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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/17/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (APRIL 1982)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 50

JAUVERT/BROWER

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116790	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHIEF RABBI OF ISRAEL SHLOMO GOREN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	3/30/1982	B1
116791	TALKING PTS.	RE. CALL TO PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI	3	ND	B1
116792	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN RR AND PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	2/4/1982	B1
116809	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN RR AND PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	2/3/1982	B1
116810	MEMCON	RE. KISSINGER GROUP MEETING WITH RR <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	4/13/1982	B1
116811	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO RR RE. PROPOSED CALL FROM PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	4/15/1982	B1
116812	TALKING PTS.	RE. PHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT GALTIERI <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116813	MEMO	ROGER FONTAINE TO CLARK RE. PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S PHONE CALL TO RR R 6/22/2015 M371/	1	4/15/1982	B1
116814	MEMCON	RE. RR AND MARGARET THATCHER	2	4/17/1982	B1
116815	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO ALEXANDER HAIG RE. PRESIDENT'S CALL TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI [W/NOTATIONS] R 6/22/2015 M371/	6	4/15/1982	B1
116816	CABLE	WH02011 R 6/22/2015 M371/	2	4/15/1982	B1
116817	CABLE	WH02019 R 6/22/2015 M371/	11	4/16/1982	B1
116818	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWNN RR AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK R 6/22/2015 M371/	1	4/25/1982	B1
116819	MEMCON	RE. CONVERSATION BETWNN RR AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN R 6/22/2015 M371/	2	4/25/1982	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~ *rw 8/24/11*
DECLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8202016

RECEIVED 01 APR 82 20

TO CLARK

FROM KEMP

DOCDATE 01 APR 82

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

AP

GOREN, SHLOMO

SUBJECT: MEMCON FM PRES MTG W/ ISRAELI CHIEF RABBI ON 30 MAR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 4/5 McFarlane approved memcon GK

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

(PA) (H)

~~SECRET~~

2016

116790

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED 2

NLRR M371/1 # 116790

BY RW DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with
Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Edwin Meese III
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant Secretary for
Near East and South Asian Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, NSC Staff Member

Rabbi Shlomo Goren
Ambassador Moshe Arens, Israeli Ambassador
to the United States
Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Robbie Sabel, Political Counselor,
Embassy of Israel

DATE, TIME, Tuesday, March 30, 1982; 1:45 - 2:15 p.m.;
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Rabbi Goren: Mr. President, I bring you greetings from our Prime Minister. You know because U.S.-Israeli friendship is so strong and good we can ask things of those people we love.

The President: Please take back my warmest regards to Menachem. Tell him we are still committed all the way to an alliance with Israel. Also, I know what a traumatic experience he is going through with the withdrawal from Sinai, yet, as he told me, he will complete this withdrawal whatever the pain.

Rabbi Goren: The Prime Minister has asked me to give you a message that we don't think the Free World understands the sacrifices we are making for peace. Three-quarters of our territory, the Sinai, is being given back. We are giving back our oil. We are also including two of the most sophisticated airport facilities in the world. This affects the security of Israel. Our security is limited. It is the first time in history we are removing Jewish settlements. We have never experienced this before. It is a very hard time for us.

~~SECRET~~

Classified and Extended By: William P. Clark
Review April 1, 2002
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (e)(f)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

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The President: Menachem told me that and I want him to know that we'll stay with the Camp David process all the way to bring about peace.

Rabbi Goren: With regards to our relations with the U.S., we are worried about two problems. First, the PLO and the possible establishment of a Palestinian State. This will become a Cuba in the Middle East. It would be a Russian State. We have to be very careful that there not be an establishment of a State in Judea and Samaria. There is no reason why we should establish a State in such a small piece of land, because this is part of Israel. We all have to learn to live together. We are ready to provide the Palestinians with equal rights but not to an established State.

The President: Wouldn't they, though, become a source of disruption included inside the State?

Rabbi Goren: We will not allow the establishment of a State in the heart of the Holy Land.

Ambassador Arens: Also, the geographic heart of Israel.

Rabbi Goren: Yes. They would exploit this area. They would try to destroy the State of Israel. Some of the West Bank cities are only twelve miles from Tel Aviv. We know, Mr. President, that you are friendly to Israel and so is the United States and, therefore, you will not let them destroy the State of Israel. They have rights. We are going to provide them with autonomy. More rights than any other people in the region. They can run their own lives but not destroy the State.

The President: We are dedicated to the peace process and will pursue it.

Rabbi Goren: Now I would like to talk about the sophisticated weapons that you are providing to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Arab moderates.

The President: Jordan hasn't asked for them yet. What we want to do is to support friends. This helps Israel. We don't want to see Israel continue to be armed to the teeth and breaking its back to pay for a defense budget. We are using our influence to bring the Arabs into the peace process. We are trying to get more countries to behave like Egypt. We think we've been reasonably successful with them. I would include Jordan in this. However, as I said to the Prime Minister, no one will allow Israel's security to be overshadowed by others. In this context we are trying to get others to follow the lead of Egypt.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Rabbi Goren: Egypt would never have signed the treaty with Israel had she had military superiority. If they'd had all of those sophisticated weapons the United States gives to Saudi Arabia, then there would never have been peace. If Jordan gets the most sophisticated weapons the United States will provide, never will they make peace. 4

The President: But, they've never asked for them. Our decision, if they do ask, will include issues related to the security of Israel and what the particular defense problems of Jordan are. They also are faced with some problems and they are very worried about Soviet influence in the region. The bottom line is we will not allow the quantitative and qualitative advantages of Israel to be overshadowed.

Rabbi Goren: But how can we achieve this when you are providing all these arms?

The President: They are not going to get them yet. Furthermore, you mentioned Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia has been more influential in helping us in the Arab world than a lot of the others. Their help in the Lebanon and the cease-fire was very impressive. We were very glad of this.

Rabbi Goren: The cease-fire in Lebanon saved the PLO. If there had been no cease-fire, the PLO would have been destroyed. The PLO would have been killed.

The President: Well, I can assure you that we are going to pursue peace and I want you to tell that once more to Prime Minister Begin.

At this point, after pleasantries, the meeting broke up at 2:15 p.m.

MW
5

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

April 1, 1982

NOTES

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with Israeli Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren

Attached for your review at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Israeli Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren on March 30, 1982.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the memorandum of conversation at Tab I and forward to Ed Roberts for file.

APPROVE ✓

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

RW
8/17/11

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 2016

02 APR 2 A 8: 32

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

President used this
with minor mods in
telephone call last night.

.. J

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Withdrawer

RB 8/17/2011
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File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (APRIL 1982)

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371
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11

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116791	TALKING PTS. RE. CALL TO PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RW 8/24/11
UNCLASSIFIED (NON-PROLIFERATION)
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

RECEIVED 03 APR 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 03 APR 82

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

MUBARAK, HOSNI

Memcons

SUBJECT: ~~MEMORANDA~~ OF PRES MTG W/ MUBARAK ON FEB 3 & 4

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 06 APR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

TANTER

COMMENTS

REF# 8208968

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>clark</i>	<i>4/05</i>	<i>for decision</i>	<i>4/06</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<i>4/6</i>	<i>Ponderstein approved</i>		<i>HT</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C) *De*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

PARTICIPANTS: EGYPT

President Hosni Mubarak
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs Khamal Hassan Ali
First Under Secretary of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Osama El-Baz
Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal

UNITED STATES

President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Secretary of State Haig
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
National Security Affairs Advisor Clark
Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton

PLACE : White House Yellow Oval Room
DATE/TIME : February 4, 10:50 a.m.
SUBJECT : Middle East Peace Negotiations and Bilateral
Relations

Following a 20-minute tete-a-tete, Presidents Reagan and Mubarak were joined by the above-named officials.

