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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/30/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (09/28-1983-09/30/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 51

JAUVERT/BROWER

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117557	CABLE	260228Z SEP 83 R 6/22/2015 M371/	6	9/26/1983	B1
117558	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MARGARET THATCHER R 1/11/2008 M06-007 #24195	12	9/29/1983	B1
117559	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO OF FINLAND R 6/22/2015 M371/	5	9/27/1983	B1
117560	MEMCON	RE. RR'S MEETING WITH KOIVISTO R 6/22/2015 M371/	4	9/27/1983	B1
117561	MEMCON	RE. RR'S LUNCH WITH MOROCCAN KING HASSAN R 6/22/2015 M371/	4	9/26/1983	B1
117562	MEMCON	RE. RR'S MEETING WITH INDIAN PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI R 6/22/2015 M371/	5	9/26/1983	B1
117563	MEMCON	RE. RR'S MEETING WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND SON SANN OF KAMPUCHEA R 6/22/2015 M371/	7	9/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID 8306887

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 29 SEP 83 17

TO CLARK FROM WETTERING DOCDATE 28 SEP 83

KEYWORDS LIBERIA IMF DOE, SAMUEL AP

SUBJECT MEMCON OF PRES 25 SEP MTG W/ DOE

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FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO FORTIER TYSON KIMMITT WETTERING

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National Security Council
The White House

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83 SEP 29 P12: 33
SEQUENCE TO

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Executive Secretary

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John Poindexter

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

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NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker

DISTRIBUTION

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1983

6887

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Transmittal

Attached for your information is the approved summary of the meeting between the President and Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe which took place on Sunday, September 25, 1983, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Summary of Meeting

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW . DATE 8/30/11

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *FW*

SUBJECT: Liberia: Memorandum of Conversation of President's September 25 Meeting with Head of State Samuel Doe

Attached is a memcon covering the President's 30-minute meeting with Liberian Head of State Samuel Doe on September 25, 1983, from 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the Presidential Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City. The memcon was prepared by U.S. Ambassador to Liberia William Swing who attended the meeting. (C)

The meeting appeared to me to have followed anticipated lines and it contains no surprises. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon; approve attached Kimmitt/Hill memo of transmittal. (U)

APPROVE RMK DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I Summary of Meeting
- Tab II Kimmitt/Hill memo of transmittal

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White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
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WHITE HOUSE FOR FRED WETTERING
STATE FOR S/S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), LI, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH LIBERIAN HEAD
OF STATE DOE

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1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION FOR NSC CLEARANCE AND DISTRIBUTION.
3. SUMMARY. A CORDIAL 1/2 HOUR MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF STATE DOE COVERED A RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP. THESE INCLUDED LIBERIA'S RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THE STATUS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THE LIBERIAN ECONOMY, AND THE SOVIET-LIBYAN THREAT.

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THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR LIBERIA'S SUPPORTIVE POSITION ON A NUMBER OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES. DOE IN TURN THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR US ASSISTANCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. DOE DWELT AT LENGTH AND REPETITIVELY WITH HIS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET-LIBYAN ENCROACHMENT AND LEFTIST FORCES WITHIN LIBERIA. THE CONVERSATION BROKE NO NEW GROUND NOR WERE SPECIFIC AID REQUESTS MADE. END SUMMARY.

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4. CIVILIAN RULE. AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE REDEMPTION COUNCIL GOVERNMENT AND THE LIBERIAN PEOPLE FOR US ASSISTANCE, DDE RECALLED THAT ON HIS 1982 OFFICIAL WORKING VISIT HE HAD BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON EFFORTS TO RETURN LIBERIA TO CIVILIAN RULE. HE WAS HAPPY NOW TO REPORT FURTHER PROGRESS. A DRAFT CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRC AND WAS NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISORY ASSEMBLY. DOE EXPECTED THE ASSEMBLY TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BY THE SECOND OR THIRD WEEK OF OCTOBER.

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5. HOWEVER, LIBERIA IS HAVING DIFFICULTY MEETING SOME OF THE TARGET DATES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE FINANCING. LIBERIA FACED HARD ECONOMIC TIMES AS IT TRIES TO MEET IMF TARGETS. IN THIS REGARD, HE HAD REDUCED PUBLIC SECTOR SALARIES BY 16 2/3 TO 25 PERCENT. THREE MILLION DOLLARS IS NEEDED TO FINANCE THE CONSTITUTION PROCESS BUT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS ONLY BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE 1.3 MILLION. DOE SAID HE HOPED "FOREIGN FRIENDS" WOULD ASSIST LIBERIA IN MAKING UP THE SHORTFALL.

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6. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. DOE SAID THAT ON HIS RETURN FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE FRG HE HAD DECIDED TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL. ON THIS BASIS, THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT HAD EXTENDED AN INVITATION FOR HIM TO VISIT ISRAEL. SINCE THIS VISIT, HE HAD MADE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH, IF

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IMPLEMENTED, WOULD LEAD OTHER AFRICAN STATES TO RE-ESTABLISH TIES WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT SIERRA LEONE, TOGO, GUINEA BISSAU AND BENIN ARE ALL WILLING TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL BUT ARE HESITATING TO DO SO OUT OF FEAR THAT ARAB LOANS WILL BE WITHDRAWN. DOE SAID THESE GOVERNMENTS HOPED THAT THE US COULD "INTERVENE" IN ASKING ARAB STATES NOT TO RETALIATE. DOE SAID HE HAD MADE ONE-DAY VISITS TO SIERRA LEONE AND TOGO TO URGE RENEWAL OF ISRAELI TIES. WHILE BOTH STEVENS AND EYADEMA ENDORSED THE IDEA OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THEY ARE WAITING FIRST FOR SOME SORT OF ECONOMIC GUARANTEE FROM THE US SHOULD THE ARABS RETALIATE.

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7. ECONOMIC REFORM. LIBERIA'S ECONOMIC TROUBLES, DOE SAID, ARE REQUIRING HIM TO ADOPT STRINGENT MEASURES. AS HE HAD ALREADY NOTED, SALARIES HAVE BEEN CUT. IN THE PAST MONTH HE HAD REDUCED ALL MINISTRY BUDGETS BY THREE PERCENT IN ORDER TO HAVE THE NECESSARY FUNDS TO RENOVATE THE NATIONAL HOSPITAL IN MONROVIA. ALTHOUGH MAKING NO DIRECT APPEAL, DOE TOLD THE PRESIDENT LIBERIA NEEDS HIS SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE US BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

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8. LEFTIST FORCES IN LIBERIA. DOE THEN TURNED TO HIS CONCERNS AT THE THREAT OF "COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST FORCES" IN LIBERIA. THESE HE NOTED INCLUDE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMISSION WHO IS RECEIVING SOVIET, CUBAN AND LIBYAN SUPPORT, AND IN

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RETURN IS KEEPING THESE GOVERNMENTS CLOSELY INFORMED. DOE SAID HE FELT THAT LIBERIA'S SECURITY IS BEING THREATENED BY THESE FORCES AND "WE CANNOT HAVE ELECTIONS IF THE FUTURE OF THE NATION IS NOT SECURE." ALTHOUGH COMMUNISTS IN LIBERIA ARE TRYING TO DIVIDE THE LIBERIAN PEOPLE, "WE WILL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO BRING LIBERIA BACK TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE." POINTING TO FOREIGN
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WHITE HOUSE FOR FRED WETTERING
STATE FOR S/S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), LI, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH LIBERIAN HEAD,
MINISTER EARNEST EASTMAN, DOE OBSERVED THAT HE HAD FOUND
IT NECESSARY TO OUST FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER H. BOIMA
FAHNBULLEH TWO MONTHS AGO BECAUSE HE IS A COMMUNIST AND
OPPOSED LIBERIA'S RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL. WHILE NOT ELABORATING, DOE STATED THAT HE WOULD
NOT ALLOW COMMUNISTS TO STAND FOR ELECTION IN 1985.

