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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/29/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (06/03/1983-06/15/1983)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 51

JAUVERT/BROWER

24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117475	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	5/26/1983	B1
117477	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HELMUT KOHL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	5/30/1983	B1
117479	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH IVORY COAST PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY [COPY OF DOC. 117482] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	6/7/1983	B1
117482	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH IVORY COAST PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	6/7/1983	B1
117484	MEMCON	RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RR AND MARGARET THATCHER <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	6/10/1983	B1
117485	MEMCON	RE. LUNCHEON MEETING BETWEEN RR AND PRIME MINISTER HAWKE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	6/13/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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RECEIVED 03 JUN 83 18

TO POINDEXTER FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 03 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
SUMMIT

ITALY

KOHL, HELMUT
FANFANI, AMINTORE

SUBJECT: PRES SUMMIT MEMCONS W/ KOHL & FANFANI

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8303793 NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	6/03 JUN 6 1983	joined by 3793 POINDEXTER approved KHL		
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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 3788

1845

JUN 03 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col. John Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and Italian Prime Minister Fanfani and German
Chancellor Kohl (S)

Attached are the summaries of the President's bilateral
discussions with Italian Prime Minister Fanfani and Federal
Republic of Germany Chancellor Kohl. Distribution of these
papers should be restricted to those whose duties require
knowledge of their contents. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
for Robert M. Kimmitt DEPUTY
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 8/29/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

NLR M3211 #117475

BY RW DATE 6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese
William P. Clark
Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam
Ambassador Maxwell Rabb
Under Secretary Allen Wallis
Richard Burt
Henry Nau
Dennis Blair

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani
Ambassador Petrignani
Ambassador Remo Paolini, Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME May 26, 1983
AND PLACE: 11:30 a.m.-12:10 p.m., Oval Office

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, The President expressed to Prime Minister Fanfani his appreciation for the Italian actions in the peacekeeping force in Lebanon. He said that he understood the Italians were approaching the Syrians through diplomatic channels urging them to agree to remove their forces from Lebanon. He asked Prime Minister Fanfani if there had been any response.

Prime Minister Fanfani said it was not easy to get answers from the Syrians; they are subject to both overt and covert pressure from the Soviet Union. He said that the approach by the Soviet Union would depend on developments in Geneva. As long as there was hope for progress in Geneva the Soviet Union would be very careful with Syria, as it would be in Poland and Afghanistan. This could change if the Soviet military leaders forced Andropov to take a different attitude.

The President said that it had taken a long time to work out the agreement in Lebanon between Lebanon and Israel. The United States thought it had secured a commitment that the Syrians would withdraw if the Israelis did.

Prime Minister Fanfani said that Foreign Secretary Colombo was deeply involved in the Lebanese situation. He said that he admired Secretary Shultz's accomplishment in working out the agreement between Israel and Lebanon. If the Syrians were more

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Declassify on: OADR

independent of the Soviet Union, he would have more hope for their cooperation. The Prime Minister assured the President of Italy's complete solidarity. Italy would continue in the multinational force, as he had told Secretary Shultz that morning. There would be no initiatives from the Italians without consulting first with the United States, the French and the British.

The President said that he made the same commitment to Italy.

Prime Minister Fanfani said that so far the consultations had been excellent. The question now was how to help Lebanon strengthen its own armed forces. It was important to see what the other Arab states could do. One of the cards that could be played is the Saudis. Without exerting undue pressure, it was important to see if the Saudis could persuade the Syrians to leave Lebanon.

There followed a short discussion of the visit of the U.S. space shuttle to Rome and the Italian astronaut who would be joining the shuttle program.

The President turned the conversation to the subject of Libya. He said that Prime Minister Fanfani was familiar with the events of the last several days in which Libya had been shipping arms to Nicaragua and of course there had been the shipments by plane earlier. He asked for the Prime Minister's views on Libya.

Prime Minister Fanfani said that "all of us had been too patient at the beginning of the Libyan experiment." Since that time the danger from Libya had increased. Some Libyans believe that Col. Qadhafi could be brought back to reason. This of course would be the most preferable course of action. He personally had received several requests from Libya to set up discussions between the United States and Libya. Mr. Galoud, Qadhafi's number two man, seemed to be the one pushing this course. It was difficult to tell if these requests were serious. Italy was in a difficult position with regard to Libya. In the past some Italian leaders had been "too mild" with the Libyans. Now because of the number of Italian companies doing business and Italian workers in Libya, the Italian leverage with Libya was weaker. However, Italy was not economically dependent on Libya and something should be done. Libya received a great deal of Soviet aid and equipment and although they said they had signed no agreement with the Soviets, it was difficult to know for sure. Italy would never take any initiative which would make difficulties for the United States with Libya. Perhaps Italy could probe Libya's seriousness without involving the United States to see if a dialogue would be worthwhile. The Prime

Minister added that Col. Qahafi's pressure on Syria to reject the peace process certainly had not been helpful. He concluded that he did not seek a mandate to approach the Libyans but if the United States believed it was worthwhile to test Libyan seriousness, Italy would be happy to take the initiative in concert and in consultation with the United States.

