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File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversations,
President Reagan [December, 1981] (1)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/9/2007

File Folder MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN DECEMBER 1981 (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F04-065

Box Number 49

BARBARA ELIAS

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33851	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU SES SEKO OF ZAIRE, DECEMBER 1, 1981 <i>R 3/5/2008 NLRRF04-065</i>	3	ND	B1
33852	MEMCON	DUPLICATE OF #33851 <i>R 3/5/2008 NLRRF04-065</i>	3	ND	B1
33853	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, NOVEMBER 2, 1981, 11:10-11:25AM <i>R 3/5/2008 NLRRF04-065</i>	3	ND	B1
33854	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, NOVEMBER 3, 1981, 10:30-11:15 AM. <i>PAR 3/5/2008 F04-065; R M10/371 #33854 12/21/2015</i>	6	ND	B1
33855	PAPER	BIO <i>D 5/12/2008 F04-065; UPHELD 8/30/2012 M10-371 #33855</i>	2	4/23/1981	B1 B3 B6
33856	PAPER	YOUR LUNCHEON WITH AGOSTINO CARDINAL CASAROLI, VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE <i>R 3/5/2008 NLRRF04-065</i>	4	12/10/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/9/2007

File Folder MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN DECEMBER 1981 (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F04-065

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 01 DEC 81 19

TO NANCE

FROM WETTERING

DOC DATE 01 DEC 81

dlb 2/2/87

KEYWORDS: ZAIRE

VISIT

MOBUTU, SESE S

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ ZAIRE PRES ON 1 DEC

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

PA circled in red

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NANCE

Please send MEMCONS to Ed. I wonder who had the original?

COMMENTS RECD WW 12/2 0753 HR / ADDON RECD WW 12/3 1052 HR

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D / J)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Nance</i>	<i>4 12/2</i>	<i>Request for Decision</i>	<i>12/7</i>	
<i>ue</i>	<i>5 12/4</i>	<i>Nance appt recon</i>		<i>WE</i>
	<i>C 12/4</i>	<i>Nance Long to Bremer</i>	<i>12/7</i>	
		<i>Long signed memo to Bremer</i>		<i>LZ, WE</i>

DISPATCH

done don 12/4 8pm

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

AA don

~~SECRET~~BY AL NLRR F04-065 # 33851
NARA DATE 3/5/08THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6969

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with President
Mobutu Sese Seko of ZairePARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Edwin Meese
Admiral James W. Nance
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Ambassador Robert Oakley
Mr. Frederick Wettering, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan (Interpreter)President Mobutu Sese Seko
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoka Mangano
Ambassador to the US Kasongo MutualeDATE, TIME
AND PLACE:December 1, 1981
1:00-1:45 p.m., the Oval Office

The President opened his remarks by thanking President Mobutu for the handsome memento he presented. The President stated that he appreciated very much Zaire's long time friendship with the US and looked forward to this friendship continuing. The President added that he was delighted to hear about President Mobutu's plans and programs for domestic adjustment. The President also expressed appreciation for Mobutu's cooperation in sending Zairian troops to Chad for the peacekeeping force.

President Mobutu thanked the President for the warm welcome and kind words both to him and the Zairian people. He observed that the US officials with whom he has met were very well prepared for talks with him. President Mobutu noted his satisfaction with the "good talks" with Secretary Haig and his people, Secretary Weinberger and his people, Director Casey, and the Congress.

President Mobutu then summarized four points which he had presented in his discussions in Washington. They are: internal security problems, external security problems, economic problems, and bilateral relations with the US.

-- On internal security problems, President Mobutu noted that he was experiencing real difficulties from the Communist Bloc embassies. They are attempting to subvert students, workers.

~~SECRET~~

33851

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

2

A few weeks ago he almost expelled the Cuban and East German Embassies, but decided to postpone this because of his trip abroad. President Mobutu requested US help in training security experts and obtaining equipment to monitor the activities of these communist diplomats.

-- On external security, President Mobutu observed that the USSR and its satellites had established a "belt of insecurity, a red belt" around Zaire. He noted that the communists were training Katangan rebels in Angola and then infiltrating them into Zaire. He mentioned he had discussed this with DCI Casey. He cited figures on tanks and aircraft possessed by the Marxist-Leninist states of Angola and Congo and how this compared to the few aircraft and tanks of Zaire. President Mobutu stated that there was no balance of forces in the area but an imbalance. He noted the buildup of Soviet and Libyan arms in Burundi. President Mobutu stated he was happy to note that he found considerable understanding of these problems in his talks at Defense and State. He noted that despite the sacrifice he has sent 800 troops to Chad and was prepared to send another battalion. He understood that the US had decided to financially help out the Chad peacekeeping force and congratulated the President on this decision. He referred again to the problem of the Shaba Province and the Katangan rebels. He reiterated his pleasure that this problem was well understood here and expressed the hope that measures agreed on can go forward quickly.

-- On economic problems, President Mobutu noted that he has worked out the "Mobutu Recovery Plan" with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Its implementation will be delicate and difficult. Zaire cannot do it alone, he added. Friends must also help out. President Mobutu noted that a strong approach to the IMF and World Bank by the US would be helpful and he had raised this with State. He added that on October 23 World Bank President Clausen had written him a series of questions on Zaire economic policy. President Mobutu stated that he had answered these questions in letters to the IMF and World Bank leaders and that they stated they were satisfied.

-- On bilateral relations, President Mobutu cited the excellent relations that had prevailed between the nations until the Carter Administration. We suffered greatly in morale terms, during the Carter years, he declared. As examples, he noted the cutoff of US food assistance due to so-called "human rights violations," immediately followed by a US request to support the US position on the Olympics. President Mobutu affirmed that he overrode the advice of his ministers and ordered the US position supported. "We have never bargained or bartered our friendship with you," he declared. Zaire has always sided with the US, even against our African friends at times, he added. President Mobutu complained that one country which had recently changed sides from hostility to friendship with the US was getting military loans at 2% while Zaire had to pay 15%.

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~~SECRET~~

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3

4

President Mobutu stated that in conclusion he had not come to criticize but to sensitize the President and his senior officials to Zaire and its strategic importance to the US. President Mobutu noted that he over the years has observed that it takes time for the US to deliver on military and security assistance. He expressed the hope that things could move faster.