9. SOVIET-LIBYAN-CUBAN ENCROACHMENT. DOE DEVOTED MUCH
OF HIS PRESENTATION TO A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET, LIBYAN,
AND CUBAN ENCROACHMENT AND INFLUENCE WHICH HE DESCRIBED
AS ON THE INCREASE IN AFRICA. HE DESCRIBED SIERRA
LEONE, MALI AND GHANA AS BEING INFLUENCED BY THE
CUBANS. HE HAD ONLY LAST WEEK DISMISSED SOME 300

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TEACHERS TRAINED IN ETHIOPIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE DID NOT WISH THEM TO "SABOTAGE" THE ELECTIONS. DOE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SENDING AID TO THE "LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD." DOE SAID THAT IN HIS UN ADDRESS ON SEPTEMBER 26 HE INTENDS TO MENTION THE SOVIET UNION'S DOWNING OF THE KAL COMMERCIAL AIRLINER -- AN ACTION HE DESCRIBED AS "VERY DETRIMENTAL TO A PEACE-LOVING NATION."

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10. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT THE US WILL DO WHAT IT CAN TO HELP. HE SAID HE SHARED DOE'S FEELING CONCERNING LIBYA AND THE THREAT THAT QADHAFI POSES. QADHAFI SEEMS TO BE "TIRELESS" IN THIS REGARD, THE PRESIDENT ADDED. QADHAFI HAD ALSO THREATENED HIS LIFE, THE PRESIDENT SAID, NOTING THIS IS SOMETHING HE AND DOE HAVE IN COMMON. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH QADHAFI IS TIRELESS, HE IS ALSO LARGELY DESTRUCTIVE. NOT ONE COUNTRY HAS PROSPERED FROM SOVIET OR LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT. BOTH THE FACTS AND THE TIDE OF HISTORY ARE AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND THE LIBYANS. FREE ENTERPRISE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO CARRY THE GREATEST BENEFITS FOR THE PEOPLE. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID SHE FOUND IT NOTEWORTHY THAT DOE'S ACCOUNT ACCORDED SO CLOSELY TO SIMILAR ACCOUNTS SHE HAD OFTEN RECEIVED FROM HER COLLEAGUES AT THE UN CONCERNING THE SOVIET-LIBYAN THREAT.

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11. THE SECRETARY COMPLIMENTED DOE ON THE PROGRESS LIBERIA IS MAKING ON THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ON THE COURAGEOUS ECONOMIC MEASURES HE HAS TAKEN. THESE ARE NOT EASY BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO HAD TO TAKE TOUGH MEASURES AND THE US ECONOMY SITUATION IS CLEARLY IMPROVED. THE SECRETARY URGED DOE TO CONTINUE EXERCISING DISCIPLINE AND ASSURED HIM THAT THE US WISHES TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING HIM ON THE ECONOMY. THE PRESIDENT TOLD DOE THAT THE US APPRECIATES HIS "STIMULATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT" OF PRIVATE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ENTERPRISE IN LIBERIA. THE ECONOMIC RECORD OF COUNTRIES FOLLOWING A FREE ENTERPRISE PATH OF DEVELOPMENT SHOWS THIS TO BE THE BEST SYSTEM.

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12. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, DOE SENT THE PRESIDENT A COPY OF THE NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION, ALONG WITH A LETTER REQUESTING ASSISTANCE WITH THE GANTA/HARPER HIGHWAY PROJECT. SHULTZ

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KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM THATCHER

ACTION FOR DECISION

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

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- 10/12 Poindexter approved recom

- 10/12 Noted by Clark

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John Poindexter	2		
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	3	✓	
Judge Clark	4	✓	I
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	5		D
Situation Room			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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6937

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

October 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and British Prime Minister Thatcher

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on September 29.
It should be handled on a particularly restricted basis.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Tab A Memcon

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

AW 8/30/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation Between the President and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Peter R. Sommer (notetaker)

Margaret Thatcher
A.J. Coles (notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 29, 1983, 11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Oval Office

After exchanging warm greetings, Mrs. Thatcher opened by saying that she did not understand criticism to the effect that the President had given too much authority to local commanders in Lebanon. She clearly understood the risk that Suk-al-Gharb could have fallen if the U.S. had not taken preventive action. (S)

The President replied that he appreciated her supportive remarks and that the U.S. also appreciated the British providing the security forces for the last round of negotiations. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher commented that this was entirely appropriate since the British had been providing patrols in this area. She emphasized the importance of the four MNF countries working and consulting together. We need to act in concert and this applied as well in dealing with the media. It would pose greater difficulties if one of the participating countries pulled out. At the same time, she said Britain was leery of becoming too deeply involved. The situation in Lebanon merits our closest attention. (S)

The President agreed and noted he had won on the War Powers Act in the House yesterday and just this morning he had been personally working on obtaining a favorable vote in the Senate. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher asked about crippling amendments. (U)

The President said the Administration had defeated all of them in the House and now needed to do it again in the Senate. (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Before getting too deep in discussion, The President said he wanted to congratulate Mrs. Thatcher in person on her election victory. He underlined that her reelection was a shot in the arm for the West. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher graciously replied that in Britain they have the advantage of being able to pick the election date. She continued that she had the good fortune of picking the "right date." (U)

Turning to what she called the central issue of East-West relations, Mrs. Thatcher noted that she would be making a speech this evening to the Winston Churchill Foundation. She was confident that everyone in the President's Administration would agree with what she would say. She would be emphasizing that we must deal with the Soviets from strength and should not deceive ourselves about the true Soviet character. It is essential that we make an accurate assessment of the Soviets -- the KAL incident speaks for itself -- but at the same time we must live on the same planet with the Soviets. Therefore the key question is what will be our future relations. While she would not say so this evening, we must, she stressed, strive to establish normal relations. She praised the President for continuing the Geneva negotiations, the tone of his UN speech and the latest U.S. INF proposals. We must find ways to influence the Soviets. We should, for example, continue trade when it is to our mutual advantage. (U)

The President replied that he shared her views. He knew some had criticized his reaction to the KAL shutdown, but those critics failed to recognize what we have already done and are doing. We have restricted the transfer of high technology to the Soviets. We have reduced credit subsidies and European dependency on Soviets energy and perhaps most importantly, we have begun to rebuild America's defenses. Arms talks are not a favor to the Soviets. We must not cease our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher then turned to a topic that she said is clearly attracting much attention: the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in INF. She emphasized that this is a Soviet device to take attention away from the true facts. British and French forces do not belong in INF or START. British forces are only 2½ percent the size of Soviet nuclear forces. Britain could consider inclusion of its forces only after there had been sizable reductions by both the Soviets and the U.S. She said she had recently convened a meeting of her experts on this matter. They had concluded that Britain could never agree to including its forces until there had been deep reductions; this is a long way down the road. Britain had an irreducible minimum requirement of four submarines. To have one on station at all

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times, we need four submarines. Britain likes to have two on station, but with one submarine always in refit and another often undergoing maintenance, this was difficult. She repeated that British forces could not be included in INF. British forces are minor compared to the Soviet threat. If the Soviets cut their nuclear forces to 20 or 30 percent of today's arsenals, then we could think about including British forces in negotiations. She said Senator Glenn had pushed her on this point when she met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. She emphasized to Glenn that if you include British and French forces, you have precluded the U.S. by definition from having parity with the Soviet Union. She doubted Congress would accept less than parity. For example, under this formula, if the French decided to modernize at a later date the U.S. would have to reduce its forces by the same numbers that the French were adding. Parity is an absolutely fundamental point. She beseeched the President not to get us in a position that implied the U.S. would accept less than parity. If the Soviets moved into a new era and reduced their forces significantly, then Britain would take another look at its position. Some in Europe, however, continue to advocate the inclusion of British and French forces. Most recently, she continued, she had explained British arguments in blunt terms to Prime Minister Lubbers of the Netherlands. (TS)

The President agreed with her assessment on inclusion of forces and added we must, however, continue to seek ways to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. The more he examined this problem the more he saw how complicated it was. The U.S., for example, had proposed deep reductions in land-based systems -- those are the most destabilizing, the ones people most fear -- but the Soviets, it turns out, are more dependent on land-based systems than we and rely on a different weapons mix. In short, we have learned that we cannot dictate the composition of Soviet forces. (S)

It is troubling, said Mrs. Thatcher, that the Soviets are doing all their negotiating publicly, rather than at the negotiating table. This is a clear signal that they are not serious. Andropov's latest ploy saying the Soviets would liquidate its weapons -- which on examination meant launchers not missiles -- adds another shadow. (S)

The President underlined that we must remain firm if we are to achieve results in Geneva. The latest news from Bonn that the Bundestag debate will slip six days to November 21 is troubling. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher asked for clarification and The President said we had just received news that the Kohl coalition had decided for domestic political reasons that it must delay the Bundestag debate until November 21. The President added that he continued to have faith in Kohl, but he worried about some of those around him -- Genscher in particular. (TS)