President Reagan opened the enlarged meeting by saying that he had told President Mubarak about our decision on the \$400 million. He had explained the problems involved, but we were ready to take them on.

President Reagan said he had also reviewed Secretary Weinberger's discussion with President Mubarak about nuclear powered warship transits of the Suez Canal. President Mubarak had agreed that such transits should take place but faced political problems. Turning to Secretary Weinberger, President Reagan

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1, 3 1/4/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 #116792
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

-2-

said we need fool-proof agreement that would avoid opening the Canal to Soviet NPWs.

President Mubarak responded that he wanted to do nothing that would create problems for Egypt's friendship with the United States. This was a basic principle of Egyptian policy. He wanted to find a way to permit NPW transits, but this was a sensitive matter and he must proceed carefully. Otherwise the Communists would exploit such a decision.

Secretary Haig commented that we had done a good job with respect to U.S. economic aid and the decision this morning by the President on the \$400 million would help our military assistance relationship. On the peace process, the Secretary said we have a good idea of where we are going; it is especially important to keep up the momentum after April. Mr. Fairbanks would be returning soon to the area to visit both Egypt and Israel. The Secretary continued that he had dropped some "mini-bombshells" during his recent visit to the area. These had not all sat well with the Egyptians but they had sat even less well in Israel. We need to instill confidence at a time when there may be questions in some people's minds.

The Secretary continued that we had clarified that, when President Mubarak spoke of a "reasonable and acceptable" agreement, he did not mean that the Palestinians must accept an agreement in order for Egypt to accept it. El-Baz interjected that President Mubarak would make this point clear in his National Press Club speech.

President Mubarak commented that if we agree to a "hasty" Declaration of Principles, the other Arabs would say the United States had exerted pressure on Egypt. If the agreement was not reasonable and acceptable, they would raise hell in the area. An agreement that was not reasonable and acceptable would also help the Soviets. Noting that U.S. media and Israel were criticizing him because he did not mention Camp David in his arrival remarks, President Mubarak said that when he spoke of the need to solve the Palestinian problem, this meant Camp David since Camp David was the only agreed basis. He saw no need to mention Camp David every time but he would mention it now to the press.

Drafted: NEA/EGY - Ambassador Atherton:mar
2/6/82 ext 22365

Clearance:
S - Sherwood Goldberg

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

PARTICIPANTS: EGYPT

President Hosni Mubarak
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs Khamal Hassan Ali
First Under Secretary of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Osama El-Baz
Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal

UNITED STATES

President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Secretary of State Haig
Treasury Secretary Regan
National Security Advisor Clark
Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton

PLACE : White House Oval Office
DATE/TIME : February 3, 1982, 11:00 a.m.
SUBJECT : Middle East Peace Negotiations and Bilateral
Relations

The two Presidents had met alone for about one half hour before being joined by the above advisors.

President Reagan opened the enlarged meeting by noting that he and President Mubarak had had a good conversation. He had told President Mubarak he was convinced that the Israelis would return the rest of Sinai on schedule. He had also told Mubarak that he believed we should continue the autonomy talks to accomplish as much as possible before April but should also be prepared to continue beyond April. As for the Palestinians, President Reagan said that if they recognized Israel's right to exist as a nation, this would remove the stumbling block for us.

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RDS-1, 3 1/3/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711#116809
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

15

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-2-

Noting that he had been quoted as saying the Soviet Union should have a role in the peace process, President Mubarak said he wanted to explain his idea. All he had meant was that the Soviets should have a role to play in persuading the Syrians and Palestinians to join the process. They would be told to use their influence to obtain PLO and Syrian recognition of Israel's right to exist. This would put the Soviets in a most embarrassing position since they preferred to see the conflict continue. At the most, they could perhaps participate in signing a final settlement, but there was no role for them now. Similarly, the Syrians could be put on the spot. "If I was in your place," Mubarak said, "I would announce support for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria." The Syrians would refuse, saying they would not make a separate peace without a solution to the Palestinian problem. Furthermore, the Syrians prefer to keep the money flowing from the other Arabs, which would stop once there was peace.

Mubarak continued that the Declaration of Principles which we are seeking in the negotiations should be "reasonable"; otherwise, the other countries in the area would "raise hell", and the Soviets would exploit an agreement to say that they were defending the Arab cause while Egypt had made concessions under pressure from the United States -- even though there was no pressure in reality.

Secretary Haig commented that he had previously told President Mubarak that Foreign Minister Gromyko, whom he had seen in Geneva, sensed there was uncertainty in the area and an opportunity for the Soviets. Gromyko had been very self-confident. It is important, the Secretary said, that we remain alert, keep the peace process going, and seek a reasonable autonomy agreement. We were not asking for concessions but for ingenuity.

President Mubarak responded that he had no concessions to make; the rights of the Palestinians were not for Egypt to give away. Mubarak stressed that, despite press reports to the contrary, Egypt had had no contacts with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets participated now in the negotiations, this would create too many problems. They could perhaps, as President Sadat had once said, participate in the final signing.

President Reagan commented that, wherever there was trouble in the world, there was a Soviet hand. Mubarak said that there was now much more confidence in the United States on the part of the Gulf countries. Excusing himself for speaking so frankly, he said that the Arabs had no con-

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-3-

confidence in the United States during the previous Administration. This situation had now changed for the better under the Reagan Administration.

Vice President Bush asked President Mubarak about his "friend" Qadhafi. Mubarak responded, "Our friend or yours?" Qadhafi, Mubarak said, had sent 26 Egyptian families to cross the Libyan-Egyptian border, which was closed, in order to embarrass Egypt and, in giving publicity to this, Qadhafi was trying to undermine his (Mubarak's) trip to the United States.

President Reagan asked whether there were other subjects which should be discussed, and Secretary Haig noted that both Secretary of Treasury Regan and DOD Deputy Secretary Carlucci were present. President Mubarak had spoken of the need for greater flexibility in the U.S. aid program. Secretary Regan asked if Mubarak could explain his problems with the aid program. Mubarak said it was important to move from project assistance to sectoral programming. It was important that his people feel the results of American aid. Projects take too long to complete. President Reagan interjected that this sounded reasonable to him.

Elaborating on President Mubarak's comments, Under Secretary El-Baz said that Egypt had also requested "incremental" budgeting, by which it meant year-by-year funding rather than funding the entire life of a project at the beginning. This would free funds for other projects which were now tied up and earmarked for disbursement in later years. El-Baz continued that President Mubarak had ordered a review of the Egyptian economy, with the objective of reducing waste, increasing investment and productivity, and developing a Five-Year Plan. Egypt needed American help in carrying out its proposed new policies. Egypt also hoped the Administration would receive de-obligation/re-obligation authority from the Congress; this would make it possible to drop some projects which had been decided upon too hastily after Camp David and to substitute more productive projects. Secretary Regan said he thought we could do something about this problem.

