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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109079	MEMCON	RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS BETWEEN GEORGE SHULTZ ET AL AND ANATLIY DOBRYNIN ET AL	11	2/15/1983	B1
		<i>R 10/12/12 M361/2</i>			
109080	TALKING POINTS	FRO CALL TO BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT (ANNOTATED)	1	2/17/1983	B1
		<i>11</i>			
109085	MEMCON	BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL	4	2/17/1983	B1
		<i>R 3/2/12 M361/1</i>			
109081	MEMCON	RE THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO	2	3/9/1983	B1
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109082	DRAFT MESSAGE	REAGAN TO HABIB BOURGUIBA	2	ND	B1
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		<i>11</i>			

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: February 15, 1983
 TIME: 7:00 p.m.-8:15 p.m.
 PLACE: The Secretary's Office

SIT

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations

ARTICIPANTS: United States

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of
 State for Political Affairs
 Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV,
 Department of State

U.S.S.R.

Anatoliy F. DOBRYNIN, Soviet Ambassador
 Oleg M. SOKOLOV, Minister-Counselor,
 Soviet Embassy, Washington
 Viktor F. ISAKOV, Minister-Counselor,
 Soviet Embassy, Washington

The Secretary said he would briefly summarize the meeting with the President and invited Ambassador Dobrynin to comment if he differed with what the Secretary said.

The President knew of the series of meetings between the Secretary and Dobrynin, and had decided it would be useful were he to meet directly with the Ambassador to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. The President has very definite views, as Dobrynin had discovered; they were not always the views ascribed to him. He had spent longer than the Secretary thought he would; of course Dobrynin had spoken too. The net result was that Dobrynin, for Andropov, and the President for himself had agreed that both countries should make a genuine effort to solve problems so that the bilateral relationship could progress. We could not say how far this would go, but we want to improve it. The discussion with the President had covered a four-point agenda.

(1) Arms control has many aspects: START, INF, MBFR, and related CBMs. It is an area of great importance, and we should try to identify aspects where progress may be possible. We should be ambitious where we can, for instance on START and INF.

(2) There are a number of regional issues. Dobrynin had mentioned the Middle East, and the President had mentioned Poland, Afghanistan, and Central America. Southern Africa, while perhaps

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somewhat different in character, is also important. We are unlikely to be able to resolve our differences; but on some we might do something. We should try to make progress. We had tried on Afghanistan, but without results. Our talks on southern Africa had not been wholly unproductive, but not much had been accomplished. They were more in the nature of informational meetings.

(3) Economic topics perhaps fit best in the framework of bilateral relations, but they also could be looked at on the basis of individual issues.

(4) The President had put great emphasis on human rights. Dobrynin had seen how important these questions were to the President and how important they were to the relationship between the two countries. The President had made very clear that his approach was a quiet one; he wishes to talk, not to have newspaper stories or claims of "victory."

This represents a sweep of the issues discussed; we should try for progress in all areas, recognizing that we cannot do everything at once, but seeing if we can get something done on the agenda across the board. The closing note of both the President and the Ambassador had been that both parties are interested in a genuine effort to improve conditions; Dobrynin, in fact, had expressed optimism that this could happen.

Dobrynin said that, with the addition of working more closely in this channel, the Secretary had given a fair summary.

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The meeting was the President's idea, the Secretary added, and was not on his calendar. We have no intention of making a statement on it, but knowing how Washington works a question is conceivable. We plan to answer that the meeting took place; that Dobrynin had called on the President with the Secretary, in connection with his series of talks with the Secretary; that the President had suggested the meeting; and that we would have no further comment. Dobrynin said that it is not the Soviet practice to comment on such matters, but what the Secretary had said about the U.S. approach was acceptable.

The Secretary said that with the President, and then together in the car on the return to the Department, he and Dobrynin had talked about a meeting of the Secretary with Gromyko, and then of a meeting of Gromyko with the President at the time of the UNGA. Dobrynin noted that the latter would restore normal practice.

Moreover, the Secretary continued, they had talked about the Secretary's meeting Andropov if the Secretary were to travel to Moscow. They had also discussed Ambassador Hartman's access to people in Moscow, a topic they had talked about before.

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The Secretary then turned to matters at hand, saying time was too short for him to discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin his Far East trip at length. But, to summarize, he had found Afghanistan and Kampuchea much on people's minds; further, arms control is not just a U.S. and European issue, but is much on minds in Asia as well. Dobrynin asked if this meant the Asians were prepared to take part in arms control, not now perhaps, but in some other forum at some time in the future. He realized the Secretary could not speak for them -- for the Japanese and Chinese -- but wondered whether they would be willing to negotiate in the future. The Secretary replied that he did not get to that point with them. However, he had been impressed in Korea, China and Japan with the interest in what the Soviets are doing. In side meetings his people had with subordinate officials, they were impressed with how much the hosts knew about arms control negotiations underway, and how well informed they were.

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The Secretary suggested that they go through the work of their staffs on the bilateral lists (attached).

He began with a brief review of the four pages of agreements still in force, saying that he was glad to note the 1973 taxation convention, since it had been his responsibility in the Nixon Administration.

Dobrynin turned to page 5, which lists agreements up for renewal in 1983/1984 (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, grains, housing, world ocean, economic-industrial-technical cooperation). The Soviets favor continuing these agreements. We could look at them later, or, if the Secretary had comments on all or any of them, he was prepared to discuss them. In any event the Soviets are in favor of renewing them. The U.S. side had added grains to this list; the Soviets had reminded us of the others. On grains, he asked if the U.S. was proposing renewal. The Soviets did not want to force themselves on us; if the U.S. dropped it, they would let it go. The rest they thought worthwhile to renew. If the U.S. thought one or another should be dropped, we should say so. The rest can be sent to the working level for further work.

The Secretary commented that we find the seven agreements generally constructive. Given Dobrynin's statement, we would begin to review them through our interagency process. We would develop positions -- presumably positive -- on each and as this work proceeds we will get back to the Soviets. Dobrynin asked if this meant the basic U.S. intention was positive. The Secretary replied that it did.

Dobrynin said that the third category listed (agreements in force, but where more active implementation would be useful) really had no substance now (agriculture, environment, health, artificial heart). The Soviets would like to invite us to give more life to these agreements. We should consider renewal of working groups, for example. If the Secretary agreed in principle, and after the U.S. had completed its internal process, then we could proceed to meetings between small delegations or work with the Soviet Embassy to put life back into the agreements. There were four of these agreements. If the U.S. was not negative, we could go ahead.

The Secretary said this was a worthwhile field on which to exchange ideas, but there is the question of how far and how fast to proceed, and the question of whether to engage higher level officials in these exchanges. Dobrynin said level is not really a question. It is not a matter for Gromyko and the Secretary. It is a question of letting people who know each other, who are old friends, get together to find out what can be achieved. Agriculture is an example; let our working people find out what can be done -- draw on their experience -- and then report to their superiors.

Dobrynin continued that the Soviets are proposing working groups from Moscow or from here, for an active exchange. This is not a new avenue; it is a matter of restoring substance to agreements now in disuse. No publicity is necessary. Delegations can be sent by the Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, or there can be experts on the environment that sit down together. This is only renewal of what went on before.

The Secretary said it is not a question of who goes where, but there is an issue of level of representation. We will consider the matter and get back to the Soviets at the working level. Dobrynin suggested that the embassies might be the appropriate channel.

Dobrynin turned to the fourth category (agreements expired or in suspense). The Secretary commented that we need to examine further what might be worked on in this category.

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Dobrynin noted that civil air, maritime, science and technology, and energy agreements had been proposed by the Soviets; the rest (space, trade, culture, Kama and consulates) by the U.S. The Soviets are prepared to look at all of them. He asked how the Secretary proposed to proceed. The Secretary commented that all were worth reviewing, but without commitment at this point.