Mrs. Thatcher said the recent state elections in Hesse and Bremen were a setback. Andropov's speech was clearly aimed at Germany; but she was confident in Kohl's steadfastness. (S)

The President said he welcomed her assurances. He doubted the Soviets would negotiate seriously until we actually begin deployments. He observed that he worried about Soviet paranoia over security. Until the KAL incident he had assumed the Politburo ran the show, but he had been struck that the initial Soviet reply came from the military. It was not clear what this meant. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Soviet obsession with security was not new. What is new is their military posture which goes well beyond Russia's legitimate defense requirements. The Soviets have as well demonstrated the will to use their military power. They overreacted in Afghanistan, partially because of the fear of Moslem influence extending into the Southern regions of the Soviet Union. The fact that the Soviets cling to the communist creed that world communism is inevitable is also cause for concern. They have tried to practice this philosophy in Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Cuba, and Central America. In a recent meeting with British Sovietologists she had asked what would happen if a member of the Politburo proposed that the USSR spend less on defense and more on the economy. She had been told that he would eventually be replaced: there is little room for latitude. She continued that the Soviet economy is also cause for concern. Andropov recognizes that you cannot run an efficient economy under a totally centralized system. But change would undermine communism. This poses a difficulty for the West: how can we influence the Soviet Union to change its policies. We need to maintain a dialogue. The U.S.-Soviet grain agreement had been a positive step. (S)

The President underscored that the Soviets are only at the negotiating table because the U.S. is rebuilding its defense posture. The Soviets are not persuaded by people being nice to them. They are afraid of the U.S. defense buildup. The Soviets recognize, continued the President, that when we mobilize our industrial base -- as we did in World War II -- that they cannot compete. He added that he was convinced that the Soviets are at the limit of their military buildup -- they can't afford another round in the arms race. He recalled a cartoon he had once seen with Brezhnev saying "I liked the arms race much better when we were the only ones in it." (S)

Mrs. Thatcher agreed that these are testing times for the West. Neither she nor Kohl will falter, she insisted. The West must deal with the Soviets from a position of mutual interest and respect. There must also be a mutual wish to agree. The Soviets have not indicated any such wish. Moreover, against the

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background of the KAL incident there appears to be a tendency for the Soviets to turn inward to a world with blinders. We must continue negotiations after deployments begin, but it is difficult to know how to deal with the barrier the Soviets are creating. (S)

The President noted that in a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin sometime ago, he had stressed that Soviet words are not enough. If the Soviets truly want better relations, they must demonstrate it by deeds. There was the beginning of a thaw before the KAL shootdown, but now more than ever the Soviets must demonstrate through positive acts that they want to improve relations. A simple approach would be for the Soviets to say privately and quietly what has been bothering them, and see if we can't react positively. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said the KAL incident had given us a glimpse of how Andropov reacts in a crisis. It is not encouraging. The Soviets proved exceedingly difficult to deal with, and Andropov must have been directly involved. If the Soviets had handled KAL differently, the world's reaction would have been considerably different. (S)

The President agreed that the Soviets had reacted foolishly. They had initially lied, saying the airliner simply disappeared from their radar. Then when trapped by the tapes, they called the aircraft a spy plane. If they had offered an apology and compensation, rather than diatribe, the Soviets could have been almost heroes. The world would have had to claim: "See you can reason with the Soviets." (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said she remained mystified as to why the airplane was so far off course. Even with heavy cloud, she would have thought the pilot would have seen he was over land. (S)

The President replied that he had not fully understood until he saw a TV program explaining how the computers work, and how easy it was to insert the wrong information. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said the way the KAL tragedy happened made one worry about the Soviet command structure, Soviet rules of engagement for local commanders, and the relationship between the Soviet military and civilians. We need, she emphasized, to establish a fail-safe system for civilian airliners. (S)

The KAL tragedy, said The President, proves that we are not dealing with people who think like us. Gromyko treated George Shultz rudely in Madrid and shockingly told the Conference that the Soviets would do it again if a commercial plane crossed their border. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that the Soviet system seems to preclude them from admitting they are wrong. They backed down in Cuba in the early 60's, but ever since the Soviets have been absolutely determined not to let such an event happen again. It is important in this difficult atmosphere, said Mrs. Thatcher, that you are proceeding with the modernization of U.S. chemical weapons. (S)

The President replied that the Soviets used these gruesome weapons in both Cambodia and Afghanistan. A group of Afghan refugees, five men and one young lady visited with him, he said, right in the Oval Office. One personally showed the disastrous effects of these weapons; a young man actually peeled off his shirt and showed the burns and disfiguration. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that just last week she had joined the British Army on the Rhine during exercises in which they had to wear heavy protective clothing because of the chemical threat. This slowed down the soldiers movements and is especially cumbersome for pilots. (S)

The President added that Soviet deserters have confirmed to us the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Another reason for desertion is that these soldiers have been ordered to kill women and children. (S)

Turning to Central America, Mrs. Thatcher stressed that her government is supporting the President's policy. His April speech to Congress on promoting democracy in Central America was a masterpiece. We need to continue to stress that 75 cents out of every dollar is going for civil aid and that the government in El Salvador is an elected government. But we are losing the propaganda battle in Europe. The Vice President saw this first hand on his summer trip. He was a great boost to our efforts to explain American policies. (S)

Belize, as you know, is of special interest to Britain, which had planned to take our garrison out by the end of the year. We know you oppose it and circumstances simply don't merit its withdrawal. We will leave the garrison there for about another 18 months. This will bring us past both the American and Belize elections. She emphasized that her decision to retain British forces in Belize should be closely held. (TS)

Saying bless you, The President interjected to thank her for maintaining the British garrison. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher complained that Premier Price is not seriously negotiating with the Guatemalans, at least in part, she believed, because of the continued presence of British forces. British forces

cannot stay in Belize indefinitely. We would like, she said, to have talks between British and American officials on how to ensure the future security of Belize after British withdrawal. We cannot, she said, delay these talks until closer to our pull-out date. We need to begin making preparations now. (S)

The President agreed to the talks and added that Price seems like a nice young man. When Rios Montt was President of Guatemala, he told me that all Guatemala wanted was access to the sea. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said that Guatemala already has access to the sea but the problem is they cannot make effective use of this access. She continued that Price is indeed a good and honest man, but we need to use this interim period to get results on the Guatemala-Belize border dispute. (S)

The President then described Cuban influence in Nicaragua. There are not only military advisers, but Cuban teachers setting up schools in poor villages ostensibly to teach them to read and write. But Communist doctrine and hatred for the Yankees is imbued in these young children through this educational system. We have a hard time, continued the President, getting fair coverage on our press and TV about our true goals in Central America. Now that the government seems to be winning, El Salvador is no longer in the news. When the guerrillas had the upper hand El Salvador was a daily topic. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher agreed that the Western countries had to do a much better job of explaining their policies in the world at large. Duarte came to see me recently, she observed, and stressed that if democracy is not seen to be working in El Salvador after the next election then the democratic forces would lose out. Mrs. Thatcher added that before leaving Latin America she wanted to urge the President to think carefully before supplying arms to Argentina. (S)

The President replied that once Argentina returned to civilian rule the U.S. would be under intense pressure to make it eligible for arms purchases. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher rejoined that the last civilian government in Argentina was not a model for democracy and that it would be greatly misunderstood in Britain -- America's most loyal and ardent supporter -- if sales resumed. (S)

The President and Mrs. Thatcher broke for lunch at 12:30 p.m. (U)

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Luncheon Participants

U.S. The President

Secretary Shultz
 Secretary Regan
 William P. Clark
 Deputy Secretary Thayer
 American Ambassador to the U.K. John J. Louis, Jr.
 Assistant Secretary Burt
 Charles P. Tyson
 Peter R. Sommer

U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe
 U.K. Ambassador to the U.S. Sir Oliver Wright
 Sir Robert Armstrong, Secretary to the Cabinet
 Sir Antony Acland, Permanent Undersecretary to the FCO
 F.E.R. Butler, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
 A.J. Coles, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Brian Falls, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

At the outset, Mrs. Thatcher asked Foreign Minister Howe to give a run down of topics discussed during the foreign ministers session. (U)

