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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/29/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (06/23/1983-07/25/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 51

JAUVERT/BROWER

25

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117526	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ R 6/22/2015 M371/	8	6/21/1983	B1
117527	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR R 6/22/2015 M371/	3	6/24/1983	B1
117528	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CARDINAL KROL D 6/22/2015 M371/	2	6/27/1983	B1
117530	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OF FRG R 6/22/2015 M371/	4	7/11/1983	B1
117531	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE R 6/22/2015 M371/	4	7/14/1983	B1
117532	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN FOLEY R 6/22/2015 M371/	2	7/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 JUN 83 18

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 23 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

VISIT

GONZALEZ, FERNANDO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF GONZALEZ 21 JUN VISIT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED . ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	6/27	Poindexter approved recoms		
Kimmett	6/27	For signature		
C	6/27	Kimmett 861 memo		TS, TIC

DISPATCH HW. 6/27

W/ATTCH FILE (PA) (C)

National Security Council 717
The White House

2

RECEIVED

Package # 4288

83 JUN 24 P 4: 53

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	X	A
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		A
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

June 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Spanish Prime
Minister Gonzalez' Visit, June 21, 1983

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez on June 21.

This memorandum, and others similar, are Presidential records containing sensitive information, including foreign government information. They are generally shared only with the Department of State. Further reproduction should be strictly limited, and any request, now or in the future, for access or release outside of the Department must be cleared by the NSC Staff.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A - Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED
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RW 8/29/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Vice President
 Secretary Shultz
 Secretary Regan
 Secretary Baldrige
 William P. Clark
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Deputy Secretary of State Dam
 Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer
 Charles P. Tyson
 Assistant Secretary Richard Burt
 Peter Sommer, NSC Staff Member

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
 Foreign Minister Fernando Moran
 Economics Minister Miguel Boyer
 Ambassador Gabriel Manueco
 Presidential Spokesman Eduardo Sotillos
 Secretary of the Presidency Jose Feo
 Director General for North American Affairs
 Jose Manuel Allendesalazar
 Secretary General of Commerce Guillermo de la Dehesa

DATE, TIME: June 21, 1983
AND PLACE: 11:45 - 1:30 Cabinet Room/State Dining Room

The President welcomed President Gonzalez to Washington and emphasized our desire to work closely with Spain. He expressed appreciation for Spain's ratification of our bilateral defense agreement, support on INF, and decision to purchase the F-18 aircraft. As an ally and friend, the U.S. strongly supports Spain's democracy and efforts to assume its rightful role in Europe. The President underscored that the U.S. understands Spain's approach to NATO, but sincerely believes that full membership is in Spain's best interest.

Prime Minister Gonzalez thanked the President--on behalf of the Spanish delegation--for his kind opening remarks and warm welcome. Gonzalez emphasized Spain's desire for friendly and close relations with the U.S. Spain, he noted, did not benefit from either America's freeing of Europe, or its reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II. Indeed, Spain is presently building democracy and striving for fuller integration into Europe against the backdrop of a much different international

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NLRP M371/1 # 117526
BY RW 6/22/15

situation. Spain has, said Gonzalez, an inherent interest in the Mediterranean basin, where certain anomalies still exist. Referring to Gibraltar, Gonzalez quipped that Spain's historic relationship with Britain dates back to 1714. But except for Gibraltar, Spain maintains good relations with Great Britain. In a reference to the NATO command question, Gonzalez said that it is difficult to imagine a Spanish admiral subordinate to a British admiral on Spanish territory. But Spain hopes, he said, to resolve this problem in friendship. Fuller participation in Europe is essential for Spain and the development of Spanish democracy. Gonzalez continued that no matter what happens in Spain's referendum on NATO, Spain's bilateral defense relationship with the U.S. would continue. He called this bilateral security relationship a mutual responsibility.

In saying that he should follow the healthy Anglo-Saxon habit of brevity, Gonzalez turned to Latin America. He began by emphasizing Spain's historic and cultural links. Joking that in Latin America he would not need an interpreter or earphones, he said Spain viewed these countries as brothers. He added that Spain looks at the region from a different perspective than the rest of Europe. To Spain, South and Central America is not a distant continent. Spain wants to assist in the region's development. Our goals, he said, are peace, freedom, and democracy. Spain opposed any form of dictatorship. Communism is the furthest from any model that Spain could follow. Spain, he continued, wishes to contribute to solving the region's problems in coordination with the U.S. who carries such great weight in the area. Gonzalez again emphasized Spain's desire to help these brotherly countries--from Argentina to the U.S. border-- find a path to peace and democracy. Peace is both a condition and goal, he said. Spain is determined to help the Latin countries find their place in the sun between now and the year 2000.

The President praised Gonzalez' remarks, noting he found no areas of disagreement. He said he had long held a dream of improving our relations with our southern neighbors. Past Presidents had proposed the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for Progress, but Americans on a whole had remained insensitive to the weight of our size and past history in the region. Early in his Administration, added the President, he had traveled to South and Central America to hear their ideas first hand. There is much common ground. We worship the same God, share the same heritage, and both our forebearers largely came from Europe to these great unexplored continents. The President underlined that he has introduced in Congress the CBI legislation, which is aimed at opening investment opportunities, economic growth, and most importantly job opportunities for the Central American countries and the Caribbean Island nations.

We acknowledge, he continued, that there is a wide disparity in the region between those enmeshed in poverty and the more fortunate. This, we recognize, makes many countries vulnerable to revolution.