The President responded that he was grateful for the Italian support and friendship on many issues. (The President did not respond to the Prime Minister's offer to approach the Libyans.)

Mr. Arcelli joined the conversation at this point.

The conversation turned to the Summit and The President outlined his objectives for the Summit. He wanted it to be less formal than the others he had attended, not spending all its time on negotiating the communique. He looked for a message of hope on the world's economic problems to come from the Summit and it was his hope that the Summit would be unified without confrontations. He noted that on Saturday evening the discussion would be on INF, an area in which Italy's strong support had been most appreciated.

Prime Minister Fanfani said that during his last discussion with President Mitterrand, Mitterrand had said that he would be in agreement with the other leaders on INF. He had been particularly proud of the speech he had made in Bonn. The Prime Minister said that some of President Mitterrand's statements should be considered in the light of his situation at home, which was much more difficult than he had anticipated. He was in trouble both with the opposition and with some of his own socialist supporters.

The meeting adjourned to a working lunch in the State dining room.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Regan
Edwin Meese
James Baker
William P. Clark
Assistant Secretary Burt
Commander Dennis Blair

Chancellor Kohl
Foreign Minister Genscher
Finance Minister Stoltenberg
Horst Teltschick
Hans Tietmeyer
Hans Weber
(one other unidentified FRG official)

DATE, TIME: May 30, 1983 4:15-4:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: Providence Hall, Williamsburg, Virginia

Chancellor Kohl began the meeting by thanking the President for his hospitality. He remarked on the quiet, informal atmosphere at Williamsburg which facilitated real communication with the other heads of state. He thanked the President for the preparations done by the United States government and the President personally. Chancellor Kohl said that the Summit had made good accomplishments. He noted that the security statement included endorsement of the Alliance policy by Japan. He said that the work on economic problems at Williamsburg would be helpful in the future. In this regard, he said that it was important for each country to do its own homework and noted that the Federal Republic was spending more on investment and less on consumption, cutting its budget by 6 billion DM. In order to balance the budget, he had made cuts in social services affecting 30 million Germans, which was one out of every two citizens. Despite these hardships, however, he was pleased with his economic program. He said that it was important to maintain and develop close contact between the German and American governments. After the Chancellor took his upcoming trip to Moscow, he would send Foreign Minister Genscher to the United States to report and would personally telephone his other European colleagues. The Soviet strategy for the Chancellor's trip was clear. The Soviets would "try our endurance," using both the carrot and the stick. The Chancellor noted that the stick was already visible, most recently in a statement of two days ago which had threatened retaliation for INF deployments

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BY RW NLR DATE 6/22/15

and said that the deployments would "drive a nail in the coffin of German reunification." However, the policy of the Federal Republic was clear: it was a part of the West, it was a part of the European Community, it sat firmly on one chair, not between two chairs. Twice in this century Germany had been on the wrong side in a conflict and it hoped not to make the same mistake again. The schedule for the INF deployment must not be changed. And it was important to keep the Pershing II missiles as a part of the deployment. The Chancellor said that reports of German policies in Washington newspapers did not reflect his real views. He said that he believed that negotiations on INF would only make progress after the first missile had been deployed. The Soviets would play poker to the last possible moment. The Chancellor went on to urge the President to consider a meeting with Secretary General Andropov during the first half of 1984 before the election season. The meeting would have to be well prepared, but the Chancellor thought that good results would be possible. The type of meeting which Mrs. Gandhi had suggested, a summit in connection with the U.N. General Assembly, was not a good idea. Chancellor Kohl would not attend such a meeting, nor would the other European heads of state with the possible exception of Mr. Papandreou.

The President responded by telling Chancellor Kohl that his contributions had been invaluable during the Summit. The President said that this was the third Summit he had attended, but the first that he had understood. It was the first at which the meetings were not run so as to fit some pre-negotiated communique. The President said that his thinking about a meeting with Andropov was along the lines the Chancellor had mentioned. The President said that many people wanted him to have a meeting just for the sake of a meeting, but it was his opinion that a meeting would have to result in some accomplishment. Under those conditions the President would welcome a meeting.

