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Digital Library Collections

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject  
File: Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversation –  
President Reagan (09/12/1984-October 1984)

**Box:** 53

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 2/8/2007

**File Folder** MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-  
OCTOBER 1984)

**FOIA**

F04-062

**Box Number** 53

BARBARA ELIAS

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33555	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1984	6	ND	B1
33556	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU SESE SEKO OF ZAIRE, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984 <i>R 11/26/2008 NLRRF04-062</i>	3	ND	B1
33557	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984	4	ND	B1
33558	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND SON SANN OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA COALITION, SEPTEMBER 24, 1984	3	ND	B1
33559	MEMCON	THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MANEA MANESCU, VICE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA'S STATE COUNCIL: PHOTO OPPORTUNITY	1	ND	B1
33560	MEMCON	MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID, SEPTEMBER 27, 1984 <i>R 4/5/2013 M370/1</i>	2	10/2/1984	B1
33561	MEMCON	PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER PERES, ETC., OCTOBER 9, 1984 <i>R 4/5/2013 M370/1</i>	8	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8406779

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

ab 2/26/07

RECEIVED 14 SEP 84 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 12 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: NATO

GREAT BRITAIN

CARRINGTON, PETER

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & CARRINGTON

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 17 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	9/27	Kimmit's sgd memo		RK, PS

DISPATC

9/27

W/ATTCH

FILE (C)

lmi

### National Security Council The White House

System # I

Package # 67.0

1345

8 S.P.14 A9

22

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>"</u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Wilma Hall	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4/6</u>	<u>K/K</u>	<u></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u></u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Corruption</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

September 27, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES dib 2/6/07

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL R.J. AFFOURTIT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between  
the President and Lord Carrington

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the  
President's meeting with Lord Carrington on September 11,  
1984.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

DLB 2/8/2007

*File Folder*

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

*FOIA*

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

*Box Number*

53

8

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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33555 MEMCON

6

ND

B1

SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
LORD CARRINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1984

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

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**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Lord Carrington

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's September 11 meeting with Lord Carrington.

RECOMMENDATION:

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward it to State and Defense.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Pns for*  
Rob Lehman concurs.

Attachments  
Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill/Affour *Att*  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *dh* NARA, Date *2/4/02*

CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 SEP 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 24 SEP 84 11

*db 2/6/07*

KEYWORDS: ZAIRE

UN

MOBUTU, SESE S

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ MOBUTU SEP 23 AT UNGA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 26 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8406916 NSCIFID ( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Wettering</i>	<i>S</i> SEP 25 1984	<i>for redo</i>		
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X</i> 9/27	<i>For Decision</i>		
	SEP 27 1984	<i>Kenneth approved</i>		
	SEP 27 1984	<i>Kenneth sgl</i>		<i>WCRK</i>

DISPATCH *9/27/84* W/ATTCH FILE PA *let*



National Security Council  
The White House

System # I

Package # 7132

D

SEP 27 P 1:46

1371

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

1365 GAF

System # I  
Package # 7132

2 P 6: 07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Wettering</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>Reho</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Redone*    9/27  
*DW*

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

7132

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)


September 27, 1984

dlb 2/6/04

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's September 23, 1984  
Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of  
Conversation covering the President's September 23 meeting with  
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Memcon

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7132

~~SECRET~~

3356

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick  
Counsellor to the President, Edwin Meese III  
Assistant to the President, James A. Baker  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker  
Ambassador to Zaire, Brandon Grove  
Frederick Wattering, NSC Staff (Notetaker)  
Alec Toumayan, State Department (Interpreter)

President Mobutu Sese Seko  
Foreign Minister Umba di Lutete  
Finance Minister Kiakwama Kiakiziki  
Director, Office of the President, Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi  
Ambassador to the U.S., Kasongo Mutuale

DATE, TIME September 23, 1984, 4:00 PM - 4:30 PM  
AND PLACE: Presidential Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, N.Y.