Secretary Haig noted that Egyptian and American economic experts were working on a joint statement which they hoped to have agreement for issuance during President Mubarak's visit.

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-4-

With respect to military assistance, the Secretary said he knew there was a political/psychological problem arising from the comparison of our aid to Egypt with our aid to Israel. We were trying to close the gap and were asking for \$1.3 billion in military sales credits for FY 83, with \$400 million on concessional terms. At least \$200 million of this would be on a forgiveness or grant basis, and we would try to increase that amount, but in any event, there would be concessional terms of some kind for a total of \$400 million.

President Mubarak commented that President Carter had told President Sadat that he would treat Egypt on an equal basis with Israel after Camp David. Mubarak said he was not asking for equality; Israel was going to have \$550 million as a grant, and Egypt should have at least \$400 million as a grant. Secretary Haig said we were committed to try for that amount. President Reagan noted that we have problems with the Congress. Mubarak responded, "You can do it, just like the AWACs." President Reagan responded that some of his problems with Congress were precisely the result of his earlier successes.

Secretary Haig said that the worst thing we could do would be to promise something that we could not deliver. He was confident we could get \$200 million in forgiveness and we would try for more. The problem is the overall ceiling in the budget. If we go now to \$400 million forgiveness, we would have to take money from other programs, specifically Turkey.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci said that the Defense Department appreciated its cooperative relationship with Egypt. We had now laid out together an orderly Five-Year Plan. While this did not include everything Egypt wanted, it was important. Carlucci then summarized the equipment which would be delivered to Egypt by the end of the year as a result of our agreement to accelerate many deliveries. Things were moving well. Mubarak interjected that it was important his armed forces feel something was coming to them. Carlucci said he agreed; that was why we had diverted items from our own stocks and from other customers.

Mubarak then turned to the Egyptian request for additional I-HAWK batteries. He had been told by his military advisors that the price had increased 100 percent over the last purchase of I-HAWKS. Carlucci said he would look into this; inflation is a problem but he doubted the price had increased that much. Secretary Haig commented that our prob-

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-5-

lem is that Mubarak is a military man and understands these things. President Reagan interjected that his problem was that he had been in the horse calvary where you could put two horses in a barn and get three. You cannot do that with aircraft.

President Mubarak then said he wanted to explain about Egypt's purchase of French Mirages, which had received so much publicity. Prior to Camp David, Egypt had discussed with France the possibility of manufacturing Mirages at the Arab Organization for Industries (AOI) factories in Egypt. After Camp David, the other Arabs had withdrawn their financial participation in AOI, and Egypt had then begun discussing with France the purchase of additional Mirage aircraft. The agreement had not been consumated sooner because of the lack of financing, but France had finally come up with attractive financial terms. The Mirage purchase should, in fact, have been signed in September, 1981, but there were some further delays and it had only now been possible to sign the transaction. The sale was in fact still not final. When in Paris, Mubarak had found the French under the impression that the United States was exerting pressure on Egypt to cancel the Mirage purchase. Mubarak said he had told the French this was not the case. Egypt was buying only 20 Mirages and, since it would now get additional F-16s from the United States, there was no need for more Mirages.

Deputy Prime Minister Ali commented that in 1979, when he was Minister of Defense, Egypt had sought U.S. help in manufacturing aircraft parts in Egyptian defense factories. An American survey team had concluded that this was feasible and \$240 million had been earmarked for this purpose, but nothing had come of this project. President Mubarak added that there would now be cooperation with the French in military production in Egyptian plants.

At this point, the meeting adjourned to the Cabinet room to be joined by the remaining members of the American and Egyptian parties.

Drafted: NEA/EGY - Ambassador Atherton:mar
2/6/82 ext 22365

Clearance: S - *SAW* Goldberg

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

April 2, 1982

/NODIS/ 23

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memoranda of Presidential Meetings

Attached for your review and approval are two memoranda prepared by Ambassador Atherton on the meetings between President Reagan and President Mubarak, February 3 and 4, 1982.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

/NODIS

RDS-1 4/1/2002

Dep of State
BY RW

8/24/01

National Security Council
The White House

2

RECEIVED

Package # 2167

APR 5 P 6:37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN*	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

2167

21

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WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HOWARD J. TEICHER *HT*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of President Reagan's February 3 and 4 Meetings with Egyptian President Mubarak

Attached for your review and approval at Tab I are the memoranda of conversation of February 3 and 4 between the President and Egyptian President Mubarak. The memoranda were drafted by Ambassador Atherton.

Recommendation

That you review and approve the memoranda of conversation at Tab I and forward to Ed Roberts for filing.

APPROVE

[Signature]

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I - Memoranda of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

RW
8/24/11

RECEIVED 14 APR 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 14 APR 82

22

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

USSR

KISSINGER, HENRY A

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ KISSINGER GROUP ON APR 13

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 APR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8201476

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	C 4/19	CLARK APPROVED		102

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CLARK APPROVED

102

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

102 (C) 102

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2546

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President
 David R. Gergen, Assistant to the President
 Mort Allin, Assistant Press Secretary/Foreign Affairs
 William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Henry A. Kissinger
 Lawrence Brainard, Bankers Trust Company
 Willard Butcher, Chase Manhattan Bank
 Edmund W. Littlefield, Utah International Inc.
 Elvis L. Mason, InterFirst Corporation
 David Rockefeller
 William D. Rogers, Arnold & Porter
 George Shultz, Bechtel Group, Inc.
 Walter Wriston, First National City Bank
 Marc Leland, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury
 Norman A. Bailey, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME & PLACE: April 13, 1982
 2:30 p.m.-3:15 p.m.
 Roosevelt Room

SUBJECT: Kissinger Group Meeting with the President

The meeting began with Dr. Kissinger presenting a paper entitled "Talking Points" to the President.

Dr. Kissinger proceeded to outline the findings of his group. The main point made was that even if there is no crisis, the economic relationship has tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In strictly economic terms, they gain. So we must counterbalance in other areas. What are our priorities? We need to organize the economic strength of the West -- leading to negotiations later. Occasional unilateral sanctions don't work well.

There are three options: (1) economic warfare, (2) continue present practices -- everyone on his own, (3) period of disciplined economic pressure leading to eventual negotiations and enhanced cooperation (Kissinger group favors this option).

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 NLRR M3711 # H6810
 BY RW DATE 6/22/15

In the last four years most credit has been official. If the market is allowed to operate, it will handle matters. Only a Presidential initiative will work -- a summit or other -- to use this period of Soviet weakness to get our efforts coordinated.

We need to coordinate our objectives. What do we mean by disciplined restraints? We need to develop a coherent understanding of the purpose of sanctions.

What do we have to offer down the road in the way of economic cooperation? We have not addressed the question of differentiation. We have not addressed the question of what to do if the allies do not accept a coordinated approach.

Shultz: The Soviets need us a lot more than we need them. Nevertheless, they use these tools much more effectively than we do. Ours is technological, theirs is not. We sell our stuff on concessional terms. (He makes the point again of private vs. public lending to Poland.) If government-supported credits could be curtailed, there would be very little flow. We must have a long-term approach -- a sustained effort. Curtailing of official credit.