Secretary Shultz added that he would welcome receiving Foreign Secretary Genscher when he came to the United States after the Chancellor's visit to Moscow.

The President then said that he would like to bring up the subject of the Master Restationing Plan. He noted that he was still having problems with Congress, having fought off one attempt to reduce the number of American forces in Europe. Currently there was a \$10B administration request for military construction before the Congress, but Congress was sitting on that request and looking at the German contribution to the Master Restationing Plan.

Chancellor Kohl responded that he would give the President a frank answer. He was facing a difficult economic and demographic problem. In the next three years the number of young men who could be conscripted was dropping. The Chancellor said he was concerned about this age group which must have the skills and the desire to enter the work place after their military service. He said that programs to deal with youth unemployment was the one area in the budget which had been increased during the last budget review. The Chancellor said that in order to keep up the 500,000 man force level for the Army it would be necessary for the German government to extend the period of conscripted service from 15 to 18 months. In addition, the government was facing the problem of deploying INF missiles. The Chancellor recalled a meeting he had had with the leaders of the evangelical churches who had promised to use their influence against anti-INF demonstrations at the missile sites. However the Chancellor warned the President that such demonstrations would in all probability take place and might be violent. The President should not be surprised to see three to four hundred thousand demonstrators on television, and should not be surprised by disinformation about German public opinion. However, the Chancellor felt that he would prevail. It was unfortunate that there was not complete support for the INF deployment decision. Although when in opposition he had supported that decision of an SPD government, now that he was in government, the SPD had not maintained its support. In summary, the Chancellor said, it was necessary to concentrate the government's resources on these two problems.

The President responded that he well understood the demographic problem the Chancellor was talking about. In addition, the disinformation campaigns were familiar to him. He mentioned that in the United States there were similar sorts of campaigns underway. Changing the subject, the President mentioned the Vice President's upcoming visit to Krefeld and the state visit of President Carstens to the United States in the fall.

Chancellor Kohl responded that he welcomed the Vice President's visit. He would be meeting the Vice President in London and then would be spending a day with him in Krefeld. He was also grateful for the preparations to receive President Carstens. He said that it was extremely important that the President of the Federal Republic visit the United States at that time. It would have an important psychological effect.

Secretary Shultz returned to the subject of the Master Restationing Plan. He pointed out that funding was not needed until the fiscal year 1985 budget. When 1983 was behind us with its problems, and there had been some resolution of the

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INF question, the Secretary asked if a commitment to MRP funding might be made at that point. He understood that there could be no commitment now, but perhaps the subject could be discussed after 1983.

Minister Stoltenberg said that there were no planned expenditures on MRP in the current budget which he had inherited from his predecessor government. He pointed out that the new government had accepted additional commitments at the request of the American Secretary of Defense, particularly in the area of NATO infrastructure funding. He said that additional funds had been required to pay for the longer-term of conscription and that therefore additional funds were not available for the Master Restationing Plan. However, since the question had been opened, he would go back and take another look at it.

The meeting ended at 4:55 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

ACTION

June 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. POINDEXTER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DCB*

SUBJECT: Fanfani and Kohl Memcons

Attached for your approval are the memcons of the bilaterals with Kohl and Fanfani in connection with the Summit. They are non-controversial and you need not read that closely. Once you approve, Bob Kimmitt's memo at Tab I will forward them to the State and Defense Departments.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve both the Fanfani and Kohl memcons.

Approve *JK* Disapprove _____

- Tab I Kimmitt to Hill
- Tab A Fanfani memcon
- Tab B Kohl memcon

RW 8/11

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

Declassify on: OADR

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET *Wg/24/11*

ID 8303911

RECEIVED 08 JUN 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 07 JUN 83 13

KEYWORDS: **IVORY COAST**

HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, F

SUBJECT: **MEMCON OF PRES 7 JUN MTG W/ PRES HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY**

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 JUN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

LEHMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8302939 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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<i>Wettering</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Memo Kennitt to Hill</i>	<i>6/14</i>	
	<i>C</i>	<i>Kennitt Sqd News to Hill</i>		<i>We Rk</i>

DISPATCH *LF* 6/14

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *LF*

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National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 3911

89 JUN 11 11 49

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Send copy to State.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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3911 Add On


June 14, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's Meeting with
the President of the Ivory Coast

Attached is a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, which took place at the White House on June 7, 1983.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

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8/29/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3911