Dobrynin said commercial flights under the civil air agreement had been stopped; with regard to the maritime agreement, it is a question of implementation; the U.S. had added the references to the trade, culture, Kama and consulate agreements. What did the Secretary have in mind?

Eagleburger commented that where we added items to the list of agreements from which we are working, it was solely for the purpose of making the list complete. Dobrynin said the intention was to add items to make things more active; what did adding the Trade Agreement mean? Eagleburger said our only purpose was to assure that we had before us a complete list of all agreements -- nothing more than that.

The Secretary commented that all these items have merit; we need to pick and choose among them, and assign priorities. Once this has been done, Dobrynin said, you can instruct the Soviet desk on next steps and we can then talk further.

Dobrynin then turned to the fifth category (regular consultations), which includes Foreign Ministers at the UNGA, pre-UNGA working level, delegations at IAEA meetings, incidents at sea, grains, Nazi war crimes. He suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers between UNGA sessions should be added. The Secretary commented meetings only once a year is insufficient, and agreed to Dobrynin's suggestion.

On pre-UNGA consultations, Dobrynin noted that these take place between the MFA and State, and asked if we had anything else in mind. Simons noted that our intention was to record what exists; Dobrynin responded that we should also try to move forward.

We are discussing non-proliferation, Dobrynin pointed out. The Secretary said this was a useful step, and we are looking toward another meeting. Simons noted we seem close to agreement on another separate bilateral session in June.

Dobrynin said that the incidents at sea consultations are useful. On the grains consultations, the Soviets agree to them if the LTA is agreed, but they would drop it if not.

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Dobrynin then turned to the sixth category (recent consultations) which lists Afghanistan, southern Africa, CSCE, and nuclear non-proliferation. He said the Soviet side agreed to continue all of them.

The Secretary noted we had had consultations on Afghanistan that went nowhere. The UN process is now going on. If it works, fine; we do not need to be involved in everything.

Dobrynin replied that there is no need for a meeting each month, but if we need a meeting we should agree to have one. The matter is now going through the UN. There is no big movement, but things are positive. Still, there is a possibility to continue bilaterally as well. He understood that this was Ambassador Hartman's field. When and how is up to the U.S. to decide.

The Secretary said that on so-called regional issues, we should work to see where emphasis might prove productive. Leaving Afghanistan aside, southern Africa is somewhat different. Afghanistan is snuggled close to the Soviet Union. Southern Africa is a long way from both of us: we both have an interest, we are both involved, and the world is interested. It could be an example of effective collaboration, and would be to everyone's benefit. This may also be true of other issues nearer or farther away. On southern Africa, though, he had to say he was disappointed that our talks have not produced more. They have been informational, but not operational.

Dobrynin said he would pass the Secretary's comments to Moscow.

The Secretary continued that on CSCE we understand each other. When he and the Vice President had been in Moscow, Andropov had lectured them that this was none of our g.d. business. The President had just told Dobrynin our views. The Soviets might not agree with them, but they are our views.

Dobrynin said our CSCE delegations are in touch, and that is not the problem; the Secretary agreed. These contacts could be improved, however, Dobrynin said. The big question is that in previous administrations, as Eagleburger well knew, the Secretary and Gromyko might decide that an additional push could be useful at some point, and would then act to break deadlocks.

The Secretary noted that on issues where we had recently consulted, the last three (southern Africa, CSCE and non-proliferation) had resulted from his New York meetings with Gromyko, whereas the first (Afghanistan) had been agreed to before his time.

Dobrynin said he had mentioned the Middle East to the President, and previously discussed it with the Secretary. He asked why we should not add it to the list. He was not speaking here on behalf of Gromyko, but there had been a meeting between Hartman and Korniyenko, and even though it was inconclusive, why not add it to the list?

The Secretary said he and Gromyko had discussed the issue in New York, and agreed to be back in touch if there were anything further worth reporting. Dobrynin suggested again that it be added. The Secretary agreed.

Dobrynin then turned to the seventh category of consultations under discussion (deep seabed mining aspects of LOS, nuclear non-proliferation, Pacific maritime boundary, bilateral consular matters).

Deep seabed mining talks had taken place, Dobrynin said, and were good, though outside the Law of the Sea Treaty context. Non-proliferation talks were okay too. We need to find a solution on the Pacific maritime boundary. The Secretary said this would be a tough one, but needs to be resolved. Dobrynin agreed.

Dobrynin said that on consular talks we have gone back and forth on the issue of an agenda, thus far without results. The Secretary said he had a possible solution, and proposed that we schedule a preliminary informal session in Moscow and a formal opening in Washington one month later. We need to confront the officials involved with two scheduled meetings, thus forcing them to use the first to get ready for the second. Dobrynin said this sounded good if the first meeting was for discussion of substance and not just the agenda, and was to be continued in Washington. The Secretary noted that it is hard to begin discussions without an agenda. Dobrynin said he would support the Secretary's proposal with Moscow. Eagleburger said that when we had a response, we could schedule the meetings.

Dobrynin then turned to the Soviet-proposed category on arms control talks (conventional arms transfers, CTB, CW, Indian Ocean, ASAT, RW, non-proliferation). All except No. 7 (non-proliferation) had been stopped, and the Soviets would like to resume. He asked if the Secretary had any comment on the first six.

The Secretary said he had two comments:

- On TTBT, which is not included, the U.S. owes the Soviet side a proposal, and is about to make one. Rick Burt has been designated to be in touch.

-- On the others, returning to what had been discussed with the President, we had identified arms control, regional issues and human rights (as a kind of special category) as areas for discussion. We ought to list these categories separately, and see where things can progress. We should look at what is most promising, but also most worthwhile. We should not confine ourselves just to the easiest issues, but include also the most important questions, even where we know they will be difficult. We need to develop a sense of priorities, of places where we need a political impulse to make something happen. We need to get back to each other on things we have identified, to construct an agenda. Dobrynin had told the President, and Gromyko told the Secretary that arms control is at the top of the Soviet priority list. There is no question that it is an important category, but there are other important categories as well.

Dobrynin said there is no question of the importance of the three negotiations (INF, START, MBFR) now underway, but he invited comment as to whether the U.S. was ready to talk on any of the others. The Soviet side was prepared to talk on all seven listed in this category. His government was prepared to talk, but he did not know if the U.S. government was. If not it was all right, but the Soviets want answers. Perhaps not today, but the matter is important. Non-proliferation was being discussed, but some of the other issues were also ready to be discussed. He was not pressing, but wished to report to his government which issues we should continue on. He and the President had agreed that the three negotiations must be included, but success on the others is also important.

The Secretary replied "maybe." We would get to the Soviets on TTBT. On the seven others, we would get back to them. He noted that the Soviets never mention MBFR. Dobrynin said the Soviets agreed it is important.

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The Secretary said that on INF we feel the Soviets believe we will not deploy the missiles. But we will, in the absence of a negotiated agreement. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also think we will. The Secretary said that our position is that we are prepared to make a reasonable agreement, but equality does not mean the Soviet Union being equal to everyone combined. We think the U.S. and the USSR are the relevant standard, with SS-20's,

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Pershing II's, and GLCMs the main items. We do not think the proposal Dobrynin described to the President is responsive or acceptable.

The Secretary said he did not want to repeat the argument, but wondered whether it was worthwhile to push on INF given the Soviet analysis. Nitze is ready to listen to any suggestions, or to discuss principles. Dobrynin said principles had been discussed more than enough. The Secretary said perhaps they should be discussed some more. But we also need to look at whether START is more significant, or whether it is time to turn to MBFR. Certainly there is a relationship between nuclear weapons under discussion in INF and the conventional weapons we are talking about in MBFR, and perhaps this relationship cannot really be handled by the individual negotiators. Perhaps in trying to respond to the President, Dobrynin, with his experience, and without our going around the negotiators, could suggest ways to move forward. The Secretary concluded that he was looking for a way of sorting out issues on a broad agenda to see how to get someplace, to see what political impulse is needed.