Turning to El Salvador the President noted that this small country recently overthrew 50 years of military rule. It now has a democratically elected government, chosen by the people. Guerrilla forces intent on challenging the elected government tried to prevent the election. These non-democratic forces, guided and supplied by the Soviet Union--by way of Cuba and Nicaragua--are seeking a communist dictatorship. The President recalled that the stories he heard from some election observers were astounding and heart rendering. Many of the El Salvadoran people walked many miles to vote. Some waited in lines for 10 hours. There was even a woman--wounded by guerrillas--who refused to seek medical treatment until she voted. People chanted at the visiting press: "tell the truth!" There was an 80 percent voter turn-out. It has been a long time, added the President, since the U.S. has had such a large turn-out. The El Salvador government plans on holding another election before this year is out. We support a political solution. Three-quarters of our aid is economic. El Salvador, continued the President, has made great strides in land distribution. But their efforts also require a security shield. We only have 55 military advisors in country. In emphasizing that he had no plans to send combat troops, he emphasized that our the advisors are helping to train the El Salvadoran military to protect a democratic government.

The President then turned to Nicaragua and what he called its failed revolution. Immediately following the revolution, my predecessor, he said, provided aid to the new government. But the Junta quickly began abusing individual rights, restricted freedoms, and refused to hold early elections. Then Soviet and Cuban equipment came pouring in. Its purpose, the President underlined, was to overthrow the elected government of El Salvador. The Contras are loyal Nicaraguans who participated in the original revolution, but were ousted by the communist elements. Now they strive, he added, to return Nicaragua to the origins of the revolution, i.e., democracy. He said many in Europe do not have a true understanding of the situation in Central America. The Soviet aim is to spread communism throughout Central America and undermine developing democracies in such countries as Costa Rica--which does not even have an army--and Honduras. We recognize Spain's historic interest--these links can help all of us overcome the problems. As I have repeatedly said, continued the President, the U.S. has no intention of sending troops. Nor, he added, had the Salvadoran government asked for them. President Magana confirmed this to the press in Washington last week. Gunboat diplomacy is not the answer, but we do, he underscored, need to

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help the El Salvadoran government provide the shield to protect their emerging democratic institutions and reforms.

In concluding, the President apologized for making a speech and said that discussions could continue over lunch.

The meeting resumed in the State Dining Room at 12:20 p.m.

After again exchanging greetings, the President asked Prime Minister Gonzalez to begin.

Prime Minister Gonzalez spoke of Spain's experience in 1975 the year of Franco's death. Everyone thought the communist party would be the dominant political force. But in the first election the communists won 11 percent of the vote and in the third election--last year-- the communists only won 5 percent. Our socialist party, he said, obtained 30 percent in the first election and 48.5 percent in last year's election. We hope, continued Gonzalez, that we have set a good example for our brethren in Latin America. Costa Rica is perhaps the best reflection of the Spanish example. Chile and Pinochet, who he called a worthy disciple of Franco, is perhaps the worst.

The President noted that some revolutions simply result in one ruler replacing another ruler. El Salvador in contrast is heading toward real democracy. This also had been our hope for Nicaragua until the Soviets and Castro--who have openly stated their objectives--made inroads. The promises of the Nicaragua revolution have not been fulfilled, concluded the President.

Prime Minister Gonzalez replied that there certainly had been many human rights violations in Nicaragua. Noting that he had followed the Nicaragua revolution from its outset, Gonzalez said that Somoza was not overthrown by the forces of communism. The Nicaraguan movement was a mixture of Christianity and anarchy. Radicalized minorities existed at the outset, and Nicaragua suffered from not having a good model to follow. It is important, he continued, to distinguish between the revolution's original goals and its later evolution. Its original goal was to be non-aligned and pluralistic, with a mixed market economy--a very acceptable model, he added. Now the question is how to bring the revolution back to its origins.

Turning to El Salvador, Gonzalez said we are facing what is really an open civil war. In supporting the goals of peace and pluralism, it is our duty to work persistently for a peaceful solution. Spain, therefore, has placed hope in a peaceful dialogue via the Contadora group. We have repeatedly stressed, he added, that no one from outside should interfere.

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The President forcefully underscored that the U.S. also wants a peaceful solution, but the Sandinistas seem intent on exporting violence. He then went over again some of his earlier remarks on U.S. aid immediately following the fall of Somoza and the internal struggles, which he noted had resulted in a large number of exile groups. We wish, he said, for the restoration of the original purpose of the Nicaraguan revolution. Referring again to El Salvador, the President cited as positive signs the formation of the Peace Council and the release of political prisoners. The guerrillas, said the President, are welcome to join the democratic process. But they should not share power, without resort to the voters. We are trying to be helpful, he emphasized, in bringing the parties together.

Prime Minister Gonzalez replied that favorable conditions now exist, if a concrete plan for negotiations is offered. There is a danger, he said, that some factions may be looking at negotiations as a way to gain time, but both governments, he believes, desire a peaceful solution.

Secretary Shultz expressed the hope that what Prime Minister Gonzalez says about the climate is true. There are positive signs--the Peace Commission, the release of almost 500 "political prisoners," and the active role of the Contadora Group--and we can make progress if Nicaragua and the guerrillas in El Salvador truly favor a peaceful solution. The Secretary then joked that Central America, like the Middle East, can consume all the time available and suggested that the discussion move to other topics.

Prime Minister Gonzalez quickly agreed and asked Economic Minister Boyer to discuss Spain's economy, noting that the interpreter deserved a rest.

Economic Minister Boyer underlined that Spain is striving to modernize both its society and its economy. Even though their government is the first with a strong majority, the process is difficult and will be painful. Spain's wishes, he continued, to adapt to the European context and move closer to the European community. But Spain's economy, Boyer underscored, has structural problems and the only way forward entails many sacrifices. This means refusing government bail outs to industries that are modernizing, as well as the loss of jobs. Spain is also, he added, concerned about the international economic situation. Spain sees the U.S. as the engine leading the world's recovery, which Spain hopes will spread rapidly to the rest of the world. He applauded the U.S. fight against inflation, promotion of international trade, and opposition to protectionism; but cited high U.S. interest rates as an unhelpful factor. Recovery, he said, is not, however, spreading rapidly enough. There are, noted Boyer, small signs of progress

in Germany and Britain, but Spain fears the recovery trend will not be sustained. The consequences would be serious for Latin America and Europe, and in particular for Spain, which is at the initial stages of economic development. Spain, he said, would not follow the mistaken economic path of the Mitterrand government; their path has not produced positive results.

