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President Reagan (04/06/1984-04/24/1984)

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/31/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (04/06/1984-04/24/1984)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

34

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117802	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING NWITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	3/22/1984	B1
117803	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING NWITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	3/22/1984	B1
117804	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PREM OF THAILAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	4/13/1984	B1
117805	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PREM OF THAILAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	4/13/1984	B1
117807	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PREM OF THAILAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	4/13/1984	B1
117809	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	4/2/1984	B1

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KEYWORDS FRANCE

VISIT

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTGS W/ MITTERRAND MAR 22 & 23

ACTION: KIMMITT SGD MEMO

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

April 10, 1984

2

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversations Between the  
President and French President Francois  
Mitterrand

At Tab A are the memcons from the President's meeting with  
French President Francois Mitterrand on March 22 and March 23,  
1984.

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memcons, 22-23 March

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Cabinet Room Meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand, March 22, 1984 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador William Brock  
Ambassador Vernon Walters  
Ambassador Evan Galbraith  
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt  
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC  
Robert Gelbard, Department of State  
  
French President Francois Mitterrand  
Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson  
Ambassador Bernard Vernier-Palliez  
Elysee Secretary General Jean-Louis Bianco  
Special Counselor Jacques Attali  
Press Spokesman Michel Vauzelle  
Foreign Affairs Advisor Hubert Vedrine

DATE, TIME March 22, 1984  
AND PLACE: 10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

The President welcomed President Francois Mitterrand to the White House and remarked that the visit could not have come at a more opportune time. America's relations with France have never been better, nor Alliance solidarity so strong. The Atlantic Community had withstood the challenge of the INF missile deployments and the French efforts had made a significant contribution on this. (C)

Although the press often puts our efforts to reduce tensions in a bad light, the U.S. was determined to improve East-West relations. We were making every effort to get arms control and arms reduction talks under way and we would be presenting a draft CW treaty shortly. The President suggested that this morning's meeting concentrate on international security issues and then asked for President Mitterrand's suggestions for improving our dialogue with the USSR. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

President Mitterrand began by expressing appreciation for the warm welcome accorded him and noted that he agreed with the President's view that the Atlantic community was united. He noted that French public opinion firmly supported his strong stance on missile deployments and dealing firmly with the USSR. He added that there were few pacifist tendencies within France. In some other countries, such as the UK, the FRG and Italy, the governments demonstrated considerable courage in deploying the INF missiles. However, he could not prejudge what the future would bring, but expressed the hope that the other countries would be firm. He did not know what would happen in France, but did not think that a fundamental change in public opinion would take place. He remarked that we had been through two stages on INF: first, verbal confrontation regarding the missiles, sometimes including Soviet threats, followed by actual deployments. Now we were at the third phase: the Soviets were obliged to say they did not accept NATO's decision, but the real problem was how long it would take the Soviets to absorb and assimilate the situation involving deployment; how long would they devote to a posture of hostile silence; when would they offer to negotiate? He noted that the USSR had emphasized so strongly that it could not accept Western INF deployments that it finds a reversal of this course difficult to implement. (S)

President Mitterrand predicted that the Soviets would probably be willing to go back to the table during the second half of this year. First, they would go through a stage where they would actively make threats; then they would change their position to one of promoting negotiations. The U.S. elections would affect the tactics the USSR decides to employ. They might well wait until they saw how the elections would come out. He felt that gradually the Soviets would become milder, with a dialogue possible by the end of the year. Of course, there were two partners involved and part of the decision depended on the U.S. He added parenthetically that he hoped the same Soviet leader would still be around at the end of the year, since they seemed to be changing with considerable frequency. (S)

The President responded that we would be ready and we hoped we could bridge the gap between us and the Soviet Union. Secretary Shultz asked Mitterrand how, in his view, we could best probe and explore Soviet intentions. The Secretary suggested that there were two things we might consider: first, make direct substantive proposals to see if the Soviets would respond to issues that were not just bilateral, but also in a multilateral context, such as the CDE, MBFR, or on CW negotiations; this would indicate if the USSR was ready to respond in any way across the board. Second, each country had its own bilateral relationship with the Soviets, but we needed to coordinate our approaches to them. For example, he pointed out, two Western European Foreign Ministers, Jaime Gama and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, were going to the USSR in May, and Geoffrey Howe would go in July. So it was clear that the Soviets were probing, too. Under



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these circumstances, it was imperative for us all to stay closely in contact. The Secretary added that we must go beyond a general statement to the Soviets that we were prepared for a dialogue with them and make substantive probes. He then asked Mitterrand what his thoughts were on this. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that his present view of the Soviet Union, especially the internal situation, led him to be apprehensive. He did not think the Soviets had nearly as much unity as they proclaimed; they had 60 years of central organization, but the situation had changed in recent years and there seemed to have developed considerable fragmentation of power. For example, the military and the Party both have strong apparatus of power. This did not involve competition for the trappings of power -- the Army was not concerned about that -- but he was worried that the Army was playing a larger role. Further, the Army had ambitions and concerns it voiced from a powerful position. At the same time, he noted that a sense of ideological decadence appeared to have developed in the Communist party and among the apparatchiki. This had developed in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Romania had its own independent foreign policy, but exercised tight internal controls. East Germany was closely aligned with the Soviets, but was, in fact, more "liberal" than the USSR -- less corrupt, but perhaps more dangerous. Mitterrand expressed further concern that the internal dynamics of the Soviet Union at the present were becoming increasingly unstable; events in Afghanistan, Poland, and the KAL incident were very indicative of this and he feared that we might see more of the latter type of incident, involving the military's acting on its own. He voiced the concern that the USSR might be more dangerous now, more prone to react strongly to provocation. (S)