President Mobutu offered an example of Zaire's diplomatic importance. He noted that the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister visited Zaire yesterday and sought his counsel on the election of the UN Secretary-General. President Mobutu added that he encouraged the Chinese to support Secretary-General Waldheim. President Mobutu added that the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister asked to see him in Paris next week.

President Mobutu added that in Chad, President Goukouni relied heavily on Zaire. This shows that we can be very useful to you, he concluded, because we share the same views.

The President stated that we are aware of Zaire's friendship and importance. We want to help, but it sometimes takes time, especially in dealing with Congress. Once you begin implementing your domestic programs and reforms, our efforts to gather more help to Zaire will be facilitated, the President added. We want to cooperate, and Secretaries Haig and Weinberger will work closely with you on this.

The President also noted that we were aware of the "colorful tinge" of some of Zaire's neighbors, and that we have discussed this at some length - especially Angola. We are hopeful we can improve the Southern African situation.

Secretary Haig praised President Mobutu's excellent preparation for this visit, not only in his statements to the President but in his talks with the IMF and the World Bank. This will help us in our efforts to get additional funding. Secretary Haig declared that prior to President Mobutu's departure we will be able to speak specifically on his Chad force, extra support to the two Zaire brigades, and other matters thanks to President Mobutu's excellent preparation.

The meeting concluded with pleasantries.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6969 Add On

5

December 2, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE


FROM: FRED WETTERING 

SUBJECT: Request From State Department for Copy of Memcon

State has requested a copy of the memorandum of conversation which I submitted yesterday of the President's December 1 meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. I see no reason why they should not have a copy.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve transmitting a copy of the memcon to the State Department.

APPROVE

 _____

DISAPPROVE _____

6969

6

6

RECEIVED

81 DEC 2 A 7: 53

JANET COLSON

JK

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

December 1, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 2/9/07 dlbACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: FRED WETTERING

SUBJECT: Memcon on President's Meeting with Zaire President
Mobutu, December 1, 1981Attached is my memcon summarizing the President's December 1
meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon for the record.

Approve Bvd

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab IMemcon between President Reagan and
President Mobutu of Zaire~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

6969

~~SECRET~~

NLRR FO4-065 #33852

BY CW NARADATE 3/5/08 33852

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Mr. Edwin Meese
Admiral James W. Nance
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Ambassador Robert Oakley
Mr. Frederick Wattering, NSC Staff
Mr. Alec Toumayan (Interpreter)

President Mobutu Sese Seko
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoka Mangano
Ambassador to the US Kasongo Mutuale

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE:

December 1, 1981
1:00-1:45 p.m., the Oval Office

The President opened his remarks by thanking President Mobutu for the handsome memento he presented. The President stated that he appreciated very much Zaire's long time friendship with the US and looked forward to this friendship continuing. The President added that he was delighted to hear about President Mobutu's plans and programs for domestic adjustment. The President also expressed appreciation for Mobutu's cooperation in sending Zairian troops to Chad for the peacekeeping force.

President Mobutu thanked the President for the warm welcome and kind words both to him and the Zairian people. He observed that the US officials with whom he has met were very well prepared for talks with him. President Mobutu noted his satisfaction with the "good talks" with Secretary Haig and his people, Secretary Weinberger and his people, Director Casey, and the Congress.

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~~SECRET~~
Review 12/1/87

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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President Mobutu offered an example of Zaire's diplomatic importance. He noted that the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister visited Zaire yesterday and sought his counsel on the election of the UN Secretary-General. President Mobutu added that he encouraged the Chinese to support Secretary-General Waldheim. President Mobutu added that the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister asked to see him in Paris next week.

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The President stated that we are aware of Zaire's friendship and importance. We want to help, but it sometimes takes time, especially in dealing with Congress. Once you begin implementing your domestic programs and reforms, our efforts to gather more help to Zaire will be facilitated, the President added. We want to cooperate, and Secretaries Haig and Weinberger will work closely with you on this.

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The meeting concluded with pleasantries.

RECEIVED

81 DEC 3 A10: 52

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

MEMORANDUM

6969

12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

December 1, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) db 2/9/02

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: FRED WETTERING

SUBJECT: Memcon on President's Meeting with Zaire President
Mobutu, December 1, 1981

Attached is my memcon summarizing the President's December 1
meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

Attachment
Tab I

Memcon between President Reagan and President
Mobutu of Zaire

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~


December 4, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES) *dlb 2/19/02*

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation

Per your request, attached is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation of the President's December 1 meeting with President
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

Attachment
as stated

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 09 DEC 81 14

14

TO NANCE

FROM KEMP

*dh
2/9/02*

DOCDATE 07 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

VISIT

HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: MEMCONS OF PRES MTG W/ JORDANIAN KING ON 2 NOV & 3 NOV

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NANCE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 12/10

Nance apnd memcons

GK

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

Pa (C)MS

NLRR F04 065 #33853

BY Cel NARA DATE 3/5/08THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

33853

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President
James Baker III, Chief of Staff to the
President
Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff to
the President
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert McFarlane, Counsellor, Department
of State
Ambassador Richard Viets, U.S. Ambassador
to Jordan
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Geoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council

King Hussein
Prime Minister Mudhir Badran
Chief of Royal Court Ahmad Lawzi
Commander-in-Chief of the Jordan Armed
Forces Zaid Bin Shakir
Ambassador 'Abd al-Hadi 'Atallah al-Majali,
Jordanian Ambassador to the United States
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marwan al-Kasim

DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE: Monday, November 2, 1981; 11:10-11:25 a.m.;
The Oval Office

The President: We just had a conversation in the other room and I would like, for the benefit of all of you, to say one thing that I didn't say, namely that the United States will continue to do everything we can to bring peace to the Middle East based on UN Resolution 242. We will not do anything that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Classified and Extended By: James W. Nance
Review December 7, 2011

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (a)(e)(f)

will be at the expense of the Kingdom of Jordan. I've also expressed my concerns about outside forces, but let me repeat: the United States has no interest in dictating our own policy on you. We want to negotiate a solid peace between us, having said that we are very interested in hearing your views.

