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File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (08/04/1982-08/06/1982)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

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JAUVERT/BROWER

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117218	MEMCONS	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SAUDI ARABIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	8	7/20/1982	B1
117226	MEMCONS	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	7/30/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 04 AUG 82

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

SYRIA

SAUD

AP

KHADDAM, ABD H

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & SAUDI ARABIAN FOMIN & SYRIAN FOMIN 20 JUL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 07 AUG 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8205101 8205012 NSCIFID (N /)

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<i>HT</i>	<i>8/6</i>	<i>McFarlane approved recon</i>		
<i>S</i>	<i>8/6</i>	<i>Memo on Heller</i>	<i>8/7</i>	
<i>C</i>	<i>8/9</i>	<i>Wheeler of memo</i>		<i>HT</i>
		<i>to Bremer</i>		

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon for the President's Meeting with
Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud
and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam,
July 20, 1982

As requested, we are forwarding the approved subject memcon
for your information.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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RW
8/24/11

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117218

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam (U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff to the President
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)
Zaki Aslan, Interpreter, Department of State
Prince Saud al-Faysal, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Faisal Alhegelan, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Hassan Shawaf, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Rafic Jouejati, Syrian Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Sabah Qabbani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Samiah Abek Fares, Interpreter

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Tuesday, July 20, 1982; 11:15 a.m.-12:20 p.m.; The Cabinet Room

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The President opened the meeting by expressing his delight that Foreign Minister Saud and Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam had come to visit and exchange views. We still believe in what the U.S. has been trying to accomplish in the Middle East, President Reagan said. Lebanon must be a sovereign nation with its own strong central government. Its territorial integrity must be preserved and all foreign forces must leave Lebanon. The situation of the Palestinians must be solved in the general sense as well, but the principal problem that we are now faced with is the presence of PLO forces in West Beirut. They must leave in order for other forces to leave Lebanon. The U.S. welcomes the help of the Arab League Delegation to solve these problems. The PLO should be dispersed in the Arab world so as not to impose a special burden on any one Arab country.

Prince Saud stated that he had held very fruitful talks with Secretary Shultz regarding Lebanon. He said that the Arab League is in complete agreement with U.S. goals for Lebanon, i.e., Lebanon must be a completely sovereign nation, its central government must be strengthened and restored, its territorial integrity must be preserved and all foreign forces should leave. He said there is absolutely no difference between the U.S. goals and the Arab League goals. The Arab League will cooperate in any way that the U.S. and the Arabs together see fit. He described the Arab League mission that he was on as follows: To discuss UN Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. He said that the PLO has made the decision to leave Beirut. This has been announced publicly. The Arabs are not shrugging their responsibility nor are they seeking the procrastination of the dispersal of the PLO from Lebanon. Saud said that he had asked Shultz what would the Israelis do following a PLO withdrawal from Beirut. Is there an Israeli commitment to withdraw from Beirut? If Israel does not withdraw, what steps will be taken? He then referred to a specific proposal for Beirut that he had described to the Secretary. He asked the President for his opinion and answers to these questions.

The President said that all available means will be taken by the U.S. to ensure that Israel returns to its own borders, but he reiterated that the main stumbling block to progress is the PLO. The PLO attacked Israel and this led to Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

Prince Saud answered that for history's sake the Arabs are sure that the Palestinians had strictly controlled the cease-fire. Even when it was broken by the Israelis, Saud argued, Palestinian retaliation was symbolic. He stated that this view was confirmed by the American Embassy in Jidda and by Ambassador Habib.

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The President responded that, in any event, the reason for Israel's action in Lebanon will have been removed once the Palestinians leave West Beirut. He repeated that the U.S. will do all that it can to ensure Israel's removal.

Prince Saud asked whether temporary withdrawal, as the Arab League proposes, to the north would guarantee that Israel will not act elsewhere in Lebanon. He asked what would be the Israeli responsibility during this transitional stage and what assurances would be provided to the Palestinians.