The President expressed his pleasure at seeing President Mobutu again. He characterized bilateral relations as based on solid friendship and described them as excellent. He commended President Mobutu's courage in dealing with his economic problems and maintaining the reforms. He also thanked President Mobutu for his very positive contribution to the Chad problem. He stated that he personally held President Mobutu in the highest esteem for his courageous actions. (S)

President Mobutu thanked the President for seeing him in the midst of his electoral campaign. But he felt it important to tell the President what his government is doing in economic and political spheres and what seems to be needed. (S)

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 404-062-33556

SECRET BY CN NARA DATE 11/26/04

~~SECRET~~

16

SECRET

2

President Mobutu noted that in 1982 one senior American official asked him to help himself so that we (Americans) can help you. In 1983 we began a program of economic and financial austerity by ourselves, even without waiting for the IMF. Then in 1984 Zaire turned to the IMF and things have worked out well with the IMF. After bearing these heavy burdens in 1983 and 1984, Zaire must and will continue reform in 1985 but must call on the help of our friends and partners in the manner I will describe, he added. (S)

President Mobutu stated he was leaving a memorandum outlining in detail steps which Zaire has done and will do and what Zaire is asking its friends to do. The principal issue is that he will continue the austerity program in 1985. But the \$900 million debt due next year is beyond Zaire's capability. Hospitals must have medicines, soldiers must have clothing and ammunition, communications must work. Zaire still has aircraft engines in Italy and owes \$29 million for these. He has no stipends for Zairians abroad. We need help in these matters; we want to pay what we owe, but we need to meet around a table and talk about what Zaire can pay, he added. (S)

President Mobutu noted that two months ago he had been massively reelected. But he was unhappy; in going around the country campaigning he found mothers and children looking to him for help, for improvement in life. What can I do, he asked. Must I tell them austerity means no medicine, no clothes? That is why I am here, he declared. (S)

President Mobutu then turned to political aspects. He noted that the US had asked Zaire for help and Zaire had responded without hesitation or bargaining. Ambassador Kirkpatrick knows, he added, that during Zaire's term on the UN Security Council we acted closely and in concert with the US. We ask you to extend all the support and understanding you can. (S)

President Mobutu noted that he had said the same thing to President Mitterrand a few days ago. Mitterrand had said something which embarrassed him, though. Mitterrand said that along with Presidents Houphouet-Boigny, Bourgiba, Sekou Toure, he, Mobutu, was the only African leader worthy of the name. Two very old, infirm men and one dead man, Mobutu grumbled. Mitterrand responded to Mobutu's pleas by saying that he understood and asked Mobutu to tell the American friends that they too should understand. (S)

President Mobutu apologized for speaking candidly, but noted that was his style when in the presence of good friends. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

~~SECRET~~

3

The President responded by stating that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had kept him well informed on Zaire's strong support in the Security Council and General Assembly. He noted that he has raised our bilateral assistance this year over last and had asked Congress for an increase for next year. Regarding debt rescheduling, he went on to say, we will try to be of help and we want to be of help, and will work with his people on this.

~~(S)~~

Secretary Shultz noted that we would carefully study the aide memoire and sit down with President Mobutu's advisors. He thought we could parse it into separate areas - Paris Club, bilateral aid, etc. - and that we would sit down with his people and go through it with them. No doubt we can develop a program, he added. ~~(S)~~

President Mobutu added that he was not asking us to bear the burden alone. He had met with President Mitterrand and on Wednesday he would meet with the Belgians and Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, on Friday he would be in Rome, and possibly on Thursday he would meet with Prime Minister Thatcher. ~~(S)~~

The President wished President Mobutu well and asked him to pass the President's regards to the leaders he would soon see. He concluded that we would study President Mobutu's memorandum carefully. ~~(S)~~

President Mobutu wished the President well in his campaign and the meeting ended on pleasantries. ~~(U)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

7132

ACTION

September 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: FRED WETTERING *FW*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Zaire: Memorandum of Conversation Covering the President's September 23 Meeting with President Mobutu (S)

Herewith is the memorandum of conversation covering the President's bilateral meeting with Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko on September 23, 1984, in the Presidential Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, New York. (S)

As is customary I have attached a Kimmitt/Hill memo transmitting a copy of the memcon to State for their information. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon; approve the attached Kimmitt/Hill memo of transmittal.

