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(02/06/1981-09/21/1981)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/31/2011

File Folder MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT [02/06/1981-09/21/1981]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 53

JAUVERT/BROWER

39

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117856	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO RR RE. NICARAGUA PAR 6/22/2015 M371/	1	2/6/1981	B1 B3
117857	CHECKLIST	RE. NICARAGUA	1	1/31/1981	B1
117858	CABLE	MANAGUA 0487 PAR 6/22/2015 M371/	4	1/31/1981	B1 B3
117859	CABLE	SAN SALVADOR 0858 R 6/22/2015 M371/	4	1/31/1981	B1
117860	SUMMARY	RE. MORNING SUMMARY PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	1	1/31/1981	B1 B3
117861	REPORT	[REGARDING FOREIGN EVENTS; ATTACHED TO DOC. 117860] PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	4	1/31/1981	B1 B3
117862	PAPER	RE. ANALYSIS R 2/27/2018 M371/1	5	1/31/1981	B1
117863	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO RR RE. SOVIET UNION PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	1	2/6/1981	B1
117865	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CENTRAL AMERICA PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	2	2/6/1981	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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117867	MEMO	RE. NOON NOTES [W/NOTATIONS] PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	3	2/5/1981	B1 B3
117871	MEMO	SITUATION ROOM TO ALLEN RE. INFORMATION ITEMS [W/NOTATIONS] PAR 8/16/2016 M351/1	3	1/31/1981	B1 B3
117873	CABLE	LA PAZ 0625 R 6/22/2015 M371/	6	1/30/1981	B1
117875	CABLE	STATE 024207 R 6/22/2015 M371/	2	1/30/1981	B1
117876	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. PATCO STRIKE R 6/22/2015 M371/	1	8/8/1981	B1
117878	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SITUATION R 6/22/2015 M371/	3	8/11/1981	B1
117881	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CRASH NEAR LAS VEGAS R 4/13/2012 M351/1	1	9/21/1981	B1

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117856

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

13526
E.C. 12758
As Amended
Sec. 3.3b(1)(6)

~~SECRET~~

February 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

Nicaraguan Plans to Ship Weapons to El Salvador: The Nicaraguan government plans to send 30,000 pounds of weapons to El Salvador early this month, the largest shipment since the supply flights originated in December 1980,

Nicaraguan Official Offers to Mediate Political Compromise in El Salvador: In late January Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan interior minister, requested that Dominican Republic and Costa Rican Christian Democratic representatives relay an offer for him to mediate a political solution to the current impasse in El Salvador to their contacts in El Salvador and Venezuela.

Borge most likely assumed his message would be passed to the U.S. government. Borge initially said the removal of President Duarte was a condition for settlement, but later backed away from the position. He asserted that his offer should be welcomed by the Salvadoran junta because the leftist forces are, and will continue to be, well armed -- even in comparison to the Sandinista forces when they defeated Somoza. While admitting they do not enjoy the widespread popular support, he asserted the government could not totally destroy their forces without alienating the populace. there is little doubt Borge's offer is a calculated move coordinated between the Nicaraguan FSLN and the Salvadoran leftists, probably with advice and guidance from Havana. (S)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRB M3711 # 117856
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Withdrawer

RB 8/31/2011
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File Folder

MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT[02/06/1981-09/21/1981]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371
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Box Number

53

39

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117857	CHECKLIST RE. NICARAGUA	1	1/31/1981	B1

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DE RUEMG #0487/1 0310100
O 310004Z JAN 81
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0324

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MANAGUA 0487

MODIS
EO 12065 XDS-1 1/30/81 (PEZZULLO, LAWRENCE A) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINT, NU
SURJ: (8) MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ON GUERRILLA SUPPORT

1. 8 - ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN ORDER TO EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERN AND PRESS FOR CONCRETE ACTIONS, I HAVE BEEN MEETING KEY PLAYERS PRIVATELY SINCE FORMAL DEMARCHE. I MET WITH MIN OF DEF HUMBERTO ORTEGA FOR TWO HOURS LAST EVENING AT JAIME WHEELLOCK'S SUGGESTION. WHEELLOCK HAD INDICATED THAT ORTEGA WAS A KEY FIGURE, AND ONE WHO WAS "PRAGMATIC ENOUGH", ACCORDING TO WHEELLOCK, TO UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES.

3. I FOUND TO MY SURPRISE THAT ORTEGA HAD JULIO RAMOS, CHIEF OF MIL INTELLIGENCE, WITH HIM. I BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUE WE FACED AND URGING HIM TO "TAKE SOME MOVES" WHICH WILL DEMONSTRATE TO US CLEARLY THAT THEY WERE CUTTING ANY SUPPLY TO THE GUERRILLAS. I SUGGESTED HE VIEW THE PROBLEM IN A TIME SEQUENCE - PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (THE PAST WE KNOW ABOUT; THE PRESENT IS THE PERIOD IN WHICH CRUCIAL ACTION

HAD TO BE TAKEN; AND THE FUTURE WILL BEING THE CONSEQUENCES. ORTEGA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, BUT THE LACK OF DETAILS OF WHAT WE KNEW MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM AND OTHERS IN THE NATIONAL POLN DIRECTORATE TO REACT. HE ASKED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE WAS "DISTORTING THE PICTURE FOR US" AND CREATING A FALSE IMPRESSION OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS IN SALVADOR.

4. I SAID THAT DEFINITELY WAS NOT THE CASE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A GROWING DOCUMENTARY BASE ACCUMULATED IN EL

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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PSN:040532 RECALLED PAGE 01 TOR:031/0417Z DTG:0310004Z JAN 81

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NLRR M3741 #117858

BY RW NARA DATE 6/28/15

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S E C R E T

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SALVADOR. I SAID WE WERE DEALING WITH A MASSIVE SUPPLIES OF ARMS TRANSITING THROUGH NICARAGUA WITH THE APPROVAL OF KEY MEMBERS OF THE FRENTE. WHAT MADE NICARAGUA'S CASE SO PERILOUS FOR THEM WAS THAT THE GRN/FSLN HAD UNWISELY IDENTIFIED ITSELF, EVEN IF ITS MOTIVATION WAS SELF-DEFENSE, WITH CUBAN/ SOVIET DESIGNS TO DESTABILIZE COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I SAID "WE HAVE DEALT WITH CUBANS AND SOVIETS ELSEWHERE AND KNOW HOW THEY OPERATE. I SAID THE GOVT OF NICARAGUA, WHICH HAS ENOUGH TO ATTEND TO AT HOME, HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE USED. I ADDED WE WERE OFFERING A WAY OUT IF THEY COULD PROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT THEY WERE CUTTING SUPPLY.

5. ORTEGA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO BE HELPFUL. I GAVE HIM THE NEWEST COORDINATES FOR THE CLANDESTINE RADIO STATION (WHICH SUBSEQUENT TO MY SESSIONS WITH WHEELQV AND ORTEGA CEASED OPERATION, BUT WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING IF MY DEMARCHES WERE RESPONSIBLE). I ALSO INDICATED THAT ACTION WAS URGENTLY NEEDED AND THAT US DECISIONS WOULD BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF AN EVALUATION OF THEIR ACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO OUR CONFIDENTIAL DEMARCHES.

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PAGE 02

OF 02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8325

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MANAGUA 0487

NODIS

6. ORTEGA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE URGENCY, ADDING THAT THE "VENEZUELANAS AND MEXICANS" HAD ALSO "PRESSURED US ON THIS ISSUE." (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST MENTION MADE OF MEXICAN CONCERN, WHICH IS GOOD TO HEAR.)

7. ORTEGA THEN BROADENED THE DISCUSSION TO VOICE HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE ENTIRE CA REGION WHICH HE SAW AS "ONE PROBLEM." HE DETAILED THE DANGERS TO THE GRN REPORTED THROUGH THEIR INTELLIGENCE. THE RECENT ATTACK WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF SIX NICARAGUAN SOLDIERS ON THE HONDURAN BORDER WAS THE MOST RECENT MANIFESTATION OF THIS THREAT. "WE HAVE LOST MORE THAN 100 SOLDIERS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS," HE COMPLAINED, AND YET ATTACKS ON US EMANATING FROM EX-NATIONAL GUARD (GN) GROUPS OPERATING IN HONDURAS DO NOT SEEM TO CONCERN THE USG. HE SAID HE GRANTED THAT THE SALVADORAN ISSUE WAS OF A LARGER DIMENSION AND HE UNDERSTOOD US CONCERN BECAUSE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH LARGE NUMBERS OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT, BUT, HE COMPLAINED, "PEACE WILL NEVER COME TO CA IF WE DON'T DEAL WITH THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND DEAL WITH THE DANGERS THAT WE ALL FACE." HE SAID THE FSLM DIRECTORATE WOULD LIKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO BROACH THIS BROADER ISSUE WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE "WE ARE FEARFUL THE IMPRESSION WILL BE SPREAD THAT NICARAGUA ALONE IS CAUSING ALL THE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA." I SAID WE WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION ON THIS BROADER TOPIC, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT I DIDN'T WANT HIM TO FOCUS ON ANYTHING BUT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WE FACE NOW. ITS SOLUTION WAS CURCIAL TO ANY BROADER DISCUSSION. I ADDED, "IF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SUFFERS, DIALOGUE ON ANY ISSUE WILL BECOME DIFFICULT." HE NODDED AGREEMENT.

8. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD MAKE SOME OVERTURES TO THE GOH ON USE OF ITS TERRITORY BY ANTI-NICARAGUAN FORCES.

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WE HAVE KNOWN FOR SOMETIME THAT SMALL CONSPIRATORIAL GROUPS
 ARE OPERATING THERE, AS WELL AS IN COSTA RICA, AND THAT A LOT
 OF THE CONSPIRING IS DONE IN GUATEMALA AND, UNFORTUNATELY,
 IN THE MIAMI AREA AS WELL. ANYTHING I CAN PASS ALONG INDICATING
 ANY ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN WILL HELP STILL SOME OF THE FEARS,
 ALBEIT EXAGGERATED, THE GRN/PSLN EXHIBIT. HELPING
 STILL THEIR FEARS MAY HELP IN OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF CUTTING
 OFF FURTHER SUPPLIES TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS, AN LOWER THE
 LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION.
 PEZZULLO
 BT

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PAGE 02

OF 02

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DE RUEBAL #0858/01 0302158
O R 302157Z JAN 81
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2218

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 8881
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 4635
AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3596
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6872
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1028
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 7204
USCINCPAC QUARRY HEIGHTS PAN
USINT HAVANA 047

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NLRR M3711/#117859
BY LW NARA DATE 4/22/15

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 0858

EXDIS
MILITARY ADDEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 120651 GDS 1/30/87 (HALLMAN, WILLIAM H.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR PINS PINT ES
SUBJECT: (C) FOREIGN SUPPORT OF SALVADORAN INSURGENCY;
WHAT THE SALVADORANS WILL DO NEXT
REF: A) SAN SALVADOR 0849; B) STATE 23210

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EMOFFS CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVEZ MENA MORNING 1/30 TO DISCUSS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF NICARAGUAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO GUERRILLOS HERE (SAN SALVADOR 849), AND TO DEVELOP SOME ANSWERS TO STATE 23210 ("INTERAGENCY STUDY ON EL SALVADOR".) CHAVEZ MENA SEES THE NEED TO MAKE A FORMAL PROTEST TO NICARAGUA, AND WILL ASK DIESCOTO TO COME HERE. THE NEW EVIDENCE WILL BE USED FOR A SECOND ROUND OF BILATERAL COMPLAINTS AT CAPITALS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE, TO BE FOLLOWED, POSSIBLY, BY FORMAL COMPLAINTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE, POLOFF AND TDY OFFICER JON GLASSMAN CALLED THIS MORNING 1/30 ON FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVEZ MENA TO DISCUSS WHAT THE SALVADORANS EXPECT TO DO ON THE DIPLOMATIC

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIARA

FRONT TO MAKE THEIR CASE AGAINST THE NICARAGUANS FOR HAVING PROVIDED MASSIVE ARMS SUPPORT TO THE GUERRILLAS IN THIS COUNTRY. WE TOLD HIM ABOUT U.S. DEMARCHES IN MANAGUA.

4. CHAVEZ MENA REMINDED US THAT ALREADY SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE BEEN SENT ABROAD TO MAKE THE POINT PUBLICLY THAT THIS COUNTRY IS UNDER ATTACK BY GUERRILLAS AIDED FROM ABROAD, AND PRIVATELY TO GOVERNMENTS THAT THIS HELP HAS PRINCIPALLY BEEN CHANNLED THROUGH NICARAGUA. EL SALVADOR'S AMBASSADOR TO ITALY ALVARENGA IS IN BRUSSELS TODAY, FOR EXAMPLE, TO MAKE EL SALVADOR'S CASE KNOWN. DEPUTY FOREIGN SECRETARY GOMEZ VIDES AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR LOVO CASTELAR HAVE MADE A SWING THROUGH SOUTH AMERICA, AND MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY PABLO MAURICIO ALVERGUE HAS COVERED CENTRAL AMERICA ON A SIMILAR MISSION. (COMMENT: THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ALSO DISPATCHED REPRESENTATIVES TO CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES.) CHAVEZ MENA CLAIMED THAT THESE ENVOYS HAVE BEEN GIVEN SYMPATHETIC HEARINGS AT ALL OF THE CAPITALS IN WHICH THEY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MAZVER.

5. SAN SALVADOR REFTEL DESCRIBES DOCUMENTS AND A SUMMARY STATEMENT WHICH WE GAVE TO CHAVEZ MENA CONCERNING NICARAGUAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM HERE. WE URGED CHAVEZ MENA TO MAKE USE OF THESE IN PRESENTING SAN SALVADOR'S CASE, MAKING CLEAR OUR BELIEF THAT THE GOES OWES A FORMAL PROTEST TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA LEST THE SALVADORANS APPEAR TO BE BRINGING THEIR CASE BEFORE THE WORLD WITHOUT ANY EXPLICIT EXPRESSION OF CONCERN DIRECTLY TO THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT. CHARGE SAID THAT FSLN WAS MAKING THIS EXCUSE TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN MANAGUA.

6. CHAVEZ MENA SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A PERSONAL AND FRIENDLY CONVERSATION ON THE TELEPHONE WITH D'ESCOTO LAST FRIDAY IN WHICH HE TOLD THE NICARAGUAN OF HIS DISMAY AT ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE THAT NICARAGUA WAS INVOLVED IN ASSISTING TERRORISTS IN THIS COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT HE PLANS TO CALL D'ESCOTO ONCE AGAIN AND ASK HIM TO COME TO SAN SALVADOR, WHERE CHAVEZ MENA WOULD MEET HIM AT THE AIRPORT AND LODGE A FORMAL PROTEST, POSSIBLY BY "NOTE VERBALE". (COMMENT: CHAVEZ MENA DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT HE WOULD DO IF D'ESCOTO DECLINED THE INVITATION.) CHAVEZ MENA SAID THAT HE KNOWS THAT D'ESCOTO HAS NO REAL POWER IN THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT, BUT HE AGREED THAT

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 DE RUEBAL #0858 0302159
 O R 302157Z JAN 81
 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2219

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 8882
 AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 4636
 AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3597
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6873
 AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1029
 AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 7205
 USCINCPAC GUARRY HTS PN
 USINT HAVANA 048

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAN SALVADOR 0858

EXDIS
 THE FORMAL PROTEST WAS WORTH MAKING.

7. CHAVEZ MENA SAID THAT THE SALVADORAN AMBASSADORS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ARE IN TOWN TODAY TO BEGIN THREE DAYS OF DISCUSSION ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED WITH CHARGES AGAINST NICARAGUA IN THOSE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. CHAVEZ MENA'S PREFERENCE SEEMS TO BE A FURTHER ROUND OF BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC PRESENTATIONS, IF ONLY AS A "SOFTENING UP" PROCESS FOR, POSSIBLY, ULTIMATELY CHARGING NICARAGUA AT THE UN AND/OR AT THE OAS. (BUT THE UNITED NATIONS APPROACH IS LIKELY TO GO BADLY AND THE OAS IS A PANDORA'S BOX," HE ADDED.)

8. CHAVEZ MENA SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED AS AN OBSERVER TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN NEW DELHI EARLY IN FEBRUARY. HE SAID THAT HIS INCLINATION IS TO GO, AND THAT HE HAD TOLD THIS TO DIESCOTO DURING THEIR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST FRIDAY. "WE KNOW THAT THE CARDS ARE COMPLETELY STACKED AGAINST US IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT," HE SAID, "BUT ON THE OTHER HAND I FOUND OUT JULY 19 IN MANAGUA THAT JUST BEING IN A PLACE KEEPS PEOPLE FROM SAYING ALL THE BAD THINGS ABOUT YOU THAT THEY MIGHT SAY OTHERWISE."

9. IN LOOKING BACK OVER THE HISTORY OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

IN THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY CHAVEZ MENA RECALLED A LONG CONVERSATION IN MANAGUA DURING THE JULY 19, 1980 CELEBRATION WHEN CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIAL ABREU, WHOSE BEAT IS RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, WARNED HIM THAT CUBAN HELP WOULD BE MASSIVE AND WOULD TIP THE BALANCE TOWARD THE DISSIDENTS. IN EFFECT HE WARNED CHAVEZ MENA TO GET OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT ALONG WITH HIS CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT COLLEAGUES (ALL OF WHOM HE SAID WERE "REDEEMABLE" EXCEPT FOR NAPOLEON DUARTE) AND HOPE FOR POSTS IN THE VICTORIOUS NEW GOVERNMENT. ABREU REPEATED THE MESSAGE AT AN ENCOUNTER IN SAN JOSE DURING DECEMBER, THIS TIME WARNING HIM HE WOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A WAR CRIMINAL IF HE WAS IN THE JRG WHEN ITS DEFEAT CAME. (CHAVEZ MENA ADDED THAT RUBEN ZAMORA TELEPHONED HIM IN WASHINGTON FROM LONDON, ALSO URGING HIM TO LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT WHILE IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE. EARLIER EMBASSY REPORTING DESCRIBES SIMILAR ENTREATIES FROM FOR MEMBERS.)

10. SEPTEL DESCRIBES SOME OF CHAVEZ MENA'S COMMENTS ON IMPROVING EL SALVADOR'S IMAGE IN THE WORLD.

11. CHARGE RETURNED TO SEE FONMIN CHAVEZ MENA FOLLOWING SECURE TELCON WITH DAS CHEEK AND URGENTLY REQUESTED JRG DEMARCHE TO THE GRN TO SUPPLEMENT AND UNDERWRITE OUR FORCEFUL APPROACHES IN MANAGUA AND WASHINGTON. HE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF POINTS CHARGE MADE AND PROMISED TO CONSULT THE JUNTA IMMEDIATELY.