Foreign Minister Khaddam then spoke. He thanked the President for agreeing to this meeting. He said he wanted to talk about several points in a clear and frank matter. The Israeli aggression confirmed the fact that Israel is working to destroy security and peace in the Middle East. A series of wars and aggression since 1948 have been caused by Israel. Lebanon is the latest example of this Israeli behavior. Ever since the cease-fire, American sources have assured the Arabs, and Habib confirmed, the Palestinians observed the cease-fire. But what has happened, happened. The Arabs want peace throughout the Arab world. Israel always creates new problems. No doubt that the U.S. shares the Arab opinion that the tragedy in Lebanon leaves a bitter taste. The Arabs believe that Israeli intransigence will lead to an end of moderation and new radicalism in the Arab world. This is promoted by Israeli extremism. The U.S. must play an essential role at this time, especially because U.S. aid in the form of political support, military assistance and economic assistance to Israel have given Israel the wherewithal to act the way it pleases. Khaddam further argued that the Arabs compute that the U.S. gives more to Israel than it gives to its own citizens. The U.S. must be fair and just. The Arabs hope that the President will assume an historic role such as that played by President Eisenhower in 1956. If President Reagan adopts a similar role, there is the possibility for a new era between the U.S. and the Arabs. The Arabs expect President Reagan to take this role because the region complains of injustice. He said that he knows that the U.S. understands what effects injustice can leave in the region. Khaddam then expressed his appreciation for the U.S. desire and willingness to help get Israel out of Lebanon. He asserted that the Arab proposal is helpful and constructive. At the same time, the Arab League will assume its responsibilities, but the question remains: If the Palestinians withdraw from Beirut, Israel should withdraw to provide breathing room, especially as they will be starting new administrative procedures to process the dispersal of the Palestinians. Israeli withdrawal to certain locations and then complete withdrawal would facilitate the Palestinian withdrawal. What Saud said about Arab League goals toward Lebanon, Syria is also committed to. That is, Lebanese independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity with a strong

central government. The only assurance for security for Lebanon and Syria is a strong Lebanon. A weak Lebanon creates difficulties for the Syrians. But, he argued, Syria cannot depend on the sectarianism of Lebanon. They want national reconciliation among all the factions and the Arabs are pleased at the American position. There is hope in the Arab world that the U.S. will help seek justice and evenhandedness in the region. For the sake of the world, given the importance of the Middle East to the world, there is an urgent need for peace. But the U.S. needs to adopt a clear position in order to give the Arab world a feeling that the U.S. is committed to justice. The Arab world knows of America's commitment to Israeli security, but Israeli security now threatens the Arab world. Syria looks forward to better relations between the U.S. and Syria.

Secretary Shultz, picking up on what President Reagan had to say, reiterated our policy on Lebanon. Lebanon must be clear of all foreign forces so that Lebanon can live securely without foreign interference. Then, the underlying Palestinian issues can be addressed. But turning to West Beirut, where will the PLO and the PLO fighters go? He said that the Arab League proposal had already been rejected by the Government of Lebanon. He asked whether the two ministers had additional thoughts on how they might be dispersed. Would Syria be prepared to take the PLO leadership plus 1500 fighters, the balance going to northern Lebanon and then to be dispersed? If this is agreeable, Phil Habib could work on it.

