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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File:  
Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversation –  
President Reagan (05/08/1984-06/12/1984)

**Box:** 52

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/31/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (05/08/1984-06/12/1984)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

35

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117810	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	5/7/1984	B1
117811	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT QUETT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	5/9/1984	B1
117814	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT QUETT MASIRE OF BOTSWANA [COPY OF DOC. 117811; PGS. 3-5 ONLY] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	ND	B1
117815	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	6/7/1984	B1
117816	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	5/31/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

*AW  
3/2/11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8403710

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 MAY 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 08 MAY 84

KEYWORDS FRENCH POLYNESIA

AP

GENSCHER, HANS D

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ GENSCHER MAY 7

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8403105

NSCIFID

( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	MAY 14 1984	<i>Kinnitt approved</i>		
	MAY 14 1984	<i>Kinnitt</i>		<i>PS, RR, CIA</i>

DISPATCH

*5/14/84*

W/ATTCH FILE

*PA*

(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

1152 8F

FOUO ED

System #

I

Package #

3710

8 MAY 9 P 5: 51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5		D
Situation Room			
Rosie	3	done	Correction

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)  
Also, please  
Add (u) after  
subject line,  
first page Tab A,  
and a (c)  
after end of  
paragraph on  
page 4 of Tab A.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 14, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED  
W/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the  
President and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting  
with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on May 7, 1984.

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED  
W/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

AW 8/31/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3710

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting  
with Foreign Minister Genscher (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
James A. Baker, III  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt  
Peter R. Sommer, NSC  
Giesela Marcuse, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Ambassador Peter Hermes  
Franz Pfeffer, Political Director,  
German Foreign Office  
Heinz Weber, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE May 7, 1984, 4:05 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.  
Oval Office

In opening the discussion, the President briefly reviewed his trip to China. He said China was absolutely fascinating, and one becomes even more aware of its impact after one leaves. The President continued that one finds one's mind going back to particular aspects of the visit. All in all it was fascinating. (C)

Secretary Shultz noted that Deng appears in firm control. And for a country with a dictatorship, Deng was taking the unprecedented step of grooming a successor. Leaders who do not come to office by elections generally are not willing to prepare the way for a successor, but Deng is. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher intervened that this proves Deng is a wise leader. (U)

The President underlined that he appreciated Genscher coming to Washington for consultations prior to visiting Moscow. He said the U.S. is actively pursuing a dialogue with the Soviets. If there is silence, it is coming from the Soviet side. The U.S. is ready to resume arms negotiations at any time, but he said he had no intention of going hat-in-hand to the Soviets. They are the ones who walked away from the negotiating table and we can't reward them for this. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37111 # 117810

BY LW NARA DATE 6/22/15~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Genscher said that we in the West must continually make clear to our publics our willingness to discuss all armaments questions with the Soviets. For a long time we have been on the defensive about our policies. The Brussels Political Declaration of last December put NATO on the political offensive. We must stay there. It is necessary, continued Genscher, to reassure our publics of our willingness to negotiate any subject with the Soviets. Germany wishes to revitalize the East-West dialogue, but from a united position with its Allies. America and Europe are one in wanting to deal with the Soviets from a position of strength and firmness. (C)

Genscher observed that he will be one of several NATO Foreign Ministers to visit Moscow. For his part, he intended to make two points clear. One, NATO will continue INF deployments, absent concrete negotiation results. Two, NATO is available to continue negotiations at any time. Genscher underlined that while the Soviets have focused on European security, they recognize and understand that it is U.S.-Soviet relations that are decisive. The Soviets fully understand the overriding importance of their relations with the U.S. It is correct to assume, continued Genscher, that the Soviets will not significantly change their policies, prior to the U.S. elections. Therefore, we in the West must continue to make clear to our publics that it is not the western countries that are impeding negotiations. This is particularly important, he said, for a number of the smaller NATO Allies. (C)

Genscher continued that the Soviet Union is also well aware of the role of public opinion. The recent Warsaw Pact proposal to conclude a treaty on the non-use of force is clearly a propaganda ploy. In the FRG, public opinion no longer focuses exclusively on nuclear issues; instead domestic questions such as taxation and the 35-hour work week have captured the public attention. The Netherlands and Denmark, however, continue to confront major domestic problems and apparently the situation in Italy is also uncertain. Genscher said that the FRG has no intention of agreeing to Craxi's moratorium proposal. Germany will stand behind NATO's decision. It is important, added Genscher, for the Alliance again to make a political declaration, as it had done last December, at the Washington May Ministerial meeting. (C)