King Hussein: Thank you, Sir, once again, for the privilege to be here and to have this exchange at this crucial time. Because we need a just peace, further generations can live without the fear of war. We have accepted every United States initiative, including UN Resolution 242, for the purposes of establishing peace. Unfortunately, it is still not within our grasp. The only reason for suspicion between us and members of the free world and the Arab moderates is the Palestinian problem. A solution could remove many threats in this strategic location that is vital because of the oil and the proximity to Africa.

Unfortunately, we see an identity of interests between Israel and the Soviet Union. Both want to polarize the Middle East. We must stand, however, to support Arab rights. There are elements in the area that mirror Israel's intransigence. They wish to humiliate their neighbors and polarize events. If this happens, we are destroyed as a people, our past and our future. We will oppose to the best of our ability this effort. Again, sir, my main concerns, more than anything else in the past, is to outline for you what is at stake. As for our concerns, we must build on our ideals. At the same time, sir, I have proposed working papers for you to see and hope that you can look at them before our next meeting. (The King then distributes working papers and maps of the Middle East. He lays out three maps prepared by the Jordanians, including one of Israeli settlements, one of the growth of Israel, and a third that points to the strategic location of Jordan within the Middle East.)

The King continued to talk about the peace process. Mr. Begin, yesterday on the television, referred to the threat to Israel based on Katushka rockets and artillery. But, said the King, there is no security unless there is peace. If you are in an airplane taking off from Beirut, you can see Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Amman. The distances are minimal in the Middle East. The barriers to be broken are psychological barriers. Security on the ground means nothing these days.

Secretary Haig: We hope to be able to analyze the papers and talk about them at the next meeting.

King Hussein: Yes, and in addition I want to talk about my concerns about Turkey and Greece.

The President: Its a great pleasure to hear of Jordan's willingness to work for peace and we acknowledge how helpful the King has been in protecting terrorism along his borders. I know there are going to be meetings between you and your Defense Minister and Mr. Weinberger.

Secretary Haig: We are having a working lunch next and then the King meets with Cap. At State we can go into more details on these matters.

The King wanted to talk about the problem of the Dead-Med Canal.

The President: I have to confess one thing. I presume the Dead Sea is lower than the Med.

King Hussein: Yes, the purpose of the canal would be to raise the level of the Dead Sea, but we believe the main purpose of the Israeli canal is to cool nuclear reactors and they have not even signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The President wondered whether the King knew about the experiments done in the western desert of the United States where fish had been bred to live in salt water.

Secretary Haig: I think we have covered all we need to now, Mr. President.

The meeting broke up at 11:25 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

33854

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting
with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Richard Viets, U.S. Ambassador
to Jordan

King Hussein

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Tuesday, November 3, 1981; 10:30-11:15 a.m.;
The Oval Office

The President opened the meeting by asking the Secretary of State to sum up the meetings held with the King thus far.

Secretary Haig said that discussions had been fruitful, and they covered a number of areas:

o Covert activities have been discussed and agreement has been reached.

o Arms sales follow-up talks had been initiated, and will continue.

o The peace process had been discussed, and the United States had indicated it is necessary to proceed with Camp David. Any derailing of the Camp David process will be counterproductive to the peace process itself and would also jeopardize Moubarek in Egypt. We hope to have the MFO in place, but there are worrisome requirements developing from the European side in terms of conditions that may apply, although we should be able to bridge these differences.

o There was a good working luncheon yesterday (2 November 1981) with Senator Nunn and Congressman Trent Lott present.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Classified and Extended By: James W. Nance
Review December 7, 2011
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)(e)(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M-37111 #33854
BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/15

o King Hussein's paper had been extraordinarily helpful, and set the record straight on how we got to where we are. It is a cogent, important paper. With respect to the concept of "total withdrawal for total peace," we have some differences on the matter and have seen great ambiguity in the interpretation of Resolution 242.

o The threat from Syria was discussed, and we acknowledge the failure of the United States to react promptly to it at the time.

The President responded by indicating that he too had read the paper and felt much better informed as a consequence of having done so. The President indicated that now we have to work out the process and steps we will follow to begin negotiations. We need more flexibility under 242; the "total withdrawal for total peace" formula does not truly leave enough room for flexibility negotiations. Now we have to make sure that we don't go after this with one side asking for the moon and the other side asking for "green cheese."

Secretary Haig indicated that sometimes the perfect is the enemy of the good, and that too many pressures or burdens upon Israel at the present time could cause Israel to lash out into Lebanon.

King Hussein responded by thanking the President for the privilege and opportunity of the meetings, and especially this second meeting. He indicated that with respect to Resolution 242, his paper submitted to the President is the basis of our understanding of 242 as negotiated with Arthur Goldberg, President Johnson, and the two Rostows at the time. Any subsequent misunderstanding about 242 is not the fault of the Jordanians. The basis was total withdrawal for total peace, and the resolution of the West Bank involved removal to pre-1967 orders. In Jordanian eyes, any solution regarding the West Bank and Gaza would require them to be linked under one umbrella as the King put it. The issue of security is regarded as impossible to achieve unless both sides have agreed, and unless both sides can live with an agreement interpreted to be in their own interests. After so many years, the King noted, we have not yet come to a conclusion although at the time of my meetings with President Johnson it was promised that six months would pass and all of "this" would be implemented. The King appeared to present this portion of his statement with humor.

The President asked the King how he sees the problem of bringing the Palestinians to recognize the right of Israel to exist. He indicated that clearly the refusal of the

Palestinians to recognize Israel must be eliminated before talks can begin. He asked that although we recognize the leadership of the PLO is made up of diverse elements, including Marxists, radicals, terrorists and moderates, we still need to find a method of approaching the Palestinians. He asked what the best approach would be and who ought to make it in order to get them involved.

