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President Reagan (11/01/1982-12/06/1982)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/26/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/01/1982-12/06/1982)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 50

JAUVERT/BROWER

19

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117410	PROFILE SHEET	RE. TALKING POINTS <i>R</i> 8/30/2012 M371/1	1	11/23/1982	B3
117401	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO RR RE. CALL TO NEW JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	1	11/24/1982	B1
117402	TALKING PTS.	RE. PRESIDENT'S CALL TO PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE [ATTACHED TO DOC. 117401] <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	1	ND	B1
117403	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR THROUGH CHARLES TYSON TO CLARK RE. CALL TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	1	11/22/1982	B1
117409	FORM	RE. TRANSMITTAL [W/NOTATIONS] <i>R</i> 8/30/2012 M371/1	1	ND	B3
117404	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL OF LEBANON <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	6	10/19/1982	B1
117405	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	4	11/15/1982	B1
117406	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL <i>R</i> 6/22/2015 M371/	7	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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19

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117407	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MONGE <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	12/4/1982	B1
117408	CABLE	BOGOTA 13027 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	12/4/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Ed Roberts,

File.

J

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Phone conversation between President Reagan and
Prime Minister Begin.

PRESIDENT: Hello, Menachem,

BEGIN: Good evening.

PRESIDENT: Menachem, this is Ronald Reagan...

BEGIN: I know...

PRESIDENT: Menachem, I just want to tell you I have just
learned the news...

BEGIN: Yes.

PRESIDENT: ...and I know there are no words that can be of help
at a time like this, but please know that Nancy and
I are just so deeply sorry for you. Wish we could
say something to help. I know you will be going
back, is there anything we can do for you?

BEGIN: No, thank-you. (inaudible)... we will fly back
home...

PRESIDENT: I'm, I'm having trouble hearing you.

BEGIN: Nothing can be said. I am so grateful to you for
calling.

PRESIDENT: Well, Menachem, just know that you'll be in our
prayers.

BEGIN: (inaudible) I apologise that I can't come to see
you.

PRESIDENT: There's nothing to apologise for.

BEGIN: It meant so much for me to go. I didn't want to go, because of her illness. All the times I've postponed this journey. She insisted so much ... the doctors told me ... before it happened she was so happy, in a year she has changed so much ... I should service the country.

PRESIDENT: Well Menachem,

BEGIN: Thank you very much. Thank you, God bless you.

PRESIDENT: Bless you and if there's anything we can do let us know.

BEGIN: Express my gratitude to Nancy for me. (inaudible) thanks our dear, dear friends, thank you very much. Good bye.

PRESIDENT: Good bye.

117410

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8208035

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)~~
RW 8/26/11

RECEIVED 23 NOV 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 22 NOV 82

TYSON

22 NOV 82

4

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

AP

NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES 26 NOV TELEPHONE CALL TO NEW PM NAKASONE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 24 NOV 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

CHILDRESS

MCGAFFIGAN

WHEELER

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-371 # 117410

BY RW NARA DATE 8/30/18

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Pres

P 11/24

for decision via PDB

NOV 30 1982

Pres made call

54 CT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PK

(8)

8035

5


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1982

Mr. President,

It is almost certain that Nakasone
will be elected either Thursday
or Friday.

Recommend you place a call to him
tomorrow evening, November 26,
around 8:00 p.m. -- which would be
1:00 p.m. Friday, November 27 in
Japan.


Bill Clark

Attachment

Call memo

(7)

117401

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8035

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to New Japanese Prime Minister

Issue

It appears likely that the new Japanese Prime Minister to be selected, probably on November 26, by the Japanese Diet, will be Yasuhiro Nakasone.

Facts

It is desirable that you and Nakasone establish a personal relationship as quickly as possible. He has recently expressed a desire to do this in a conversation in Tokyo with Gaston Sigur. Gaston is a friend of long-standing with Nakasone.

Discussion

As is usual in these cases, the State Department will be preparing for you a cable of congratulations to Nakasone on his election. In view of the troubled relations between Japan and the United States, I recommend that you go beyond this normal message and telephone Nakasone your personal best wishes. He would be delighted with this gesture and I am sure the Japanese press and public would react most favorably.

Talking points that you could use for this conversation are attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK No

WPC

That you telephone Prime Minister Nakasone congratulating him on his election.

Attachment:
Tab A: Talking Points

Prepared by:
Gaston J. Sigur

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR M3711 # 117401
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE
CALL TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE

-- May I be among the first to congratulate you on your selection as Prime Minister. Anyone who has come to the top through the democratic political process respects the long hard road it takes to get there and you have my sincere admiration.

-- I very much look forward to a chance for us to get to know each other personally in the near future, and of course will be welcoming you to the Williamsburg summit. I already know we have a lot in common in trying to bring about fiscal austerity despite the competition of many worthy budget demands.

-- This is not the time to get into substance. I would only say that despite the attention the newspapers may pay to various issues under discussion between our two countries, you can count on my working with you on the premise that we enjoy one of the most beneficial and productive partnerships the world has known. We look forward to bringing the tremendous influence of our two countries to bear constructively on world issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRB M3711 # 117402
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *cm*

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to New Japanese Prime Minister

During my luncheon meeting in Tokyo with the probable new Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, on November 18, he was clearly delighted with the idea that the President might telephone congratulations to him on his election to the head of the Liberal-Democratic Party and, subsequently, to the position of Prime Minister of Japan. This would be a most appropriate step for the President to take and would begin a personal tie between the two leaders which is so critically needed now in the troubled U.S.-Japan relationship.

I recommend that the President place a personal telephone call to the new Japanese Prime Minister upon his selection to that post by the Diet. The date will probably be November 26. The exact timing of the call will depend upon when the vote is actually taken and how this corresponds to the time difference between the U.S. and Japan.

There should be no need for an interpreter. Nakasone's English is quite adequate, if the President speaks slowly and distinctly.

I attach talking points for the President to use in his conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I with talking points at Tab A to the President.

Approve ✓ 11/24/82 Disapprove _____

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab II to Sadleir.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Clark memo to President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab II Schedule Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR # M3711 # 117403
BY RW DATE 6/22/15

8

8035

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1982

Judge,

Admiral Poindexter and Gaston feel that the President should make the call. The Admiral said that our relationship with Japan has some difficulty and it is important that we get off on the right foot with Nakasone, if he is elected -- which is almost certain to take place Thursday or Friday.

Recommended time of call is 8:00 p.m., Thursday, Nov 25 (California time) which would be 1:00 p.m. Friday in Japan.

klm

11740A 43C

National Security Council The White House

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID-371 #11740A

Package # 8035

BY RW NARA DATE 8/30/12

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
 Recommend taking on AF-1
 and giving to Pres.
 Give memo to Sadler to Dave
 Fisher ↓
 To GO to PRES. w/11/25 *John* POB Done

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8035

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

November 22, 1982

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: Telephone Call to new Prime Minister of
Japan, Yasuhiro Nakasone

PURPOSE: To congratulate Mr. Nakasone on his election
to the head of the Liberal-Democratic Party,
and, subsequently, to the position of Prime
Minister of Japan. This would begin a personal
tie between the two leaders which is so critically
needed now in the troubled U.S.-Japan relationship.

BACKGROUND: Nakasone is the probable new Japanese Prime
Minister. There is no need for an interpreter.
Nakasone's English is quite adequate.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: The day that the Japanese Diet chooses the
new Prime Minister -- probably Friday, Novem-
ber 26. Time to be determined.