Foreign Minister Khaddam answered that Syria has expressed its willingness to accept the PLO leadership and offices, but as to the fighters, President Assad wrote President Reagan that Syria cannot take the fighters due to the number of Palestinians. He said that if the fighters came to Syria, 400,000 Palestinians would emigrate from Lebanon to Syria. He then asked whether Secretary Shultz meant all the combatants or just those in Beirut. If it is the Beirut combatants that are being referred to, then Syria can discuss it. But Syria can not solve all of the Lebanon problem and what is being requested is that Syria take them all. There are more than 30,000 fighters in Lebanon, Khaddam said. With their families that equals 150,000 people. If they go, the rest of the Palestinians will follow. Syria cannot bear this burden. The Palestinians will be a hotbed of trouble throughout the Arab world. This will be the fourth time that they have been kicked out of a state. Syria has security reasons for not allowing the Palestinians in. But, Syria welcomes the leadership, the offices, plus the Palestine Liberation Army membership of the Arab Deterrent Force. They can come back to Syria, but Syria cannot bear the burden of the rest of the Palestinians. Such a solution would give legitimacy to the Israeli invasion. This will be another success for Israeli aggression. The Israeli war machine, the aggressive Israeli spirit, and Israeli intransigence will then look for new targets and goals in the Arab world. Minister Sharon said to Suarez of Spain recently that he will not leave office until he has set up a new government in Jordan. He can

be in Amman in eight hours Sharon said. The Israelis are not natural people, Khaddam said. They are worse than Nazis. The television has shown the extent of Israeli destruction and the injustice faced by the Arab world. Syria cannot afford to absorb the Palestinians. Syria cannot guarantee that they will not infiltrate back into Lebanon, but the U.S. should not believe it is because Syria does not want to help.

The President responded that Khaddam seemed to be exaggerating the extent of the U.S. suggestion. The U.S. is talking about the PLO fighters in West Beirut. Maybe 1500 to 2000 would go to Syria. Meanwhile, Phil Habib would shuttle to find a dispersal site for the rest of them. They could go to a northern spot, lay down their arms, and the Lebanese government would be in charge. Infiltration would be a problem for the Lebanese government to handle but it would not be a problem if there had not been a government within a government, such as the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Regarding other Arabs, U.S. efforts are aimed at convincing the Arabs that we do seek justice and fairness in the Middle East. Like Egypt and Israel the U.S. goal is peace throughout the area. We intend to pursue that problem through UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Camp David framework. But the problem today is in West Beirut, the terrorists there, and elsewhere in Lebanon. This cannot be denied. They are the block to the continuation of the peace process.

Foreign Minister Khaddam responded. He said he wanted to be clear and frank. He told the President, You say that the Government of Lebanon must watch security, but every village in Lebanon has arms. A half million of them. How can the Government of Lebanon watch its borders with all of the armament? Further, he said, that Syria will receive the PLO, the leadership and its offices. Hundreds of people. Maybe even a thousand. Third, Khaddam said he does not share the President's conviction that the PLO are terrorists. They are combatants with an issue and a cause. They have not resorted to terrorism. But the Israeli invasion did not come about to establish peace and security. He then admitted that some individuals in the PLO may be terrorists, but basically the PLO wants peace and security. But if the PLO leadership is defeated in Beirut, then no one in the Arab world will be able to deal with the Palestinian movement. He then said that Habib can go to Arab countries. The two ministers will return and propose this to an Arab League meeting. He stressed that he truthfully wants to cooperate to find a solution. It is a danger to the world to let this situation continue.

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Secretary Shultz said he had listened carefully and wanted to summarize what he felt was a three-part commitment that the ministers had suggested. First, Syria will take the PLO leadership to include around a thousand PLO fighters from West Beirut. Second, as representatives of the Arab League, the ministers agree that if the Government of Lebanon could be persuaded to allow the balance of the PLO fighters to go to north Lebanon, then three, Arab countries would arrange for quick dispersal to various Arab countries, with Phil Habib's help, of the remaining Palestinian combatants.

Foreign Minister Khaddam answered, I want to amend your first point. Syria welcomes the PLO leadership and offices regardless of their number, but regarding the fighters, I cannot approve because the Government of Syria has already decided. After Minister Saud approves, then we will suggest this proposal to the Arab group. Regarding Ambassador Habib, he is always welcome in Syria, but Syria hopes that his role can be expanded. He came first to arrange a cease-fire. Now, Israel has turned him into a supply officer discussing how food will move through checkpoints into Beirut. He has been diverted from the main issue of his mission.