King Hussein responded that the PLO is a transitional organ designed to exist until peace is found. The present leadership is threatened, and he noted that perhaps the most important leaders could "disappear" in the near future by virtue of Libyan and Syrian attempts to radicalize the leadership of the PLO. He said that he has spoken with them regarding the right to recognize Israel's right to exist, and they ask what they will get in return. The King said that he thinks a dialogue leading to mutual recognition would be the best approach, and then indicated that the United States ought to enter into some form of dialogue with the PLO, which would not require recognition of the PLO but which could lead to the result of eventual mutual recognition of Israel's right to exist coupled with Israeli recognition of a similar condition. He said it is important to keep the channels open. It would then be possible to take another look, after the dialogue had been opened and the United States would be in a position to communicate. He noted that the "rest of the Palestinians" are reasonable, and that while there is always the possibility of a Soviet-dominated Palestine, he does not take this to be a serious possibility. He indicated that Syria is much more dangerous in this regard.

The Vice President asked what would then stop the more radical elements of the PLO from splitting off and denouncing the moderate leadership elements?

King Hussein responded that we would then recognize the moderates and eliminate the radicals from any future participation in the peace process. He mentioned that when he had seen Arafat in London recently, Arafat stated that at least three assassination attempts on his life had been planned in the near future.

Secretary Haig noted that what was critical in the near term was to achieve a confidence-building process based on progress in Lebanon. He indicated the Lebanese situation is the most dangerous and at the same time a promising aspect of developments in the Middle East. It is clear that the PLO has achieved a better reputation as a consequence of its participation in the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and has behaved responsibly. The more responsible the PLO behaves in the

context of Lebanon, the greater the atmosphere will be to develop possible bridging conditions among the main differences of the actors. If Lebanon falls apart, the peace process will be set back and the PLO will be a big loser, too. If we can realize the peace process in Lebanon, that in itself would demand responsible action by Arafat and his wing of the PLO. Then, if this succeeds, the PLO could meet the requirement of recognizing Israel without giving up its only card. With respect to autonomy, what we need is agreement as soon as possible it does not jeopardize the rights of the Palestinian people. We should urge that there be a most positive effort for all to get the peace process moving forward and to get national reconciliation underway in Lebanon. This, combined with the necessary guarantees, could bring us to a real breakthrough.

King Hussein responded that we hope for success in such an undertaking. He also hopes that all efforts toward peace will be successful, and hopes that Moubarek and the Egyptians will be able to recover Egyptian territory. He further hopes that Moubarek would not give legitimacy to any Israeli infringement on the rights of Palestinians or Arabs. He noted that Saudi Arabia cannot provide the leadership that is required in the peace process. We need a team to work together to face these challenges, to isolate the radicals. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq could work together as a team to achieve the next steps. Concerning Lebanon, he indicated that there are important differences with Syria, which wants to bargain over Lebanon and the Palestinian solution for Syria's own interests and not in the interest of general peace. The problem with the Saudis is that whenever the Syrians feel the need for national support they go to the Saudis to get money. This encourages the radicals. For example, with respect to Crown Prince Fahd's eight point peace plan, the Syrians were quiet at first but are now indicating their opposition to it. This is doubtless preparation designed to get the Saudis to extend more financial assistance, during the process of which the Syrians will insist on inserting two or three conditions to bear with their changing the nature of the Saudi peace plan and the Saudis will ultimately be the losers.

King Hussein continued that when he got back from the Soviet Union, he carried the message that the Soviets wanted to get into contact with the Saudis. He talked with the Saudi Defense Minister, who replied that Saudi Arabia would have regular contact with the Soviet Union through the United Nations and through other international fora. The Saudi Defense Minister said that Saudi Arabia is giving Syria \$3 billion a year to purchase Soviet arms, and seemed to suggest

that this was a satisfactory circumstance. The King responded that this is not at all a good situation, especially since Syria is on the borders of Jordan and the \$3 billion is therefore an unwise investment. Syria could cause a problem within Lebanon in the very short term, the King noted.

With respect to Iraq, the King stated that there has been a tremendous change in its attitudes and policies in recent years, especially during the time of expanded communication between Jordan and Iraq. During this period of close connection, it has been increasingly clear that Iraq is unhappy with the Soviet connection. Iraq is moving toward Europe, and it would also like to establish good relations with the United States. Its relations with Great Britain are normal, cordial and close, and Iraq would like to investigate the prospect of an armed forces relationship with the United States as well as with Western European countries. He noted that Iraq had never departed from Western doctrine.

Secretary Haig indicated that at the outset of the new Administration, the President authorized the sale of civilian aircraft to Iraq as a sign of good will. The process has begun, and it is encouraging. We need to have better coordinated positions on issues in the Middle East, and above all there should be no surprises for our friends (meaning Jordan, among others).

The President responded by noting that Iraq has been outspoken and it has indicated that it is still at war with Israel. He also noted that the bombing of the reactor did not help matters. He said that we need to come together at some point, that people have to call off the past in order to create a new future.

King Hussein remarked that Israel had been unhelpful in its continual supply of weapons to Iran, even during the period of the hostage crisis, and yet today.

Secretary Haig indicated that there have also been discussions of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal, as well as of the legal case regarding extradition which has yet to come to his desk.

King Hussein asked permission to raise the issue of Soviet arms to Jordan. He said that this had been the result of the Baghdad Summit, at which time Libya made as a condition that arms from the Soviet Union should be sought. The doors to Washington were closed at the time, the King noted, and thus Jordan began negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning this \$200 million sale. Agreement had been reached, but

Libya did not provide the money, so Iraq indicated that it would provide the money which comes to Jordan almost as a gift. While the King indicated that Jordan opposes Soviet entry into the Middle East, he was faced with no option and had to take the equipment. He indicated that Iraq wanted to purchase the Roland, but that this was impossible because of the U.S. connection. In 1980 when Jordan faced the military build-up in Syria, there was no help from the United States. We signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, and the equipment is about to be delivered in the beginning of 1982. There is no Soviet follow-up team to come to Jordan, and these arms will become Jordanian. He indicated that Jordan may give these arms to someone else with comparable equipment at a later date, while Jordan seeks to acquire another type of weaponry. Nonetheless, a strong moderate Jordan is extremely important to the entire structure of the Middle East, and with this the King implied that the Soviet weapons would enhance Jordan's position of strength. He said that nothing is sadder than to have a single piece of Russian equipment in Jordan's armed forces, and the Kingdom will try to limit it to the smallest possible extent. He indicated that he just wanted to give the President this explanation, and said that "To my great sorrow, I tried to avert it. We did not initiate or seek such arms."