Referring to Secretary Shultz's points, President Mitterrand said he agreed that it was more a question of being alert for signals than the actual substance involved in what was said. He added that the Soviets could employ a variety of signs and we had to assess their importance. The USSR was a mystical country and signs and symbols were very important to them. He added, parenthetically, that there were two kinds of Russians; the apparatchiki, like Chernenko, who looked like battleships, and the other kind, like Brezhnev, who shook their fists at you and then turned around and kissed you on the lips. (S)

Citing to the INF talks, President Mitterrand said that he did not want France to attend as a participant, but noted, as a spectator, that in the theater there was often a dialogue between the actors on the stage and the audience. He expressed appreciation and thanks for U.S. determination in the negotiations as well as for

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U.S. firmness in excluding British and French systems. But that phase (of INF negotiations) was now behind us; it was essential that the U.S. not abandon the idea of deployment. In any event, British and French systems were not intermediate, but strategic forces; most French systems were submarine-based and could not be considered as tactical nuclear weapons. (S)

President Mitterrand pointed out that Vice President Bush had been correct in his statement of some months ago that the time would eventually come when there would have to be broader discussions. Mitterrand mentioned that at the U.N. this fall, he had said he was not against a global approach toward disarmament, since it could be a way out and might be a way to get the Soviets back to the table without losing face. He pointed out, however, that with everything on the table, UK and French systems would be quite small and he still expected the conditions for French participation that he had mentioned at the U.N. to be met before France could be involved. (S)

President Mitterrand said he had discussed East-West relations and arms control with Helmut Kohl last July before Kohl went to Moscow. Mitterrand said he told the Chancellor that he would not go to Moscow if he were Kohl, that the real discussions were between the U.S. and the USSR, and that, in any event, Kohl could not promise the Soviets anything. The only possible result would be a softening of German public opinion. Now, with deployment a fact, the situation was somewhat different, but the Russians still hoped to soften the Western coalition through all the visits of Western foreign ministers to Moscow. Mitterrand felt that the principle of the visits was a good thing but, as the Secretary suggested, they had to be coordinated within the Alliance and should be encouraged only as long as relations were strong within the Alliance. He noted that Foreign Ministers were often intelligent and certainly loyal, but in some countries they might be playing internal politics by going to Moscow. Mitterrand countered that for France, bilateral relations with the USSR had improved since INF deployment. Some visits had taken place; for example, Gromyko had come to Paris. It appeared that Gromyko now had much more influence than previously. Gromyko was more open now, also, and that might be a positive sign. During Andropov's time, Gromyko seldom talked; when Brezhnev was sick, he talked a lot and he was speaking out again. Perhaps this meant something about Chernenko. Overall, there was a marked detente in Franco-Soviet relations. Mitterrand stressed that when he got invitations or messages he would inform his friends. It was through such means that the Soviets would begin to send signals, but ultimately, it was with the U.S. that they must negotiate. The Soviets would also try to confuse things; that was why the Allies must all talk to each other. (S)

The President expressed appreciation for France's critical support on INF, and said that Mitterrand's Bundestag speech had especially helped. The President noted that an American Ambassador many



years ago said it was a mark of stupidity to claim that he understood the Russians. The President suggested that perhaps we should all be adjusting our minds towards the Soviets; we had assumed all these years that we were the ones being threatened. They had brought this on themselves since virtually every Soviet leader at some time had declared his interest in world domination. The President wondered if the situation had changed and the Soviets had now abandoned ideology and the bureaucracy was simply determined to preserve itself. They appeared to have created a new kind of aristocracy of the type they had overthrown. The President asked rhetorically if the Soviets felt that we represented a threat to them, and if they had shifted from their position of aggressor? Should we accept the possibility that if we assure them that no one meant them harm that they might move toward a more peaceful posture? (S)

President Mitterrand replied that he did not believe that the Soviets wanted war. They were very rarely the direct aggressors, but that did not mean that they did not have a practical policy capable of starting war. The primary urge to avoid war derives from the leadership's desire to maintain their privileged place in society. However, the people in power did not have Stalin's energy and faced a very difficult economic situation, and this threatens their hold on power. He pointed out that they played chess very well, but did not play poker. Mitterrand said that they indeed may fear that the U.S. wants war. Since 1917, they have had a complex regarding encirclement; that, ironically, they feared that any setback would start a chain reaction like "dominoes." Mitterrand used the analogy of infancy: they appeared still to be living with the fears of their first two years, somewhat like psychoanalysts think an individual's complexes might develop in the first few months after conception. (S)

President Mitterrand stressed that we must be vigilant, but needed to avoid what might be perceived by the Soviets as a provocation. This was why he insisted that a balance of force was vital for peace: the Soviets remained fearful of encirclement. He used as an example the story of the madman and the chicken. The madman thought he was a grain of wheat, and went to a psychiatrist and was cured. Upon leaving the hospital, he saw a chicken and went running back. The psychiatrist reminded him that he was cured and that he no longer thought he was a grain of wheat. The madman responded that he knew that, but did the chicken? (C)

After the Bundestag speech, President Mitterrand said he had been accused of supporting the conservatives against his Social Democratic colleagues. There were real tensions in Germany and he felt that the Russians would try certain things aimed at dividing Germany and Western Europe as a whole. With respect to Soviet paranoia, Mitterrand told the President that he (President Reagan) could allay those concerns and fears. He said the President had

certainly chosen the most difficult task in the world by assuming the Presidency of the United States. The Soviets do not want war and would not go to war unless they were scared. Thus, there were dangers of miscalculation. They, too, were waiting for signs from the U.S., and positive signals from America could allay Soviet apprehensions. (C)