Foreign Secretary Howe said he, Secretary Shultz, and the others had covered South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Belize and Central America, bilateral economic problems the Polish debt, and the EC's common agriculture policy; in particular, EC fats and oil taxes. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then summarized her private talk with the President. We had a preliminary word, she said, on Lebanon. We stressed the necessity of the four MNF countries acting in concert. It is important that we work together to bring about reconciliation and create a climate in which the MFN countries no longer need to be in Lebanon. Our main discussion, she said, focused on East-West relations in the wake of the KAL tragedy. We need to continue dialogue with the Soviets, but not necessarily at the top levels. The key question is how in the longer term the West can influence the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the nature of its system and its leaders. We reached no conclusion on how to deal with the Soviets. We stressed as well, she continued, the importance of pursuing arms talks. She underscored that she had expressed her concern about facile statements from some countries in Europe about including British and French nuclear forces in INF. This suggestion incorrectly assumed, she was certain, that the U.S. is prepared to accept less than parity with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, deterrence is strengthened when three, rather than one finger, is on the button. Inclusion of British and French forces is a Soviet tactic

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designed to confuse the European publics and to avoid serious negotiations. We also addressed Belize, she added. She continued that she had underlined that the British people would not understand if the U.S. began to supply arms to Argentina. She noted that her government was supportive of U.S. policy in Central America and prepared to speak out in its defense. She continued that she had not addressed unitary tax in her meeting with the President, but had done so in depth in her earlier meeting with Secretary Regan. She was pleased to say that her views, which were well known, were supported by U.S. business. Double taxation is wrong. There are pressures for the UK to take retaliatory action. She was encouraged that the Working Group on unitary taxation had been told to get on quickly with its task, and she understood that there were other pending cases in which the Administration may file an amicus brief. She then asked Foreign Secretary Howe to review the Middle East situation. (S)

Foreign Secretary Howe noted that he had been in close touch with Secretary Shultz over the last few days at the UN meetings in New York. They had met privately and with other MNF countries. There is an ongoing effort to put together an observers group to monitor the cease-fire. Syria recognizes the need for observers, but thus far has not agreed to UN observers. It is not clear that this is their final position. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher interjected that we must also look further ahead, to the overall peace process. History speaks for itself. When Britain had responsibility for Palestine, it had set a firm withdrawal date and stuck with it. Fighting erupted the day the British departed and Israel ended up with an area far beyond the original Palestine partition plan. Israel got "the whole lot." This obviously continues to concern the Arabs. We also must, she continued, consider what she called the Jordan factor. Jordan feels under pressure. Shamir is continuing Begin's West Bank settlements policy, thereby pushing Arabs from the West Bank into Jordan. Syria may push the PLO inside Syria into Jordan. There are Palestinians from the Gulf area who may move to Jordan. King Hussein feels under immense pressure. Should the Hashemite Kingdom fall -- especially following the demise of the Shah -- it would be a major blow to the West. Our reliability would be seriously questioned. (S)

Secretary Shultz said the broader considerations that Mrs. Thatcher raised had been addressed by the President's initiative of last September. Lack of progress on the President's initiative was in part Israel's fault; the Arabs also shared the blame. The Palestinians could not agree on a delegation. Hussein had been prepared to sit down at the table with the Israelis, and even Arafat had been ready to strike a deal, but Syria had shot it down. Syria, the Secretary continued, was determined that the peace process not go forward unless it was controlled in Damascus. Now Syria is acting in a most unhelpful

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manner in Lebanon. They have flamboyantly moved the PLO back into Lebanon. This has made Israel even more difficult to deal with. The current problem is Syria. The Syrians have gained much, given up little; the Syrians need to be cut down to size. (S)

In asking that her comments be held closely, Mrs. Thatcher said Assad has a vanity problem. She then returned to the Jordan factor, stressing that Jordan has long been a good friend of the West and Hussein has long worked in a constructive and quiet manner. The international community opposes Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Jordan is not and never was Palestine. Hussein cannot move forward on negotiations with Israel, without Israeli concessions on settlements. We must not, she underlined, let Hussein down. He is shrewd and courageous. Before the Reagan Administration, Jordan did not get a good hearing in the U.S. (TS)

Secretary Shultz replied that it is hard to persuade the Israelis to negotiate when the Arabs cannot produce an interlocutor. The violence in Lebanon has commanded our immediate attention, but we have not lost sight of the overall peace process and its relationship to Jordan. (S)

The President added that we share the Prime Minister's favorable assessment of Hussein. We seek a negotiated solution in the Middle East. Israel must be prepared to give up territory in return for a security guarantee. There is a link between peace and Israel's willingness to exchange territory for security. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher intervened that the willingness of Israel's current government is in doubt. And Israel's continuing settlement policy greatly complicates the peace task. The President's initiative was sound, but progress has been disappointing. (S)

The President commented that if we are to move Israel away from its intransigent positions, there must be a reward for Israel. One such reward could be wider Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. Israel cannot go on indefinitely maintaining a military force disproportionate to its size. Israel may go bankrupt; and it presently is obligated to raise money all over the world, outside of Israel. Jordan, we agree, must be preserved. He often wondered what would happen, added the President, if other Palestinians besides the PLO stood up. Based on experience to date, they would be killed. But we cannot give up our hope and resolve for a Middle East settlement. (S)

Turning to the economy, Mrs. Thatcher said she knew she would not convert the U.S. to British views on deficits and ask if the President would have Secretary Regan expand on U.S. views. (S)

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Secretary Regan emphasized that both he and the President decried deficits, but talk of a \$200 billion U.S. deficit was exaggerated. The government and industry will not be competing to borrow funds to finance the deficit over the next twelve months. The U.S. recovery has produced enough capital so industry will not have to compete with the government. We anticipate real GNP growth of 4½ to 5 percent. Congress is hewing reasonably close to the President's budget request -- there will be no runaway government spending. We are talking about a budget deficit of \$160 billion, about 5 percent of our GNP. Our growth in money supply also appears to be under reasonable control, he continued, and we should be able to sustain 5 percent real growth. This is not to suggest that we do not need to come to grips with our deficit problems; it cannot go on indefinitely. We may eventually have to consider increasing taxes or further reducing spending. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that if the Secretary's analysis is correct and the private sector is not in competition with the government on borrowing, then interest rates should come down. (C)

Secretary Regan agreed and added that people should not be misled by the prime rate, which is only a benchmark against which small businesses and consumers borrow. Big business obtains better rates, and indeed if one goes to the commercial paper market today, the rates are below 10 percent. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher said it is extremely important for Europe to sustain its recovery. Without it, political pressures against defense spending will become enormous. Against the background of slow growth, defense spending -- even without significant increases -- becomes a higher portion of GNP. Thus a sustained recovery is necessary both to improve the standard of living and to increase defense spending. To the U.K., high interest rates are the worst aspect of the current situation. The international debt is hurting exports; and with a slow recovery in the Third World demand had dropped. (C)

Secretary Regan commented that we are also concerned by the international situation. Escalation in the Iran-Iraq war could interrupt oil supplies. This fear has prompted a large increase in oil imports, and while prices are down, these large increases have upset the trade balance. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher said some oil executives had also expressed a fear that, when the war ends, the oil market would be flooded and further unsettle the overall economic situation. Britain, nonetheless, wants the war to end, but doubted it would happen soon. She then asked what were reasonable interest rates to expect in a recovered economy. She thought 3 to 4 percent in real terms sounded about right. (C)

The President said there have been some recent positive signs on U.S. interest rates. A Milwaukee bank is offering home mortgages at 9.9 percent. General Motors is offering cars at 8.8 percent financing with up to three years to pay. Overall interest rates, however, remain entirely too high. He attributed this to more than the deficit. Many people are pessimistic. Since World War II, the U.S. has had seven severe recessions, each one followed by an artificial cure. We are attacking the core problems. Inflation is down to 2.6 percent, the lowest in the last twenty-three years. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that it sounded as if there might be hope. (U)

Noting that he had promised himself that the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer should stay out of this discussion, Foreign Secretary Howe underlined that the size of the U.S. deficit causes Britain great anxiety. The longer term repercussions could be severe. (C)

The President interjected that it was time to meet with the press, and thanked Mrs. Thatcher for the useful discussion. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher expressed great appreciation for the President's his warm hospitality and the valuable discussions. In concluding, she said that the opportunity to discuss the issues first hand is enormously helpful. (U)

The lunch concluded at 1:35 p.m. (U)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ACTION

September 30, 1983

26

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation between the President and
British Prime Minister Thatcher, September 29

Attached for your approval is a memcon from Mrs. Thatcher's meeting with the President on September 29. It covers both their private discussion and the luncheon. While there are no controversial items in the minutes, they do contain a number of sensitive comments about world leaders. (TS)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve *J* Disapprove

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memcon to State.