Wriston: It's a question of what to get the Europeans to stop doing. We need to turn the market back to market forces.

Rockefeller: (He reported on Trilateral Commission meeting on East-West economic relations.) We must have cooperation. It must be at a high level. Credit area is the greatest area of potential cooperation. The pipeline is a foregone conclusion. If we go along, we might get something from them.

The President: The allies are unwilling to go along with sanctions. (He uses the pipelayer example.) Have we failed to bring out to them that the concept is temporary to persuade them to come back to the "real world"? No one is out to attack them. We've been more successful in the credit line.

Kissinger: A reduction in arms would make the Soviets more creditworthy.

The President: They could turn their economy around.

Shultz: Their system causes the failure of agriculture.

The President: Here the situation is the opposite -- high productivity, low price. We will all look at these papers with great interest.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 14, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's Meeting
with the Kissinger Group

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of conversation on the President's April 13 meeting with the Kissinger Group.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memcon at Tab I for the files.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

26

127

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 2546

02 APR 14 11:57

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	<u>JP</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>2P</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
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COMMENTS

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RECEIVED 15 APR 82 17

TO CLARK

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 15 APR 82

27

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA

GREAT BRITAIN

GALTIERI, LEOPOLDO F

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR GALTIERI CALL TO PRES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 15 APR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 4/15</i>	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>C 4/15</i>	<i>noted by Pres</i>		<i>FOV</i>

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2561

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

20

WASHINGTON

WPC HAS SEEN

NLRR 11/21/11 #116811

ACTION BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

April 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Proposed Phone Call from President Galtieri of Argentina

Issue

President Galtieri of Argentina has asked to talk to you by phone today.

Facts

President Galtieri's office phoned the White House this morning to arrange a phone call between you and President Galtieri. We have set a mutually agreed upon time of 5:00 p.m. today.

Discussion

President Galtieri has made known that the call is not "urgent" but he wishes to continue the dialogue begun with you last week shortly before Argentine forces occupied the Falkland Islands.

The best guess is President Galtieri is looking for reassurance from you that the U.S. remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the dispute and an evenhanded approach to the problem.

He may, however, raise some new points to be considered in the negotiations. More likely, Galtieri may seek your personal assurance that the United States is not providing intelligence and other forms of military assistance to the British during the crisis as was reported in the American press two days ago.

It is important that Galtieri hear from you your personal concern regarding the crisis and your commitment to bringing about a peaceful resolution of the dispute. It would also be a good idea to phone Prime Minister Thatcher in order to brief her on your talk with President Galtieri.

Attached are talking points for your use in talking today with President Galtieri (Tab A).

Recommendation

OK No

 That you talk to President Galteri and then contact Mrs. Thatcher at the earliest convenient moment.

Attachment

Prepared by:
Roger W. Fontaine

Tab A Talking Points

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL FROM
PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA

-- MR. PRESIDENT, GOOD TO HEAR FROM YOU AGAIN. I KNOW YOU EXPRESSED
A WISH TO CONTINUE OUR CONVERSATIONS. I AM VERY PLEASED TO HAVE
THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU. I AM AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

(PRESIDENT GALTIERI WILL THEN MAKE HIS STATEMENT OF CONCERN.
HE WILL PROBABLY OUTLINE THE SITUATION AS HE SEES IT AND SEEK
REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. AND YOU PERSONALLY ARE COMMITTED TO
AN EVENHANDED APPROACH TO SETTLING THE DISPUTE. YOUR RESPONSE
SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.)

-- I REMAIN COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE.
THIS IS IMPORTANT TO US BECAUSE AS I HAVE SAID, TWO OF OUR
FRIENDS ARE INVOLVED. OUR GOOD OFFICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE
EXTENDED TO YOU BOTH.

-- SECRETARY HAIG IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HE WILL BE
ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS.
I HAVE FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN SECRETARY HAIG.

-- I MUST TELL YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM COMMITTED WHOLEHEARTEDLY
TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE. A WAR IN THIS
HEMISPHERE BETWEEN TWO WESTERN NATIONS, FRIENDLY TO THE U.S.,
IS UNTHINKABLE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY AND A DISASTER FOR

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NLRR M371/1 # 116812
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

FOR THE WESTERN WORLD. IT WOULD BE A BITTER LEGACY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS OF ARGENTINES, BRITONS, AND AMERICANS. ONLY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WOULD PROFIT AT OUR COMMON MISFORTUNE.

-- SO I HOPE, SIR, THAT WE CAN COME TO AN AGREEMENT SOON.

-- I MUST ALSO SAY IN ALL CANDOR THAT IF FIGHTING BEGINS, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THIS COUNTRY'S NEUTRALITY. I HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED ALREADY FOR MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES. I WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT IF FIGHTING BREAKS OUT, IT WILL BE VERY, VERY DIFFICULT.

-- BOTH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ARE LEADERS OF COURAGE, PRINCIPLE, AND DETERMINATION. WE ARE GOING TO NEED THAT COURAGE AND DETERMINATION -- ALL OF IT -- IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS.

-- WE WILL ALSO NEED FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT FROM YOU AND THE BRITISH IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEK.

-- WITH FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT WE CAN GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. WE STILL HAVE A WAYS TO GO, BUT I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN FIND A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER.

(IF PRESIDENT GALTIERI PRESSES SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING POINTS THE FOLLOWING POINT IS RECOMMENDED.)

-- MR. PRESIDENT THESE ARE INTERESTING POINTS (PROPOSALS). AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE WITH YOU SOON. I SHALL REVIEW YOUR POINTS WITH MY STAFF AND WITH HIM. MEANWHILE, YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE THAT SECRETARY HAIG IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

(IF PRESIDENT GALTIERI ASKS FOR A PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. IS NOT PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE BRITISH, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD RESPOND:)

-- I REALIZE YOUR CONCERNS. AND IT IS A MOST SENSITIVE SITUATION. MR. PRESIDENT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING NOTHING TO UNDERMINE ITS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ROLE AS HONEST BROKER IN THESE TALKS. PEACE, MR. PRESIDENT, IS OUR COMMON CAUSE. TO PRESERVE PEACE BETWEEN OUR GOOD FRIENDS IS MY PERSONAL GOAL.

(IF PRESSED BY PRESIDENT GALTIERI)

-- MR. PRESIDENT, I REITERATE THAT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE IS MY SINGLE OBJECTIVE.

-- WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH YOU AND THE BRITISH. IF WE DID NOT WE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO OFFER GOOD OFFICES. WE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THAT.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO EXISTING OBLIGATIONS -- OR GOING BEYOND THEM -- WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO PLAY AN HONEST ROLE -- A ROLE BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM BOTH WANT.

(IF FURTHER PRESSED)

-- MR. PRESIDENT THE UNITED STATES, AS SECRETARY HAIG POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, HAS NOT ACCEDED TO REQUESTS THAT GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CUSTOMARY PATTERNS OF COOPERATION BASED ON EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE WHILE OUR PEACE EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 15, 1982

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RW*

SUBJECT: President Galtieri's Phone Call to the President

President Galtieri of Argentina wants to phone the President today. Our information is that he has no specific issue or proposal in mind, but wants to continue the dialogue begun last week.

