERVERS WERE ACTIVE IN BEIRUT LAST SUMMER, AND PERHAPS THEY CAN BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH AN IDF HANDOVER OF POSITIONS TO THE LAF.

-- WHAT EXACTLY WOULD THE ROLE OF THE MNF "TRAINERS" BE IN THE FORTIFIED LAF POSITIONS TURNED OVER BY THE IDF? COULD PERSONNEL UNDER AN OMC UMBRELLA WORK IN THIS ROLE? WOULD THEY HAVE TO BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO LAF UNITS?

4. ON OTHER ISSUES:

--WOULD A STRONGLY WORDED GOL DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIANS ACCOMPLISH VERY MUCH AT THIS POINT? WOULD A DEMARCHE BY THE SAUDIS BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND/OR LESS LIKELY TO RUN THE RISK OF SYRIAN REJECTION?

-- IN SUCH A DEMARCHE, WHAT WOULD BE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MATN?

-- WOULD A LEBANESE REQUEST FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT CAME AFTER A SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF?

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #31

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

-- WE HAVE ALREADY OBTAINED DOD AUTHORIZATION TO USE U.S. AIRCRAFT TO FLY WALID JUMBLATT TO ANY MEETING WITH AMIN. WOULD A MEETING ON A SIXTH FLEET SHIP PUT AMIN IN AN EMBARRASSING SITUATION? SHOULD WE PUSH FOR JUMBLATT TO COME ALL THE WAY TO BEIRUT, IF NECESSARY UNDER OUR PROTECTION?

-- SINCE HUSSEIN HAS HIMSELF RAISED DOUBTS THAT AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE MUCH IN THE WAY OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, IS THERE ANYTHING NEW THAT YOU BELIEVE WOULD MAKE SUCH A SUMMIT WORTHWHILE?

-- IN THE SAME REGARD, ANY LE ANESE INITIATIVE IN THE UN WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE BROADER THAN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. MIGHT NOT SUCH A UN INITIATIVE BACKFIRE?

5. ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THESE OR OTHER QUESTIONS YOU CAN ANTICIPATE GIVEN THE PLAYERS INVOLVED (WHOM YOU KNOW WELL) WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZED. DAM

BT
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(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

READ

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INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9438
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9552
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4690
RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1005

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CN: 07607
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 232256

EXDIS FOR MCFARLANE FROM ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS PREL, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DEALING WITH THE
PERCEPTION OF PARTITION

REF: JERUSALEM 2958

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE TWO COURSES OF ACTION PROPOSED IN REFTTEL AND AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE IDEA OF A WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGESTED. WE THINK THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE YOU SHOULD EXPLORE THE STATEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS IN YOUR MEETINGS TOMORROW MORNING TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY WOULD BE FULLY ON-BOARD AND NOT CONTEST IT ONCE IT IS ISSUED. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, WILL BE THE LEBANESE REACTION AND WHETHER THE STATEMENT WILL SERVE THE NEEDS OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THEREFORE, BEFORE GIVING FINAL CONSIDERATION TO THE TEXT OF SUCH A STATEMENT WE WOULD WANT TO HAVE YOUR JUDGMENT THAT THIS MEETS WITH ISRAELI AND LEBANESE CONCURRENCE.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#32

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM ~~222~~ CHRON

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OO RUEHBL
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9128
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9439
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9554

LOC: DISK 01 581
17 AUG 83 0042
CN: 07608
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 232290

NODIS
FOR AMB. MCFARLANE FROM THE ACT)NG SECRETARY

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGY FOR
LEBANON

REFS: (A) JERUSALEM 2956 (B) STATE 231398 (C) BEIRUT 8930

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS WE RAISED LAST NIGHT ARRIVED NOT LONG AFTER THE INTERAGENCY MEETING CHAIRED BY NICK ENDED. THE CLARIFICATIONS YOU HAVE PROVIDED ARE VERY USEFUL AND IN SOME INSTANCES RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO CONCERNS RAISED DURING THE MEETING. THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISAGREEMENT OVER THE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. IN MANY CASES, AS YOU INDICATE, THESE PROPOSALS ARE LARGELY A MATTER OF TIMING. AS YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE, MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE VARIOUS ROLES YOU HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE MNF. I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW THAT, FRANKLY, THERE WERE A LOT OF QUESTIONS ON THIS ISSUE.

3. IN THIS REGARD, IO WILL BE SENDING SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF USING UNTSO "OBSERVERS" IN THE SHUF AND WINNING TIMELY UN APPROVAL FOR SUCH A ROLE, ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGESTED. MEANWHILE, OUR LEGAL AFFAIRS OFFICE IS STUDYING SOME OF THE WAR POWERS IMPLICATIONS OF THE VARIOUS MNF ROLES, AND DOD IN COORDINATION WITH PM IS FRAMING SOME MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW U.S. FORCES MIGHT BE USED. ALL OF THESE STUDIES ARE AIMED AT ENGAGING WEINBERGER AND SHULTZ IN THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED, PLUS OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS, AND POSSIBLY THEREAFTER A DECISION MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT.

4. A GENERAL CONSENSUS EMERGED DURING THE MEETING THAT WE SHOULD ASK YOU WHAT ROLE FOR THE MNF IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL LAF REDEPLOYMENT IN THE SHUF. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE PRIORITIES OF USING THE MNF AS "OBSERVERS", "TRAINERS/ADVISERS" AND ON PATROLS IN THE SHUF.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 #33
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

STATE 232290

5. INPUT MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. DAM

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STATE 232290

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(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM ~~AMB~~ CHRON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9129
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9443
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9558

LOC: DISK 01 647
17 AUG 83 0229
CN: 07623
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 232434

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UN, LE, XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE USE OF UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF

REF: JERUSALEM 2956

1. (ENTIRE TEXT - ~~SECRET~~)

2. WE AGREE THAT, IN ORDER TO BOLSTER THE LAF IN THE SHUF AND ASSURE THE LOCAL DRUZE POPULATION AS THE IDF WITHDRAWS, USING UNTSO OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE IDF-LAF CHANGEOVER AND ITS AFTERMATH HAS MUCH IN ITS FAVOR. SHOWING THE UN FLAG IN THIS WAY WOULD GIVE INTERNATIONAL BACKING TO THE MANEUVER. FROM THE U.S. DOMESTIC STANDPOINT, THERE WOULD BE AN ADVANTAGE TO USING UNTSO OVER THE MNF WITH LL THE CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT THAT THE MNF ENTAILS. UNTSO PERSONNEL ARE TRAINED FOR THE OBSERVER JOB, UNLIKE THE MNF TROOPS. WE ASSUME THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY FROM THE UNTSO MANPOWER AVAILABLE IN BEIRUT OR ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION.
3. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL (SYG) WOULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT SPECIFIC SECURITY COUNCIL BACKING OF SOME KIND. WHILE THE SYG

ENJOYS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYMENTS OF UNTSO PERSONNEL, THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE A NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL DEPARTURE USING UNTSO IN A SITUATION HAVING HEAVY OVERTONES OF INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICS. SOME WOULD ASSERT THAT UNTSO WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN A "PARTITION" OF LEBANON AND RATIFYING AN ISRAELI PRESENCE SOUTH OF THE SHUF. WE ALSO RECALL THAT ABOUT NINE MONTHS AGO WE DISCUSSED WITH THE SYG REDEPLOYING UNIFIL NORTH OF ITS PRESENT AREA OF OPERATIONS. HE TOLD US HE WOULD NOT APPROVE SUCH REDEPLOYMENT, EVEN IF A FELICITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE ALLOWED HIM TO DO SO, WITHOUT CHECKING WITH THE UNSC, ESPECIALLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS.

4. THEREFORE, THE SYG WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THAT THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING UNTSO AND LAST YEAR'S

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 7534
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING UN OBSERVERS IN AND AROUND BEIRUT DO NOT GIVE HIM AN ADEQUATE MANDATE TO DEPLOY UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF. AT THE VERY LEAST, WE THINK THE SYG WOULD REQUIRE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE UNSC FOLLOWED BY A LETTER FROM THE UNSC PRESIDENT TO THE SYG INDICATING THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSED MOVE. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE SYG AS WELL AS THE UNSC WOULD ALSO WANT ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSAL FROM ALL THE MAJOR PARTIES ON THE GROUND.