The President paused for a moment, and said only that this will give us problems on the Hill.

Secretary Haig indicated his agreement, noting that problems would be caused on the Hill plus there would be the matter of dependency on spare parts and pressures on developing vulnerabilities within Jordan which we cannot quite foresee at the present time. The point is that this is the way the Soviets operate and we should be attentive to it.

King Hussein indicated that Jordan will do all it can to get rid of these weapons in time. If there is an option for future fighters, Jordan would be open. For example, he noted that the F-1, a French manufacturer, could be sent to Iraq and would ultimately be replaced with U.S. equipment. Based on our constant contact, the King noted, perhaps we can arrange suitable movements of this type.

The President reiterated that he was more than delighted with the opportunity to meet with the King, and said that he has great expectations as a result of these meetings.

King Hussein responded warmly, and again thanked the President for such a productive visit.

The meeting ended at 11:15 a.m.

JK

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *db 2/9/07*

ACTION

December 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*

SUBJECT: Summaries of the President's Meetings
with King Hussein of Jordan

Attached for your review and information at Tab A is the summary of the President's November 2, 1981 meeting with King Hussein of Jordan and at Tab B is the summary of the President's November 3, 1981 meeting with King Hussein.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the summaries at Tabs A and B and forward to Ed Roberts for file.

APPROVE *Barf*
12/10/81

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments:

- Tab A Memcon of November 2, 1981 Meeting Between the President and King Hussein of Jordan
- Tab B Memcon of November 3, 1981 Meeting Between the President and King Hussein of Jordan

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS~~

#7061

24

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81 DEC 10 A 8: 41

JANET COLSON

Jc (not read)

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

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CY TO BRADY

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Comments:

RECEIVED 09 DEC 81 15

TO NANCE

FROM NEWELL, G

dh
2/9/07

DOC DATE 07 DEC 81

TYSON

11 DEC 81

25

KEYWORDS: ITALY

VATICAN

CARDINAL CASAROLI

AP

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKERS FOR PRES MTG 15 DEC & RECOMMENDED ATTENDEES
FOR LUNCHEON

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO TYSON TO BREMER DUE: 10 DEC 81 STATUS X/D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TYSON

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS WITHDRAWN FM 6715.

REF#

LOG 8106703 8106715 NSCIFID

(L / *S*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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<i>C</i>	<i>12/14</i>	<i>Noted by Pres</i>		<i>CT, DB</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>12/31</i>	<i>Nance appt recon + signed memo to agencies</i>		<i>CT, RE</i>

DISPATCH

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PA (C)

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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26

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Working Lunch with Agostino Cardinal Casaroli

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
President's Chief of Staff James Baker
Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs James W. Nance
President's Personal Envoy to the Vatican William A. Wilson
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, H. Allen Holmes
NSC Staff Member Dennis C. Blair

Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State
Archbishop Pio Laghi, Apostolic Delegate to the United States
Monsignor Audrys Backis, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 15, 1981, 12:45 p.m. to 2:15 p.m.
The Map Room

After an exchange of pleasantries, Cardinal Casaroli observed that, based on his conversations with Secretary of State Haig, the U.S. and the Vatican analyses of the situation in Poland had many points in common. (S)

Secretary Haig stated he had described two scenarios for what had happened in Poland: Under the first, President Jaruzelski had acted to prevent Soviet intervention, and under the second he had acted as a result of Soviet pressure to do so. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli stated that he believed that Jaruzelski had acted both because of Soviet pressure and to prevent the Soviets themselves from intervening. He believed that without Soviet pressure Jaruzelski would not have imposed martial law, but based on his personal knowledge of Jaruzelski, Cardinal Casaroli felt that he was nationalist enough not to want the Soviet Union to intervene directly. (S)

The President said that he found it hard to believe, as had been announced, that Polish troops would actually shoot Polish workers for labor violations. (S)

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Rev 12/15/11
NSC 1.13(a)

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/16/06

Cardinal Casaroli stated that he too found it hard to believe and wondered if the United States had any evidence that shootings had occurred. (S)

Secretary Haig stated that there had been no evidence of shootings, only reports of the threat. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli said that when the Pope had discussed the imposition of martial law with Polish representatives in the Vatican, he had characterized the manner of imposition of martial law as moderate, but the measures themselves as extremely strong. Cardinal Casaroli believed that the Pope would have spoken differently if he had believed there to be danger of executions of Polish workers. Cardinal Casaroli, for his part, could understand harsh punishments for sabotage, but could hardly see them applying to workers who failed to come to work. (S)

The President recalled one news broadcast describing an observation of soldiers in Polish army uniforms speaking Russian and asked if anyone present had seen any confirmation of this report. No one had. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli recalled that he had been told by Cardinal Wyszynski that the Soviets could "kill" Poland economically any time they wished, so there was no need to take military action. (S)

Mr. Wilson pointed out that such an action would "kill" further Western economic and financial assistance to Poland. (S)

The President stated that we should take full propaganda advantage of the fact that what had sparked the imposition of martial law was the Solidarity demand that there be a national referendum on the government. This was a clear comment on the lack of popular support for the government. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli agreed that this was a telling point, but added that it was unrealistic to think that one East European country could be extensively liberalized on its own. The Soviets would simply not tolerate such a development. (S)

The President wondered if in our emphasis on the impressive buildup of Soviet military power whether we had failed to appreciate how tenuous was the Soviet hold on the people in its empire. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli stated that it was important to support movements for liberalization in Eastern Europe, but reiterated his point that no country could be far ahead of the others. The Poland situation is unique: completely surrounded by Warsaw Pact countries, cut off from any direct contact with the West. (S)

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Cardinal Casaroli stated that the Pope's belief was that change in Eastern Europe would come only gradually and at the same rate in all Eastern European countries. He was convinced that over time such liberalization would occur, but no one could know how long the process would take. (S)

In reply to Mr. Baker's question on Romania, Cardinal Casaroli pointed out that although in foreign policy Romania acted independently of the Soviet Union, the internal regime was more Stalinist than any other Eastern European country. He recalled a conversation of a Romanian diplomat with Pope Paul VI. The diplomat had said that it was a conscious policy of the Romanian government to remain strong internally in order to resist "pressure from its friends." Concerning Hungary, Cardinal Casaroli recalled the views of priests in that country, that although they were unhappy with the lack of religious freedom, they were relatively happy with the political situation there. (S)