Secretary Regan answered that we had just received good news with regard to U.S. economic recovery. Our second quarter real GNP growth is estimated at 6.6 percent. Real GNP rose at a revised rate of 2.6 percent in the first quarter. Of course over the entire year, he added, the growth rate will be revised. But today's projections show the direction and dimension of our growth. Turning to Boyer's comments on high interest rates, Regan observed that these rates are more of a worry to us than to others. By way of explanation he noted that to pay our national debt, we will need to borrow \$100 billion to meet our payments for just this month. He then cited several positive economy signs. Commodity prices are holding, and wage settlements, which are holding at around 6 percent, bode well. We also believe we can keep real inflation down. If we can also keep labor, raw materials and the consumer price index down, and if the President is successful in his budget battle with the Congress, our economic recovery will certainly be sustained. In closing the Secretary noted that he and Boyer would have more time to continue the economic discussion during the afternoon.

Secretary Shultz underlined that we welcomed the comments on protectionism. We were pleased, he said, with the outcome of the recent OECD meeting in Paris. The Williamsburg Summit had issued a clear statement, which not only advocated a halt in the increase of protectionism, but also called for an effort to roll back protectionism. This effort, he noted, would be especially important toward improving trade opportunities for developing economies. Recalling the lengthy discussion on Central America, he stressed that CBI is aimed at opening our markets.

The President added that it was very rewarding that all the participating countries at Williamsburg had pledged an effort to rectify protectionism.

The Vice President then asked for Spain's views on full EC membership.

Foreign Secretary Moran answered that Spain was disappointed with the results of the just concluded European Council meeting in Stuttgart. Spain had futilely hoped for a firm announcement on an entry date. He and his Portuguese colleague--the other country also seeking membership--had had a follow-up meeting in Bonn with Foreign Minister Genscher, and Genscher's Danish and

Greek counterparts, the past and future EC Presidents. There are two varying interpretations, said Moran, of conditions for accession and next steps. The British are focussing on the rebate that they have long argued is owed to them. Mrs. Thatcher has declared that there is no direct connection between Britain's refund and agreement on an overall plan to reform the EC's financial system. The German view, which would facilitate progress on Spain's entry, is that the revision of the financing system--to include taking into account the added costs of Spain's and Portugal's entry--must first be resolved. Moran concluded that the December EC Council meeting in Athens will be crucial both with regard to accession and financial reform.

Secretary Shultz jokingly observed that Mrs. Thatcher is accustomed to winning; he then turned to NATO and CSCE. The Secretary reiterated the President's earlier remarks that we understand Spain's approach to NATO integration. We also firmly support, he emphasized, the idea of Spain belonging to NATO. He noted as well, U.S. appreciation for Spain's fine comments on INF. The Secretary then welcomed Spain's CSCE initiative, calling it a good move. We hope, he added, that the Spanish initiative will provide the basis for bringing the conference to a conclusion.

Prime Minister Gonzalez suggested that agreeing on a conclusion was very much up to the U.S., but Spain recognized the difficulties ahead.

Secretary Shultz stressed that there was also a prominent red star in the picture, and again underlined that Spain had offered a good initiative.

In response to the Prime Minister's query, Secretary Shultz gave a tour d'horizon on the Middle East situation. He began by noting that the Iran-Iraq war, while receiving little publicity these days, is one of the bloodiest in Middle East history. The U.S. has little influence on either party, but the war merits careful attention. We are doing everything we can, he continued, to implement the President's program with regard to Lebanon. The objectives are to protect Lebanese sovereignty, to see all foreign forces depart, and to ensure Israel's security interests on its northern borders, which have long been subject to harassment.

It is encouraging, said the Secretary, that Israel has agreed to pull out its forces. Governments around the world agree on the need for withdrawal--except for the most important one: Syria. The U.S. also recognizes that the problem of Palestine remains at the heart of the Middle East problem. The President's September first peace initiative, continues--on the whole--to maintain wide appeal. However, recent internal PLO developments appear troubling, and we are appalled by the horrible human

conditions faced by the Palestinians. The moderate Arab leaders remain vitally interested in the President's program, but everything in the Middle East comes hard. We would welcome, concluded the Secretary, your help with both the Arabs and the Israelis.

Prime Minister Gonzalez stressed that Spain agrees on the need to withdraw all foreign forces. Syria is perhaps being affected by what he called the new Soviet policy. On Palestine, Spain has consistently supported a combination of the Reagan plan and the Fez Summit. Together they represent the best possibility in recent memory. The internal PLO situation merits close attention; it could result in the PLO's internal collapse and Arafat's loss of leadership. Gonzalez continued that sooner or later the PLO must be considered an interlocutor. This, he noted, is the fundamental difference between the Reagan plan and the Fez Summit.

Spain's relations with Israel, said Gonzalez, are on two levels. Spain has very good relations with the Labor Party. Spain, however, lacks official relations with the State. Our historic ties to the Arabs have impaired our formal relations with Israel, but we are working for closer official relations, added Gonzalez. Spain has never denied Israel's right to exist, nor its need to have its survival guaranteed. We hope, he concluded, to improve relations.

Turning to Iraq, Gonzalez said three years ago he began to sense that Iraq was trying to bend its policy and increase relations with the West. Their approach was less obvious than Algeria's and the West probably did not sufficiently perceive Iraq's change.