LOCATION: California

PARTICIPANTS: President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Brief telephone call

REMARKS REQUIRED: Congratulations on Nakasone's appointment.

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Gaston Sigur

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW DATE 8/26/11

~~Confidential~~ *rw 8/26/11*

8035

✓
Com - bab
Yan RR

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES 7

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DACOM # _____

RELEASER _____

DEX # _____

DTG 272025Z NOV82

TTY # _____

12

FROM/LOCATION/

1. Milade / Rancho del Cielo, CA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Judge Clark / Santa Barbara #02 TOR: 272059Z NOV 82

2. Richard Darman / Washington #02

3. _____

4. _____

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

*Nabason Call
Made by RR*

~~Confidential~~

CLASSIFICATION

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~ *pw/rd/ll*

ID 8208179

UNCLASSIFIED UPON RECEIPT OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 NOV 82 17

TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 26 NOV 82

13

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

GEMAYEL, AMIN

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES 19 OCT MTG W/ PRES GEMAYEL

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 30 NOV 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KEMP

DUR

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8207135 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C DEC 03 1982 *McFarlane approved* *HTL*

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *(PA)* *4* (C)

14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH ~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

November 26, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*

SUBJECT: Memcon for President's Meeting with
President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon,
October 19, 1982

Please review and approve the subject memcon for file.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

APPROVE *RCM/H* DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment
Tab A - Memcon for Gemayel Meeting
with the President

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH ~~SECRET~~ *AW 8/26/11*
ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

117404

THE WHITE HOUSE

8179

15

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George Shultz
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam
Peter McPherson, Director, AID
Robert Dillon, Ambassador to Lebanon
Ambassador Morris Draper
Assistant Secretary Nicholas A. Veliotos
Geoffrey Kemp, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, National Security Council

President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon
Foreign Minister Dr. Elie Salem
Dr. Baha Eldine Albissat
Minister of Hydroelectric Resources
Ambassador Khalil Itani
Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Muhammad Atallah
President of the Council for
Development and Reconstruction
Ambassador Ghassan Tuani
Former Minister
Mr. Alfred Madi, Private Counselor
Ambassador Abbas Hamiye, Acting Chief of Protocol

DATE, TIME, AND LOCATION: Tuesday, October 19, 1982; 8:30-9:15 a.m.
The Cabinet Room

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLR M371/1# 117404
BY RW
DATE 4/22/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16

MINUTES

President Reagan welcomed President Gemayel to the Cabinet Room. He said that he was very pleased that the US had helped stop the fighting in Lebanon and was working to accomplish peace. The US was prepared to do all it could to help Lebanon. President Reagan then turned to Secretary Shultz.

Secretary Shultz said that there were four subjects that needed to be discussed in the morning session: withdrawal of all foreign forces; Lebanon's relationship with Israel; the assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces; and reconstruction and rebuilding of Lebanon.

President Gemayel said that he brought a message of gratitude from the Lebanese people: that the US had brought Lebanon hope after eight years of despair and tragedy. We do not want this hope to fail. You are a hero. After eight years this is the first time that we see a light at the end of the tunnel. Thank you for risking the lives of the American Marines. I know and appreciate what that risk is. I intend to repay this debt fully with a reciprocal commitment to U.S. goals. Lebanon is ready to become part of your strategic system in the Middle East. It is the wish of the Lebanese people to have such relations. We want to reinforce these relations. Every family in Lebanon has relatives in the United States. There are very close family ties and the same human values. These are freedom, democracy and human rights. Lebanon is the only Arab country with a democratic system, free elections, and free enterprise. Lebanon is close to America and we want to further improve ties and establish close cooperation between the Lebanese Government and the American Government. This is an expression of the wishes of the Lebanese people. The first problem we must deal with is the foreign forces that are in Lebanon without having been invited. We must work together to obtain their full withdrawal. We need their withdrawal to preserve our sovereignty, to rebuild our country and to play our proper role in the Middle East. The uniqueness and specificity of the Lebanese system has allowed Lebanon to always play this role but it is very difficult to protect our sovereignty and the entity of Lebanon due to the presence of foreign forces. We also seek peace in the Middle East. It is very important. We look at your plan as a new venture, as a new possibility for peace in the Middle East. But there is also a new policy at Fez. All the Arabs accepted it and they are promoting a new policy for the future of the Middle East. Lebanon can help bring peace. Lebanon is working for peace. We have paid much for the lack of peace. We want peace with Israel. We want to end the state of war. Lebanon can play a real role to help reach this peace. It is possible. Perhaps we need a new Camp David or some other initiative. Most important is peace sponsored by America. But, whatever is embarked upon should not destroy our national consensus.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Lebanon must respect its Arab ties. We cannot hurt them but we have to promote peace in the area and not undermine the US initiative. Every initiative should take this aspect into account but in the meantime we should start negotiations immediately for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. I also want to express my appreciation for the efforts of Phil Habib, Morris Draper and Bob Dillon. We owe them our deepest thanks. Active US participation is necessary in order for us to begin discussions with the IDF to bring about their withdrawal. These discussions should include an agenda and framework for the near future. Perhaps we could get an immediate good will withdrawal from the Israelis around the Presidential palace. Maybe we can use this exploratory committee for withdrawal and other preliminary discussions. This should involve you personally and directly.

Turning next to the Multinational Force we have to protect this process. The presence of the Multinational Force is more important for symbolic purposes rather than military purposes. I hope that the MNF will stay until the withdrawal of all foreign forces is complete and the rebuilding of the Lebanese Armed Forces is complete. I also hope that we can expand the number of the MNF as well as the countries involved. Regarding military assistance I appreciate the help provided by the US Government survey team. The Lebanese Armed Forces should soon be the only army responsible for the protection of Lebanon. A US-Lebanon military commission is also something that I would like to propose. Such a body could help solve other problems and coordinate out relations in the military area. The details could be discussed with the Secretary of Defense. We need your complete support and backing in this activity. We are trying to build a professional Presidential office. We need your assistance for organization and experience. American experience at the White House is good and it would help us manage our affairs. Perhaps we could obtain your help. Meanwhile, we are reviewing the needs of our people for reconstruction and development. Perhaps we could obtain more economic assistance from the USG. Regarding reconstruction your help is very important. U.S. leadership could encourage others to participate. Lebanon needs your support especially in the beginning. We estimate that we need a package of approximately 1 billion dollars per year. After several years the need for assistance will decline. We will not need such assistance permanently. If we compare this with others, Lebanon gets almost nothing. We need your complete support. We could restore the economy very quickly and we could be self-sufficient if your aid comes in the form of concessional aid and grant. Aid will cover the deficit, budget support, reconstruction and military support.

I would like next to address the Palestinian problem -- it has two dimensions -- security and human rights. The Lebanese are proud to be the one country that protects human rights in the Middle East. We gave the Palestinians more than anyone else.

We are ready to consider the Palestinians as our brothers and rebuild the system of their housing with decent conditions. We have security problems, especially with new arrivals connected with international terrorism and subversives. The Lebanese Government must be very strong. We want to prevent a repetition of the past. The location of the camps was chosen to prevent a property belt from being consumed around the capital. All the Lebanese Armed Forces actions against the Palestinians were controlled by the court. We have to promote this type of activity. We need a strong policy to prevent terrorism and the presence of illegal aliens.