Prince Saud said that he wanted to elucidate further on the proposal. He wants to demonstrate the willingness of Arab countries to help with Beirut as well as the general Palestinian problem. This proposal focuses on Beirut. The Arab League believes it is the easiest and speediest way for them to be collected in Lebanon and then to be dispersed. But, the two cannot speak for the other Arab states. Once they have been collected in the north, the Arab League will be asked to meet to report and to determine who will accept them. But Syria cannot take all the fighters. Saud stressed, again, UN Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509. He asked, "How will this be carried out? What steps will be taken to guarantee Israeli withdrawal?" It is their understanding that Israel will withdraw to allow the Palestinians to withdraw. If the issue of Beirut is finished, then the siege of Beirut will be lifted. Does this mean there will immediately be Israeli withdrawal? The Arab League mandate that the ministers came under is to guarantee what specific steps will be taken in this regard. It is not clear what the ministers can say to the Arab League about Israeli withdrawal.

The President said that if the Arab League proposal, which focuses on the PLO leadership, is accepted, total Israeli withdrawal will have to await the disposition of the dispersal of the fighters. The U.S. has offered its help. Knowing

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the problems of Lebanon and its factionalism, the Soviet dimension, and the Lebanese army dimension, it would be our recommendation that in the event of the Palestinian withdrawal and dispersal Israel would withdraw and the siege of Beirut be lifted. In such a period a multinational force, if invited, could go in to ensure order while this is done. This would guarantee the safe withdrawal of the PLO.

Prince Saud said that his understanding is that the Palestinians will withdraw at the same time that the IDF withdraws. This would allow the movement of the Palestinians to the north. Meanwhile, the multinational force would be another element that would assist in this process. Assuming that the Palestinians leave Beirut, what other steps will the U.S. take to implement complete Israeli withdrawal? Saud said it must be clear to him what the procedures in the political sphere would be to guarantee withdrawal, especially since President Sarkis has asked for the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to leave. But that is a bilateral problem between the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Syria. That is not an obstacle to Israeli withdrawal. There are still no assurances that the Israelis will withdraw. What happens if Israel then asks about all the Palestinians in Lebanon, for instance, "they must also leave or we will not leave."

Secretary Shultz told the two ministers to face facts. The Israeli forces will not leave while other armed forces are still in Lebanon.

Prince Saud returned to the ADF. He said that if the Lebanese ask them to leave then they'll leave. But there is no guarantee regarding the Israelis.

Secretary Shultz said that we cannot sit here and negotiate a Middle East settlement. There is no time. But there is a need for a delicate orchestration of the withdrawal. To come back to Beirut in order for Habib to be successful, we need something different. What's new from this? When the PLO leadership leaves to go to Syria, then the balance of the fighters go to north Lebanon. Maybe the Government of Lebanon will buy this.

The President then said if this is accomplished and we develop a plan for dispersal, then we would use all our offices to accomplish an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. This will help Lebanon.

Foreign Minister Khaddam said that our mission is to find a way to carry out 508 and 509, but what we are now discussing looks as if the Israeli presence is being equated to the

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decision of other Arabs in Lebanon to invite in the ADF. But the ADF was invited because of the Arab League and the Government of Lebanon. Khaddam expressed his deep concern that allowing Israel to use force to change the conditions in Lebanon creates a great precedent and danger in the area. The Israelis must first withdraw, then other problems can be dealt with. The Syrian presence is not equal to the Israeli presence. Syria entered Lebanon for reasons that are well known and Syria will go out as it came in. But to link Israeli withdrawal to the Syrian withdrawal is unacceptable. The U.S. role must go beyond that of mediator. Were it not for U.S. military assistance, Israel could not have entered Lebanon or anywhere else. Khaddam could not equate any presence of an Arab in Lebanon with Ariel Sharon in Lebanon.