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 # 117479

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 The Vice President
 Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
 William P. Clark, Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs
 Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of
 State
 Ambassador Nancy Rawls
 Frederick Wettering, Director of African
 Affairs, National Security Council
 Sophia Porson (Interpreter)
 Stephanie Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)

 President Felix Houphouet-Boigny
 Foreign Minister Simeon Ake
 Director of Cabinet, Governor Guy Nairay
 Ambassador Rene Amany

DATE AND Tuesday, June 7, 1983
 TIME: 11:00 A.M. - 12:00 Noon

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Ivory Coast
 President Houphouet-Boigny

The President opened the conversation by noting the Ivory Coast's long record of cooperation with the US, both economically and politically. He expressed pleasure at the importance of the private sector in the Ivory Coast and the growing role that US private sector is playing. After repeating the warm welcome, he invited President Houphouet-Boigny to make a few remarks. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny began a very lengthy response by reiterating his pleasure at the invitation to visit. He recalled his previous visits to meet with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. He noted his only regret was that he had recently developed sciatica which keeps him from standing. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny recalled the President's words in a speech on February 3, 1980, in which he stated that the US and the world would never permit those who wish to destroy freedom

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to dictate the future course of the world. Building on this, President Houphouet-Boigny stressed that he shared the President's appreciation and desire for peace and freedom, and that freedom comes from peace and that peace cannot prevail if there is serious underdevelopment. In the Ivory Coast, some good development has taken place, as the President so kindly noted. This is because there was domestic tranquility. But elsewhere, there was not such peace and development. As he noted earlier to Secretary Shultz, President Houphouet-Boigny noted that in West Africa there were only five countries where there was peace; the others have been destabilized, had coups. If poverty becomes more widespread, he stressed, more destabilization will occur, and this will benefit the communists. Poverty, disorder nourishes communist propaganda. So peace and security is the first point he wished to stress. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then developed the second point, Western Sahara and Qadhafi of Libya. He noted that Qadhafi has divided countries and set one against other - Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Algeria. He has created the false problem of Polisario (the Western Sahara liberation front). The King of Morocco pledged to the OAU that he renounced annexation and would abide by a referendum in Western Sahara. But a previous census showed only 70,000 inhabitants - Polisario and Libya now claim 700,000. Morocco can't possibly agree to this. He noted that his fellow African leaders were attempting to convene an OAU meeting in Addis this day, but he, Houphouet-Boigny, told them it was premature. Other problems divide us, including Polisario. President Houphouet-Boigny recalled in 1962 African leaders faced a similar problem in Algeria. The two regional groups (the Monrovia Group and Casablanca group) attempted to form an OAU, but it fell apart over the question of Algeria, which at that time was a movement rather than a state. A year later, Algeria was an independent state and the problem fell away, and the OAU was formed. Arafat can make a speech at the UN but he cannot get a seat because there is not yet a Palestine state, he added. Polisario is not a state and we cannot admit it (to the OAU), he concluded. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then went into the problem in Chad, which he attributed to Qadhafi's attempt to annex territory from a sovereign neighbor state. He remarked that Qadhafi wants a puppet government in Chad which will accept a Libyan annexation of part of Chad. We cannot accept that, he avowed. (S)

Continuing on the subject of Qadhafi, President Houphouet-Boigny noted that the Soviets were using Qadhafi to destabilize. Qadhafi himself, Libya itself, is inconsequential, he stated. The real problem is that the Soviets are behind Qadhafi. The West must neutralize him, pull his teeth. Not go to war, because I am against bloodshed, he

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added. He remarked that Africans fight and reconcile, but the Arabs never seem to reconcile. He recalled that President Bourgiba (of Tunisia) told him that Arabs could only agree on one thing - to disagree. He noted Qadhafi's malicious activities - in Nicaragua, Northern Ireland. Qadhafi is the agent of Russia in Africa, he added. President Houphouet-Boigny said he had one question to ask - why do both the West and the East always treat Qadhafi with kid gloves? The West must find a solution, he concluded. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then turned to the problems of South Africa and Namibia. He noted that we all condemn apartheid. He recalled that some years ago he sent one of his ministers to South Africa, and he spoke to the black peoples of South Africa on behalf of Houphouet-Boigny. His minister then told the South African blacks that he opposed apartheid - which shocked the whites - but that there were only two solutions, war or dialogue. Houphouet-Boigny (through his minister) advised dialogue; to be patient, to negotiate, it will take time but there will be a future worth having. President Houphouet-Boigny noted that South Africa is encircled by countries close to Russia. They must defend themselves. He recalled that in the case of the former Portuguese African colonies, both he and President de Gaulle pressed Salazar (the-then Portuguese dictator) to convince him to change. But he did not, the African peoples took up arms, and only the communists supplied them with arms. But now they want to get rid of the Russians, the Cubans. They know that these have no interest in development of Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny said he knew of the efforts we are making to convince the South Africans to give independence to Namibia, and we must continue this. He added that the African leaders would do their part in helping get rid of the Cubans and Soviets, as Egypt did. He stressed the importance of the West to give assurances to the White South Africans that they are not and will not be left alone to face communism. He remarked that we should tell the blacks that we oppose apartheid and favor change, but we should not let communism get established in states on South Africa's borders. (S)