Turning to withdrawal, we are ready to establish a structure to obtain the withdrawal of the Israeli Army. Any formula should respect our national consensus and our Arab relations. We have started talks with the Palestinians and the Syrians. We need your personal commitment to help with Israel. I come from a united Lebanon. We shall continue to pursue our mission.

President Reagan responded saying that the US intends to provide as much help as possible. The first priority is stabilizing the situation in Lebanon and ending its troubles. We want our forces to be there as long as they can help. We are not occupiers. We can give you help and help with the management of your executive branch. We are very anxious for withdrawal. One complication is your southern border. We believe there is a need for staged withdrawal to provide security. I understand that the need for this is due to the PLO. We also want to be of help financially. We are talking about 107 million dollars for this year. We have some of your countrymen being organized in the private sector initiative. We recognize your necessity to maintain ties with the Arab world and their importance to a lasting peace. We can be of help in our counseling of Israel. We do want to bring about peace between you and Israel but not at a cost of alienating Lebanon from the Arab world.

Secretary Shultz said that you two have outlined the work that is to be done. The US is prepared to work on a withdrawal plan. I met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir this week. We want to hear your thoughts. The spirit of the talks with the Israelis was consultative. General Bartlett has now returned from the survey team. We are organizing our thoughts on how to help the Lebanese Armed Forces. You will talk to Secretary of Defense Weinberger about that later today. Peter McPherson is our money man. He is organizing private initiatives. People like Mike Haboody in Houston are being very helpful. We see organized financial help coming from the public and the private sector plus the World Bank. Regarding the organization of the Presidential office Ed Meese can be of assistance. Treasury Department said that they can help with the Customs. As for the peace process, we are impressed with the fundamental importance you attach to it. Lebanon deserves

more than than any other country. President Reagan feels that way as well. Lebanon can play an important role as a bridge between Israel, the United States and the other Arab countries on this issue.

Secretary Weinberger said that we have a preliminary team report on what equipment and other forms of assistance would be of most help to Lebanon. He said that the morale seems to be improving due to President Gemayel's visit with the troops. On equipment the survey team agrees that tanks, APCs and Howitzers are important. The US wants to be as helpful as possible. In fact, we are prepared to take equipment from our own stocks and make immediately available 24 APCs, 12 Howitzers, and other equipment later. The Army is most anxious to be helpful but is reluctant to deplete its stocks. But we know that a strong, well-equipped army is needed right now. This is the first increment. Your brother asked for communications equipment and trucks. They were delivered right away. A joint commission is a good idea and we can explore that later on.

President Gemayel said that he appreciated the remarks of the Secretary of Defense. He read the minutes of the meeting between the Secretary of Defense and his brother. He also met with General Bartlett. What Lebanon needs is to move quickly from quantity to quality. Qualitative capabilities do not conceal quantitative deficiencies. Quick delivery is needed. There are many brigades without equipment. He said that if you could send the equipment immediately without delays the Lebanese could use the brigades immediately, especially if the army is to be deployed in the countryside.

Secretary Weinberger said that the largest available supplies are those pieces of equipment that the Israelis captured.

President Gemayel said that there are no problems with the militia. He is taking care of them. He wants to extend the presence of the army but most important is permanent coordination between Lebanon and the United States to obtain funds to re-equip the Lebanese army very quickly. He also hoped that someone could come soon to assist in training the army.

Edwin Meese said that he would be happy to help work something out in terms of helping manage the office of the President. Much has to do with personal style. The key things involve trust in your people, communications, economic policies, legislative relations and other matters. He would be happy to provide general and specific advice.

President Gemayel then said that he wanted to thank Mr. McPherson. He knows that Mr. McPherson has had a direct support role and has been very helpful.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20

-5-

Foreign Minister Salem then said that he wanted to underline several points. First America's continuing intervention with Israel to avoid direct pressure on Lebanon is very important. Lebanon cannot submit to Israeli pressure. Lebanon is ready to live in peace with Israel. It is prepared to be accommodating. It believes in the right of states to exist within the state system. But Israel must let Lebanon regain its health. America is a hero in the popular eyes of Lebanon.

President Reagan said that the US is extremely sensitive to this problem. We must move on a double track to persuade Israel to accept our judgment and not to interfere.

Foreign Minister Salem said there has been a qualitative change in Lebanon, a new determination, a new President committed to the elimination of terror in the states of the Gulf as well as Lebanon. Lebanon must regain its health with American support.

President Gemayel then thanked President Reagan for taking the time and the meeting broke up and the group went to the Rose Garden for a closing statement.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

443

21

RECEIVED

Package # 8179

82 NOV 29 P 6: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u> </u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>2</u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

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FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 02 DEC 82

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KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

KOHL, HELMUT

AP

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF KOHL VISIT 15 NOV

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 06 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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	<i>12/6</i>	<i>McFarlane approved recoms</i>		
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S 12/6</i>	<i>For signature</i>	<i>12/6</i>	
	<i>C 12/6</i>	<i>Wheeler's command</i>		<i>DB, MW</i>

DISPATCH

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of FRG Chancellor Kohl Visit,
November 15, 1982

Attached is the memorandum of conversation for the President's meeting with German Chancellor Kohl on November 15. Distribution of the memo should be restricted to those whose duties require them to know its contents. (C)

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Tab A Memcon

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW DATE 8/26/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 1037111 #117405
BY RW DATE 6/22/15 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
U.S. Ambassador to the FRG Arthur F. Burns
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William P. Clark
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane
Donald R. Fortier, NSC Staff Member

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
State Secretary Berndt Von Staden
Ambassador to the United States Peter Hermes
Director, Foreign and Inner-Government Relations and External Security Horst Teltschik

DATE, TIME November 15, 1982; 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Reagan opened the discussion by welcolming Kohl to the United States. He said that he was pleased with the agreement on East-West economic relations that was just concluded. He said that the French should take "whatever problems" they had with the agreement back to the entire group.

Chancellor Kohl began by thanking the President for his warm welcome. He said that our "common basic convictions" would have to "prove themselves in the years ahead." The Chancellor said he wanted first to describe the situation in his own country. The FRG, he said, faced difficult economic problems. These problems can be repaired, but Germany has spent too much for too long and must now begin to do a better job. The Chancellor said that it was his task to refute the idea that it was possible "to live better while working less." It will be necessary to tighten belts and pursue free market principles. Above all else, a strong fight must be waged against unemployment. The Chancellor observed that Germans hadn't known unemployment for twenty years. This winter there will be over two million unemployed persons in the FRG, many of them young. The Chancellor said that his main goal would be to stop this and to bring the level of unemployment down. At the same time, the Chancellor recognized that unemployment could not be resolved overnight, particularly in light of the problem's demographic dimension. In five years or so, the demographics would change for the better.

Turning next to international issues, Chancellor Kohl said, whatever you read or hear, "proceed on the assumption that the FRG will stand by the United States." The Chancellor said that he had recently seen studies which show how steady support for

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-2-

the US has remained despite the current "disorientation campaign." Ninety-seven percent of the FRG population trusts the US more than the Soviet Union. Never forget that, he said. This doesn't mean there isn't any criticism, but it should be kept in perspective. Speaking for himself, the Chancellor said, he doesn't like discordant music, he liked harmonic music.