The President apologized that it was time for the discussion to conclude.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he had one last point. Spain hoped the U.S. looked favorably on the cooperative gas pipeline project in the Magreb.

The President replied that not only do we look favorably on it, but we have already expressed our willingness to help finance a joint feasibility study.

The meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

mmk

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER

SUBJECT: Memcon of Gonzalez Visit

Attached for your approval is the memcon from Gonzalez' June 21 visit. There are no controversial items in the minutes, but given that this is my first one, and the various nuances that can always be applied to the wide-ranging remarks, you may wish to run it by Bud.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

That you approve Kimmitt forwarding the memcon to State (Tab II). We will attach the memcon once you have approved it.

Approve

Disapprove

Tab I Memcon
Tab II Kimmitt to Hill memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/29/11

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET
CAS 9-29-4

ID 8304400

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE (C)

RECEIVED 30 JUN 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 29 JUN 83

13

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

BANDAR

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 24 JUN MTG W/ PRINCE BANDAR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 30 JUN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KEMP

DUR

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8304282

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
DUR	S JUL 0 2 1983	for redo	7/6	
Clark	X 7/20	Release / For Decision	7/22	
	JUL 2 2 1983	Pandexter approved		
Kimmit	S 7/25	For Signature	7/25	4/1
	C 7/23	Kimmit Sgd M/aw		PL, HT
DISPATCH	5/23 17/23			

DUR

S JUL 0 2 1983

for redo

7/6

Clark

X 7/20

Release / For Decision

7/22

JUL 2 2 1983

Pandexter approved

Kimmit

S 7/25

For Signature

7/25

4/1

C 7/23

Kimmit Sgd M/aw

PL, HT

DISPATCH

5/23 17/23

W/ATTCH FILE JA (C) 2/83

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National Security Council The White House

14

Package # 4400

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83 JUN 29 P 8: 57

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Dur</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Please check errors.

National Security Council
The White House

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Package#

4400

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83 JUL 20 P 5: 19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

4400

16

July 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon for President's Meeting with
Prince Bandar, Saudi Arabia, June 24, 1983,
the Oval Office, 9:40-10:00 a.m.

The subject memcon is forwarded for your information.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memcon

~~SECRET~~ *AW 8/29/11*
ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

117527

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4400

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

17

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Prince Bandar
June 24, 1983, 9:40-10:00 a.m.,
The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan

State

Kenneth Dam,
Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Murphy,
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

NSC

William P. Clark,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert C. McFarlane,
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Howard J. Teicher,
Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M37111 # 117527
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

Minutes

President Reagan welcomed Prince Bandar, asking him to send his warm regards and respects to His Majesty King Fahd. I am very interested in the subject to be discussed. Saudi Arabia is a key to progress. I am sending Phil Habib to Israel to determine how Israel's views have changed and matured. He can then discuss the issues with His Majesty. We are trying to get the withdrawals that everyone promised. Syria is the key.

Prince Bandar extended King Fahd's best wishes to the President. The King is very worried about the situation in the Biqa. I will share Saudi views on the overall situation and summarize a sobering six hour meeting with Assad. The Soviets have increased their influence to a disturbing proportion. Nonetheless, U.S.-Saudi friendship goes back three generations. We have common goals and interests and rely on your leadership to deal with communist threats. The essence of U.S. policy is the pursuit of principles of fair play, even in far off places. These principles help King Fahd preserve our friendship, but you inherited several events that bother us and help the ankle-biters who criticize our relationship. For instance, during my meetings with President Assad he took several potshots at President Carter's treatment of the Shah. King Fahd does not

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

like it when potshots are taken at the U.S. This makes us uptight. But, a nation is represented by its leadership and thus a criticism of the past Administration may be deserved. On a personal note in this regard, I recall the first visit that you and Mrs. Reagan took to Iran. This reminds me of a recent arrival of mine at Kennedy Airport. While there I saw the Shahbanu. Although I was moved through the line quickly, the Shahbanu had to go through the line. This was not very good treatment for her and although she did not know me when I approached her I was able to get the State Department people to help her out. You should know that America's treatment of the Shah really affected us in a significant way, but we were relieved at Cancun to find out about the resurgence of our friends' strength. However, Andropov is dangerous; he does not joke around. We will stand up with you and we are ready to be counted but we are worried about your ability to checkmate the Russians. When you fight the Russians our bases and forces are with you, but people talk about bases too much including the RDF and it is very sensitive. I recall in 1980, September, that we asked for help. I told King Fahd that you would probably recommend sending three to four thousand troops. Fahd said let them send ten thousand. This was followed by President Carter's speech drawing the line by a US insistence on a neutrality declaration by us. We refused a public declaration and were told there would be no AWACS. In the end, we solved the AWACS problem but no HAWKS were sent -- these types of responses all go in our computer. But, you have reassured us and we need to work to deal with the Soviets. Right now the Soviets are very active against you and your friends. On many basic issues we agree with you. For instance, we agree that Israel is a State with a right to exist. It has a right to live in the region with good relations with its neighbors behind secure borders. It is your right to have these views, but some of your friends think that you are too sensitive to Israel's needs and not to your other friends who number as many as one hundred and forty million people. As you know, we are doing a lot to help you--such as in Afghanistan, Chad, and with the Libyans. We are trying to consolidate support for you, but right now we don't like the cheap shots against you.

Turning to his discussion with Assad, Bandar continued that the Syrians feel that they have legitimate concerns regarding the agreement. They argue that they were cheated out of a ceasefire. Habib carried a letter from the President, but it was not acted upon as the parties agreed. You told us that it was the Israelis who lied but nonetheless you are associated with the failure to live up to the commitment of the letter.