Prince Saud said, Our commitment is to the Government of Lebanon and its people. If we are to strengthen the Lebanese government to get the Palestinians to withdraw and to get the ADF out, then that must come at the request of the Government of Lebanon. The Syrian presence is not a stumbling block. But, if the Israelis say that they will not withdraw except with the withdrawal of others, then it is up to the Government of Lebanon. But will Israel withdraw?

The President answered that we respect fully the sovereignty of the Government of Lebanon. We are not equating Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. We are speaking of a time when the Government of Lebanon asks all others to leave.

Prince Saud said there is no argument between us but no one can impose itself militarily on an Arab state. He then thanked the President for taking the time to receive the two of them. He reiterated the importance of this historic period. Most of the Arab world is looking to the Americans for leadership. It is up to the Americans to take the steps that will win the hearts and minds of the Arab world.

The President closed the meeting by stating that we hope to achieve peace and security to the Middle East for all of our friends.

The meeting adjourned at 12:20.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
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ACTION

August 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER *NOT*

SUBJECT:

Summary of the President's Meeting with
 Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud
 and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam,
 July 20, 1982 (U)

Attached for your review and approval at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam on July 20, 1982.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review and approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab I.

APPROVE

RCM/Hor

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

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WITH ~~SECRET~~
ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12

August 9, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*

SUBJECT: Memcon for the President's Meeting with
Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud
and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam,
July 20, 1982

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Bremer transmitting
the subject memcon.

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to Bremer
- A - Saud & Khaddam memcon

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National Security Council
The White House

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82 AUG 4 P 9: 31

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Jacque Hill	7	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	MWg	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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TO CLARK

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 06 AUG 82

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KEYWORDS: EGYPT

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ALI, KAMAL HASSAN

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF PRES MTG W/ DEPUTY PM & FOMIN OF EGYPT 30 JUL

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 09 AUG 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 11, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon for President's Meeting with
Kamal Hassan Ali, Egypt, July 30, 1982

Per your request, we are forwarding the subject memcon for
your information.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

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ATTACHMENT RW 8/24/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Kamal Hassan Ali, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Alfred Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt
Ambassador Richard Fairbanks, Special Negotiator for Middle East Autonomy Talks and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Howard J. Teicher, Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)

His Excellency Kamal Hassan Ali, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Ambassador Osama El Baz, First Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Salah Bassiouni, Head of Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Friday, July 30, 1982; 9:55-10:40 a.m.; The Cabinet Room

The President welcomed Deputy Prime Minister Ali to the United States and said that he looked forward to hearing the views of the Deputy Prime Minister and receiving President Mubarak's message.

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REF ID: A63711 #117226
BY: RW
DATE: 6/22/15

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Deputy Prime Minister Ali responded that President Mubarak had asked him to send the President his best and warm regards. He then handed the President a written message from President Mubarak.

After reading the letter, the President responded that it was too complex for him to provide an off-the-cuff response. The letter was lengthy and it was important that the U.S. answer be complete. It was obvious to the President that the letter had been written before the Arab League follow-up committee met in Taif where it had been announced that the PLO should leave Beirut. President Reagan expressed his view that this Arab League action would break the logjam. On the question of the willingness of the U.S. to deal directly with the PLO, the President stated that our position on the PLO has not changed. Our terms for meeting with them are well known. Moreover, we do not believe that Arafat's signing of a piece of paper for Congressman McCloskey met our terms. In fact, some of the resolutions that have been passed by the United Nations are contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 242. We remain convinced that the Palestinian question is solvable in the context of the Camp David Framework, but before we can turn to that we need to deal with the situation in Beirut. Where will the Palestinians go? Obviously they cannot all go to one country. But, President Reagan continued, Egypt must accept some of the Palestinian fighters. If Egypt does not, it will seem as if it does not want to help the PLO. We want to move forward in the peace process, but it would seem to be that Egypt is trying to destroy the peace process should Egypt refuse to take the PLO and continue to insist on a political gesture.