Commenting on the peace movement, Chancellor Kohl said that Germany needed "soldiers who were convinced of the reasons for having to use the new weapons we are putting in their hands." We are a divided country. People are afraid of war. They have experienced it. The Chancellor said that the Soviet Union was conducting an "aggressive" propaganda campaign. He noted that the Soviet Union had spent over 60 million deutschmarks in trying to sustain a disorientation campaign in the FRG--as much as would be spent in the FRG's own electoral campaign this spring. The Soviet Union's strategic objective in Europe is to break the FRG off from the rest of the alliance. If this aim can be achieved through propaganda campaigns, the Soviets will win the war at a very small price.

Chancellor Kohl assured the President that the FRG would "stick by" the two-track decision. The Chancellor said he wanted to "cordially encourage" the President to tell his negotiators to be courageous and determined. The Chancellor said that people say the FRG is not informed about the negotiations. We are informed. We are getting good information. These reports, the Chancellor said, are just part of the slander being conducted against the US. Chancellor Kohl also affirmed that if there were no success in the negotiations the FRG will "put up the missiles." "We'll do it," he said, "even if I have to do it all by myself." The Chancellor added, however, that certain "psychological assistance was important with regard to the number under discussion, and also regarding the harmonization of the deployment schedules between one state and another. The Chancellor cited the prospect of major equipment being moved around England in May or June, with bridges being tested, the media alerted, and so forth. This could create problems.

Chancellor Kohl said that he didn't have to hold elections in March. He had the necessary majority. He was safe until 1984. He could sit in his office and ignore elections; this would be perfectly legal. The Chancellor said that he realized, however, that "there was both a written and a living constitution," and in the spirit of the latter he had chosen to seek a mandate. The Chancellor said that the opinion polls show that he has 52 percent of the vote. People, he said, want to know the truth. They are willing to make sacrifices. They don't want pious moralizing. The Chancellor said he would tell them "the straight story" on the missiles. This will be important to the United States because Germany is the "center of Europe." What the FRG does "makes a difference" to the other countries of Europe. The Chancellor also told the President that Mitterrand had recently paid him a visit. The Chancellor said he and Mitterrand saw eye to eye on

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security policy even though they were in different political camps. In fact, the Chancellor said, we have a much easier time with Mitterrand than with his predecessor. Mitterrand knows that the Rhine is only 300 meters wide at Strasbourg and on the other side sits the American army in Heidelberg. Chancellor Kohl concluded his introductory remarks by saying if there are problems they should be handled face to face not in public. "The telephone lines," he said, "are in order."

The President opened by saying that he too wanted to stay in close consultation. The President said that he understood Germany's economic problems, adding that we of course have many of our own that we are working hard to solve. The President said he also understood the Chancellor's immediate political problems. However, later on, when the time is right, we will have some problems in the defense area and elsewhere we will want to discuss. The President suggested discussing the question of the number of missiles at a later time and when proper. There is a problem the President said over our need for spares in order to assure the proper readiness. With regard to defense spending and foreign assistance, greater German efforts would help us with our own Congress. The President said he was determined to resist amendments to draw down US forces in Europe. In that effort, however, it would be helpful to be able to show our opponents that the burden is being effectively shared. The President concluded his opening remarks by telling the Chancellor: "You can bet on us to be with you."

Chancellor Kohl said he could suggest certain arguments that the President could take to the Hill in arguing Germany's case. The first problem Congress should be aware of was German demographics. Because of this, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain current force levels. The Chancellor said that not only would he have to face up to the two track decision, but he would also have to extend the period of the draft from 15 to 18 months. The Chancellor said this would have an adverse impact on students and complicate their ability to schedule courses. In addition to this, the Chancellor said he was opening the armed forces for women in noncombatant roles. Here, he said, the psychological burden is heavy, particularly for war veterans.

The President said he wanted to reassure the Chancellor with regard to the missile negotiations. We are very serious. But the President said he also told the negotiators that the US doesn't want a treaty just for its own sake. We want genuine reductions, the President added, not just cosmetics. As part of the negotiations, however, it is also important that we indicate a willingness to stick by the deployment plan. The President said he shared the Chancellor's experience with regard to the peace movement. Here, the President said, many of the same types of people are egging it on.

The Chancellor asked whether the President preferred to talk about East-West economic relations at lunch.

The President said he agreed with this. The President said he hoped the Chancellor felt as he did about the LOS Treaty.

The Chancellor said that the President's man had been to see him, and that they had talked at length about the subject. The Chancellor said that in the next few weeks he would be having the necessary consultations on this question. The FRG will have to discuss the matter with its European partners. The Chancellor said he would be back in touch on this. It is, he said, an important issue that goes far into the future.

The Chancellor said he wanted to bring up the economic summit and Mitterand's visit. He said he couldn't be too sure what French reasoning was on this, but assumed that timing was part of the issue. The Chancellor said that if he could offer just a bit of advice it would be to take Mitterrand's opinion into account. The Chancellor said he had no illusions about US-French relations. There have always been big problems, the Chancellor knew, but in the crunch the two countries have always stood side by side. Next to the Poles, the Chancellor said, the French are the proudest people in Europe. I live near the border, the Chancellor said, and I know this first hand. Germany carries the burden of centuries on her shoulder. She can take such things less critically. "My advice and my neighborly plea," the Chancellor said, is "to take a psychological step so that the French can join." The French need to be tied into the economic summit because there is a lot at stake and some current French policies particularly need to be discussed.

Judge Clark said that the French had given no reason for their objection beyond the date. May 29 had been agreed to by everyone else and, because of the tourist season, the Williamsburg facilities would not be available at the other date.

The President said the problem with tourist reservations at Williamsburg was a real one. We have no Versailles Palace.

Chancellor Kohl said again that he hoped the French would come and that delegations would be smaller. The Chancellor again asked the President for "a personal gesture," "It is important, he said, "to have the French with us."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(The meeting moved to the State Dining Room for a working lunch, and the following additional participants joined:)

United States: Secretary Regan
Secretary Weinberger
General Vessey
Secretary Baldrige
Director Charles Wick
Mr. Robert McFarlane
Dennis C. Blair, NSC

Germany: State Secretary Schreckenberger
Franz Pfeffer
Dr. Ackerman
Dr. Stolze
Dr. Ruth)

Chancellor Kohl opened the luncheon discussion by returning to the subject of the Siberian Pipeline. He thanked the President for the decisions announced on Saturday. He said that he had not invented the pipeline and was "not a great fan" of it. It had been on his desk when he arrived. For him now the issue was German reliability. It was necessary to demonstrate that the government of the FRG kept its commitments. This went for the two-track INF decision as well. The Chancellor was not interested in going into the past, but proceeding from the situation of the present. The President's decision announced on Saturday concerning East-West trade and the pipeline was an excellent one. It had created a good atmosphere for the Chancellor's visit. The agreement that had been reached on trade with the East was reasonable and the Chancellor pledged to defend the agreement publicly. Intensified talks on these topics were important. Many Europeans did not understand, the Chancellor continued, that the United States had international responsibilities, that it was itself a continent with two coasts. It was necessary for Europe to understand American responsibilities just as Europeans should ask the United States to understand its responsibilities. (C)