Dobrynin said not just the Soviets, but also the U.S., needed to suggest, through our channels. If the Secretary had some ideas, he should not hesitate to put them forward. On INF the Soviets have made three proposals, and the U.S. has stuck to the zero option. He did not know what to think when the U.S. said it was open to serious suggestions. The Soviets thought the U.S. would deploy the missiles, because it is sticking to a zero option that is totally unacceptable to the Soviets. If the U.S. stood on it, it will put the missiles in, he said, and the Soviets and the U.S. and your generals and at least some U.S. Allies know it. But if the U.S. wants some way out of the impasse, compromise will be required.

The Secretary noted that our position was not take-it-or-leave-it, as the Vice President had made clear. Dobrynin said we should use back channels. The Secretary replied that the Soviets and the U.S. should evaluate what would be the most fruitful arena for a political impulse, whether in INF or somewhere else.

Dobrynin said that in the three negotiations, including INF where we are working under an artificial deadline imposed by the U.S., we should try for a breakthrough, but this did not mean the others are hopeless. The Secretary reminded him that we are negotiating in good faith, as we are sure the Soviets are.

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But, Dobrynin replied, the U.S. Ambassador had made clear that the U.S. did not like the three Soviet proposals, and the Secretary had said they were not acceptable. The Vice President and the Secretary could say the U.S. position was not take-it-or-leave-it, but the Soviets had made proposals to reopen the talks, in an attempt to find a way out. They proposed going from what they have to 162, almost half.

The Secretary said it was not clear to him whether systems reduced were to be destroyed or removed. Dobrynin said this could be discussed if the cards were on the table. The Secretary specified he had not meant to say the offer was acceptable, but our friends in China and Japan had made clear they are worried that an agreement would only more the missiles which would then be pointed at them. Dobrynin said the Asians could discuss this with the Soviets.

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The Secretary suggested that further staff contacts take place on the lists: Dobrynin responded that this would not solve the basic issues. The Secretary continued that they had had a broad, penetrating discussion between 5:00 and 8:15 p.m., which covered a lot of ground. We agreed on some things; on others we compared notes; on others we need further work. We should let our staffs work with some urgency, and hope to meet again, perhaps next week, if not early in March after the Queen's visit. He would give Dobrynin feedback, and would expect feedback from Dobrynin on what the President had said.

Dobrynin said the President had raised one question (i.e., Pentacostalists) which he would try to clarify to Andropov. The President had raised it as a good will step; he took this to mean the President did not mean the whole field of emigration, though he had mentioned that too. The Secretary said he would try to interpret the President's remarks. We have many human rights concerns, including Jewish emigration; the President's specific reference is an example of those concerns. The President had also mentioned Jackson-Vanik, making clear he did not like that approach.

Dobrynin concluded that it was, however, for each separate side to determine according to its own law how to deal with its citizens.

Dobrynin said our colleagues should work hard, looking toward a meeting next week. The Secretary said he would try to get back in touch next week; he was to leave again March 2.

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U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS BY CATEGORYI. Bilateral Agreements Made with the Soviet Union and Still in ForceA. 1933-1940

1. 1933. Arrangements relating to the establishment of diplomatic relations, nonintervention, freedom of conscience and religious liberty, legal protection, and claims.

2. 1935. Agreement relating to the procedure to be followed in the execution of letters rogatory.

3. 1939. Agreement concerning the exchange of parcel post, with detailed regulations for execution.

4. 1942. Preliminary agreement relating to principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, and exchange of notes.

5. 1945. Agreement relating to a change of boundary lines between the American and Soviet zones of occupation in Germany.

7. 1945. Agreement relating to the disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States.

8. 1946. Agreement on the organization of commercial radio teletype communication channels.

B. 1950-1959

1. 1955. Protocol defining the location of the boundary of Greater Berlin.

2. 1955. Agreement relating to the exchange of medical films.

3. 1958. Agreement relating to the reciprocal waiver of visa fees to nonimmigrants.

C. 1960-1969

1. 1961. Agreement on the 3-to-5 day role for diplomatic visa issuance.

2. 1962/1970. Understandings concerning Cuba.

3. 1963. Memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of a direct communications link, with annex.

4. 1964/1968. Consular convention.

5. 1966. Civil air transport agreement with exchange of notes; agreement supplementary to the civil air transport agreement.

6. 1968. Arrangement relating to the inauguration of air service between New York and Moscow.

7. 1969. Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington with annexes and exchanges of notes.

D. 1970-1979

1. 1971. Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

2. 1971. Agreement on measures to improve the direct communications link, with annex.

3. 1972. Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection.

4. 1972. Agreement on cooperation in the field of medical science and public health.

5. 1972. Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.

6. 1972. Communique on the establishment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission.

7. 1972. Agreement with respect to purchases of grains by the Soviet Union in the United States and credit be made available by the United States with exchange of notes.

8. 1972. Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal aid and claims.

9. 1972. Agreement on the conditions of construction of complexes of buildings of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Washington with attachment.

10. 1973. Agreement relating to the consideration of claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels or gear and

measures to prevent fishing conflicts, with annex and protocol. 16

11. 1973. Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.

12. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture.

13. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world ocean.

14. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation.

15. 1973/1976. Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters.

16. 1973. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

17. 1973. Protocol to the agreement of February 21, 1973 relating to the consideration of claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels or gear and measures to prevent fishing conflicts, with annex.

18. 1973. Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

19. 1973. Protocol relating to the possibility of establishing a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce.

20. 1973. Protocol relating to expansion and improvement of commercial facilities in Washington and Moscow.

21. 1973. Protocol on questions relating to the expansion of air services under the civil air transport agreement of November 4, 1966, with agreed services and annex.

22. 1973. Protocol relating to a Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in Washington and a Commercial Office of the U.S.A. in Moscow.

23. 1974. Memorandum of understanding on participation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in deep sea drilling project.

24. 1974. Agreement on cooperation in artificial heart research and development.

25. 1974. Agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other construction.

26. 1974. Long term agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.

27. 1975. Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple entry and exit visas to American and Soviet correspondents.

28. 1975. Agreement on the supply of grains by the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

29. 1976/1978. Convention concerning the conservation of migratory birds and their environment.

30. 1976. Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes, and related letter.

31. 1977. Agreement concerning the translation and publication in English of Soviet journals and articles, with annexes.

32. 1977. Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington.

33. 1978. Agreement concerning the translation and publication in English of copyrighted Soviet books, with form.

34. 1978. Agreement relating to privileges and immunities of all members of the Soviet and American embassies and their families, with agreed minute.

35. 1979. Agreement on exchange of recreational facility sites.

E. 1980

1. 1982. Agreement on special flights in support of embassies.

II. Bilateral Agreements Coming Up for Renewal in 1983 and 1984

1. Agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation. Signed June 19, 1973; extended June 19, 1978, by exchange of notes until June 19, 1980; further extended June 19, 1980 according to its own terms for an additional three years; to be further extended June 19, 1983 unless there is notification to the contrary 30 days before, i.e. by May 19, 1983.
2. Agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy. Signed June 21, 1973, for a ten-year period; may be renewed by mutual agreement.
3. Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed November 26, 1976; entered into force February 28, 1977; extended July 1, 1982, with change of two ports to which Soviet vessels have access under the agreement, for one year.*
4. Agreement on the supply of grains by the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed October 20, 1975; extended September 30, 1981, and September 30, 1982, for one year.
5. Agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other construction. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1979, on its own terms for an additional five years; to be renewed automatically on June 28, 1984, unless there is notification to the contrary six months before, i.e. by December 28, 1983.

