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President Reagan [11/19/1981-11/27/1981]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/16/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/19/1981-11/27/1981)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 49

JAUVERT/BROWER

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116656	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO RR RE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HELMUT SCHMIDT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116655	MEMCON	RE. SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GAAFAR NIMEIRI OF SUDAN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/20/1981	B1
116657	MEMCON	RR AND SCHMIDT [COPY OF DOC. 116626] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	11/21/1981	B1
116658	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CALL FROM SCHMIDT [W/NOTATION; COPY OF DOC. 116659] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116659	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CALL FROM SCHMIDT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
116660	MEMCON	RR AND SCHMIDT [COPY OF DOC. 116626] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	11/21/1981	B1
116661	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/27/1981	B1
116662	TALKING PTS.	RE. CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

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FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116665	MEMCON	RE. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT LUIS HERRERA CAMPINS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	6	11/17/1981	B1
116669	FORM	RE. MEMCON FOR RR AND HERRERA CAMPINS MEETING <i>R 12/21/2015 351/1</i>	2	11/17/1981	B1
116666	MEMCON	RE. RR EXPANDED MEETING WITH HERRERA CAMPINS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	11/17/1981	B1
116667	FORM	RE. MEMCON FOR RR AND HERRERA CAMPINS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	11/18/1981	B1
116668	MEMCON	RE. RR'S WRAP-UP MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HERRERA CAMPINS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	11/18/1981	B1

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 19 NOV 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM GUHIN

DOCDATE 19 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: REFUGEES

UN

HARTLING, POUL

AP

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ HARTLING ON 13 NOV

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 NOV 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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FILE

PA (C)

Cen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Mr. Poul Hartling
UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. Howard Eugene Douglas
US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs-
Designate

Mr. Michael A. Guhin
National Security Council Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: Friday, November 13, 1981,
10:45 a.m., The Oval Office

The President welcomed Hartling and congratulated him on the 1981 Nobel Peace Prize.

Hartling expressed appreciation for the opportunity to thank the President personally and the American people for United States support to refugees; this included both financial support and the high numbers of refugees accepted for resettlement in the United States.

The President noted the need to correct or remove those conditions that give rise to refugees in the first place. Hartling responded that this was an important political objective, but that the UN Office's work was humanitarian, not political.

The President asked specifically about the causes of refugee flows in Africa -- for example, was conflict stemming from tribal situations or the establishment of new nations a major factor? Hartling responded that this was a key point, as many of the refugee problems in Africa resulted from tribal conflicts, borders splitting tribes, as well as other reasons. He noted that 250,000 refugees from the conflict in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia had been repatriated.

Hartling added that the United States had made a deep and positive impression on African nations at the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, in April of this year, by pledging \$285 million over the next two years for African refugees. He especially praised Mrs. Kirkpatrick's performance in this regard.

With reference to Haiti, Hartling noted that he had talked with Attorney General Smith and recognized that there was a problem of economic migrants here. However, he said he sought and received assurances from the Attorney General that the United States approaches to these problems would not affect genuine refugees or those seeking asylum and that they would continue to be handled according to laws and obligations.

Hartling summarized his recent visit to China, noting that China had resettled 265,000 refugees from Indochina and, for the first time, provided some contributions to the UN program and the African refugee program. He also touched on his trip to Pakistan, where there are 2 million refugees from Afghanistan that required help.

The President recalled that he had been in Teheran during the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and saw some of the problems from a much closer view. He noted that larger numbers came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

RECEIVED

81 NOV 20 A 8: 01

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

[Handwritten signature]

Mike

If you think it's accurate, we'll take your word for it! Go

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN


FROM: MICHAEL GUHIN *gy*
SUBJECT: Memcon of Hartling Meeting

Attached for the President's records is a memorandum of conversation of his November 13 meeting with UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memcon at Tab I.

