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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 8/31/2011

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (03/27/1984-04/04/1984)

**FOIA**

M10-351/M10-371

**Box Number** 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

33

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117789	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	8	3/5/1984	B1
117790	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	13	3/22/1984	B1
117791	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	4/4/1984	B1
117792	TALKING PTS.	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117791] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117793	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	4/4/1984	B1
117794	TALKING PTS.	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117793] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117795	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	4/5/1984	B1
117796	TALKING PTS.	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117795] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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33

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117797	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 <i>M371/</i>	1	4/5/1984	B1
117798	TALKING PTS.	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117797] <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 <i>M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117799	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 <i>M371/</i>	2	4/6/1984	B1
117800	TALKING PTS.	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117799] <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 <i>M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117801	MEMO	JACQUELINE TILLMAN/ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE. CALLS TO LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 <i>M371/</i>	2	4/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 27 MAR 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOC DATE 27 MAR 84

KEYWORDS. GERMANY F R

KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMO OF CONVERSATION PRES MTG W/ KOHL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8401053 8401533 NSCIFID ( DW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Matlock S	MAR 28 1984	for reds		
matlock S	3/28	For Further Action		
Kinnitt X	3/29	for signature	3/30	
C	MAR 30 1984	Kinnitt sgl		JIM ✓

DISPATCH ✓ ed MJR 3/30 W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MK

National Security Council 1082 *ml*  
The White House

System # I  
Package # 2505

CE ED

8 MAR 29 11:45

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			<u>DISPATCH</u> <u>cy of TAB I</u>
Tom Shull			
<u>Phyllis</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>typo on</u> <u>page 1 Tab I</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

National Security Council  
The White House

✓ mp  
10786  
I  
2505

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System #  
Package #

84 MAR 27 P 5: 21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Mallock	2	_____	A

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_ (Date/Time)

Jack: Need to paragraph make (including subject) at the I. Also, three spelling corrections.

Corrections made 3/29/84 per

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 30, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of FRG Chancellor Kohl's  
Visit, March 5, 1984

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's  
meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl on March 5, 1984.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

*rw 8/31/11*  
SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachment  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

2505

117789

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary Burt  
Ambassador Burns  
Jack Matlock, NSC  
Harry Obst, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
MFA State Secretary Andreas Meyer-Landrut  
Ambassador to the U.S., Peter Hermes  
Dr. Horst Teltschik, Director General,  
Foreign and Security Affairs, Federal  
Chancellery  
Heinz Weber, Interpreter  
Dr. Juergen Sudhoff, Acting Chief, Federal  
Press and Information Center (lunch only)  
Dr. Edouard Ackermann, Director General,  
Communications and Public Relations,  
Federal Chancellery (lunch only)  
Dr. Franz Pfeffer, MFA Director General for  
Political Affairs (lunch only)  
Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, FRG Commissioner  
for Disarmament and Security Affairs (lunch  
only)

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M3711/#117789  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

DATE, TIME

March 5, 1984

AND PLACE:

11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Oval Office, and  
12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Working Lunch,  
Family Dining Room

The President greeted Chancellor Kohl and they exchanged greetings to Mrs. Kohl and the First Lady. Kohl also mentioned that his eldest son was with him and was on his way to study at Harvard. (U)

The President then asked Kohl what was on his agenda. (U)

Kohl replied that he had in mind a tour d'horizon, and that the President should interrupt and comment as he went along. Kohl then began with a review of the domestic situation in the Federal Republic. (U)

Turning first to the economic situation, Kohl said that economic recovery was under way and that he felt that the recovery would

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Declassify on: OADR

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be stronger than the experts were predicting. Inflation was being controlled and would be in the 2.8-3% range. Unemployment continues to be a problem, with two million Germans out of work. Basically, the problem resulted from too little investment for too long. The FRG must put more investment in industries of the future. (C)

There is also, Kohl noted, a potential future problem with the trade unions. They are proposing a shorter work week -- 36 hours -- with the same pay. Kohl feels he cannot yield on this point, though consultations continue. He feels that when Brandt yielded to comparable union pressure it was the beginning of his end. (C)

Kohl also noted that the FRG has a problem with exports and protectionist pressures are growing, but that he will oppose them firmly. He feels that they must compete with the Japanese in efficiency, and he is not pessimistic regarding their ability to do so. But it is clear that protectionism hurts everyone in the long run. (C)

In this regard, he added that he was strongly opposed to the proposed Common Market tax on fats and oils, and that he could assure the President that it will not be adopted. He had discussed this issue with Prime Minister Thatcher and she is not willing to support it either. (C)

Kohl noted the European criticism of high U.S. interest rates, and said that they are indeed annoying. But, as he had told his colleagues, it would be even more annoying if the President is not reelected, and he realized that perhaps it is not the best policy to bring them down this year. He hoped, however, that the problem could be addressed next year. (C)

Secretary Shultz observed that the Chancellor's statement regarding his firm position against the special tax on fats and oils is very important to us. He was pleased that Kohl stated it so unequivocally. An agricultural trade war would be the worst thing that could happen to all of us. (C)

Kohl said that he would make this point when he meets with the Senate, but we should understand that the resistance to protectionism must be a two-way street. (C)

Secretary Shultz suggested that he make this point to the Senate as well. (U)

Turning to political topics, Kohl observed that the opposition to LRINF deployments had not disappeared, but the anti-nuclear forces in Germany were disoriented. They hope to rebuild their structure, but lack unity on fundamental questions. He believes they will not be able to reforge this unity in the near future. He added that predictions in the press on East-West relations tend to be wrong. (S)