Turning to your September 1st initiative, it was rejected by Begin, but we are supporting it. We differ between Israel's basic rights and what Begin tries to do especially his efforts to disturb U.S. relations with the Arab world. As soon as there is

peace economic, political and cultural relations will develop. You said as much in your speech that security and peace are much more likely to evolve through normal relations than through military might. This is our overall feeling.

Turning to Lebanon, no one appreciates just how much prestige you have committed to bring about a solution. We understand that you have other worries such as Central America, and that there are other showdowns between you and the Soviets. But, whatever you can do on a personal basis it is very important that you remain personally committed in Lebanon. Assad kept reading me a list of what the Soviets are doing for him--giving him arms, manning their air defense, providing direct telephone links with Moscow. Assad said, "They are using me. The US should help me not to be used by the Soviets." He feels that you are treating him with disdain. It strikes me as more bitterness than substance. He intimated that the security problems can be worked out and that a solution may still be possible. The bottom line is that his Majesty King Fahd would like your personal involvement, an intensive personal commitment. For us the Saudis, it means survival. Perhaps there should be another special emissary such as the Judge, Bud or Ken Dam. This would reassure us and help tighten up all the loose ends.

The President responded that he remains as determined as ever to deal with the problem of Lebanon and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviets want to get back into the Middle East but this would be fatal. We think that if we can get the Soviets out then we could get back into a better relationship with Syria. Please assure His Majesty that Habib, the President's Emissary, will be there soon. Furthermore, we are aware of our mistakes from the past Administrations and they won't be repeated. It is a shameful blot on our record. Further, the President said that he had no idea about the Shahbanu and the treatment she gets must be better. Finally, he said that the comment by Assad about his Soviet relationship was extremely interesting but it is very hard for us to know if he is with them or not.

Prince Bandar then said that Assad is ready to do things with the US, but somebody must talk with him in quiet.

The President answered that we will follow-up and we will fulfill our commitments.

The meeting ended at 10:00 a.m.

4400

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7.20.83

John Poindexter:

I have reviewed
changes we both asked be made.
Other than accuracy of remarks,
which I'm sure Howard followed
as well as he could, I see no
reason to send to WPC or RCM.

Bob Krumm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7.6.83

Phil Dur / Pat Putignano

Further work needed
on memcon. Also prepare
Kimmitt -> still to
transmit to State
when done across street.

Bob

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8304559

~~SECRET~~
8/29/11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 01 JUL 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 01 JUL 83

23

KEYWORDS: POLAND

KROL, JOHN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 27 JUN MTG W/ JOHN CARDINAL KROL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

TYSON

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8304076 8304363 NSCIFID

(R /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (c)

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET Attachment

July 1, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: The President's
Meeting with John Cardinal Krol, June 27, 1983

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a memorandum of conversation for the record of the President's meeting with John Cardinal Krol, which took place on Monday, June 27, 1983.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab I for the record.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

cc: Charles P. Tyson
Jack Matlock

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET Attachment

RW 8/29/11

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (06/23/1983-07/25/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
371
JAUVERT/BROWER

Box Number

51

25

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
117528	MEMCON RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CARDINAL KROL	2	6/27/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council
The White House

727

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Package # 4559

83 JUL 7 P 7: 04

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8304757

rw 8/29/11

UNCLASSIFIED UPON RE
OF CLASSIFIED EXCEPT SUMMARY

RECEIVED 12 JUL 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 12 JUL 83

28

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

GENSCHER, HANS D

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FOMIN GENSCHER JUL 11

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 14 JUL 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8304494 8304035 NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Kennitt</i>	<i>JUL 20 1983</i>	<i>Podester approved</i>		
	<i>5 JUL 20 1983</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>C 17/21</i>	<i>Kennitt Sgd Mares</i>		<i>JM, PK</i>

DISPATCH

11/21

W/ATTCH FILE *FR* (C/M/D)



National Security Council
The White House

737

RECEIVED

Package#

4757

29

83 JUL 12 P 5:00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	A
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	1		
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter	2	✓	A
Executive Secretary	3		A
Situation Room			

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

36

July 21, 1983

SECRET ATTACHMENTMEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Federal Republic
of Germany Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher on July 11, 1983.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memcon

rw 8/29/11
SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

31

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Edwin Meese
William P. Clark
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Assistant Secretary Burt
Harry Obst, interpreter

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Peter Hermes
Gisela Siebourg, interpreter

DATE, TIME: July 11, 1983
AND PLACE: 2:00-2:30 p.m., Oval Office

The President welcomed Foreign Minister Genscher, thanked him for coming to Washington to brief us on Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow, and observed that we were pleased with the reports of the talks in Moscow. It is important that the Soviets get the message that the West is prepared to deploy the Pershing II's on schedule.

Foreign Minister Genscher conveyed Chancellor Kohl's personal regards to the President and said that he would like to describe their impressions of their Moscow visit inasmuch as we have already been briefed on the substance of the talks.

The Germans came away with the impression that Andropov will be in place for some years, and therefore he should not be considered an interim leader. The Germans also met with three other Politburo members; Tikhonov, Ustinov, and Gromyko. As for Ustinov, Genscher found him more confident and flexible than he seemed in 1980 when they met. Genscher inferred that Ustinov's influence may now be greater than it was three years ago.

Kohl tried to address Andropov as a person. He discussed German policies and also talked about U.S. policies and the President personally. Both Kohl and Genscher feel that Andropov is the type of person the President should talk to, and believe that the President's personal style would have a lasting effect on the Soviet leadership.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M37114 #117530

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

Although the Soviet leaders did not press the Federal Republic to neglect its duties to the NATO alliance, they attempted to create doubt regarding the U.S. interest in negotiating arms reduction. The Germans rejected Soviet criticism of U.S. methods, pointing out that these negotiating positions had been worked out with the FRG and other allies in advance.