Turning to SDI, Genscher praised the thorough briefing he had received early in the day and underlined that this is an issue on which the FRG wishes to stay in close touch. He emphasized that the FRG wishes to have a continuing exchange of information on this important topic. It is important to avoid the impression that SDI would decouple Europe from America. The U.S. must also take into account and recognize that vital European security interests are also at stake. I understand, he said, that the U.S. has already offered to discuss space weapons with the Soviets. This should be made known to our publics. In Moscow, I intend, said Genscher, to make clear the West's willingness to negotiate on a wide range of issues. (C)

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The President replied jokingly that Genscher should convey his special thanks for all the Soviets have done to help get me reelected. In a serious vein, he continued that one of the major problems is different perceptions between the Soviets and the West. The West feels threatened by the Soviet military build-up. Yet the Soviets feel a great sense of insecurity. The Soviets apparently really feel threatened by the U.S. This Soviet insecurity is in part due to their history. But even the Chinese in quiet conversations expressed alarm over the Soviet military machine. I wish, continued the President, that the Soviets would tone down or disavow some of their statements. From Lenin onward, the Soviets have preached world revolution and a communist conquest of the world. We believe the Soviets are threatening world peace and they claim we are threatening it. (C)

Genscher injected that this is why it is so important that we make clear, to world opinion, time and time again, our peaceful, long term plans. I know, he added, from my many dealings with him that Gromyko's first priority is relations with U.S. and his second priority is relations with Germany. The Russians can never forget that they were nearly conquered by Germany and that they only survived because of U.S. help. They now see the U.S. and Germany allied against them and this gives them a massive inferiority complex, despite their arms build-up. Moreover, the Soviet inability to stop the deployment of INF missiles was a massive defeat. And even if the Netherlands does waver, in the bigger picture, this would have little impact on the Soviets' view of the situation in Europe. (C)

Turning to Poland, Genscher said he hoped the President had a useful meeting with the Pope and noted he would be in Rome in July and has asked for an audience. The role of the Catholic Church is particularly important in the evolving situation in Poland. The Germans had suggested in 1982 that the Catholic Church take the lead in providing needed aid to the Polish people. The response was positive but a concrete plan is not yet in place. In particular, the Polish Catholic Church initiative would be aimed at the agriculture sector and it would help improve the living condition of the common Pole. This plan offers an opportunity for Western countries to strengthen the private sector in Poland, the church, and at the same time it would benefit the people of Poland. (C)

The President replied that we are keenly interested in and support the Polish Church private sector agriculture initiative. German views

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are similar to ours and we applaud your efforts. Secretary Shultz added that we are prepared to cooperate in improving relations with Poland and that we have suggested some constructive steps, but the Polish authorities have not reciprocated. Shultz noted that he hoped that when he and Genscher meet tomorrow that we could review the East European countries in more depth -- country-by-country. Shultz added that the President was too polite to say so, but we have already gone beyond our scheduled time. (C)

In concluding, the President thanked Genscher for coming to Washington prior to visiting Moscow. (U)

The meeting ended at 4:30 p.m. (U)

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8

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

May 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's May 7 meeting with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward it to State.

Approve RMK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt Memo to Hill
- Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12058, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/31/11

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 MAY 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 09 MAY 84

KEYWORDS BOTSWANA

AP

MASIRE, QUETT KJ

SUBJECT. MEMCON OF PRES MAY 9 MTG W/ BOTSWANA PRES

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8401510 8403247 NSCIFID ( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	5/14	Ki - it sg		WE, RL, CH

DISPATCH 5/14 W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

10

1152

JIF

National Security Council  
The White House

CE/ED

System # I

Package # 3755

84 MAY 9 P 5: 51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>BMK</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Conclusions</u>

MAY 24 1984

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506  
May 14, 1984

3755

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's May 9, 1984  
Meeting with President Quett Masire of Botswana

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of  
Conversation covering the President's May 9 meeting with  
President Masire of Botswana.

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
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*AW 8/31/14*

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117811

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

3755

12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Quett Masire of Botswana (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
James A. Baker III, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for International Development  
Ambassador Theodore Maino  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Wisner  
Frederick L. Wettering, NSC  
  
President Quett Masire of Botswana  
Foreign Minister Archibald Mogwe  
Minister of Public Service, Daniel Kwelagobe  
Secretary to the President, Festus Mogae  
Permanent Secretary, External Affairs, Geoffrey Garebomono  
Secretary to the President (Political), Louis Selepang  
Ambassador Serara T. Ketlogotswe  
Director of Economic Affairs, Kenneth Matambo

DATE, TIME May 9, 1984  
AND PLACE: 11:30 AM - 1:20 PM, Oval Office/Family Dining Room