Regarding conditions in the European Community, Kohl noted that the Community was going through a difficult period arranging its finances. All the members need to make sacrifices, but Thatcher has not reached the point of recognizing this fully. In the end he believed that an arrangement would be reached, but that care must be taken to make sure that the arrangement devised would not lead to a trade war. This question is also linked to Spain and Portugal; the other members must increase their contributions. They need another two billion on top of the four agreed to. (C)

Kohl noted that there are rumors that Spain would like to obtain a position in NATO like France has, and said that this should be strongly opposed. He recognized that EC negotiations with Spain and Portugal are crucial, and felt that they must be concluded successfully since the European Community without the Iberian peninsula would be only a torso. As for other NATO allies, he stated that the position taken repeatedly by Papandreou in opposition to alliance views is not acceptable and must be resisted. (S)

So far as the EC is concerned, he hoped that the current problems would be solved, but noted that this would be a long process, since any agreements would have to be ratified by national parliaments, and this could take two years or so. With the elections to the European Parliament, however, a new and more informal phase of negotiations will begin. (U)

Nevertheless, he is dissatisfied with the present condition of the European Community. The perspective of the future is missing, and it lacks the vision and spark of its founders. A new attitude toward political integration is needed. This does not mean separation from the United States; his policy will never look at European unity and the Atlantic Alliance as an either/or question. Indeed, close ties with the United States lie at the basis of the FRG state rationale. The tragic history of the twenties and thirties would have been different if Germany had been bound to the West. (C)

Kohl then turned to Henry Kissinger's recent analysis of the alliance, and noted that it contained some good proposals. He felt, however, that Kissinger was wrong on two points: that there should be a European supreme commander, and that the U.S. troop presence should be lowered. These steps would be interpreted in Europe as a diminishing U.S. commitment to the alliance and would lead to an unraveling of the alliance. He agreed, however, that the Europeans should do more for themselves. (C)

Regarding the GDR, Kohl said that "seismographic" developments are taking place. Pressures are building up, and it is clear that the ideological basis for communism has gone to pieces. The GDR is letting more people leave than before -- 4,000 were allowed out in January and February, more than in ten years. This is an attempt to reduce the pressures on the regime in the hope that an explosion can be prevented. It is not in our

interest, Kohl added, that an explosion occur. He has the feeling that Honecker is on better terms with Chernenko than he was with Andropov, and this may give him a little more elbow room. Basically, Kohl expressed optimism about the direction of current trends. (S)

Regarding LRINF deployments, Kohl noted that the most important decisions have been made, but that the Dutch are a problem. (C)

Secretary Shultz asked how the Dutch should be handled. (C)

Kohl replied, "As quietly as possible." He noted that the Dutch were "proud Calvinists" and would react negatively to public pressure. He suggested, however, that we could help by pursuing a policy of negotiation with the Soviets. (C)

Turning to the Soviet Union, Kohl observed that it was stupid to ridicule Chernenko's age or health, as the media had done. He believed Chernenko could stay in office and that he should be treated with courtesy. His position is, however, not as strong as Andropov's, and his successor may already have been chosen. It would be a good idea to try to establish contacts with the successor, but this of course should not be done behind Chernenko's back, but by using normal channels. (S)

Kohl added that he thought the President's decision not to go to the Andropov funeral was correct. The Soviet Union continues to have a collective leadership. They misread the situation in regard to NATO LRINF deployments, and it is important now for us to keep the initiative. (S)

Kohl then reviewed some specific issues as follows:

Chemical Warfare Ban: He felt Secretary Shultz's statement in Stockholm that the U.S. would table a draft treaty in Geneva was excellent, and it will be important to follow through promptly so that we will be seen negotiating the issue. (C)

MBFR: He felt we should move during the next round of negotiations in order to keep the initiative. (C)

INF: Here it is up to the Soviet Union. The U.S. should not make a move, but should make it clear that it is still interested in an agreement. (S)

On balance, he thought it to our advantage to keep the stress on chemical weapons. As for U.S.-Soviet relations in general, he considered the President's speech of January 16 an excellent move. (C)

Kohl then turned to Poland, where he felt the situation continues to be bad. The Soviets have not mastered the ideological situation. He felt the Catholic Church initiative to provide support for private agriculture has great promise, and noted that it is the Pope's idea. The Polish regime would have to make a

very difficult decision to allow it, but it deserves our support if it is approved. (S)

Kohl then apologized for talking so long. (U)

The President said that he had not at all talked too long, and noted that we seem to be very close on the issues. Regarding protectionism, he felt very strongly that it should be opposed. However, he has problems with Congress. He then suggested that the conversation be continued at lunch. (C)

\* \* \* \* \*

Kohl initiated the conversation at lunch by saying that he was trying to do his part in supporting democratic forces in El Salvador. His ambassador is now there, and he was asking everyone to stand up for Duarte and assist him. (C)

The President said that these actions were most helpful. (U)

The topic then shifted to East-West relations, and Secretary Shultz referred to Kohl's earlier comments on the Polish Church initiative to assist private agriculture. (C)

Kohl reiterated the importance he attached to supporting this initiative, and observed that the President's personal support must be clear -- this will be very important for Catholics. (C)

The President noted that we have moved on some of our sanctions and will be prepared to move on others if the Polish government takes appropriate steps. As for the Soviets, he is making clear that we are ready to negotiate. (S)

Kohl said that it would be useful if the President could arrange a meeting with Chernenko. Personal contact is important, and Gromyko is a problem. A way must be found to get around him and contact other policy makers directly. He had talked to Mrs. Thatcher, and she agrees that a summit meeting would be desirable. (S)

The President replied that he was interested in preparing for a meeting, but it was important that we not talk about this publicly, since the Soviets could use it for propaganda purposes. (S)