5. EVEN SO, CONVINCING THE SYG AND MOST UNSC MEMBERS THAT THIS IS NOT SIMPLY INSERTING THE UN INTO THE INTERNAL LEBANESE BUZZSAW MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT. WE WOULD HAVE TO CAST THE DEPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY RATHER THAN INTERNAL LEBANESE POLICING. MONITORING THE IDF WITHDRAWAL AND HELPING TO RESTORE GOL SOVEREIGNTY ARE GOOD STARTING POINTS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR UNSC CONCERN IN THESE REALMS IN NUMEROUS UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

6. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE UNSC WOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT AND WOULD PROBABLY BE GUIDED BY SYRIA'S ATTITUDE TO A LARGE EXTENT. THE SYRIAN POSITION ON THE ROLE OF UNTSO IN SUCH A SITUATION IS EXTREMELY UNCLEAR. DAMASCUS WOULD NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF BOLSTERING THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT, BUT IF THE IDF PULLBACK COULD BE PICTURED AS THE BEGINNING OF FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE SYRIANS MIGHT ACQUIESCE, PARTICULARLY IF WALID JUMBLATT WERE ON-BOARD.

7. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE THOUGHTS, AND ALSO REGARDING THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

-- WOULD THE GOL BE DISPOSED TO REQUEST UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF? ANY FORMAL INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE GOL, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY PLAY A HEAVY ROLE IN CONSULTATIONS WITH URQUHART AND WITH OTHER UNSC MEMBERS.

-- HOW LONG WOULD AN UNTSO DEPLOYMENT HAVE TO LAST IN THE SHUF? A UN PRESENCE MERELY TO MONITOR THE INITIAL IDF-LAF CHANGEOVER WOULD PROBABLY NOT REASSURE THE LOCAL DRUZE, BUT A LENGTHY STAY WOULD MAKE THE UN MISSION LOOK MORE LIKE INTERNAL POLICING THAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING. WHAT IS THE PROPER BALANCE?

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9464

INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9140

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9584

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 233642

LOC: DISK 02 334

18 AUG 83 0229

CN: 07784

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

NOLIS

FOR AMB. MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, LE, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSIONS: LEGAL

CONSIDERATIONS AND DOD QUESTIONS ON POSSIBLE MNF ROLES

REFS: (A) STATE 232290 (B) STATE 232434 (C) JERUSALEM
2956 (D) BEIRUT 8930 (E) STATE 2247091. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PROMISED REF A, ANALYSIS (REF B) HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF AS WELL AS SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THIS POSSIBILITY. BY SEPTEL WE ARE PROVIDING OUR THOUGHTS ON THE RECONCILIATION ISSUE. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH YOUR MNF PROPOSALS HAVE RAISED IN DOD AND THE DEPARTMENT. WE REGRET HAVING TO RESPOND TO YOUR PROPOSED STRATEGY WITH SO MANY QUERIES, BUT BELIEVE ANSWERS ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PROCEED FURTHER.

3. THE FOLLOWING DOD-STATE COORDINATED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MNF ROLES YOU HAVE PROPOSED ARE PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WILL BE A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT OVER THE SHUF AMONG THE LEBANESE AND THAT THERE WILL BE CLOSE LAF-IDF COORDINATION, THE BEGINNING OF WHICH WE

WERE PLEASED TO SEE IN YOUR REPORT OF THE TANNOUS-LEVY MEETING. THE QUESTIONS ALSO ASSUME THAT WHEN REFERRING TO THE MNF, ALL THE CONTRIBUTING NATIONS' CONTINGENTS ARE INCLUDED, AND THAT THE USE OF U.S. FORCES IS ENVISIONED IN EACH CASE.

4. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE MNF ENVISIONED IN THE STRATEGY PRESENTED REFS C AND D MAY REQUIRE THE ADMINISTRATION TO SEEK AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION AND/OR MAY RAISE ISSUES UNDER THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION. REF E PROVIDED GENERAL GUIDANCE CONCERNING WHAT CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. CONTINGENT IN THE MNF WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATION AND/OR WOULD RAISE WAR POWERS CONSIDERATIONS. YOUR ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF THE

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NLS F98-0081 #35
BY 107 NARA, DATE 1/5/02

FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE A MORE REFINED ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION AND THE WAR POWERS IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGY, AS WELL AS ALLOW DOD TO ANALYZE THE FEASIBILITY OF USING THE USMNF IN THE PROPOSED NEW ROLES.

5. FOR EACH OF THE THREE SUGGESTED MNF ROLES--AS OBSERVERS, TRAINERS, AND ON PATROL IN THE SHUF--WE NEED ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING:

-- WOULD USE OF U.S. TROOPS FOR THIS FUNCTION REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. TROOPS IN LEBANON? HOW LARGE AN INCREASE?

-- HOW LONG WOULD THE U.S. FORCES FULFILLING THIS FUNCTION REMAIN? A LIMITED, DEFINED PERIOD? INDEFINITELY?

6. WE ALSO NEED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SPECIFICALLY RAISED BY EACH OF THE PROPOSED ROLES.

A. MNF AS "OBSERVERS" TO ACCOMPANY THE LAF AS IT RELIEVES IDF POSITIONS AND CHECKPOINTS THROUGHOUT ALAYH AND THE SHUF:

-- WHAT PRECISELY WOULD THE OBSERVERS' FUNCTION BE? WOULD THEY MERELY PROVIDE A "PRESENCE" BY STANDING BY? WOULD THEY MAN CHECKPOINTS? (FYI: WE BELIEVE USMC TROOPS ARE NOT QUALIFIED, AS UNMO'S ARE, TO PERFORM AS OBSERVERS. END FYI.)

-- WHERE IN ALAYH AND/OR THE SHUF WOULD THE U.S. TROOPS OPERATE?

B. MNF AS "TRAINERS" WITH LAF UNITS AT THE FORTIFIED
SECRET 3

POSITIONS TURNED OVER BY THE IDF:

-- WHAT WOULD THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TRAINERS BE? IS THIS A EUPHEMISM FOR ADVISORS? WOULD THEY ACTUALLY BE GIVING REAL-TIME ADVICE TO COMMANDERS OF LAF UNITS? IF NOT, IN WHAT AREAS AND AT WHAT LEVEL OF COMMAND IS "TRAINING" REQUIRED?

-- WOULD TRAINERS NEED TO BE ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC UNITS OR COULD THEY MAKE BRIEF VISITS TO APPROPRIATE LAF UNITS TO PROVIDE ADVICE AS NEEDED?

-- WHAT WOULD THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT BE?

C. REGULAR MNF PATROLS ON THE STRATEGIC ARTERIES IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF:

-- FROM WHERE WOULD THE PATROLS OPERATE? WHAT AREA OF OPERATION IS PROPOSED? WOULD THERE BE CHECKPOINTS OR B;SES ESTABLISHED ALONG THE STRATEGIC ARTERIES?

-- WHAT IS MEANT BY STRATEGIC ARTERIES, ESPECIALLY IF OTHER THAN THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, BEIRUT-SIDON ROAD OR THE COASTAL HIGHWAY TO TRIPOLI?

-- THE USE OF THE TERM "PATROL" DESCRIBES AN ACTIVE MILITARY MISSION, UNDER WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT ARISE WHERE THE MNF PATROLS COULD BE EXPECTED TO FIRE ON LEBANESE MILITIAS AND/OR POPULACE. BEYOND THE UNQUESTIONED RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, ARE YOU PROPOSING ACTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, COUNTER ATTACK OR SEARCH AND DESTROY?

7. FYI: IF PATROLLING BY THE MNF IN ALAY AND THE SHUF IS ENVISIONED, IT MIGHT REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT REPOSITIONING OF COMBAT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO SUPPORT PATROLLING ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS PROPOSED. END FYI.

8. AS NOTED REF E, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, WHATEVER CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. MNF CONTINGENT ARE CONTEMPLATED, PROMPT AND FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS WILL BE VITAL TO OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, AND, IF NECESSARY, LEGISLATION.
COMMAND? IF NOT, IN WHAT AREAS?

-- GIVEN THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM THAT THE LAF MUST DO THE JOB THEMSELVES, MIGHT NOT THE PROPOSED USE OF THE MNF CAUSE THE LAF TO RELAX AND LET THE "OTHER GUYS" DO IT?

-- GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF AN ENLARGED MNF ROLE, WHAT IS THE MINIMUM ROLE YOU CONSIDER ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS?

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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ACTION CG INFO DPO VIP-5 7

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TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5496
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9484
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9156
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4930
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7784
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4730
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3090
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9605
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19-AUG-83
TOR: 08:40
CN: 27459
CHRG: PROG
DIST: EXDV

~~SECRET~~ STATE 234683

EXDIS

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, LE, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE OF AUGUST
14

REFS: (A) AMMAN 7070; (B) BEIRUT 8931

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER SOONEST FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN.

BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING YOUR AUGUST 12 MEETING WITH MR. WALID JUMBLATT AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BUD MCFARLANE JOINS ME IN THANKING YOU FOR YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT AND WISE COU SEL IN SEEKING A PR MPT RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND STABILITY. BUD'S MEETING WITH YOU IN AMMAN WAS ESPECIALLY USEFUL, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE.

WE LOOK TO YOU, HIS MAJESTY KING FAHD, AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK FOR CONTINUING GUIDANCE. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH YOURS, AND WE MADE IT CLEAR TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISO S, THAT OUR COMMITMENT IS FIRM AND STEADFAST, NOT JUST TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AS AN INDIVIDUAL, BUT TO HIM AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. MR. JUMBLATT IS IMPORTANT IN THE NEAR TERM AS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WORKS TO PREPARE FOR THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALAYH AND THE SHUF, BUT AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT -- AND I AGREE COMPLETELY -- THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MUST CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORKING WITH ALL THE CONFESSIONS.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/#36
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

RUD IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE POLITICAL PLAN TO REINFORCE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE PERCEPTION AND REALITY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO OUR SHARED GOAL OF STRENGTHENING THE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. THE REVITALIZATION AND CREDIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE INTERNAL CONSENSUS WILL IN TURN SHOW SYRIA THAT ITS INTRANSIGENCE IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WILL ALSO DEMONSTRATE TO SYRIA THAT IT MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THEREFORE AGREE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS SYRIA HAD PROMISED. ACCORDING TO OUR LATEST INFORMATION, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS NOW SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING MEETING WITH MR. JUNBLATT AND OTHER CONFESSIOANAL LEADERS. OBVIOUSLY, YOUR ADVICE IS HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT IN BEIRUT AND HAS REINFORCED OUR OWN REPEATED URGINGS TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

I THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR VERY HELPFUL MESSAGE. WE WANT TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AS THE SITUATION EVOLVES, AND ESPECIALLY ON WAYS IN WHICH THE ARAB CONSENSUS BEHIND OUR SHARED GOALS CAN BEST BE MADE APPARENT AND EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ

END TEXT

2. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM
BT
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Return to wire file

ACTION CG INFO DPO POL RF VIP-5 9

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P 182210Z AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 7796
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6061
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 9612
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 9495
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 9161
BT

19-AUG-83
TOR: 11:20
CN: 27538
CHRG: PROG
DIST: POLV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 234980

JERUSALEM FOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, SY, US, ICRC
SUBJECT: SYRIAN PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT TO ICRC IDENTIFICATION OF ISRAELI WAR DEAD

REF: DAMASCUS 6257

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON AUGUST 18, 1983, FORMER US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TELEPHONED AMERICAN RED CROSS PRESIDENT RICHARD SCHUBERT TO INFORM HIM THAT, IN RESPONSE TO CARTER'S AUGUST 17, 1983 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION PRESSURING HIM FOR ACTION, SYRIAN PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD AGREED TO ALLOW THE ICRC TO "IDENTIFY AND VERIFY" THE FOUR DECEASED ISRAELI POWS WHOSE ALLEGED NAMES, GIVEN BY THE SYRIANS TO THE ISRAELIS, PROVED TO BE THE NAMES OF PERSONS WHO ARE ALIVE AND ACCOUNTED FOR.

3. CARTER ASKED THE AMERICAN RED CROSS TO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO BRING THIS AGREEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ICRC. MR. SCHUBERT TELEPHONED THE INFORMATION TO ICRC-PRESIDENT HAY AT GENEVA, WHO SAID HE WILL INFORM THE ICRC AT DAMASCUS. MR. HAY APOLOGIZED THAT HE HAS BEEN

ON HOLIDAY AND WAS NOT ABREAST OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS MATTER.

4. WHEN HE INFORMED US OF THIS EXCHANGE WE TOLD THE AMERICAN RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE IN CONFIDENCE THAT ARRANGEMENTS TO AFFECT EXHUMATION BY THE ICRC ARE ALREADY GOING FORWARD.

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NLS F98-008/1737
BY ADJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESENT NON COPY

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ~~47~~¹⁴~~76~~ LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS5 POL PM CHRON

EMKVVZCZCBL0703

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHC #5811 2311512

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O O 191507Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEBJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 9173

INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8848

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9508

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9629

BT

S E C R E T STATE 235811

LOC: DISK 03 319

19 AUG 83 1518

CN: 08039

CHRG: PROG

DIST: EXDI

EXDIS

EO. 12356

DECL:OADR

TAGS:

PREL SOPN US LE IS

SUBJECT:

U.S. STATEMENT ON LEBANON

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS THE FINAL TEXT OF DRAFT STATEMENT WITH YOUR PHONED REVISIONS.

3. BEGIN TEXT: FOUR WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON -- THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 7 WAS A FIRST STEP TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING

INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL WITHDRAWAL AND FULL AUTHORITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FACES IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFSSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL-

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

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WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THE STATEMENTS OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES.

THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND

ISRAEL WILL COORDINATE THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH-SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY, EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY
- END TEXT. - - - -

5. FEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9163

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 235303

19-AUG-83
TOR: 11:36
CN: 27549
CHR: PROG
DIST: NODV

NODIS, FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

C O R R E C R E D C O P Y (UPGRADED TO NODIS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, XF, XT, US, JA, AS

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: DEMARCHE TO ALLIES

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8930 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 232436 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PER REFTELS, DEPARTMENT HAS PREPARED INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEMARCHE TO NATO ALLIES PLUS IRELAND (KEY UNIFIL PARTICIPANT), AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND JAPAN. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE OR SUGGESTED CHANGES IN TEXT (BEGINS PARA. 3) AND PREFERENCE REGARDING TIMING.

3. BEGIN TEXT: AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS NOW TWO WEEKS INTO HIS MIDDLE EAST MISSION, AND HAS COMPLETED INITIAL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WITH THE KEY REGIONAL ACTORS. HE HAS ESTABLISHED THAT SYRIA REMAINS INTRANSIGENT IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND IN ITS REFUSAL TO A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WITH ISRAEL. THE IMPENDING ISRAELI REDEPL YMENT FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF, WHICH REPRESENTS BOTH A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY AND A REAL DANGER TO THE GOL, HAS FORCED MCFARLANE TO INCREASINGLY FOCUS ON THIS IMMINENT EVENT. A SUCCESSFUL LAF ENTRY INTO THE AREA WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE AUTHORITY

AND CAPABILITY OF THE GOL AND LAF, AND ENCOURAGE THE SEVERAL LEBANESE FACTIONS TO SUPPORT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT; A BREAKDOWN OF ORDER IN THE SHUF, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A SEVERE SETBACK TO BEIRUT AND COULD CALL THE GOL'S LEGITIMACY FURTHER INTO QUESTION.