Approve



Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memcon

TO ALLEN

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 20 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: SUDAN

AP

NIMEIRI, GAAFAR

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG ON 20 NOV W/ NIMEIRI

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 23 NOV 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

COMMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

6705

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of President's Meeting with President Gaafar Nimeiri of Sudan

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Counsellor Robert McFarlane
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Frederick L. Wattering, National Security Council Staff Member

President Gaafar Nimeiri
Ambassador Omer Eissa
Brigadier General Mustafa Kamil Salih

DATE, TIME November 20, 1981
AND PLACE: 1:30-2:00 p.m., Oval Office

The President opened the substantive conversation by thanking President Nimeiri for our continued bilateral cooperation and for his support to the Middle East peace process. The President noted for our part we resolved to continue to assist Sudan; in this regard, the President noted that just a few days ago he had asked Congress for an additional \$50 million in aid for Sudan.

President Nimeiri expressed his pleasure at this news and his appreciation of American assistance. On the Middle East peace process, he stated peace in the area was vital and he fully supported and believed in "the Sadat plan." Up to now, nothing else is working, he added.

President Nimeiri stated that to protect peace it was regrettably necessary to build defenses. He expressed his warm appreciation for the US policy recently. He explained that when Sudan was threatened by Libya, the President's policy helped very much in removing the danger. He praised the US policy which is clear - a plan, a policy, a frankness, with no hesitation to help friends (as he characterized the US policy) is a good deterrent.

The President noted that the OAU force was now arriving in Chad. He asked for President Nimeiri's views on whether this will be successful in removing the Libyans from Chad.

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Review 11/20/87

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NLRR M37111 # 116655
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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President Nimeiri noted that Secretary Haig had briefed him on US support to the OAU force. This is helpful, he said. He remarked that Qadhafi still threatened him (Nimeiri), but even if he succeeds against Nimeiri, Sudan will still resist Qadhafi.

President Nimeiri then opened a discussion on Libya by observing that war against Qadhafi was not the answer. President Nimeiri proposed that the US stop the petrodollars going to Libya which Qadhafi uses to finance his terrorism. He noted that if left alone by Libya, Sudan could prosper. He noted that a US company has discovered oil in significant quantities in Sudan and has begun to exploit it. If we help ourselves, you will help us more, he stated.

Returning to his proposal, President Nimeiri again called for stopping the flow of petrodollars to Libya. He also called for elimination of US machinery exports to Libya. The US should lead the pressure on Libya. He called for a coordinated "team" to stop the export of vital machinery from the US and Europe to Libya.

The President noted that two US oil companies had pulled out of Libya and only two were left.

Secretary Haig noted that a study of options against Libya was in its final stages. He noted that we had had discussions with the Saudis about driving even lower the price of oil, thereby further reducing Qadhafi's resources, by increased Saudi production.

The Vice President noted that Libya still had a lot of foreign exchange, and asked President Nimeiri how we can deal with this.

President Nimeiri stated that Qadhafi has funds but that they had been reduced.

The President mentioned a story he had recently seen on television news, which reported that a French electronics company which makes sophisticated electronic equipment, including NATO defense items, had secretly been bought by Qadhafi through a Swiss front.

Secretary Haig noted that Qadhafi had a lot of foreign holdings but currently has a cash flow crunch. Secretary Haig added that Qadhafi had recently tried to get loans from the Gulf states but failed. He also just gave \$100 million to Ethiopia in this "alliance of terrorists."

President Nimeiri noted Qadhafi owned 16 percent of Fiat. He observed that Qadhafi needed the money to pay his mercenary soldiers. He added that a Libyan opposition group based in London wanted to hold a public trial of Qadhafi to reveal his crimes and has approached Sudan to meet and hold the trial in Khartoum. President Nimeiri said that he approved, and the

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trial will be held in January-February. This has incensed Qadhafi, he added, noting that Qadhafi places value in having a good image, especially internally.

The President asked that if Qadhafi got into a real war, we know he has modern weapons but would his troops fight? What are their fighting qualities?