Kohl said that he had told the Soviets that the President was going to be reelected whatever they did. They should believe him, since he had told them last June that the missiles would be deployed, and he had been proven right. So he had told the Soviets that if they hesitated to deal with President Reagan because 1984 is an election year, they would lose again. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if Chernenko could stand up to Gromyko. His speeches seem a bit milder, but Gromyko seems to act as the gatekeeper to the outside world. (S)

Kohl thought it would be possible to arrange a summit, and noted that a 30-minute meeting would not be enough. It should provide enough time to discuss subjects thoroughly. He had observed Gromyko's relations with Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko respectively, and had noted that Gromyko was more assertive with Brezhnev (in his last years) and Chernenko, than he was with Andropov. Andropov was more clearly the boss. But he felt the President should probe, and it would surprise him if Chernenko did not react positively. The East Europeans, at any rate, want a meeting, and Chernenko himself may feel that he doesn't have a lot of time to lose. (S)

The President said he was reminded of the story of the man who had just had a physical, and who asked his doctor for a report. The doctor advised, "Just eat the best part of the chicken first." (U)

The Vice President asked how Kohl would view the development of U.S.-GDR ties. (S)

Kohl said that it depends. If greater prestige of the GDR regime helps the people, this is all right. But the question should be examined carefully to make sure that any moves do help the people. Honecker does seem to have an interest in improving his relations with the U.S. Kohl met with him at a Soviet guest house in Moscow during the Andropov funeral. Honecker said at that time that he had an invitation to speak in San Francisco, and asked some questions about Americans and the United States. So he may be interested, and Kohl himself would give a qualified yes to an improved U.S.-GDR relationship. (S)

The President asked if Kohl could estimate how many East Germans would choose the FRG over the Communist ideology. (C)

Kohl said 90 percent. Of course, he added, not all really want our system; they have grown up under a socialist system and may not want to give up some of the social benefits. But the influence of the Church is growing and there is no support at all for revolution. (C)

Secretary Shultz recalled that in Bonn they had spoken of the importance of military to military contacts with the Soviets. (C)

Kohl said yes, he thought they were potentially useful. At present, he observed, the Soviets have only two channels of information from the outside world, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. Soviet marshals know little of the personalities in the West, and direct contact could broaden their horizons. (C)

The President remarked that it is easy for us to see the Soviets as aggressive. He wondered whether they could possibly view us as aggressive. (C)

Kohl said that he thought they could, but not because they fear we will attack their borders, but because they feel they need a buffer zone. And then dictatorships always need an enemy. (C)

The President asked rhetorically how they could think that we would want to go to war. They have emphasized their determination to impose Communism, and should recognize that the rest of us are merely being defensive. (C)

Kohl observed that Communist ideology is becoming more flaccid. He noted at the Andropov funeral that the symbols and procedures were as if a pope or emperor or tsar were being buried. And he himself was witness to the fact that when Mrs. Andropov paid her final farewell to the corpse, she made the sign of the cross over the casket. (C)

The President observed that the Soviets seem to have created an aristocracy such as the one they overthrew. (C)

Kohl remarked that whereas Americans have found their place in the world and in history under the President's leadership, time is not working to the Soviet advantage. He noted that Mitterrand agrees with this, and he believes that it gives the United States an opportunity. The idea of Communism has lost much of its force. One can see this in the decline of the French and Italian Communist Parties. The idea of freedom is stronger everywhere. While the Soviet regime will not collapse overnight, it is brittle. (C)

The President said that he understood there was a turn to religion among the young. (C)

Kohl confirmed that he believed this was the case and noted that the Patriarch was allowed to read a public mass during the funeral period for Andropov. He wondered why the regime permitted it, and thought they might need it for insurance. He then asked Meyer-Landrut (until recently FRG Ambassador in Moscow) if he had any observations. (C)

Meyer-Landrut agreed that there is a growth of interest in religion, and noted that the Russians must cope with many problems for which the ideology gives them no help. They need better information regarding the West. (C)

Shultz wondered if Western tourists have an impact on the Soviet population. (U)

Meyer-Landrut thought that they definitely have an impact. Soviets are very interested in life in the West. They draw conclusions from the way Western tourists are dressed and act, and when they can, question the foreigners about their life. (U)

Kohl thought that we should not forget what it means to live in a country sealed from the outside. Distortions are great, and thirst for information is great. (C)

The lunch terminated with both the President and Chancellor Kohl agreeing on the usefulness of their conversation and on the importance of maintaining close consultations on the various issues that confront us. (U)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's  
Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, March 5, 1984

Attached for your review and approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl on March 5, 1984 (Tab I).

Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to Mr. Charles Hill, Department of State, forwarding a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve forwarding the memorandum to Mr. Hill.

Approve RMK

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation  
Tab II Memorandum to Mr. Hill

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 01, 2009  
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/31/11



# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Subject: MEMCON

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RECEIVED 28 MAR 84 09

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 27 MAR 84

KEYWORDS . FRANCE

VISIT

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: STATE MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ MITTERRAND MAR 22

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO HILL DUE: 30 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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8409241  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 27, 1984

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(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President Reagan's Memcon  
with Mitterrand

Attached is a draft memorandum of conversation  
for your clearance of the President's March 22 meeting  
with French President Mitterrand.

*Charles Hill*  
or Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

RW 8/31/11

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with French President  
Francois Mitterrand (U)

PARTICIPANTS:           The President  
                          The Vice President  
                          Secretary of State Shultz  
                          Secretary of Defense Weinberger  
                          Robert C. McFarlane  
                          Ambassador William Brock  
                          Ambassador Vernon Walters  
                          Ambassador Evan Galbraith  
                          Assistant Secretary Richard Burt  
                          Tyrus Cobb, NSC Staff  
                          Robert Gelbard, Department of State

                          French President Mitterrand  
                          Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson  
                          Ambassador Bernard Vernier-Palliez  
                          Elysee Secretary General Jean-Louis Bianco  
                          Special Counselor Jacques Attali  
                          Press Spokesman Michel Vauzelle  
                          Elysee Foreign Affairs Adviser Hubert Vedrine

DATE, TIME               March 22, 1984, Cabinet Room -  
AND PLACE:               10:45 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.