The President opened the substantive discussions by noting his pleasure at the cordial level of our bilateral relations. He observed that we share fundamental values and interests - a multi-party democracy, a commitment to a free economy and the free operation of private enterprise. He expressed his personal concern and sympathy over the severe drought affecting Botswana and other African countries and noting the US willingness to be of help in alleviating this drought. (U)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M371/1 # 117811  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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President Masire began lengthy remarks by expressing his thanks for the invitation to visit. He described Botswana's democracy as the most practical means the Botswanans have found, and that Botswanans have tried to show neighbors by example. Especially by being non-racial they hope to serve as a model to racist neighbors. He stated his pleasure at friends who can be counted upon to help meet the expectations of Botswanans, especially since the colonial power did almost nothing to develop Botswana. (S)

President Masire expressed gratitude for US efforts for peace in Africa. He noted his briefings from State on destabilizing events in Africa - Chad, Libya, Sudan, the Horn, southern Africa. He expressed delight at the South African troop withdrawal from Angola in which we played a constructive part, and with our efforts on Angola/Namibia. He did note that while he supported the concept of no linkage between Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola, he noted that the Angolans said that the Cubans were only there to protect against the South Africans. Now that the South Africans were withdrawing, the days of the Cubans should be numbered. (S)

President Masire said he understood and supported the Nkomati Pact between Mozambique and South Africa, and that the longstanding conflict between these two states should come to an end if both sides honor the agreement. (S)

President Masire then spoke on a major concern of his. He noted that Botswana had an 18-year record of not allowing liberation movements or any other groups to use Botswana to stage attacks on other countries. Despite this record, South Africa is pressing for a formal accord. Such an accord would have negative consequences for Botswana, he added. Botswana would lose the current sympathy she enjoys with the OAU, the other Front Line states, the UN and the liberation movements if such a formal accord were signed, he amplified. The liberation movement would "jump on us," he added. He suggested that South Africa may wish to see this happen - for Botswana to become a battleground, "a Lebanon." He wondered why South Africa was pressuring Botswana so hard as opposed to Zimbabwe, and concluded it was because Botswana was small and weak. He concluded by asking for the US to use its good offices and prevail on the South Africans to reconsider on this. He repeated that he had authorized his security forces to work out working arrangements with South African counterparts, but a recent delegation of these Botswanan security officials was rebuffed by South African counterparts who demanded a formal written understanding. (S)

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President Masire also expressed his anxiousness for a Namibia settlement, which he said would significantly lower area tensions. (S)

On bilateral matters, he acknowledged his detailed talks with AID Administrator McPherson, Secretary Shultz, and DAS Wisner, and said he only wanted to mention two things. The first, as the President had already noted, was the severe 3-year drought. Botswana needed food and especially help with transport to get food to widely scattered peoples in remote areas. The second was the railway. Botswana was being required to take over its share of the railway (from Zimbabwe) and needs the wherewithall to run this vital transport artery. Botswana especially needed help in obtaining locomotives, he added, as he ended his opening remarks. (S)

The President responded by expressing understanding of President Masire's concerns. On Namibia/Angola, he stated that we have made some progress but that the Cuban withdrawal requirement still remains to be resolved. He expressed his opposition to apartheid in South Africa and noted our efforts to promote peaceful, meaningful change in South Africa rather than just standing off and criticizing. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that drought had been discussed in detail in previous meetings with the Botswanans, and that there were things we can and are doing to help. On locomotives, we will arrange talks with the Export-Import Bank which may be able to be helpful. In general, the Secretary noted, our bilateral relations were excellent. (S)

Secretary Shultz went on to state that the problems of southern Africa are of intense interest to us. On the question of South African pressure on Botswana, we understand and will try and use our good offices to be helpful. President Masire's assessment of our Namibia negotiations are of acute interest, he added. He stated that his question was whether the MPLA was being genuine in saying that the Cubans were only there to protect against South Africans. Was not the MPLA regime caught up in internal problems, including UNITA? He also asked what President Masire could tell us on this matter from the recent meeting of the Front Line State leaders. (S)

President Masire noted that he could only say what the Angolans told him, and noted that they were "not forthright" but only gave brief accounts. However, the impression the Angolans have given is that the only thing keeping the Cubans in Angola was the South African threat. He added that the Angolans describe UNITA as an arm of the South Africans, sustained and armed by them. (S)

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(At this point the plenary meeting ended and discussion continued over lunch).