Approve *J* Disapprove

Tab I Memcon
Tab A Kimmitt to Hill

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2001
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/30/11*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

September 30, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PR*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister Thatcher, September 29

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Approve Disapprove

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memcon to State.

Approve Disapprove

Tab I Memcon
Tab A Kimmitt to Hill

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW DATE 8/30/11

NSC/S PROFILE

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FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 30 SEP 83

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30 SEP 83

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KEYWORDS FINLAND

VISIT

KOIVISTO, MAUNO

SUBJECT MEMCON OF KOIVISTO VISIT 27 SEP

ACTION KIMMITT SGD MEMO

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FOR INFO

MATLOCK

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

31

SECRET Attachment

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President
Koivisto's Visit, September 27Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Rev 9/20/11
SECRET Attachment
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Koivisto of Finland

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Edwin Meese, Counsellor to the President
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Deputy Assistant Secretary John H. Kelly
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

President of Finland Mauno Koivisto
Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen
Ambassador to the U.S. Richard Muller
Special Assistant Jaakko Kalela

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1983; 11:30 - 12:15, Oval Office, followed by lunch, State Dining Room, 12:15 - 1:15

After stepping outside for a photo opportunity, the President opened the conversation by describing the history of his desk in the Oval Office, and said that he was delighted with President Koivisto's visit and regretted the delay in their meeting, but that it was important to deliver his speech at the United Nations yesterday. He added that we are proud of our strong relations with Finland and are pleased that we have no problems.

President Koivisto responded that they were also pleased with our relationship, and pointed out that his visit to the United States is important to Finland. They must maintain good relations with their neighbors, but also want good relations with others. He had made several visits to the Soviet Union: two since Brezhnev's funeral, one official and one working visit. He had been pleased with his warm reception in Washington and was happy to say that he came with no big problems and no requests for favors. He added that there is not much tension in Finnish society, although it is suffering from inflation and growing unemployment. Trade is important to them and they are proud that, among the Nordic nations, with which they maintain a special relationship, they have the least foreign indebtedness.

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RW DATE 6/29/15

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Koivisto continued that world events have not touched Finland greatly, but that the state of East-West relations is of importance to them. The Finns try to have close relations with their Nordic neighbors, although the members of the Nordic group have different defense policies. He pointed out, in particular, the difference in Swedish and Finnish neutrality: the Finns maintain a lower profile than the Swedes. They must maintain good relations with their neighbor to the East and therefore they are not as active as the Swedes are in speaking out. For example, during the war in Vietnam, they had little to say, in contrast to the Swedes. Their policy of neutrality has permitted them to host many international gatherings, such as the CSCE conference and, last year, a track and field meet where both Iraq and Iran and both Koreas participated.

Regarding the USSR, the Finns had no complaints. He had been received well on his visits and the Russians were willing to talk. They had some hopes--he was not sure why--that he could be of assistance in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet leaders are hoping that something could emerge to improve the present atmosphere. Andropov had told him during his June visit that if you play poker and lose, you can hope to play again and perhaps win. But if you play with missiles, no one will survive to play again.

The President said that he hopes that Andropov feels that way, because he does. But he did not understand Soviet intransigence if that is Andropov's feeling. He (the President) had tried to establish communication and to indicate to the Soviet leaders that words are not enough and that we must have deeds. And before the KAL massacre, small things had started to happen which could have removed some of the burrs under the saddle. We tried to be responsive. But now he has begun to wonder, in light of this tragic affair, whether the Soviet military has more authority in policy making than we have assumed in the past.

Koivisto said that he did not think so. He noted that both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had referred at times to their problems with the military, but that he did not think the military leaders played a major, independent policy-making role. They are important, of course, in the Soviet system, but he does not believe they are independent. Regarding the action in shooting down the KAL airliner, he believes the military were obeying standing orders to fire on intruders, but the Soviet leadership is unhappy with the result. Nevertheless, they feel that they must back up the people who did what they were told to do. It is a sign of weakness that they were unable to apologize. He is sure that orders would not have been given to fire on the plane if the circumstances had been known.

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The President observed that we are in dead earnest in the INF negotiations. He still believes that our original proposal was the proper one. Why should there be any of these missiles in Europe? He then referred to his speech at the UN General Assembly yesterday when he quoted President Eisenhower's statement that nuclear weapons are so destructive that in the future neither side can depend on victory. He recalled that as a young man, before World War I, he had learned about the rules of warfare worked out over the centuries which were designed to protect civilians. But this is no longer the case, since in a war nuclear weapons would be aimed at civilians. It is now time to get back to a civilized point of view.

Koivisto observed that there seems to be much excess capacity in nuclear weapons. Some say that 300 modern missiles are enough to kill everyone. If this is the case, what is the meaning of having more? Insistence on equal numbers must be a matter primarily of prestige. And the French and British nuclear systems must be a question primarily of prestige, since it is not likely they intend to use these weapons.

The President said that he did not think it is that way. The only reason for building up is to deter war. Our only defense against the use of nuclear weapons is our capacity to retaliate. For 38 years there has been peace in Europe and he believed this was in large part because of an awareness on both sides that if nuclear war were unleashed there would be retaliation. He recalled that many had assumed that poison gas would be used in World War II because it had been used in World War I. But it was not because neither side wanted to be subjected to it. And one had to ask if the United States would have used nuclear weapons against Japan--which it did to end the war--if Japan had possessed nuclear weapons and could have threatened our cities on the West coast.

We have tried to open channels of communication with the Soviet Union, the President continued, but in its massacre of the Korean airliner, the Soviet Union has offended the world. What is needed is an admission and an attempt to ensure that it will not happen again. The Soviets have violated our airspace, but we would never shoot a civilian plane down.

The Vice President mentioned that a Cuban airliner had, for example, flown off the designated course and over a nuclear submarine construction facility in Groton, Connecticut.

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Koivisto recalled a speech at the Kremlin on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, when it was said that nobody's security is increased by additional weapons. He believed that there are people in the Soviet Union who believe that increased weapons mean more security. But there are also those who believe the build-up must be stopped. He went on to mention the actions of submarines in the Baltic, noting that the Swedes are convinced that Soviet submarines have been violating their territorial waters. He had taken this up with Andropov and Andropov had stated that Soviet submarine commanders had been ordered to stay at least 50 kilometers from the Swedish coast. Koivisto had told him that words are not enough since if there is evidence that the Russians are always pushing, this makes them nervous. Nevertheless, he felt that even if the submarines violating Swedish waters had been Soviet, the Soviets do not intend to change the current situation. Why should they wish to push the Swedes further toward the West?

The President said that he hoped UNIFIL would stay in Lebanon. The cease fire provides a ray of light. He had talked to the UN Secretary General and he believes it could be helpful if UNIFIL could be the observer of the cease fire, since we might not be acceptable to all the parties.

Koivisto congratulated the President on the cease fire, since everyone felt that something must be done about the fighting there. As for Finland, it would send troops only upon a request by the UN Secretary General. It happened that troops were available for UNIFIL since plans had been made to have a contingent available for Namibia, and these were used when participation in UNIFIL was requested.

The President observed that, if the hot spot in Lebanon cooled down, then this would open up possibilities for progress toward a peace settlement. He mentioned that King Hassan feels that there must be a solution to the Palestinian problem. However, there can be no solution while shooting goes on.

The Vice President asked for Koivisto's impressions of Andropov's health.

Koivisto said that when he saw Andropov last June, the latter did not seem to be in very good shape. In fact, he was shocked by his appearance. He did not know what his difficulties were, but in any event he seemed authoritative and fully in charge. He added that we cannot expect every Russian leader to last as long as Brezhnev or Stalin. Andropov seems to be working to improve the way the Soviet

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government functions, and is replacing people in the interests of efficiency. Andropov's approach is business-like and he seems anxious to get something accomplished during his tenure. 36

The President said he hoped that what Andropov desires is directed at achieving a more peaceful world.