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~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~ 117000
MORNING SUMMARY

January 31, 1981

13526
E.O. _____
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

Current Reports

1. Poland
 - A. Government-Solidarity Talks Held in Warsaw but Strikes Continue Elsewhere
 - B. Local Party Aktivs Support Solidarity Line
 - C. TASS Stiffens Polish Government Statement
 - D. France Seeks Quick Decision on Financial Assistance
2. Ecuador Conducts Retaliatory Attack on Peru
3. El Salvador: More on Foreign Assistance to Insurgents
4. Soviets Critical of President Reagan's Press Conference
5. Egypt: Change in Public Stance toward PLO
6. Great Britain: Mrs. Thatcher Emphasizes Bilateral Relations
7. South Korea: Police Free American Held by Disgruntled Workers
8. Mozambique To Join CEMA?

Analysis

1. Spain's Suarez Resigns: Our Assessment of the Man
2. The Iraq-Iran Conflict: The Current Outlook
3. Giscard Remains the Favorite in French Election Race
4. India Challenges US Nuclear Agreement

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M357/1 #11786D
BY LN NARA DATE 8/16/16

Classified by: L. Paul Bremer III
and Ronald Spiers

Review for Declassification on: 1/31/11

Extended by: L. Paul Bremer III
and Ronald Spiers

Reason for extension: RDS-2-3

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~ [REDACTED]

CURRENT REPORTS

January 31, 1981

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)(c)

12

1. POLANDA. Government-Solidarity Talks Held in Warsaw But Strikes Continue Elsewhere

Negotiations between the Polish government and Solidarity began in Warsaw yesterday, wire services report. The two sides tentatively agreed on the 40-hour workweek and access to the media issues, but "failed to compromise on the status of a farmers union." The January 29 government statement, which warned that authorities would act to stem spreading labor unrest, was reinforced yesterday by an equally stern statement listing specific actions in which strikers had been engaged and recalling that the appropriate provisions of the penal code provide for sentences of one to 15 years.

Meanwhile, Solidarity's national leaders' appeal for a strike moratorium fell on deaf ears in the southwestern Jelenia Gora province and Bielsko Biala province. However, in the southeastern Rzeszow region, strikes in support of a "Rural Solidarity" were suspended yesterday. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. Local Party Aktivs Support Solidarity Line

Party organizations in two provinces yesterday made separate appeals to the Party leadership and indicated strong support for Solidarity's positions:

--A party aktiv representing 20 branch organizations in Bydgoszcz province adopted a decision urging the Politburo to start "immediately, genuinely, and credibly" implementing reforms of the economy and of the laws governing trade unions and censorship. It also called for immediate talks to create a single agreement out of the August accords with the workers, remove conservatives from government, and open TV and radio coverage of negotiations.

--A Gdansk party aktiv appealed to the government to open talks immediately and in public, but it also urged a halt to further strikes until negotiations have been completed.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

C. TASS Stiffens Polish Government Statement

The TASS report of the Polish government statement of January 29 omitted a key passage which reaffirmed the Polish government's readiness for talks and its support for the consistent implementation of the August agreements with the workers.

INR Comment: The TASS account made the statement a bleak description of a deteriorating situation and could signal Soviet disapproval of interminable negotiations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~ [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M351/1 #117861

BY RW NARA DATE 8/16/16

D. France Seeks Quick Decision on Financial Assistance

According to Embassy Paris, French Treasury Director Jean-Yves Haberer, during his Washington visit, will urge the US to come to a rapid decision on financial aid to Poland. Haberer, chairman of the ad hoc group on multilateral assistance to Poland, sees the US decision as essential in permitting other creditor countries to establish an aid package going beyond June 1981. He plans to convene a meeting of the governments involved in late February, and would like the US to make its decision before then.

Embassy Comment: Warning that France has political and economic reasons of its own for obtaining an agreement soon, the Embassy believes we should not necessarily be guided by Paris' timetable, but agree to help later this year. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)

2. ECUADOR CONDUCTS RETALIATORY ATTACK ON PERU

Ecuadorean ground troops supported by aircraft and helicopters conducted a retaliatory attack against Peru in the Condor area early January 30, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the attackers penetrated Peruvian territory, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Late last night, the guarantors under the 1942 Rio protocol met and agreed to send an appeal for peace to both countries. (TOP SECRET [REDACTED])

3. EL SALVADOR: MORE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS

Embassy San Salvador reported yesterday that newly obtained documents confirm the establishment in Cuba last May of a unified leadership and a coordinated military and political strategy among Salvadoran leftist armed groups. [REDACTED]

4. SOVIETS CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE

In an unattributed commentary on President Reagan's January 29 press conference, Radio Moscow on January 30 criticized the President for:

--"a number of premeditated distortions" in his assessment of Soviet policy, especially his comment that "up to now detente has been a one-way street" and "more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the US;"

--talking "in an unworthy manner" about "some sort of insidiousness" in Soviet policy "which allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist state;"

--"misinterpretations" of SALT II, in alleging that it leads not to arms limitations but to their buildup; and

--"linking new SALT regulations to other questions which are not relevant to this topic."

INR Comment: Though critical of the President, the commentary was not as vitriolic as Moscow media's treatment of President Carter in recent months. For example, to signal a degree of official politeness, it referred to him as "the President" rather than using his surname alone. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. EGYPT: CHANGE IN PUBLIC STANCE TOWARD PLO

A recent publicized meeting between PLO and Egyptian representatives and an official press statement on the need to bring the PLO into the peace process may signal a shift in Egypt's public stance toward the Palestinians, Embassy Cairo reported yesterday. Foreign Minister Ali encouraged the PLO to join the peace process after Israel, Egypt, and the US reach agreement on the main features of full autonomy. Ali also asked privately that the US open a dialogue with the PLO.

The shift in Egyptian policy may be intended as a message to the new administration emphasizing the centrality of the PLO in the peace process. It may also be designed to counter moves toward a "Jordanian option" solution and to help Egypt mend Arab fences. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. GREAT BRITAIN: MRS. THATCHER EMPHASIZES BILATERAL RELATIONS

In a January 29 speech, described yesterday by Embassy London as an introduction for her February visit to the US, British Prime Minister Thatcher emphasized the "special relationship" between the US and the UK, and underscored the need for increased efforts and better coordination on issues like defense, Poland, the Third

World, and Namibia. Addressing the question of a common strategic approach, Mrs. Thatcher invited US comments on more effective policy coordination on NATO and increased cooperation outside of Europe. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)

7. SOUTH KOREA: POLICE FREE AMERICAN HELD BY DISGRUNTLED WORKERS

The American citizen representative of the Asian-American Free Labor Institute in South Korea, George Curtin, was taken hostage the evening of January 30 in his office in Seoul by 15 to 18 members of a textile union. Riot police rescued him several hours later without harm to him or his Korean captors. The group had demanded repeal of the government's tough new labor law, permission to reestablish their legally disbanded union, access to foreign correspondents, and the resignation of the mayor of Seoul.

INR Comment: The action was timed to embarrass President Chun during his current visit to the US. It reflects the intense dissatisfaction among some labor groups at the government's attempt to control union activities, especially at a time of economic pressure on the workers. Because this particular union is one of Korea's most militant labor groups and other unions have complied with the government's new labor restrictions, we do not expect this type of protest to spread. It highlights, however, the pressure Chun is under to revitalize the economy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. MOZAMBIQUE TO JOIN CEMA?

Mozambican Foreign Minister Chissano announced January 29 that his country had decided to join the East European economic organization CEMA. According to Chissano, the action was due to reservations Maputo had about the EC Lome Convention but did not mean that Mozambique was any less interested in developing close bilateral economic relations with the West or a continued dialogue with the EC.

INR Comment: It is unclear whether Mozambique will be granted full membership like Poland and Vietnam, or observer status like Mexico, Cuba, and Iraq, if indeed it does join CEMA.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JANUARY 31, 1981

1. SPAIN'S SUAREZ RESIGNS: OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN

At 47, Adolfo Suarez can count on returning to office at some future date, but not now. His dramatic resignation after four-and-a-half years as Spain's Prime Minister was no casual ploy calculated to force his detractors to abandon their criticism and accord him a fresh mandate. It was a personal sacrifice of power, timed to serve the growth of democratic institutions and the evolution of a Spain at peace with itself: objectives that have characterized his tenure in office.

* * *

The most remarkable thing about this "man without vision," as his critics were wont to label him, is that he--even if not they--always knew where he wanted to go. He used the instruments of the old regime, from which he came, to dismantle it. He provided effective democratic government even as its bases--a constitution, political parties, a free press--were still being formed.


Suarez institutionalized respect for civil liberties and due process as Basque and leftist urban guerrillas sought to destabilize the state by assassinations of police and military figures. He chose, and stood by, politically costly long-term solutions to the regional and terrorist problems when an opportunist might have been tempted by dramatic alternatives. The key to his successes was not candor, but an ability to maneuver and choose the right moment to strike. His resignation makes abundantly clear that he has not lost this touch.

