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President Reagan (11/01/1983-11/17/1983)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/30/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/01/1983-11/17/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 52

JAUVERT/BROWER

29

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117671	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND BANGLADESH CHIEF MARSHALL LAW ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL ERSHAD <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	10/25/1983	B1
117672	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER EDWARD P. SEAGA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/6/1983	B1
117673	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE AGOSTINO CARDINAL CASAROLI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	11/22/1983	B1
117681	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND CYPRUS PRESIDENT SPYROS KYPRIANOU <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/21/1983	B1
117683	MEMO	FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE. MEETING BETWEEN RR AND KYPRIANOU <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	11/21/1983	B1
117684	TALKING PTS.	RE. MEETING BETWEEN RR AND KYPRIANOU [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117683] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
117685	REPORT	<i>D 8/30/2012 M371/1</i>	2	11/16/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/30/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/01/1983-11/17/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 52

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29

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117702	FORM	RE. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	11/18/1981	B6
117687	MEMO	PETER SOMMER THROUGH CHARLES TYSON TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE. REQUEST FOR CALL BY KYPRIANOU <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1
117688	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE. CALL BY KYPRIANOU <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1
117691	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE. CALL BY KYPRIANOU [COPY OF DOC. 117688] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8307922

RECEIVED 02 NOV 83 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 01 NOV 83

KEYWORDS BANGLADESH

ERSHAD, H M

SUBJECT REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR MEMCON BTW PRES & ERSHAD ON 25 OCT

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE 03 NOV 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

DUR

COMMENTS

REF# 8333134

LOG 8307434

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

McFarlane	X	11/16	For Decision		
		11/21	JP Approved		
Kimmitt	S	11/21	for signature	11/21	
	C	11/21	Kimmitt S60 memo to Hill		RK, GK

DISPATCH V 04 11/21

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

PA (11/21)

**National Security Council
The White House**

964

RECEIVED

83 NOV 16 P 4: 34

System #

I

Package #

7922
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>MS</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>JP</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

November 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: MEMCON Between the President and Bangladesh
Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad

We approve the MEMCON between President Reagan and Bangladesh
Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad for transmission
telegraphically to the field.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

RW 9/30/11
~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7922

November 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: MEMCON Between the President and Bangladesh
Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad

A draft MEMCON from State between President Reagan and Bangladesh Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad is attached for approval to transmit telegraphically to the field.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you approve the MEMCON at Tab A.

APPROVE *gk* DISAPPROVE _____

- 2. That you approve the Kimmitt to Hill memo at Tab I transmitting approval to State.

APPROVE *gk* DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments:

Tab A - MEMCON

Tab I - Kimmitt to Hill memo

RW 8/24
~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

117671

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Time: 11:30 a.m.
Date: October 25, 1983
Place: Oval Office
The White House

Participants - Oval Office:

U.S.

President Reagan
Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth Dam
U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh
Jane Coon
National Security Adviser
Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
Geoffrey Kemp
Deputy Assistant Secretary
David T. Schneider

Joined at Lunch by:

U.S.

Counsellor to the President
Edwin Meese

Bangladesh

President, Council of Ministers
Lt.Gen. H. M. Ershad
Foreign Minister A. R. Shamsud Doha
Local Government Minister
Mahbubur Rahman
Bangladesh Ambassador to U.S.
Humayun Rasheed Choudhury

Bangladesh

Secretary, Ministry of Finance
and Planning Mohammed
Syeduzzaman
Secretary, Ministry of Health
and Population Control
A.B.M. Ghulam Mustafa
General Staff Director
Maj Gen. Nazirul
Chisti
Chief of Protocol Ambassador
Bridadier A.H.M. Abdul Momen

SUMMARY: The President received Bangladesh Chief Marshall Law Administrator General Ershad in the Oval Office at 11:30am, October 25 and thereafter for a working lunch in the Family Dining Room. Much of the conversation related to internal economic and political affairs in Bangladesh. General Ershad described improvements in his country since his assumption of control of the government and expressed appreciation for generous U.S. assistance. He then described the program of denationalization and encouragement for private investment and

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BY RW NARR #117671
6/22/15

foreign investment which his government has put into effect. Ershad gave particular emphasis to his interest in foreign investment, referring to his address the previous day to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Bangladesh leader described his plan for decentralizing government and emphasized the importance of population control, welcoming U.S. assistance in this area. Ershad also described the Food for Work Program and its effective use of PL-480 wheat. In reply the President expressed his hearty approval of the programs General Ershad had described. He said despite U.S. fiscal austerity, we would work hard with the Congress to continue our assistance to Bangladesh at present levels. Indicating interest in Bangladesh decentralization, the President explained how he was trying to restore the authority of the U.S. states.

Turning to foreign policy, General Ershad said the Soviets had no business in Afghanistan and that Kampuchea must be able to decide its own future. He asked about U.S. Central American policy. The President reviewed U.S. policy, setting forth in detail his analysis of the situation in Central America and briefing General Ershad regarding the joint action in Grenada. General Ershad spoke with pride of the success of the Bangladesh proposal for a South Asian forum and expressed the hope that discussions within this organization would improve relations among South Asian governments and reduce the influence of foreign countries (e.g., the Soviet Union). The President replied that the U.S. admires Bangladesh's stand on Afghanistan, saying "there are some things worth dying for".
END SUMMARY.