APPROVE     *K*     DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal
- A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *dlb* NARA, Date *2/6/07*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 27 SEP 84 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

db 2/6/07

DOCDATE 25 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: NORWAY

NATO

WILLOCH, KAARE

AP

HS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM WILLOCH 23 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 01 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( CT

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*Sommer* *S* *SEP 28 1984* *for redo*

*Mcfarlane* *X* *9/29* *for sig.*

*C* *9/29* *Kimmit 5gd memo* *PS, RR, RA*

DISPATCH

*✓ 9/29w*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*7A*

*(8)*



National Security Council  
The White House

JF

System # T

Package # 7177

8 S 28 P 5 43

1375

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7177

1372

SEP 27 P 3: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Summer</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>redo</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)  
good note

[Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7177

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES db 2/6/07

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

September 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between  
the President and Prime Minister Willoch

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
meeting with Prime Minister Willoch on September 23, 1984.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

DLB 2/8/2007

*File Folder*

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

*FOIA*

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

*Box Number*

53

8

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
33557	MEMCON  SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984	4	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7177

27

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

U  
C

U

REMOVAL OF

(S)

dlb 2/6/87

September 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between  
the President and Prime Minister Willoch

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's  
September 23 meeting with Prime Minister Willoch.

RECOMMENDATION:

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob  
Kimmitt to forward it to State.

Approve *RHK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 26 SEP 84 15

TO KIMMITT

FROM CHILDRESS

*db 2/6/87*

DOCDATE 26 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: KAMPUCHEA

SUBJECT: MEMCON PRES MTG W/ DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA COALITION

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 27 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW *CT*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

SEP 27 1984

*Kimmitz spd memo*

*RK, RC,*

DISPATCH

*✓ C.T. 9/27*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA*

(*CT*)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # I  
Package # 7200

8 SE 26 P 1:38

1570

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

7200

30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,  
September 24, 1984

Attached is the approved Memorandum of Conversation for the meeting between the President and Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, September 24, 1984, at the Waldorf-Astoria.

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A 9/24/84 Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 2/6/07

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~





# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

DLB 2/8/2007

*File Folder*

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

*FOIA*

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

*Box Number*

53

8

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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33558 MEMCON

3

ND

B1

MEETING WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND SON  
SANN OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA  
COALITION, SEPTEMBER 24, 1984

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

7200

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 26, 1984

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ACTION

11/21/07

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: DICK CHILDRESS *DC*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,  
September 24, 1984

Recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the  
cleared MEMCON of conversation (Tab A) to State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum  
Tab A 9/24/84 MEMCON  
Tab II Original of 9/24/84 MEMCON

cc: Gaston Sigur  
Don Fortier

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7200

35

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 26, 1984

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES) *dlb 2/6/07*

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: DICK CHILDRESS *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,  
September 24, 1984

Recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the  
cleared MEMCON of conversation (Tab A) to State.

Approve     *K*    

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum
- Tab A 9/24/84 MEMCON
- Tab II Original of 9/24/84 MEMCON

cc: Gaston Sigur  
Don Fortier

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8407324

CLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL FROM  
ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 03 OCT 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM DOBRIANSKY

*db 2/6/07*

DOC DATE 28 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: ROMANIA

MANESCU, MANEA

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ ROMANIAN VP SEP 25

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 05 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8406734 8407042 NSCIFID ( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>C</i>	<i>OCT 03 1984</i>	<i>Kinnitt Approved</i>		<i>DO RK</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

*27*

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7324

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1382

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>PD</sup>

SUBJECT: Memcon of the Romanian Vice President Manescu's Photo Opportunity with the President

Attached at Tab I for your approval and for the record, is a memorandum of the President's brief encounter and conversation with Mr. Manescu.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I for the record.