My best guess is that Galtieri mostly wants reassurance that the U.S. remains evenhanded in settling the Falkland Islands question.

President Galtieri may, however, bring to the President's attention some new points for the negotiating process. Galtieri may also want a direct assurance from the President that the United States is not providing the British with intelligence and other support as reported two days ago in the American press.

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President as well as talking points (Tab A).

Recommendation

That you sign the memo to the President forwarding the talking points.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Talking Points

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NLRR M3711# 116813
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED Package # 2561

02 APR 15 P 4: 09

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
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Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>Hand carried to P. ...</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (APRIL 1982)

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116814	MEMCON RE. RR AND MARGARET THATCHER	2	4/17/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
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27

Brian,

Pass to Ed Roberts
for file. Also file in 575 II.

SENT TO HAIG IN
BUENOS AIRES AZ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ALEXANDER HAIG

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR SECRETARY HAIG ON PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI

For your information in your meetings with President Galtieri, attached is a verbatim transcript of the President's phone conversation with President Galtieri tonight. As you can see, it ran about 30 minutes.

Galtieri did not raise much that was new nor did he bring up specific negotiating points. He did underline his obvious concern about the approaching British fleet. Galtieri also suggested unnamed nations might be exacerbating the conflict, and that U.S. media disclosures were unhelpful. The Argentine President ended with a rousing Argentine version of western hemisphere history and implied that the Argentines and North Americans share a common heritage of struggle against (British) colonialism.

President Reagan reiterated our search for a peaceful solution resolution of the dispute and called on the parties to be flexible and restrained in the coming days and weeks. The President also expressed his personal support for your mission.

I might add we read Galtieri as a worried man, but one not yet ready to retreat from previously established positions.

Word of the call leaked and as a consequence we prepared a short press release which deals only with generalities. Then, so as to relieve any concerns on Maggie's part we notified Prime Minister Thatcher of the call through a cabinet line message.

Attachments

- Tab A Text of Conversation
- Tab B Text of Press Release
- Tab C Text of Message to Prime Minister Thatcher

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NLRR M371/1 #116815
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

President: This is Ronald Reagan.

Galtieri: Good afternoon, Mr. President. This is President Galtieri of Argentina speaking to you. It's a pleasure to greet you, Mr. President. I wonder if you hear me well. I can hear you very well.

President: Yes, I can hear just fine, and I know that you wish to continue our conversations. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you. I'm at your disposal.

Galtieri: Mr. President, I'm very glad to be able to speak to you once again as a follow-up to our first conversation that we had which, perhaps, was not very fruitful on the night of April 1 at a time from our standpoint the essence of the issue was resolved and we were not in a position to ~~agree~~ ^{agree} immediately to your request. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

agree
agree

President: Yes, just fine.

Galtieri: Mr. President, I think it is highly important for Argentina, for us to have assistance, the assistance of your government, in this very difficult situation, that we are experiencing in our relationship with Great Britain which, among other things, is affecting the solidity of the Western World. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

President: I can hear you, yes, very well.

Galtieri: Mr. President, it is the profound wish, my personal wish, and that of the government, and the people of Argentina, to see to it that this situation does not deteriorate.

continue to

And it is furthermore our wish that with the assistance of the United States, that both countries seek an acceptable solution within the framework of UN Resolution 502 taking into account the whole background of this problem that goes back 150 years both from the standpoint of the bilateral relationship as well as all that has been debated, all that has been, the way the problem has been dealt with, the whole record of the UN in its debate, of the problem ~~within~~ the past 16 years with reference to the issue of decolonization around the world. Did you read me, Mr. President?

President: Yes, I have all of that.

Gaitieri:--

President: Was that all the President wanted to say BEFORE, **or do you** want a response from me now or does he have more?

Gaitieri: Mr. President, going on ^{to} ~~with~~ one more paragraph, if you ^{would} ~~will~~ allow me, I also wish to have you realize that with the advance of the British fleet toward the South Atlantic region we feel that there is an increasingly dangerous situation, not only between our two countries, between the two countries involved in the South Atlantic, but it also our concern that this issue not deteriorate to a point where other nations might become involved and that this might not become tangled up and exacerbated by outside interests. We wish to continue the good relationships that have been established between our two governments, your administration and my administration, over recent times, relationships which have become so close, Mr. President, and for this reason we wish to continue this relationship with reference to all aspects of the international scene

and within this context it is my fear that if the British continue their hostilities in the direction of the South Atlantic region the situation may slip out of our grasp, may slip out of our control and become an extremely delicate issue for the world at large. Did you understand me, Mr. President?

President: Yes, let me just say I'm committed to a peaceful resolution of this dispute. This is important to us because as I've said both countries involved, yours and Great Britain, are friends of ours so our good offices will continue to be extended to you both. Now, Secretary Haig will be arriving in Buenos Aires in a few hours to continue our efforts, and he is my personal representative and I have full faith and confidence in him. Now, Mr. President, I am committed wholeheartedly to a peaceful resolution of this dispute. I agree that a war in this Hemisphere between two Western nations, both friendly to the United States, is unthinkable. It would be a tragedy and disaster for the Western world, and a bitter legacy for future generations of Argentines, Britons, and Americans. The only one who could profit from such a war would be the Soviet Union and its slave state allies, and it would be a common ~~misfortunate~~ misfortune for the rest of us. So I hope we can work out a solution to this. Over.

Galtieri: Thank you, Mr. President, I share your views. But with the passing of every hour and with the continuation of the blockade by Great Britain along our coasts and as the British fleet continues to advance toward the South Atlantic, I fear that whether we wish to see this or not, this may bring about some serious misfortune that we will not be in a position to pinpoint or to keep under control immediately and will have the consequence of aggravating the present situation. And this is why I think that we must be very careful in regard to this because it is obvious that there are attempts also on the part of the American press and the world press as we noticed in some of the coverage yesterday, in particular to bring about some split in the very good relationships that have been established between our two

countries in recent times; between our governments, ^{two} two governments, ^{two} two nations, and between our two administrations. For this reason I fear that as time passes we may be faced with certain events that would very difficult to bring under control. It goes without saying, Mr. President, that I am thankful to you for dispatching Secretary Haig once again to Buenos Aires and, of course, I will again be in touch with him tomorrow and we will have lengthy conversations tomorrow to focus on ~~this~~ ^{this} ~~their~~ problem which is of ^{our} concern to us. Over.