The President noted that some observers had conjectured that Israel had annexed the Golan Heights under the cover of the events in Poland. He wondered if the Soviets had allowed Liza Alekseeva to leave the Soviet Union, ending Sakharov's hunger strike, to counteract the unfavorable publicity generated by the imposition of martial law in Poland. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli said that the events in Poland were unfortunate, but predictable. He recalled a visit to the Vatican six months ago by the Polish Minister of Transportation who was decrying the economic deterioration in Poland caused by the lack of worker discipline and had spoken openly of Soviet pressure on the Polish government to take action. He had predicted that the Polish government would be forced to intervene openly. (S)

Secretary Haig pointed out that the imposition of martial law had been weeks in the planning; it was not something which had been planned in the half-day after Solidarity called for a referendum. He stated that the U.S. policy dilemma was not to appear to welcome a repressive regime of martial law, but not to incite Soviet intervention. Although in reality the effect of indirect Soviet pressure and direct Soviet intervention was the same. The distinction was important in the stance that the United States adopted. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli said that he would not rule out the possibility that Solidarity had been infiltrated by the Polish government and that these infiltrators had generated the pretext for the imposition of martial law. In response to a question from the Vice President, Cardinal Casaroli stated that the United States and other Western observers could not act until they knew what the real situation was in Poland. He lamented the lack of good information. (S)

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The President said that the Vatican and the Pope had a key role to play in events in Poland, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Pope's visit to Poland had showed the "terrible hunger" for God in Eastern Europe. The President said he had heard reports of the fervor of the underground Church in the Soviet Union itself. He had heard stories of Bibles being distributed page-by-page among the believers. (U)

Cardinal Casaroli acknowledged that there was a hunger for God in specific groups in Eastern Europe, but that in general, youth was "insensible" to God. Despite strong religious beliefs among certain minorities, young people in general were apathetic. He told a story of the Pope's visit to Poland. The Pope in Krakow was prepared to address a group of some 30,000 young people. Having been told that some of these had prepared a demonstration, he put aside his prepared speech and improvised remarks to exert a moderate influence on the crowd. That night the youth held their demonstration in the streets, and the Police had called a priest to tell the demonstrating youths to wait until the Pope left town. This illustrates that there are changes coming in Eastern Europe little by little, but that the time is not ripe for real change in Eastern Europe. He recalled the advice given to him in 1963 by an American diplomat in Budapest. He had said that the policy of the United States was to avoid a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union but to work for small openings in the Iron Curtain, to plant the seeds of freedom. Although times had changed since 1963, the same principle still applied. The time was not yet ripe for major change in Eastern Europe. (U)

Mr. Wilson pointed out that we will probably only know in retrospect what the time for real change actually was. (U)

Cardinal Casaroli stated that he and others considered the United States "the sanctuary" for the future of the world. It was a big responsibility for the President, but he should know that the world relied on his good judgment and wisdom. (U)

The President replied that he hoped he could live up to this challenge. He turned to the visit the day before by the Papal delegation to deliver the study on nuclear war. He stated that currently the only way to deter nuclear war was to arm as strongly as the potential opponent. However, this was not good enough. There could be miscalculations and accidents. It was necessary to reduce the number of forces on both sides. The United States had made a start in Geneva, offering to dismantle one type of missile. It was hoped that this start could be turned into wider moves towards arms reduction. He stated that he had been struck by the Papal report's conclusion that in the event of a war there would be no way to care for the huge numbers of wounded. (U)

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Cardinal Casaroli replied that it was relatively simple to understand the horror of nuclear war. It was less easy to figure out how to keep it from occurring. A credible military deterrent depended on a resolve to incur the horrors of that war if necessary. There should be some better way. He pointed out that another group of scientists was meeting that day with President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union to present him the same report. (U)

The President told the story of an American farmer's opinion of the best place for a nuclear war to take place: far enough away that he could say, "What was that?" (U)

Cardinal Casaroli said that it was a challenge of our time to find the wisdom to avoid nuclear war. He said that although the Vatican of course maintained no formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, it liked to maintain some communication with the Soviet government. It was necessary to be able to speak to them, although everything that they said must be interpreted. Because of the Vatican's position, it had to rely not only on the United States but also on the Soviet Union for peace in the world. (U)

Secretary Haig told Cardinal Casaroli that he expected the negotiations in Geneva to go slowly because the United States had little leverage in the negotiations with the large imbalance of weapons in the Soviet favor. He said that Cardinal Casaroli had asked him if it might not be better to accept an imbalance so long as the United States and NATO had a small but significant deterrent of their own. In rejecting such an approach, the Secretary had explained that significant imbalances created conditions for more aggressive diplomacy by the other side, and in addition they removed the incentive for arms controls and reductions. (S)

There was a discussion of the possibility of a technological breakthrough which would make the present Soviet strategic advantage obsolete, and agreement that there was nothing of this type on the horizon. (S)

Cardinal Casaroli pointed out that some way was needed to break out of the arms spiral in which each side wanted a little cushion and this spurred the other side to further escalate. Some way was needed to break that cycle, or to find a balance at a lower level. (U)

The President said that there was no miracle weapon available with which to deal with the Soviets, but that we could threaten the Soviets with our ability to outbuild them, which the Soviets knew we could do if we chose. Once we had established this, we could invite the Soviets to join us in lowering the level of weapons on both sides. (U)

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Cardinal Casaroli asked if we thought of the Chinese aspect of the problem. In his opinion the Soviets were very worried about the Chinese, especially possible future Chinese weapons systems, and this made them build extra weapons beyond those they thought they needed to deal with the United States. (C)

Admiral Nance pointed out that such weapons would be of considerably less range than those which threatened the United States and that we would be able to distinguish those weapons directed against China from those directed against us. (S)

The President added that China was many years away from an ability to threaten the Soviet Union. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli said that he thought that arms reductions either had to be global, including all countries, or they could not be accomplished at all. (C)