AID Administrator McPherson characterized Botswana's record of managing resources and effectively using aid as good, unlike so many others. He noted that at independence the per capita GNP was around \$60, now it is \$1800. Per capita agriculture production was steadily up until this drought. Botswana uses money and manages resources well, he added. He described our longstanding AID programs in Botswana. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted the region-wide drought. (U)

AID Administrator McPherson noted that the US had committed \$100 million already this year in drought relief efforts in Africa and would commit an equal amount before the year was over. 31 African countries were affected, he noted, and that a key problem was lack of in-country transport. He noted that many African countries were now revising policies which had contributed to the problem, but not in Botswana's case since the policies were sound. (S)

The President noted the world-wide weather shifts in recent years and discussed the effects of drought with President Masire. (U)

President Masire introduced a request for help in attracting private investment into Botswana. He explained that Botswana had created a favorable investment climate and that there was no problem in profit repatriation and no danger of expropriation. (S)

The President expressed support for this and thought we could encourage more private investment. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if more investment were needed in the mining sector. (S)

President Masire noted that all was welcome, but new investment was sought for more labor-intensive sectors such as manufacturing so as to create more jobs. He added that Botswana offered a way of entering the South African market since Botswana is a member of the Customs Union with South Africa. (S)

The President noted that some countries such as Mozambique started out with Marxism or communism and are now discovering that this system doesn't work economically, and are now making changes. He asked President Masire about the prospects for a tourism industry. (S)

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President Masire noted the real prospects for tourism to observe wild animals since Botswana had huge game parks. He added that Prince Charles recently visited and went on safari. In response to questions, he noted that hunting was permitted, but closely licensed. (S)

The President observed that in his experience hunters were the most dedicated people to preserve and improve the natural environment. He noted the success that Kenya had in parlaying game parks into tourist revenues. (S)

Secretary Shultz remarked that President Masire had mentioned his concern about Chad, which translated into a concern about Libya. He stated that the President had stated early on that Qadhafi was a bad actor on the international scene and that Libyan aggression was a real problem. He asked President Masire for his views on how the Africans see Libya and how to deal with Qadhafi. (S)

Foreign Minister Mogwe was asked to respond by President Masire. He reviewed the troubles Libya had in twice trying to hold an OAU summit and cited this as evidence that the majority of Africans were not fond of Libya. He noted that Libya had few real supporters in black Africa - Madagascar, Benin, maybe Congo. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that while the Libyans have destroyed their relations with Britain, France and other Europeans still have relations. He noted that Libya's oil money made Qadhafi a more effective troublemaker. (S)

The luncheon concluded with numerous anecdotes and mutual expressions of good will. (U)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3755

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

**SIGNED**  
May 9, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: FRED WETTERING *rw*

SUBJECT: Botswana: Memorandum of Conversation Covering  
the President's May 9 Meeting with President  
Quett Masire

Attached is my summary of the relevant conversations during the President's meeting with President Masire of Botswana on May 9, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve memcon; approve Kimmitt/Hill memo at Tab I transmitting the memcon to the State Department.

APPROVE RMK

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal  
A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*rw*  
*8/31/11*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

#3755

TO: NSC/S

5/14

REVISED PAGES --  
FOR YOUR FILES.

Dee Wilson

~~SECRET~~

117814

~~SECRET~~

3

19

President Masire also expressed his anxiousness for a Namibia settlement, which he said would significantly lower area tensions. (S)

On bilateral matters, he acknowledged his detailed talks with AID Administrator McPherson, Secretary Shultz, and DAS Wisner, and said he only wanted to mention two things. The first, as the President had already noted, was the severe 3-year drought. Botswana needed food and especially help with transport to get food to widely scattered peoples in remote areas. The second was the railway. Botswana was being required to take over its share of the railway (from Zimbabwe) and needs the wherewithall to run this vital transport artery. Botswana especially needed help in obtaining locomotives, he added, as he ended his opening remarks. (S)

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3-711 #117814

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BY PCW NARA 6/22/15

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4

(At this point the plenary meeting ended and discussion continued over lunch).

AID Administrator McPherson characterized Botswana's record of managing resources and effectively using aid as good, unlike so many others. He noted that at independence the per capita GNP was around \$60, now it is \$1800. Per capita agriculture production was steadily up until this drought. Botswana uses money and manages resources well, he added. He described our longstanding AID programs in Botswana. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted the region-wide drought. (U)

AID Administrator McPherson noted that the US had committed \$100 million already this year in drought relief efforts in Africa and would commit an equal amount before the year was over. 31 African countries were affected, he noted, and that a key problem was lack of in-country transport. He noted that many African countries were now revising policies which had contributed to the problem, but not in Botswana's case since the policies were sound. (S)

The President noted the world-wide weather shifts in recent years and discussed the effects of drought with President Masire. (U)

President Masire introduced a request for help in attracting private investment into Botswana. He explained that Botswana had created a favorable investment climate and that there was no problem in profit repatriation and no danger of expropriation. (S)