32

Basically, Kohl attempted to convey two messages in Moscow:

- (1) That the FRG is serious in its desire to find negotiated solutions, and
- (2) That the FRG will under no circumstances be dissuaded by external or internal pressure to abandon the scheduled timing of INF deployments.

If the Soviets had doubts on this score before the Kohl visit, they should have none now.

The Germans have always believed that the weight the FRG carries in dealing with the Soviets depends on the state of its relations with the U.S. Andropov seemed to understand this point since he observed, "I know that your word carries weight in Washington and also in Western Europe." Western unity therefore is an element of great importance in dealing with Moscow.

The Germans feel that the Soviet leadership is interested in achieving a long-term accommodation with the West. The West should therefore take steps in areas where progress is possible. This is also the reason for Kohl's view that a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting would be beneficial. The Germans would also welcome a visit by Secretary Shultz to Moscow. It is important for him to go to Moscow because, although he can meet Gromyko elsewhere, he can only meet the other leaders there. And it is important to have direct talks with Andropov, as well as Ustinov and Tikhonov.

Regarding the various negotiations in progress:

-- Madrid: Now is the proper time to say yes. The conference has reached the stage of producing some things which can be of use in the coming months. We should keep this lever intact. The Germans would welcome a positive decision on the President's part now so that it cannot be charged that the U.S. is making problems for progress at the CSCE.

-- INF: Any new U.S. positions should be discussed with the Allies in advance. The Soviets are also in the process of reviewing their position. They must take account of the attitude of the UK and the FRG following the recent elections. Despite its close call at the polls, the Italian Government is also firm on deployments.

The U.S. could help its allies in future months by showing initiative at Geneva. Meetings with Gromyko, a visit by the Secretary of State to Moscow, and his attendance at the concluding session in Madrid also could help.

~~SECRET~~

The recent sequence of events in Europe are bound to make the Soviets think twice:

- (1) The elections in the UK and FRG;
- (2) The Pope's visit to Poland, which effectively answered the question of how many divisions he has;
- (3) Developments in Japan and ASEAN; and
- (4) The Soviet economic difficulties

On INF specifically, the Soviets keep reiterating their position on the French and British systems. Genscher told Ustinov that he recalled being told during his 1980 visit that these systems have nothing to do with INF but are strategic. And the Germans made it clear that inclusion of these systems in an INF agreement is out of the question. But if the Soviets are interested in moving the negotiations forward, they will come off their insistence that British and French systems be included.

In sum, our position should be firmness plus willingness to negotiate. He hopes that the Kohl visit to Moscow will be taken into account in the President's decision-making, and his government believes a quick and positive decision to wind up the Madrid conference would contribute to a good atmosphere.

He also noted that he had earlier briefed Secretary Shultz regarding demarches made in Moscow in regard to human rights cases such as Shcharansky, Sakharov, Ida Nudel and others.

The President replied that he was pleased and impressed that Chancellor Kohl stressed the strength of our alliance. It is important to follow through on the spirit of the agreements at Williamsburg. Regarding CSCE, he has not yet had the opportunity to discuss with Ambassador Kampelman, but he understands that we are very close to agreement.

Secretary Shultz said that a memo is on the way over, and they hope for a meeting with the President on this subject soon.

The President pointed out that we want a quick agreement. We want to negotiate in general. We mean it and are serious. But we want answers to the questions we have posed. He is encouraged that the Germans have the impression that the Soviets are serious.

Genscher added that the Germans had made clear to the Soviets their interest in a U.S.-Soviet summit, provided it is well prepared. In reply, Gromyko said, "If you want to know our position, read my recent interview."

Secretary Shultz joked that the foreign ministers are the "tough guys", while everyone else want to compromise.

Genscher observed, regarding possible timing of a summit, that the Soviets are concerned that if the meeting is held next year it would become involved in the election campaign.

Secretary Shultz suggested that the President might be interested in some of the remarks Genscher had made about Central America this morning at the State Department.

Genscher recalled a conversation at a dinner here during a previous trip when he said that they would like to invite President Duarte to the FRG. This had been done and Duarte is meeting with Chancellor Kohl today, and will see Genscher tomorrow. The German intention is to send their ambassador back to El Salvador in the near future. They will consult with Duarte to determine his preference regarding timing--whether he prefers for the FRG ambassador to return before or after the election.

Also, in his report to the EC in Brussels last Friday he brought up Central America and encouraged the others to send their ambassadors back, or if they had none, to appoint ambassadors to El Salvador. It would be helpful to let the other Europeans know of U.S. feelings on this subject.

The meeting concluded at 2:30 p.m.

Dmm

4757

35

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a Memorandum of Conversation for the record of the President's meeting on Monday, July 11, with Foreign Minister Genscher.

At Tab II is a memorandum from Bob Kimmitt to State forwarding a copy of the memorandum of conversation for their information.

RECOMMENDATION

JFM
OK
JFM
OK

NO
—
—

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memorandum at Tab II to Charles Hill attaching a copy of the memorandum of conversation for State's information and records.

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Memcon with Foreign Minister Genscher
Tab II Kimmitt to Hill memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *8/29/11*

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8304875

RECEIVED 18 JUL 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 18 JUL 83

36

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

HOWE, GEOFFREY

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 14 JUL MTG W/ HOWE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 19 JUL 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8304770

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Kimmit</i>	<i>JUL 20 1983</i>	<i>Poundstone approved</i>		
	<i>JUL 20 1983</i>	<i>signature</i>		
	<i>C 17/21</i>	<i>Kimmit Sgd Mans</i>		<i>25, 75</i>

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225 17/21

W/ATTCH FILE

22

(C) *ms*

National Security Council
The White House

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Package#

83 JUL 18 17 P 6: 09

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4875

38

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

July 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of British Foreign
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe on
July 14.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Tab A Memcon

RW 8/24/11
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Edwin Meese
William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Burt
Peter R. Sommer