The President argued that if the superpowers were engaged in a serious process of reducing their armaments, the other nations of the world would feel obliged to join in. He recalled that President Eisenhower, at a time when the United States had a marked nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, offered to turn over all nuclear weapons to an international authority. The world would be different today if the Soviets had not refused to join in this offer. (C)

Cardinal Casaroli repeated that it was an extremely difficult question, but one that it was vital for the nations of the world to address and solve. The Vatican for its part could not play a major role, but would provide the moral assistance that it could. If an informal channel was needed to deal with the Soviet Union, one that would remain private, the Pope would be available to establish it. It was important that a major power be able to "save face," and for that reason some discreet diplomacy might be valuable. Although the Holy See was politically weak, it was morally strong and might be helpful. (S)

The President agreed that quiet diplomacy was often extremely important. He recalled that President Nixon, without making a public show of it, had been able to secure the emigration from the Soviet Union of a large number of Soviet Jews. (U)

Cardinal Casaroli recalled another incident in which a Soviet ambassador had been able to accomplish a specific humanitarian action through quiet diplomacy which would not have been possible through a public campaign. He then told the President that Mr. Wilson was a "unique envoy" to the Vatican. He said that he spoke for the Pope in expressing his gratitude that an envoy of the quality of Mr. Wilson had been sent by the President. (U)

The meeting ended with pleasantries on both sides. (U)

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Allen

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EC18 P 8: 43

JANET COLSON



BUD NANCE

SIGNED

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

AJL
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MEMORANDUM

7123 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) dls
2/9/07

ACTION

December 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memorandum Summarizing the President's
Conversation with Vatican Secretary of
State Agostino Cardinal Casaroli,
December 15, 1981 (U)

Attached for your signature is a memorandum forwarding
to State, Defense and ACDA the summary of the President's
conversation at lunch with Cardinal Casaroli.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the summary for the record.

Approve Bud Disapprove _____

That the summary be sent to State, Defense and ACDA
with in-house distribution to the Vice President,
Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver.

Approve Bud Disapprove _____

* Don't send to Meese/Baker/Deaver

Attachments

SIGNED

Tab I Memo to State/Defense/ACDA
A Memcon

SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~MEMORANDUM
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

The President has seen _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*

SUBJECT: Your Lunch with Vatican Secretary of State
Casaroli, Tuesday, December 15, 12:30 p.m.

BACKGROUND: Cardinal Casaroli is the Pope's closest advisor, serving as a "prime minister" for the Vatican. He was on his way to meet with you last May when the Pope was shot. Recent events in Poland will probably be uppermost in his mind. Both the Pope and Archbishop Glemp have issued pleas for restraint in Poland. In addition, Casaroli will be interested in your views on the study on nuclear war which you received yesterday, the INF talks in Geneva, and in events in Central America. On all of these subjects our objective is to present our positions clearly to Casaroli, and to hear his views, which will reflect those of the Pope.

TALKING POINTS:

--Please convey to the Pope my personal best wishes for the Christmas season, the time of year when Christians pray for peace.

--The Pope seems to have made a complete recovery from his wounds. How is his health?

--The Pope and Archbishop Glemp have called for moderation in Poland. Do you see a peaceful settlement coming from the current crisis?

--I received a delegation yesterday with the study on nuclear war; our approach to preventing the horror of these wars is a balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

-- Our proposal for the INF talks in Geneva for the dismantling of certain land-based nuclear missiles is a serious proposal; We hope the Soviets will respond.

-- Our approach to START next year will also focus on deep reductions by both sides.

-- We hope the Church will, as we do, support the elections in El Salvador and encourage participation and international observers.

.81 DEC 14 6:35
Attachments:

Tab A State Department Briefing Paper

cc: The Vice President
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET Attachment~~

LUNCH WITH CARDINAL CASAROLI - 15 DECEMBER

- POPE'S HEALTH ? XMAS GREETINGS TO POPE.
- PEACEFUL OUTCOME IN POLAND ?
- PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR BY BALANCE AT LOWEST LEVEL.
- INF AND START: SERIOUS REDUCTION PROPOSALS.
- CENTRAL AMERICA: DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND ELECTIONS.

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33855	PAPER	2	4/23/1981	B1
	BIO			B3
				B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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NLRR: FOI-065#33856

BY Cel NARADATE 3/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~SECRET~~

YOUR LUNCHEON WITH AGOSTINO CARDINAL
CASAROLI, VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE,
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15 AT 12:30 P.M.

33856

I. OBJECTIVES

We will want to make plain our commitment to progress at the Geneva talks with the Soviets on mutual reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons. Pope John Paul II has written to you and to Brezhnev urging this goal. A reply has been prepared for your signature, but we recommend that you also review the issue with Cardinal Casaroli, to ensure that the Vatican understands our position exactly. (Your letter to the Pope of November 22, enclosing a copy of your November 18 speech on arms control, should also contribute to Vatican understanding). It will be useful to hear Casaroli's views on Poland, the Middle East, and Latin America, and to articulate our own thinking on these issues.

II. SETTING

The Pope looks to the United States to play a major role in promoting world peace and helping the world's disadvantaged. He deeply distrusts the Soviets and understands the need for firmness in dealing with them. But he has also been critical of the West's shortcomings, especially what he regards as its wastefulness and materialism. Casaroli himself is a close confidant of the Pope, whom he serves as a sort of "Prime Minister". His scheduled call on you last May was pre-empted by news that the Pope had been gravely wounded. On this occasion he is coming from Mexico, where he took part in a Church anniversary celebration.

III. ISSUES

A. The Pope's Letter on Disarmament.

1. Essential Factors: In nearly identical letters to you and Brezhnev the Pope has appealed for substantial progress in the Geneva negotiations. He has also asked you and Brezhnev to meet personally later this month with separate Vatican delegations to receive a Vatican-sponsored study on the effects of nuclear war.

2. Suggested Points

-- The United States is well aware of the potential for destruction in nuclear weapons; but

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-2-

the danger to peace does not arise entirely or even primarily from their existence per se.

-- Our objective is to avoid any conflict, conventional or nuclear; our nuclear weapons and our conventional forces serve as an important deterrent to war of any kind, by preserving a balance.

-- The United States sincerely hopes to achieve significant reductions of nuclear weapons. It is prepared to agree at Geneva to the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

-- It is essential to have an equitable agreement which gives neither side cause to feel its security threatened, and thus lessens the likelihood of conflict of any kind.