Finally, President Houphouet-Boigny turned to the problem of commodity prices. He noted that Ivory Coast had diversified. He noted the great fluctuation in coffee and cocoa prices. He found himself in the curious position of having been in the French government when the EEC was formed, and now making demands on the EEC for stabilization assistance. He stated that Ivory Coast lost 200 billion francs in cocoa but the EEC stabilization fund offered only 16 billion francs as recompense. He told the President that he meant to make this case to him at Cancun, but illness prevented this, so he was

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making it now. He claimed that cocoa prices were hostage to speculators, to the New York cocoa market. Ivory Coast bought the cocoa from the producers but cannot sell it at the low prices offered and unrealistic quotas had been imposed on Ivory Coast. He remarked that if a western country had suffered such a drop in revenue there would have been a revolt. Prices must be stabilized. President Houphouet-Boigny said he put the problem before the President and the West who must help solve this problem on a global basis. He apologized for going on so long. (S)

The President responded that he agreed with a great deal of what President Houphouet-Boigny said. He noted that at the recent Williamsburg summit we were discussing these problems. The answer lies in the Ivory Coast's own approach, the course of free enterprise. The Ivory Coast, Taiwan, South Korea, all are far ahead of their neighbors because of this. We are trying to develop a program of promoting both democracy and free enterprise. In South Africa, we are doing as you say - we oppose apartheid and favor dialogue. I wish you could make this point to certain Black American opinion-leaders. They make it impossible to say anything about South Africa, and no Congressman dare say anything positive. On Namibia, we are working with South Africa on Namibia. South Africa wants the Cubans out of Angola and we are working on it. On agriculture, I have no real disagreement with what you said - we have similar problems. I have established a program of giving some of the massive surplus of crops back to the farmers and it is going well. (S)

The Presidents then took leave of one another with closing courtesies. (U)

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RMK

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3911

~~SECRET~~

June 7, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *W*

SUBJECT: Ivory Coast: Memcon of the President's
June 7, 1983 Meeting with President Houphouet-
Boigny

Attached is my memcon covering the salient points of the President's June 7, 1983 Oval Office meeting with Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. (U)

From my perspective the meeting went well. Although it was essentially a monologue by President Houphouet-Boigny he clearly had a lot he wanted to tell the President (indeed, he was likely disappointed that the hour went so fast). (S)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon.

APPROVE

W

DISAPPROVE

Attachment
Tab A

Memcon

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW* . DATE *8/29/11*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3911

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #117482

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 The Vice President
 Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
 William P. Clark, Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs
 Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of
 State
 Ambassador Nancy Rawls
 Frederick Wattering, Director of African
 Affairs, National Security Council
 Sophia Porson (Interpreter)
 Stephanie Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)

 President Felix Houphouet-Boigny
 Foreign Minister Simeon Ake
 Director of Cabinet, Governor Guy Nairay
 Ambassador Rene Amany

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, June 7, 1983
 11:00 A.M. - 12:00 Noon

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Ivory Coast
 President Houphouet-Boigny

The President opened the conversation by noting the Ivory Coast's long record of cooperation with the US, both economically and politically. He expressed pleasure at the importance of the private sector in the Ivory Coast and the growing role that US private sector is playing. After repeating the warm welcome, he invited President Houphouet-Boigny to make a few remarks. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny began a very lengthy response by reiterating his pleasure at the invitation to visit. He recalled his previous visits to meet with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. He noted his only regret was that he had recently developed sciatica which keeps him from standing. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny recalled the President's words in a speech on February 3, 1980, in which he stated that the US and the world would never permit those who wish to destroy freedom