The President gave General Ershad a warm welcome, thanking him for his condolence message on the Marine tragedy in Beirut. The President said he was interested in the things Ershad was doing in Bangladesh. Did he have an agenda?

Replying, Ershad thanked the President for his invitation and then turned to a description of his programs in Bangladesh. Things had been at a standstill in Bangladesh when he assumed control of the government. Now the country was back in motion again, the atmosphere was better, the government was better managed, the economy was moving. The General said he hoped--and believed--Bangladesh was not a basket case anymore.

Concluding his initial presentation, General Ershad said that Bangladesh was very grateful for the generous assistance which has been provided by the U.S. Bangladesh, however, didn't want to have to depend on aid. It wanted to build its own economy so there could be a better life for coming generations.

The President expressed his hearty approval of what Ershad had said. He explained he had heard of Bangladesh denationalization, of its return to private enterprise. He was pleased that U.S. aid has been helpful. The U.S. has had to practice fiscal austerity because of economic conditions here. The President said, nevertheless, we would work hard with the Congress to continue our assistance to Bangladesh at present levels.

The conversation continued on the virtues of the private sector. The President cited the example of the Soviet experience when they turned over 3% of their farm land for private cultivation and found the result to be a vastly disproportionate product. Speaking of the condition of Bangladesh nationalized industry, General Ershad said management was greatly deficient and these industries were a burden to the economy. Handing them over to the private sector had brought marked improvement. Furthermore, the remaining national sector was now doing well because of the competition from private enterprise. Most of the Bangladesh economy has been opened to the private sector; all restrictions have been lifted. It is now simple for an entrepreneur to set up his own industry. General Ershad spoke of the interest he found in foreign investment and referred to his address the previous day to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He described the special arrangements which his government has made to protect and encourage foreign investment.

General Ershad then shifted the focus of the discussion to his plan for decentralizing government, which he said comprised "taking government back to the people". He described the structure he was establishing and explained that he was "going for both development and democracy." He then set forth his intentions for first local, then Presidential, and finally Parliamentary elections.

Indicating his approval of this process the President described the U.S. federal system and explained how he had been trying to restore some of the "upsurped" power back to the states. General Ershad then turned to the subject of population control. The rate of increase was 2-1/2 - 3% and Bangladesh could not survive if this continued. The decentralized administration could better reach the people and convince them to practice family planning. Bangladesh was fully utilizing U.S. assistance in this area.

Deputy Secretary Dam suggested that the group turn to a consideration of foreign policy. Accepting the suggestion, General Ershad declared that the Soviets had no business staying in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Kampuchea must have the opportunity to decide upon its own future. Bangladesh had been one of the first countries to recognize the Sihanouk government of Kampuchea and establish diplomatic relations with it.

General Ershad asked about U.S. Central American policy, saying that Bangladesh was America's friend and it would help them in the NAM and the Commonwealth to know more of U.S. views. In reply, the President described the change he had brought about in U.S. policy toward Latin America. We had not paid enough attention to the region and too often "we had arrived with gunboats". He had tried to change this, to reestablish a relationship of trust. In Central America most of the countries are changing from dictatorships to democracies. El Salvador had overthrown its dictator and held elections a year ago. The guerrillas--subsidized, trained, and armed by the Soviet Union and Cuba--were invited to participate; but instead on election day they set forth the slogan "vote today and die tonight". 83% of the people voted nonetheless. While we are training and equipping the Salvadoran army, our economic assistance is three times our military aid.

In neighboring Nicaragua, the President continued, after overthrowing a dictatorship the Sandanistas maintained that they would pursue a policy of democracy and human rights. Once in power, however, their communist leaders threw out the leaders of the other revolutionary factions and the latter are now engaged in the guerrilla movement which we are supporting. The Nicaraguans, who maintain that revolution knows no boundaries, are channelling arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

General Ershad then returned the focus of the conversation to South Asia. He explained the Bangladeshi proposal for a South Asian forum and described the successful series of meetings and economic studies which had emerged thereafter. He said that South Asia cooperation such as this should help reduce foreign influence in the region. It should also improve Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Bangladeshi relations. If South Asia cooperation succeeded, Soviet influence should decline; but Bangladesh was worried about Soviet influence. The terrorist attacks against South Korean governmental leaders was indicative of the problem. U.S. assistance to Bangladesh gives them courage to stand on their own feet.

Referring with approval to the successful deliberations of the South Asian forum, the President cited his belief that nations should talk to each other, not about each other.

At this point the group proceeded to the scheduled working lunch. The conversation there was largely non-substantive but periodically returned to foreign policy and other issues. The President briefed General Ershad on developments in Grenada and the steps the U.S. had taken. He explained that the U.S. had responded to an appeal by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) after it had decided that order had to be restored in Grenada. Mr. McFarlane explained that this action had a demonstrative effect in countries around the world. It may not be popular but it was unthinkable that the U.S. would refuse the OECS request. Unless we take a stand, others can't rally around.

The President then said that the U.S. admires Bangladesh's stand on Afghanistan. There are some things worth dying for. People must engage themselves on such issues to determine whether good or evil will triumph.