Controversy was the price of Suarez' success. But the controversy, perhaps even by intent, centered on the man himself. Spain's generations-old ideological divisions, that once erupted in bloody civil war, were submerged in the consensus politics that Suarez fashioned. He became the lightning rod for the regional, class, and political frustrations that had left Spain a history "filled with traumas."

Suarez' role within the governing Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) was also that of a lightning rod. Never a disciplined party, it was an uneasy coalition of "families" who diffused their energies by attacking Suarez. The UCD congress, originally slated to open on January 29, was to have witnessed a showdown between Suarez and his intra-party critics.

Suarez' stunning departure leaves his colleagues, once more, thrown off balance. They have been forced to close ranks around a moderate successor. Suarez takes with him the burden of controversy that centered on his personality and style of governance. He leaves his policies intact, his successors with a clean slate, and Spain the prospect of an orderly succession.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 110-3711 * 117862
BY RW NARA DATE 2/27/8



LAKE URMIA

CASPIAN SEA

Irbil

Karkuk

I R A Q

Qasr-e Shirin

Kermanshah

Tehran

I R A N

Tigris

Rudkhaneh-ye Simareh

Euphrates

Baghdad

Esfahan

Tigris

Dezful

Susangerd

Euphrates

Khuzestan

Rudeh Karun

Ahvaz

Bandar-e Khomeini

Al Basrah

Abadan

Shatt al Arab

Shiraz

KUWAIT

Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone

SAUDI ARABIA

Kharg Island

PERSIAN

GULF

- Front Line
- - - International boundary
- - - Province boundary

2. THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT: THE CURRENT OUTLOOK

It is likely that the political-military stalemate will continue for some time. Despite Iraq's recent victories around Susangerd, significant changes in the military situation are unlikely before spring. Even then Baghdad's moves will probably be limited. On the diplomatic front, efforts by the Islamic Conference and UN envoy Olaf Palme have not produced flexibility. Neither side in the conflict seems to have a clear-cut strategy for ending the war.

* * *

The costly failure of Iran's offensive earlier this month essentially eliminated its ability to launch further large-scale attacks this winter. The Iranians were saved from greater losses only by the overcautiousness of the counterattacking Iraqis. Although Baghdad's forces are continuing to apply pressure around Susangerd, plans for a major offensive on the key Khuzestan front are likely to be deferred until the roads improve in the spring.

Iraq will retain its substantial, but not decisive, military margin at least through the rest of this year, regardless of Iran's efforts to reconstitute and reequip its forces. If Iraq chooses to pay the price, it can probably seize considerably more territory in Khuzestan when drier weather comes.

Baghdad has more modest objectives in mind, however. It probably hopes to improve its positions through minor tactical gains, complete its encirclement of Abadan, and maintain some pressure on Iranian forces all along the front. Such goals are well within Iraqi capabilities, but would do little to break the political deadlock.

Prospects for successful mediation are dim. Iran refused to participate in the recent Islamic Summit. Iraq reiterated there its previous offer to withdraw from Iran in return for Iranian recognition of its territorial claims and a pledge of non-interference in Iraq's internal affairs. Tehran has repeatedly rejected this formula, maintaining that negotiations are not possible until Iraq withdraws.

Each side apparently entertains vague hopes that the war will eventually weaken the other to the point where a political upheaval will take place, after which greater flexibility might be expected. The conflict has in fact caused domestic dislocations and economic shortages on both sides. In Iraq, enthusiasm for the war has waned, and the regime must contend with dissident Kurds and Shiites. But the government is still firmly in control. Domestic infighting continues in Iran, but there is little reason to expect a major change or that any faction is prepared to give in to Iraq's demands.

3. GISCARD REMAINS THE FAVORITE IN FRENCH ELECTION RACE

Giscard's press interview of January 27, which sought to portray France as playing an active international role, was aimed primarily at French voters. With the election less than three months away, Giscard's popularity took a significant drop in January. The latest polls show Giscard barely beating Socialist party leader Francois Mitterrand in the second, or run-off round.

* * *

Recent public opinion polls, the most unfavorable yet for Giscard, coincide with a wave of public concern over unemployment and rising prices. Inflation is running at about 13 percent and the number of unemployed is approaching 1.7 million with little relief in sight.

Most political observers expected Giscard's year-end lead in the polls to dwindle. While it is still too early for the sharper-than-expected declines in recent polls to be taken as definitive trends, the election will not be the Giscardian landslide that had been predicted on the basis of earlier sampling. For Giscard supporters, the polls are a little too close for comfort.

Giscard is unpopular with an important segment of the Gaullist electorate. There has been increased speculation about Gaullist/Socialist cooperation, but any formal arrangement between the two groups is very unlikely. Nevertheless, backers of Mitterrand are hopeful that disgruntled Gaullist voters will support their candidate or abstain in sufficient numbers to allow the Socialist party leader to win. It is expected that Giscard will increasingly wrap himself in the cloak of Gaullism in an effort to prevent such hemorrhaging.

The key to Giscard's reelection remains the French Communist Party (PCF). The Communists want Mitterrand defeated. By loudly demanding a role in any future left government, the PCF could scare a sufficient number of centrist or Gaullist voters to ensure Giscard's election.

4. INDIA CHALLENGES US NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

The Indians have informed us that they will soon begin reprocessing US-supplied spent power reactor fuel, albeit under IAEA Safeguards. They have also told us that they will henceforth look elsewhere for fuel unless they receive "positive assurances" of future US shipments by the end of February.

* * *

India maintains that the IAEA Safeguards agreement fulfills its obligation under the 1963 Indo-US bilateral agreement. Many officials, however, would welcome an end to US nuclear cooperation in order to enhance India's nuclear independence. Mrs. Gandhi evidently hopes to present Washington the choice of continuing or terminating the agreement and taking the onus for resulting political strains.

The initial spent fuel to be reprocessed will be either that supplied by the US for the Tarapur reactors or that indigenously fabricated for the Rajasthan-I reactor. It is not clear which will be reprocessed first. The spent fuel from both reactors is under IAEA Safeguards.

Contrary to the US position, the Indians maintain that the agreement concluded with the IAEA last August obviates the need for further US approval for reprocessing fuel from Tarapur. The Indians have, however, offered to allow the US to inspect the reprocessing facility between now and the end of February to confirm that safeguards are being effectively applied.

The reprocessed fuel will probably be used as new reactor fuel for either the Tarapur reactors or the fast breeder test reactor. It is unlikely that the reprocessed fuel will be used as weapons material since India has unsafeguarded research reactors which produce more suitable material for use in a weapons program. Reprocessing at Tarapur, along with the possible construction of a mixed-oxide fuel plant, would eventually make India independent of foreign nuclear fuel suppliers, including the US.

117863
~~SECRET~~
21

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ - [REDACTED]

February 6, 1981

13524
E.O. 2938
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b (1)(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

Israel-South Africa Discuss Exchange of Soviet Spy: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the possibility of a "swap" involving "a Russian spy captured in South Africa," presumably Major Aleksej Kozlov, and Soviet dissident Anatolij Shcharanskij.

[REDACTED] According to press, Kozlov, a KGB agent, was arrested in 1981. His main mission was said to be to judge how much damage the black nationalist movement had caused South Africa. (S [REDACTED])

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese

~~SECRET~~ - [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M3511 #117863
BY RW NA TE 8/16/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

February 6, 1981

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

(3)

Cuba Expects U.S. to Pursue "Interventionist Policy" in Central America; Salvadoran Leftist Group Attempting to Organize Campaign of Violence Against U.S. Embassies:

• Cuba: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Havana is preparing for the worst in relations with the U.S., possibly even including a U.S. blockade of Cuba and an "interventionist policy" in Central America. [REDACTED] Cuba is ready to continue to pursue the "normalization of relations" begun during the Carter administration, and will respond to conciliatory U.S. actions, though it will take no new initiatives itself. [REDACTED]

Havana does not believe Washington has the military might to intervene in the Middle East and other areas far from its borders, and feels the U.S. might attempt to assert itself in Central America out of frustration. In this regard, the Cuban government expects the administration to pursue an "interventionist policy" in Central America, either indirectly through support to the governments of Guatemala and Honduras -- which will try to implement U.S. policies in the area -- or directly by the military and related support to El Salvador. [REDACTED] the revolutionary activity in El Salvador will eventually spread to Guatemala and Honduras, confronting the U.S. with a "Vietnam-type situation" in Central America. [REDACTED]

• El Salvador: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the National Revolutionary Union (URN) of Guatemala was asked by the United Revolutionary Union (DRU) of El Salvador to participate in a "concerted campaign of violence" against the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City. The request [REDACTED] was reportedly being made in retaliation for the military and financial assistance which the U.S. government is allegedly providing to the government of El Salvador. The same request is being made to unidentified groups in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, and the DRU representatives who met with the URN planned to travel to Mexico upon leaving Guatemala. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
Review on January 30, 2011
Classified by Multiple Sources

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M35111 #117865

BY RW NARA DATE 8/16/16

Malta-USSR Shipping and Bunkering Agreement: Although details of the January 26 USSR-Malta bilateral merchant marine agreements are undetermined, they could portend a significant increase in Soviet presence in Malta, [REDACTED]. These two agreements themselves do not represent a serious threat of a major increase in Soviet presence -- Moscow has similar arrangements with other NATO countries. Rather, concern is generated by uncertainty of any unannounced agreements. [REDACTED] the possible political implications of an expanded Soviet presence on the island are significant. In his attempt to play the East against the West to see who will provide the greater economic assistance, Mintoff may have endangered Malta's claimed position of neutrality. (C)