Deputy Prime Minister Ali answered that in fact Egypt has not refused to take some Palestinians, but we need to give them hope or they will revert to a terrorist organization and they will terrorize people everywhere. The Egyptian position from the beginning has been that something must be done to give them hope. Egypt wants to achieve a peaceful solution in coordination with the United States. We were on that road, but we have been stopped by the Israeli invasion. Israel's action has created new hatred in the area. This is why we have tried to eliminate civilian casualties. But the situation is continuing to deteriorate. Egypt supports the Arab League follow-up committee. Through contacts with the PLO, we learned that Terzi, their representative at the United Nations, has accepted 242 and 338 in the context of the French-Egypt UN Security Council draft resolution. Our aim is to get the Palestinians into the peace process. Added to the Arab League Declaration, we need a step forward from the U.S. to encourage dialogue, not retreat. Eighty

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percent of the PLO are moderates and they must be encouraged. Those who have rejected 242 and 338 are the leftists and radicals. You should see that Arafat's signing the McCloskey document is an important decision by a Palestinian leader even if other resolutions contradict 242 and 338.

Osama El Baz said that Egypt and the U.S. are in agreement on many things, including the objective to end the fighting, to remove outside forces, to accelerate the peace process, to prevent the radicalization of the Palestinian national movement and to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East. Egypt seeks greater stability and strategic agreement between us, but Egypt disagrees with the U.S. on tactics. You are only focusing on today and the next few days. You must look ahead to the next six months or a year. What is done now will not be enough. The PLO is not going to disappear. In fact, the current leadership could fall. A radical leadership will assume control of the movement. That will be the effect if the moderates go to Jordan and Syria. The main premise of Egyptian policy is that the Palestinians cannot move unilaterally. Israel is not giving them anything. The Palestinians also are not giving enough. Thus, we need the U.S. to move, to give hope, for increasing the prospects for peace. We hope the U.S. will make a statement calling for Palestinian self-determination. Unfortunately, Begin's policy has made Camp David look like a permanent occupation and annexation and there will never be any sort of legitimate entity for the Palestinians. Begin is attempting to decide what the final settlement will be now. The Palestinians don't see the end of the tunnel. The Palestinians under Begin's plan will have very little jurisdiction. Thus, we need a new approach. We must reassure the Palestinians and encourage the Arabs who want to move in the peace process. The responsibility is on the U.S. to act.

The President answered that we all agree on the importance of the Palestinian question, but it is a matter of timing. Those of you who say you are ready to take the Palestinians want some sort of gesture from us, and that's not right.

Osama El Baz responded that Egypt is willing to take Palestinians on the basis of U.S. agreement to express commitment to Palestinian self-determination and a commitment to finding a final settlement. Otherwise, the radicals will pose a tremendous threat to Egypt and the other Arab states and the West. The only thing that will prevent radicalization of the Palestinian movement is a U.S. gesture.

Secretary Shultz said that with reference to the U.S. dealing directly with the PLO, he suggests that President Reagan's press conference statement be very carefully read. They

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should note that he was very forthcoming. Obviously, it related to earlier visits by Arab officials. When the PLO recognizes 242, 338 and Israel's right to exist, then we will authorize direct negotiations with the PLO. The President stated that Israel would not share this willingness to talk to the PLO and would, in fact, be very unhappy with our willingness to do so. When it comes to what the U.S. conditions are, it is clear; but, Arafat said no on 242 right after he signed the McCloskey document.

Osama El Baz responded that President Reagan's comments were very forthcoming.