In response to a question by Mr. McPherson, General Ershad described the food for work program which was made possible by the use of PL-480 wheat. He explained how relief, employment, and rural works were obtained through the same activity. Now U.S. support had been obtained so that bridges and culverts could be provided in a program of construction of village-to-market roads. The President welcomed this use of U.S. food, commenting on how important it was.

November 1, 1983

7922

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Conversation Between the President and Bangladesh
Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad

There is attached a draft memorandum recording the conversation on October 25, 1983 between the President and Bangladesh Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad. Approval of this draft is requested so that it may be transmitted telegraphically to the field.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memcon

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY AW NARA, DATE 8/30/11

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8308084

RW 8/30/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 08 NOV 83 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MENGES

DOCDATE 08 NOV 83

KEYWORDS JAMAICA

MINUTES

SEAGA, EDWARD P

AP

SUBJECT MINUTES OF PRES MTG W/ PM SEAGA

ACTION FOR DECISION

DUE 08 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8307999 8308012 NSCIFID (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

NOV 10 1983 Ponderester approved TS, ME

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE PA VL (C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System # I

Package # 8084

83 NOV 8 P 1: 50

858

12

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>JS</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Adm. Poindexter,
Note in the list of participants in the MEMCON Constantine indicates that he is a Special Assistant to the President. Has that issue been resolved?
NO, not yet. Jon

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8084

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

November 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *com*

SUBJECT: Minutes of the President's Meeting with
Prime Minister Edward P. Seaga of Jamaica

Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the President's meeting with Prime Minister Edward P. Seaga on November 6, 1983 at 5:00 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

RW 8/30/11
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 21, 2006
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/11*

~~SECRET~~

117672

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED 8084

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M37111 #117672
BY RW . 2 4/22/15 14

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
Prime Minister Edward P. Seaga of Jamaica

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Ambassador William A. Hewitt
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Constantine C. Menges, Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director
for Latin American Affairs

Prime Minister Edward P. Seaga
Minister of State Neville Gallimore
Special Assistant Dorothy Carter
Ambassador Keith Johnson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 6, 1983
5:00-5:45 p.m., Residence, White House

The meeting was held in an atmosphere of cordiality and frank exchange in the White House residence. The major substantive points will be summarized below.

Grenada

-- Both leaders expressed their mutual satisfaction and appreciation for the cooperation in dealing with the serious problem of instability and violence in Grenada.

-- President Reagan said that this action had the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

-- Prime Minister Seaga noted that, although many governments publicly condemned the action in the United Nations, he was certain that the peoples of the Caribbean enthusiastically supported what was done.

-- Prime Minister Seaga indicated his view that it was "absolutely essential" that the U.S. provide logistical and material support for the multi-national security forces that would be needed in Grenada for six to twelve months. He emphasized that none of the Caribbean nations have the means to provide the surface transportation, weapons, ammunition,

~~SECRET~~

communications, surveillance patrol boats, and helicopters that are essential for effective maintenance of law and order and to prevent Cuban supported infiltration.

-- The Prime Minister said it would be best if the U.S. could maintain two to three rifle companies on Grenada for at least six months. Prime Minister Seaga expressed his deep concerns about possible Cuban-sponsored political and covert action, including infiltration, sabotage and perhaps terrorism intended to undermine the democratic transition.

-- He specifically referred to the prospect of Cuban infiltrators -- perhaps some coming via Guyana -- arriving in isolated coastal areas and trying to set up anti-democratic opposition networks.

-- Secretary Weinberger assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. would provide air and naval forces for the surveillance of Cuba and that these could help monitor this potential threat.

-- Prime Minister Seaga repeated his concern about the more covert type of action by the Cubans and their friends which he said also requires immediate steps to establish a competent intelligence service in Grenada, something with which Jamaica can help but the U.S. must provide the major assistance.

-- Prime Minister Seaga also emphasized that it was important to move quickly against the remnants of the Bishop regime -- in order to assure their lawful prosecution. He noted that the Grenadan people would be very willing to provide information and cooperation with the transition government now but that in two to three months if uncertainties arose due to Cuban supported instability or terrorism the current opportunities might be gone.

Financial Issues

-- President Reagan initiated the discussion of Jamaica's relationship with the IMF.

-- Prime Minister Seaga said that there was no way that Jamaica could make it through to the end of December under the current financial circumstances.

-- Secretary Shultz asked about the unification of exchange rates.

-- Prime Minister Seaga indicated that his government had decided in principle to unify the exchange rates, that a final decision would be made within a week and implementation would probably occur in December 1983.

-- Secretary Shultz noted that this would be seen by the IMF as a significant positive action and would provide the basis for the U.S. bridging financial assistance and support with the IMF.

-- Secretary Shultz urged Prime Minister Seaga to meet with Secretary Regan on Monday, November 7, to discuss the specifics and commented that once Jamaica had decided to unify the exchange rates, word might leak out and this suggested "the sooner the better" on timing.

Jamaican Domestic Politics

-- Responding to a question from Vice President Bush, the Prime Minister noted that one week before the collective security action opinion polls had shown his party doing much better. The Grenada operation had reinforced that trend.