President: Mr. President, as I said, I sincerely hope that we all can reach an agreement soon. And I share your fears about an ^{adverse} inadvertent act creating the trouble that ~~we~~ ^{you} will be unable to retreat from. I know that you and the British Prime Minister are leaders of courage, principle and determination and we're going to need all of that in these days ahead. We're also going to need, though, flexibility and restraint from both you and the British. And, if we have that we can get through this together. I know we have a ways to go but there must be a just and peaceful solution to this very serious matter and one that, ~~as~~ ^{as} I said the other night, when I spoke to you, that takes into consideration the interests of those people living on the islands. And, Secretary Haig will be with you soon and I will be relaying what we have just said to my own staff here, and again you have my assurance about him and that he is my personal representative. It's a most sensitive situation and I want to assure you that I know others have used propaganda to try and indicate that there is some division ~~between~~ ^{between} us. We are doing nothing to undermine our role as an honest broker in these talks. Peace, Mr. President, is our common cause. To preserve peace between our two good friends, you and Britain. That is my personal goal. And that is our single objective. We've been careful to maintain good relations with both ^{you} and the British, because if we didn't we couldn't continue to offer our help in this. At the same time, failure to live up to existing obligations, going beyond them, would jeopardize our ^{ability} ~~position~~ to play an honest role. The role both Argentina and the United Kingdom want. So, I want you to know that we are maintaining this neutral attitude. I hope we can continue to, if fighting breaks out

this will be much more difficult. I have ~~undergone~~^{undergone} some criticism myself simply because we're trying to remain neutral. But I intend to do that as we continue to negotiate this and I just hope and pray that there will be no hostile act from either side while we continue to work this out.

Galtieri: I thank you very much, Mr. President, I'm sure that ^{you} are aware that the purpose of this call was to continue the dialogue that we had ~~initiated~~^{initiated} on the first of April for a direct communication between two presidents and to continue the cordial and friendly ~~and friendly~~ relationships ~~with~~^{with} the understanding that has been developed between both countries in our search on behalf of the Western world for solutions to our problems in order to avoid any divisions ~~of~~^{of} splits ~~among~~^{between} us. I only wish to add, Mr. President, the following consideration. The people of the United States in 1976 ^(sic) and the Northern Hemisphere began their struggle against colonialism and achieved their independence. We, in the Southern Hemisphere, began this struggle in the last century, perhaps somewhat later than you did, and we achieved independence for our people and now on the 2nd of April 1982, we have tried to make this independence complete. Perhaps achieving ~~independence~~^{independence} later than you did, Mr. President. I hope that you can appreciate our sentiments in this regard, Mr. President. Over.

President: I understand your concern and assure you again that we are going to stay in this with the sincere hope that we can help bring about a peaceful solution and maintain the friendship that we have with the nations of the Western world and I appreciate your calling me and look forward to hearing from Secretary Haig after you have had a chance to discuss matters with him and so I will say thank you again and good night.

Galtieri: Talk to you again, Mr. President, thank you very much.

Galtieri: Good night to you, Mr. President.

President: Good night. (We'll talk again, some time.)

~~THE WHITE HOUSE~~

~~Office of the Press Secretary~~

~~DA SARGENT~~

~~TO JERRY BREMER~~

~~ALAN KROMBERG~~

~~STATE~~

44

~~FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE~~

~~APRIL 15, 1982~~

TAB B

TAB B

Late this afternoon, President Galtieri of Argentina called President Reagan to discuss the situation in the South Atlantic.

During the conversation, President Reagan said that he was wholeheartedly committed to a peaceful resolution of the dispute. He said that a conflict in the hemisphere between two western nations would be a tragedy and would leave a bitter legacy. President Reagan also asked for flexibility and restraint by all parties in the days ahead. With that, he said, we should be able to get through this together. We still have a ways to go, he added, but he is hopeful that we can find a just and peaceful solution to this very serious matter. The President also said that Secretary Haig, his personal representative, would be arriving in Buenos Aires in a few hours to continue the efforts of the United States.

As he had in a previous conversation, President Galtieri reaffirmed to President Reagan his personal desire for a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

~~###~~

~~SECRET~~

116816
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PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2011
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FLASH
DE WTE #2011 1052329
Z 152353Z APR 82
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH02011

APRIL 15, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

AT HIS REQUEST, I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH GENERAL GALTIERI CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS ISLAND CRISIS. I WANTED TO RELAY TO YOU A SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR IN LONDON, I HAVE SENT YOU THIS MESSAGE, BUT WE CAN TALK ON THE TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY.

GENERAL GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO ME HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH YOUR COUNTRY, AND HIS FEARS THAT CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DETERIORATION IN RECENTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE ADVANCE OF YOUR FLEET AND THE BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS WERE MAKING HIS SITUATION DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM THAT I SHARED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT, AND URGED HIM TO BE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WHO HAD MY FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS TO ME, GENERAL GALTIERI PROMISED TO DEAL HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

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I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO AL DURING HIS TWO VISITS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTIVITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY, ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, AND ARGENTINA, WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN ADVANCING SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

~~SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02019 SECTION 1 OF 3

FOR AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMANN:

PLEASE DELIVER TO SECRETARY HAIG IMMEDIATELY.

BEGIN TEXT

APRIL 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXANDER HAIG

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR SECRETARY HAIG ON PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL
TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI

FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI, ATTACHED IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI TONIGHT. AS YOU CAN SEE, IT RAN ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

GALTIERI DID NOT RAISE MUCH THAT WAS NEW NOR DID HE BRING UP SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING POINTS. HE DID UNDERLINE HIS OBVIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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APPROACHING BRITISH FLEET. GALTIERI ALSO SUGGESTED UNNAMED NATIONS MIGHT BE EXCERBATING THE CONFLICT, AN THAT U.S. MEDIA DISCLOSURES WERE UNHELPFUL. THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT EDNEO WITH A ROUSINGLY ARGENTINE VERSION OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE HISTORY AND IMPLIED THAT THE ARGENTINES AND NORTH AMERICANS SHARE A COMMON HERITAGE OF STRUGGLE AGAINST (BRITISH) COLONIALISM.

PRESIDENT REAGAN REITERATED OUR SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE AND CALLED ON THE PARTIES TO BE FLEXIBLE AND RESTRAINED IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. THE PRESIDENT ALSO EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR YOUR MISSION.

I MIGHT ADD WE READ GALTIERI AS A WORRIED MAN, BUT ONE NOT YET READY TO RETREAT FROM PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED POSITIONS.

WORD OF THE CALL LEAKED AND AS A CONSEQUENCE WE PREPARED A SHORT PRESS RELEASE WHICH DEALS ONLY GENERALITIES. THEN, SO AS TO RELIEVE ANY CONCERNS ON MAGGIE'S PART WE NOTIFIED PRIME MINISTER THATCHER OF THE CALL THROUGH A CABINET LINE MESSAGE.

ATTACHMENTS

TAB A TEXT OF CONVERSATION
TAB B TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE
TAB C TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

TAB A

PRESIDENT: THIS IS RONALD REAGAN.