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe
Ambassador Oliver Wright
Anthony Acland, Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office
Brian Fall, Howe's Private Secretary

DATE, TIME July 14, 1983
AND PLACE: 3:30-4:00 p.m. Oval Office

In welcoming Foreign Secretary Howe, The President underlined how pleased we were with the British election results. Mrs. Thatcher's victory had truly been overwhelming. It represents, the President said, a welcomed shot in the arm to the West. (U)

Foreign Secretary Howe thanked the President for his remarks on behalf of Mrs. Thatcher and himself and noted that the British were encouraged by the election trends in Europe. He cited Kohl's victory as especially gratifying. (U)

The President replied that we are as pleased as you, both with the British and German election results. According to all reports we have received--including one from Foreign Minister Genscher earlier this week--Kohl was unyielding in Moscow. Unity and firmness is what we need. Kohl's stance may, however, have surprised the Soviets. But it should help convince them that they cannot divide us. (C)

Foreign Secretary Howe said that Genscher gave the same message to the EC Foreign Ministers last week. The German stance was helpful and should encourage the Soviets to believe that we mean what we say. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M374/1 #117531
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

The President praised British defense spending efforts and noted that Britain's recent recommitment to a significant real term increase was most welcome. He jokingly said that he personally did not favor such large U.S. increases, but Secretary Weinberger always insists on them. In a serious tone, he underlined his constant battle with Congress over spending levels for defense. Congress, added the President, tends to treat the defense budget as a kind of piggy bank that can be robbed for pet projects. He is doing his best, he emphasized, to cure Congress of this misperception. (C)

In thanking the President for his remarks, Foreign Secretary Howe said as Exchequer it has always been his task--which was not an easy one--to find the money for the increases in defense spending. These increases amount to 17 percent over 4 years. This had been the first election in which he has been involved that defense and foreign issues were at the forefront. The election results represent an endorsement of the need for a strong defense. The results also represent, continued Howe, an endorsement of the need to make progress on arms control. The general public is concerned about tensions in the nuclear age. (C)

The President replied that some seem to doubt his commitment to arms reductions, but he has never been more serious about anything in his life. The world will not support countries always pointing all these powerful weapons at each other. I can't help feeling, he continued, that if we could just get on the path to reductions that the Soviets would see the wisdom of deep reductions. (C)

Foreign Secretary Howe agreed on the need to get the Soviets to shift their emphasis, and underscored that remaining firm on INF deployments was essential toward bringing the Soviets around. Turning briefly to the Middle East, Howe said he had come to his job with a clean sheet on the area. The problems are enormous. All the parties know what they want, but unfortunately what they want is not the same. (C)

In recalling an explanation of the Middle East that he had once heard, The President asked the Foreign Secretary to permit him to digress for a moment. There was, he said, a frog and a scorpion, both of whom wanted to cross a stream. However the scorpion bit the frog and hence they both died. When someone asked the scorpion why he did it, he simply replied: because this is the Middle East. (U)

Foreign Secretary Howe commented that he had been encouraged by yesterday's vote in the British Parliament. On the same day that four more British soldiers were brutally killed in Northern Ireland, Parliament had rejected capital punishment.

At one stage he thought he might have to return to cast a key vote, but was pleased that this proved not to be necessary. Moderation had won by a large majority. Howe continued that Britain was grateful for all the U.S. has done to crack down on the supplies of arms. (C)

The President praised both the current Irish Ambassador, and his predecessor, for pleading with the American-Irish community not to support the IRA. Their pleas have played a major role in helping stem the flow of money and arms in support of violence. (U)

In noting that he and the Foreign Secretary had discussed Central America, Secretary Shultz suggested that the President--knowing his strong feelings--also say a few words. (U)

The President characterized Central America as one of our historical failures. It is a shame, he said, that the U.S. has come this far in our history without establishing a proper relationship with the area. Despite good intentions, the U.S. approach has sometimes been insensitive. In the past we have forgotten on occasion our weight: that we are the colossus of the north. But I am determined, he underlined, to set us on the right course. We seek a better long-term relationship. But this is not easy when you have countries like Nicaragua that have violated the original promises of its revolution. The U.S. recognized Somoza's many faults and stood back when he was being ousted. Indeed we cooperated in the OAS effort which asked Somoza to step down. But now the ruling junta has broken its promises for a free press and early free elections. The so-called Contras, who were part of the original revolution and who were subsequently pushed out by hard-core communists, are fighting for the restoration of the original promises. They deserve our support and help. Moreover, the junta is being aided, particularly with weapons, by the Soviet-Cuban axis. Many of the weapons captured for the guerrillas in El Salvador turn out to be weapons of American origin that come to Central America via the communist net from Vietnam. For the U.S. this adds insult to injury. I am pleased to note, he continued, that a number of Congressmen who recently went to the region as doubters, have returned convinced of our cause. Strong remarks from one of the Sandinista leaders helped turn our Congressmen around. The Sandinista leader said their revolution was aimed not just at their country, but at all of Central America. Before long, he reportedly said, you will see us on the Arizona and New Mexico borders. The President added that he hoped this was more boastful than prophetic. (C)

Foreign Secretary Howe replied that he had reviewed Central America in some detail with Vice President Bush in London and with Secretary Shultz in Washington. He simply wanted to say to

the President that Britain shares U.S. concerns and objectives. He also emphasized that we all need to do a much better job of getting across to the public what is actually happening in the area. We also need to heighten our efforts to explain our policies. Britain, he continued, of course has its own special interests in Belize. (C)

The President quickly interjected that he hoped Britain would delay withdrawing its forces. We know keeping them there is a financial burden, but their presence enhances regional stability. (C)