-- Asked how the opposition People's National Party viewed Grenada, Prime Minister Seaga replied that they did not endorse use of force but many of the people around former Prime Minister Manly think that they may owe their lives to the Seaga victory in 1980 because they believe that the Cuban partnership might have led them to the fate of Maurice Bishop had the election gone differently.

-- Nevertheless, the Prime Minister expressed his interest not to take domestic economic measures that would "erode the political capital that has been building up and for that reason expressed a need for international financial assistance. He commented that if economic conditions get worse "people may quickly forget their good feelings about Grenada."

Conclusion

Prime Minister Seaga concluded by stating "Mr. President, I want to say how grateful we are for your having taken this unprecedented action and, because it was decisive, you have struck a blow for freedom. Without U.S. forces helping us, the liberation of Grenada might have cost 1000 more lives but, because a superpower was involved it saved lives since the outcome was absolutely certain and the other side gave up hope. We are grateful that you rose to the occasion.

What the next phase of Cuban action will be we don't know. But at least it will not be the overt targeting of our governments, the building of bases such as in Grenada ... Most likely the Cubans will revert to more covert action."

President Reagan responded by saying that the collective security action could not have occurred unless the OECS countries, along with Jamaica and Barbados, had joined together and made the explicit request for assistance.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8308270

RW 8/30/11

RECEIVED 16 NOV 83 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 15 NOV 83

KIMMITT

16 NOV 83

KIMMITT

18 NOV 83

KEYWORDS . VATICAN

VISIT

CASAROLI, CARDINAL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF CARDINAL CASAROLI VATICAN SEC OF STATE 21 - 23 NOV / MEMCON
BETWEEN PRES & CASAROLI 22 NOV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 DEC 83 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION
COBB

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
FORTIER
SOMMER
TYSON
KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8334935

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Paundexter</i>	<i>X 11/30</i>	<i>Reopen For Decision</i>		
	<i>12/5</i>	<i>Paundexter Approved</i>		<i>OK, ME</i>
<i>Kimmitt</i>	<i>S 12/5</i>	<i>For Sig</i>	<i>12/5</i>	
	<i>C 12/5</i>	<i>Kimmitt apd memo</i>		<i>RIC, CO, GE, M</i>
DISPATCH	<i>VL 12/05</i>		W/ATTCH	FILE <i>PA</i> (C)

876

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 NOV 30 P12: 34

System # I
Package # 8270

Add on/2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

Send cc to Kemp and Menges when approved. (Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8270 Add-On/2

December 5, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli
(C)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Vatican Secretary of State, Agostino Cardinal
Casaroli on November 22, 1983. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended
in Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
Kin 8/20/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Cardinal Casaroli

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Vatican Envoy William Wilson
John M. Poindexter
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC

Agostino Cardinal Casaroli
Apostolic Delegate to the U.S.,
Archbishop Pio Laghi
Monsignor Justin Rigali
Monsignor Pier Luigi Celata

DATE, TIME November 22, 1983
AND PLACE: 4:00-4:35 p.m., Oval Office

The President welcomed Agostino Cardinal Casaroli to the White House and commented that this was the third time they have had the pleasure of meeting in the United States. He noted that they had an excellent conversation in Connecticut last year at the Knights of Columbus Conference. The President added that he was gratified that the Cardinal had come to the United States to open the magnificent Vatican art exhibit in San Francisco. (U)

Cardinal Casaroli replied that he certainly enjoyed the visit with President Reagan last year and commented that the whole week in Connecticut was a superb opportunity to meet with Americans. Cardinal Casaroli indicated that he was also pleased with a recent visit to the Vatican of an American Catholic delegation that included a 90-year old Bishop who was still quite active in Church affairs. (U)

Envoy Wilson interjected that the Bishop must have no inclination to accept "early retirement." (U)

Cardinal Casaroli praised the President for the success he enjoyed on his recent trip to the Far East. The Cardinal added that Pope John Paul II maintained a close personal interest in the President's journey since he, too, would be visiting Korea in the near future. Cardinal Casaroli asked the President to discuss his feelings in being at this "strongpoint of freedom." (C)

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NLRR 11/3/11 # 117673
BY AW 6/22/15

The President responded that he was amazed at the dedication of the Korean people and commented on the spread of Christianity in that country. He emphasized that he found the Koreans to be remarkable people and that he felt a close identification with their quest for freedom. (C)

President Reagan then turned to the situation in Lebanon and expressed his appreciation for Vatican support for our search for a peaceful solution to the Lebanese struggle. The President added that the United States was most grateful to His Holiness for the offers of assistance in bringing stability to this troubled land. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli indicated that he had discussed Lebanon in some detail at the State Department and concluded that the situation in that region was very difficult. The Cardinal noted that he felt the crux of the problem lay with Syrian actions and expressed pessimism over any possibility of Syria and Israel reaching an agreement. He added that "we" (The Vatican) should be associated with the search for peace. Syria, he noted, was the primary source of difficulties there. (C)

The President agreed and noted that Damascus has long held ambitions to create a "Greater Syria" that would include lands now under the control of Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. He underlined the emphasis on military spending in Syria and pointed out that the Syrians now have approximately half the number of tanks that the entire United States Army has in its inventory. This is a major concern for those of us trying to reach a peaceful settlement of Middle East problems. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli and Archbishop Laghi both expressed agreement. The Cardinal added that he felt that the Soviet Union, however, would not be happy should some sort of "Greater Syria" arise from the ashes of a Mid-East conflict. (C)