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to dictate the future course of the world. Building on this, President Houphouet-Boigny stressed that he shared the President's appreciation and desire for peace and freedom, and that freedom comes from peace and that peace cannot prevail if there is serious underdevelopment. In the Ivory Coast, some good development has taken place, as the President so kindly noted. This is because there was domestic tranquility. But elsewhere, there was not such peace and development. As he noted earlier to Secretary Shultz, President Houphouet-Boigny noted that in West Africa there were only five countries where there was peace; the others have been destabilized, had coups. If poverty becomes more widespread, he stressed, more destabilization will occur, and this will benefit the communists. Poverty, disorder nourishes communist propaganda. So peace and security is the first point he wished to stress. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then developed the second point, Western Sahara and Qadhafi of Libya. He noted that Qadhafi has divided countries and set one against other - Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Algeria. He has created the false problem of Polisario (the Western Sahara liberation front). The King of Morocco pledged to the OAU that he renounced annexation and would abide by a referendum in Western Sahara. But a previous census showed only 70,000 inhabitants - Polisario and Libya now claim 700,000. Morocco can't possibly agree to this. He noted that his fellow African leaders were attempting to convene an OAU meeting in Addis this day, but he, Houphouet-Boigny, told them it was premature. Other problems divide us, including Polisario. President Houphouet-Boigny recalled in 1962 African leaders faced a similar problem in Algeria. The two regional groups (the Monrovia Group and Casablanca group) attempted to form an OAU, but it fell apart over the question of Algeria, which at that time was a movement rather than a state. A year later, Algeria was an independent state and the problem fell away, and the OAU was formed. Arafat can make a speech at the UN but he cannot get a seat because there is not yet a Palestine state, he added. Polisario is not a state and we cannot admit it (to the OAU), he concluded. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then went into the problem in Chad, which he attributed to Qadhafi's attempt to annex territory from a sovereign neighbor state. He remarked that Qadhafi wants a puppet government in Chad which will accept a Libyan annexation of part of Chad. We cannot accept that, he avowed. (S)

Continuing on the subject of Qadhafi, President Houphouet-Boigny noted that the Soviets were using Qadhafi to destabilize. Qadhafi himself, Libya itself, is inconsequential, he stated. The real problem is that the Soviets are behind Qadhafi. The West must neutralize him, pull his teeth. Not go to war, because I am against bloodshed, he

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added. He remarked that Africans fight and reconcile, but the Arabs never seem to reconcile. He recalled that President Bourgiba (of Tunisia) told him that Arabs could only agree on one thing - to disagree. He noted Qadhafi's malicious activities - in Nicaragua, Northern Ireland. Qadhafi is the agent of Russia in Africa, he added. President Houphouet-Boigny said he had one question to ask - why do both the West and the East always treat Qadhafi with kid gloves? The West must find a solution, he concluded. (S)

President Houphouet-Boigny then turned to the problems of South Africa and Namibia. He noted that we all condemn apartheid. He recalled that some years ago he sent one of his ministers to South Africa, and he spoke to the black peoples of South Africa on behalf of Houphouet-Boigny. His minister then told the South African blacks that he opposed apartheid - which shocked the whites - but that there were only two solutions, war or dialogue. Houphouet-Boigny (through his minister) advised dialogue; to be patient, to negotiate, it will take time but there will be a future worth having. President Houphouet-Boigny noted that South Africa is encircled by countries close to Russia. They must defend themselves. He recalled that in the case of the former Portuguese African colonies, both he and President de Gaulle pressed Salazar (the-then Portuguese dictator) to convince him to change. But he did not, the African peoples took up arms, and only the communists supplied them with arms. But now they want to get rid of the Russians, the Cubans. They know that these have no interest in development of Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny said he knew of the efforts we are making to convince the South Africans to give independence to Namibia, and we must continue this. He added that the African leaders would do their part in helping get rid of the Cubans and Soviets, as Egypt did. He stressed the importance of the West to give assurances to the White South Africans that they are not and will not be left alone to face communism. He remarked that we should tell the blacks that we oppose apartheid and favor change, but we should not let communism get established in states on South Africa's borders. (S)

Finally, President Houphouet-Boigny turned to the problem of commodity prices. He noted that Ivory Coast had diversified. He noted the great fluctuation in coffee and cocoa prices. He found himself in the curious position of having been in the French government when the EEC was formed, and now making demands on the EEC for stabilization assistance. He stated that Ivory Coast lost 200 billion francs in cocoa but the EEC stabilization fund offered only 16 billion francs as recompense. He told the President that he meant to make this case to him at Cancun, but illness prevented this, so he was

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making it now. He claimed that cocoa prices were hostage to speculators, to the New York cocoa market. Ivory Coast bought the cocoa from the producers but cannot sell it at the low prices offered and unrealistic quotas had been imposed on Ivory Coast. He remarked that if a western country had suffered such a drop in revenue there would have been a revolt. Prices must be stabilized. President Houphouet-Boigny said he put the problem before the President and the West who must help solve this problem on a global basis. He apologized for going on so long. (S)