President Nimeiri answered that standards were low but added that Qadhafi has mercenaries from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Germany. They were not so effective outside Libya - Habre demonstrated that in Chad - but they would fight hard inside Libya because they would have no place to go, he remarked. President Nimeiri added that the USSR would intervene if there was an attack on Libya from a major power, or even from Egypt. He believed that Qadhafi would sign the Warsaw Pact, anything, to save himself. We don't want this, he stated. We want to catch him slowly, to let the Libyan people eliminate him. Otherwise, any plan of attack must finish him in six hours. And that will be difficult since he sleeps in different places every night, he added.

The President noted the analogy with Stalin.

President Nimeiri stated that Qadhafi was interfering in Western Sahara. He reminded us that he is on the OAU "wisemen" committee which recently came up with the plan to resolve Western Sahara. President Nimeiri stated he favors US support, assistance, to King Hassan of Morocco. And he will state this to the OAU or anyone. He noted that he had just come from a visit to the House of Representatives. One member had asked him whether Sudan recognized the Polisario Front. President Nimeiri related that he replied by stating that he had made one mistake and was not going to make another. He explained that he had made a mistake in recognizing the PLO. He does not recognize SWAPO or Polisario. He distrusts exile movements which collect money and claim they speak for the people. He again observed that he now knows that the PLO does not represent the people, and expressed resentment that Yasser Arafat is treated as a chief of state.

President Nimeiri said he had read the President's recent speech (on arms reductions) with interest. He recalled well that the US had all the power after World War II, had exclusive control of nuclear weapons and yet acted responsibly.

Mr. Allen reminded the President of his next appointment. The meeting concluded with a brief exchange of pleasantries.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116656

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Your Telephone Conversation with
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, November 21,
1981

Attached for your information is a summary of the telephone conversation between you and Chancellor Schmidt on the eve of the Brezhnev visit to Bonn.

The main points of the conversation were as follows:

- Schmidt told you he would be very tough on substance but soft in tone in his discussions with Brezhnev.
- You requested Schmidt to impress on Brezhnev the sincerity of your proposal on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on November 22, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711/#116656
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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81 NOV 20 P 7: 09

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

[Signature] 22

IRENE DERUS

[Signature] 23/

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

Q5L

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6705

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

November 20, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: FRED WETTERING *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's November 20 Meeting With
President Nimeiri of Sudan

Attached is the memcon covering the President's meeting with
Sudan President Nimeiri from 1:30-2:00 p.m. on November 20, 1981,
in the Oval Office.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon at Tab I.

APPROVE *[Signature]*

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment
Tab I

Memcon between President Reagan and President
Nimeiri of Sudan

thanks, Fred

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

rw
8/16/11

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Allen	O
Nance	C
Colson	C
Poindexter	C
PA/AG-ND	C
NSC S/S	

bc

C = Copy

O = Original

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

November 22, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Schmidt, November 21, 1981

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding the summary of his telephone conversation with Chancellor Schmidt (Tab A).

I recommend also that we make a copy of the memorandum available to the State Department, along with a copy of the message the President sent to Schmidt after the conversation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve sending to State a copy of the summary of the telephone conversation and of the President's message to Schmidt.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo for RVA signature to the President
- A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

cc: W. Stearman
S. Kraemer

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

RW 8/16/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
(calling from Hamburg)

DATE, TIME November 21, 1981
AND PLACE: 3:14-3:30 p.m.

Chancellor Schmidt: Hello, Mr. President.

The President: Well, hello there, how are you, Helmut?

Chancellor Schmidt: Well, thank you very much Ronald, I'm fine. I'm spending the weekend at Hellum in Hamburg and preparing for the visit which will start tomorrow night.

The President: I thought it had already started..tomorrow night.

Chancellor Schmidt: No, it will start tomorrow night and I'm calling for two reasons, sir.

The President: All right.

Chancellor Schmidt: For one, I would like to express my gratitude for the speech which you gave in the second half of this week in front of the National Press Club. It just came in time and I'm rather thankful and have said so publicly already.

The President: Well, I know and I appreciate very much your kind words about it. I appreciate that.