Approve RMK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation for the record

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 2/6/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

*FOIA*

F04-062

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33559 MEMCON

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B1

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MANEA  
MANESCU, VICE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA'S  
STATE COUNCIL: PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 03 OCT 84 19

TO THE RECORD FROM RAPHEL, A

dh 2/6/07

DOCDATE 02 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

MEGUID, ABDELL

GHORBAL, ASHRAF A

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FOMIN MEGUID & AMB GHORBAL 27 SEP

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DUR

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8407222 NSCIFID ( J F )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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NLRR M37D/L # 33560  
BY KML NARA DATE 4/5/13

7468

NSC  
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~~SECRET~~

October 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM: NEA - Arnold Raphel *am*  
SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and Foreign  
Minister Meguid

PARTICIPANTS:

The President	Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid
Secretary Shultz	Ambassador Ghorbal
Mr. McFarlane	
Mr. Kemp	
Mr. Raphel	

TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1984, 1630, the Oval Office

The President opened the conversation by noting that the resumption of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Egypt was encouraging. The Minister agreed, and then complimented the President on his UNGA speech. Meguid said that many delegations were pleased by the speech, especially its reference to peace in the Middle East.

The Minister then gave the President a letter from President Mubarak. After reading it, the President said that we would be back to the GOE with a response.

Meguid said that the Jordanian move on recognition would help the peace process. He added that there had recently been some positive moves from the new Israeli government. There was the possibility of movement on Lebanon, the Palestinian issue and Taba.

The President responded that we are determined to move. Jordan's action is a good step. He then added that we hope Egypt will soon return its Ambassador to Israel. Meguid said that he had a good, frank discussion with Foreign Minister Shamir in New York. Meguid has noticed that the GOI no longer links its withdrawal from Lebanon with Syria's. It no longer insists on specifically mentioning the Camp David framework when it talks about discussions with Jordan. On the third issue, Taba, Egypt is prepared to go to arbitration. Once this is settled, there can be a Summit meeting between Mubarak and

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DECL:OADR

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- 2 -

Peres and then "we can go ahead". Meguid summed up his mood, and concluded the substantive part of the meeting, by saying he was "cautiously optimistic".

- cc: S/S
- S
- D
- P
- PM
- NEA
- AmEmb Cairo
- AmEmb Tel Aviv
- NSC

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL RECEIVED 18 OCT 84 08  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

Ch 2/6/09

DOC DATE 17 OCT 84

44

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

PERES, SHIMONS

SUBJECT: STATE MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PERES OCT 9

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO HILL DUE: 20 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# 8428720

LOG 8407500

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

MCFARLANE	X	11/30	For Decision	12/3	
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National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 7826

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	✓	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5		A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Because of the importance of these memcons,  
recommend you both review.

November 29, 1984

410

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's Meetings with Shimon Peres

Attached at Tab A for your approval is a consolidated memcon of the subject meetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Memcon of President's meeting with Peres

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2/6/07*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
OCTOBER 9, 1984  
THE OVAL OFFICE, ROOSEVELT ROOM, CABINET ROOM  
11:30 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

United States

The President  
The Vice President  
Mr. Meese  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Ambassador Lewis  
Assistant Secretary Murphy  
Mr. Howard Teicher, NSC

Israel

Prime Minister Peres  
Foreign Minister Shamir  
Ambassador Rosenne

The President began with the observation Israel is facing an enormous challenge. The United States has an unwavering commitment to Israeli security and maintenance of its qualitative edge. U.S.-Israeli ties have grown significantly, and we are determined to see the alliance grow stronger. The President invited Peres to comment on the Israeli economy. (C)

Peres thanked the President for his sincere friendship to the Jewish people. As a small country surrounded by so many difficulties, the Israelis particularly appreciate the human aspect of Reagan's support. The President thanked him. He then said he felt that Israel's economic situation could only be solved by reforms which would be difficult, as he knew from his own experience. (U)