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NLRR M3711/1 # 11779D  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/72/15

The President began the meeting by suggesting that the discussion that morning concentrate on security issues. He noted that the Alliance had never been so strong and the Franco-American alliance was firm. We had withstood the challenge of missile deployment and the French position had been instrumental in this. Press reports to the contrary, the U.S. was determined to improve East-West relations. We were making every effort to get arms control and arms reduction talks under way and we would be presenting a draft CW treaty shortly. The President then asked for President Mitterrand's suggestions for improving our dialogue with the USSR. (C)

Mitterrand began by saying that first we must measure the state of Western Europe. He noted that French public opinion was mostly united in favor of his policy and there was hardly any pacifism within the country. In some other countries, such as the Netherlands, FRG, and Italy, the governments were required to show considerable courage regarding INF. However, he could not prejudge what the future would bring. He did not know what would happen in France, but did not think that a fundamental change in public opinion would take place. He remarked that we had been through two stages on INF: first, verbal confrontation regarding the missiles, sometimes including actual Soviet threats; then, actual deployment had begun to take place. Now we were at the third phase: the Soviets were obliged to say they did not accept NATO's

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- 3 -

decision, but the real problem was how long it would take the Soviets to absorb and assimilate the situation involving deployment; how long would they devote to semi-hostility and silence; when would they offer to negotiate? (S)

Mitterrand predicted that they would probably be willing to go back to the table during the second half of this year. First, they would go through a stage where they would actively make threats; then they would change their position to one of wanting negotiation. The U.S. elections would affect this and the Soviets might well wait until they saw how the elections would come out. He predicted that gradually the Soviets would become milder, with a dialogue possible by the end of the year. Of course, there were two partners involved and part of the decision depended on the U.S. He added parenthetically that he hoped the same Soviet leader would still be around at the end of the year, since they seemed to be changing with considerable frequency. (S)

The President responded that we would be ready and we hoped we could bridge the gap between us. (U)

Secretary Shultz asked Mitterrand how in his view we could probe and explore Soviet intentions. He suggested that there were two things we could do: first, make direct substantive proposals to see if the Soviets would respond to issues that

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- 4 -

were not just bilateral but also in a multilateral context, such as the CDE, MBFR, or on CW negotiations; this would indicate if the USSR was ready to respond in any way across the board. Second, each country had its own bilateral relationship with the Soviets, but we had to be coordinated in our approaches to them. For example, he pointed out, two Western European foreign ministers, Jaime Gama and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, were going to the USSR in May and Geoffrey Howe would go in July. So it was clear that the Soviets were probing, too. Under these circumstances, it was imperative for us all to stay closely in contact. The Secretary added that, overall, we must go beyond a general statement to the Soviets that we were prepared for a dialogue with them. He then asked Mitterrand what his thoughts were on this. (S)

Mitterrand replied that his present view of the Soviet Union, especially the internal situation, led him to voice an expression of fear. He did not think the Soviets had nearly as much unity as they proclaimed; they had 60 years of central organization but the situation had changed in recent years and there seemed to have developed considerable fragmentation of power. This did not involve competition for the trappings of power -- the Army was not concerned about that -- but he was worried that the Army was often divorced from other events while playing a larger role. At the same time, he was further worried that a sense of ideological decadence appeared to have

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- 5 -

developed in the Communist party and among the apparatchik. This had also developed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, while Romania had its own foreign policy but tight internal controls. East Germany was closely aligned with the Soviets but was in fact more "liberal" than the USSR, less corrupt but perhaps more dangerous. Mitterrand expressed further concern that the internal dynamics of the Soviet Union at the present were becoming increasingly unstable; events in Afghanistan, Poland, and the KAL incident were very indicative of this and he feared that we might see more of the latter type of incident, involving the military's acting on its own. (S)

President Mitterrand asked rhetorically, referring to Secretary Shultz' points, what signs we should look for, especially regarding bilateral relations. He agreed with Secretary Shultz that it was more a question of being alert for signs than the actual substance involved in what was said. He added that the Soviets could employ a variety of signs and we had to assess the importance of them since we did not know which signs they would choose. The USSR was a mystical country and signs and symbols were very important to them. He added parenthetically that there were two kinds of Russians; apparatchik, like Chernenko, who looked like battleships, and the other kind, like Brezhnev, who shook their fists at you and then turned around and kissed you on the lips. (S)

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Referring to the INF talks, Mitterrand said that he did not want France to attend as a participant but noted, as a spectator, that in the theater there was often a dialogue between the actors on the stage and the audience. He expressed appreciation and thanks for U.S. determination in the negotiations as well as U.S. willingness to exclude British and French systems. He noted that France thought the U.S. was right in doing this but still appreciated our firmness. But that phase (of INF negotiations) was now behind us. It had been essential that the U.S. not abandon the idea of deployment. In any event, British and French systems were not intermediate but strategic forces; in any event, most French systems involved submarines. (S)

Mitterrand pointed out that Vice President Bush had been correct in his statement of some months ago that the time would come when there would have to be broader discussions. Those would eventually take place. Mitterrand mentioned that at the U.N. this fall he had said he was not against a global approach toward disarmament, since it was the only way out and would be the only way to get the Soviets back to the table without losing face. He pointed out, however, that with everything on the table UK and French systems would be quite small and he still expected the conditions for French participation that he had mentioned at the UN to be met before France could be involved. (S)