Chancellor Schmidt: However, in the meantime, Ronald, you have seen a letter which I wrote you a week ago and you will perhaps also have seen some explanation by your Ambassador Arthur Burns.

The President: Now wait a minute..maybe, six days ago?

Chancellor Schmidt: Yes.

The President: Oh let me..I don't think that's reached me yet.

Chancellor Schmidt: It must have been on Monday, It was a long letter and Arthur Burns strongly..just before I put my signature

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to it just in case that the White House had any questions, I tried to explain the substance and the motivations in that letter. Now the reason for my calling is that I wanted you to tell me whether you have any advice or any need for explanation or any comments as far as the letter sent out to you what I am going to tell Mr. Brezhnev when he comes tomorrow night.

The President: Well, I think that factory of mine down there is just running slow and that they haven't gotten it to me yet.

Chancellor Schmidt: Get them going, Ronald.

The President: I'll get on the horn and find out, but I could say that the only thing is that if they seem to be saying from the other side..you know, questioning my sincerity on this and thinking we've got some kind of tricks, anything you could do to reassure them that, no, I meant what I said.

Chancellor Schmidt: Oh, surely. I surely will.

The President: All right.

Chancellor Schmidt: I surely will and I will also tell them that my own country is committed to station the Pershing II and the GLCMs by the end of 1983 if not in the meantime they get to some agreement in the Geneva talks.

The President: Good.

Chancellor Schmidt: And that he must not believe..must not be misled by propagaᅇda things and by some young people who demonstrate in London and Amsterdam and Bonn. I will tell him that this is just a mistake to read this for the general opinion of my country, or of my government or of any other government.

The President: That is great.

Chancellor Schmidt: Pardon.

The President: I say that is great.

Chancellor Schmidt: Yeah. I will be very clear. He will get a very clear message.

The President: Good, good.

Chancellor Schmidt: On the other hand, I will be soft speaking. I will be very clear in substance but my tone will be conventional like yours was in your speech.

The President: Yes. That was deliberate with me. I thought this was not a time for harsh words.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Chancellor Schmidt: Yes, I think so. Especially the tone in your speech, as much as the substance, was very welcome, I felt.

The President: Well, I'm pleased about that.

Chancellor Schmidt: I beg your pardon, Ron.

The President: I say, I'm very pleased to hear that.

Chancellor Schmidt: I have a little question in mind. In your speech it seemed, or rather in the directives which you gave to your people who would start negotiations in Geneva Monday next week, as if there was much time. There isn't very much time. There is a little less than two years, and this I would like to put into your conscience..that we do not waste these two years, because we have now the end of '81 and until the end of '83 when we start deployment. It's just 24 months and we need to get an agreement a little earlier, otherwise we'll deploy and then all the things will become even more complicated and difficult.

The President: Yes, and I'm going to speak to our people. We don't want it lengthened. It was from the Soviet side that some spokesman for them said, "Well we'll spend the first year on definitions and things, and then the second year we'll get down to something else." My idea was, you sit down at that table and try to wind it up, get it through as quickly as possible.

Chancellor Schmidt: Right.

The President: And I would think, just between us, that he's got some problems on his side with the economy in his country and the hunger of his people, that he might be more amenable now to not spending so much on military.

Chancellor Schmidt: It's possible, although they can make their people acquiesce to the economic hardship. On the other side, your people and my people don't like unemployment and talk loudly about it.

The President: That's right.

Chancellor Schmidt: My letter consists of two parts. The first part deals with the economic situation in Europe, and I would rather like that they show it to you.

The President: Oh, I know that I will see it. It's just, I think they have been a little slow here. With this speech and setting up the world network and everything I think their minds maybe were on that. But no, I will speak and make very sure that I get as quickly as I can your letter.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Chancellor Schmidt: I am quite sure that Brezhnev has great economic difficulties, especially as regards feeding his own people with grain and his cattle with grain and feeding the Poles and the Rumanians and all the rest. But we've got economic difficulties as well which are quite open for him to detect and to observe. So, I think he will for the first time in the oncoming years possibly even ask for Western credits. I would not be astonished if that would happen. I would not be astonished. Not officially, but, I mean, buy machinery on a credit basis, and pay a little later and so on. I would not be astonished. I have no notice so far but I understand that his balance of payments and his current account is getting into trouble as is the current account of almost any East European country, perhaps with the exception of Hungary. Hungary seems to be okay.