GALTIERI: GOOD AFTERNOON, MR. PRESIDENT. THIS IS PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA SPEAKING TO YOU. IT'S A PLEASURE TO GREET YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. I WONDER IF YOU HEAR ME WELL. I CAN HEAR YOU VERY WELL.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRESIDENT: YES, I CAN HEAR JUST FINE, AND I KNOW THAT YOU WISH TO CONTINUE OUR CONVERSATIONS. I'M PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU. I'M AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, I'M VERY GLAD TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO YOU ONCE AGAIN AS A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR FIRST CONVERSATION THAT WE HAD WHICH, PERHAPS, WAS NOT VERY FRUITFUL ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 1 AT A TIME FROM OUR STANDPOINT THE ESSENCE OF THE ISSUE WAS RESOLVED AND WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACCEDE IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR REQUEST. CAN YOU HEAR ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, JUST FINE.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, I THINK IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR ARGENTINA, FOR US TO HAVE ASSISTANCE, THE ASSISTANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, IN THIS VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, THAT WE ARE EXPERIENCING IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT BRITAIN WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IS AFFECTING THE SOLIDITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD. CAN YOU HEAR, ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: I CAN HEAR YOU, YES, VERY WELL.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS THE PROFOUND WISH, MY PERSONAL WISH AND THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, TO SEE TO IT THAT THIS SITUATION DOES NOT CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. AND IT IS FURTHERMORE OUR WISH THAT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SEEK AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UN RESOLUTION 502 TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE BACKGROUND OF THIS PROBLEM THAT GOES BACK 150 YEARS BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS ALL THAT HAS BEEN DEBATED, ALL THAT HAS BEEN,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE WAY THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN DEALT WITH, THE WHOLE RECORD OF THE UN IN ITS DEBATES OF THE PROBLEM OF THE PAST 16 YEARS WITH REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF DECOLONIZATION AROUND THE WORLD. DID YOU READ ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, I HAVE ALL OF THAT.

PRESIDENT: WAS THAT ALL THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO SAY BEFORE, OR DO YOU WANT A RESPONSE FROM ME NOW OR DOES HE HAVE MORE>

GAITIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, GOING ON FOR ONE MORE PARAGRAPH, IF YOU WOULD ALLOW ME, I ALSO WISH TO HAVE YOU REALIZE THAT WITH THE ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FLEET TOWARD THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION WE FEEL THAT THERE IS AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION, NOT ONLY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT IT ALSO OUR CONCERN THAT THIS ISSUE NOT DETERIORATE TO A POINT WHERE OTHER NATIONS MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED AND THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BECOME TANGLED UP AND EXACERBATED BY OUTSIDE INTERESTS. WE

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OUTGOING

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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WISH TO CONTINUE THE GOOD RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, YOUR ADMINISTRATION, OVER RECENT TIMES, RELATIONSHIPS WHICH HAVE BECOME SO CLOSE, MR. PRESIDENT, AND FOR THIS REASON WE WISH TO CONTINUE THIS RELATIONSHIP WITH REFERENCE TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND WITHIN THIS CONTEXT IT IS MY FEAR THAT IF THE BRITISH CONTINUE THEIR HOSTILITIES IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION THE SITUATION MAY SLIP OUT OF OUR GRASP; MAY SLIP OUT OF OUR CONTROL AND BECOME AN EXTREMELY DELICATE ISSUE FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. DID YOU UNDERSTAND ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, LET ME JUST SAY I'M COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO US BECAUSE AS I'VE SAID BOTH COUNTRIES INVOLVED, YOURS AND GREAT BRITAIN, ARE FRIENDS OF OURS SO OUR GOOD OFFICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTENDED TO YOU BOTH. NOW, SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS, AND HE IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND I HAVE FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN HIM. NOW, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM COMMITTED WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE. I AGREE THAT A WAR IN THIS HEMISPHERE BETWEEN TWO WESTERN NATIONS, BOTH FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES IS UNTHINKABLE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY AND DISASTER FOR THE WESTERN WORLD, AND A BITTER LEGACY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS OF ARGENTINES, BRITONS, AND AMERICANS. THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD PROFIT FROM SUCH A WAR WOULD BE THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SLAVE STATE ALLIES, AND IT WOULD BE A COMMON MISFORTUNE FOR ALL THE REST OF US. SO I HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THIS. OVER

GALTIERI: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, I SHARE YOUR VIEWS. BUT WITH THE PASSING OF EVERY HOUR AND WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE BY GREAT BRITAIN ALONG OUR COASTS AND AS THE BRITISH FLEET CONTINUES TO ADVANCE TOWARD THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, I FEAR THAT WHETHER WE WISH TO SEE THIS OR NOT, THIS MAY BRING ABOUT SOME SERIOUS MISFORTUNE THAT WE WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO PINPOINT OR TO KEEP UNDER CONTROL IMMEDIATELY AND WILL HAVE THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGGRAVATING THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THIS IS WHY I THINK THAT WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL IN REGARD TO THIS BECAUSE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE ATTEMPTS ALSO ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PRESS AND THE WORLD PRESS AS WE NOTICED IN SOME OF THE COVERAGE YESTERDAY, IN PARTICULAR TO BRING ABOUT SOME SPLIT IN THE VERY GOOD RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN RECENT TIMES; BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OUR TWO NATIONS, AND BETWEEN OUR TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. FOR THIS REASON I FEAR THAT AS TIME PASSES WE MAY BE FACED WITH CERTAIN EVENTS THAT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO BRING UNDER CONTROL. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT I AM THANKFUL TO YOU FOR DISPATCHING SECRETARY HAIG ONCE AGAIN TO BUENOS AIRES AND, OF COURSE, I WILL AGAIN BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM TOMORROW AND WE WILL HAVE LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS TOMORROW TO FOCUS ON THIS PROBLEM WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN TO US. OVER.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRESIDENT: MR. PRESIDENT, AS I SAID, I SINCERELY HOPE THAT WE ALL CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT SOON. AND I SHARE YOUR FEARS ABOUT SOME INADVERTENT ACT CREATING THE TROUBLE THAT YOU'D BE UNABLE TO RETREAT FROM. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ARE LEADERS OF COURAGE, PRINCIPLE AND DETERMINATION AND WE'RE GOING TO NEED ALL OF THAT IN THESE DAYS AHEAD. WE'RE ALSO GOING TO NEED, THOUGH, FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT FROM BOTH YOU AND THE BRITISH. AND, IF WE HAVE THAT WE CAN GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. I KNOW WE HAVE A WAY TO GO BUT THERE MUST BE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND ONE THAT AS I SAID THE OTHER NIGHT WHEN I SPOKE TO YOU, THAT TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF THOSE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE ISLANDS.

AND SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE WITH YOU SOON AND I WILL BE RELAYING WHAT WE HAVE JUST SAID TO MY OWN STAFF HERE, AND AGAIN YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE ABOUT HIM AND THAT HE IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. IT'S A MOST SENSITIVE SITUATION AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I KNOW OTHERS HAVE USED PROPAGANDA TO TRY AND INDICATE THAT THERE IS SOME DIVISION BETWEEN US. WE ARE DOING NOTHING TO UNDERMINE OUR ROLE AS AN HONEST BROKER IN THESE TALKS. PEACE, MR. PRESIDENT, IS OUR COMMON CAUSE. TO PRESERVE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOOD FRIENDS, YOU AND BRITAIN. THAT IS MY PERSONAL GOAL. AND THAT IS OUR SINGLE OBJECTIVE.

WE'VE BEEN CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH YOU AND THE BRITISH, BECAUSE IF WE DIDN'T WE COULDN'T CONTINUE TO OFFER OUR HELP ON THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, GOING BEYOND THEM, WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO PLAY AN HONEST ROLE. THE ROLE BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WANT. SO, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE ARE MAINTAINING THIS NEUTRAL ATTITUDE. I HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO, IF FIGHTING BREAKS OUT THIS WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. I HAVE UNDERGONE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SOME CRITICISM MYSELF SIMPLY BECAUSE WE'RE TRYING TO REMAIN NEUTRAL. BUT I INTEND TO DO THAT AS WE CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THIS AND I JUST HOPE AND PRAY THAT THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE ACT FROM EITHER SIDE WHILE WE CONTINUE TO WORK THIS OUT.