*The Soviet side notes that practical implementation by both sides of all the provisions of the fisheries agreement is unresolved. By practical implementation it means allocations to Soviet vessels now operating with the West Coast joint venture; and, most important, the USSR national allocation in general under the provisions of Article III, paragraph 1(d) of the Fisheries Agreement. It is prepared to discuss the agreement with the goal of renegotiation which takes all these implementation matters into account as well as participation in joint ventures. The U.S. side notes that the agreement provides for U.S. implementation and Soviet recognition of the U.S. 200-mile Fisheries Conservation Zone, but does not provide for a USSR national allocation or participation in joint ventures on either coast.

6. Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world ocean. Signed June 19, 1973; extended by mutual agreement until December 15, 1978; further extended December 15, 1978, with modifications contained in an exchange of notes, until December 15, 1981; extended December 15, 1981, on its own terms as last amended, for three years; may be renewed by mutual agreement.

7. Long term agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. Signed June 29, 1974, for a ten-year period; may be renewed on June 29, 1984, by mutual agreement six months before, i.e. by December 29, 1983.*

III. Bilateral Agreements in Force for Which Soviet Side Considers More Active Implementation Would Be Useful**

1. Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture. Signed June 19, 1973; June 19, 1978 extended according to its own terms for an additional five years; will be further extended according to its own terms for an additional five years as of June 19, 1983.

2. Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Signed May 23, 1972; extended May 23, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended May 23, 1982 according to its own terms for an additional five years.

3. Agreement on cooperation in the field of medical science and public health. Signed May 23, 1972; extended May 23, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended May 23, 1982, according to its own terms, for an additional five years.

* This is a framework agreement, and the Soviet side considers that it would be useful to agree to renewal in December 1983.

** In general the Soviet side favors full implementation of all agreements in force, and infusing them with concrete, business-like substance. As a practical matter it favors renewal of meetings of working groups and joint or mixed bilateral commissions. This would contribute to the development of bilateral relations. These four agreements are cited in addition to those listed in Section II.

20
4. Agreement on cooperation in the field of artificial heart development and research. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended June 28, 1982, according to its own terms for an additional five years.

IV. Bilateral Agreements Expired or in Suspense*

1. Civil air transport agreement with exchange of notes; agreement supplementary to the civil air transport agreement. Signed November 4, 1966, amended June 23, 1973.**

2. Maritime agreement. Signed October 14, 1972; extended on December 31, 1975, for an additional five years; extended December 31, 1980, for an additional year; expired December 31, 1981. Ancillary agreements on certain maritime matters, signed in 1975 and entering into force in 1976, and a memorandum of understanding on marine cargo insurance, signed and entering into force in 1979, lost applicability at that time.

3. Agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Signed May 24, 1972; extended May 18, 1977, to enter into force on May 27, 1977; expired May 23, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

4. Agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Signed May 24, 1972; extended on July 8, 1977, for an additional five years; expired July 7, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

* The Soviet side is prepared to consider restoration of the agreements noted at Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. It also favors restoration of direct commercial flights between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

** The U.S. side considers that the civil air transport agreement and the supplementary agreement to it of 1966 are in force, and notes that there is no level of service provided by the agreements. The Soviet side notes that the civil air transport agreement of 1966 and the supplementary agreement of 1973 provide for regular commercial flights between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

5. Trade agreement. Signed October 18, 1972. Did not come into force. Certain provisions were applied.*

6. General agreement on cultural relations (contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields). Signed June 19, 1973; expired December 31, 1979. Distribution of Amerika and Soviet Life in the respective countries continues.

7. Exchange of letters relating to the establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the procurement of equipment for the Kama River Truck Complex. Signed October 18, 1972; expired April 18, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

8. Agreement on establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York City. Joint communique signed July 3, 1974; implementation negotiations in suspense due to the U.S. decision of January 4, 1980.

9. Agreement on cooperation in the field of energy. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1979, with modifications, for an additional three years; expired June 28, 1982 due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

V. Regular consultations

1. Meetings of Foreign Ministers during UN General Assembly sessions.

2. Pre-UNGA consultations.

3. Bilateral meetings of delegations on nuclear non-proliferation matters.

4. Incidents at sea consultations.

* The U.S. side notes the following examples of provisions of the Trade Agreement that have been applied:

-- Article 4, dealing with payment in U.S. dollars or other freely convertible currencies;

-- Article 5, on setting up a U.S. commercial office in Moscow and a Soviet trade representation in Washington;

-- Article 6, on opening representations for firms (Belarus and Sovfracht in the U.S.); and

-- Article 7, on encouraging use of arbitration.

- 5. Grains consultations.
- 6. Cooperation in investigating Nazi war crimes.

VI. Issues on which bilateral consultations recently held

- 1. Afghanistan (July 1982)
- 2. Southern Africa (September, December 1982)
- 3. CSCE matters (October 1982)
- 4. Non-proliferation matters (December 1982)

VII. Issues on which bilateral consultations are agreed to or being considered

- 1. Deep seabed mining aspects of Law of the Sea (February 1983)
- 2. Nuclear non-proliferation matters
- 3. Pacific maritime boundary
- 4. Bilateral consular issues

Bilateral Negotiations on Certain Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament Previously Held between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

23

1. On the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Conducted (with British participation) from July 1977 to November 1980.
2. On the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Conducted from June 1977 to May 1980.
3. On the limitation and further reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. Started in 1977 and conducted until February 1980.
4. On limiting conventional arms transfers. Conducted between December 1977 and December 1978 (heads of delegations met in Washington in December 1979).
5. On antisatellite weapons limitation. Conducted from June 1978 to June 1979.
6. On the prohibition of radiological weapons. Conducted from June 1977 to July 1979. To expedite completion of the draft Treaty in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament it would be useful, in Soviet view, to continue the bilateral negotiations.
7. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet side confirms that it is prepared to continue bilateral consultations.

~~SECRET~~

*President used these
for a call from
Pres. Figueiredo
at about 1540: 2/17.*

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CALL TO BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

FIGUEIREDO REGARDING HIS REQUEST OF A LOAN OF \$400 MILLION

*109080 f
24*

February 17, 1983

[NOTE: President Figueiredo will reiterate his request for a \$400 million short-term loan, pleading urgency against the risk of a cessation of Brazilian payments on its external debts. Although we have major problems with the loan and do not believe it should be granted, we suggest you listen, reassure President Figueiredo that we will look at the question closely, and will be back in touch shortly.]

- o Ambassador Motley and Secretary Regan have informed me of your concern that your request for a \$400 million short-term credit be given the utmost priority and consideration.
- o We are looking at the matter closely and have asked Secretary Regan to get in contact with Minister Delfim Netto as soon as we have had an opportunity to examine all the facts.
- o Despite the difficulties of the current situation, we are quite confident in the quality of Brazil's economic management.
- o We believe with perserverance and patience that even these troubled days will be overcome.
- o IF ASKED: We are following the situation with the banks closely and hope you are successful in your efforts to restore deposits and credit line to last year's levels.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-361/2 #109080

BY CA NARA DATE 10/12/12

~~SECRET~~

YOU SHOULD KNOW HOW MUCH I LOOK FORWARD TO GUIMINISH'S
ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES. AMBASSADOR MOTLEY HAS TOLD
ME HOW YOU HAVE BEEN EXERCISING HIM WHILE ARRANGEMENTS ARE
BEING MADE FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION AND RECEPTION. THE RED
TAPE NEVER SEEMS TO END. EVEN THE CHIEFS OF STATE ARE
SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF THE LAND.