Peres said that economic problems stem from Israeli mistakes, which Israel itself must correct. After a prolonged period, a generation of austerity, the new generation wanted to enjoy higher living standards. The government policy had probably relaxed too much. However, Israel would never ask the U.S. to make the lives of Israeli citizens easier and more comfortable. He observed that if Israel sacrifices its defenses it can solve its economic problems. But Israel is a real fighting democracy ready to pay the price not to let the Middle East become another tumultuous area. Virtually 50



-2-

percent of Israel's operational budget of \$11 billion will go to defense. So Israel can be made stronger economically if the policy is chosen to make it weaker militarily. Israel, however, thinks it is a mistake to give up military strength. Israel has and will always act without U.S. troops but does need U.S. financial and military support. Shamir and he do not intend to take any easy way out of their present economic difficulties. There will be economic restraints and they will appreciate it if the U.S. can help both maintain its military posture and give a ray of hope for the future as it works for economic independence. (S)

The President commented that the JEDG should be an effective way to consult on economic policies. He understood Peres' views on a strong defense and assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. is committed to peace in the Middle East. Achievement of peace would be all the more important because it would mean Israel would not have to pour the percentage of its resources it now does into defense. The President noted our plans for the Free Trade Area and his hopes for quick implementation. (C)

After a brief one-on-one meeting, the President and Peres joined the full delegations in the Roosevelt Room and invited Peres to make an opening statement. Peres said that the new government was only 20 days old. It would try to decrease divisiveness within Israel. It would work on the economy, put an end to problems with Lebanon through secure borders, and reopen, under reasonable conditions, negotiations with its neighbors. He touched on economic measures already taken against inflation: cutting the budget, restricting luxury goods, and reducing foreign travel allowances. He said he was close to achieving a national compact to restrain wages and profits for a short period. The political-military situation is more complex. The last two wars have cost Israel \$10 billion. Its total bill on the costs of war and peace (returning the oil fields to Egypt and removing its infrastructures from Sinai) came to a total of \$14 to 15 billion. (S)

U.S. inflation in the course of a decade has totalled 50 percent. An F-4 equivalent aircraft is now \$40 million a copy instead of \$4 million twenty years ago. Israel knew the U.S. is committed to its maintaining a qualitative edge. We ask the U.S. to share the burden with us. Israel is a worldwide U.S. ally and is so out of complete confidence. Were Israel not in the Middle East, the U.S. would have had more troubles there. (S)

-3-

Peres said he was not asking for immediate help but rather for a safety net through this difficult stretch of time and a ray of hope to encourage the Israeli people that after a period of reform and standing on its own feet, production and exports would increase. He aims to make his people self-reliant. (C)

The Secretary remarked there had been several hours of discussions on the economy and Lebanon. He had heard Israeli analyses and a number of programmatic ideas concerning a safety net. We had discussed this with Treasury and worked out an understanding of our competence on the situation, our capabilities and limitations. He noted that Peres had suggested ideas which we want to think through: just what is sought, how it would be funded, what incentives could be found, etc. The JEDG is a way to go about this and it should meet promptly. By the time Congress reconvenes, we should be in a position to make recommendations to be considered for the long term. Israel has a vision of long term development which will place it on the cutting edge of modern technology. Only Israelis can deal with their own problems. We have said we are ready to help more; particular attention needs be paid to the inflation rate. (C)

Peres said he had met with Secretary Weinberger. It is customary for our respective military people to meet and plan ahead three to four years. The Secretary will review plans for the Air Force and other aspects of the Israeli military establishment. He urged that offsets/buy back be continued. He asked that the 15 percent offset rate be raised slightly to 20 percent, and if possible continued. He noted the President had mentioned the LAVI program in his B'nai B'rith speech. He asked that the U.S. Army be enabled to buy supplies from Israel since Israel buys most of its technology in the U.S. (S)

Secretary Regan said that a strong defense has top priority but this comes only from having a strong economy. He added that Treasury is worried about Israel's economy. There is no halt to inflation in sight. Although your Foreign Minister talked about new policies, other ministers are saying they can't live with it. How are you going to crack the whip? What discipline will you put into the economy? Peres replied that the basic reason for having a GNU was that no minister can effectively threaten the government by resigning. The government has already taken Draconian measures and more will be taken shortly. (S)