4. THE US BELIEVES THAT IT IS NOW CRUCIAL TO ENSURE THAT THE INITIAL ISRAELI REDEPL YMENT AND SUBSEQUENT LAF ENTRY INTO ALAYH AND THE SHUF GOES SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. THIS WILL REQUIRE COOPERATION ON THE PART OF BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS, AS WELL AS SYRIAN RESTRAINT IN FURTHER EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE AND EMBARRASS THE GOL. WE ARE NOW CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS THESE ENDS. SPECIFICALLY, WE ARE SEEKING TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE SEVERAL LEBANESE FACTIONS, TO MAXIMIZE LEBANESE-ISRAELI COORDINATION, TO

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

FACILITATE THE ENTRY OF THE LAF INTO ALAYH AND THE SHUF, TO DETER FURTHER SYRIAN DIRECT OR INDIRECT INTERVENTION, AND TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IS SEEN AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS AND THAT IT WILL ESTABLISH MOMENTUM FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT ALL THE PARTIES TO THE LEBANESE CONFLICT ARE AWARE THAT OUR EUROPEAN AND OTHER ALLIES STRONGLY SUPP RT BOTH OUR EFFORTS AND GOALS, AND REMAIN ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ACTIONS BY ANY PARTY THAT MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER DESTABILIZATION OF THE GOL OR TO DISRUPTION OF THE REDEPLOYMENT/WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD THEREFORE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL TO BRIEF THEM ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MCFARLANE MISSION AND TO SEEK THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS, UTILIZING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A BASIC TWO-TRACK STRATEGY. IN SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA, HE HAS SOUGHT FLEXIBILITY IN THE SYRIAN POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HE HAS WORKED TO BOLSTER GOL EFFORTS TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG THE VARIOUS LEBANESE FACTIONS AND TO COORDINATE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL LAF DEPLOYMENT IN THE SHUF.

-- MCFARLANE REPORTS THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF AN EARLY SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS MAY, IN FACT, SIMPLY BE STALLING FOR TIME WHILE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL.

-- THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCE WILL IMMINENTLY REDEPLOY ITS FORCES FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF. WE HAVE SOUGHT, BUT HAVE NOT YET OBTAINED, A PUBLIC COMMITMENT THAT THIS IS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. REDEPLOYMENT WILL ESTABLISH A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR THE GEMEYAL GOVERNMENT. SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF INTO THE AREA WILL BE SEEN AS DEMONSTRATION OF THE AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITY OF THE GOL AND THE LAF, WHILE A BREAKDOWN OF ORDER IN THE SHUF WILL WEAKEN FURTHER THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES.

-- TO STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY OF THE GOL TO SUCCESSFULLY MEET THIS CHALLENGE, AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE IS WORKING STRENUOUSLY TO ENCOURAGE DISCUSSIONS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SEVERAL LEBANESE FACTIONS. ALL LEBANESE RECOGNIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION, AND WE HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF JORDAN, EGYPT, AND SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS EFFORT.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SYRIA WILL ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE

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FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SEVERAL LEBANESE FACTIONS. ALL LEBANESE RECOGNIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION, AND WE HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF JORDAN, EGYPT, AND SAUDI ARABIA IN THIS EFFORT.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SYRIA WILL ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER DISCREDIT THE GOL THROUGH DIRECT OR, MORE LIKELY, INDIRECT EFFORTS TO PREVENT A SUCCESSFUL LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SHUF AND TO FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION. THEY WILL BE LIMITED IN THEIR ABILITY TO DO SO BY LEBANESE PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE GOL TO MAKE A STRONG DEMARCHE TO THE SARG WARNING AGAINST ANY SUCH INTERVENTION. WE WILL REINFORCE THE GOL MESSAGE, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WOULD VIEW SYRIAN INTERFERENCE MOST GRAVELY.

-- WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS STRONGLY. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD REQUEST THAT YOU MAKE VERY CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS YOUR OPPOSITION TO THEIR ACTIONS WHICH DESTABILIZE THE GOL. YOU MIGHT EMPHASIZE TO THE SARG THAT REGARDLESS OF THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, THIS REDEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ARAB SOIL. A SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF INTO THE AREA WILL BE A STRONG INCENTIVE TO ISRAEL TO MAKE FURTHER WITHDRAWALS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS OR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. FAILURE OF A PEACEFUL TRANSITION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO CIVIL WAR IN THE SHUF AND TO THE DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON THAT THE SARG MAINTAINS - THAT IT OPPOSES.

-- WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EFFORTS YOU MIGHT MAKE AMONG YOUR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE GOL AND THE LEBANESE FACTIONS TO STRESS TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO URGE THEM TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DO SO.

-- WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEIR OWN ACTIONS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS, IF PROPERLY PHRASED, COULD HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON HOW THIS REDEPLOYMENT IS VIEWED IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE, AND ON THE SUCCESS OF THE GOL'S EFFORTS TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY TO THE AREAS VACATED. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO MAKE A SIMILAR POINT TO THE GOL.

6. FOR LONDON, PARIS, AND ROME. WE HAVE BEGUN PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF LEBANESE REQUESTS TO ASSOCIATE MNF UNITS WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE SHUF. IF OUR INTERNAL REVIEW INDICATES THAT THE USG SHOULD SUPPORT A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, WE WILL IMMEDIATELY CONSULT WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD WELCOME THE VIEWS OF OTHER MNF GOVERNMENTS. DAM

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(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 3769

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9520

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 236387

LOC: DISK 03 737

20 AUG 83 2225

CN: 08135

CHRG: PR03

DIST: EXDI

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UNRWA, LE, US

SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR DILLON TO UNRWA

REF: BEIRUT 8922

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE INFORM MR. RYDBECK THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AMBASSADOR DILLON HAS BEEN OFFERED AND HAS ACCEPTED APPOINTMENT AS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF UNRWA, A POSITION HE WILL ASSUME BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

3. IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRIES, PLEASE DO NOT COMMENT ON WHO WILL REPLACE AMBASSADOR DILLON IN BEIRUT. STANDARD PRESS GUIDANCE IS AS FOLLOWS: "AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON REPORTS SPECULATING ABOUT PERSONNEL MATTERS."

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATE 236387

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 11/22/97

~~SECRET~~

STATE 236674

ACTION: DCM INFO: AMB/3

LOC: 38 164
20 AUG 83 0544
CN: 50668
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ZNC

VZCZCCRO974
OO RUEHGC
TF RUEHC #6674 2320125
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200119Z AUG 83 ZFF6
FM SFCSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9518
RUFHFG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4999
INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8849
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 236674

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

F.01 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: UNTSO, LF
SUBJ: POSSIBLY USE OF UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF:
DISCUSSION WITH UNDER SYG URQUHART

REF: BFIRUT 9118

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. NICK VF-IOTES RAISED THE IDEA OF USING UNTSO OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF WITH UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL URQUHART IN A PHONE CONVERSATION AUGUST 19. URQUHART WAS DISPOSED TO BE HELPFUL BUT SAID THE UN RESPONSE WAS "SLIGHTLY PROBLFMATICAL". HE NOTED THAT THE PLAN WOULD HAVE TO BE "LEGITIMIZED" WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SOME WAY. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING UNARMED UNTSO OBSERVERS INTO THE VOLATILE SHUF, AND HE WAS GREATLY RELIEVED WHEN NICK TOLD HIM THAT THE PLAN WAS PREDICATED ON A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GFMAYFL GOVERNMENT AND THE DRUZE. HE SAID THIS WAS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH THE PLAN WOULD WORK. HE ALSO STRESSSED TO NICK THAT, FROM A FORMAL STANDPOINT, A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REQUEST WOULD BE THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT.

3. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE URQUHART'S REACTION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ENCOURAGING TO ENABLE US TO GO AHEAD WITH FURTHER PLANNING ON THE UNTSO DEPLOYMENT. WE WILL DEVELOP THE GAME PLAN YOU REQUESTED AND INCORPORATE IT INTO COMPREHENSIVE ANSWER TO REFTEL. DAM

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#6674

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DECLASSIFIED
NLS 198-008/1 #41
BY 105 NARA DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

STATE 236674

(10) ACTION ROSS5 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

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DE RUEHC #6692/01 2320432

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FM SLCSTATE WASHDC

TO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 6323

RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 3405

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5527

RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2011

RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0521

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 3093

RUDKBBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 1762

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9256

RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2692

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5012

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7826

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4760

RUEHAKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1181

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2733

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8495

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5641

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0760

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2910

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 7132

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3118

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9584

RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 5627

RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 6418

RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 6304

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8055

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1950

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9526

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9662

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9187

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 236692

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/22/99

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS
MISSION

(C) WHITE HOUSE ISSUED AUGUST 19 STATEMENT CONTAINED PARA 2 BELOW ON CURRENT STATUS OF AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE'S AND FAIRBANKS' MISSION. STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO OUR THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON AND DESCRIBES HOW THE FORTHCOMING ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHUF IS A STEP TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN LEADING TO PARTITION AS SOME HAVE ALLEGED. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO BRING THIS STATEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, STRESSING THAT WE HOPE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE LEBANON CRISIS.