← correct spelling
GUIMINISH

~~Flo,~~
check spelling.
Manny -
pls check spelling - I can't
find it anywhere.

22 Feb.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OK. File

Admiral Poincette

Roger Robinson
has provided
attached memorandum
of conversation of
the President's
telephone call
with President
Figueroa last
week.
Munny.

109085

28

Time: 3:40 p.m., February 17, 1983

Unidentified voice: GO AHEAD PLEASE GENTLEMEN.

REAGAN: Hello

MOTLEY Hello. President Reagan?

REAGAN: Yes.

MOTLEY: This is Tony Motley of Brazilia. How are you sir?

REAGAN: Well just fine, Tony.

MOTLEY: I've got President Figueiredo on the line who wanted to talk to you sir.

REAGAN: All right, tell him I'm pleased to talk to him and looking forward to his arrival very shortly from his country, our mutual friend Gaminish.

FIGUEIREDO: Hello Mr. President.

REAGAN: Hello. It's good to hear your voice. Well, it is good to talk to you.

FIGUEIREDO: It is a great pleasure to be able to talk directly with you today.

REAGAN: Well, I am pleased also.

FIGUEIREDO: I'm sorry that it is not a pleasant atmosphere that I need to discuss with you but an item of grave consequence to my country.

FIGUEIREDO: I'm going to rapidly and in a very capsuled form attempt to summarize for you the dilemma we are in.

FIGUEIREDO: In order to resolve our external payment problems, we have ongoing four major projects. The first project is to capture new funds to finance our balance of payments. We have put together a group of banks we are soliciting from 4.4 billion dollars. They have already committed among these banks to the tune of 4.38 billion dollars. In other words signifies that that project -- that deal -- is closed.

FIGUEIREDO: Our second project, Mr. President, is for the refinancing of the amortization of the existing debt. We have asked the banks to put forth 4 billion dollars and they have

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-361 #109085
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/12

already agreed and committed to 4.9 billion dollars. So they have exceeded the amount we have asked for.

FIGUEIREDO: The third project which is a short-term commercial credit program in order to finance exports and imports, we have asked the banks to put together 8.8 billion dollars and they have already agreed to 9.5 billion dollars.

FIGUEIREDO: The fourth project deals with the international money market debt which affects the Brazilian banks overseas. We lost, since June of 1982, we have a leakage or a draw-down of around 3 billion dollars on this line of credit and we are slowly, but slowly, recuperating from that line.

FIGUEIREDO: We had asked the United States and you agreed to put together a series of loans totalling 1.43 billion dollars of which we have already paid back the U.S. Treasury 930 million dollars.

FIGUEIREDO: Now, Mr. President, is my request. What we would like is a loan from the Treasury of the United States of 400 million dollars in order to maintain our daily payments until the 25th of February, when we should sign, in New York, those two projects that I mentioned to you.

FIGUEIREDO: For you Mr. President to understand the great effort that we have made here in Brazil, let me just tell you that we have, we are carrying the paper in the tune of 3 billion dollars from our international partners. That is, other countries owe us in the tune of 3 billion dollars and which the banks will not accept even on a discounted basis as collateral.

FIGUEIREDO: To give you a very quick idea of the position we find ourselves in, we are holding the commercial papers of these various countries in various parts of the world; for example: in Latin America we are holding 800 million dollars worth of paper, in Africa 540 million, in Asia 200 million, from Hungary 200 million, from East Germany 180 million, and from Poland about 1 billion, 200 million dollars. These are commercial papers that are overdue to us and they just haven't been able to pay.

FIGUEIREDO: This, Mr. President, is our challenge. We have been making a tremendous effort in order to reach the date of the 25th of February which is when we close the other two loans and a popular saying here in Brazil: "We have been allowed to swim and we've managed to swim only to appear like we are going to die on the beach."

FIGUEIREDO: In summary Mr. President, the position we are in is this: that we are owed by other countries over three billion dollars, and they are not paying us. And what we are asking for is 400 million to see us through until the 25th of February when we have signed the loans and we can put the projects into being.

FIGUEIREDO: (garbled) I think you have done yeoman's service in the recent past in attempting to keep Brazil paying their bills on time and what we now come up to is that I find myself in the unfortunate position of having to make a personal appeal to you as we continue to pay our bills for 400 million dollars in order to get us through until the 25th of February.

FIGUEIREDO: This solicitation Mr. President, that I am making to you and my apologies to having to come about in such a dramatic form and to use the channels, the personal channels, between the two of us to dwell on this issue.

INTERPRETER: Laugh. His sense of humor is coming through Mr. President, he says:

FIGUEIREDO: If this personal appeal is not looked upon favorably, would you please look upon favorably accepting him as a political refugee?

REAGAN: Laugh. Yes, he can ride the horse up.

FIGUEIREDO: He said the horse is all ready, it is up to me to give him a date and they are going to move it.

REAGAN: Well listen, I'm so, tell him incidentally on another subject, I'm very grateful to him. I know he has been exercising it and everything and I apologize for the way we have been caught up in red tape at our end that not even I could cut. But now, on that date, the 25th -- what month was that? that he says, until the?

INTERPRETER: February.

REAGAN: Of this month?

INTERPRETER: Yes, let me just confirm that.

INTERPRETER: It is February.

REAGAN: Yeah. Well, listen I of course was aware that this was what you would be calling about and I have already notified Secretary Regan and we will--believe me-- we will get together and give this the utmost priority in consideration and then I will have Secretary Regan get in contact with his Minister Netto.

FIGUEIREDO: I'm very grateful to your attention Mr. President.

FIGUEIREDO: Please accept my presentations and a warm _____ and pass on to Mrs. Reagan our best wishes.

REAGAN: Well, I certainly will do that and please give mine to that lovely lady of yours.

FIGUEIREDO: He just wanted to bring to your attention that my minister of finance, Minister Galdez, is in New York presently and it would be very easy for Secretary Regan to get into contact with him.

REAGAN: I will pass that word on and I just don't know what our situation can be, but believe me we will give it every consideration we can and I want you to know that we are confident in the quality of Brazil's economic management. We know the, we are all having struggles at these times, but I am convinced that these bad times are going to pass.

FIGUEIREDO: Thank you Mr. President one more time and I just want to close by saying to you that it was a great personal pleasure to have an opportunity to chat with you and I am just sorry that the grave situation that faces us is what had to prompt this call.

FIGUEIREDO: And I hope to hear from you as soon as Giminish gets there so you can give me a report.

REAGAN: I certainly will and I shall get on this right away and see what can be done. And it has been a great pleasure talking to him.

FIGUEIREDO: Thank you very much Mr. President until the next time and I hope the next time I won't have to be soliciting dollars.

REAGAN: Laugh.

FIGUEIREDO: We will only talk about horses.

REAGAN: Oh, all right, all right. Goodby and God Bless you my friend.

FIGUEIREDO: Thank you very much (in English).

REAGAN: Bye, bye.