The President agreed with this assertion and added that the Syrians in that case might become a "Big Bully" in the region. This would not be especially comforting to the Soviets and, in fact, there is some evidence that the Kremlin has tried to restrain Damascus. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli expressed the apprehension that Libya's Qadhafi might support Syria in its ambitions, but felt that few others would do the same. The Cardinal added that Syria possessed the "Dream of Qadhafi." (C)

The Vice President noted that we recently played host to President Nimeiri of Sudan, who was clearly worried over the ambitions of Qadhafi. (C)

The Cardinal reemphasized that as far as the Vatican was concerned the major problem was Syria. He indicated that they regularly received reports from the field and, although they were not military experts, they were very concerned with the trend of events. (C)

The Vice President shifted the conversation to Central America and asked the Cardinal what the Vatican thought about Catholic priests who had joined various radical movements in the region. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli applauded those who demonstrate concern over social ills and the poverty of the masses in Central America. He indicated that some priests had taken a radical turn that was of concern, but he did not feel that this represented a great danger for the Church. (C)

The President noted that in Nicaragua many of the priests had turned quite radical and had begun a new type of Church. (C)

Archbishop Laghi interjected that this was true and that they called it the "Popular Church." (U)

Cardinal Casaroli commented that many of these were very religious men who were convinced that they were pursuing the correct path. It was best to help them see the errors in their approach, but no one should attempt to force them to change their thinking. This could best be done through experience where they would ultimately see that there is a contradiction between being a Marxist and a Catholic. In Poland, for example, this contradiction has been brought to light. Of course, some do work with the Communist Party, but basically this is not a feasible thing to do. But, these priests in Poland, and elsewhere where there are Communist regimes, labor under extremely difficult circumstances. They must have a strong spiritual foundation in order to deal with the tough theological challenges that arise there. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli added that he saw a danger in Central America and elsewhere when priests became infatuated with "liberation theology." This worries us, he noted, since it is not theology, but mere wishful thinking. This could lead to a dangerous evangelicalism. (C)

Archbishop Laghi pointed out that the Nicaraguan Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal, a priest, wants to come here (Washington) in December, along with Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge, whom he described as the "real mastermind" and a dedicated Communist. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli reiterated, in response to the President's comment, that it was probably impossible to be both a good Christian and a good Communist, that those priests working in Communist societies must have great inner guidance. The Communist countries were attempting to create a "new man," one devoid of spiritual commitment, and a novel societal structure; this we were all against. (U)

Envoy Wilson turned then to the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the United States. (C)

The President indicated that he was pleased that the Congress had passed the legislation that provided him authority to explore the question of upgrading our relations. He indicated that the establishment of full diplomatic relations would be considered following close consultations with the Vatican and with the appropriate Congressional committees. (U)

Cardinal Casaroli noted the Vatican's appreciation for the President's efforts and was pleased that consultations would be initiated on this question. He praised the work of Envoy Wilson as the American representative in the Vatican and stressed the close ties that exist between us. (U)

Archbishop Laghi indicated that Envoy Wilson's effectiveness is attributable to a great extent to the fact that he spends a considerable amount of time in Rome and not just the Holy Days. (U)

The President then indicated that he had been greatly impressed by the appeals from the Pope regarding the urgency of securing reductions in nuclear arsenals. He emphasized that, as he had written to the Pope in his recent letter, the United States has no higher objective. We have engaged the Soviets in several arms control fora where we are striving to achieve substantial and verifiable arms reductions. The President also noted that he was moved by the Pope's call for the scientists of the world to channel their energies toward peaceful purposes; a goal we endorse. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli thanked the President for his kind words and indicated that he would mention them to the Pope. The Cardinal stated that the Vatican and the Pope want to do what they can to bring peace to this earth and to be of assistance in world affairs. (C)

The President thanked Cardinal Casaroli for coming to the White House and indicated that he looked forward to seeing him again soon. (U)

The meeting concluded at 4:35 p.m.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Casaroli

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Cardinal Casaroli on November 22.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab II, and authorize Kimmitt to sign the memo at Tab I forwarding it to State.

Approve *J*

Disapprove _____

- Tab I Kimmitt to Hill memo
- Tab II Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

RW

8/30/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RWS 8/30/11
REMOVAL
ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 17 NOV 83 11

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C
SOMMER
TYSON

DOCDATE 17 NOV 83
17 NOV 83
17 NOV 83

KEYWORDS CYPRUS
VISIT

TURKEY
AP

KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

SUBJECT. REQUEST FOR CALL ON PRES BY PRES KYPRIANOU DURING 21 - 22 NOV /
MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & KYPRIANOU

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 DEC 83 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

DUR

COBB

TYSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8335232

LOG

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>POINDEXTER</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>12/2</i>	<i>Reopen/For Decision</i>	<i>12/5</i>	
		<i>DEC 05 1983</i>	<i>POINDEXTER Approved</i>		<i>PS</i>
<i>Kimmitt</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>12/5</i>	<i>FOR SIG</i>	<i>12/5</i>	
	<i>C</i>	<i>12/5</i>	<i>Kimmitt apd memo</i>		<i>PS, PK</i>