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BY RW DATE 6/22/15

The Chancellor recalled the visit that Prime Minister Thatcher had paid to Berlin when she had seen the Wall for the first time. She had been depressed by the sight of the wall and equally struck by the crosses commemorating those who had died trying to cross the wall -- going from one part of Germany to another part. This division of the country was bound to affect the German view of relations with the Soviet Union, in the area of disarmament in particular. After all, the Soviets had "17 million hostages." As an example, the Chancellor described a decision he had made several days before in which he had paid ransom for some 65 political prisoners who had been arrested in East Germany. He felt that for human reasons he had to make the payment and free the prisoners. The Chancellor continued to analyze the effect of the events in Poland on Germany. Nothing like it, he said, had affected the German people as much in recent years. German-Polish history had been "full of difficult chapters." Terrible things had been done by each people to the other. The German reaction to the events in Poland had been horror, but there had been a positive side: private donations worth 200 million DM had been collected from Germans and sent to private Polish citizens in forms of gift parcels, taking advantage of free postage. (C)

The President said that there never would have been U.S. oil and gas sanctions against the Soviet Union if the agreement which he announced on Saturday had been in place earlier. He had tried for many months unsuccessfully after the Ottawa Summit to work out this sort of an agreement. The agreement, as it now stood, was much more effective than the U.S. sanctions. The job now was to work seriously on the development of alternative energy sources -- Norway, primarily, and Algeria, as examples -- so that a second strand of the pipeline would not be built. This had been his goal all along. The President repeated that if the agreement that he had announced on Saturday had been in place earlier, he would not have imposed the sanctions. (C)

The discussion turned to the new Soviet leadership. The President said that it was his evaluation that the new Soviet leader would be a very tough adversary. He did not see great changes in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union was faced with major economic problems. The change of leadership gave an opportunity to let the Soviet Union know publicly that they could easily have better relations with the West "if they changed their ways." The President said that the Soviets did not have to make any great public announcements about changed behavior, but only to take a specific action. If they would take an action to indicate a willingness to deal peacefully with the rest of the world, the United States would be prepared to take an immediate reciprocal action, to meet their quid with a quo. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said that he shared the President's evaluation of the new Soviet leadership: It was not just one man, but "a crew."

The Soviets did not believe in replacing an old generation with a new generation; the new leaders all seemed to be of an age. Chancellor Kohl said that he was basically reassured by the advanced age of the Kremlin leadership. It was his reading of history that it was safer for other countries for potential adversaries to be led by elders. He recalled that Hitler was reported to have said at the time of Munich that he (Hitler) would have to start a war before he was fifty. The Chancellor continued to analyze communist economic development. He noted that after 40 years of communism Poland had shown that the people were "running away" from the Communist Party. They were turning to other parts of Polish society, for example, 130,000 had gone on a pilgrimage to the Black Madonna. Contrary to their goals, communist regimes had not been able to develop "the new man" that they had sought. The West needed perseverance, steadfastness, courage, wisdom and also the ability to respond flexibly to communist regimes. It was necessary to keep in mind the objectives of detente. The Chancellor pointed out that the development of Solidarity under Lech Walesa's leadership in Poland had caused problems in East Germany. The East Germans had asked themselves why such an independent labor movement could not be developed in their country. It was necessary to exploit this sort of development in approaching the "new man" of Eastern Europe. The Chancellor noted that President Reagan's speech in Berlin had been a particularly effective approach of this type. He said that President Reagan was extraordinarily effective when he could get his message directly to people; for example, when he had spoken in Germany he had increased his standing by 12 points in the polls. The reason was that he had overcome the distorted images that had previously been held by most Germans and Europeans. The Chancellor said that the President should not underestimate the impact that he was able to make personally in Eastern Europe as well. The people of West Germany and Europe, the Chancellor concluded, wanted peace, but did not want peace at any price. Therefore the President, by addressing the Europeans directly as he had on his trip would make it more difficult for the Soviets to "deal in fear" as they had been able to do in the past. (C)

The President pointed out that there were two common explanations for Soviet behavior: One was that the Soviets were following the teaching of Marx and spreading the world revolution of the proletariat. The second explanation was they were paranoid and afraid and were expanding in order to protect themselves. The President pointed out that it was absurd for the Russians to believe that any country was out to conquer them. He asked the Chancellor's opinion on this question. (C)

The Chancellor replied that both explanations were correct. Fundamentally, Soviet policy was Russian policy. Marxist-Leninist ideology was an addition, but underneath Soviet policy was imperial great Russian policy. Historically, the Soviet Union had no

defensible frontiers. The approaches to the homeland had been wide plains, therefore traditionally the Soviets had attempted to build buffer zones. This explained much of the history of Poland. Twice invading armies from Western Europe had reached the Soviet capital -- Napoleon and Hitler. Chancellor Kohl said the President was right. No country seriously threatened the Soviet Union, least of all the Federal Republic. From a rational point of view there was no threat, but there was an irrational but deep fear among the Russian people, which the government exploited to justify military expenditures. The Chancellor noted that he and the President as politicians knew the importance of irrational emotions held by people and how they must be taken into account. It was also important to look at history. In the 19th century, the Russians had had the same fears and Bismark had recognized these and was therefore careful to maintain the balance which would keep the Russians satisfied. On the other hand, this fear also offered an opportunity that could be exploited. It was a key element of Russian policy never to take great risks, never to move when the risks were high. The only recent exception to this had been the move into Afghanistan. (C)

The President recalled the analysis done in two books by Laurence Beilenson, a lawyer who had become an historian after retirement. He had written three books about history, the first, called The Treaty Trap had shown that any country which had put its faith in treaties rather than building up its defenses had failed to protect its national interests. The second book, on the use of subversion, had shown that although many countries in history had used subversion against their adversaries to a certain extent, Lenin had uniquely based an entire approach to foreign policy on it. Beilenson had also found that the Soviets or the Russians would not make an aggressive move if it risked a threat to their homeland. They would never gamble if there were a threat to Russia itself. The President said he could not help but remember 1928 when the Soviets had made a proposal for worldwide disarmament. He wished that someone would remind them of that. The President said that he had been recently pursuing quiet diplomacy with the Soviets. As a politician he knew that if he made public demands on the Soviets they would find it impossible to give in, so he had privately asked for a gesture, a concrete action from the Soviets. The President cited as an example the Pentacostalists who were in the basement of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Their release was the sort of gesture he was looking for. If the Soviets took such an action, the U.S. would not publicize it, but would reciprocate with an appropriate response. The President said that President Nixon had been able to operate in this fashion. He had asked Brezhnev to take a number of actions privately and Brezhnev had taken some of them. President Nixon had responded immediately with reciprocal actions. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said that the most important issue of the day was peace, that is, peace and freedom. He recalled from his family history that his mother's brother had been killed in World War I, that his parents had then given the same name to his older brother and that brother had been killed in World War II. Chancellor Kohl had given the same name to his son, although his mother had opposed it and that son was now serving in the army before going to university. The Chancellor said he told the story as he understood the President was a man with a heart, a man who could see the human aspects of the problems which confronted him. It was necessary to see the human side of great problems, while not neglecting the danger and the threat. The Chancellor continued to discuss the INF deployments. He said that if in the fall the negotiations had not achieved results in Geneva he expected all of the basing countries to go forward with their deployments, but even if they did not, the Federal Republic would. The Chancellor said that he had made this clear in his party platform. (C)