The President responded that he agreed with a great deal of what President Houphouet-Boigny said. He noted that at the recent Williamsburg summit we were discussing these problems. The answer lies in the Ivory Coast's own approach, the course of free enterprise. The Ivory Coast, Taiwan, South Korea, all are far ahead of their neighbors because of this. We are trying to develop a program of promoting both democracy and free enterprise. In South Africa, we are doing as you say - we oppose apartheid and favor dialogue. I wish you could make this point to certain Black American opinion-leaders. They make it impossible to say anything about South Africa, and no Congressman dare say anything positive. On Namibia, we are working with South Africa on Namibia. South Africa wants the Cubans out of Angola and we are working on it. On agriculture, I have no real disagreement with what you said - we have similar problems. I have established a program of giving some of the massive surplus of crops back to the farmers and it is going well. (S)

The Presidents then took leave of one another with closing courtesies. (U)

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NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8304077

RECEIVED 14 JUN 83 17

DOCDATE 13 JUN 83 *25*

TO CLARK FROM SOMMER

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES CONGRATULATORY CALL TO THATCHER

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 15 JUN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *(PA)* (C)

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 4077

33 JUN 14 P 5:20

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>X</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u> </u>	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

pmk

27

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4077

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SUBJECT: President's Congratulatory Call to Mrs. Thatcher

Attached at Tab A is the memcon of the President's congratulatory call to Mrs. Thatcher.

I believe that you were in the President's office when he placed the call. His remarks were largely spontaneous (as opposed to using my suggested talking points) and hence doubly effective.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

Approve

Disapprove

Tab A Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW DATE 8/29/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

DATE, TIME June 10, 1983
AND PLACE: 10:15 a.m.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hello, Ron. How are you?

President Reagan: How am I? (Laughter), I'm overjoyed and couldn't be happier; and you must be very pleased. What a landslide!

PM Thatcher: Well, we're absolutely delighted, obviously. You can't detect when you're going to get a landslide, because under our system, when you've got two parties opposite you, a lot depends on which takes how much from the other.

President Reagan: Yes.

PM Thatcher: But nevertheless, we have got a tremendous victory. And what pleases me immensely is that it will strengthen the Alliance.

President Reagan: Yes it will. God bless you. It's a shot in the arm for all us who have a kind of a solid philosophy worldwide to see this victory.

PM Thatcher: At last Andropov might come up with some disarmament proposal.

President Reagan: Yes. If in the future I should have some need, how would you like to manage a campaign?

PM Thatcher: (Laughter) I don't think I've got that much spare time. But, campaigns do need to be managed. Yours, I'm afraid, is longer than ours.

President Reagan: Yes. I was on the plane coming back to Washington, -- I've been out in the Middle West here, -- when we got the news. But by then I knew (laughter) that you must be enjoying a well earned rest, so I waited until morning on our side to call you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

PM Thatcher: Oh, bless you. That's absolutely marvelous. We're just in the aftermath. There is still some results coming in. Then we'll be getting down to everything we have to deal with immediately after the election. But it's marvelous of you to phone Ron.

President Reagan: I couldn't wait. I had been waiting (laughter) for quite a number of days here to make this call, and we were sure every day as I followed the reports from over there that I was going to be able to make it. Believe me, I think there must be as much of a celebration mood here in our country today as there is in England.

PM Thatcher: Well that's marvelous. Can I just say that I thought you chaired Williamsburg absolutely marvelously. It was very tricky wasn't it at one stage.

President Reagan: (laughter) Yes, and I had my ire up a little bit at one stage too, I recall.

PM Thatcher: I think it was quite justified. We got very good communiques, and I think it was an enormous success.

President Reagan: Well, everyone's been treating it here that way. Our press is a little reluctant about it, but they have to admit it.

PM Thatcher: Well, that's good if they admit it. That really is something.

President Reagan: I know you have many things to do, but just know that we're all very happy here and we congratulate you.

PM Thatcher: And God bless you for phoning. Thank you very much. It's an enormous encouragement. If we get a similar majority for you, it will be marvelous.

President Reagan: Thank you. All right, goodbye and have a happy day.

PM Thatcher: Thank you, goodbye.

NSC/S PROFILE

RW 2/29/11
SECRET

ID 8304093

RECEIVED 15 JUN 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 15 JUN 83 30

KEYWORDS: AUSTRALIA

HAWKE, JAMES LEE

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF LUNCHEON BTW PRES & HAWKE ON JUN 13

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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S. J. K.