Bolivia Anxious for Improved Relations with U.S.: A Bolivian foreign ministry official told an embassy officer Wednesday "there is great hope at the highest levels of the regime" that the administration will recognize the Garcia Meza regime soon. The regime is attempting to improve its image, however, and according to that official Garcia Meza will make a speech next week announcing that a new "political parties law" will be enacted soon to pave the way to democratic elections "in the future." The desire to obtain U.S. recognition also reportedly influenced a recent cabinet decision to maintain the current cabinet until either Washington recognized the regime or at least until June or July to show the government is in control. (While the embassy believes the information is accurate, it also notes that to date a coherent government performance has not been possible, with ministers speaking and acting independently. (C))

MEMORANDUM

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)(6)

117007
~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

24

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

February 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Noon Notes

*make memo of
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it to him
in A.M.*

Nicaraguan Plans to Ship Weapons to El Salvador: The Nicaraguan government plans to send 30,000 pounds of weapons to El Salvador early this month, the largest shipment since the supply flights originated in December 1980, [REDACTED]

The plane carrying the weapons will be a reconditioned DC-6 which will be burned as soon as it has unloaded in El Salvador. No identifying markings will be on the aircraft so that the GRN can deny any connection with it. (S)

(Embassy Managua comments that it is puzzling why the aircraft would be destroyed, thus deliberately "burning their air bridge behind them." The embassy also feels the plan is more likely a covert operation compartmentalized within the FSLN, rather than a Nicaraguan government plan. (S)

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Romanian Diplomat's Warning on Soviet Initiatives Toward an Afghan Settlement: A Romanian diplomat abroad recently commented that one could not assume Soviet proposals for talks on Afghanistan to the Pakistani and Iranian governments were well intentioned or serious. [REDACTED] the diplomat believed the proposals were merely an effort by the Soviets to create confusion among the delegations to the Islamic conference and the upcoming nonaligned conference in New Delhi. The Romanian commented that the Soviets have somewhat succeeded

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW ON FEBRUARY 5, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

NLR 13511 #117867
BY RW NADA DATE 8/16/10

~~TOP SECRET~~

in splitting off Pakistan from the other Islamic countries and also from the NAM countries. This split is a more significant accomplishment for the Soviets than the support they are expected to receive on this issue from Syria and Cuba. (S)



Nicaraguan Official Offers to Mediate Political Compromise in El Salvador: In late January Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan interior minister, requested that Dominican Republic and Costa Rican Christian Democratic representatives relay an offer for him to mediate a political solution to the current impasse in El Salvador to their contacts in El Salvador and Venezuela. [redacted]

[redacted] that Borge most likely assumed his message would be passed to the U.S. government. Borge initially said the removal of President Duarte was a condition for settlement, but later backed away from that position. He asserted that his offer should be welcomed by the Salvadoran junta because the leftist forces are, and will continue to be, well armed -- even in comparison to the Sandinista forces when they defeated Somoza. While admitting they do not enjoy the widespread popular support, he asserted the government could not totally destroy their forces without alienating the populace. [redacted] there is little doubt Borge's offer is a calculated move coordinated between the Nicaraguan FSLN and the Salvadoran leftists, probably with advice and guidance from Havana. (S)

include in memo to P- get list 1 item on 1 page



See list memo

[REDACTED]

Possible Brezhnev Visit to Nigeria: Nigerian foreign ministry officials in mid-January revealed that Soviet embassy personnel recently approached the foreign ministry regarding a visit by Brezhnev this spring, in response to an invitation extended last October by President Shagari.

[REDACTED]

It appears the visit will take place shortly after the Soviet party congress in early March. (S)

117811

~~TOP SECRET~~

27

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

January 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD ALLEN
FROM: The Situation Room
SUBJECT: Information Items

*Combine w/ Item 4
memo for [unclear]*

Cuba Expects U.S. to Pursue "Interventionist Policy" in Central America: [redacted]

[redacted] Havana is preparing for the worst in relations with the U.S., possibly even including a U.S. blockade of Cuba and an "interventionist policy" in Central America. [redacted] Cuba is ready to continue to pursue the "normalization of relations" begun during the Carter administration, and will respond to conciliatory U.S. actions, though it will take no new initiatives itself. [redacted]

Havana does not believe Washington has the military might to intervene in the Middle East and other areas far from its borders, and feels the U.S. might attempt to assert itself in Central America out of frustration. In this regard, the Cuban government expects the administration to pursue an "interventionist policy" in Central America, either indirectly through support to the governments of Guatemala and Honduras -- which will try to implement U.S. policies in the area -- or directly by military and related support to El Salvador. [redacted] the revolutionary activity in El Salvador will eventually spread to Guatemala and Honduras, confronting the U.S. with a "Vietnam-type situation" in Central America. [redacted]

135046
E.O. 11652
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1)(6)

(1)

(2)



~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW ON JANUARY 30, 2011
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY RW NARA DATE 8/16/16
#11787/

~~TOP SECRET~~



3

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Malta-USSR Shipping and Bunkering Agreement: Although details of the January 26 USSR-Malta bilateral merchant marine agreements are undetermined, they could portend a significant increase in Soviet presence on Malta, according to DIA. These two agreements themselves do not represent a serious threat of a major increase in Soviet presence -- Moscow has similar arrangements with other European nations in the Mediterranean region, including some NATO countries. Rather, concern is generated by the uncertainty of any unannounced agreements. ~~There is general uneasiness that Prime Minister Mintoff may be approaching culmination of his longstanding effort to barter permission for an official Soviet presence in exchange for substantial economic assistance involving improved commercial relations. Furthermore, possible additional Soviet access to Maltese sea and airport facilities, which supposedly were discussed in the negotiations, apparently was not mentioned in the publicized accords.~~ DIA comments that nevertheless, the possible political implications of an expanded Soviet presence on the island are significant. In his attempt to play the east against the West to see who will provide the greater economic assistance, Mintoff may have endangered Malta's claimed position of neutrality. (C)

4

to

Salvadoran Leftist Group Attempting to Organize Campaign of Violence Against U.S. Embassies:

~~the~~ the National Revolutionary Union (URN) of Guatemala was asked by the United Revolutionary Union (DRU) of El Salvador to participate in a "concerted campaign of violence" against the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City. The request, ~~the~~ was reportedly being made in retaliation for the military and financial assistance which the U.S. government is allegedly providing to the government of El Salvador. The same request is

being made to unidentified groups in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, and the DRU representatives who met with the URN planned to travel to Mexico upon leaving Guatemala. [REDACTED]

1/8
Bolivia Anxious for Improved Relations with U.S.: A Bolivian foreign ministry official told an embassy officer Wednesday "there is great hope at the highest levels of the regime" that the administration will recognize the Garcia Meza regime soon. The regime is attempting to improve its image, however, and according to the official Garcia Meza will make a speech next week announcing that a new "political parties law" will be enacted soon to pave the way to democratic elections "in the future." The desire to obtain U.S. recognition also reportedly influenced a recent cabinet decision to maintain the current cabinet until either Washington recognizes the regime or at least until June or July to show the government is in control. (While the embassy believes the information is accurate, it also notes that to date a coherent government performance has not been possible, with ministers speaking and acting independently. (C)

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NLRR M37111 #117873

BY lw NARA DATE 6/22/15

TO SECRETATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0900

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 0625

LIMDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 1/28/01 (WATSON, A.F) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, EL
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON US POLICY TOWARD BOLIVIA.
REF: (A) STATE 23755, (B) 80 LA PAZ 7634, (C) 80 LA PAZ 9611

1. (S = ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE OUTLINES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INTER-AGENCY GROUP MEETING FEBRUARY 3 OUR VIEWS ON HOW US INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA MAY BE BEST ADVANCED IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AS REQUESTED IN REF A. THE MEETING IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY BECAUSE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS MAXIMUM LEVERAGE IN BOLIVIA NOW. OVERRIDING US INTERESTS HERE ARE REDUCTION OF COCAINE FLOW, PROTECTION OF US CITIZENS, AND AVOIDANCE OF FURTHER POLITICAL RADICALIZATION WHICH PROVIDES INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RADICAL LEFT. THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT IN WHICH THESE INTERESTS MUST BE PURSUED IS ONE OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION OF A BOLIVIAN REGIME WHICH HAS STUBBORNLY DEFIED SERIOUS CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE US, OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE HOLY SEE. THE REGIME HOPES TO BE RESCUED FROM THIS ISOLATION WITHOUT ADDRESSING THESE CONCERNS BY GAINING US SUPPORT WHICH WILL RESULT IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, JUSTIFICATION OF ITS PERFORMANCE AND AN UNDERMINING OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS' AND ORGANIZATIONS' POSITIONS. CONTRADICTORILY, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE REGIME AND ITS PRE-COUP ANTECEDENTS TOWARD THE US HAS BEEN BELLIGERENTLY OSTILE: VICIOUSLY ATTACKING OUR AMBASSADOR, DESTROYING OUR CONSULAR AGENCY AND BINATIONAL CENTER IN SANTA CRUZ, SACKING OUR COMMISSARY, AND TREATING US CITIZENS IN VIOLATION OF THE VIENNA CONSULAR CONVENTION, INCLUDING THE GROSS MISTREATMENT OF THREE EMBASSY MARINE SECURITY GUARDS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS BY THE REGIME TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US AND IT HAS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

NAN COL VP
EOB:ASTMET

PSN:030775

PAGE 01

TOR:030/19:30Z

DTG:00140Z JAN 81

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ISSUES WE HAVE RAISED. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR LOW-KEY, UNSUPPORTIVE POSITION HAS WON THE PRAISE OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MODERATES WHO CONSTITUTE THE BRADAD CENTER OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WILL LEAD FUTURE GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ADVANCE OUR KEY INTERESTS IS FOR THE USG TO ADVISE THE BOLIVIAN REGIME DIRECTLY THAT A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION UNTIL THE REGIME MAKES SERIOUS EFFORTS: (A) TO END ITS OWN INVOLVEMENT IN COCAINE TRAFFICKING AND MOVE AGAINST OTHER MAJOR TRAFFICKERS; (B) TO TREAT AMERICANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH TREATIES, LAWS AND CIVILIZED NORMS; AND (C) TO TERMINATE THE RADICAL, REPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR WHICH FOSTERS POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND RADICALIZATION AND TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM. THERE ARE NO SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES WHICH WE WOULD GAIN BY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE RESULTING SACRIFICE OF OUR CURRENT LEVERAGE ON THESE VITAL ISSUES. IF THE USG APPLIES THIS LEVERAGE NOW, WE COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ATTAINING OUR IMMEDIATE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVES AND POSITION OURSELVES VERY WELL FOR THE FUTURE.