Secretary Shultz continued that the President has said that it is his determination to resolve the Palestinian issues. Camp David is very much worth preserving, but the negotiations on autonomy over the past year and a half have not gotten anywhere. The U.S. wants to resolve these issues. Lebanon points this out. We have a very clear picture. Shultz said that he also shares President Reagan's opinion that if you really want to delegitimize the PLO then the Arab world should leave them unwelcomed in Beirut. "Is the PLO not welcome in any Arab country?" Shultz asked. West Beirut must be solved in order for us to get on to the main task. We can then accomplish much more in the peace process. Egypt is our main source of support in this regard.

The President noted that had it not been for Egypt and President Sadat we would not have achieved progress in the peace process.

Deputy Prime Minister Ali noted Egypt's appreciation that there was no deadline for solving the Beirut problem. This will give more time for the PLO to work at recognizing 242 and 338. Maybe the U.S. will support Egypt and help with the PLO. Without commitment or encouragement from the U.S., Egypt is convinced that the PLO will become radicals. Arafat will fall and the radicals will be in charge.

Osama El Baz added that there is a limit to how far the PLO can go. Israel has given nothing. If the PLO gives up its cards, what will Israel give up? There is a certain state of imbalance.

Ambassador Ghorbal interjected that the President is right in asking the family to put up its members. But the issue is the final home for the family. All the Arabs have been giving temporary homes to the Palestinians for thirty-five years, but they are always disappearing due to the Israelis. The Arab world needs America's help now in giving a temporary home so that a final destination is clear. In Lebanon,

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there has been tremendous destruction. Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza is also very repressive. The mayors have been fired; the city councils have been dismissed. Egypt will take its share, but the U.S. must help to give the Palestinians a feeling of security for a final destination and self-determination.

The President said that you have got to remember that we cannot impose a settlement. Your own country changed its policy by reaching out to Israel and signing a peace treaty. Prime Minister Begin praises President Mubarak constantly, but other Arab states won't recognize Israel's right to exist. They cling to old ideas. All we can do with our widespread interests is try to bring people together. But, this must be done by Arabs and Israelis. Is the PLO the chosen representative of the Palestinians? How many Palestinians would choose to be Lebanese if given a choice? This is yet to be decided. We must end the suffering and the combat in Lebanon. The Palestinians must be taken care of temporarily. Take the PLO in, give the PLO legitimacy, and then we will be as much help as we can in solving the Palestinian problem through negotiations. What has kept the other Arabs from being able to negotiate has been the continuing PLO unwillingness to recognize Israel. We know Egypt is willing to take its share. From others we understood that Syria would take a thousand; Jordan would take two to three thousand; Iraq will take some; and then, once this has happened, we can undertake negotiations leading to a final resolution of the Palestinian problem. But we need to know the wishes of the Palestinians. Do they want a state or not? Some Arabs tell me that they don't want a Palestinian state, but we want justice and fairness for all and we want to do all that we can to help. Please give President Mubarak my warm regards.

Deputy Prime Minister Ali thanked President Reagan for taking the time and extended an invitation to the President to visit Egypt in the near future.

The President said he would look forward to that very much.

Prepared By:
Howard J. Teicher

National Security Council 295
The White House

Package # 5482

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	1	M	R
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	2	J	_____
Staff Secretary	3	MW.	R
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

LW
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTACTION

August 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
Kamal Hassan Ali, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Arab Republic of Egypt, July 30, 1982Attached for your review and approval at Tab I is the
memorandum of conversation between the President and
Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Ali on July 30, 1982.RECOMMENDATION:That you review and approve the memorandum of conversation
at Tab I.APPROVE *RCM/for*

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT*RW*
8/24/11

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ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 10, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM:

HOWARD J. TEICHER *HJT*

SUBJECT:

Memcon for President's Meeting with
Kamal Hassan Ali, Egypt, July 30, 1982

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to Bremer
at State, transmitting the subject memcon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

APPROVE NW

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to Bremer
- A - Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED
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ATTACHMENT

RW
8/24/11

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**Folder: Memorandums of Conversation-
President Reagan (08/04/1982-08/06/1982)**
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