PRESERVATION COPY

(U) BEGIN TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS STATEMENT:

- FOUR WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON -- THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE AGREEMENT

CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 17 IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

- SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL WITHDRAWAL AND FULL AUTHORITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FACES IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

- IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES IN LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE OFFICIAL ISRAELI STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

- "IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

- "IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

- WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT; FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES.

- THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THESE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

- WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL COORDINATE THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH-SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY, EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

- WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. END TEXT

DAM

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#6692

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PRESERVATION COPY

ACTION: DCM INFO: AMB/3

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FM SFCSTAFF WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5020
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 237059

FOIA(b)(1)

LOC: 38 823
20 AUG 83 0659
CN: 50802
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ZNC



NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F98-00811 #42
By CS, NARA, Date 4/19/06

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MASS, CG, US
SUBJECT: U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M2008-098/12#
56632
BY AMJ NARA DATE 11/24/08

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT GEOFF KE;P'S SUGG:STION AND FOR BUD'S USE, WE TRANSMIT BELOW A CLEARED INTERAGENCY PAPER ON CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTION

WE ARE APPROACHING A CROSSROADS IN OUR STRATEGIC MILITARY COOPERATION WITH EGYPT. THE RAS BANAS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS (AND THE CONGRESS) ARE ENTERING A MAKE-OR-BREAK PHASE. OUR SUCCESS OR FAILURE WITH EITHER THE CONGRESS OR THE EGYPTIANS COULD AFFECT THE QUALITY OF OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REGION. IF THE EGYPTIANS REJECT OUR FINAL EFFORTS TO MEET THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT RAS BANAS OR ARE UNABLE TO CARRY OUT THEIR PART OF THE CONSTRUCTION, QUESTIONS WILL BE RAISED WITHIN THE USG ABOUT MUBARAK'S COMMITMENT TO A MEANINGFUL STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP. IF THE CONGRESS REJECTS OUR APPROACH TO MEETING EGYPTIAN CONCERNS AND CUTS OFF FUNDING FOR RAS BANAS, QUESTIONS WILL BE RAISED IN EGYPTIAN MINDS ABOUT WHETHER WE ARE INTERESTED IN DEALING WITH THEM AS EQUALS OR WISH A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP ONLY ON OUR TERMS. EITHER OF THESE OUTCOMES COULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE SUCCEED IN MOVING AHEAD WITH AN AGREED PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION AT RAS BANAS, WE WILL ACHIEVE OUR PRIMARY GOAL OF OBTAINING A USEFUL FACILITY AT A VITAL LOCATION IN THE REGION AND REINFORCE OUR STRATEGIC COOPERATION BY DEMONSTRATING WE CAN RESOLVE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AND REACH A WORKABLE SOLUTION.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT DESPITE THE RECENT DIFFICULTIES INVOLVING RAS BANAS, OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR

STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT HAVE CONTINUED. THE MOST NOTABLE EXAMPLE IS THE MONTH-LONG BRIGHT STAR 83 EXERCISE WHICH WILL BEGIN IN EARLY AUGUST. PRIZED FALCON, AN EXERCISE INVOLVING F-16'S FROM THE U.S., IS ALREADY UNDERWAY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TRANSITED THE PANAMA CANAL ON A NPW IN MID-JULY AS PART OF OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO WIN EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT FOR NPW TRANSITS OF THE SUEZ CANAL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DESPITE RECENT MEDIA PUBLICITY WHICH LED TO OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF THE MUBARAK GOVERNMENT. ALSO, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE PARTICIPATED WITH US IN EFFORTS TO DEFEND CHAD AGAINST A QADHAFI-SUPPORTED INVASION, AS WE COOPERATED EARLIER IN THE YEAR IN DEFENDING SUDAN.

THE FACT THAT THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ROUTINELY WHILE WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON RAS BANAS DEMONSTRATES BOTH THE RANGE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. OUR SHAPED POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS-ARE SO CRUCIAL TO REGIONAL STABILITY THAT WE MUST ENSURE THAT PROBLEMS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS RAS BANAS DO NOT UNDERMINE THE BROADER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP, BOTH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, SO THAT WE CAN REALIZE THAT GOAL.

RAS BANAS: NEXT STEPS

THE TOP PRIORITY NOW IN U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS IS TO RESOLVE THE RAS BANAS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES

AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF OUR ORIGINAL PLANS WITHOUT STRAINING RELATIONS WITH EGYPT OR THE CONGRESS. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WE MUST ACCOMPLISH THIS PRIOR TO THE HOUSE-SENATE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS BILL CONFERENCE, GIVEN HOUSE AND SENATE DISAGREEMENT ON WHETHER TO RESCIND ALL FY 83 RAS BANAS CONSTRUCTION FUNDS. THE JULY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS PRODUCED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH COULD MEET THIS GOAL AND HELPED WIN SENATE AGREEMENT TO RETAINING \$55 MILLION IN FY 83 MILCON FUNDS FOR RAS BANAS. HOWEVER, THE DETAILS STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT IN TECHNICAL-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS. EMBASSY OFFICERS, MEETING WITH GOE OFFICIALS IN CAIRO ON AUGUST 1, EXPLAINED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR REACHING AGREEMENT ON A PLAN OF JOINT CONSTRUCTION BEFORE THE MILCON CONFERENCE. THE EGYPTIANS AGREED THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES ARE TECHNICAL AND HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO

MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO SATISFY CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND WORK OUT CONSTRUCTION DETAILS. WE HOPE TO SEND A TEAM OF PLANNERS TO CAIRO FOR THIS PURPOSE IN MID-AUGUST. A JOINT PLAN AND A DRAFT BILATERAL CONTRACT WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE MILCON APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE AS SOON AS WE HAVE OBTAINED EGYPTIAN CONCURRENCE.

IN PREPARATION FOR RESUMED TALKS, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS DRAFTED A CONSTRUCTION PLAN FOR USE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS. THIS PLAN, AT A MINIMUM, CALLS FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO BUILD A SPF-CAPABLE RUNWAY AND APRON, AND FOR THE U.S. TO FUND CONSTRUCTION OF A POL DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE SYSTEM. THE PLAN ALSO PRIORITIZES FOLLOW-ON CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED TO GIVE RAS BANAS MAC AND THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY. WORK HAS ALSO BEGUN TO PREPARE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FOR U.S.-FUNDED PROJECTS AT PAS BANAS, WITH EMPHASIS ON FASHIONING A BILATERAL CONTRACT DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM. BECAUSE NO FORMAL BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR THE RAS BANAS CONSTRUCTION EXISTS, THESE CONTRACTS WILL DEAL WITH VARIOUS ISSUES NOT NORMALLY PART OF MILCON CONTRACTS. THE EGYPTIANS MAY HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THIS, AND THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY TAKE SOME TIME.

DOD AND STATE OFFICIALS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY, WILL BRIEF -COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFFERS ON OUR PROGRESS TO DATE AND REITERATE THE HIGH PRIORITY THE ADMINISTRATION GIVES TO RETAINING \$55 MILLION OF FY 83 MILCON FUNDS FOR RAS BANAS. IF NECESSARY, THE WHITE HOUSE WILL BE ASKED TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT WITH CALLS TO KEY HOUSE AND SENATE REPUBLICANS.

WHILE THE REMAINING ISSUES ARE TECHNICAL, FAILURE TO RESOLVE THEM QUICKLY WILL RESULT IN OUR LOSING ALL REMAINING CONSTRUCTION FUNDS. IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER CONGRESS WILL AGREE TO RETAIN FUNDS PREVIOUSLY APPROPRIATED FOR RAS BANAS UNLESS IT RECEIVES ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES FROM THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ITS OWN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. THUS, IF AN IMPASSE WITH THE EGYPTIANS APPEARS LIKELY, WE WILL HAVE TO RAISE OUR CONCERNS TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN CAIRO QUICKLY.