END SUMMARY.

3. THE ADVENT OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON AFFORDS US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT OUR POLICY TOWARD BOLIVIA. AS I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE FEBRUARY 3 INTER-AGENCY MEETING AT WHICH OUR POLICY WILL BE REVIEWED, I AM OFFERING IN THIS CABLE SOME THOUGHTS IN SUMMARY FORM WHICH I HOPE THE IG WILL FIND USEFUL.

4. US INTERESTS: WHILE WE HAVE NO MAJOR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA, THERE ARE TWO BASIC CATEGORIES OF US INTERESTS OF SOME IMPORTANCE--COUNTRY SPECIFIC INTERESTS AND BROAD HEMISPHERIC INTERESTS. THERE SEEM TO US TO BE THREE OVERRIDING COUNTRY SPECIFIC US INTERESTS HERE. THEY ARE: (A) REDUCTION OF THE FLOW INTO THE US OF COCAINE ORIGINATING IN BOLIVIA; (B) PROTECTION OF THE WELFARE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THIS COUNTRY; AND (C) AVOIDANCE OF FURTHER POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND RADICALIZATION WHICH WOULD INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EXTREME LEFT AND RIGHT

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DEVOLVE INTO A DANGEROUS SITUATION SIMILAR IN SOME RESPECTS TO THOSE IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR. ALTHOUGH DEFINITION OF BROADER US INTERESTS IN THE HEMISPHERE IS CLEARLY BEYOND MY RESPONSIBILITIES, I VENTURE TO SUGGEST SEVERAL INTER-RELATED BROAD INTERESTS RELEVANT HERE: (A) ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE WHICH REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF SUCCESSFUL MEDDLING BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS AGENTS; (B) MAINTENANCE AND FURTHERING OF RECENT PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRATIC, PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES, NOTABLY AMONG THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES AND BRAZIL, AND (C) INCREASED SHARING BY THE LATIN COUNTRIES OF VALUES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE US, INCLUDING A RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. CURRENT DIPLOMATIC SITUATION: HOW WE ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA DEPENDS, OF COURSE, ON THE DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE ARE WORKING. THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME CONTINUES TO BE ISOLATED INTERNATIONALLY--A SITUATION OF ITS OWN MAKING. NOT ONLY THE US, BUT ALSO THE HOLY SEE, THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES SAVE JAPAN, THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES AND OTHERS HAVE REFRAINED FROM ESTABLISHING "NORMAL" DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOLIVIA SINCE THE JULY

17. COUP. EVEN GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE "NORMAL" RELATIONS, SUCH AS BRAZIL AND MEXICO, HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT EVENTS IN BOLIVIA SINCE JULY 17 AND CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE WARM RELATIONS. RATHER THAN TRY TO ACCOMMODATE THE PROFOUND CONCERNS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CHURCH, THE REGIME (WITH SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FROM ARGENTINA) HAS HELD ITS GROUND DEFIANTLY, HOPING THAT A NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WILL OFFER SUPPORT (CHIEFLY IN TERMS OF SENDING AN AMBASSADOR TO LA PAZ AND RESTORING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS), THUS

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 ILLICIT US MARKET. IN FACT, ITS INVOLVEMENT IS EVER DEEPER AND MORE CONSPICUOUS. SECONDLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING THE REGIME'S REPRESSION: ILLEGAL BREAKING INTO HOMES, SACKING, STEALING, ARBITRARY ARRESTS, MISTREATMENT AND TORTURE OF PRISONERS AND THE USE OF PARAMILITARY DEATH SQUADS CONTINUE. THIRDLY, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THIS REGIME EVER INTENDS TO SEEK A NEW OPENING TOWARD CONSTITUTIONALISM; RATHER, IT HAS MADE IT INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT IT WILL REMAIN IN POWER AS LONG AS IT CAN. FINALLY, DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC MEASURES THAT WERE TAKEN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED THE REGIME WILL TAKE THE ADDITIONAL STEPS, INCLUDING REFINING IN PUBLIC SPENDING, ESSENTIAL TO RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC HEALTH.

8. OUR DOMESTIC POSTURE: WHILE THE REGIME HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY HOSTILE TO THE US, OUR LOW-KEY, DIGNIFIED POSTURE OF REFUSING TO DEAL WITH IT WHILE MAKING CLEAR TO ALL WHO INQUIRE THAT OUR CONCERNS ARE WITH MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES NOT PERSONALITIES HAS WON THE PRAISE OF MODERATE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL GROUPS OF THE MODERATE LEFT, CENTER AND INCREASINGLY THE MODERATE RIGHT. THE MODERATE MILITARY OFFICERS ARE THE ONLY FORCE WITH REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES OF BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE OF REGIME OR MODIFICATION OF GARCIA MEZA'S POLICIES. MOREOVER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONTROL ANY IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR REGIME. THE MODERATE CIVILIAN POLITICAL GROUPS ARE THE DOMINANT CIVILIAN POLITICAL FORCES WHO WILL LEAD EVENTUAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS. THESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELEMENTS HAVE URGED US TO HOLD FIRM. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE US TO RETAIN THEIR CONFIDENCE.

9. ADVANCEMENT OF US INTERESTS: THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION

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IS HOW IN THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT WE CAN BEST ADVANCE US INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY OVER THE MEDIUM AND LONGER TERM. UNTIL THE REGIME MAKES A SERIOUS EFFORT TO END ITS OWN EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN COCAINE TRAFFICKING AND TO MOVE AGAINST THE "SANTA CRUZ MAFIA", US COOPERATION IN NARCOTICS CONTROL WOULD BE A WASTE OF FUNDS AND PRESTIGE. COOPERATION BY DEA IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES LIKELY WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE; IT WOULD TEND TO LEGITIMIZE THE REGIME'S CYNICAL CLAIMS THAT IT IS ATTACKING THE PROBLEM SERIOUSLY; AND, IF SUCCESSFUL IN EXPOSING THE REGIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN TRAFFICKING, COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR US PERSONNEL. OUR BEST COURSE ON THIS ISSUE IS TO PRESS THE REGIME TO DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY IT INTENDS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM, BEFORE WE TAKE ANY ACTION. SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THE REGIME SHOULD TREAT AMERICANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VIENNA CONSULAR CONVENTION AND ADHERE TO CIVILIZED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR, BEFORE WE MOVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS.

10. FINALLY, IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE TENDENCY TOWARD POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND RADICALIZATION, WE MUST RETAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MODERATE MILITARY ELEMENTS AND THE BROAD CENTER OF THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, WHILE PRESSURING THE REGIME TO CEASE ITS GROSS EXCESSES AND MOVE TOWARD A MORE OPEN, PARTICIPATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM. IF WE DO NOT, THE MILITARY FORCES MOST LIKELY TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE WILL BECOME DEMORALIZED AND MODERATE LEFTISTS MAY WELL CONCLUDE THAT A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH IS HOPELESS AND ADOPT MORE RADICAL METHODS, PERHAPS TURNING TO OTHER FOREIGN SOURCES FOR SUPPORT. IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GARCIA MEZA'S CLAIMS THAT HIS COUP PREVENTED A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND THAT HIS REGIME IS A BULWARK AGAINST THE RADICAL LEFT ARE PATENTLY FALSE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE REGIME'S INCOMPETENCE, CORRUPTION AND REPRESSION CREATE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE EXTREME LEFT TAKES ROOT.

11. I CAN THINK OF NO SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE THAT WOULD BE GAINED BY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CONSEQUENT SACRIFICE OF THE INFLUENCE ON THESE VITAL ISSUES WE NOW HAVE. TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITHOUT POSITIVE PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO US WOULD HELP THIS REGIME CONSOLIDATE WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR INTERESTS. MOREOVER, SUCH A NORMALIZATION WOULD VITIATE THE SOLID INFLUENCE AND CREDIBILITY WE HAVE WITH THOSE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH TO OUR MIND CONSTITUTE THIS COUNTRY'S REAL FUTURE.