Correct spelling

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8301581

RECEIVED 11 MAR 83 13

TO CLARK

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 09 MAR 83 32

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CL 5/5/11

KEYWORDS: ITALY

AP

COLOMBO, EMILIO

SUBJECT: MEMCON MTG BTW PRES & ITALIAN FORN MINISTER 9 MAR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8301184 8301467 NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>3/14</i>	<i>Kindergarten approved</i>	<i>3/15</i>	<i>Persons</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>3/14</i>	<i>For signature</i>	<i>3/15</i>	<i>JF, MJ</i>
	<i>3/14</i>	<i>Wheeler's memo</i>		

DISPATCH *4/14 3/14*

W/ATTCH FILE *(7A)* *(C)*

National Security Council The White House

Package # 1581

'83 MAR 11 P1:19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____


COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

March 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the
President and Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo
of ItalyAttached for distribution on a need-to-know basis only, is a
copy of the memorandum of conversation between President
Reagan and Foreign Minister Colombo of Italy, which took place
on Wednesday, March 9, 1983Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

CS 5/5/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1581

109081

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Colombo of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary of State
William P. Clark
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard R. Burt
Ambassador to Italy Maxwell M. Rabb,
Robert C. McFarlane
Donald R. Fortier, NSC Staff Member
Charles Giugno, interpreter

Emilio Colombo, Foreign Minister
Ambassador to the United States Rinaldo Petrignani
Ambassador Bruno Bottai, Political Director, MFA
Minister Ranieri Vanni d'Archirafi, Chef de Cabinet
Mrs. Vivina Bonaccorsi, interpreter

DATE, TIME Wednesday, March 9, 1983
AND PLACE: 11:30-11:50 a.m., The Oval Office

The President welcomed Colombo and thanked him for his strong personal help regarding peacekeeping in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Colombo said he was delighted to be able to meet with the President and was pleased that consultations between our two countries were good. He said he would like to present certain opinions to the President. The Foreign Minister began by citing the German elections. The result in Germany, he said, was a positive fact which strengthened the alliance considerably and demonstrated that Soviet influence could be pushed back. Still, Colombo said, we must expect further assaults, and we must prepare for them.

He said it was his view that the West now needed to inject new energy into the negotiations so as to help demonstrate that we are negotiating with toughness. He said the President's speech to the American Legion traced an outline and a framework in which one could place a new initiative. Colombo said he had spoken to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher and UK Foreign Minister Pym and that they, too, agreed we should seize the initiative and put forward some solution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR MID-361/z #109081
BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

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The Foreign Minister also told the President that he felt the idea of a summit should remain visible, although he fully understood that any such summit would have to be well prepared. By maintaining the initiative, Colombo said, we are better able to counter the influence of anti-nuclear groups.

The President said we are not in disagreement at all. Prior to the elections in the FRG, we had to be quite restrained in our comments on the negotiations. Now we can speak out more directly.

The President said as recently as yesterday he had again asserted, in a public address, our willingness to talk. He said we must remain with the goal of zero, but that we were considering how best to indicate that there could be intermediate steps. The President said if we say out loud there will be intermediate steps, they, in turn, will become the new immediate goal.

Moreover, the President said, we know the Soviets are still clinging to the view that any outcome would have to guarantee a monopoly for them and none for us. This is unacceptable. We believe, the President added, that when the time of scheduled deployment arrives, if we are determined, this may have an effect on negotiations.

Foreign Minister Colombo repeated the fact that the time has come for us to show movement. He added that he agreed completely with the President about the unacceptability of a Soviet monopoly. In fact, he said, he would add "no monopoly" as a fifth principle to the four the President cited in his speech.

The meeting concluded at 11:50.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

March 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo of Italy

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a Memorandum of Conversation for the record of the President's meeting on Wednesday, March 9, 1983, with Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo.

At Tab II is a memorandum from Mike Wheeler to Jerry Bremer at State forwarding a copy of the memcon for their information.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>	
<i>OK</i>	—	That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.
<i>OK</i>	—	That you authorize Mike Wheeler to forward the memorandum at Tab II to Jerry Bremer attaching a copy of the memorandum of conversation for their information and records.

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed Memcon with Foreign Minister Colombo
- Tab II Wheeler to Bremer memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

AS 5/11

RECEIVED 11 MAR 83 19

TO WHEELER

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 11 MAR 83 38

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

C 1 5/5/11

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BTW PRES & KOHL 6 MAR CONGRATULATING
GERMAN CHANCELLOR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 3/14 Noted by Poundstone DBL

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *et* *(c)*

National Security Council
The White House

574

1740p
MAR 1 1 1983

Package # 1615

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

**National Security Council
The White House**

40

Package # _____

MAR 1 1 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~ **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**
INFORMATION

John Poindexter

March 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Memcon of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl

Attached for record purposes is a summary of the 6 March telephone conversation between President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl.

Tab A Memcon

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CU 8/5/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl

DATE, TIME March 6, 1983
AND PLACE: 4:15 - 4:20 p.m.

Chancellor Kohl: How are you, Mr. President?

President Reagan: I'm just fine, but I am more fine now in learning of your victory over there. Believe me, we have been watching with great interest, and I am delighted. Congratulations.

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your congratulations and for the gesture of friendship in calling me. And you may assume, Mr. President, that today you have won additional friends in Europe and in Germany. And we will take a good path into the future.

President Reagan: Well, believe me, it was a courageous decision on your part to call the early election and, of course, you were right to do so as it turned out. And we do look forward to continuing to work with you on the many challenges that face all of us, both with our economy and our security.

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, Mr. President. You were right; it took a certain amount of guts to take that risk and call the elections, but it has paid the proper dividends. Our citizens seem to understand what the issues are, and now in the fall when many important decisions have to be made with regard to security we can base those decisions on a broad mandate of the people.

President Reagan: Well, believe me, we do look forward and I look forward to working with you on that and on maintaining this friendship and alliance we have. Now, I know you have a lot of work to do on this, your election day, so I'll let you get to it. Nancy sends her best and from both of us, please give our regards to your wife. And once more, congratulations on this great victory.

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Please pass our greetings and the greetings of my wife along to Nancy also. I would also like to tell you that we really have two

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA CS DATE 5/5/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

celebrations back-to-back. In an hour and a half we will have a new day here and my wife will have an important birthday--her fiftieth. So, we will be celebrating not only tonight, but it will go right on to the next day.

President Reagan: Well, happy birthday to her and auf wiedersehen!

Chancellor Kohl: Danke schoen and auf wiedersehen!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 12 MAR 83 13

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 11 MAR 83

44

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

cu 3/5/11

KEYWORDS: TUNISIA

HS

KIRKPATRICK, J

BOURGUIBA, HABIB

SUBJECT: REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR PRESIDENTIAL MSG TO PRES BOURGUIBA FOR DELIVERY BY AMB KIRKPATRICK

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 14 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

WETTERING

DUR

WHEELER

COMMENTS

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S/S 8307186

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1664

March 11, 1983

83 MAR 12 P 1: 14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message to President Bourguiba of Tunisia

We recommend that you authorize the Department to cable the text of the attached letter from President Reagan to President Bourguiba to our Embassy in Tunis for delivery by Ambassador Kirkpatrick. She will be in Tunis from March 21 to March 23, after visiting Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. She will bear Presidential messages to the heads of state in each of those countries.

Charles Hie

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested letter.

DECLASSIFIED
Dept of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY NARA, DATE 5/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OADR

Department of State
Suggested Message

Dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to extend to you my warm greetings in the spirit of personal friendship which has developed through our frequent correspondence. Ambassador Walters has reported to me that his recent meetings with you and your able Prime Minister, Mr. Mzali, fully reflected the closeness of our two governments.

I have asked Ambassador Kirkpatrick to take time from her heavy schedule at the United Nations to visit some of our most important friends in the Middle East. Tunisia figures prominently on that list because of our friendship, the strength of the ties that link our two countries, and the respect I have for your political wisdom. The Ambassador carries a message from me and the people of the United States: we stand beside you and the people of Tunisia as friends and supporters of your security and independence in these times of trouble.

As we have discussed in previous letters, I believe that the peace proposal I enunciated on September 1 of last year contains the best hope of resolving a dispute which brings sorrow to so many nations and peoples. I also believe that we

His Excellency
Habib Bourguiba,
President of the Republic of Tunisia,
Tunis.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M10-361/z #109082
BY ON NARA DATE 10/12/12

must free Lebanon of foreign forces for a resolution of the conflict to endure. Be assured of my resolve to pursue the goal of peace consistently and vigorously in the time ahead. I hope that I can rely on your frank and sage advice in this matter of truly global importance.

My warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8301824

RECEIVED 17 MAR 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 17 MAR 83 48

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

GI 5/5/11

KEYWORDS: IRELAND

FITZGERALD, GARRETT

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES CONVERSATION W/ PM FITZGERALD

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 1824

'83 MAR 17 P6:21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[checkmark]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[checkmark]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Telephone Conversation
with Irish Prime Minister FitzGerald

Attached for your information is a summary of the telephone
conversation between the President and Irish Prime Minister
FitzGerald.

Tab A Memcon

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 14, 2009
BY NARA CA, DATE 5/5/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Irish Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald
Irish Ambassador Tadhg O'Sullivan

DATE, TIME: March 17, 1983, 2:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: Irish Embassy

Amb. O'Sullivan: I have the President of the United States Mr. Ronald Reagan with me, who would like to say a few words to you.

President Reagan: Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: Mr. President, it is an honor for you to ring me on this St. Patrick's Day. I appreciate it greatly, and all our people do.

President Reagan: Well I just called to wish you a most happy St. Patrick's Day and to tell you how pleased we are that Foreign Minister Barry has been able to visit us here. We've lunched, and we're now gathered here at the Embassy for a reception and I wanted to take this opportunity to speak to you of my own personal interests in the efforts that you are undertaking to achieve reconciliation between the two Irish communities. You can count on me to do whatever we can to support that effort. Our ambassador, Peter Dailey, keeps me up to date on your thinking, so I hope you will stay in close touch with him.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: Yes.

President Reagan: I've issued a statement today which emphasizes the policy themes which I've expressed in previous St. Patrick's Day statements. I hope it will remind our own citizens here that we are determined to end any American link with the violence and that only a democratic approach supported by both Irish traditions can work. Vice President Bush and my advisor Bill Clark have both told me of their high personal regard for you and I hope that one of these days that you and I will be able to get together.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: I hope so. Maybe here in Ireland before long.

President Reagan: Well, I would look forward to a visit there. I hope that you and Mrs. FitzGerald and all the people have as enjoyable a day as we are having here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 110-361/2 #109083
BY CN DATE 10/12/12

109083 51

Prime Minister FitzGerald: Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President. I want to thank you for what you said about your support for our efforts to reconcile the two traditions in Ireland. This was a theme which was agreed upon by Prime Minister Thatcher and myself some 15 months ago when we met in London. It is an objective that all of us must have to achieve this peacefully, democratically. I might mention to you that as a step in that direction we recently established a forum for political parties on this island which reject violence-they must have nothing to do with any party that doesn't reject violence-come together and see what kind of paths to the future we might be able to suggest that would guarantee the identity and the rights of both traditions in this country and offer the possibility of some way out of the present violence and deadlock. And we will be grateful for your support in this and in the other efforts you are making and we know we have that support and your statement shall be heartening and encouraging to us. We are very heartened and encouraged if it were backed up by your coming here in person and I hope you may be able to do that before very long.

President Reagan: Well, we shall retain our good relationship and shall cooperate with you. Mr. Prime Minister, I think something is happening to our connection. You've begun to fade. I don't know whether you are hearing me now but you're beginning to fade and I'm having difficulty hearing you.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: I can hear you alright, but I'm sorry that it's not coming through the other way. Even in these days, we get these difficulties.

President Reagan: That was a little better.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: Well, thank you again for your call and thank you very much for coming to the Embassy again.

President Reagan: It's a great pleasure and on this particular day, especially. And again my regards to you and Mrs. FitzGerald.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: And to you and Mrs. Reagan. Thank you again, Mr. President.

President Reagan: Thank you. Goodbye.

Prime Minister FitzGerald: Goodbye.

**National Security Council
The White House**

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Package# _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>R</u>
Situation Room			

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DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN
(July 19, 1983, 9:37 - 9:41 am)

Begin: Hello?

President: Menachem? This is Ronald Reagan. How are you?

Begin: Thank you very much. I phoned you just to tell you that while you have all the time been so grateful for your invitation and I accepted it, but for purely personal reasons, I can't make it next week, and I have to apologize with all my heart for all the inconvenience I caused to you and all your advisers.

Perhaps we can put another date later in the year.

President: Well, I'm sorry to hear that Menachem. I was looking forward to it, but I understand you have personal reasons. Tell me, how are you feeling?

Begin: Well, this are the reasons that I can't make it next week. Actually, it was my duty to tell you much earlier, but all the time I hoped that I would be able to come.

President: Uh Uh

Begin: I postponed the announcement until the very last moment, the week before. I am so deeply sorry, and apologize.

President: Well, I understand and we'll find a date later then when we can do it.

Begin: Thank you very much.

President: Alright.

Begin: It's so kind of you and I am sorry for the trouble.

President: Not at all, I understand. Good luck to you.

Begin: Bye

President: Bye

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN
(July 19, 1983, 9:37 - 9:41 am)

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Begin: Bye

President: Bye

RECEIVED 31 MAR 83 15

TO CLARK

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 30 MAR 83

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ac 5/16/11

KEYWORDS: AFRICA

ZAMBIA

KAUNDA, KENNETH

AP

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MAR 30 MTG W/ KAUNDA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 01 APR 83 STATUS C FILES PA

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National Security Council 602
The White House

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Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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MEMORANDUM

2128

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

March 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK


FROM: FRED WETTERING 

SUBJECT: Zambia: Memcon of the President's March 30 Meeting with Zambian President Kaunda

Attached is my memcon covering the salient points from the President's March 30 meeting with Zambian President Kaunda.

For what it's worth, I thought the Zambians were delighted.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve Memcon.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment
Tab A

Memcon

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109084

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2128

59

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State George P. Shultz
 Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan
 William P. Clark, Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs
 AID Director Peter McPherson
 Asst Secretary of State Chester Crocker
 Ambassador Nicholas Platt
 Ambassador Vernon Walters
 Charles Tyson, NSC
 Fred Wettering, NSC

 President Kenneth Kaunda
 Reuben C. Kamanga, Chairman of the
 Political and Legal Committee
 Lameck Goma, Foreign Minister
 Ambassador Putteho M. Ngonda
 Wilted J. Phiri, Special Advisor
 D.C. Mulaisho, Special Assistant
 K. Kangwa, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, March 30, 1983, 11:30 a.m.
 to 1:30 p.m.

PLACE: Oval Office/Cabinet Room/State Dining Room

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Zambian President
 Kenneth Kaunda (U)

The President and President Kaunda exchanged pleasantries in the Oval Office. The President presented President Kaunda with a set of golf balls. (U)

The President opened the substantive talks in the Cabinet Room by noting President Kaunda's role as a peacemaker and statesman. (S)

President Kaunda expressed his thanks for the welcome and stated Zambia's appreciation for US economic assistance. (S)

The President noted he was interested in President Kaunda's views in a number of areas. The President noted that we are vitally interested in Namibian independence and peace in Southern Africa. He stated that we had a formula which we

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NLRR M10-361/2 #109084
BY CU NARA DATE 12/15/12

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believed would accomplish these things but it involved withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. In the Middle East, the President stated our proposal will provide for a peace settlement and a homeland for the Palestinians. In Korea, we hoped for eventual unification; we have supported talks between the Koreas but North Korea has imposed unacceptable preconditions. On South Africa, we are opposed to apartheid. We had our own racial problems and overcame them. Coercion is not going to solve this problem but we believe persuasion, supporting moderate forces of change, will lead to a solution. We will continue to do this. We have some optimism. We are totally opposed to violence as an answer in Southern Africa. We believe it important to get people talking to one another. We are aware of the drought and Zambian economic difficulties, and I will propose a meeting of our economic experts to examine the problems, the President said. (S)