The President expressed support for this and thought we could encourage more private investment. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if more investment were needed in the mining sector. (S)

President Masire noted that all was welcome, but new investment was sought for more labor-intensive sectors such as manufacturing so as to create more jobs. He added that Botswana offered a way of entering the South African market since Botswana is a member of the Customs Union with South Africa. (S)

The President noted that some countries such as Mozambique started out with Marxism or communism and are now discovering that this system doesn't work economically, and are now making changes. He asked President Masire about the prospects for a tourism industry. (S)

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President Masire noted the real prospects for tourism to observe wild animals since Botswana had huge game parks. He added that Prince Charles recently visited and went on safari. In response to questions, he noted that hunting was permitted, but closely licensed. (S)

The President observed that in his experience hunters were the most dedicated people to preserve and improve the natural environment. He noted the success that Kenya had in parlaying game parks into tourist revenues. (S)

Secretary Shultz remarked that President Masire had mentioned his concern about Chad, which translated into a concern about Libya. He stated that the President had stated early on that Qadhafi was a bad actor on the international scene and that Libyan aggression was a real problem. He asked President Masire for his views on how the Africans see Libya and how to deal with Qadhafi. (S)

Foreign Minister Mogwe was asked to respond by President Masire. He reviewed the troubles Libya had in twice trying to hold an OAU summit and cited this as evidence that the majority of Africans were not fond of Libya. He noted that Libya had few real supporters in black Africa - Madagascar, Benin, maybe Congo. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that while the Libyans have destroyed their relations with Britain, France and other Europeans still have relations. He noted that Libya's oil money made Qadhafi a more effective troublemaker. (S)

The luncheon concluded with numerous anecdotes and mutual expressions of good will. (U)

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RECEIVED 12 JUN 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOC DATE 11 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . GERMANY F R

NATO

PRESIDENT

KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTWN PRES & CHANCELLOR KOHL 7 JUN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 JUN 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 4588

8 JUN 13 12:29 PM '68

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>RT</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
June 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the  
President and Chancellor Kohl (U)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
meeting with Chancellor Kohl on June 7, 1984. (U)

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/31/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4588

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting  
with Chancellor Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Regan  
Edwin Meese, III  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Richard G. Darman  
Ambassador Burns  
Allan Wallis  
Richard R. Burt  
Peter R. Sommer  
Harry Obst, Interpreter  
  
Chancellor Kohl  
Foreign Minister Genscher  
Foreign Affairs Advisor  
Teltschik  
Private Secretary Neuer  
Heinz Weber, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 7, 1984, Winfield House,  
London, England  
5:10-5:45 p.m.

After the President and Chancellor Kohl exchanged welcoming remarks, Kohl expressed hope for an Economic Summit useful to all participants. If it helped the U.S., he said, he would like it all the more because this is a special year in U.S. terms. (U)

The President interjected that he hoped the Summit would be mutually beneficial to all seven countries. (U)

Kohl praised the President's Dublin speech, saying it set the correct tone for improving the political climate in West Europe. This is especially important given the D-Day celebration -- which he thought had been well handled -- but which others in Germany, for reasons he need not explain, had watched with apprehension. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

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The President agreed that the D-Day arrangements had been handled in a fashion not to offend; he sensed no hint of enmity. Secretary Shultz added that the D-Day ceremony makes it all the more important to have a strong Summit statement looking toward the future; the British draft is fine, but it needs to be strengthened. (C)

Kohl agreed on the need for a strong Summit statement and asked if we anticipate problems. Recalling our experiences at Williamsburg, Shultz replied that as soon as one tries to make the statement more explicit there are problems, especially with the French. The Japanese, he was sure would support a strong statement. Foreign Minister Genscher noted that France continues to question the need for a political statement. Kohl said last week he had reiterated to Mitterrand the need for a strong statement pointing to the future. (C)

Referring to Genscher's visit to Moscow, the President said he had been intrigued by a recent Economist article which theorized that the Soviet Union was in hibernation, like a bear in winter. Genscher responded that he didn't know if the Soviet bear was sleeping in a cave, but it was certainly on the defensive politically. Kohl added that the Soviet reaction to the President's Dublin speech had been helpless. The Soviets are in a state of hesitation with their eyes fixed on the U.S. election. We don't expect much movement, added the Chancellor, until after the elections. The President observed that the Soviets had tried to affect previous elections and didn't do a very good job of it. (C)

Kohl recalled a recent conversation he had had with a leading Soviet official, who couldn't grasp that the Soviet withdrawal from the Olympics worked to the President's advantage politically. He added it is hard to understand electoral politics if one has never had to stand for public elections. (U)