The President expressed his appreciation for Mitterrand's discourse about the Soviet need to avoid war. He recalled that on the road to Moscow from the airport there were tank traps left over from World War II as a reminder of the effects of war. But the Soviets were still pursuing international blackmail and aggression. He mentioned Lenin's own statement predicting revolution would begin by organizing the Asian hordes, then taking Latin America and moving to the industrialized countries. He noted that if their fear of war could be allayed and they could be convinced that no one meant them harm, this would be an important step. The only way they resembled a superpower was in their military might; they could become a true superpower if they joined the family of nations. The President added that we had more to fear from them than they did from us, and asked how we could convince them we really wanted peace. He suggested that he would like to take Chernenko and the other Soviet leaders on a tour of our countries to see how our people lived, as a way of demonstrating that our system worked and that we certainly would not risk all this by resorting to war. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that this was a good point. He wondered how we could lure Chernenko out of the USSR, out of his "fortress," to do this. He pointed out that Lenin also said that they would not achieve their goals by war, but by ideology and by influencing the internal politics of other countries. But Lenin had been wrong on many occasions. For example, Lenin was mistaken when he said that revolutions would come from uprisings of the industrial proleteriat in Germany, the U.K. and eventually the U.S. Revolution had never occurred this way, but only through the dissatisfaction of farmers and peasants. (C)

Mitterrand added that the U.S. had shown remarkable moral resistance to Soviet ideology. The U.S. should show the Soviets that it was a great peace-loving country and could move the whole world toward technological and industrial progress. The more the U.S. could create a climate that demonstrated the attractiveness of its system, the more the Soviets would be susceptible to modifying their behavior. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that it was true the Soviets did not want a major war, but they looked for other ways to extend themselves that were war-like. We had seen the development of organized state-supported terrorism, which obliterated the boundary between war and peace. It appeared to us that the tactics of organized terrorism were becoming one of the really important

weapons and required lots of attention and thought. We had to decide how to defend against it, what preventive measures to take, and how to retaliate against it. This was something our two countries and the Alliance as a whole must learn to deal with. (C)

President Mitterrand replied that this was something we could perhaps talk about later. He agreed the Soviets did not want large classic wars. They were very good at chess and wanted to make threats of war, but not war itself. INF deployment had occurred because there had been no other option. If deployment had not occurred, the Soviets would have picked off each Western European country without having to go to war. The Soviets had other means of action: guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and local warfare. This could not be prevented, but whenever it took place we or others must block their way and do it quickly. Mitterrand suggested that as soon as the Soviets moved out of their natural environment they became awkward; they were not very nice people to get along with. No African country liked the Russians; Guinea had had an alliance with them, but Sekou Toure was now one of their main antagonists. Angola and Mozambique were now trying to diversify as were the Ethiopians, whose economy had been ruined by Soviet help. Mitterrand added that there was total incompatibility between Islam and the Soviets; what we see now in the Middle East were circumstantial alliances. The Soviets were not capable of keeping friends, as were the U.S. and France. He pointed out that we talked of our two centuries of friendship, but the Soviets gained allies only through opportunistic circumstances, not out of conviction. The Soviets exploited opportunities and were not above supporting terrorism; it was their nature to act that way. (S)

President Mitterrand added that he did not think that events in Central America were entirely caused by the Soviets. They examined the circumstances of each country case by case, to see if they were ripe, before they attempted to establish themselves. He noted that the Soviets were giving arms to Libya and the Soviet military was not far from Beirut. On Nicaragua, Mitterrand said he did not share the U.S. analysis, but added that on Central America our policies were not all that far apart. It would be dangerous for the Soviets to gain too much ground there. However, they could not be stopped by reliance on military measures only (S).

The President noted that they had run out of time. On the Middle East, he said he was deeply concerned about the Iran-Iraq war and the threat of closure of the Straits of Hormuz. He mentioned that he had made it clear that the U.S. would not allow the Straits to be closed, but we must all be on our guard. The President expressed the hope that they all agreed on this since that was another area in which the Soviets would attempt to become involved, perhaps by supporting both sides in the conflict. In conclusion, the President again extended his appreciation for France's independent, yet supportive, foreign policy and for Mitterrand's personal steadfastness in the Alliance.

The meeting closed at 12:15 p.m.



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ADD-ON #1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Working  
Breakfast Meeting with French President  
Francois Mitterrand, March 23, 1984 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Counsellor Edwin Meese  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Evan Galbraith  
Deputy Treasury Secretary McNamar  
Ambassador Vernon Walters  
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for  
European Affairs John H. Kelly  
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC

French President Francois Mitterrand  
Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson  
Ambassador Bernard Vernier-Palliez  
Elysee Secretary General Jean-Louis  
Bianco  
Special Counselor Jacques Attali  
Foreign Affairs Advisor Hubert Vedrine  
Elysee Advisor Elizabeth Guigou

DATE, TIME March 23, 1984  
AND PLACE: 9:00 a.m. - 10:05 a.m.

The President said that the US would be pleased if the French would accept our offer to accommodate a French astronaut on a forthcoming flight of the space shuttle. This could be in connection with a French medical experiment which will be on board a shuttle flight next year. (U)

President Francois Mitterrand responded that space is a grand enterprise and he saw no impediments to accepting the US offer. Mitterrand added that France has astronauts who are already trained and readily accepted the President's offer. Mitterrand felt that cooperation on space efforts was a very promising venture. (U)

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Mitterrand continued that NASA Administrator James Beggs had discussed French participation in a manned space station with him. Mitterrand said the French are examining the proposal. It was discussed by the EC-10 at the Brussels Summit this week. The proposal lies several years ahead and has significant financial implications, and technical obstacles to overcome, but the two projects (the shuttle and the space station) should not compete with one another. Mitterrand concluded by saying he would examine the issue but that for both real and symbolic reasons, he thought it a good idea. (C)

President Reagan said that with regard to the space station, this would be good for international cooperation and a real step forward. He suggested that it could be discussed at the London Economic Summit in June. Mitterrand repeated that it had not yet been fully studied by the French. (C)