At this point the meeting ended and the participants proceeded to the State Dining Room for lunch.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

37

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

September 30, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President Koivisto's Visit, September 27

Attached is a memorandum to the President (Tab I) transmitting for his approval the memorandum of conversation of his meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27. At Tab II is a memorandum for Bob Kimmitt's signature transmitting this memorandum to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove RMK

No need to go to P *RMK*

2. That you approve the memorandum at Tab II for Bob Kimmitt's signature forwarding the memorandum of conversation to State.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

9-30-83

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation
- Tab II Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President
Koivisto's Visit, September 27

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of conversation from your meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27, for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.
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— —

Attachment:

Tab A	Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President Koivisto
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AW 8/30/11
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

Declassify on: OADR

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8306968

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TO HILL, C

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 30 SEP 83 39

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03 OCT 83

KEYWORDS FINLAND

VISIT

KOIVISTO, MAUNO

SUBJECT MEMCON OF KOIVISTO VISIT / LUNCHEON MEMCON 27 SEP

ACTION KIMMITT SGD MEMO

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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October 3, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Herewith is a summary of the President's 27 September luncheon for President Mauno Koivisto.

Bruno McKinley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attached:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 8/30/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 27, 1983

PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: Central America, Foreign Trade, Arms Control,
United Nations, and Nuclear Free ZonePARTICIPANTS: US:
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Counselor to the President Edwin Meese
NSC Advisor Judge William P. Clark
US Ambassador to Finland Keith F. Nyborg
Acting Assistant Secretary of State John H.
Kelly
NSC Senior Staff Member Jack MatlockFINLAND:
President Mauno Koivisto
Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen
Ambassador Richard Muller
Mr. Kalela
Mr. Wihtol
Dr. Tornudd

N.B. This is a summary Memorandum of
Conversation in that not all of the luncheon
conversation was audible at the notetaker's
end of the table.

Central America: The President outlined the recent
history of Central America. He explained the reasons for the
Sandinista movement's opposition to Somoza and described the
fact that the previous Administration had made a significant
contribution of aid following the Sandinista victory. However,
over time it became clear that the Sandinista regime was
betraying its revolutionary goals and consolidating a totali-
tarian regime. When this became clear, the previous American
Administration had suspended aid to Nicaragua. In the
meantime, Nicaragua had continued exporting arms to aid the

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DECL: OADRDECLASSIFIED
NLRR M371/1 # 117560
BY RW 6/22/15

rebels in El Salvador. The latter country has been struggling to institute democratic processes. In last year's elections, 83 percent of the voters participated even though the rebels threatened death to those who voted. The President noted that we are searching for political solutions to the problems of the area.

President Koivisto asked about prospects for a peaceful resolution of the problems in Central America. Acting Secretary Dam outlined US support for the Contadora process and noted that in two days' time the Salvadoran guerrillas will meet with the Government of El Salvador in a search for a peaceful solution.

Judge Clark added that the Kissinger Commission is examining the long-term problems and that Senator Stone has been in direct contact with the Salvadoran guerrilla movement. Judge Clark also added that we are conscious of the humanitarian side of the problem and have increased medical assistance.

Mr. Dam observed that the Contadora countries insist that Nicaragua negotiate an end to their arms shipments to El Salvador. In addition, the Contadora countries want the installation of a democracy in Nicaragua, recognizing that such is needed to guarantee the safety of Nicaragua's neighbors.

President Reagan stated that the Government of El Salvador has offered an amnesty to the guerrillas in that country.

Foreign Trade: Secretary Baldrige commented that we have no trade problems with Finland because the Finns do not subsidize exports. He noted that Finland is interested in selling the US icebreakers but that we have acquired no new icebreakers since 1940.

Foreign Minister Vayrynen stated that Finland builds more icebreakers than any country in the world.

Arms Control: President Koivisto asked if there is a chance for an INF agreement before the December deployment date.

President Reagan answered that the zero-zero option would prevent any deployments at all. If the Soviets will not accept that, we are prepared to reduce Pershing II and GLCMs to whatever level the Soviets are willing to agree.

President Koivisto asked about Pershing II flight time, noting that modern systems give governments less and less time to react.

President Reagan answered that that is exactly why we need new confidence-building measures to improve communications between the US and the Soviet Union. In this regard, the shooting down of the Korean airliner is worrisome since it implies a sort of automatic reaction on the part of the Soviets.

The President continued that we should start down the road to reductions of nuclear arms with the goal that someday we can do away with them and eliminate them. The President cited the Baruch Plan of 1946 which aimed at international control of nuclear weapons.

The Vice President noted that despite popular stories, modern technology prevents the accidental release or use of nuclear weapons.

President Koivisto asked how many new nations are in a position to assemble nuclear weapons on very short notice if they so desire.

President Reagan responded that there are several in this category and this is a matter of great concern to us. The Indian explosion of a nuclear device should have been a lesson to all.

(There was then a discussion of last Saturday's rodeo.)

Acting Secretary Dam commented on Finland's interest in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which will open in Stockholm in January and noted that the Government of Finland will host the preparatory conference next month. Foreign Minister Vayrynen stated that it was the intention of the Finnish Government to keep the preparatory conference to three weeks and to focus on agenda and procedural issues -- but ultimately everything would be political.

The United Nations: President Koivisto congratulated President Reagan on his UN General Assembly speech, calling it a genuine achievement. Koivisto also expressed appreciation for President Reagan's backing of the UN, which is very

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TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 30 SEP 83

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KEYWORDS INDIA

MOROCCO

GANDHI, INDIRA

HASSAN II

SUBJECT: STATE MEMCONS OF PRES MTG W/ GANDHI & HASSAN II

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 04 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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National Security Council
The White House

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John Poindexter			
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Situation Room			
<u>Teuchen</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>Redo Tab I</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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
October 4, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: The President's Meetings with King Hassan II of
Morocco and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India
in New York

Attached are approved memoranda of conversation between the
President and King Hassan II and Prime Minister Gandhi,
respectively, as transmitted on September 30, 1983. Mr. Tyson's
title should be changed on both to Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs (Coordination).


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Memcon between the President and King Hassan II
Tab B Memcon between the President and Prime Minister Gandhi

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SECRET ATTACHMENTS

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8/30/11

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: The President's Lunch with Moroccan King Hassan
Date: September 26, 1983
Time: 12:00 Noon - 1:00 p.m.
Place: The President's Suite, Waldorf Towers Hotel, New York, New York

Participants:

U.S.

The President
Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
William P. Clark, Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs
Michael K. Deaver, Asst. to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed
Ambassador Vernon Walters
Charles Tyson, Member, National Security Council
David T. Schneider, Deputy Asst. Secretary, NEA (Notetaker)

Morocco

King Hassan II
Foreign Minister Boucetta
Moulay Hafid, Court Minister
Reda Guedira, Counselor to the King
Moulay Ahmed Alaoui, Minister without Portfolio
Ambassador Bengelloun
UN Ambassador Zentar

Summary:

King Hassan of Morocco told the President at lunch that he believed the ceasefire in Lebanon would last no more than two months. He said that Syrian and Israeli withdrawal may never take place because of Syrian dreams of a greater Syria, and the prospect that Israel could become the arbitor of the situation in Lebanon after being asked to return. Hassan said there could be no lasting solution of the Lebanese and Middle East problems without relating them to the Iran-Iraq question. The King considered that the PLO had made a "totally stupid mistake" when it failed to take up King Hussein's offer for peace negotiations. He argued that the Palestinians should be given a second chance and, rather than a separate state or merger with Jordan, they should become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian Federation guaranteed by global or regional powers. Having questioned Hassan closely regarding

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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his views, the President expressed great appreciation for the King's presentation, saying it had given him much food for thought. King Hassan was deeply grateful for the President's invitation to lunch, knowing how many similar requests the President must have turned down.

The President started off the conversation speaking warmly of the "great" visit made by Vice President Bush to Morocco. King Hassan then turned to Lebanon, asking what the latest news from that country was. In response, the Secretary reviewed the situation, citing the need to get discussions among the parties going, to define who would be the truce observers, and to select a place for discussions.

Beginning a number of candid remarks on the Middle East, King Hassan expressed his personal view that Lebanon was a "Syrian trap" to keep U.S. forces in that country. He urged that Americans should not be involved or be a part of any U.N. force. He predicted that the ceasefire would last no more than two months.

After the Secretary explained that there was no plan for observers from the U.S., King Hassan inquired whether the Syrians would get out of Lebanon. The Secretary replied that if a broadly based government in which the Syrians had influence were constructed, they would be hard pressed to argue that they should stay; but they are not always logical. Further, the Fez Declaration pretty much ended the Syrian mandate. Hassan pointed out the difference in the status of Syrian and Israeli forces in Lebanon and explained that Israeli departure was a condition for Syrian withdrawal. The Secretary replied that the Israelis were unambiguous about their willingness to leave, but we have not been able to get the Syrians seriously to discuss mutual withdrawal.