The President expressed disappointment that the Soviets are now also withdrawing from the Olympics for handicapped people, and asked rhetorically how one tells a group of handicapped youngsters that they will now not have the opportunity to participate. (U)

Kohl said a Soviet withdrawal from Los Angeles was an act of revenge for the Moscow boycott; it is also related to the stationing of U.S. missiles in Europe. The President interjected that the Soviets are also concerned that some of their athletes may decide to stay in Los Angeles. Kohl agreed, but underscored that the main reasons were revenge for the Moscow boycott and INF. (C)

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The President then turned to European complaints about the U.S. budget deficit. He noted Congress is considering what he called a down payment on the budget deficit. He expected this budget reduction legislation to be enacted, and if re-elected, he would seek further cuts. Reduction in government spending remains one of my primary goals, said the President. (U)

Kohl replied that Europe is concerned about the U.S. deficit, as well as government spending. Too much government spending is also a European problem. He then explained how his efforts to control German spending impacted on such programs as funding for NATO's infrastructure program. Noting that NATO Defense Ministers had agreed in Brussels to take a look at the infrastructure ceiling within 90 days, he said Germany would find a way to accommodate an increase in NATO's ceiling. But this would not be easy. The main burden of EC expenditures falls on Germany. The EC heads of government would meet again in Paris in two weeks. And Mrs. Thatcher surely will cling to her tough negotiating stance. He did not know, said Kohl, if the President had ever had to negotiate money with Mrs. Thatcher, but he would gladly yield his EC chair to the President for this purpose. Every political leader, he continued jokingly, should have the experience of negotiating fiscal matters with our London hostess. (C)

Noting that he believed in talking to and not about friends, Kohl observed that a lowering of US interest rates was important to Europe's economic recovery. Germany's economic recovery is being confronted by the unions' efforts to obtain a 35-hour work-week. This is sheer madness, especially when Germany's GNP is now beginning to grow. Some union people are not really after a 35-hour work-week, said the Chancellor. What they want is to hurt Germany's economy and thereby hurt me. Neutralists and labor -- who he called the other side of the same coin -- have combined in three efforts to unseat me. First in the national elections, then in the INF debate and now in the current labor strikes. (C)

The President asked what was the genesis for the 35-hour work-week, observing that it would not be so bad if they produced the same amount in 35 hours as they did in 40 hours. Kohl answered that the unions want to receive the same pay for less working hours and they claim that this will help rectify the unemployment situation by opening new job opportunities. The drive for the 35-hour week is especially strong in the metals and auto industries, but outside factors also influence our economy, added Kohl. For example, proposed U.S. legislation to tax luxury cars would hurt Mercedes, and BMW, more than the strike itself.

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Moreover, if the big companies went to a 35-hour work-week, small companies would feel the same pressures. The President said that we were especially proud that four million new jobs had been created in the US last year, noting that most of these new jobs were generated by small and medium-sized companies. (C)

Kohl commented that the union campaign in Germany was largely politically driven, but added he was confident that he would manage and overcome it. The upcoming European parliamentary elections, however, posed certain difficulties for his party. In this sort of campaign it is difficult to focus on specific policies and it is particularly difficult to explain to the general public the EC's agricultural policy. Furthermore, if the EC goes along with the British equalization plan, explaining the EC agriculture policy will become even more difficult. He added that he was pleased to report he had detected an increasingly pro-European sentiment in his campaign travels around Germany. He was also careful to stress, commented Kohl, that the equation was Europe plus the United States, not Europe or the United States. (C)

The President said that when he hears mention of EC problems, the subject of corn gluten comes to mind. Kohl noted that the U.S. already sells a great deal of corn gluten in Europe, and these sorts of questions when combined with high US interest rates do have a negative psychological impact in Europe. Genscher added that it is US grain that feeds German cows. Hence, it is natural for Germany to hope that the US will buy more German meat products. The President replied that we hope to buy more and underlined that we have to be on special alert against increased protectionism -- a topic he knew Mrs. Thatcher wished to address at the Summit.