President Reagan noted that the EC discussions in Brussels apparently were very intense and said that we would appreciate a readout on the Summit. Mitterrand responded that despite press reports to the contrary, most of the pressing issues were resolved. A major remaining issue concerns reimbursement to the UK for its contribution to the Community. Mitterrand said that at his Brussels press conference he listed the 16 points where agreement was achieved, including major issues such as budgetary problems, monetary pressures, and mundane problems like cross-border travel. The dairy production problem is more difficult, but may be separate. The Summit meeting was more positive than is generally thought, but the remaining disagreement on the UK contribution blocks settlement of all the other issues. (C)

Mitterrand noted that concerning the UK reimbursement problem, because it is a major industrial producer, and food importer, the UK pays substantial sums to the EC. Since 1980 the UK has asked that payments and reimbursements be equalized. There is no question among any of the 10 of not helping the UK, but not on a permanent basis. The other nine all agreed on that point. Already the UK has been allotted 1/2 to 2/3 of the differential in return, but Britain is holding out for complete equalization. It was West Germany which formulated the principal refusal to the UK position and Holland had supported it. (C)

Mitterrand said that each time in the past Mrs. Thatcher has gotten everything she asked for. This time she did not and that is part of the problem. Some observers, he noted, wonder sometimes whether or not the UK really considers itself part of Europe. (S)

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Beyond the current difficulties, there are interesting and positive potential solutions among the nine. The UK says that the EC will soon be short of funds. This is an attempt to frighten the poorer countries, e.g., Greece, into believing that when the Community runs out of cash, it will have to accept the UK position. Mitterrand said that he will go to London on April 10 for an important and amicable meeting. There will be the June 6 D-Day ceremony, where he looks forward to seeing Mrs. Thatcher and the President, the London Economic Summit, and the EC Summit later in June. There is no great crisis in the EC. (C)

The EC has discussed the admission of Spain and Portugal. The aim is to wrap up the negotiations this year so that they can enter the EC in January, 1986. (C)

The President stated that we are in a battle against protectionism, as discussed at Williamsburg. The Administration is beating back protectionist efforts from the Congress, pressures which are particularly intense in an election year. This was the case with the pressure for the wine equity act. We were happy we were able to defeat that. Besides, no civilized human being should want to make it more difficult to buy good French wine. (Laughter) (C)

Mitterrand responded that the US is also importing more German and Italian wine -- but that is free trade. He continued that there was protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic and he believed that we should address the opposing viewpoints seriously. He finds that when he talks with Europeans, they accuse the Americans of protectionism. When he talks to Americans, they accuse the Europeans of protectionism. The fact is that neither should be protectionist. We need to conduct serious consultations on this, because the problems of agriculture surpluses are critical. That is the reason, Mitterrand said, that he wanted to visit US agricultural areas in the Middle West. Mitterrand said that when he visits Secretary Block's farm, he does not fear demonstrations by farmers with pitchforks as happens in France -- on the other hand, there may be no pitchforks left in the US. (Laughter) (C)

The President answered that if President Mitterrand wishes, we could arrange a demonstration. (Laughter) Protectionism is a worldwide problem, he noted, and we should work for its elimination. President Mitterrand said that he is fully determined to make his contribution to clearing the air. The President said, "we will join you." (C)

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President Mitterrand said that he wanted to raise with the US Government the question of reenactment (extension) of the Export Administration Act. We have discussed in COCOM the problems that would be created by new rules governing East-West trade. He felt no new regulations were required, and could create new difficulties. Mitterrand continued that he did not know the intent of Congress, but he would say that we should proceed with great caution. In fact, we do not sell enough to the Soviets. (C)

Secretary Shultz commented that we, too, do not know how the Act will emerge from Congress, but the legislation is vital to the President's capability to regulate US exports on national security or foreign policy grounds. Without that authority to control our own activities, our ability to participate in COCOM would be curtailed. There are occasions when our export controls take shape outside the COCOM framework. These are appropriate for us and up to you to decide on your own. (C)

Secretary Shultz continued that, for example, Libya's conduct is out of bounds, so we have dramatically curtailed our sales to Libya. We wish you would do so also, but that is different from a COCOM issue. The key to the various controversies stems from US components or US licensed products which are sold by a second country to a third. We take the view that we can exercise export controls on such components or licensed products. The firms involved know when they are undertaking a commitment to abide by US export controls. The key element in all this is the President's power to control and regulate exports, but we use these at a minimum and only as a last resort. (C)

President Mitterrand said that relations with Libya are ambiguous. There are a number of major Western oil companies purchasing its products. They seem to feel that Qadhafi is not so terrible. Qadhafi makes no distinction as to East and West when he sells his oil. Qadhafi is unpredictable. For example, he buys aircraft from France and wants France to train his pilots. The problem is in training pilots who then attack our own troops. If the US intends to discuss sales to Libya, let us know so that we will be prepared. It will not be a difficult problem unless the issue concerns strategic items. (S)

President Mitterrand said that he does not know Qadhafi, but that Qadhafi is not all negative, but also not entirely rational. He has little support from his North African neighbors. He has made no serious alliance with the Soviets, but he has Soviet weapons and materiel. Libya now occupies the north of Chad, which has only 150,000 people and is 10 percent of Chad's productivity. The south has 4 million people and 90 percent of Chadian productivity.