President Reagan said that he was willing to deal with the Soviet Union on a human basis. He recalled that when he was recovering in the hospital from being shot, he had written a letter by hand to Brezhnev asking him to sit down together to talk about the aspirations of their people and what their leaders could do for them. The President said he didn't know if Brezhnev ever saw the letter, since the reply came through normal diplomatic channels and contained all the normal Soviet propaganda. That did not mean he would give up trying to establish contact with the Soviet leadership. He would try again, but as the Chancellor had said, never losing sight of the threat. It was important for the Soviets to understand that the United States would not buy peace at any price. (C)

The Chancellor replied that if it had not been for that principle, Berlin would long ago have fallen. He gave another example of the lack of Soviet concern for the human aspects of their policies. Rudolph Hess had been 35 years in jail. It required 60 people to guard him and the Soviets were even now arguing over what would happen with his body after he had died. The Chancellor had told Brezhnev that their policy on Rudolph Hess was the greatest stupidity that they were conducting in Germany. (C)

The President asked if the responsibility for guarding Hess were rotated among the Allies. He asked in jest what would happen if Hess escaped while the United States had the guard. The President said that it was typical behavior for the Soviets to get themselves in a spot like this from which they could not back down publicly. (C)

Chancellor Kohl asked for the President's assessment of the current developments between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

The President replied that he did not think the People's Republic was pushing very hard for a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. He thought there might be some moves in order to balance their relations with the United States. For the United States, he said it was important to keep in mind in developing the relationship with the People's Republic that they might draw closer to the Soviet Union and that therefore care was needed in developing the relationship. He then asked the Chancellor for his opinion of the Soviet economy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl responded that he did not believe the Soviets would be able to overcome the current crisis in their economy. Although state-run economies could achieve some successes, they were limited. He gave an example from the German experience in which collective farms were on one side of a valley in East Germany and private farms run by West Germans were on the other side of the valley. It was obvious at haying time that the private farmers worked as long as necessary to get the job done while the collective farmers would knock off at 5:00 p.m. Yet this was an example from the GDR, one of the more successful Eastern European economies. Another example was Czechoslovakia which before the war had been one of the most highly developed countries in Europe and now was not even a factor. It was the simple fact that the collective system did not allow the commitment and dedication of a private system. (C)

The President responded that Soviet people themselves had 60 years to see the effect of a communist government. It was also clear in other regions of the world when you compared similar countries with free and state-run systems: North versus South Korea, The Peoples Republic of China versus Taiwan, Singapore versus its neighbors, some countries in Africa. In every case the collectivized system had failed. He recalled an anecdote he had used as a candidate. He had said that for the United States to adopt the Soviet system it would be necessary to tear down 70% of its houses, destroy 9 out of every 10 automobiles, tear up 80% of its highways and so forth. In addition it would need to find a capitalist country to sell it grain to make up for its farming inefficiencies. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said that the question that the President had asked was a question that only an American could ask in that way. A European would have a different approach. America has not had the historical experience that Europe has had. The main reason why there had not been change in the Soviet Union was because a new change would mean that the ruling group would lose. That is why the loss of one man like Chairman Brezhnev would not make a change to the government and its policy. The sergeants in the Red Army live better than they had before and they therefore had a stake in continuing the present system. The Chancellor

went on to give another personal example. The people who lived in the GDR for the last 50 years had only known the Nazis and the Communists. The Chancellor's own wife was born in Leipzig and the other citizens of Leipzig who had not come to the FRG had known nothing else. The ordinary citizen in East Germany had to face decisions of where his children would be sent to school. He knew if he baptized them in the church the good schools would be closed to them. There were occasional people of principle who could stand up to this sort of pressure, but most people went along with the system. The Chancellor pointed out that he and President Reagan had once been in opposition. Think of the number of friends they had had then compared to the number of friends they now seemed to have. Those in the East aged 60 or younger had lived under one aristocracy after another. The attitude towards it had passed from generation to generation. The bureaucracy was a relatively small portion of the population, most could not enter it and those who did had a vested interest in continuing the system. The Chancellor recalled the famous child psychiatrist who said the education of a child starts 25 years before his birth with the education of his parents. He and the President in their arrival remarks had spoken of the contributions of Germans to the United States. In the Chancellor's home district, one out of three had emigrated to the United States. These were the most dynamic of its citizens, those who were willing to take risks. Those citizens who were left behind were in many cases not only less willing to take risks but they then had been subjected to many years of dictatorship. Look what the Nazis had managed to do during 12 years of dictatorship, the Chancellor observed, and don't underestimate the effect of sixty years. The Chancellor could recall from his own background how an authoritarian government could force people to go along with its programs. Ambassador Hermes' father had been one of the rare exceptions who had stood up against the Nazis. The Chancellor said he was now preparing a speech to give on the 30th of January 1983 on the anniversary for the 50th anniversary of the coming to power of Hitler. It was the anniversary of opportunism in Europe. (C)

The President ended the meeting by telling a joke about the Communist party which was told among the Russian people. (U)

MEMORANDUM

8104

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. POINDEXTER

FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memcon of FRG Chancellor Kohl Visit

Attached for your approval is the memcon from the Kohl visit. There are no controversial items in the minutes and I recommend that you approve Mike Wheeler's transmission of the memcon to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab I.

Approve *PCM* Disapprove _____

That you approve forwarding the memcon to State with the Wheeler memo at Tab A.

Approve *PCM* Disapprove _____

Tab I Memcon
Tab A Wheeler to Bremer memo

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Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 14, 2006
BY NARA *RW* DATE *8/26/11*

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 8104

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Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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
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TO POINDEXTER

FROM ADAMS, A

DOCDATE 06 DEC 82



KEYWORDS: COLOMBIA

COSTA RICA

MONGE, LUIS A

LATIN AMERICA

BETANCUR, BELISARIO

SUBJECT: PRES MEMCONS DURING LATIN AMERICA TRIP / PRIVATE BILATERAL MTGS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 10 DEC 82 STATUS S FILES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

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8404

December 6, 1982

02 11 01

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Memcons during the Latin America
Trip

Following up our phone conversation of earlier today, I am enclosing two memcons of the Presidential trip to Latin America which I am not sure you have received: private bilateral meeting between the President and President Monge, and the President's second meeting with Colombian President Betancur. Other than giving Tom Enders an info copy of the memcons, we are holding further distribution pending receipt of clearance from you on these as well as any memcons which we receive from the President's trip over the next few days.

Alvin P. Adams, Jr.
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Meeting between President Reagan and President Monge (S/S 8237538).
2. Meeting between President Reagan and President Betancur (S/S 8237539).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (with ~~SECRET~~ attachments)

DECL: OADR

NODIS

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY rw NARA, DATE 8/26/11

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S/S 8237538

117407

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PRIVATE BILATERAL MEETING

NLRR M3711 #117407

BY FW NARA DATE 4/22/16 PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MONGE

Saturday, December 4, 1982, 8:30 AM to 8:50 AM

When the press was still in the room for a photo opportunity, an American reporter asked the President if it was true that there were 150 CIA agents in Honduras, as the New York Times had reported. He answered that he could not confirm that and doubted that the Times could, and that he was not accustomed to answering questions regarding national security during photo opportunities.

After the press left, President Monge said that the press had been doing a lot of damage. He said that the Communists were waging a propaganda campaign against him, accusing him of "militarizing" Costa Rica. He was shocked that an American reporter had asked him yesterday if this were true.