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 4093

83 JUN 15 P 7: 24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

4093

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6-15-83

Judge Clark:

Jul for

Once you have approved
the attached minutes, I intend
to share a copy with State.

Bob Kinnitt

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

33

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 18, 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DAVID L. CHEW
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Memcon of Meeting Between the President and
Prime Minister James Lee Hawke of Australia
on June 13, 1983

Attached are minutes of the luncheon meeting which took place
between the President and Prime Minister Hawke on June 13, 1983.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

RW
8/29/11

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MEMORANDUM

34

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
George Bush, Secretary of State
Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
Edwin Meese, III
James A. Baker, III
Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Robert Nesen, U.S. Ambassador to Australia
Gaston Sigur, Senior Director of Asian Affairs
and Special Assistant to the President, NSC
Charles P. Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (Coordination)

Australia

James Lee Hawke, Prime Minister
Paul Keating, Treasurer
Sir Robert Cotton, Australian Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Geoffrey Yeend, Secretary, Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet
Peter G. F. Henderson, Secretary, Department of
Foreign Affairs
John O. Stone, Secretary, Department of the Treasury
William B. Pritchett, Secretary, Department of Defense
Graham C. Evans, Principal Private Secretary, Prime
Minister's Office

DATE AND TIME: Monday, June 13, 1983
12:15 - 1:15 p.m.

PLACE: State Dining Room

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting - President Reagan and Prime
Minister Hawke

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged complimentary opinions about Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone -- "a new breed" on the Japan political scene, as the Prime Minister put it. (S)

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Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 # 117485

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Hawke asked about the INF talks. The President said that he seeks an agreement, that he is dead serious about wanting to rid the world of nuclear weapons, but that he thinks it will probably be necessary to put the missiles into place in Western Europe before the Soviets will agree to any deal. (S)

Secretary Shultz emphasized the number of talks that are going on with the Soviets. He spoke of INF, START, MBFR, active discussions in Geneva on chemical weapons, discussions on CBM's and what he termed "a vast array" of meetings. (S)

A brief exchange took place on the subject of the Pope's visit to Poland. It was agreed that the visit will reinspire the Polish people, but will not lead to any major changes in Poland. (S)

The Prime Minister explained to the President in detail his meeting in Australia with labor and business leaders. He thought the sessions had gone well. (S)

Hawke then spoke about the high unemployment rate in Australia, and the resulting rise in protectionist sentiment. The President said that at the Williamsburg Summit all agreed to work together to eliminate the protectionism which exists in every country. (S)

The atmosphere at the luncheon was cordial and relaxed. (U)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
w/SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 15, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

[Handwritten signature in red ink]

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR

[Handwritten signature in black ink]

SUBJECT: Minutes of Luncheon Meeting Between the President
and Prime Minister James Lee Hawke of Australia
on June 13, 1983

Attached at Tab A are minutes of the luncheon meeting which took place between the President and Prime Minister Hawke.

Attachment:
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED
w/SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW 8/25/11

LOG # 4093

37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE June 18, 1983

Situation Room:

Please LDX attached to: Hill, Stanford,
& Chew

* Return copy and receipt to
NSC Secretariat. Thanks.


NSC SECRETARIAT

WASH FAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

JUN 18 2 03 PM '83

WATCH OFFICE

38

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Rev 4/26/11

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 365

CLASSIFICATION

PAGES 3

FROM NSC/S

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Memcon - Log # 4093

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

B

Charles Hill

Exec. Sec.

D

John H. Stanford

Exec. Sec

K-1


David Chew

Exec. Assist. to Sec.

REMARKS:

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



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18 JUN 1983 13 50

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) (w/ 3/31/1)

~~SECRET~~

365

PAGES 3

MESSAGE NO.

FROM NSC/S

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Memcon - Log # 4093

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

B

Charles Hill

Exec. Sec.

D

John H. Stanford

Exec. Sec.

K-1

David Chew

Exec. Assist. to Sec.

REMARKS:

RECEIVED

83 JUN 18 P 1: 55

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SITUATION ROOM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) ^{EW 7/29/11}

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 365 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM NSC/S _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Memcon - Log # 4093

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Charles Hill</u>	<u>Exe. Sec.</u>	_____
<u>D</u>	<u>John H. Stanford</u>	<u>Exe. Sec.</u>	_____
<u>K-1</u>	<u>David Chew</u>	<u>Exe. Assi. st. to Sec.</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS: _____