12. CONCLUSION: WE BELIEVE THE USG HAS AN EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE US INTERESTS IN BOLIVIA NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME HAS BEEN STALLING FOR MONTHS IN THE HOPE THAT A NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROVIDE THE RECOGNITION AND ASSISTANCE IT SEEKS WITH NO RECIPROCAL ACTION ON ITS PART. WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION, WE NOW HAVE MAXIMUM LEVERAGE. BY SPELLING OUT TO THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME CLEARLY AND SOON (PROBABLY IN WASHINGTON) THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION UNTIL EFFECTIVE ACTION IS TAKEN ON THE ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US, AND COMMUNICATING THIS POSITION TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, I BELIEVE WE COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES.

..... WATSON

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NODIS
E.O. 12065: XDS 1/29/01 (BUSHNELL, JOHN A.)

TAGS:PINT, US, NU

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH GRN OFFICIALS

REF: MANAGUA 00440

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. HERE IS MY VERSION OF MY BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH CASCO. YOU SHOULD GO BACK TO YOUR INTERLOCUTOR AND MAKE CLEAR WHAT I DID AND DIDN'T SAY AS WELL AS ITS FULL IMPORT AND INTENT.

3. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR CASCO'S EXPRESSED HOPE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS I SAID WE COULD NOT HAVE SUCH RELATIONS UNLESS THE GON CHANGED ITS WAYS. I REFERRED TO ITS ROLE IN SUPPORTING INSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR AND IN LETTING THE CUBANS USE ITS TERRITORY. THE AMBASSADOR DENIED THAT THIS SUPPORT EXISTED. I TOLD HER WE HAD THE EVIDENCE, PICTURES AND MUCH MORE.

4. FINALLY YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT I DID NOT SAY WE HAD MADE UP OUR MIND TO SUSPEND ASSISTANCE. WHAT I DID SAY AND I WANT YOU TO BRING THE FULL FORCE OF THIS HOME TO THE GON WAS THAT, SHOULD NICARAGUA'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE INSURGENTS IN EL SALVADOR NOT STOP, SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE WILL BE THE LEAST

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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OF THEIR PROBLEMS. I TOLD HER TO REPORT ACCURATELY AND QUICKLY.

5. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD SEE BAYARDO ARCE AND BORGE AS WELL AS THE GROUP YOU HAVE BEEN SEEING. WHILE GROUP SESSIONS ARE PREFERABLE, YOU COULD SUPPLEMENT BY INDIVIDUAL SESSIONS.

6. ONCE YOU HAVE COMPLETED THIS ROUND COME TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS. MAKE CLEAR TO THE NICARAGUANS THAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TOUGH QUESTIONS HERE ON THEIR RESPONSES TO YOU ON THE QUESTIONS OF (A) WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE GOING TO STOP USE OF THEIR TERRITORY AND (B) WHAT QUICK MEASURES THEY WILL TAKE THAT WILL BE VISIBLE TO US, IN ADDITION TO OUR SEEING THE FLOWS OF MATERIEL AND PEOPLE STOP. HAIG
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MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: "Gambier Bay"

Cap Weinberger has forwarded a memo to you regarding the "Gambier Bay," the carrier which the two of you apparently discussed the other evening.

He also has attached a few pages from "The Battle of Leyte Gulf," which tell the story of the carrier.

Attachments

cc: Ed Meese

.81 VEO-3 64:30



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The name of the carrier we were discussing at dinner last evening was the "Gambier Bay." I am attaching a copy of a few pages from "The Battle of Leyte Gulf," by Edwin P. Hoyt, which tells the story in a rather dramatic fashion.

We lost two other carriers in that battle and a total of eleven in the course of World War II. Reviewing these losses (list also attached) indicates that all carriers lost were of pre-World War II construction, or were light or escort carriers. Some of the heavy carriers we commissioned during World War II received tremendous punishment, but all survived.

We are looking into the possibility of some documentaries along the lines you spoke of, trying to recreate for the current generation the people who took part in World War II and some of their more heroic activities.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Sap", is located in the center of the page.

Attachments

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WORLD WAR II UNITED STATES CARRIER LOSSES

<u>CARRIER</u>		<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Lexington	(CV-2)	Coral Sea	5/8/42
Yorktown	(CV-5)	Midway	6/4-7/42
Wasp	(CV-7)	Solomons	9/15/42
Hornet	(CV-8)	Solomons	10/27/42
Liscome Bay	(CVE-56)	Gilbert Islands	11/24/43
Block Island	(CVE-21)	Atlantic	5/29/44
Princeton	(CVL-23)	Leyte Gulf	10/24/44
Gambier Bay	(CVE-73)	Leyte Gulf	10/25/44
St. Lo	(CVE-63)	Leyte Gulf	10/25/44
Omaney Bay	(CVE-79)	Mindoro	1/4/45
Bismarck Sea	(CVE-95)	Iwo Jima	2/21/45

Altogether they had taken six shells, four direct hits, and two near misses. Four men were killed and five were seriously injured.

The *White Plains*, in the center of that forward line, was not hit at all, saw no torpedoes, and did not think much of Japanese gunnery.

The results may indicate that the Jap surface gunnery is not very good as all 13 of our ships involved should have been sunk by the number of projectiles thrown at them. This ship was not hit but it received so many straddles that by the laws of chance it should have been hit several times. One . . . salvo . . . 14-inch . . . was almost the gunners' delight with four close overs and two close shorts. . . . The laws of probability and chance were not operating in favor of the Japs that day. The shooting was good but the percentage of hits was very low, at least on this ship. No accurate estimate of total number of rounds fired can be given but photographs taken from this ship show about 180 splashes. . . .

The *Kitkun Bay* took eight salvos from Japanese ships within 1000 yards, but only one shot came close enough to do any damage at all, and that landed 50 yards astern. The *St. Lo* took innumerable straddles and near misses, mostly from the destroyers that came in on the starboard side of the formation (she was the starboard ship in the second line) but not a single hit was observed, and only three men were injured, all from flying shrapnel that causes superficial wounds.

// But there was a more tragic story: that of the *Gambier Bay*. It would seem impossible that the Japanese could come down like wolves on the fold and not manage to do any destruction to the targets they sought, and they did sink the *Gambier Bay*.

Here is the story of the sinking of *Gambier Bay*, from the ship's action report and the Captain's recollections:

Captain W. V. R. Vieweg ordered the launching of planes as soon as he learned of the arrival of the Japanese on the scene, and the crew moved quickly. But there were problems because of the changes in course to try to escape the Japanese.

. . . When my planes were brought up on deck we had very little relative wind movement over the deck. According to the tables we didn't have enough wind to launch a fully loaded and fueled torpedo plane. The first torpedo plane to be launched with a torpedo in it was accordingly launched with only 35 gallons of gasoline in it. This plane subsequently launched a torpedo successfully against the enemy and then, of course, was lost.

When that plane got off, the second plane was launched with a full load of gasoline. There were two more planes—one got off successfully, but as for the second:

We had changed course a little more to the south which brought the wind almost directly astern of us and there was only a 5-knot relative wind over the deck and I knew that was certain death for the crew to catapult it and hence I pulled the crew out of the plane and catapulted the plane without a crew as a means of jettisoning it, since we were by that time threatened with hits. Salvos were falling pretty close.

Gambier Bay's trouble was that she was on the windward side of the formation, which meant her smoke and that of the destroyers blew away quickly, leaving her the most exposed and readily visible of the carriers.

I maneuvered the ship alternately from one side of the base course to another as I saw that a salvo was about due to hit. One could observe that the salvos would hit some distance away and gradually creep up closer and from the spacing on the water could tell that the next would be on if we did nothing. We would invariably turn into the direction from which the salvos were creeping and sure enough the next salvo would land right in the water where we would have been if we hadn't turned. The next few salvos would creep across to the other side and gradually creep back and would repeat the operation. This process lasted for, believe it or not, a half hour during which the enemy was closing constantly.

The first hit came at 0810. Thereafter she was hit almost continually on the flight deck and in the spaces above the waterline. The shells killed and wounded a number of men, and caused fires, but they were quickly put out. As far as they could tell, the men of *Gambier Bay* were being fired upon by no fewer than three of the cruisers.

The disastrous shell came at 0820. Apparently a salvo aimed for the flight deck (for that's what the Japanese were trying to knock out first) fell short and lit in the water just off the port side of the ship, exploding so near the plates of the forward engine room that they were holed. The engine room flooded so rapidly it had to be secured, and one engine stopped. Speed dropped from 19½ knots to 11 knots, and the

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Gambier Bay was a sitting duck among sitting ducks. Even if the Japanese could not shoot this day, all they had to do was come up and fire point-blank at the stricken carrier, which dropped astern of the formation.

The Japs "really poured it on then," said the Captain, and they were hit by nearly every salvo, or some shots from each salvo. "During the period from the first hit, which was around 8:20 in the morning, until we sank, which was about 9:10 in the morning, we were being hit probably every other minute."

The shells that struck high did not explode and did little damage. The damage came from the shells that struck alongside the ship, by and large, or came in just below the waterline. It was not long before the second engine room went out, and the ship was dead in the water. Then the fires, which had been kept down, began to flare up, and there was no water pressure. Soon every hit caused a fire, and the fires grew in intensity. There was one plane left on the hangar deck and it caught fire and the gasoline burned fiercely.