DISPATCH

12/05

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

National Security Council
The White House

879

RECEIVED

System # I

Package # 8337

83 DEC 2 A10:09

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

JP: Since Bud was not at this meeting, he may want to read the President's remarks concerning our govt with two states on Cyprus. (Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8337 A.O./2

December 5, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and Cyprus President Spyros Kyprianou (C)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou on November 21,
1983. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.7(d), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/30/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation between the President and Cyprus
President Spyros Kyprianou

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
John M. Poindexter
Edwin Derwinski
Richard Burt
Peter R. Sommer
Richard Haass

President Spyros Kyprianou
Foreign Minister Iacovou
Ambassador Jacovides

DATE, TIME November 21, 1983, 3:45 - 4:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Following the President's welcoming remarks, President Kyprianou expressed appreciation for the strong U.S. stand against the establishment of an illegal, separate Turkish state on Cyprus. He added that Denktash's action took him by surprise, coming as it did amidst preparations for a summit. I have come, continued Kyprianou, at a most crucial time, to make an appeal for the U.S. to intensify its efforts to have the Turkish Cypriots undo what they have done. (C)

The President said we were pleased that the Cypriot government had avoided any precipitous or dangerous reaction. Kyprianou's statesmanlike reaction was laudable. The President noted that he had spoken to the UN Secretary General last Friday to underline our support for his good offices effort. We had offered to help in any way we can. He noted that we had strongly protested to the Government of Turkey about the unilateral Turkish Cypriot act. We have also asked others to help out by making representations to the Turkish government. The President said he also wished to emphasize our appreciation and thanks for the Cyprus government's help with regard to Lebanon. (C)

President Kyprianou replied that his government was eager to maintain friendly relations with the governments in the region, and was pleased that it could help out with regard to Lebanon. He also reaffirmed his government's readiness to strengthen

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NLRR M37111 # 117681

BY RW NMF

6/22/15

cooperation with the U.S. Returning to the Cyprus situation, Kyprianou said he feels a strong sense of urgency. He noted Denktash has stated he is ready to begin negotiations. However, continued Kyprianou, it would be absurd to accept and commence negotiations--the Turkish Cypriots will read this as a sign that we have recognized their illegal state. Our first priority, he continued, must be to condemn this illegal act and to call for its reversal. He added that Mrs. Thatcher--the U.K. is one of the guarantor powers--is taking an active interest in resolving the current crisis. She is right, he said, in calling for consultations. It may not, however, be possible to have trilateral consultations among the three guarantors at this time, but there could be parallel bilateral talks. Our goal, he said, is to preserve Cyprus' unity and integrity. (C)

Noting that the Cyprus problem is complex, but that we must seek a solution, The President wondered if it would be possible to have two separate states on Cyprus with one central government. In explaining the federal system in the U.S., with 50 separate state governments and one federal government, he asked if Cyprus could draw from this example. (C)

President Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriots had negotiated for many years in good faith, but without any positive results. If we now recognize Denktash's illegal act, negotiations would go on forever. Hence, our immediate urgent task, he said is to have the Turkish Cypriots reverse their unilateral act. If Turkey makes a political decision to support reversal, it would happen. A face-saving formula could be devised, he said, to make it easier for Turkey. (C)

Secretary Shultz intervened to say that we are encouraged by the emphasis on negotiations. We may need some form of constructive shuttle diplomacy. He continued that we recognize that direct negotiations between the two communities are not immediately feasible. We do, however, he stressed, strongly support the Secretary General's good offices efforts. The Secretary General, continued the Secretary, is personally intimately familiar with the Cyprus situation and we have encouraged his efforts. (C)

In noting that he would be meeting with the Secretary General tomorrow, President Kyprianou said the Cyprus government fully accepts the Secretary General's special responsibilities. He added, however, if we enter into direct consultations, that this would detract from our immediate goal of obtaining a reversal of the unilateral Turkish Cypriot declaration. Direct negotiations, he continued, would imply that we had accepted what has happened. Our feelings are simply too strong to resume direct talks. (C)

The President then again pondered the feasibility of a federal solution, i.e., two states joined together under one president. (C)

President Kyprianou replied that if the Turkish Cypriots reversed their unilateral act, the U.S. Constitution could provide an acceptable model. (C)

In concluding the meeting, The President emphasized the U.S. willingness to do all we can to help. (U)

President Kyprianou expressed deep gratitude for the President's supportive remarks and underlined what he called his personal responsibilities to the Greek Cypriots. (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Cyprus President Kyprianou

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Cyprus President Kyprianou on November 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab II, and authorize Kimmitt to sign the memo at Tab I forwarding it to State.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill memo
Tab II Memcon

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8308337

RW 8/30/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

URGENT

RECEIVED 17 NOV 83 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 17 NOV 83

KEYWORDS . CYPRUS
VISIT

TURKEY
AP

KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

SUBJECT. REQUEST FOR CALL ON PRES BY PRES KYPRIANOU DURING 21 - 22 NOV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 18 NOV 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION
SOMMER