In saying that he expected the President to mention British forces when he heard the name Belize, Foreign Secretary Howe replied that keeping forces in what is now a sovereign nation poses great difficulties for Britain. He continued that Britain intended to withdraw its forces. (Comment: he stopped short of saying precisely when they would be withdrawn). Howe then briefly turned to East-West economic relations. He emphasized the overall commonality of our views. Britain favors, he said, non-subsidized commerce with the Soviet bloc. Britain shares U.S. concerns, continued Howe, over the transfer of sensitive military technology to the East. It makes no sense to arm our enemies, and we look forward to continued close cooperation within COCOM. In suggesting that he did not expect a reply, Howe indicated he had an obligation to cite a few bilateral issues. Britain must defend its corner. He then quickly listed the Export Control Act, unitary tax, and speciality steel as bilateral problems. While our policies normally converge, we can not expect, he continued, to see eye to eye on every issue. It is normal that there is not always sweetness and light. The EC will address speciality steel next Monday and will then take its case to the GATT. In noting that Secretary Shultz had said earlier in the day that this was an appropriate vehicle, Howe praised what he called the Shultz Doctrine. That is, positive solution can be reached through negotiations and discussions. It is always better, he continued, to talk things out. (C)

The meeting concluded with an exchange of friendly stories about the Queen's visit to California and the Williamsburg Summit. In discussing Williamsburg, Foreign Secretary Howe praised its success. It did a lot, he said, to consolidate Western opinion. There were many more agreements than disagreements. But there were a few rough moments. (U)

The President agreed and noted that there had been some last minute backtracking by one or two concerning the statement on security. A few even raised their voices in the ensuing discussion. But the end result had been a positive statement on security. Prime Minister Thatcher, he underlined, had played an instrumental role in assuring that there was a positive statement. (C)

The meeting concluded at 4:00 p.m.

mm

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4875

43

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ACTION

July 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pea*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting on Thursday, July 14, with British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

At Tab II is a memorandum from Bob Kimmitt to State forwarding a copy of the memcon for their information.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve *Pea* Disapprove _____

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memcon (Tab II) to Charles Hill.

Approve *Pea* Disapprove _____

Tab I Memcon
Tab II Kimmitt to Hill Memo

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sep. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RWS*, DATE *8/29/11*

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TO CLARK

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 25 JUL 83

44

KEYWORDS: USSR

INF

FOLEY, THOMAS S

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 25 JUL MTG W/ REP FOLEY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 27 JUL 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

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(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Kimmett S</i>	<i>AUG 0 1 1983</i>	<i>Clark approval both</i>	<i>8/2</i>	
<i>C</i>	<i>8/1</i>	<i>for signature Kimmett Sgd Mens</i>		<i>Im, RK</i>

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John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>PAUL</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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
46

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August 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Representative
Thomas S. Foley, July 25, 1983

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with Representative Thomas S. Foley on July 25.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memcon

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(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 21, 2006
BY NARA *RW* DATE 8/29/14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5126

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Congressman
Foley regarding Mr. Foley's trip to the
U.S.S.R.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
George P. Shultz
William P. Clark
Kenneth M. Duberstein
Jack F. Matlock

Congressman Thomas S. Foley
Congressman Richard B. Cheney

DATE, TIME July 25, 1983; 11:00-11:20 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President began the meeting by thanking the Congressmen
for their support on the MX votes.

Congressman Foley began his report on their trip to Moscow
by saying that, whatever differences they may have at home,
the delegation spoke entirely in support of current policies
while they were in the USSR.

The delegation came with an agenda of four major categories:
arms control, economic and trade questions, problems in
"third areas," and human rights. Although the Soviets were
reluctant to discuss the latter, they let the Americans have
their say on all subjects. The principal, almost exclusive,
interest of the Soviets was arms control.

Their most interesting interlocutor was Marshal Akhromeyev.
When asked about the "Walk in the Woods" formula, Akhromeyev
said, "If it is put on the table, it will be negotiated
seriously. But I understand that when your negotiator,
Ambassador Nitze, returned he was reprimanded." Akhromeyev

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

and other Soviet interlocutors tried to convince the Congressmen that the Soviets took our deployments very seriously. But when Akhromeyev spoke of counter-deployments, the Congressmen reacted very vigorously and pointed out that deployments near the U.S. would bring a profound negative response from across the political spectrum in the U.S. Akhromeyev also implied that INF deployments might "imperil" the START negotiations.

The President asked if the Soviets conceded any flexibility on the U.S. part in offering parity rather than the zero option.

Congressman Foley said that there was no hint of this in the Soviet comments. On the whole, Akhromeyev was unemotional in his comments, but with one exception: "yellow rain." When this was raised, Akhromeyev flushed and said that he did not call Foley a liar because a liar is someone who repeats something he knows is untrue, but that he (Foley) had just repeated a lie. Foley thought that if Akhromeyev was acting, then he is a consummate actor.

The President asked rhetorically if it is possible that some Soviet officials are not informed of what they are doing.

Congressman Foley mentioned the great Soviet interest in American internal politics. He was asked about the effect of the Supreme Court decision on the War Powers Act and also about the status of the Export Administration Act. When the Americans discussed human rights matters, the Soviets were obviously displeased, and some demonstrably removed their earphones for the interpretation, but the Americans were allowed to have their say.

In conclusion, Congressman Foley paid tribute to the fine work of Ambassador Hartman, Consul General Shinn, and their staffs, who work under such difficult conditions, but who provided outstanding support to the delegation.

The meeting concluded at 11:20.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1983

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Representative Thomas S. Foley.

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a Memorandum of Conversation for the record of the President's meeting on Monday, July 25, with Representative Foley.

At Tab II is a memorandum from Bob Kimmitt to State forwarding a copy of the memorandum of conversation for their information.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the memo at Tab II to State transmitting a copy of the memcon.

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed Memcon with Representative Foley
Tab II	Kimmitt to Hill memorandum

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