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Mitterrand continued that the day the risk was highest that the French and Libyan armies would clash, Qadhafi sent a message to say that Mrs. Qadhafi and their children were coming to Paris and that he hoped they would be well-received, assisted with their shopping, and provided security. (Laughter) Mitterrand said that Qadhafi must be taken seriously, as Islamic fundamentalism is highly contagious. (S)

President Reagan agreed and noted that terrorism is a major problem in the Middle East. He added that many of our friends there are quite concerned. Mitterrand assented and added that the head of government in Algeria worries about both the Shiites and Qadhafi. Perhaps Syria is also worried. Islamic fundamentalism is one of the important phenomena of our times. If it sweeps the Arab world, we will have to redraw the political and strategic maps. It has ramifications also in Africa, especially Nigeria, which is two-thirds Muslim. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that terrorism is used by some both as a tool and a tactic. We would welcome closer discussions of ideas and ways to deal with terrorism. There are various fora in which we can discuss this with France or among the Allies. Mitterrand answered that he favored such discussions. He pointed out that we share information among our police and security services. France is a definite target of terrorists. Secretary Shultz commented that we are, too. (S)

Mitterrand stated American and Israeli diplomats in France are targets. In addition, both Armenian and Basque terrorists cause trouble. As we learned in Corsica, the different terrorist groups have pooled their efforts on arms procurement and the forging of documents. We have decided to be very stern. (S)

Mitterrand, citing "Carlos," said that two and a half years ago France arrested by chance two of his friends. Since then there have been terrorist attacks and we have been told that if we release the friends of Carlos, the attacks will stop. Such bargains used to be the case, but we have decided to stand firm. (S)

President Reagan observed that Carlos has been so successful that one wonders if there is possibly more than one Carlos. Mitterrand agreed, but thought that the person of Carlos is at the center. He is not in business for himself. He is a professional. If we were in need of his services, we could hire him. (S)

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President Reagan noted that terrorist activities were not well publicized. He recounted that several years ago the New York police discovered a car bomb near the Empire State Building. The police removed it to an isolated area and detonated the explosive. They learned that if the bomb had gone off everyone within 100 meters would have been killed. This received no publicity, but imagine how horrible it would have been. This was an unadvertised success. (S)

President Mitterrand commented that relationships among our security services are excellent. Sometimes terrorism stems from ideology. Iran is so inspired, and ideological terrorism is the most dangerous and hardest to control. Those who blew up the American and French soldiers in Beirut were members of suicide squads. President Reagan agreed that it is hard to combat a cult that professes the belief that these acts will bring them a free ticket to heaven. Mitterrand observed that a good Christian ought not to resort to such actions. A good Christian might believe the sooner he reaches heaven, the better, but Mitterrand did not know any Christians who were in a hurry. (Laughter) (C)

The President summarized that he felt the past two days of discussions were very productive. He indicated that communications are very good and we both have very capable Ambassadors in our respective capitals. We are so confident of our solid relations that any matter can be openly discussed. Mitterrand agreed and stated that we have had excellent conversations and that as far as we can foresee, the affirmatives clearly outdistanced the negatives. (C)

President Reagan expressed support for Mitterrand's economic programs and said that he hoped the long range results will be satisfactory. He noted the progress that has been achieved over the last year. He also observed that Mitterrand's program was not all that different from his own! President Mitterrand said that the economic situation in France has been described in overly pessimistic terms. People believe that France produces only strikes. In the last two and a half years there have been fewer strikes than the average over the preceding 25 years. The strike rate is half of that which prevailed under de Gaulle, but the public is convinced that there are four times as many strikes in current days. (C)

Mitterrand continued that when the truckers block the roads it is page one news, but similar things happen in all countries. France has a unique "democracy Gaulloise." All we do is argue about our national identity, a process which has been going on for 2,000 years. (C)

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The President pointed out how difficult it is to get the press to report positive achievements. He noted that a recent study of television news broadcasts in the US indicated a frequent tendency to play down favorable economic news by following these reports with negative data, no matter how irrelevant. For example, a reported drop in the unemployment rate will be followed by an interview with someone who is unemployed. Mitterrand commented that it is the same in France, or worse, but one gets used to it. Also, perhaps both he and President Reagan took a different perspective on these events given their present positions. By the time our successors sit in our place, we will listen to the news with greater equanimity. (C)

The President noted that when he first took over the Presidency the media ridiculed "Reaganomics." Now that inflation and unemployment were down and the economy booming, no one referred to his economic program as "Reaganomics." President Mitterrand expressed admiration for President Reagan's ability to communicate with the people on television and how well he was able to explain himself to the public. In conclusion, he thanked the President for the warm hospitality he had received at the White House. (U)

The meeting ended at 10:05 a.m.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *twc*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversations Between the  
President and French President Francois  
Mitterrand

At Tab A are memcons from the President's meetings with French  
President Francois Mitterrand on March 22 and March 23, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

That you have Kimmitt forward the memcons to State after your  
review.

Approve *RMC* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmitt to Hill Memo
- Tab A - Memorandum of Conversations - 22 March and  
23 March 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003  
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/31/11*



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Subject: Memcons

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| _____ Mr. De Graffenreid | _____ Mr. Levine    | _____ Mr. Pollock  | _____ Mr. Sommer      |                       |
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: MEMCONs of Prime Minister Prem's Visit -  
Thailand (S)

The attached MEMCONs on the visit of Prime Minister Prem from  
Thailand are approved for release to interested capitals. (S)

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A MEMCON - Oval Office (Restricted Session)  
Tab B MEMCON - Plenary Session  
Tab C MEMCON - Luncheon

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Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW DATE 8/31/11





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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Prem of the Kingdom of Thailand - Oval Office (Restricted Session) (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State  
US Ambassador to Thailand John Dean  
Richard Childress, Director, Political-Military Affairs, NSC

Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda  
Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
M. R. Kasem S. Kasemsri, Ambassador to the United States  
Mr. Chawat Arthayukti, Deputy Director-General, Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Krit Garnjanagoonchorn, Attached to the Secretariat of the Prime Minister (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME April 13, 1984  
AND PLACE: 11:33 a.m. - 11:45 a.m., Oval Office

The President opened the meeting by welcoming Prime Minister Prem back to Washington, that he remembers the last visit warmly, but vividly because it fell on the day Anwar Sadat was killed. The President noted despite it being Friday the 13th, he understood it was the beginning of the traditional lunar New Year for Thailand, thus very auspicious. He asked if we could dispense with throwing water on each other, the traditional way of celebrating the day. He noted that they were visiting at a difficult time, given Vietnamese actions at their border. (U)