The President: Uh, huh. Well, all right, we'll keep that in mind too.

Chancellor Schmidt: When he leaves on Wednesday morning, I will immediately send State Secretary von Staden to Washington to inform the State Department about the talks.

The President: Good.

Chancellor Schmidt: So you will get a first-hand report by von Staden, who is the chief permanent official in our State Department, and if you like, I would also call you by telephone on Wednesday to tell you how the talks were going, if you are interested. I'm not going to spoil your time.

The President: No. Now we may have a little problem timewise.. (a discussion followed on the time difference between Germany and California).

Chancellor Schmidt: I will ask my chief advisor to get in touch with Mr. Meese and they might work it out whether it is advisable or not.

The President: Okay.

Chancellor Schmidt: Anyway I will send my chief diplomat to inform the State Department about the talks with Brezhnev and I'm very much looking forward to seeing you early in January when I will have my holidays in Florida and you were good enough to ask me to come by for a chat.

The President: Yes, I'm looking forward to it. All right. Then I shall look forward to seeing you and thank you very much for this call and for the letter and I'll get on them right away about that.

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Chancellor Schmidt: Well, thank you, Ronnie, and if anything is in the letter which you would like to correct, there is time enough between now and tomorrow night and somebody in the White House might tell me, because the talks with Brezhnev will only open up in 24 hours.

The President: Okay. All right. I shall.

(Goodbyes from both.)

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 NOV 81 16

19

TO ALLEN

FROM BLAIR

DOC DATE 24 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

USSR

SCHMIDT, HELMUT

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR PROPOSED SCHMIDT CALL FOR NOV 25

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 25 NOV 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	1P 11/27	for info (DACOM'd to Calif.)		
	C 12/1	noted by Pres.; "Call rec'd."		DTB ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

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(C)H.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6854

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Phone Call from Chancellor Schmidt
(Wednesday, November 25, 1981)

Case / Raw

Background: In your phone conversation with him on Saturday you accepted Schmidt's offer to telephone when Brezhnev left to report on the visit. In addition, Schmidt is sending his State Secretary von Staden to Washington to report in more detail. Listed below are talking points to use when Schmidt calls.

Talking Points:

- Did Brezhnev make any serious proposals to you on the intermediate-range nuclear forces? (In his public toast, Brezhnev offered a freeze, "missile cuts in the hundreds" and removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe - all rehashes of previous public proposals).
- Were you able to make clear the Alliance's determination to deploy our weapons unless the Soviet Union comes to an agreement with us?
- Did Brezhnev say anything about the economic problems the Soviet Union is experiencing?
- Did the Soviet pamphlet "The Threat to Europe," published during the visit, have any effect on public opinion?
- Did Brezhnev himself bring up the idea of a summit meeting with me? (We specifically asked Schmidt not to bring it up).
- How did Brezhnev appear physically - in the pictures he seemed in poor shape?

Attached at Tab A is the summary of your earlier conversation.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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NLRR M371/1 # 116658
BY *RW* NARA DATE 6/22/15

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Review on 11/24/87

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Historical File

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MEMORANDUM

6854

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Phone Call from Chancellor Schmidt
(Wednesday, November 25, 1981)

Background: In your phone conversation with him on Saturday you accepted Schmidt's offer to telephone when Brezhnev left to report on the visit. In addition, Schmidt is sending his State Secretary von Staden to Washington to report in more detail. Listed below are talking points to use when Schmidt calls.

Talking Points:

-- Did Brezhnev make any serious proposals to you on the intermediate-range nuclear forces? (In his public toast, Brezhnev offered a freeze, "missile cuts in the hundreds" and removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe - all rehashes of previous public proposals).