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Bilaterally, Mitterrand said there were lots of Soviet attempts to be friendly with the individual European countries. He had discussed East-West relations and arms control with Helmut Kohl last July before Kohl went to Moscow. Mitterrand said he told Kohl that he would not go to Moscow if he were Kohl, that the real discussions were between the U.S. and the USSR, and that, in any event, Kohl could not promise the Soviets anything. The only possible result was to soften German public opinion. Now, with deployment a fact, the situation was somewhat different, but the Russians still hoped to soften the Western coalition through all the visits of Western foreign ministers to Moscow. Mitterrand felt that the principle of the visits was a good thing but, as the Secretary suggested, they had to be coordinated within the Alliance and should be encouraged only as long as relations were good within the Alliance. He noted that Foreign Ministers were often intelligent and very loyal, but in some countries some foreign ministers might be playing internal politics by going to Moscow. Mitterrand countered that for France, bilateral relations with the USSR had improved since INF deployment. Some visits had taken place; for example Gromyko, came to Paris and now had much more influence than previously. Gromyko talked now too, more and more and that might be one of the signs that we are looking for. During Andropov's time, Gromyko did not talk; when Brezhnev was sick he talked a lot and he was talking now. Perhaps this meant something about Chernenko.

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- 8 -

Overall, there was a marked detente in Franco-Soviet relations. Mitterrand stressed that when he got invitations or messages he would inform his friends. It was through such means that the Soviets would begin to send signals, but ultimately it was with the U.S. that they must negotiate. The Soviets would also try to confuse things; that was why the Allies must all talk to each other. (S)

The President expressed his appreciation for giving us credit for our position on INF but said that Mitterrand's Bundestag speech had helped, too. The President noted that an American Ambassador many years ago said "the second stupidest thing anyone could say was that he understood the Russians"; the President said he always wondered what the stupidest thing was. The President suggested that perhaps we should all be adjusting our mindset towards the Soviets: we had assumed all these years that we were the ones being threatened. They had brought this on themselves since virtually every Soviet leader at some time had declared his interest in world domination. The President wondered if the situation had changed and the Soviets had now abandoned ideology and the bureaucracy was simply determined to preserve itself. They appeared to have created a new kind of aristocracy of the type they had overthrown. The President asked rhetorically if the Soviets felt that we represented a threat to them and if they had abandoned their position as aggressor? Should we accept the possibility that if we assure them that no one meant them hard that they might move towards peace? (S)

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President Mitterrand replied that he did not believe that the Soviets wanted open war. They were very rarely the direct aggressors but that did not mean that they did not have a practical policy capable of starting war. However, the people in power did not have Stalin's energy and faced a terrible economic situation, but they still did not want to lose power. He pointed out that they played chess very well, but did not and could not play poker. Mitterrand said that they may fear that the U.S. wanted war. Since 1917 they had a complex regarding encirclement; psychoanalysis would how such a big country feared this. Mitterrand used the analogy of infancy: they appeared still to be living with the fears of their first two years, somewhat like psychoanalysts think an individual's complexes might develop in the first few months after conception. (S)

Mitterrand stressed that we must be on guard but we wanted to avoid what might be seen by the Soviets as any provocation, which was why he insisted that a balance of forces was vital for peace: the Soviets remained fearful of encirclement. He used as an example the story of the madman and the chicken. The madman thought he was a grain of wheat, and went to a psychiatrist and was cured. He thanked the doctor, saying that he was amazed that he ever thought himself a grain of wheat. Upon leaving the hospital, he saw a chicken and went running back. The psychiatrist told him that he was cured and he was not a grain of wheat. The mad man responded that he knew that but did the chicken? (C)

Mitterrand said after the Bundestag speech he had been accused of supporting the conservatives against his Social Democratic colleagues. There were real tensions in Germany and he felt that the Russians would try certain things aimed at dividing Germany and Western Europe as a whole. He told the President that he (President Reagan) could allay those concerns and fears. He said the President had chosen the most difficult task in the world by becoming President. The Soviets would not go to war unless they were scared and they too were now waiting for signs from the U.S. (C)

The President expressed his appreciation for Mitterrand's words about the Soviets not wanting war. He recalled that on the road to Moscow from the airport there were tank traps left over from World War II as a reminder of the effects of war. But the Soviets were still pursuing international blackmail. He mentioned Lenin's own statement predicting revolution would begin by taking Eastern Europe, then organizing the Asian hordes, then taking Latin America. He noted that if their fear of war could be allayed and they could be convinced that no one meant them harm it would be important. The only way they resembled a superpower was in their military might; they could become a true superpower if they joined the family of nations. The President added that we had more to fear from them than they did from us, and asked how we could convince them we really wanted peace. He suggested that he would like to take Chernenko and the other Soviet leaders on a tour of our countries to see how our people lived, as a way of demonstrating that our system worked. (S)

Mitterrand replied that this was a good point. He wondered how we could lure Chernenko out of the USSR to do this. The Soviets lived in a fortress state, but they would not go to war except out of fear. He said that Lenin also said that they would not achieve their goals by war, but by ideology and by affecting the internal politics of other countries. For example, Lenin had been wrong when he said that revolutions would come from uprisings of the industrial proleteriat in Germany, the U.K. and eventually the U.S., but it had never occurred this way, only through the dissatisfaction of farmers and peasants. (C)

Mitterrand added that the U.S. had shown remarkable moral resistance to Soviet ideology. The U.S. should show the Soviets that it was a great peace-loving country and could move the whole world toward technological and industrial progress. The more the U.S. could do this, the more the Soviets would be susceptible to this type of approach. (C)