Prime Minister Prem expressed his appreciation for being invited a second time and offered the best wishes of the King and Queen. He said they look forward to receiving the President and Mrs. Reagan in Thailand. (U)

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NLRR M3711 #117804

BY RW NA #6122/15

The President said he looked forward to that, as it had been a long time since he was in Thailand (1970). (U)

The Prime Minister expressed the view that peace and freedom in the world has increased under the President's wise leadership and said Thailand will continue the close cooperation with the United States. He said Thai-US security cooperation is essential to both of us, critical to his nation's security. He asked that the US consider increasing support and modernization of the Thai armed forces to meet the Soviet/Vietnamese threat in the region. He asked that Thailand be furnished modern weapons, that they are handicapped and the ratio against them was too heavy. They need enough to protect their border and prevent incursions. (S)

The President responded that we would help modernize Thai forces, first with the M-48 tanks the Thai needed and will ask the Congress for more liberal repayment terms under FMS. (C)

Prime Minister Prem said they were looking forward to receiving a better fighter aircraft and wanted our help through a positive response. He requested the President to give the necessary guidelines to his subordinates. (S)

The President said that we would provide Thailand an advanced fighter, but first we wished the Thai to take a complete briefing on all of the alternatives available. At the conclusion of this process, the choice would be theirs. (S)

Prime Minister Prem responded that this was a very positive answer and wished to know if they could publicize it on their side. (S)

Secretary Shultz stated that we wished the Thai to seriously consider all of the alternatives, that it is important for Thailand to conduct a genuine review, not just say the current choice remains the same. After a short discussion in Thai to the effect that the public language of United States support for an advanced fighter aircraft for Thailand is assured, the Thai acknowledged the Secretary's point. (S)

The President concluded the Oval Office session by expressing his gratitude for Thailand's help on the VOA transmitter as it would extend VOA's reach and demonstrates our close cooperation. (S)



~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Prem of the Kingdom of Thailand - Plenary Session (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State  
US Ambassador to Thailand John Dean  
John Monjo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
Gaston Sigur, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Asian Affairs, NSC  
Richard Childress, Director, Political-Military Affairs, NSC

Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda  
Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Narong Wongwan, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
Flying Officer Suli Mahasantana, Minister attached to the Prime Minister's Office  
Lt. Gen. Chantrakupt Sirisuth, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister  
M. R. Kasem S. Kasemsri, Ambassador to the United States  
Mr. Thalerng Thamrongnawasawat, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
Dr. Snoh Unakul, Secretary-General, National Economic and Social Development Board  
Maj. Gen. Chawalit Yodmani, Secretary-General, Narcotics Control Board  
Amb. Sukho Suwansiri, Director-General, Department of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Amb. Sawanit Kongsiri, Director-General, Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Krit Garnjanagoonchorn, Attached to the Secretariat of the Prime Minister (Interpreter)

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NLRR 103711 #117805

BY RW) N. D. DATE 1/22/82

DATE, TIME April 13, 1984  
AND PLACE: 11:45 a.m. - 12:10 p.m., Cabinet Room

The President and Prime Minister Prem met in the Oval Office. They joined the group gathered in the Cabinet Room at 11:45 a.m. (U)

The President opened the meeting by giving Prime Minister Prem the Senate resolution of welcome noting that it passed unanimously. He then stated we recognize Thailand as a frontline state and a Treaty ally under the Manila Pact which we will honor. He noted that military assistance levels have doubled in this Administration and that we accelerated delivery of equipment as needed. In this context we are pleased to offer Thailand 40 M-48 tanks. The President then asked the Prime Minister to speak. (C)

Southeast Asia Security. Prime Minister Prem led off with presentation on Soviet threat in Southeast Asia noting that it affects both Thai and US strategic interests. Increased number of Soviet reconnaissance planes and bombers at Cam Ranh Bay demonstrates the threat. It is, therefore, necessary for the US to "strengthen its role in Southeast Asia, politically, militarily and economically." The Prime Minister wishes to see the US commitment "in graphic terms" and hopes that the Seventh Fleet will be deployed more regularly in Southeast Asia. Given the Soviet threat, the Prime Minister said he seeks a stronger Japanese role "in the China Sea," enhanced cooperation with the EEC and intensification of ASEAN-US relations. (S)

The President, agreeing with the Prime Minister, commented that Japan's taking on responsibility for defense of its country out to 1,000 nautical miles would release US forces for other places. Prime Minister Nakasone is trying to increase military cooperation despite problems he is encountering with the Diet. (S)

JCS Chairman Gen. John Vessey noted that the Soviets are undertaking amphibious exercises off the Vietnamese shore, using Cam Ranh Bay. (S)

Refugees/Piracy. Prime Minister Prem stated that he was certain the President is aware of the "big burden" refugees pose for Thailand and asked US cooperation in bringing the numbers down. Specifically, he asked that the 50,000 annual offtake level for Southeast Asia be maintained and that the economic support funds for affected Thai villages on the border be continued. The Prime Minister expressed special concern over the refugees who remain in Thailand after 2-3 years and who are proving very difficult to resettle. (C)

The President noted that the United States has taken about half of Thailand's refugees and that he personally had gotten the processing rate up to its present level. The President stressed that the pushoff and piracy problems make the refugee problem much more difficult for the United States Government to handle, particularly given Congressional concerns. (C)



Prime Minister Prem said that "we are doing our best" on the piracy question as it affects the boat people. Thailand is short of equipment and "we cannot do as much as we want." If more Vietnamese took the ODP route, he noted, the piracy problem would be greatly eased. (C)