The President agreed that the press could do a great deal of harm, and told the story of a secret shipment of 4000 unescorted soldiers who had been sent to Iceland by Roosevelt just before Pearl Harbor. The New York newspapers had learned of the secret departure of the ship and had published the story, thus endangering the lives of 4000 unarmed men. He added that he gets very tired of stories being attributed to "unnamed White House sources"--when he asks the newspapers why they did not call for confirmation, they say "If you deny the story, then we cannot print it."

President Monge said that it was a great privilege to have the President in Costa Rica, and that it was a special honor for him to have met with the President three times in five months. Before this there had been a certain resentment, that the Costa Rican people who are so loyal in their friendship to the US have had so few presidential visits. This is the third one, following upon Hoover's in 1929 and Kennedy's in 1963, just months before his assassination. Thus in 161 years of independent life, only three visits from a US President. This visit is a great help to him in the face of the Marxist propaganda offensive. Now they are saying that Monge has made secret commitments to the President and to the CIA to attack Nicaragua. He has made fun of these accusations, asking with what guns and tanks Costa Rica, a country without an army, would wage such an attack. He then went on to explain that Costa Rica is probably the only Latin American country without an "anti-American trauma"--the people genuinely like the US and do not fall for the anti-Reagan and anti-American preaching of the left. Yesterday the Communist Party tried to organize a demonstration

downtown and it was a total flop. They managed to scrape together 70 people to parade down the Avenida Central, but when the shoppers and other passers-by saw them, they started to attack them physically and the police had to be called in to protect the Communists!

At this point, the Chief of Protocol ushered in Mrs. Monge and their daughter for photographs and for an exchange of gifts (Mrs. Monge sent Mrs. Reagan a pre-Colombian gold pendant). Following this, the two Vice-Presidents came and all adjourned to the expanded bi-lateral.

Drafted by: Stephanie van Reigersberg: State: 632-8917

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AMERICAN EMBASSY SAN JOSE

TELEGRAM**C**

ACTION:

INFO:
CHRON~~SECRET~~

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BOGOTA 13027

DECLASSIFIED

M3711 #117408

BY RW DATE 6/22/15

EXDIS

FOR PRESIDENTIAL PARTY: FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ AND
 JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN; RONALD)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BILATERAL WITH COLOMBIAN
 - PRESIDENT BETANCUR

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY SHULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CLARK AND AMBASSADOR BOYATT MET WITH COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT BELISARIO BETANCUR FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES DECEMBER 3 IN THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. BETANCUR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DESIGNATE (VICE PRESIDENT) AND AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO WASHINGTON ALVARO GOMEZ HURTADO, FOREIGN MINISTER RODRIGO LLOREDA CAICEDO, MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT RODRIGO ESCOBAR NAVIA AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY ALFONSO OSPINA.

3. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, FOREIGN MINISTER LLOREDA OPENED THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE TOASTS OFFERED JUST PREVIOUSLY BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS REFERRED TO MANY IMPORTANT AND DELICATE ISSUES WORTHY OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. TO THIS COULD BE ADDED THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAD DEALT WITH VERY POSITIVELY RECENTLY BY SUPPORTING THE UN RESOLUTION. IN THIS REGARD, LLOREDA UNDERLINED THE GOOD IMPACT THIS US ACTION HAD ENGENDERED DURING THE RECENT OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY OVER WHICH HE PRESIDED. LLOREDA CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD EXPRESSED VIEWS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND INQUIRING ABOUT THE STATUS IN CONGRESS OF US-CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE (CBI) LEGISLATION.

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4. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED, OBSERVING THAT THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE GRANT PROPOSAL HAD ALREADY BEEN APPROVED BY CONGRESS AND THAT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WERE NOW WORKING ON THE TRADE PROVISIONS. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED HOW THE US LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM WORKS AND NOTED THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE WHICH IS HANDLING THE LEGISLATION HAD RECENTLY TRAVELLED THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN REGION AND RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH THE US-CBI PROGRAM. THE CHAIRMAN PROMISED TO WORK THE LEGISLATION THROUGH THE HOUSE DURING THE SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL SESSION WHICH WILL TERMINATE IN MID-DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CORRESPONDING SENATE COMMITTEE, SENATOR DOLE, HAD PROMISED TO HAVE THE COMMITTEE RESPOND QUICKLY TO WHATEVER LEGISLATION THE HOUSE, WHICH MUST TAKE THE LEAD ON THESE ISSUES, MIGHT INITIATE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MET WITH THE LEADERS OF BOTH HOUSES TO DISCUSS THE CBI LEGISLATION AND THAT ONLY LAST MONDAY THE SENATE LEADERSHIP HAD PROMISED ITS SUPPORT. THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP HAD ALSO DONE SO ON OTHER OCCASIONS. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT, WHILE THERE WAS STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE LEGISLATION, ITS SUCCESSFUL PASSAGE THROUGH CONGRESS WAS NOT GUARANTEED. THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS HAVE WORKED HARD ON IT, HOWEVER, AND THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE IT WOULD BE APPROVED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

5. PRESIDENT BETANCUR WENT ON TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE COLOMBIA GAVE TO PARTICIPATION IN THE NASSAU GROUP (CANADA, MEXICO, VENEZUELA, THE US AND COLOMBIA) BUT ITS VEXATION AT HAVING BEEN INVITED TO JOIN RATHER LATE. IN THIS REGARD, HE STRESSED COLOMBIA'S CARIBBEAN GEOGRAPHIC CREDENTIALS, INCLUDING 1,500 KILOMETERS OF CARIBBEAN COAST LINE. BETANCUR THEN ATTEMPTED TO DESCRIBE THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS THE ANDEAN GROUP COULD MAKE TO DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE CARIBBEAN. HE SAID THAT, IF THE ANDEAN GROUP BECAME ECONOMICALLY STRONGER, IT COULD QUOTE IRRIGATE UNQUOTE THE CARIBBEAN, THROUGH INVESTMENT IN AND TRADE WITH THE REGION. THIS IDEA, HE CONCLUDED, WAS A THEME FOR FURTHER REFLECTION. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE US WELCOMES THIS SORT OF THINKING. THE SECRETARY SECONDED THIS POINT SAYING THAT IF THE ANDEAN GROUP BECOMES STRONGER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ALL PROVIDED IT DID NOT BECOME PROTECTIONIST. THIS WAS A DANGER OF REGIONAL GROUPINGS.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER LLOREDA RAISED A THEME CURRENT IN COLOMBIA OVER THE LAST YEAR OR SO: THE POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTANCE FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO THE CARIBBEAN BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS UTILIZING COLOMBIAN EDUCATIONAL AND APPRENTICESHIP INSTITUTIONS. CANADA WAS PROPOSING THIS KIND OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION, AS WERE ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS. THIS IS A CONCEPT WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER. BETANCUR TOOK COLOMBIA'S POTENTIAL ROLE AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT A STEP FURTHER BY STATING THAT SMALL CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WERE MORE COMFORTABLE RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM COLOMBIA BECAUSE IT WAS LESS DOMINATING THAN THE BIG POWERS. COLOMBIA WAS PERCEIVED AS AN EQUAL.