Secretary Shultz interjected that it was true the Soviets did not want a major war, but they looked for other ways to extend themselves that were war-like. We had seen the development of organized state-supported terrorism, which eventually obliterated the boundary between war and peace. It appeared to us that the tactics of organized terrorism were becoming one of the really important weapons and required lots of attention and thought. We had to decide how to defend against it, how to prevent it and how to retaliate against it. This was something our two countries and the Alliance as a whole had to learn to deal with. (C)



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- 12 -

Mitterrand replied that this was something we could perhaps talk about later. He agreed the Soviets did not want large classic wars. They were very good with chess and wanted to make the threat of war, but not war itself. INF deployment had occurred because there had been no other option. If deployment had not occurred the Soviets would have picked off each Western European country without having to go to war. The Soviets had other means of action: guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and local warfare. This could not be prevented, but whenever it took place we or others must block their way and do it rapidly. Mitterrand suggested that as soon as the Soviets moved out of their natural environment they became awkward; they were not very nice people to get along with. No African country liked the Russians; Guinea had had an alliance with them but Sekou Toure was now one of their main antagonists. Angola and Mozambique were now trying to diversify as were the Ethiopians, whose economy had been ruined by Soviet help. Mitterrand added that there was total incompatibility between Islam and the Soviets; what we see now in the Middle East were circumstantial alliances. The Soviets were not capable of keeping friends, as were the U.S. and France. He pointed out that we talked of our two centuries of friendship, but the Soviets were not successful in Afghanistan. He agreed that the Soviets practice terrorism; it was their nature to act that way. (S)

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Mitterrand added that he did not think that events in Central America were entirely caused by the Soviets. They examined the circumstances of each country case by case, to see if they were ripe, before they attempted to establish themselves. He noted that the Soviets were giving arms to Libya and the Soviet military was not far from Beirut. On Nicaragua, Mitterrand said he did not share the U.S. analysis at all, but it would be dangerous for the Soviets to gain too much ground there. However, they could not be stopped by military means. (S)

The President noted that they had run out of time. On the Middle East, he said was deeply concerned about the Iran-Iraq war and the threat of closure the Straits of Hormuz. He mentioned that he had made it clear that the U.S. would not allow the Straits to be closed but we must all be on our guard. The President expressed the hope that they all agreed on this since that was another area in which the Soviets would attempt to become involved. (S)

Drafted EUR/WE:RSGelbard

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM TILLMAN

KEYWORDS . COLOMBIA

*Brazil*

VENEZUELA

*Mexico*

*Argentina*

*Memcons of*

SUBJECT: APRES PHONE CALLS TO COLOMBIAN & VENEZUELAN PRESIDENTS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

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*C* APR 16 1984 *Kenneth* *ST, RO*

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John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3	✓	
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	
NSC Secretariat	6		D
Situation Room			

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The White House

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Bill Martin

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*Joeine:*

- ① Slight correction at Tab I, second memo.
- ② Need both memos to be paragraph marked
- ③ Need Kimmitt → Hill  
Hicks (Treasury)  
transmitting memos once Bud has approved.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. CHRISTOPHER HICKS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Calls to  
Latin American Presidents (C)

Attached are Memoranda of Conversations about economic assistance to Argentina of the following:

- April 4 President Reagan's phone calls to Colombian President Betancur and Venezuelan President Lusinchi;
- April 5 President Reagan's phone calls to Argentine President Alfonsin and Brazilian President Figueiredo;
- April 6 President Reagan's phone call to Mexican President de la Madrid. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Five Memoranda of Conversations

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A

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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NLRR M3711#117791  
BY LW NARA DATE 6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Colombian  
President Betancur (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Colombian President Betancur

DATE, TIME April 4, 1984  
AND PLACE: 1:33-1:46 PM, Oval Office

President Reagan began the conversation following the prepared talking points without deviation (attached). (C)

President Betancur graciously thanked the President and stated that in spite of Colombia's economic problems, it was clear that we had to support Argentina's return to democracy. Latin America faces many profound problems, not just that of external debt, based on longstanding inequalities that must be addressed. (C)

He also mentioned problems with the World Bank that frequently contributed to grave social and economic problems. On the one hand, they opened the door; but on the other, their rigidity and orthodoxy seemed excessive. Colombia was following the letter of the law and being very disciplined, so these remarks were intended in behalf of other Latin American countries. (C)

President Reagan replied that he hoped all the countries of the Western Hemisphere could become closer neighbors and work together on problems of this nature. (U)

President Betancur then informed President Reagan about the recent successful operation against drug traffickers and their guerrilla allies launched deep in the Amazon. He closed by affirming that Colombia will continue to struggle in the fight against drug traffickers and those helping them. (C)

President Reagan said he was aware of the successful operation and had been pleased to hear of it and bade farewell. (C)

(FYI: Last week during a state visit to Colombia by Mexican President de la Madrid, Betancur made remarks that equated the US with the USSR and Cuba and cited our lack of support for the Contadora process. While Betancur was waiting for President Reagan to get on the line this afternoon, he chatted informally with the translator and said he was glad to hear from President Reagan, "me siento mas tranquilo (I feel relieved)". I suspect his relief is related to his earlier remarks.) (C)

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Prepared by:  
Jacqueline Tillman



TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT BETANCUR OF COLOMBIA

- I am calling to express my pleasure at what we were able to do together to support economic stability and democracy in Argentina.
- The multilateral financial package is a vote of confidence in the soundness and strength of Argentina's democratic leadership.
- But it is much more than that.
- Clearly our ability to cooperate on a matter of such importance to us all is a demonstration of the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere that we can and, I hope, will continue to build upon.
- We all know that much remains to be done before the generalized debt crisis can be put behind us, but the problem-solving capacity we have shown together to meet Argentina's liquidity crisis is proof that our institutions have the flexibility and mutual accommodation to cope with emergencies. What we need now is to work towards a resolution of the underlying problems that is equitable for all our countries.