President Kaunda began a lengthy response by thanking the President for his outline and stating he would comment on each point. On Southern Africa, President Kaunda noted his credentials to speak and his personal belief in nonviolence. He expressed support for the President's views on the necessity of peaceful negotiation. He noted his admiration for President Nixon in opening channels between China and the US. He noted that when the USSR attacked Czechoslovakia in 1968 he spoke out and attacked them. He noted these illustrations indicate Zambia's support for President Reagan's thoughts on peace and negotiations. President Kaunda remarked that he told South African Prime Minister Botha that their fundamental difference was apartheid, which is a violation of Christ's message. (S)

President Kaunda stated his fear is not so much what the US or Zambia wants to do, but the trend of events in South Africa towards an explosion of violence much worse than the French revolution. He noted he told the Portuguese in 1966 that they must negotiate with the nationalists or face communism in Portuguese Africa. They ignored the message and now we have Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique. The independence fighters wanted arms, they got them from the Soviet Union, and Soviet ideology followed the weapons. President Kaunda stated his belief that Christ's message is stronger than communism, and that one cannot fight communism using communist methods. South Africa will explode, he repeated. He told this to successive South African Prime Ministers. Violence in South Africa is increasing. A few years ago I pled to the West, to the President's predecessors on Zimbabwe (that there must be negotiations with the nationalists). Finally there were, but 30,000 lives were lost. But the whites remain in peace in Zimbabwe - even Ian Smith. In Zambia, the whites remain in peace despite atrocities they committed during the independence

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struggle. But in Mozambique and Angola they (the whites) are finished. I told South African Prime Minister Botha, it is not NAC leader Oliver Tambo who is bringing communism to South Africa, it is you, Botha, by resisting talks. (S) 61

He noted the West sees South Africa as attractive for investment and an important source of strategic minerals. But recently a major investment in South Africa, the Sasol plant, went up in flames. Regarding strategic minerals, both we and the Zimbabweans continue to sell to the West. Even the Angolans allow Western firms to exploit its oil for profit. (In an aside at this point, President Kaunda urged the US to grant recognition to the MPLA regime in Angola). (S)

President Kaunda noted that only a powerful "rightwing" US President could make peace with Cuba or really handle the South Africans. (S)

President Kaunda stated he knows Dos Santos (President of Angola, Machel (President of Mozambique), Neto (former President of Angola). They are communists but human beings. (In another aside, President Kaunda expressed strong appreciation for and approval of US efforts to normalize relations with Mozambique). He feared chaos in Angola if President Dos Santos goes. (S)

President Kaunda noted the vital importance of pressure on South Africa from the West and especially from the US. Fast action is imperative, he reiterated. He noted that he told South African Prime Minister Botha that we (all the Southern African states and leaders) are in a canoe going downriver out of control. Unless there are changes the canoe will tip over. He advised Botha to begin talks with Mandela (imprisoned ANC President Nelson Mandela) and Sissulu (another imprisoned senior nationalist) and forget about Tambo (Oliver Tambo, acting head of the ANC - based externally). Find a formula with them - this is the only chance for peace. (S)

The conversation then continued over lunch in a series of questions and answers. President Kaunda asked for an update on Namibian negotiations. Secretary Shultz acknowledged President Kaunda's powerful presentation but noted South African fears of Soviet encirclement. The Soviets and their Cuban proxies are their main concern, although the South Africans have disingenuously attributed this to us from time to time. So we need a schedule for Cuban withdrawal from Angola. We get a sense of movement but nothing hard as yet. (S)

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President Kaunda dodged a question from Secretary Shultz on how the Angolans saw the Cuban presence. President Kaunda noted he supported bilateral talks between the US and Angola and South Africa and Angola, and again asked how we saw these going. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that, like Middle East talks, there is always movement, solutions seem possible, but nothing concrete has yet emerged. (S)

Assistant Secretary Crocker seconded Secretary Shultz' remarks, noting there is progress but as yet no firm proposal on withdrawal of Cubans. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that on the South African-Angolan talks, we see these as reinforcing our efforts. We had hoped that a ceasefire could be negotiated but that does not seem attainable as yet. (S)

President Kaunda dodged a question by the Vice President on the UNITA movement in Angola. He expressed the fear that a confrontation situation was building up in Angola. (S)

The President noted the common nonaligned states view that the US was fixated in the Soviet Union and Cuba, East-West confrontation. But look what was happening in our continent. The Soviets and Cuban proxies were involved in a kind of imperialism - they come as partners, but quickly become senior partners. President Kaunda mentioned normalizing relations with Cuba. We have tried. Dick Walters, here, has quietly been to Cuba, but there is no chance of reconciliation given what they are doing in El Salvador and Central America. They are putting in a massive injection of weapons - even US weapons captured in Vietnam. (S)

President Kaunda stated that the Cubans are costing the Angolans a fortune, but they have to protect their sovereignty. The Angolans are greatly in fear of a South African invasion up to the capital. Again, President Kaunda urged the US to establish diplomatic relations with Angola. (S)

Secretary Shultz remarked that President Kaunda's analysis gives him hope that if assurances can be given on South African withdrawal that the Cubans can be sent away. He added that we want that to happen at the same time. (S)

President Kaunda stated that Zambia respects that the US has sincerely been talking to the Angolans on Cuban withdrawal. He again asked how these talks were going. Secretary Shultz noted the possibility of an emerging understanding. (S)

President Kaunda noted his meeting in New Delhi (at the NAM summit) with Yassar Arafat. He asked why the Israelis are

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not responding to the President's initiative. The President noted that Yassar Arafat's problem is that he cannot bring himself to pronounce the "magic words" - recognizing Israel's right to exist. The President added that we do not believe that true peace negotiations can begin until all foreign forces are out of Lebanon, and this is taking a long time. Arafat agrees with this, and also has problems with some of his own factions. The President noted how frustrating this problem is. President Kaunda noted that, according to Arafat, there was no outright rejection of the President's peace initiative by the Palestinians. He found this interesting. (S)

The President stated that we believe the Palestinians should be present at peace talks; the question was who would represent them. It would be difficult for Arafat to do this until he recognizes Israel's right to exist. King Hussein advises that this may be possible once Lebanon is resolved. (S)

President Kaunda asked that since the Israelis must know the US will defend them in any case what is their fear? The President responded by noting the fear of giving up the West Bank without absolute security guarantees. Israel is very narrow there. But Israel cannot go on living in an armed camp believing itself surrounded by hostile forces, the President added. (S)

President Kaunda asked about North Korean preconditions on talks with the South Koreans. Secretary Shultz responded that the North Koreans have been very rigid, demanding prior US troop withdrawal and other conditions which would in fact make them dominant. We have been trying to be helpful, creating small steps and scenes for both Koreas to get together, but the North Koreans have been intransigent. The Japanese suggested a plan of cross-recognition of the Koreas by each party of supporters, but again North Korea balks. (S)

In a series of quick conversation shifts, Secretary Shultz noted the tragedy of Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and his admiration for Yugoslavia and President Tito. (U)

President Kaunda asked about our relations with Romanian President Ceausescu. Secretary Shultz explained our concerns about human rights violations and US laws which mandate certain responses in terms of changing Romania's trade status with the US. (S)

There was a brief exchange between principals on Cyprus. President Kaunda asked about world peace. The President responded that this is everyone's major concern. He outlined the series of negotiations and proposals we have going - START, INF, MBFR, and summarized his proposal this morning on an interim INF solution. He explained on INF the current

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imbalance in Europe which favors the Soviets. The President stated that we are willing to meet anytime on these vital issues. He recalled the generous US record at the end of World War II when the US was the sole nuclear power. (S)

The conversation concluded as the group adjourned for the departure area. (U)

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