King Hassan then said there were two reasons why withdrawal may not take place. First, he said, the Syrians don't want to withdraw because they still dream of a greater Syria. Second, he believed that soon the Israelis could become the arbiters of the situation in the region because the time will come when "part of the Lebanese" will ask the Israelis to return. Responding to a question from the Secretary, he said that his advice to the Israelis was to return to Israel, restore their logistics, and wait for someone to call them back.

Hassan then spoke at length of the dangers Lebanon holds for the Middle East. A country divided by religion, social groups and ideology, Lebanon is a place where "everybody fights." If he were not an Arab, Hassan explained that he would say the Syrians should take half of the country and the

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Israelis the other. Looking at the question more broadly, he said there could be no solution of the Lebanese and other Middle East problems without relating them to the Iran-Iraq question. The problem in Lebanon is that it lacks a sense of nationality; its citizens view themselves primarily as members of a minority. He blamed the situation on how the British and French, who divided up the Middle East, left remaining minorities in Lebanon. The introduction of Nasserism, followed by oil-financed shipments of arms to foreign-influenced militia brought the current crisis closer. Hassan concluded that there would not be an end to the fighting among communities and, despite his Arab League responsibilities, he did not wish "to put his finger in the business."

The Secretary then asked Hassan for his opinion about the Palestinian movement in light of Syrian intervention with the PLO. Hassan replied that we must still get at the overall Palestinian problem and noted that there were both the Reagan and the Fez plans to work with. The PLO had made "a totally stupid mistake" when they failed to seize the opportunity to work with King Hussein toward a peace settlement. The PLO had "left feathers behind" but this did not mean it was finished. Further, the U.S. should not confuse the Palestinian people with any Palestinian organization. We cannot leave five million "small bombs" in the Middle East. The only way the Soviets can get back into the Middle East is via the Palestinian issue.

The President called attention to the large number of Palestinians spread around the Middle East who were not citizens of the countries in which they resided, and asked how could an independent country large enough to accommodate them be established, particularly since there had never been a Palestinian state. Hassan caused the discussion to reach into biblical and Islamic history when he maintained the Israelis had never had a state. Following a discussion of race, religion and nationality in the Middle East, the President concluded by noting the wisdom of the United States' founding fathers when they established religious freedom and separated church from state. Hassan added that the Middle East problem should not be viewed as a religious one.

The Secretary then intervened to ask Hassan, in view of the PLO's failure to take up opportunities for peace, what he counseled that we do regarding the Palestinian question. Hassan replied that he did not advocate giving the Palestinians their own territory and then leaving them to fend for themselves. What is needed is a Jordanian-Palestinian Federation guaranteed by global or regional powers. No moderate Arab country could accept a totally separate state.

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Further, just because the Palestinians "missed the train", there is no reason not to produce another train -- "they will get on board this time." The Secretary remarked that the Palestinians will recognize the train better if it has the label "King Hussein." Hassan replied that he was not sure Hussein would accept this "viper", as he would be faced by a majority which could ultimately overthrow his dynasty. Hussein now understood much better that there should be some sort of Federation.

With time running out, the President expressed his great appreciation for Hassan's presentation, saying that the King had given much food for thought. Hassan described how touched he had been by the President's invitation for lunch, despite the many requests he knew the President must have turned down, and explained that he had been very candid in speaking to the leader of the world's most powerful state because he knew the President was a loyal and honest man.

Drafted by NEA:DTSchneider 9/27/83
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Cleared by NEA/AFN:PSebastian
NEA/ARN:DMack
Amb. Walters

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: The President's Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

Date: September 26, 1983

Place: The President's Suite, Waldorf Towers, New York, New York

Time: 1:30 - 2:00

Participants

U.S.

The President
Secretary Shultz
Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick

Michael K. Deaver, Asst. to the President
William P. Clark, Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs
Charles, Tyson, Member, National Security Council
Harry Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to India
David T. Schneider, Deputy Asst. Secretary, NEA (Notetaker)

India

Prime Minister Gandhi
Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao
G. Parthasarathy, Foreign Policy Advisor
P.C. Alexander, Principal Private Secretary
M.K. Rasgotra, Foreign Secretary
Amb. R.K. Narayanan

Summary

During her call on the President September 26, and after a brief private conversation between the two principals, Prime Minister Gandhi said she did not expect either dramatic or conclusive deliberations at the meetings of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government she had convened in New York. She expressed her appreciation to the President for his support in the form of his visit to New York, even though he could not be

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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present for the meetings. The Secretary recalled the Prime Minister's interest, during his visit to New Delhi, in a rupee foundation supporting scientific and cultural activities. Mrs. Gandhi replied only that her people were looking at the proposal. The President said that Mrs. Reagan would be the U.S. sponsor of activities planned for the special emphasis on cultural relations in 1984-85. Mrs. Gandhi criticized the Sri Lankans for not giving adequate participation in their government to the Tamil minority and expressed concern about prospects for stability in the region if President Jayewardene did not take a stronger stand. The Secretary told Mrs. Gandhi that we were paying attention to India's thoughts on this problem since India was closer to it than we. After the Secretary described the great shock caused by the downing of the Korean airliner, Mrs. Gandhi agreed this was a "shocking incident," but remarked that when mistrust reaches a certain level, nations don't behave rationally. After ascertaining that the Soviets were resisting an investigation, Mrs. Gandhi declared that India believed there should be such an investigation. The meeting ended with a brief discussion on the Middle East which the Secretary said he would continue directly with Foreign Minister Rao. Responding to Mrs. Gandhi's question regarding the prospects for the peace process, the President said that we had made a beginning in stopping the bloodshed in Lebanon and were encouraged by that, but no one could be optimistic about the future.

Mrs. Gandhi's call began with a brief (5-10 minute) private talk between the two principals. Thereupon, the other participants joined the President and Mrs. Gandhi, who opened the conversation asking the President if there had yet been any response to his new INF proposals. The President replied that our representative, Ambassador Nitze, had put the proposals on the table, and we expect an answer through that channel.

After a pause, the Secretary asked Mrs. Gandhi what she could tell us regarding her plans for the coming meetings of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. Mrs. Gandhi replied that a representative group was gathering, but she did not expect either dramatic or conclusive deliberations. Mostly, they would think aloud about the many problems facing the world. The Secretary pointed out that even though the President could not be present in New York to accept Mrs. Gandhi's invitation for lunch on the 27th, his visit to the

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DECL: OADR

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U.N. gives support to Mrs. Gandhi's effort. Mrs. Gandhi agreed and expressed her appreciation to the President. Wishing Mrs. Gandhi success in her discussions, the Secretary noted that the President had laid out his views in his speech. It was time for people to be on the side of solving problems, rather than contributing to them. Mrs. Gandhi noted that was what she was trying to do and would continue trying. The President observed that it was important that we talk to each other, rather than about each other.

The Secretary then recalled his discussion with Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi about the establishment of a small endowment of U.S. owned rupees for the support of scientific and cultural collaboration. He noted that the Prime Minister had expressed interest; consequently, we were pursuing this matter in Washington. Ambassador Barnes reported there had been a good Congressional response so far. Mrs. Gandhi replied only that her people were looking at the proposal. The President said "this is fine -- the more things such as this we can do together the better". He then asked about the program for which Mrs. Reagan would be U.S. sponsor. Ambassador Barnes and Mrs. Gandhi both described activities planned for the special emphasis on cultural relations in 1984-85. Mrs. Gandhi expressed pleasure at word that Mrs. Reagan would accept sponsorship on the U.S. side, commenting that they had not heard that this had been decided.

Ambassador Parthasarathy then mentioned his discussions in Washington about Sri Lanka. The Secretary told Mrs. Gandhi we were paying attention to Indian thoughts on this problem since India was closer to it than we. We had provided some humanitarian assistance. We understood India believed that if we were more forceful in our discussions with the Sri Lankians it might be helpful. Mrs. Gandhi criticized the Sri Lankans for not giving adequate participation in their government to the Tamils. They have no rights, so the tensions keep on simmering. She remarked that President Jayewardene wanted to do more, but he was caught between extremists. As a result, the Tamils were being radicalized. Further, there was the danger of refugees coming to India. She thought that if Jayewardene took a stronger stand, his actions could improve prospects for stability. India was concerned because it did not want destabilization around it. The Secretary noted the tragedy which had overtaken a country that had made such a spectacular political and economic success. The U.S. wants the Sri Lankans to put the necessary elements back together again.