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BY RW N. RA JA E 6/22/05

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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NLRR M3711 #117793

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Lusinchi of Venezuela (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Lusinchi

DATE, TIME April 4, 1984  
AND PLACE 1:51-2:05 PM, Oval Office

President Reagan began the conversation following the prepared talking points (attached) without deviation. (U)

President Lusinchi indicated his genuine pleasure to hear from President Reagan and indicated his pleasure, as well, that the theme of this phone call was the assistance to Argentina. Venezuela had many problems, too, he said, but we did not hesitate to contribute our short-term assistance to help Argentina resolve her problems. (C)

He strongly emphasized his pleasure that the US had participated in this effort remarking that he felt it was very revealing of new possibilities for new relations for the US and Latin America. President Lusinchi said we ought to march together in resolving these grave but frequently transitional problems. He emphasized again his deep appreciation for this timely and special gesture of friendship to Latin America from the US and warmly thanked the President on behalf of himself, his country, and all of Latin America. (C)

President Lusinchi indicated that this action on behalf of Argentina could lead to other possibilities, perhaps multilateral talks, to resolve the debt crisis. He indicated that he was considering an important initiative that he would convey bilaterally through our Ambassador in Venezuela, George Landau, whom he highly praised. (C)

President Reagan warmly responded saying that nothing pleased him more than hearing these remarks. He looked forward to learning the details of President Lusinchi's proposals. He reiterated his dream for the Western Hemisphere--that we can be closer neighbors and can work together on problems as neighbors--and said goodbye. (C)

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Prepared by:  
Jacqueline Tillman

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TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT LUSINCHI OF VENEZUELA

- I am calling to express my pleasure at what we were able to do together to support economic stability and democracy in Argentina.
- The multilateral financial package is a vote of confidence in the soundness and strength of Argentina's democratic leadership.
- But it is much more than that.
- Clearly our ability to cooperate on a matter of such importance to us all is a demonstration of the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere that we can and, I hope, will continue to build upon.
- We all know that much remains to be done before the generalized debt crisis can be put behind us, but the problem-solving capacity we have shown together to meet Argentina's liquidity crisis is proof that our institutions have the flexibility and mutual accommodation to cope with emergencies. What we need now is to work towards a resolution of the underlying problems that is equitable for all our countries.

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NLR 103711 # 117794  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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NLRR M3111 #117795  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brazilian  
President Figueiredo (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Brazilian President Figueiredo

DATE, TIME: April 5, 1984  
AND PLACE: 9:46-9:56 AM, Oval Office

President Reagan began the conversation by following the prepared talking points without deviation (attached).(U)

President Figueiredo responded by saying how pleased he was to hear these words. He congratulated President Reagan for the package in support of Argentina, personally and as a representative of his country, Brazil. The collaboration in assisting Argentina had been a cooperative action and Brazil applauded the U.S. action. He added that he was personally happy to know that the U.S. and Brazil are cooperating in the cause of the Western world, that we can collaborate, despite problems, to provide encouragement to our neighbors and friends. This strengthened the bonds of friendship within the Americas.(C)

President Reagan answered that he too was happy to hear this. He reiterated that he had a dream: that we can, from the South to the North Poles, become close neighbors and friends.(C)

President Figueiredo said therefore we should be making a full effort to move the dream to reality. He congratulated President Reagan again, offering him an abrazo of personal friendship and an abrazo of friendship and solidarity from Brazil's people to his.(C)

President Reagan thanked him, adding how much he was enjoying his horse Giminish.(U)

President Figueiredo expressed his personal happiness, respect and friendship, saying that President Reagan should know how close he was to him and to all his people.(C)

Goodbye my friend was said by both Presidents.(U)

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Prepared by:  
Jacqueline Tillman

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL

- I am calling to express my pleasure at what we were able to do together to support economic stability and democracy in Argentina.
- The multilateral financial package is a vote of confidence in the soundness and strength of Argentina's democratic leadership.
- But it is much more than that.
- Clearly our ability to cooperate on a matter of such importance to us all is a demonstration of the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere that we can and, I hope, will continue to build upon.
- We all know that much remains to be done before the generalized debt crisis can be put behind us, but the problem-solving capacity we have shown together to meet Argentina's liquidity crisis is proof that our institutions have the flexibility and mutual accommodation to cope with emergencies. What we need now is to work towards a resolution of the underlying problems that is equitable for all our countries.

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NLRR 10311, #117797

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/98

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Argentine  
President Alfonsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Argentine President Alfonsin

DATE, TIME: April 5, 1984  
AND PLACE: 9:09-9:18 AM, Oval Office

President Reagan began the telephone conversation drawing verbatim from the talking points (attached).(U)

President Alfonsin offered his appreciation for the assistance and cooperation Argentina received from the United States last week, and praised Treasury officials Mulford and Gordon for performing a "splendid job." The first and most practical result of the effort has allowed Argentina to remove an important obstacle to her progress. But the second and most important consequence was the collaboration and dialogue pursued to resolve the problem. President Alfonsin said he was convinced that this process had initiated a new dialogue where all were together, not the United States against Latin America, but the United States with Latin America. And he has instructed Foreign Minister Caputo, who will be in the United States next week, to explore this theme with Secretary of State Shultz.(C)

Finally, President Alfonsin insisted that the welfare of Latin America is linked to the strengthening of pluralistic democracy, and this involved the security and prestige of the U.S. The debts compromised economic development which was an essential condition for the development and strengthening of Latin American democracy. He strongly stated a formal pledge in the name of his country and his own personal commitment as well that Argentina will pay its debt and reiterated his commitment to raising the quality of life of his people.(C)