Foreign Minister Siddhi said that the Royal Thai Government has recently arrested 40 suspected pirates and convicted four, who were sentenced to 18 years in prison. The number of refugee boats attacked by pirates has dropped from 100 to 10 per month, he stated, adding that it is hard to deal with an area of 300,000 square kilometers of sea of which only 18,000 is Thai. "We have made some progress; we continue to admit boat people," he concluded. (C)

Pushoffs. Foreign Minister Siddhi stated flatly that pushoffs are not Thai policy and that "if anyone violates the Prime Minister's orders they will be punished." (C)


Narcotics. Prime Minister Prem said that the "suppression of narcotic traffickers will be kept up, and the eradication campaign will be continued." He said the Royal Thai Government will assist the hill people in crop substitution. The Prime Minister said the Royal Thai Government, the King and Queen are all committed to solving the problem. "We hope the US will help," he remarked. Prime Minister Prem said the hill people have been addicts for centuries, adding that the Royal Thai Government is trying to persuade the younger generation not to smoke, thus cutting down both supply and demand. (C)

Major General Chawalit, Narcotics Board Secretary-General, said that working with DEA, the Royal Thai Government has better intelligence on trafficking and has a high rate of seizures. He stressed the need for education of the young and rehabilitation of the older hill people. (S)

The President noted that the United States also has a serious narcotics problem, and that Mrs. Reagan was at that very moment in Detroit working with parents' groups and one of our largest car manufacturers to seek more effective ways of combatting it. He added that we recognize that cutting supplies is only half of the battle; it is important that usage be cut as well. (U)

As the meeting adjourned for the S&T signing in the Rose Garden, Prime Minister Prem wished the President good luck in his coming reelection campaign. (C)





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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Prem of the Kingdom of Thailand - Luncheon (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President  
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State  
US Ambassador to Thailand John Dean  
Richard Childress, Director, Political-Military Affairs, NSC

Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda  
Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Narong Wongwan, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives  
Flying Officer Suli Mahasantana, Minister attached to the Prime Minister's Office  
Lt. Gen. Chantrakupt Sirisuth, Secretary-General to the Prime Minister  
M. R. Kasem S. Kasemsri, Ambassador to the United States  
Dr. Snoh Unakul, Secretary-General, National Economic and Social Development Board  
Police  
Amb. Sukho Suwansiri, Director-General, Department of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME April 13, 1984  
AND PLACE: 12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Residence

After some warm social exchanges between the President and Prime Minister Prem, Secretary Shultz said that we were interested in the Thai views on the PRC since the President will be going there soon. (C)

Prime Minister Prem stated that the Chinese are a friend to them, that they had changed their policy a lot. They are not as socialistic in their domestic economic policy and the Prime Minister believed that they would keep their word to only provide moral support on a

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

party-to-party basis to Communists in other countries. The Prime Minister said the President's visit would be useful to the US-PRC relationship and helpful to the region. (S)

Foreign Minister Siddhi said the trip would be very successful. He had spoken to the PRC Ambassador to Thailand who said the President would receive the warmest welcome possible. They are concerned about the \$800 million in arms sales to Taiwan, but want a warm atmosphere for the visit and would try not to raise any major objections. The Foreign Minister said close friendship between the US-Japan and the PRC will contribute to world stability. The Foreign Minister said that was no real progress in the Soviet-PRC talks. The three conditions for improvement from the PRC side remain deadlocked (Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Soviet-PRC border issues). The PRC agreed with the Soviets on wording of the results of the talks to indicate progress, but there was none. Foreign Minister Siddhi said he told the Chinese they must keep the Thai informed on Soviet actions, that the Chinese are friends and there should be no dramatic changes. (S)

The President responded that he too was impressed with the changes the Chinese have made and noted these during the visit of Premier Zhao. He elaborated that they were not abandoning Communism, but adopting a different brand. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted the strength of Thai and ASEAN economic growth. He said there were US companies interested in investment. Gas development, for instance, he was aware needed some decisions. He asked how this was all going. (C)

After a general outline of the importance of the subject to the Thai economy, the Thai expressed the view, after discussions that morning with Union Oil, that with goodwill on both sides the problem could be solved. (C)

The Prime Minister expressed his hope for the President to visit Thailand next year. (U)

The President thanked the Prime Minister and responded that he didn't have to say it again, but his earlier postponement was due solely to the Congressional schedule and it was critical to remain in Washington at that time. (U)

National Security Council  
The White House

CE/ED

System # I

Package # 3110

84 APR 18 A10: 26

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 3110

84 APR 16 P 4: 44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Childress</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Dick : Minor corrections at  
Top B. Need subject/  
paragraph marking on all  
three memos.

4/18/84  
Bob Kimmitt:

Corrections made. Resubmitted.  
Dick Childress



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36

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 16, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: DICK CHILDRESS 

SUBJECT: MEMCONS - Prime Minister Prem Visit

Attached are the MEMCONS from the visit of Prime Minister Prem on Friday, April 13, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

That you scan and sign the memorandum to Hill at Tab I.

Approve   K  

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum Kimmitt/Hill
- Tab A MEMCON - Oval Office (Restricted Session)
- Tab B MEMCON - Plenary Session
- Tab C MEMCON - Luncheon

cc: Gaston Sigur

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 Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958  
 White House Guidelines, et  
 BY NARA AW, DATE 8/31/11

RW 4/31/11  
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 21 APR 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 20 APR 84

THOMPSON

24 APR 84

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AP

SUBJECT MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ HELMUT SCHMIDT ON 2 APR 1984

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE 23 APR 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

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COMMENTS

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4/24 Thompson Sgd memo PS AT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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33

April 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the  
President and Helmut Schmidt (U)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the  
President's meeting with Former German Chancellor Helmut  
Schmidt on April 2, 1984. (U)

*Paul B. Thompson for*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A - Memcon

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SEC  
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RW

8/31/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with  
Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Edwin Meese, III  
James A. Baker, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
Robert C. McFarlane  
John M. Poindexter  
Peter R. Sommer