The President underscored that the U.S. looks at interest rates in a different fashion. While there is a relationship between the two, we do not agree that there is a direct link between the U.S. deficit and high interest rates. We believe that the lender's view of inflation plays a greater role in determining interest rates. While we have brought inflation way down, lenders simply refuse to believe that it is under control -- they are running scared. We believe, however, said the President, that inflation is under control and hope the market will soon come to the same realization. Secretary Shultz commented that interest rates contribute to the strength of the dollar, which has resulted in a large US trade deficit. It will approach one hundred billion dollars in 1984. Hence, there are pressures for us to protect US markets. Moreover, the US trade deficit means expansion in other countries. Genscher replied that there is no doubt that some countries have profited from the US trade

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deficit, but the Third World, especially Latin America, is paying a heavy price for the strength of the dollar. Secretary Regan observed that the President had earlier used a key word in referring to a down payment on our fiscal deficit. This infers and promises that more will be done and this is our firm intention. (C)

Kohl asked when we expected Congress to enact the down payment deficit legislation. The President answered that each House has passed its own version and the legislation is now in conference. Secretary Regan said we expected the legislation to pass within 30 days to six weeks, but as Congress' sessions will be interrupted by the party conventions it may be the fall before legislation is enacted. In response to Kohl's question, the President underlined that he expected the budget deficit legislation to pass well before the election, that this was only a down payment, and that he remained determined to reduce government spending -- which is simply taking too high a percentage of our GNP. Europe faces the same problem. We have all gone overboard on government spending, said the President.

Kohl agreed, noting that he had been wrestling with Germany's spending problem for his 18 months in office and that it was a major political challenge to explain to the public at large the need to reduce government spending. Civil servants simply do not understand it when they don't receive raises. Pensioners object when their retirement pay is not adjusted upwardly, and we have had to reduce stipends for students. Indeed, our spending cuts, said Kohl, have affected 30 million Germans, i.e., half Germany's population. (C)

Kohl observed that it was time for him to depart and he looked forward to seeing the President in the evening. The President thanked him for coming to Winfield House. (U)

The meeting concluded at 5:45 p.m. (U)

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


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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PRS*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Chancellor Kohl

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's June 7 meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward it to State and Defense, since NATO infrastructure was addressed.

Approve                      Disapprove                     

*as modified. Notify Defense orally.*

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003  
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/31/11*

RW 4/3/11

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RECEIVED 12 JUN 84 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 12 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: NATO

USSR

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SUBJECT MEMCON BTW PRES & NATO FORN MINISTERS 31 MAY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 14 JUN 84 STATUS X

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 12, 1984


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL (P) JOHN H. STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and  
NATO Foreign Ministers

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers on May 31, 1984.



Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

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Sec. 3.4(D), E  
White House  
BY NARA RW

8/31/11

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117816

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with  
NATO Foreign Ministers (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Weinberger  
Edwin Meese, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary Burt  
Ambassador David Abshire  
Peter R. Sommer, NSC  
John H. Hawes, Department of State

Secretary General Luns  
Claude Chyesson  
Leo Tindemans  
Allan MacEachen  
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Ioannis Haralambopoulos  
Geir Hallgrimsson  
Giulio Andreotti  
Svenn Stray  
Jaime Gama  
Fernando Moran Lopez  
Vahit Halefoglu  
Sir Geoffrey Howe  
Jean Wagner  
JGN De Hoop Scheffer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 31, Cabinet Room  
9:00-9:20 a.m.

The President welcomed the Ministers to the White House and expressed his hope that their meetings had been fruitful. He noted that the Alliance was healthy and sound. We can, he said, be very proud of NATO's achievements; looking back in history, there has never been another such alliance, which has pulled countries together and maintained the peace. We can be proud of that, and what it means for the future. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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The President continued that NATO is important not only in the military sense, but also in the political sense. It is an Alliance based on shared values. The Alliance has stood the test of deploying modernized nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has seen that it cannot divide us. Collective defense means collective responsibility, observed the President. Noting that there is concern in Congress over the sharing of NATO's defense burden, the President underlined that his ability to maintain Congressional support depends on Allied efforts. It may be difficult for Ministers from parliamentary systems to understand our need to win Congressional support, he noted, but it is a fact. (C)

Saying he understood that the Ministers were very concerned at the state of relations with the Soviet Union, the President noted that he had had extensive exchanges with Chairman Chernenko since he assumed power. He then asked the Ministers if they wanted to make any comments, noting that he had been impressed by a recent Economist article, which described the Soviet Union as a hibernating bear. Since it had no answers at present, it has crawled into its cave, waiting and saying nothing. The President commented that it is our task to wait outside the cave, perhaps throw a fish in front of it, and be prepared when the bear comes out. (C)

Speaking for the group, Secretary General Luns expressed pleasure at the opportunity to meet with the President. He found it especially fitting that the 35th anniversary meeting had been held in Washington, where the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed when Truman was President. Luns said that the Ministers' talks had gone very well. The meeting at Wye had produced a very good exchange of views, with no prepared papers. Luns added that, to his satisfaction and that of the Ministers, two documents had been prepared on East-West relations, along the lines of the earlier Harmel report. These documents, one confidential and the other public, had been prepared at the suggestion of the Belgian Foreign Minister. They were now finalized, although that had been doubtful as little as two days earlier. This was a great success for NATO, and the Washington meeting would go down as a great success. Luns attributed this to the President's dedication to the Alliance, and to US hospitality. He expressed warm thanks for the President's dinner the previous evening, and for the President's personal remarks in presenting him the Medal of Freedom. (C)