President Reagan responded that "we are thinking alike." We were all friends and allies, from the Tierra del Fuego to the North Pole. We were all Americans, with the same heritage and background. He closed by stating he looked forward to the continuing process which Alfonsin had outlined.(C)

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Prepared by:  
Jacqueline Tillman



TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT ALFONSIN OF ARGENTINA

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BY HW N RA DATE 6/82

- I am calling to express my pleasure at the multilateral financial package announced Saturday in support of your policies.
- I cannot think of a more practical demonstration of the confidence and solidarity with which the hemisphere's democracies view Argentina under your leadership.
- Certainly that is how we view the situation from the United States. And I am very encouraged that the progress and responsibility Argentina is demonstrating has been matched by others.
- We all know that much remains to be done. But the problem-solving capacity we have shown together demonstrates that our institutions have the flexibility and capacity for mutual accommodation to strengthen equitable relations throughout the hemisphere.
- We also believe that it is crucial that you follow up on this bridging package in your negotiations with the IMF on a letter of intent, and we will be pleased to see the swap agreement we have already signed go into action.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid

DATE, TIME: April 6, 1984

AND PLACE: 2:37-2:55 p.m., Oval Office

The President began the conversation drawing verbatim from the first three recommended talking points (attached). (U)

President de la Madrid responded that Mexico participated in the Argentina package "because we feel it's vitally important that Argentine democracy can be strengthened." The President agreed and returned to the talking point covering the demonstration of solidarity of the Western Hemisphere embodied in this cooperative action. President de la Madrid said that in the recent trip he made around Latin America he witnessed a great desire for a dialogue among the countries in the region and also with the United States. The President responded that he thought the Argentina package is a good example of the type of cooperation among neighbors that they had discussed in the past, and at the same time acknowledged that there remains "a lot more to do." The President then returned to the talking point dealing with the flexibility of our institutions in coping with emergencies and the need to work toward a resolution of the underlying problems that is equitable for all parties. He also expressed his gratitude to Minister Silva Herzog and President de la Madrid for their leadership and imagination in putting this measure together. (U)

President de la Madrid said that during his May visit to Washington he wished to convey to the President his view of the present situation in Latin America which he depicted as a region "truly in economic crisis." In addition, he hopes to discuss new forms of cooperation between North and South and stated his belief that there have been "great strides forward in terms of the maturity and seriousness of the presentations put forward which I think will make for fruitful dialogue between the United States and Latin America." The President responded that he looks forward to seeing President de la Madrid in May and stated his belief that we have started a positive process. President de la Madrid said he would "make a point of bringing with me all information I think would be useful for the United States to have in regard to the

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problems of the Hemisphere." He went on to say, "But as far as the aims we all have in mind, I know they are well on the way to being harmonized, and the aims I am talking about are peace, democracy and economic recovery." (C)

The two Presidents closed the conversation with very warm remarks and including the value each places on their relationship. (U)

Attachment  
Talking Points

Prepared by:  
Roger W. Robinson

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO  
PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID OF MEXICO

- I am calling to express my pleasure at what we were able to do together to support economic stability and democracy in Argentina.
- The multilateral financial package is a vote of confidence in the soundness and strength of Argentina's democratic leadership.
- But it is much more than that.
- Although our ability to cooperate on a matter of such importance to us all is a demonstration of the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere that we can and, I hope will continue to build upon.
- We all know that much remains to be done before the generalized debt crisis can be put behind us, but the problem-solving capacity we have shown together to meet Argentina's liquidity crisis is proof that our institutions have the flexibility and mutual accommodation to cope with emergencies. What we need now is to work towards a resolution of the underlying problems that is equitable for all our countries.
- I particularly wish to thank you and your Minister of Finance, Mr. Silva Herzog, for your leadership and imagination in putting this measure together. I look forward to seeing you in May.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

April 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACQUELINE TILLMAN *JT*  
ROGER ROBINSON *RWR*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: President Reagan's Phone Calls to Five  
Latin American Presidents Regarding  
Assistance for Argentina

Attached are memoranda of conversations of President Reagan's April 4 phone calls to Colombian President Betancur and Venezuelan President Lusinchi; April 5 phone calls to Argentine President Alfonsin and Brazilian President Figueiredo and his April 6 phone call to Mexican President de la Madrid. These calls were about the joint efforts to assist Argentina with her debt repayments.

There were a few striking results of these conversations that we wish to alert you to:

1. The genuine appreciation for the call which was evident in the voices of each Latin American President;
2. The warm tone which characterized the conversations;
3. The consistent appraisal from all five Latin American Presidents that this joint action constituted a positive breakthrough in US/Latin American relations;
4. The strong affirmation of solidarity between the US and Latin America.

These characterizations of the conversations do not err on the side of over-emphasis. They were evident from the tone and warmth in voices and choices of words. We have established -- with the action itself on behalf of Argentina and the follow-up phone calls -- a wonderful momentum that we can and should build upon with our southern neighbors. (These five countries are the largest and most influential Latin American countries). We should seek ways to transfer this good will to mutual advantage not only for resolving the Latin American debt crisis but in foreign policy issues as well. Our two offices -- Latin America and International Economic Affairs -- will be working together on this issue.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Kimmit<sup>t</sup> to initial and forward the Memoranda of Conversations.

Approve RCM Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Hill and Hicks

Tab A Memoranda of Conversations to Colombian President Betancur, Venezuelan President Lusinchi, Argentine President Alfonsin, Brazilian President Figueiredo and Mexican President de la Madrid

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