Helmut Schmidt  
German Ambassador Peter Hermes

DATE, TIME April 2, 1984  
AND PLACE: 9:30-9:50 a.m., Oval Office

Following the President's welcoming remarks, Helmut Schmidt noted that suggestions to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has been dominating the news since his arrival. It is both a pity and a reality, said Schmidt, that foreign policy is often dictated by domestic political considerations. This happens as well in Europe and is a phenomenon of democracy. (C)

The President emphasized that he adamantly opposed moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and that it would be done over his "dead body." Secretary Shultz underscored that the President would not bow to domestic political pressures. (C)

The President said that he knew Schmidt was in regular contact with Ambassador Burns, who keeps us posted on your views. Schmidt praised Burns' performance as Ambassador and noted that Burns does not fit into the classic diplomatic mold. Shultz observed that two of our finest Ambassadors -- Burns and Mike Mansfield -- are two of our oldest. (U)

The President asked how Schmidt sees the situation in the U.S. and the world? Schmidt replied that the U.S. economic recovery was laudable and he hoped it would spread and benefit the world economy. He is concerned, however, that U.S. growth will slow

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/11

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before it could benefit other economies. U.S. interest rates -- which he called the highest since the birth of Christ and which are a direct consequence of the huge U.S. deficit -- are especially troubling. For example, a number of Germany's largest corporations are making enormous profits, but instead of re-investing in production plants, these corporations -- attracted by high U.S. rates -- put their profits into the U.S. money market. As a consequence, Germany is faced with increasing unemployment and all the political problems that unemployment brings. (C)

The President opined that U.S. interest rates are artificially high, kept up by those who believe that we have not licked inflation. There remains a lingering lack of confidence that the U.S. recovery is real. A reduced U.S. deficit, he acknowledged, would help foster confidence. Shultz added that interest rates are considerably higher than they should be in real terms. This, as the President said, reflects skepticism over our long-term rate of inflation. We are confident, the Secretary continued, that our continued determination to keep inflation under control will bring interest rates down. (C)

Schmidt underscored that the U.S. should not mislead itself into thinking that its economic recovery has spread to the rest of the world. He opined that the rest of the world is still going through a recession; indeed, the Third World is in a depression. This has resulted in excessively high unemployment which is a major political burden in Europe. Current unemployment rates are as high as they were in Hitler's days. Mrs. Thatcher is making a determined effort to bring them down in Great Britain, but the hard fact is that unemployment now matches its 1932 level. In France, continued Schmidt, Mitterrand is losing ground on employment. My message, therefore, said Schmidt, is that the U.S. should not delude itself. The rest of the world is still lagging far behind the U.S. economic recovery. In Holland, for example, unemployment is at 15%. This high rate places an enormous political burden around the neck of the Lubbers government. (C)

The President observed that he was struck that Holland, which had one of the highest unemployment rates, also had one of the highest workman's compensation plans. He understood, said the President, that workers can obtain up to 90% of what they would normally earn when they were receiving unemployment benefits. Schmidt said that the Dutch situation was a result of long-standing laws that now made for an unstable political situation. Unemployment, he emphasized, is a problem all over Europe. (C)



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Noting that he had just met with French President Mitterrand, the President said that France appears to have reversed its earlier economic plan. Mitterrand had inherited a difficult domestic political situation and it took courage to admit that his original economic program was not bringing the desired results. (C)

Turning to U.S.-Soviet relations, Schmidt said that the Soviet leadership was obviously going through a transition phase. He had only met Chernenko briefly, observed Schmidt; Chernenko was clearly the second choice of many, but it often pays dividends to be the second choice if no one outrightly opposes you. The military, continued Schmidt, has never had more influence and I am referring, he said, to a historical period that goes beyond just the Soviet period of Russian history. Soviet attitudes toward the U.S. are affected by a series of foreign policy defeats, in particular the deployment in Europe of GLCM and Pershing missiles. Furthermore, the Soviets feel humiliated by a number of U.S. public statements and speeches. Against this background, the Soviets are waiting to see how the U.S. election will go before engaging in serious negotiations with the U.S. Schmidt applauded the President's policy of standing firm in the face of Soviet defiance. He added that the U.S. position of negotiations and deployment on INF had been the right one, and underlined that one needs a lot of patience when dealing with the Soviets. Schmidt urged the President to stick to his dual-track policy, but noted that it may take until 1986 to bring the Soviets around to serious negotiations. The U.S., he continued, should at the same time stretch out the hand of cooperation in other fields. Shultz intervened to note that the President has positioned the U.S. in a policy that matches the formula Schmidt just described. (C)

Schmidt underlined that the struggle for public opinion remains at the forefront of the battle and it would be especially helpful if the U.S. could develop a catch-word or two that defined its double-track policy of deterrence and negotiations. Schmidt added that in developing such a catch-word, the U.S. should think of its European as well as its American audience. Baker noted that in the 1980 campaign, the President had used "Peace through Strength." Schmidt suggested assembling a group of bright young people to develop a list of twenty or so alternative phrases and then pick out the one or two best suited to the current circumstances. (C)

Noting that it was time to conclude the meeting, the President agreed on the need to better explain our policies publicly, and emphasized that he was prepared to take positive steps in U.S. relations with the Soviets. (U)

The meeting adjourned at 9:50 a.m.

National Security Council  
The White House

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System # I

REIVED Package # 3278

84 APR 20 P 3: 25

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>I</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>THOMPSON</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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gjf

National Security Council  
The White House

ED System # I  
Package # 3278

8 APR 23 P 4:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>0</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

April 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the  
President and Helmut Schmidt

Attached is the memcon from the President's meeting with Former  
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on April 2, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review, that you authorize Kimmitt to forward the  
memcon to State.

Approve     *PS*    

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmit Memo to Hill
- Tab A - Memcon

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Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *RWS*, DATE *8/31/11*