OTHER ISSUES ON THE U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC AGENDA

PAS BANAS IS THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE ON OUR STRATEGIC AGENDA WITH EGYPT, BUT OTHERS ALSO REQUIRE ATTENTION. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IS EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS ALSO CLEAR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS LIKELY THAT THESE VIEWS WILL CAUSE ONGOING

IRRITATIONS AS WE PURSUE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. WHILE WE CANNOT COMPLETELY OVERCOME EGYPTIAN CONCERNS, WE CAN DEAL WITH THEM THROUGH A STRAIGHTFORWARD, HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE, DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT OUR VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES THAT GIVE IT SUBSTANCE.

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UNDEPLOYING THESE IMMEDIATE ISSUES IS THE HIGH PRIORITY WE PLACE ON ENHANCING EGYPT'S ABILITY TO WORK WITH US EFFECTIVELY IN RESPONDING TO REGIONAL CRISES. OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO PROTECT COUNTRIES SUCH AS CHAD AND SUDAN AGAINST ATTACKS FROM QADHAFI HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE BENEFITS WE BOTH DERIVE FROM OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, COMBINED TRAINING EXERCISES AND PLANNING TALKS HELP INCREASE EGYPT'S ABILITY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE.

THE NEXT PRIORITY IS TO BREATHE LIFE INTO OUR STRATEGIC TALKS. THESE TALKS WERE NEARLY HALTED EARLIER

THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF EGYPTIAN MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR PERFORMANCE AS A SECURITY PARTNER. A ROUND OF ██████████ TALKS TOOK PLACE IN JUNE, BUT THE EGYPTIANS WERE GUARDED AND CLEARLY DO NOT BELIEVE THESE TALKS WILL BRING BENEFITS TO EGYPT. ██████████

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A CONTINUING PRIORITY IS MAINTAINING EGYPTIAN SUPPORT FOR COMBINED MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECT THE MUBARAK GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO REGIONAL EXERCISES. EGYPT'S 1982 ROLE IN JADE TIGER WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE. TO DATE THE EGYPTIANS HAVE FOUND THAT THE BENEFITS TO THEIR MILITARY FROM THESE EXERCISES OUTWEIGH DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL POLITICAL CRITICISM. THE CURRENT BRIGHT STAR EXERCISE IS A CASE IN POINT; DESPITE EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS' CONCERN ABOUT PUBLICITY AND THE ATTACKS IN THE OPPOSITION PRESS, BRIGHT STAR IS GOING AHEAD AS PLANNED. TO ENSURE THIS ATTITUDE CONTINUES, WE MUST SHOW SENSITIVITY TOWARD EGYPTIAN CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLICITY AND SEEK TO STRUCTURE THE EXERCISES SO THAT THE BENEFITS TO THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY ARE RELEVANT TO ITS NEEDS, PARTICULARLY IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS, AND TO OUR FMS PROGRAM.

U.S. NPW TRANSITS OF THE SUEZ CANAL REMAIN AN OUTSTANDING ISSUE ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA WITH EGYPT. MUBARAK HAS APPROVED NPW TRANSITS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT EGYPT HAS MANY TECHNICAL RESERVATIONS THAT WE MUST ACCOMMODATE. TO CONVINCED THE EGYPTIANS OF THE SAFETY OF U.S. NPW'S, AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION DISCUSSED NPW ISSUES WITH DEFENSE OFFICIALS AND TRANSITED THE PANAMA CANAL ON A U.S. NPW IN LATE JULY. THIS DELEGATION WILL SUBMIT A REPORT TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER EGYPT

SHOULD PERMIT U.S. NPW'S TO TRANSIT THE SUEZ CANAL. WE WILL FOLLOW IN CAIRO TO ENSURE AS FAVORABLE A REPORT AS POSSIBLE. FOLLOWING SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT TO MUBARAK, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON WILL RAISE THE NPW ISSUE WITH HIM.

THE EGYPTIAN VIEW OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION

THE EGYPTIAN VIEW OF OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP IS DRIVEN BY EGYPT'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS, WHICH ARE SIMILAR, BUT NOT IDENTICAL, TO OUR OWN. THE EGYPTIANS SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET AND RADICAL THREATS TO REGIONAL STATES AND EXPECT THE U.S. TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RESISTING AN OVERT SOVIET MILITARY THRUST INTO SOUTHWEST ASIA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EGYPTIANS MAY NOT REGARD REGIONAL EVENTS WITH THE SAME DEGREE OF URGENCY AS WE WOULD, UNLESS DIRECTLY THREATENING TO EGYPT. THEY ALSO LOOK TO THE U.S. AS THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO MODERNIZE THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY SO THAT IT CAN PLAY A CREDIBLE ROLE IN SUPPORTING KEY REGIONAL STATES, PARTICULARLY SUDAN, AGAINST SUBVERSION OR ATTACK FROM RADICALS SUCH AS QADHAFI. FINALLY, THE

EGYPTIANS BELIEVE THEIR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. BOTH COMPLEMENTS OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AND GIVFS EGYPT CREDIBILITY AS A REGIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER.

IN MUBARAK'S VIEW OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP HAS POLITICAL COSTS AS WELL AS BENEFITS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS POPULAR SUSPICION, BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPFRIENCE WITH THE BRITISH AND SOVIETS, OF ANY MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER POWER. [REDACTED]

THOSE OF THE U.S. THESE ATTACKS ARE PARTICULARLY VIBULENT WHENEVER ISRAELI-ARAB TENSIONS ARE HIGH. MUBARAK IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP ON HIS EFFORTS TO REASSERT EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB AND NON-ALIGNED WORLDS.

MUBARAK, UNLIKE SADAT, IS NOT WILLING TO DISMISS THESE CONCERNS AND HAS PUT CLEAR LIMITATIONS ON OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THUS, HE WILL NOT ALLOW WRITTEN AGREFIMENTS COVERING RAS BANAS CONSTRUCTION OR ACCESS, AND HAS FIRMLY RESISTED AGREEING TO A U.S. CARETAKER PRESENCE AT RAS BANAS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHICH IS SOMETIMES AT VARIANCE WITH OUR WISE TO PUBLICIZF OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE REGION AS A DETERRENT. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY, WHILE SUPPORTING OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, IS WARY OF BEING DOMINATED BY US AND HAS RESISTED OUR EFFORTS TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IT WOULD PROVIDE US IN A CONTINGENCY. AS A RESULT, OUR [REDACTED] TALKS HAVE PRODUCED A VAST AMOUNT OF INFORMATION FOR OUR [REDACTED]

HOWEVER,

EVENTS SHOW CLEARLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CONTINGENCY SUPPORT. THE EGYPTIANS ALSO WANT TO LIMIT THE PUBLIC IMPACT OF OUR TRAINING EXERCISES AND HAVE SOUGHT TO ENSURE THESE OCCUR AS FAR FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY AS POSSIBLE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE NPW ISSUE FALLS INTO THE AREA THE EGYPTIANS CONSIDER BEYOND THEIR INTERESTS, BUT OUR NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CLARIFY THIS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MUBARAK HAS INDICATED THAT WHILE THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON OUR PEACETIME STRATEGIC COOPERATION, THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE IN A REGIONAL CONTINGENCY. HE HAS STRESSED THAT IN A CONTINGENCY WHICH BOTH THE U.S. AND EGYPTIANS CONSIDERED AN EMERGENCY EGYPTIAN FACILITIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES. EGYPT HAS DEMONSTRATED THIS ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION.

A STRATEGIC COOPERATION GAME PLAN

OUR PRINCIPAL FOCUS OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS WILL BE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE CONGRESS ON PAS BANAS CONSTRUCTION AND TO GET THROUGH THE PRIZED FALCON AND BRIGHT STAR EXERCISES. WE SHOULD THEN START A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED EARLIER IN THIS PAPER. THIS COULD BE DONE IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BOTH DEFENSE MINISTER ABU GHAZALA AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK (IF HE ATTENDS THE UNGA) WILL BE IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER. IF THIS OCCURS, SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER SHOULD BEGIN THE DIALOGUE HERE WITH MUBARAK AND ABU GHAZALA. WE COULD THEN HOLD FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO. SHOULD MUBARAK NOT COME TO WASHINGTON, WE WOULD DISCUSS THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ABU GHAZALA DURING HIS MID TO LATE-SEPTEMBER VISIT AND AT THAT TIME OFFER TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO CAIRO FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH MUBARAK, FOREIGN MINISTER ALI AND ABU GHAZALA. SHOULD THE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE BE POSITIVE, A HIGH DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL COULD CARRY A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHICH WOULD BE PREPARED AFTER TALKS WITH ABU GHAZALA. THE EXACT TIMING FOR SUCH A VISIT WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED IN

CONSULTATION WITH THE GOE.