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Noting the need for progress on arms limitations, the President remarked that when he was a boy the rules of war protected civilians. Now, nuclear weapons were directed at civilians. Mrs. Gandhi said that the U.S. had both power and talent and, therefore, had a special responsibility, a moral responsibility, to seek to resolve international problems. Saying that we tried to do just this, the Secretary described the great shock caused by the downing of the Korean airliner, and the even greater shock when Soviet representatives said in Madrid that they would do the same thing again. Mrs. Gandhi agreed that this was a "shocking incident." She said that when mistrust reaches a certain level, then "you don't think." Mistrust and suspicion should be lifted. There is also a feeling that sometimes ships and aircraft can be used for other purposes. The Secretary replied that our effort in ICAO is to establish the position that there is no excuse for shooting down a civilian aircraft. He said that the level of suspicion about which Mrs. Gandhi spoke was derived from the nature of the system harboring that suspicion. There was an atmosphere in which everything was doubted. The atmosphere existed even when the aircraft could not have been engaged in activities justifying suspicion. Mrs. Gandhi asked if the Soviets were resisting an investigation. The Secretary said yes, they weren't even willing to let search teams into their territorial waters or allow mourners to throw flowers on the water. They were rejecting any outside investigation. Mrs. Gandhi declared that India believed there should be an investigation. Referring to the grief stricken letters he was receiving from families of persons lost on the airliner, the President asked how can we reply to these cries of anguish. The Secretary concluded that if Mrs. Gandhi's meetings could do something to allay these suspicions and increase civility in international relations, a major advance could be achieved.

At the end of the meeting, Foreign Secretary Rasgotra asked if the U.S. looked for progress in the peace process after the ceasefire in Lebanon. The President replied that all we could do is be hopeful. In Lebanon there is a strange mix of internal and external (Syrian and Soviet) factors at work. We have made a beginning at stopping the bloodshed and are encouraged by this, but no one can be optimistic about the future. The Secretary concluded the meeting by saying that he would discuss the Middle East at greater length with Foreign Minister Rao.

Drafted by NEA:DTSchneider ^{DTS}
x20324

Cleared by NEA:HBSchaffner ^{HBS}

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*

SUBJECT: The President's Meetings with King Hassan II of Morocco and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India in New York

Attached are memoranda of conversations between the President and King Hassan II of Morocco (Tab A) and the President and Prime Minister Gandhi of India (Tab B). Your approval of these texts is required for transmittal to post and for filing in the White House.

Recommendation

That you approve these memcons and that Kimmitt sign a memorandum at Tab I to Charles Hill apprising him of your approval.

Approve RMK

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt memorandum to Hill
- Tab A Memcon between the President and King Hassan II
- Tab B Memcon between the President and Prime Minister Gandhi

cc: Don Fortier

United States Department of State

XR-8329922/23
Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meetings with King Hassan II
of Morocco, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
in New York

There are enclosed draft memoranda of conversations
between the President and Moroccan King Hassan, and
the President and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi.

Your approval of these texts is requested so that
we may transmit them to interested posts for
information.

Thomas M. McKinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

NSC/S PROFILE

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TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 30 SEP 83

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KEYWORDS KAMPUCHEA ASEAN
VIETNAM

SUBJECT MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ KAMPUCHEANS

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 04 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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10/3/83

- No action required.
- major points covered
in weekly report.
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COMMENTS

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation with Kampuchean

Herewith for the record is the draft memorandum of conversation covering the President's September 25 meeting in New York that we LDXed to you on September 27.

Thomas Harkinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 8/30/14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: September 25, 1983

Place: Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

Time: 3:45 - 4:15 P.M.

Participants:

U.S. Side:

President Reagan

Secretary Shultz

Judge William P. Clark

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Mr. Charles Tyson

Mr. William A. Brown

Kampuchean Side:

Prince Sihanouk, Leader of the United Front for a Neutral,
Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)

Son Sann, President of the Khmer People's National Liberation

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DECLASSIFIED
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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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62

Front (KPNLF)

Ambassador John S. Sisowath, Democratic Khmer Deputy PermRep, UN

Sangwar deLopez, Chief, KPNLF Informatin Office in Washington

The President said we have deep sympathy for the Khmer cause and keep in close touch with ASEAN regarding Kampuchean developments.

Sihanouk said the Khmer people appreciate all that the U.S. has done for them. Since 1979 the U.S. has never ceased to help the Kampucheans in their struggle for freedom and independence. At the UN the U.S. delegation has rendered much important assistance. The Khmer people owe profound thanks to the President and to the U.S. people.

The President said we will continue to support Kampuchea as we can, given our constraints.

Sihanouk stressed that his is not a government in exile. All of its ministers are in Kampuchea where it has many strongholds and where its armed forces are fighting well. There is no pretense of being about to win in a single day; the Vietnamese are too strong. However, the pressure has to be

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maintained, otherwise the Vietnamese will reject all UN resolutions. Hopefully one day there will be an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) with participation by the Vietnamese, who have thus far refused. This is not merely a "Kampuchean problem"; it is the creation of Vietnam. At present the Soviets support Vietnamese refusal to attend the ICK, so there is a deadlock. Therefore, U.S. efforts to help the Kampuchians in the process of getting a peaceful solution for Kampuchea are appreciated.

Secretary Shultz referred to his recent conversation in Washington with Son Sann who had mentioned Vietnamese settlement in the best areas of Kampuchea. This shows that the Vietnamese have permanent territorial aspirations.

Sihanouk said that the Vietnamese have more than 500,000 civilian settlers seizing Khmer land and exploiting Kampuchea's natural resources. This is a very dangerous situation; they are planning to Vietnamize the Khmer homeland.

Son Sann congratulated the President for his success in defending the freedom of the Lebanese people. He then read an aide-memoire in French:

"--We are in the front line of a struggle for liberty,

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peace and security in the region against the Vietnamese aggressors who are strongly supported by Soviet hegemonism.

--We have already struggled for years and the entire world knows this.

--We need your aid first on a matter of equilibrium and also because the Kampuchean people ardently appreciate the aide of the U.S. champions of liberty.

--The Kampuchean people know well the brutality of the Vietnamese who are in the process of intensifying the atrocities against the Kampuchean population, even against the troops of Heng Samrin, and of accelerating the Vietnamization of Kampuchea.

--By the thousands the inhabitants of the interior are coming to take refuge in our liberated zone. I have myself contacted at the end of August, 9-10 thousand of these inhabitants of the region of the northwest of Kampuchea (Siemreap Battambang, Oddor Meanchey) who fled the atrocities committed by the Vietnamese. Able-bodied men seek arms to go forth and combat the Vietnamese occupiers. We have actually, in addition to our armed forces, more than 5,000 trained men who await arms. The Kampuchean people listen daily to the

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transmissions of the VOA and await the good news of sufficient aid from the U.S.

--The majority of our combatants are former comrades in the struggle of American soldiers in Vietnam.

--The announcement of the audience which you have accorded us gives great hope to Kampuchean in the interior and abroad.

--Vietnam encroaches on Kampuchea. The people do not want these occupiers. Vietnam also has great internal difficulties in its own country.

--The dry season approaches and the battles will intensify. Help us urgently, please.

The President noted that we have some very great problems resulting from past involvement in the area; Vietnam created problems at home. We have certainly supported ASEAN and we will continue to do so. He wondered what has been the fate of former members of the South Vietnamese army. Have they become part of the communist Vietnamese army?

Son Sann replied that remnants of the former South Vietnamese army had been dispersed; none are now left. But

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many South Vietnamese people are awaiting the opportunity to rise against their regime. The Khmer resistance is weak but it can serve as an example.

Secretary Shultz said that properly it was fair to say, based on the President's remarks before this meeting, that we support the non-communist Khmer resistance, that there are constraints, but that we are willing to test the limits of our constraints in rendering this support. It is hard to be precise, but that will be our basic attitude.

The President assured Sihanouk and Son Sann that our hearts are with them. He asked whether there were other factions which had not yet united.

Son Sann in reply said that recently 10,000 men from the interior (of Thailand) had gone back to the Thai/Kampuchean border. They wanted to leave their wives and children there so they could go back into Kampuchea to wage war.

Turning to Secretary Shultz, the President said he wanted us to explore to see to it that we do all that we can to help.

Secretary Shultz replied "Yes sir. I am glad to receive that order."

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Son Sann closed by saying that there is sunshine outside;
"Now there is sunshine in our hearts because of your words."

cc: S/S:JCovey

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