Peres then expressed thanks for U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation, for the unprecedented FTA and added his personal thanks to the President and the Secretary for their helpfulness



-5-

water schemes, transport organizations of mutual concern. Israel has not given up hope on the King despite some of his unpleasant declarations. We will start by suggesting Camp David as a framework for the talks, but will keep an open mind for any other opportunities. (S)

With Egypt, Israel hopes to improve its relations. There are some difficulties, but they will try their best. We want to make a real peace, having given all the land, we did not get such a peace. (S)

The Vice President asked about current Israeli attitudes on Lebanon. Peres said they were worried. Lebanon had stopped being a basically Christian country and was turning into a Shiite country with a strong tendency towards fundamentalism. Israel wants to withdraw, it never intended to remain. It had only tried to get rid of the PLO state in the south. If Israel remains too long, the resentment of Shiites toward Israel may increase. To withdraw, Israel must make sure that Syria will not extend or deploy its forces deeper in Lebanon and that Syrian controlled areas will not become areas for infiltration. Referring to Murphy's recent visit to Damascus, Peres characterized the Syrian first reaction as typical, i.e. "never generous". Israel would like to see UNIFIL replace the IDF and that there be no vacuum in the south. It sees a role for local forces. It believes that the Government of Lebanon is completely devoted, under Karami's leadership, to Syria. He thanked the President for not having received Karami. (S)

There are three points to the Lebanese problem: 1) unilateral withdrawal with secured northern border; 2) a Syrian role. The IDF is 18 miles from Damascus. If Syria wants Israel out, it must agree on Israeli conditions. Israel is not negotiating from weakness; 3) Lebanese problems are such that Israel can only talk with the GOL. It has no expectation of reaching a binding agreement. Israel would follow U.S. advice on this matter. It wants to see a U.S. success and would not ask Washington to go further than it should. Israel accepted our desire for a low profile, unpublicized role but asked that we continue our efforts. (S)

The President asked if there would be problems with the Soviets regarding UNIFIL. Weinberger observed they had a veto power twice a year on UNIFIL renewal. Peres believed that the Soviets will support the Syrian position and not veto an extension or expansion of the mandate. The Vice President said that both questions are important. The UN Secretary General may add a declaration to his report to enable him to explore

-6-

expansion of UNIFIL responsibilities. The Secretary said there is a question if this could be done without adding other things. He recalled at the time of the last renewal a number of potentially anti-Israeli actions were contemplated in connection with the mandate. Ambassador Kirkpatrick had done an excellent job facing this down and working out a simple renewal. We would be glad to see more discretion for the Secretary General, but if additional anti-Israeli items are added to the mandate, it would be better to settle for simple renewal. Peres said he would not like to see any Soviet or satellite forces in Lebanon, be they Poles or Mongolians. The further away the Soviets are, the better. (S)

The Vice President raised Central America, expressing surprise that Nicaraguan violations of human rights and the anti-Semitic actions stimulated by the PLO presence in Nicaragua had not triggered an Israeli reaction. Are the Israelis aware of this phenomenon? If so, why have there been no expressions of criticism? Peres replied that the Socialist International was interested in keeping Nicaragua from suffering the fate of Cuba, but leaders of the S.I. had had disappointments in dealing with Nicaragua. He noted a different viewpoint toward Central America on the part of Portugal and Spain. He recalled the Sandinista grudge against Israel for supporting Somoza. He had told a Sandinista leader that Somoza had been alone in supplying arms to Israel in 1948. Israel was not ashamed and would never forget its debt of gratitude to Somoza. (S)

Shamir interjected that he had had a very successful visit to Washington last November, with two decisions already bearing fruit: establishment of the JPMG and negotiations on the FTA. He hoped that this present visit would be looked back on a year from now as equally successful. (U)