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7. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE US-CBI PROGRAM IS AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO GET THE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVED. TO THIS END HE HAD ASKED CONGRESS FOR CHANGES IN THE TAX LAWS TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT IN THE REGION AND STIMULATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAD RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY, THE PRESIDENT SAID, AND IS MERELY WAITING NOW TO SEE WHAT CONGRESS WILL DO. PRESIDENT REAGAN OBSERVED THAT IN THE US THE DEMOCRATS CONTROLLED THE HOUSE AND, IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN TWO YEARS, WERE NOT EAGER TO HELP HIM. WHEN BETANCUR OBSERVED THAT THE OPPOSITION CONTROLLED THE HOUSE IN COLOMBIA, THE PRESIDENT OFFERED HIS SYMPATHY. SECRETARY SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE DEMOCRATS WERE NOT EAGER TO HELP THE PRESIDENT, THEY FEARED HIM AS A TOUGH OPPONENT AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR LEADING CANDIDATE, SENATOR KENNEDY, FOR THE 1984 RACE. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID HE HAD FOUND THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH THE LEGISLATIVE OPPOSITION WAS TO TAKE THE CASE DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE. IF PUBLIC SUPPORT CAN BE GENERATED, THE OPPOSITION MAY NOT SEE THE LIGHT, BUT IT CERTAINLY WILL FEEL THE HEAT.

8. LLOREDA RAISED CENTRAL AMERICA. HE SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE TWO OPINIONS ON THE SITUATION THERE: ONE IS THAT NICARAGUA IS PROGRESSING ALONG THE PATH CUBA FOLLOWED AND WILL BECOME A SOVIET SATELLITE; THE OTHER IS THAT IF NICARAGUA IS NOT PUSHED, IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR A REAL DEMOCRACY TO DEVELOP THERE. VARIOUS GROUPS IN COLOMBIA AND PRESUMABLY THE US ALSO ADHERE TO ONE OR THE OTHER OF THESE VIEWS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHICH IS CORRECT, LLOREDA SAID, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BROADEN SAN JOSE MEETING OF OCTOBER 4, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE PARTICIPANTS SPOKE OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY, BUT NICARAGUA AND GUATEMALA WERE NOT PRESENT. SOME BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO INCLUDE THEM BOTH IN FUTURE MEETINGS AND VENEZUELA AND MEXICO AS WELL.

9. THE PRESIDENT PICKED UP QUICKLY ON THE THRUST OF LLOREDA'S REMARKS AND STATED THAT THE US HAD TRIED TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH NICARAGUA AND WE WISHED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, NICARAGUA HAD DECEIVED THE US, LIED TO US ON SEVERAL THINGS THEY SAID THEY WOULD OR COULD NOT DO. SECRETARY SHULTZ ADDED THAT THE DEBATE DESCRIBED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TAKES PLACE EVERYWHERE. IF NICARAGUA EMERGES AS A MORE PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, THAT WOULD BE GREAT. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, THERE WAS NO DEBATE IN THE US OVER THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF NICARAGUA BEING A BASE FROM WHICH ARMS ARE SHIPPED TO INSURGENTS FIGHTING AGAINST NEIGHBORING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS. THE US IS TRYING TO HELP THOSE NEIGHBORS ACHIEVE SECURITY AND INTERDICT THE FLOW OF ARMAMENTS TO GUERRILLAS. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT NO MISTAKE SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING US OPPOSITION TO THE FLOW OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH CUBA TO NICARAGUA. THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS OF EL SALVADOR, COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS DESERVE A CHANCE TO BECOME STABLE AND DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIES.

10. JUDGE CLARK POINTED OUT THAT HARD INTELLIGENCE PROVES THAT SINCE JANUARY OF THIS YEAR MORE ARMS HAVE FLOWED TO CUBA FROM THE SOVIET UNION THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE LAST TWENTY-ONE YEARS. FULLY RELIABLE REPORTS SHOWED THAT THERE WAS A MIG WING IN CUBA READY FOR SHIPMENT TO NICARAGUA WITH NICARAGUAN PILOTS BEING TRAINED IN BULGARIA TO FLY THEM.

11. PRESIDENT BETANCUR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE MORE FRANK THAN FOREIGN MINISTER LLOREDA, WHO WAS A DIPLOMAT. (IN AN ASIDE HE SAID HE ALWAYS WANTED TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT HAD ONLY BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THE PRESIDENCY.) IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE, HE AVERRED, TO WORK WITH NICARAGUA. EFFORTS BY NEUTRAL PARTIES TO PERSUADE THE NICARAGUANS COULD BE EFFECTIVE. THEY MUST BE MADE TO SEE IF PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. THEREFORE, AT THE SAN JOSE MEETING THE FIRST QUESTION LLOREDA ASKED WAS "WHERE IS NICARAGUA?" A GUATEMALA, BETANCUR ASSERTED, IS ABSURD.

12. THE PRESIDENT SAID THERE WAS ONE THING TO BE ESPECIALLY ON GUARD FOR: THE US EXECUTIVE, HE NOTED, HAD OBTAINED APPROVAL FROM CONGRESS FOR SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS IN GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUA PREDICATED ON NICARAGUA'S WORD THAT THEY WOULD STOP HELPING SUBVERSIVES IN OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAVE DETERMINED, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, THAT THEY NEVER STOPPED FOR ONE MINUTE SO THE US ENDED ITS ASSISTANCE. THE US PROVIDED AID, BUT THE NICARAGUANS DID NOT KEEP THEIR WORD.

13. OBSERVING THAT THIS WAS SHORT, PRESIDENT BETANCUR SAID THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT THEME THAT SHOULD BE RAISED: "DON'T ABANDON BOLIVIA. BOLIVIA NEEDS SUPPORT." THAT IS WHY WHEN AMBASSADOR BOYATT INQUIRED WHETHER IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A MEETING OF HEMISPHERIC PRESIDENTS IN BOGOTA, HE HAD REPLIED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE IT IN BOLIVIA SO PEOPLE COULD SEE WE ALL SUPPORT THAT NEW DEMOCRACY. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY WOULD SEE THEIR COUNTRY AS SURROUNDED BY SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY. THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS IN COMMERCIAL CREDITS AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT TO BOLIVIA.

14. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED, LAUGHING, THAT THE US HAD ALREADY STARTED. IN A SLIP OF THE TONGUE, AT THE LARGE DINNER IN BRAZIL, HE HAD SAID BOLIVIA WHEN HE MEANT BRAZIL. SO WE ARE ALREADY HELPING. BETANCUR RECOUNTED THE STORY OF COLOMBIA'S BELOVED PRESIDENT VALENCIA WHO AT THE STATE DINNER IN HONOR OF VISITING FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE RAISED HIS GLASS TO THE GLORY OF SPAIN.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID THE US AGREED ON BOLIVIA AND SUGGESTED THAT, AS HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER LLOREDA NOW KNEW EACH OTHER WELL FROM SEVERAL MEETINGS AND AS VICE PRESIDENT GOMEZ WOULD SOON BECOME THE NEW COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE, NOT ONLY ON BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT ALSO ABOUT OUR NEIGHBORHOOD--THE REGION INCLUDING CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. THE COLOMBIANS WELCOMED OUR SUGGESTION.

16. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY RAISED THE NARCOTICS ISSUE AND PRESIDENT BETANCUR SAID HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ~~ALREADY DISCUSSED THE ISSUE IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING BEFORE LUNCH AND HAD A COMPLETE MEETING OF THE MINDS.~~ HE WAS NOT MORE SPECIFIC. BOYATT

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