PRIOR TO THE START OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE EGYPTIANS, A FORMAL INTER-AGENCY REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CONDUCTED, DRAWING UPON ONGOING NSDD 99 STUDIES. THIS REVIEW WOULD HAVE TWO GOALS. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO EXAMINE THOROUGHLY U.S. STRATEGIC NEEDS FOR EGYPT, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO SUPPORT U.S. FORCE PROJECTION INTO THE REGION DURING A CONTINGENCY. THE SECOND WOULD BE TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON OUR STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR EGYPT AND HOW THESE PRIORITIES FIT WITHIN THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH GOE OFFICIALS ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION DURING MCFARLANE

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BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 237602

EXDIS - FOR MCFARLANE FROM VELIOTES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS PREL, SOPN, LE
SUBJECT: YOUR MONDAY BACKGROUNDER

REF: (A) STATE 235303, (B) CAIRO 24526

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE OBVIOUS FRAMEWORK FOR YOUR BACKGROUNDER SHOULD BE THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU TAKE THE HIGH ROAD AND EMPHASIZE THE THEMES DEVELOPED IN THAT STATEMENT. YOU WILL WANT TO BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT YOU SAY REGARDING SYRIA SINCE THE SYRIANS ARE ALWAYS VERY SENSITIVE TO COMMENTS ABOUT THEM WHICH MAY GET DISTORTED IN THE PROCESS OF BEING PLAYED BACK THROUGH THE MEDIA. IN ADDITION, YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW VERY SELECTIVELY ON POINTS PROPOSED FOR USE IN ALLIED CAPITALS (REF. A).
3. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REINFORCE YOUR DIPLOMACY BY SENDING THE TALKING POINTS, MODIFIED AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY, TO BOTH ARAB AND ALLIED CAPITALS. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE USE OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO HAVE OUR EMBASSIES APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS. ANOTHER ROUND OF DEMARCHES USING THE TALKING POINTS WOULD MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AT THOSE CAPITALS WHICH YOU AND DICK FAIRBANKS ARE UNABLE TO VISIT. DAM

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NLS F98-008/1#43
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

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ROSS-5
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NODIS
FOR AMB. MCFARLANE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PRELL, MARR, LE, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE MNF

REF: CAIRO 24523

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I SHARE YOUR SENSE OF URGENCY OVER THE NEED TO GET AN EARLY DECISION ON THE NEW ROLES YOU HAVE PROPOSED FOR UNTSO AND THE MNF. LAST NIGHT I APPROVED AN APPROACH TO THE UN FOR THE USE OF UNTSO OBSERVERS IN LEBANON. THIS IDEA WAS REVIEWED AT AN INTERAGENCY MEETING CHAIRED BY NICK THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS A DRAFT OPTIONS PAPER ON LEBANON. THE INTERAGENCY CONSENSUS WAS THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE UNTSO PROPOSAL, REGARDLESS OF WHERE WE COME OUT ON THE OTHER OPTIONS.
3. IN A FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH URQUHART ON AUGUST 20, HE ADVISED US THAT THE BEST WAY TO AVOID A PROBLEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO TREAT THE DEPLOYMENT AS A ROUTINE EXTENSION OF UNTSO'S PRESENT FUNCTIONS IN THE BEIRUT AREA. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOL SHOULD NOT RPT NOT MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO THE UN FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT. INSTEAD, THE GOL SHOULD APPROACH THE

UNTISO CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT, EXPLAIN THE GOL'S INTENTION TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY INTO THE SHUF AS THE IDF WITHDRAWS, AND DECLARE THAT THE GOL ASSUMES UNTSO OBSERVERS WILL OPERATE IN THE SHUF AS PART OF THEIR PRESENT MONITORING FUNCTION. THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THERE MUST BE NO RPT NO PUBLICITY OF THIS INTENDED UNTSO INVOLVEMENT PRIOR TO THE TIME IT OCCURS. SUCH PUBLICITY WOULD DERAILED THE PLAN. ASSUMING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AGREES--AND URQUHART STRESSED HE HAD NOT YET OBTAINED THE SYG'S CLEARANCE BUT EXPECTED TO DO SO--THE UN SECRETARIAT WOULD BE DISPOSED TO HANDLE THIS ACTIVITY AS A ROUTINE FUNCTION. SPECIAL UNSC PERMISSION WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE SOUGHT, BUT THE NEXT REPORT OF THE SYG TO THE UNSC ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION WOULD INCLUDE A MENTION OF THIS OPERATION.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #45

BY MSJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

4. URQUHART ALSO STRESSED TWO PREREQUISITES FOR UN APPROVAL OF THE OPERATION. FIRST, THERE MUST BE AN ASSESSMENT BY THE UNTSO COMMAND IN THE FIELD THAT THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF IS SAFE ENOUGH FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT, BEARING IN MIND THAT UNTSO OBSERVERS ARE UNARMED. A SECOND, RELATED PRECONDITION IS PRIOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE DRUZE ON THE IDF-LAF CHANGEOVER.

5. FOR BEIRUT: GET IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO INFORM HIM ABOUT OUR UNTSO STRATEGY OUTLINED ABOVE AND TO ASK THAT THE LEBANESE MAKE AN INFORMAL APPROACH IN BEIRUT TO UNTSO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. WE HOPE TO HAVE A SHULTZ/WEINBERGER OPTIONS PAPER ON MNF ROLES TO THE PRESIDENT EARLY NEXT WEEK. AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING NICK EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR SPEED AND CREATIVE THINKING IN THE FACE OF OBVIOUS OBSTACLES. IN ADDITION TO AGREEMENT ON THE UNTSO PLAN, THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS TO RECOMMEND FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE THAT USMNF FORCES PATROL THE BEIRUT/SIDON ROAD, AS THE LAF HAS IN THE PAST SUGGESTED, AND THAT OMC PERSONNEL COULD MAKE NORMAL, PERIODIC TRAINING VISITS TO LAF BATTALION HEADQUARTERS. ON THE LATTER POINT, JCS REPS SAID THEY WOULD PREFER NOT MAKING A DECISION UNTIL YOU, COOLEY AND STINER HAVE A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

7. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS AROSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE OTHER SUGGESTED ROLES FOR THE MNF. THERE WAS SERIOUS RELUCTANCE TO PRESS FORWARD ON MNF PATROLS OR MNF OBSERVERS IN THE SHUF OR ON USING OMC OR

MNF PERSONNEL AS TRAINERS/ADVISERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO LAF UNITS IN THE SHUF. MNF PATROLS IN THE SHUF MIGHT IN FACT JEOPARDIZE THE UNTSO OPTION, SINCE THE SOVIETS MIGHT VIEW THIS AS TOO CLOSE AN ASSOCIATION OF THE UN WITH NATO FORCES AND RAISE AN OBJECTION IN THE UNSC.

8. WE NEED YOUR VIEWS ON SOME OF THE TROUBLING QUESTIONS STILL OUTSTANDING BEFORE WE PUT THE ISSUES TO SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER AND FORWARD THE OPTIONS PAPER TO THE PRESIDENT. IN PARTICULAR, WE MUST HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON WHICH PROPOSED ROLES FOR U.S./MNF MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL LAF DEPLOYMENT AND WHICH ARE MERELY DESIRABLE.

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TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 9545

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT/IMMEDIATE 5061

INFO RUEHLC/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 8846

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9687

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9207

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FOR AMB. MCFARLANE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

9. IN PART, THE POLICY OBJECTIONS STEM FROM DISAGREEMENT OVER THE BASIC FACTS. NOT EVERYONE, FOR EXAMPLE, SHARES YOUR ASSESSMENT OF LAF CAPABILITIES. MARINE COMMANDANT P.X. KELLEY REPORTEDLY RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM TANNOUS, FOLLOWING YOUR DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT, WHICH SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE KAFR MATTA INCIDENT SHOULD NOT BE THE BASIS FOR ANY JUDGMENT ON THE LAF'S ABILITY TO PERFORM. IN THIS REGARD, GENERALS COOLEY AND STINER HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED IN BEIRUT AND WILL NEED TO CONSULT WITH YOUR TEAM AS WELL AS THE LAF TO PROVIDE US WITH THE LATEST ASSESSMENT OF LAF CAPABILITIES AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ALSO CONVEY TO US THE VIEWS OF THE GOL LEADERSHIP AND TANNOUS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AN MNF ROLE IN THE SHUF.

10. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ALSO EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT OUR ASSUMPTIONS THAT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED IN THE SHUF AND THAT THE IDF WILL CLOSELY COORDINATE WITH THE LAF. EVEN IF THERE WERE A POLITICAL AGREEMENT, THEY ARGUE, IT WILL NOT HOLD FOR LONG. IN THIS REGARD, WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY BE DEALING WITH BOTH DRUZE AND LF MILITIAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LAF.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE DISAGREEMENTS, THERE ARE THE LEGAL AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY DISCUSSED IN STATE 224715. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, ALSO BE AWARE OF CERTAIN OTHER LIMITS IN U.S. LAW ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PERSONNEL WHO PERFORM SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS. THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT AND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PROHIBIT SUCH PERSONNEL FROM PERFORMING "ANY DUTIES OF A COMBATANT NATURE, INCLUDING ANY DUTIES RELATED TO TRAINING AND ADVISING THAT MAY ENGAGE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL IN COMBAT ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES." THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THIS PROVISION

INCLUDES, AS AN EXAMPLE OF PERMITTED ACTIVITIES, PROVIDING "ADVICE ON MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE AT HEADQUARTERS ABOVE UNIT LEVEL", AND AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES, THE PRESENCE OF "TRAINERS, ADVISERS, OR OTHER PERSONNEL WITH UNITS ENGAGED IN COMBAT". THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD APPLY TO U.S. PERSONNEL PROVIDING TRAINING UNDER FMS OR IMET; THEY WOULD APPLY TO THE MTT AND OMC PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS TO MNF PERSONNEL WHO ARE PERFORMING TRAINING FUNCTIONS. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, LIMIT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE PERSONNEL MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED WITH LAF UNITS HAVING A COMBAT ROLE, AND WOULD PRECLUDE GIVING ADVICE TO SUCH UNITS ON THEIR CONDUCT OF ONGOING COMBAT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS DIRECTING THEIR FIRE OR COMBAT DEPLOYMENT.

12. IN ADDITION TO THESE SERIOUS LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE WILL STILL NEED ANSWERS TO SOME VERY BASIC QUESTIONS BEFORE WE APPROACH THE CONGRESS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE CONGRESS WILL BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING THAT MAY INCLUDE A TRAINING, ADVISORY OR PATROLLING ROLE IN LIKELY COMBAT AREAS.

-- IS IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. DO ALL YOU SUGGEST (E.G., TRAINERS, OBSERVERS IF THE UNTSO OPTION FAILS, MOBILE PATROLS IN THE SHUF) AS A PACKAGE, OR COULD MORE LIMITED MOVES SUCCEED? THE CONGRESS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ASK A BOTTOM LINE QUESTION OF "IS THIS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME."

-- EVEN THOUGH YOU SPECIFY TIME LIMITATIONS, WHAT ASSURANCES DO WE HAVE THAT THE U.S. ROLE WOULDN'T BECOME OPEN-ENDED? AFTER ALL, WE WERE TOLD THE LAF WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE SHUF BY THIS TIME?

13. WE MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THE CONGRESS IS IN RECESS UNTIL SEPTEMBER 12 AND MIGHT VIEW ANY MOVE TO EXPAND THE U.S. ROLE IN LEBANON DURING THE RECESS AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO CIRCUMVENT THE CONGRESS'S ROLE. WE APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER OF MESSAGES TO KEY MEMBERS WITH WHOM WE NEED TO CONSULT AND WILL SUGGEST A TEXT AT SUCH TIME AS WE DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR CONSULTING WITH THE CONGRESS.

14. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE IN THE FIELD, AND THAT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE WAY SMOOTHER HERE IN WASHINGTON.

15. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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TO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 6332

RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 3424

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5572

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 3105

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5080

RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 9103

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4788

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2748

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5652

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0775

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 7156

RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 5641

RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 6321

RUEHKKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1216

INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9556

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7850

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9708

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9217

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3134

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 238404

EXDIS, BEIRUT FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DEMARCHES IN

ARAB CAPITALS

REF: (A) BEIRUT 9196 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 237598, (C)
STATE 2324361. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTELS (B) AND (C) PROVIDED TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON LEBANON AND REQUESTED FOLLOW-UP IN SUPPORT OF MCFARLANE MISSION AND GOL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITH OPPOSITION FACTIONS. IN ADDITION TO POINTS PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING WHEN APPROACHING HOST GOVERNMENTS:

-- THE IMMINENT REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELT FORCES FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF HAS CREATED A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT BY THE GOL TO INSERT ITS OWN FORCES INTO THE VACATED AREA AND TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR ALL LEBANESE GROUPS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF WILL VISIBLY STRENGTHEN THE

GOVERNMENT AND CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER MOMENTUM IN THE

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CHRG: PROG

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BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/5/02

WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. IT WILL ALSO REINFORCE EFFORTS MADE THUS FAR TOWARDS THE KIND OF RECONCILIATION THAT ALL OF LEBANON'S FRIENDS ARE WORKING TO ACHIEVE.

-- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO WORKING FOR FULL NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO DEMONSTRATING HIS GOVERNMENT'S SENSITIVITY TO THE NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF ALL OF LEBANON'S COMMUNITIES AS IT EXTENDS ITS AUTHORITY OVER EVER GREATER PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY.

-- THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS, IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO ASSIST THE SEVERAL LEBANESE FACTIONS TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RALLY BEHIND THE GOL'S EFFORTS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. ALL LEBANESE FACTIONS NOW RECOGNIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION, AND ASSERT THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO WORK HARD FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IF A SUCCESSFUL RECONCILIATION IS TO TAKE PLACE HOWEVER, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT LEBANON'S ARAB FRIENDS MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.

-- YOU CAN MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING GEMAYEL'S POSITION THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE SYRIANS AND THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF THE RECONCILIATION EFFORT.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON WILL EFFECTIVELY STRENGTHEN SYRIAN SECURITY AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN THE REGION. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL POINT OUT TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT THAT REGARDLESS OF THE SARG'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE IDF FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF REPRESENTS A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ARAB TERRITORY AND THE RETURN TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB LANDS. SUCCESSFUL RECONCILIATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF INTO THE AREA COULD WELL LEAD TO FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS OR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL MAKE VERY CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS YOUR OPPOSITION TO ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DESTABILIZE THE GOL, AND YOUR BELIEF THAT THEY SHOULD UTILIZE THEIR OWN UNIQUE RESOURCES TO SUPPORT THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.

-- WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY EFFORTS YOU MIGHT MAKE AMONG YOUR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE GOL AND THE LEBANESE FACTIONS TO STRESS TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO URGE THEM TO

MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DO ;SO.

3. FOR JIDDA, AMMAN, AND CAIRO: YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN WORKING ON SYRIA IN VARIOUS WAYS TO FACILITATE A POLITICAL ACCOMODATION ON THE SHUF. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS TO THEM OUR APPRECIATION FOR THEIR EFFORTS, AND REQUEST THAT THEY ONCE AGAIN BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE SYRIANS TO FACILITATE A DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND JUMBLATT. THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL EARLY STEP IN THE PROCESS OF REACHING A POLITICAL ACCOMODATION LEADING TO A SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE SHUF AND TO A BROADER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IN SPITE OF SYRIAN STATEMENTS OF GOOD INTENTIONS TO THE SAUDIS IN PARTICULAR, THEIR MANIPULATION OF JUMBLATT, WHICH RESULTED IN HIS VISIT TO THE MATN IN THE COMPANY OF GENERAL TLASS AT THE TIME HE WAS MEANT TO HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE IN GHARTA, CONTINUES AND IS HARMFUL TO GEMAYEL'S EFFORTS. YOUR HOSTS NEED TO STRESS TO THE SARG THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY PLACE UPON LEBANESE RECONCILITATION, THE GRAVITY OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR SINCERE EFFORTS BY ALL PARTIES.

4. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. DAM

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