FORTIER

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
MATLOCK
DUR
COBB
TYSON
KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8335232

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(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Poindexter</i>	X	11/17	FOR Decision		
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	X	11/18	Pres for info		
<i>Pres</i>	1P	11/19	for informants		<i>VP, GM, JB</i>
		11/19	Pres noted		
		NOV 21 1983	Pres noted		<i>PS, CT VL</i>

DISPATCH *ed* W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

33

RECEIVED

System # I
Package # 8337

83 NOV 18 P 4: 51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>NOV 21 1983</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese NOV 21 1983 Baker Deaver Other BUP

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP -- Monday mtg
(Date/Time)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CYPRUS PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

DATE: November 21, 1983
 LOCATION: Oval Office
 TIME: 3:45 - 4:00 p.m.
 DURATION: 15 minutes
 FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten signature]

I. PURPOSE: To demonstrate U.S. support for early resolution of the "new" Cyprus situation.

II. BACKGROUND: In establishing the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" on November 15, the Turkish Cypriots carried out their long-standing threat to declare independence from the Greek Cypriot community. International reaction, which has been overwhelmingly negative, has included appeals for reversal of this unilateral act. Besides us and the British, the strongest condemnation has come from Greece's other European Community partners.

In addition to expressing our opposition publicly, we have strongly urged the Turkish government--the only country to do so thus far--to withdraw its recognition of the illegal entity and to use its influence with the Turkish Cypriots to reverse it. Diplomatic activity is currently focused at the UN, where the Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution (on November 18) denouncing the unilateral declaration and Turkey's support for it. The British--one of the three guarantors of the Cyprus Republic--have proposed trilateral talks, but they will likely not get off the ground because of the mutual distrust between the other guarantors, Greece and Turkey. Both Cyprus President Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash will be present for the UN debate. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers are also coming.

Our intelligence community is keeping a close watch on the area. Greek and Turkish forces, and the local Greek and Turkish Cypriot militia, have apparently gone on low-level alert. However, all the parties appear to be working to avoid armed conflict. In brief, the situation on Cyprus is uneasy, but appears stable.

While the public outcry in the U.S. has not matched the 1974 level when the Turks intervened militarily in Cyprus, the current crisis has considerable domestic impact. State is working diligently to keep Congress informed. The message from Congress is the same we have heard from leading Greek Americans: unless the Turkish Cypriot decision is rolled back, we can expect a

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BY RW

12/22/15

concerted effort, when Congress reconvenes in the new year, to cut off or reduce security assistance for Turkey. This would be totally unacceptable to U.S. strategic interests in the region.

We are faced with the difficult task of balancing our important bilateral relations with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, while preserving our strategic interests in the region. The Cyprus situation potential puts at risk continued Greek and Turkish participation in NATO, and it could hinder U.S. objectives in Lebanon.

Your meeting with Kyprianou will be largely a hand-holding session. He has sent you a letter expressing his concerns. You will want to express understanding for his frustration and encourage him to take advantage of any opportunity to find a solution to this complex problem. You should emphasize our public condemnation of the Turkish Cypriots' unilateral declaration, your call to the UN Secretary General and our belief that his good offices offer the best opportunity for re-establishing a dialogue between the two Cypriot communities. You should also express appreciation for the valuable assistance the Government of Cyprus is giving our Lebanese MNF support operation.

Talking points and Kyprianou's bio are attached.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Richard Burt
Edwin Derwinski
Peter Sommer, NSC
Richard Haass, Special Cyprus Coordinator

President Spyros Kyprianou
Foreign Minister Iacovou
Ambassador Jacovides

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting.

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU (keepreeahNOO)

-- Welcome to the White House. We recognize and understand your extreme frustration with recent events in your country as outlined in your letter. As you know, we have expressed our surprise and dismay--I would add deep distress--at the unilateral action by the Turkish Cypriots. We have also condemned it publicly and we have urged the Turkish Cypriots to reconsider their ill-advised action.

-- We have also urged the Government of Turkey to withdraw its recognition of the illegal entity and to use its influence to reverse the situation. We have, as well, encouraged other countries to make representations toward this end.

-- We are pleased with your statesmanship in avoiding any rash or hasty action, which would only exacerbate the situation. We trust that should any opportunities for progress emerge that you will not let this outrageous act stop you from taking advantage of them. A lasting solution is in all our interests. An explosive situation in an already explosive area does not serve our mutual interests. In this connection, allow me to reiterate our deep appreciation for your government's valuable assistance to our Lebanon MNF support operation.

-- We stand four square behind the UN Secretary General's good offices effort. I spoke with him Friday about his difficult task and offered to assist in any way possible. It is vital that the two communities on Cyprus reestablish a dialogue. The answer to this difficult problem can best be solved through direct communication, rather than in debates by international fora. We recognize that the situation is complex and look forward to working closely with you in the search for a solution.

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BY AW N RA 6/22/15

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/01/1983-11/17/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
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52

29

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117702	FORM RE. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	11/18/1981	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/01/1983-11/17/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
371
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117685	REPORT	2	11/16/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ACTION

November 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peer*

SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and Cyprus President Spyros Kyprianou, Monday, November 21, 3:45 p.m.