Secretary Shultz asked French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, as President d'honneur of the North Atlantic Council, to comment on the meetings. Cheysson noted that it had been his privilege to open two sessions of the NAC. In his speech on Tuesday he had expressed his feelings publicly. NATO has reached maturity. It has shown that it can quietly take decisions, and quietly manage those decisions. It makes no great fuss about it, but it simply gets on with its task. This shows the basic solidarity among our peoples. Cheysson agreed with the President that it was correct to ask for greater defense efforts, both to keep the peace and to provide a basis upon which we can seek to build relations with the other side. (C)

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Cheysson continued that the two meetings he had opened had both been marked by a great determination and an expression of Alliance solidarity, which was very impressive. He observed that, after some hesitation, NATO has moved to consider issues even beyond the formal legal bounds of the Alliance. The private Ministerial discussions have now achieved the proper climate for such discussions. In this regard, he cited the discussion the day before of the Soviet Union and East-West relations, but also of the Iran-Iraq war and other issues outside of Europe, as evidence that NATO can usefully discuss these issues. Although the sixteen countries cannot have the same positions, because they have different outlooks, we can discuss any issue, added Cheysson. He suggested that this fact demonstrated that the Alliance has reached an impressive stage of maturity. (C)

Cheysson commented that the Soviet Union paid a great deal of attention to what the Alliance does. In his estimate, this was further evidence that "this old lady of 35" was doing well. He welcomed the US invitation to hold the Ministerial in Washington, and the President's willingness to meet twice with the Ministers, and thanked the President on behalf of the French government for his hospitality. (C)

Shultz observed that in the discussions the previous day at the Wye Plantation UK Foreign Secretary Howe had used an interesting formulation to describe current Soviet policy, as had the Foreign Minister of Turkey. He asked if they would be willing to elaborate for the President. Noting that he and Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglu had discussed the issue on the road to Wye, Howe said that he had characterized the Soviets as running on autopilot. It was an autopilot designed by Peter the Great, modernized by Joseph Stalin, and administered by the present regime. If we are going to influence it, we will have to have a great deal of firmness and patience. (C)

Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglu recounted an incident when he was serving in Moscow in 1949. Time magazine had printed two photos: one of Nicholas II and one of Stalin. Halefoglu had asked the Russian charwomen who was cleaning his apartment if she recognized the photos. Yes, she said, that one is the old Tsar and this one is the new Tsar. This, Halefoglu suggested, is another demonstration that in the Soviet Union people at the top may change, but the system and the thinking remain the same. We in the West must adapt to the fact of this unchanging system.

The President asked whether it was possible that we were concentrating on the wrong issues, when we analyzed the theories of Marx and Lenin. In fact, the Soviets have created their own aristocracy, and are primarily interested in maintaining the power of that aristocracy. Halefoglu agreed, commenting that the Soviet Union is the most bureaucratic and conservative country in the world, even though it calls itself revolutionary.

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Commenting that the view from Moscow is not always the same as the view from the Eastern European capitals, and that the Ministers had discussed the situation in Eastern Europe earlier, Shultz asked German Foreign Minister Genscher to comment on relations with Eastern Europe. Genscher said he believed that it was possible to discern a greater freedom of movement on the part of the Eastern European governments. They clearly feel their own national identify. The Eastern Europeans find multilateral East-West meetings, such as the CSCE and the CDE, valuable in providing them some room for maneuver. For that reason, said Genscher, the West should continue to pursue such meetings. We should not expect that the Eastern Europeans would be able to change their policies, or leave the Warsaw Pact, but it is possible for them to take different positions on issues. In this regard, he noted that on the question of the Olympic boycott, several of them had shown hesitation in following the Soviet move, and the Romanians would not boycott the Olympics. Genscher underscored that he believed East-West talks can have an impact. Thus, Genscher continued, the Alliance is on the right policy line -- which it has again defined in its statement on East-West relations -- in calling for firmness, strength, and readiness for dialogue. (C)

At this point Shultz noted that was time to move to the Rose Garden for a public statement by the President and photo-opportunity with the Ministers. The President thanked the Ministers for meeting with him. (U)

The meeting concluded at 9:20 a.m. (U)

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National Security Council  
The White House

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8 JUN 12 P 5: 52

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John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

June 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peu*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's May 31 meeting with the NATO Foreign Ministers.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward it to State and Defense.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill/Stanford
- Tab A - Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *RW* DATE *2/3/11*