The Secretary said he hoped that it didn't take the passage of a year to rate this visit as a success. The Secretary then complained of comments by the former Venezuelan president, who was gentle with the U.S. in private discussions but extremely harsh in public. This has become a world phenomenon, assuming that one can say anything publicly and then explain privately it does not matter. The gap has become too wide between speech and actions. (S)

The President said we have occasionally had disappointments when we, in a desire to bring peace to the Middle East, provided weapons to Arab nations. We want Peres to know where we stand. We will never supply arms to be used to Israel's

disadvantage, but if we are to be helpful on peace and securing Israel's right to exist, we have to win Arab confidence that we can be reasonable and fair. We would take action to ensure that our arms supply was never a threat to Israel. Peres commented that there are occasions when Israel does not object to supply of arms to Arabs. The best example is U.S. supplying Egypt. When we disagree, and Jordan is one example, he appealed that we take into account the Israeli position that it has invited Jordan to come and talk without prior conditions. Egypt has learned the lesson. It has now converted to U.S. arms. Hussein, however, wants to keep the policy of belligerency and get U.S. technology at the same time. If he changes his policy to one of peace and gets arms, then we all benefit. But the King gets away with criticizing U.S. policy. Why does he complain so much? When the Reagan initiative was announced, the U.S. had grounds to believe Hussein would not object. The problem is not supplying technology but a question of policy. Let Hussein embark on a dialogue. Both of us must consider whether a change in policy should precede a policy of supplying arms. The U.S. has leverage. Hussein will gain if he talks to Israel. The minute he talks with Israel he may reduce the Syrian threat. Whether he talks with Israel directly or through the U.S., it would be good for him to change his policy. The dilemma is whether he should depart from traditional belligerency or get supplies without having to change his policy. (S)

The President observed that Hussein didn't take a hostile attitude until the Stinger question arose. We couldn't persuade our Congress. We believe our friendship for Jordan is beyond question, but sometimes we cannot convince our own Congress. They refused Stinger and Congress acted that way thinking they were doing it on behalf of Israel. Now Hussein is going to Moscow. (S)

The Secretary commented that this not need be discussed in the press. Concerning Jordan's reaction to Syrian threats, when Jordan announced restoration of relations with Egypt, there was an immediate and public Syrian threat. We are both seeing the emergence of Syrian efforts against Jordan. You suggest we ought to work on talks between Israel, Jordan and the U.S. to put Hussein's concerns to rest. If Syria were to attack, there would be a built in readiness of two friends, both of whom want to be closer to Hussein. This could improve the atmosphere for peace. The Secretary noted that he recognized this had been in effect earlier, but maybe there is something here we could quietly pursue, another way of getting at the arms issue. (S)

-8-

Meron observed that Syrian aggression against Israel and other Arabs has been discussed in the JPMG. (S)

Peres recalled that Israel had an unpleasant experience in 1961-62 when Washington decided to supply Jordan with U.S. arms, which Hussein promised would never be used against Israel. But they were used in the 1967 war. The problem is that the King has made some mistakes. I am unsure, Peres said, that Hussein is enchanted with Soviet arms. The very missiles he has been considering from the Soviet Union were the ones Israel had destroyed in Syria. Hussein knows he needs U.S. arms. If Hussein can be convinced he has to change his policy for his own welfare, this could change Israeli views on our supplying Jordan with arms. Jordan is not a sworn enemy of Israel, but the King has "started to enjoy his disappointments." He forgets he didn't keep his promises on the Reagan initiative. Labor and Likud can act together and try to see the problem, but first there should be a change in Jordanian policy. The Secretary commented that Hussein has always supported the President's initiative but he could not assemble an acceptable Palestinian delegation. Things can be done to improve the atmosphere on the West Bank and they can possibly affect the King's overall policy. Peres observed that Arafat changed his mind after initialling a draft agreement with Hussein. The Secretary attributed this to Syrian pressure. Damascus does not want to see a peace process unless it can dominate it. (S)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

84 1 P 54

October 17, 1984

SH ROOM

SECRET/SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Peres

Enclosed for your approval is the memorandum of conversation reporting on the President's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres on October 9.

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 24, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 2/6/07