Attached for your signature is the briefing paper for the President in preparation for his meeting with President Kyprianou on Monday. I believe, in light of the attention the President has given to Cyprus this week, that he is up to speed on our position on this complex issue and our efforts to facilitate a solution.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the briefing memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- Tab I Briefing memo to the President
- Tab A Bio
- Tab II Clearance list

Peer
Don Fortier concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECL
Sec 3.4(h), E.O.
White House Gift
BYNARA RW

8/20/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/18/83

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus

DATE: Monday, November 21, 1983

TIME: 3:45 pm

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be furnished by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	C. McCain	R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero	J. Rosebush	
K. Duberstein	R. Scouten	
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix	
D. Fischer	W. Sittmann	
C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski	
	Nell Yates	

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RW 8/30/11
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RECEIVED 17 NOV 83 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 17 NOV 83

SOMMER

17 NOV 83

TYSON

17 NOV 83

KEYWORDS: CYPRUS

TURKEY

KYPRIANOU, SPYROS

VISIT

AP

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CALL ON PRES BY PRES KYPRIANOU DURING 21 - 22 NOV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 18 NOV 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

DUR

COBB

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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C "1/7 Kimmitt Sq Memo

PS, CF, RK

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1/17 w/ note to Van Kirk

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PA (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8337

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 17, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: *RM* ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Tom*

REQUEST: Brief Meeting between the President and
Cyprus President Spyros Kyprianou

PURPOSE: To demonstrate importance the President
personally places on resolution of the Cyprus
problem, and to show appreciation for the
assistance Cyprus has given to the Lebanon
MNF operation.

BACKGROUND: President Kyprianou will address the UN
Security Council on Friday, November 18 on
the "new" Cyprus situation. Before coming to
the U.S. he will have met with Greek Prime
Minister Papandreu and Prime Minister
Thatcher. A meeting would help maintain the
sound relationship we enjoy with Cyprus and
would signal the President's continuing
active interest in resolution of the Cyprus
problem.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: November 21 or 22 DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President, Robert C.
McFarlane, Secretary Shultz, Assistant
Secretary Burt, Peter R. Sommer;
President Kyprianou, Ambassador Jacovides,
one aide to Kyprianou

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting.
Meeting to last 15 minutes.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Briefing papers to be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity

RECOMMENDED BY: State, NSC, White House Public Liaison Office

OPPOSED BY: None.

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson/Peter R. Sommer

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(i), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY: WARA/RWS, DATE: 8/30/11

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 17, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON ^{CPT}

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Request for Call on President by Cypriot President Kyprianou, November 21 or 22

State recommends, as do we, that the President meet briefly with President Kyprianou of Cyprus on November 21 or 22. President Kyprianou is scheduled to address the UN on Friday, November 18 on the "new" Cyprus situation. We and most other nations have publicly condemned the unilateral declaration of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

Kyprianou's meeting with the President would give us an opportunity to express the importance the Administration places on early resolution of the Cyprus problem. It would also signal to the Greek-American community continuing Presidential interest and may help to deflect unrealistic expectations. It also offers the President an opportunity to express appreciation for the valuable assistance Cyprus is giving our Lebanon MNF support operation.

If possible, I strongly recommend that you or Bud raise this scheduling request at tomorrow's (November 18) senior staff meeting, since the Cypriots desperately hope to receive a meeting commitment by tomorrow, the day Kyprianou arrives in the U.S. This is a matter of Greek Cypriot pride.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the schedule proposal for Bob Kimmitt's signature recommending a short meeting between the President and Kyprianou on November 21 or 22.

Approve *PF* Disapprove

PF
Don Fortier concurs.

Attachment:
Tab I Schedule proposal
Tab A State memo

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NLRR M3711 # 117687
BY RW NAR 6/22/15



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 17, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Request for Call on President Reagan by Cypriot
President Kyprianou

Cypriot President Kyprianou will arrive in New York Friday for a session of the Security Council to consider the Cyprus problem. Kyprianou will be fresh from meetings with Greek Prime Minister Papandreu Wednesday and with Prime Minister Thatcher Thursday. He would like to visit Washington immediately after the Security Council session to make a brief call on the President. The call would be complemented by more detailed discussions with Secretary Shultz and senior Department officials.

The proclamation of statehood by the Turkish Cypriot community on November 15 which resulted in the Security Council session has received almost universal condemnation. Kyprianou is anxious to generate continuing support for his position. We have actively joined in the condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot move and are supporting a moderate British-sponsored UNSC resolution. A meeting with the President would demonstrate the importance the Administration places on the Cyprus issue. It would also give us the opportunity to reiterate, at the highest level, our appreciation for the valuable assistance the Government of Cyprus is giving our Lebanon MNF support operation at Larnaca airport.

A 10 minute call by Kyprianou on November 21 or 22, would be very important to our efforts to maintain the cordial and mutually advantageous relationship we enjoy with the Government of Cyprus. The Department strongly supports the proposed meeting.

for *for* Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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NLRR M3711 # 117688
BY RW NARA 10/22/15

117691
S/S 8335232

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 17, 1983

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Request for Call on President Reagan by Cypriot
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for *for* Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M37111 #117691
BY RW NADA - 6/22/15