At about 0850 with the ship helpless in the water and with this division of cruisers passing close by and other ships of the main formation passing close by on the other side, and being fired at from all sides, I ordered the ship abandoned [said Captain Vieweg]. As we were abandoning ship the enemy ships in various directions were still firing.

Here is Captain Vieweg's story of his escape from the ship:

I remained on the bridge until everyone was off the bridge and the navigator, who had the deck, and I remained up there and we saw that abandoning ship process was continuing successfully and people were getting off and at that time I directed the navigator to leave the bridge and look out for himself, which he proceeded to do by clambering down the life lines which led from the open bridge.

The Captain decided to take a look for others, and went down through the interior structure, but was almost overcome by black noxious smoke.

. . . I found myself in the rather embarrassing position in that I couldn't go back up on account of the smoke which was really climbing up through that area. And about that time another salvo

went through the bridge structure, which urged my departure. I continued, however, down to the flight deck and when I reached there the gases were so hot and black that I couldn't see.

I managed to feel my way aft along the island structure, hoping to reach the catwalk and perhaps get aft and below that way. However, instead of walking down the ladder into the catwalk gracefully, I fell into it, not being able to see, and I couldn't make out for certain where I was. In fact I was so confused at that moment that I thought I might have gone further aft than I had and had fallen into a stack, so hot and so black were the gases. However, I reached up instinctively. At this time I was probably prompted solely by instincts for self-preservation and grabbed ahold of the upper edge of what I was in and pulled myself up and over and started falling and a few seconds, perhaps a fraction of a second later, I broke into clear air with water beneath me. I fell about 40 feet and hit the water with quite a smack.

I had on me at that time my helmet and my pistol, which seemed to help very little since it gave me a good jab in the ribs and my helmet, being secured at the time, almost choked me as I hit the water. However, I came up quite rapidly and the cold water seemed to revive me quickly and I felt in perfectly good health except for my somewhat crippled right side which prevented me from using my right arm very much.

He had come off the starboard side. He tried to swim away from the carrier but it was drifting to starboard. So he swam aft.

About the time I got aft to the starboard quarter, another salvo went through the ship and at that time the ship was almost ready to roll over. The port side was in the water to the extent where the hangar deck was under water. I got about 100 yards off the port quarter at which time the ship very slowly rolled over to port and very slowly sank, and there was no serious detonation. . . .

At that point there was a Japanese cruiser about 2000 yards away, still pumping shells into the unfortunate *Gambier Bay*. But soon all the Japanese left—all but one.

However, perhaps the most alarming thing of the whole operation, from my point of view, was the fact that very shortly after we sank I observed a large Japanese ship dead in the water about three miles to the eastward. We were pretty low in the water,

hanging onto a life raft, bouncing up and down and not feeling too well.

[They thought the ship was a *Kongo*-class battleship, and it worried them considerably lest they be captured.]

At any rate this ship remained dead in the water until about sunset at which time it gradually picked up steerage way to change course to the north and disappeared from sight. This ship was at all time attended by a destroyer, a two-stack destroyer, which during the early stages would seem to disappear and reappear and we couldn't quite figure out what it was doing, whether it was picking up people or what.

Captain Vieweg was grateful when it disappeared. Capture at this stage would have been just a little too much.

When he found the first raft Captain Vieweg had begun to assemble his people, but when he had 150 or so of them together he saw the big warship and stopped, lest he attract attention and the Japanese come to get them. Actually some 700 or more survivors of the carrier assembled on various life rafts and floats in the area, but they did not ever get together in the hours that followed before rescue. Some died of their wounds. Some were eaten by sharks, as was Lieutenant William H. Buderus, who saved a number of men before he was attacked. There were many heroes of these days and nights, and most of them remain unknown.

It seemed odd to all concerned that the Japanese turned around after those two and a half hours of battle, and deserted the force they could have annihilated. And yet, certain things were happening, particularly from the air, that the Japanese could not have liked at all.

Early in the morning, before the Japanese were sighted bearing down on the escort carriers, those baby flat-tops had been assigned various tasks. Some pilots, for example, were carrying supplies, particularly water, to troops ashore who were pinned down by Japanese units. Some ships had been assigned to send their pilots out after the ships of Admirals Nishimura and Shima that were moving back westward through the Sulu Sea, or lying hurt in Surigao Strait. Some were assigned to support missions ashore, to bomb and strafe enemy troops. Of the ships of *Taffy III*, the unit under attack, the *Kalinin Bay* was able to throw heavy air strength against the enemy because it did not have morning commitments. The story of the *Kalinin Bay's* planes

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Foreign Air Traffic Controllers Support For
PATCO Strike

Information available to the State Department indicates that, in support of the illegal strike by US controllers, French controllers have decided not to handle any traffic destined for or coming from US air space for one week beginning at 0800 Paris time (0200 EDT) tomorrow. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed official support for the action having deemed US air space unsafe under French standards due to the use of military controllers.

French union statements claim support from controllers in Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, and Italy. The State Department has elicited government support in these countries in assuring that international flights in or through their air space continue to be handled in a safe and efficient manner.

It should be noted that the proposed action would not be limited to US carriers.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVIEW ON AUGUST 8, 1987

CLASSIFIED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

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NLRR M371/1 #117876

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL-SENSITIVE~~

August 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Bvd*
SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control Situation

The international impact of U.S. air controllers strike has expanded rapidly during past few days. Earlier threat of boycott by French controllers of flights to/from U.S. airspace appears diminished, but Canadian air controllers left their posts today after Canadian authorities required them to handle U.S. flights. Controllers in New Zealand also have taken isolated actions against U.S. origin/bound flights. We anticipate that international situation will continue to be fluid for at least several days.

Following is latest information on air traffic controller situation in individual countries:

Canada

Canadian authorities have taken strong stand against Canadian air traffic controller threat to stop clearing traffic to/from U.S. airspace. A general walkout has prompted closing of the Gander Flight Information Region, which controls most Transatlantic traffic. The New Brunswick Center has begun to control some of this traffic, but pressure remains. The FAA is continuing efforts to reroute this traffic. After resuming normal operations during the early evening hours last night, the ATC's have since decided not to handle any aircraft to or from the U.S. that overflies Canada.

France

Despite earlier threats by France's controllers to refuse clearance to U.S. flights, situation in Paris seems to be resolved and TWA and Pan Am flights for U.S. left on time. French Government has been very cooperative throughout. Marseille controllers still refusing overflight clearance for some flights.

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REVIEW ON AUGUST 10, 1987
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3701 # 117878

BY *LW* NARA DATE *6/22/11*

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Portugal

Air controllers in Portugal began sympathy strike in mid-afternoon August 10 (Washington time). Strike action appeared to have ended by 1700 hours EST. The ATC's have voted to boycott all flights to or from the U.S. beginning at midnight on Saturday. Workers in Portugal must give a "five day warning" before going on strike. (C)

United Kingdom

The UK situation appears close to normal. The British Civil Aviation Authority is expected to issue a statement later today that it regards the U.S. air traffic control situation to be safe.

New Zealand

New Zealand flight controllers began a selective boycott yesterday. Late yesterday, Acting Prime Minister Macintyre informed Ambassador Browne that a compromise proposal to end present action against U.S. bound planes had been worked out. If GNZ will send team to the U.S. to observe air traffic control operations in Honolulu and Los Angeles controllers would clear U.S. bound planes to intermediate destinations (Fiji and Tahiti) even if they did not land. The Prime Minister's office informed our embassy that the expectation would be that the team would file positive reports which would enable the controllers to clear planes directly to locations. From his discussion with Macintyre, Browne had the strong impression that he believes that New Zealand air traffic controllers are seeking some way out of the current situation and that the controllers will accept the compromise. In view of Air New Zealand's financial situation, the government is clearly anxious to solve the current problem soonest. But the government is reluctant to take actions which might precipitate a walkout by all controllers. Browne comments there may be compelling reasons of policy why a compromise solution involving a team visit to our facilities is not acceptable, but in view of Macintyre's personal approach, he recommends we give the proposal careful consideration. (C)

Australia

The Australian Minister of Transport is strongly supporting USG action against PATCO. Australian controllers are seeking a court injunction to stop flights to the U.S. on safety grounds. Australian Department of Transportation officials believe that, in view of present hostility between the Fraser

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Court and the unions, there may be a general stoppage of aviation in Australia by the end of the week. As a result of Transport Minister Hunt's threat to fire employees who apply bans to air traffic to or from the U.S., the ATC's have delayed instituting a complete ban against all flight to or from the U.S. The ban was to have begun at 1000 EDT this morning. (C)

Fiji

The Fiji Government also is supporting USG action, and Fiji air traffic controllers have yet to decide whether to support the New Zealand boycott. Permanent Secretary for Transportation told Embassy Suva this morning that he was "reasonably optimistic" that the ATC's would not join in the boycott. (C)

ABA

The American Bar Association assembly gave its overwhelming approval for the President's stand on the ATC's strike.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

117881

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RR

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dick*
SUBJECT: C-130 Crash Near Las Vegas

Early this morning a USAF C-130 cargo plane crashed while attempting to land on military property in Indian Springs, Nevada.

- o The plane was carrying 67 persons, 10 crew and 57 soldiers from Ft. Lewis who were on a sensitive special operations mission.
- o So far three persons are known to have died and there are four persons missing.
- o The plane was carrying ammunition, which exploded in the crash. (S)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 21, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY RICHARD V. ALLEN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-357#117881

BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/12