GALTIERI: I THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. PRESIDENT, I'M SURE THAT YOU ARE AWARE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS CALL WAS TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE THAT WE HAD INITIATED ON THE FIRST OF APRIL FOR A DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS AND TO CONTINUE THE CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES IN OUR SEARCH ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN WORLD FOR SOLUTIONS TO OUR PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DIVISIONS OR SPLITS BETWEEN US. I ONLY WISH TO ADD, MR. PRESIDENT, THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1976 (SIC) AND THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE BEGAN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISM AND ACHIEVED THEIR INDEPENDENCE. WE, IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE, BEGAN THIS STRUGGLE IN THE LAST CENTURY, PERHAPS SOMEWHAT LATER THAN YOU DID, AND WE ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE FOR OUR PEOPLE AND NOW

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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ON THE 2D OF APRIL 1982, WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THIS INDEPENDENCE COMPLETE. PERHAPS ACHIEVING COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE, AS I SAID, LATER THAN YOU DID, MR. PRESIDENT. I HOPE THAT YOU CAN APPRECIATE OUR SENTIMENTS IN THIS REGARD, MR. PRESIDENT. OVER.

PRESIDENT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN AND ASSURE YOU AGAIN THAT WE ARE GOING TO STAY IN THIS WITH THE SINCERE HOPE THAT WE CAN HELP BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND MAINTAIN THE FRIENDSHIP THAT WE HAVE WITH THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND I APPRECIATE YOUR CALLING ME AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM SECRETARY HAIG AFTER YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH HIM AND SO I WILL SAY THANK YOU AGAIN AND GOOD NIGHT.

GALTIERI: TALK TO YOU AGAIN, MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

GALTIERI: GOOD NIGHT TO YOU MR. PRESIDENT, WE'LL TALK AGAIN, SOME TIME.

PRESIDENT: GOOD NIGHT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

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TAB B

LATE THIS AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA CALLED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

DURING THE CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT HE WAS WHOLEHEARTEDLY COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE. HE SAID THAT A CONFLICT IN THE HEMISPHERE BETWEEN TWO WESTERN NATIONS WOULD BE A TRAGEDY AND WOULD LEAVE A BITTER LEGACY. PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO ASKED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT BY ALL PARTIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. WITH THAT, HE SAID, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. WE STILL HAVE A WAYS TO GO, HE ADDED, BUT HE IS HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN FIND A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD BE ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

AS HE HAD IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS PERSONAL DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE.

TAB C

APRIL 15, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

AT HIS REQUEST, I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH GENERAL GALTIERI CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS ISLAND CRISIS. I WANTED TO RELAY TO YOU A SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR IN LONDON, I HAVE SENT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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YOU THIS MESSAGE, BUT WE CAN TALK ON THE TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY.

GENERAL GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO ME HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH YOUR COUNTRY, AND HIS FEARS THAT CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DETERIORATION IN RECENTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE ADVANCE OF YOUR FLEET AND THE BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS WERE MAKING HIS SITUATION DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM THAT I SHARED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT, AND URGED HIM TO BE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WHO HAD MY FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS TO ME, GENERAL GALTIERI PROMISED TO DEAL HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO AL DURING HIS TWO VISITS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTIVITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY, ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, AND ARGENTINA, WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN ADVANCING SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

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~~SECRET~~

April 25, 1982

116818
RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK
(call took place between 1212-1215 and was initiated by Mubarak)

Mubarak: Good morning Mr. President.

Reagan: Good morning to you...listen, I'm very pleased that you and Israel have been able to find a procedure that will allow the withdrawal from the disputed border areas and I'm confident Israel will work through the proposed procedure to resolve that problem in good faith.

Mubarak: Thank your very very much Mr. President and I'm sure with your support and your help to achieve all success. (sic)

Reagan: We will continue to help in every way we can and I just want to congratulate you and thank you for the manner in which you've gone forward.

Mubarak: Thank you very much and we appreciate the support of your country and yourself Mr. President and we'll never forget that.

Reagan: I'm pleased to hear that and I also want you to know that I've taken careful note of your concerns of the Iran-Iraq war and the implications for our mutual interests and regional strategy.

Mubarak: Yes. Mr. President, it is very very important...this point has to be discussed. I'm ready to an exchange of views in this direction.

Reagan: Yes...we're aware of that and I just wanted you to know that we'll be on hand to do all we can and agian thanks to you and congratulations.

Mubarak: Thank you very very much Mr. President.

Reagan: Alright.

Mubarak: We hope to see you in Cairo.

REagan: We are both looking forward when that can be done to doing it. We've both longed to do that. And Mrs. Reagan sends her best and give our regards to Mrs. Mubarak.

Mubarak: Thank you and the same to Mrs. Reagan please.

Reagan: Alright.

Mubarak: Thany you very much Mr. President.

Reagan: You bet...good-by.

Mubarak: Good-by

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NLRRM371/1-#116818
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

116819
April 25, 1982

RCM HAS SEEN
58

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. (call took place between 1:05-1:10 and was initiated by President Reagan)

((NOTE: recorder did not operate for most of the call and following is prepared from notes taken by Duty Officer))

Reagan: Hello Mr. Prime Minister.

Begin: Hello Mr. President.

Reagan: I've just watched you on television. I know what mixed feelings you have had on this day...a very traumatic experience.

Begin: Thank you Mr. President. Thank God there was no blood shed... we were threatened right up to the very end, but our army behaved beautifully. I had threatened to resign if there was blood shed, but thank God no blood was shed.

Reagan: You are right to be proud of yourself. You showed a great amount of statemanship and I continue to offer our assistance to resolve the issues through the Camp David process.

Begin: Thank you. All of Israel is grateful and indebted to you. We are your faithful and dedicated ally in freedom.

Reagan: There are other matters I look forward to us getting into discussions about.

Begin: I want to tell you Mr. President that maybe at the end of June I'll be coming to the United States... I'll be coming for the Gozzella (SP??) Conference.

Reagan: Oh yes.

Begin: You may be there?

Reagan: Yes. I'm speaking at the UN also on that. I look forward to that.

Begin: We perhaps will be able to meet again to speak heart to heart.

Reagan: We should.

Begin: I'm going to see Aliza now...she's in the hospital and still unwell.

Reagan: Oh dear.

Begin: She joins me in sending best wishes to you and to Mrs. REagan.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

Reagan: Well, Nancy joins me and you please give her our best and tell her both of you are in our thoughts and prayers.

Begin: I also wanted to tell you Mr. President that I had a call from President Mubarak and we said on both sides of the line "peace forever".

Reagan: That is wonderful.

Begin: A very important statement.

Reagan: That is wonderful.

Begin: Thank you very much for calling Mr. President.

Reagan: It's good to talk to you and I look forward to seeing you.

Begin: Good-by.

Reagan: Good-by.

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