B. Poland

1. Essential Factors: John Paul II, history's first Polish Pope, brings an added personal dimension to the Church's involvement in Poland. He has been a force for moderation and restraint. He plans to visit Poland for the second time as Pope next August.

2. Suggested Points

-- We recommend that you seek Casaroli's assessment of recent developments, probe him on Vatican intentions, and describe the decisions you took at the NSC meeting on December 10 for the purpose of helping Poland through a difficult winter.

C. Middle East

1. Essential Factors: The Vatican continues to regard the Camp David process as a promising avenue toward an eventual overall settlement. It insists, however, that a full resolution of the Palestinian question is required for a durable final accord. It has avoided establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, it rejects the notion that Jerusalem is Israel's political capital, and it seeks to deal "evenhandedly" with all the principal parties, including the PLO. The future of Lebanon, with its large Christian population, is of special interest to the Vatican. The Vatican favors a broad international effort to secure the independence, unity, and integrity of the Lebanese state.

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-3-

2. Suggested Points

-- We suggest that you ask Casaroli for his views (especially on Lebanon) and stress our view that the Camp David process remains the only viable approach to a Middle East settlement.

D. Central America

1. Essential Factors: The Church is well aware of the disastrous course of the Nicaraguan revolution. The Vatican has also sought with great difficulty to rein in its revolutionary clergy in the region. It has mixed views on the ability of elections in El Salvador to restore social peace and end the many-sided violence.

2. Suggested Points

-- We will continue to support democratic forces in Nicaragua and will work with our equally concerned neighbors in the hemisphere on the Nicaraguan threat to regional stability.

-- In El Salvador, elections provide the best available means to move toward social peace and an end to violence. We hope the Church will assist as best it can in encouraging international observation and participation in the election process.

E. The Beagle Channel Dispute

1. Essential Factors: The dispute involves islands and the maritime divide at the southern tip of the continent. Argentina and Chile came close to war in late 1978. The Pope offered to mediate. On December 12, 1980, he presented guidelines for solution to the two Foreign Ministers. The Chileans accepted. The Argentines have not; they hope for further concessions from Chile. Despite the current impasse, we believe Papal mediation offers the best hope of eventual solution. Direct involvement by the U.S. or other countries would probably strengthen hardliners in Argentina who reject any reasonable compromise.

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~~SECRET~~

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-4-

2. Suggested Points

-- We have urged both countries to be responsive to the Pope's guidelines, but do not believe that more direct U.S. involvement would be helpful.

-- We hope that the Pope can continue his mediating role as long as may be necessary.

F. Formal U.S.-Vatican Diplomatic Relations

1. Essential Factors: The U.S. does not have formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Many Americans would welcome this step, but many others would oppose it as inconsistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution. In 1951 President Truman's nomination of General Mark Clark as Ambassador to the Vatican was thwarted by highly vocal opposition. The issue still has the potential for divisive controversy.

2. Suggested Points

-- If Casaroli raises this, we suggest you reply that we value highly our excellent relations, but that a move to more formal relations would have to be considered in light of domestic political sensitivities. We periodically review this issue and will take his views into account.

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AJL

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENTS~~

ACTION UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 11/21/07 December 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *cm*

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for President's Lunch
with Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Tuesday,
December 15, 12:30 p.m.

Attached is a memorandum for your signature forwarding
briefing materials to the President for tomorrow's lunch.
The memo condenses the four-page essay which we received
from State.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to the
President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to President

A State Department Briefing Paper

~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENTS~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1981

12/14 to Deaver
1130 hr
43

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER

FROM:

BUD NANCE *Bud*

SUBJECT:

President's Luncheon for
Cardinal Casaroli
Tuesday, December 15 -- 1:00 p.m.

Following are the recommended attendees at the President's luncheon for Cardinal Casaroli:

Italian: Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State
Monsignor Audrys Backis, Under Secretary, Council for the Public Affairs of the Church
Archbishop Pio Laghi, Apostolic Delegate to the US

US:

White House

The Vice President

Jim Baker

Mike Deaver

James W. Nance, Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NSC

Dennis C. Blair, Senior Staff Member for Western Europe

State

William A. Wilson, Personal Representative of the President to the Holy See

H. Allen Holmes, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

44

December 11, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: President's Luncheon for
Cardinal Casaroli
Tuesday, December 15 -- 1:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Mike Deaver listing the recommended participants at the President's luncheon for Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State, on Tuesday, December 15, at 1:00 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7123
~~625~~

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MEMORANDUM

12/7/81

TO: ADMIRAL NANCE
FROM: GREGORY *J.* NEWELL
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

PLEASE IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING AND NOTIFY AND CLEAR ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE BRIEFING PAPER AND REMARKS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO RICHARD DARMAN BY 3 P.M. OF THE PRECEDING DAY.

MEETING: Lunch with Cardinal Casaroli

DATE: December 15, 1981

TIME: 1:00 pm

DURATION: 75 minutes

LOCATION: To be determined

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

cc: M. Brandon
R. Darman
D. Fischer
M. Friedersdorf
C. Fuller
C. Gerrard
E. Hickey
P. McCoy
L. Nofziger
J. Parr
B. Shaddix
L. Speakes
Speechwriting and Research
S. Studdert
N. Wormser
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7123 add-on

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December 21, 1981

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EUGENE V. ROSTOW
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Conversation with
Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Cardinal
Casaroli, December 15, 1981

Attached for your information is a summary of the President's
working lunch with Agostino Cardinal Casaroli. Its distri-
bution within your departments and agency should be limited
to those whose duties require them to know its contents.



James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Summary of Conversation

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

cc: Vice President

47

A

Subject: MEMCON OF PRES MTG WITH AGOSTINO CARDINAL CASAROLI OF VATICAN

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter | <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Gold | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Lilley | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tanter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bailey | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Gregg | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Lord | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tyson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Col. Berta | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Guhin | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nau | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Weiss |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Colson | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Jennings | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Poats | <input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kemp | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rentschler | <input type="checkbox"/> Admin. Office |
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
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THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Colson | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Jennings | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Poats | <input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat |
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