-- Were you able to make clear the Alliance's determination to deploy our weapons unless the Soviet Union comes to an agreement with us?

-- Did Brezhnev say anything about the economic problems the Soviet Union is experiencing?

-- Did the Soviet pamphlet "The Threat to Europe," published during the visit, have any effect on public opinion?

-- Did Brezhnev himself bring up the idea of a summit meeting with me? (We specifically asked Schmidt not to bring it up).

-- How did Brezhnev appear physically - in the pictures he seemed in poor shape?

Attached at Tab A is the summary of your earlier conversation.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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Review on 11/24/87

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711 # 116659
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
(calling from Hamburg)

DATE, TIME November 21, 1981
AND PLACE: 3:14-3:30 p.m.

Chancellor Schmidt: Hello, Mr. President.

The President: Well, hello there, how are you, Helmut?

Chancellor Schmidt: Well, thank you very much Ronald, I'm fine. I'm spending the weekend at Hellum in Hamburg and preparing for the visit which will start tomorrow night.

The President: I thought it had already started..tomorrow night.

Chancellor Schmidt: No, it will start tomorrow night and I'm calling for two reasons, sir.

The President: All right.

Chancellor Schmidt: For one, I would like to express my gratitude for the speech which you gave in the second half of this week in front of the National Press Club. It just came in time and I'm rather thankful and have said so publicly already.

The President: Well, I know and I appreciate very much your kind words about it. I appreciate that.

Chancellor Schmidt: However, in the meantime, Ronald, you have seen a letter which I wrote you a week ago and you will perhaps also have seen some explanation by your Ambassador Arthur Burns.

The President: Now wait a minute..maybe, six days ago?

Chancellor Schmidt: Yes.

The President: Oh let me..I don't think that's reached me yet.

Chancellor Schmidt: It must have been on Monday, It was a long letter and Arthur Burns strongly..just before I put my signature

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/12/15

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to it just in case that the White House had any questions, I tried to explain the substance and the motivations in that letter. Now the reason for my calling is that I wanted you to tell me whether you have any advice or any need for explanation or any comments as far as the letter sent out to you what I am going to tell Mr. Brezhnev when he comes tomorrow night.

The President: Well, I think that factory of mine down there is just running slow and that they haven't gotten it to me yet.

Chancellor Schmidt: Get them going, Ronald.

The President: I'll get on the horn and find out, but I could say that the only thing is that if they seem to be saying from the other side..you know, questioning my sincerity on this and thinking we've got some kind of tricks, anything you could do to reassure them that, no, I meant what I said.

Chancellor Schmidt: Oh, surely. I surely will.

The President: All right.

Chancellor Schmidt: I surely will and I will also tell them that my own country is committed to station the Pershing II and the GLCMs by the end of 1983 if not in the meantime they get to some agreement in the Geneva talks.

The President: Good.

Chancellor Schmidt: And that he must not believe..must not be misled by propaganda things and by some young people who demonstrate in London and Amsterdam and Bonn. I will tell him that this is just a mistake to read this for the general opinion of my country, or of my government or of any other government.

The President: That is great.

Chancellor Schmidt: Pardon.

The President: I say that is great.

Chancellor Schmidt: Yeah. I will be very clear. He will get a very clear message.

The President: Good, good.

Chancellor Schmidt: On the other hand, I will be soft speaking. I will be very clear in substance but my tone will be conventional like yours was in your speech.

The President: Yes. That was deliberate with me. I thought this was not a time for harsh words.

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Chancellor Schmidt: Yes, I think so. Especially the tone in your speech, as much as the substance, was very welcome, I felt.

The President: Well, I'm pleased about that.

Chancellor Schmidt: I beg your pardon, Ron.

The President: I say, I'm very pleased to hear that.

Chancellor Schmidt: I have a little question in mind. In your speech it seemed, or rather in the directives which you gave to your people who would start negotiations in Geneva Monday next week, as if there was much time. There isn't very much time. There is a little less than two years, and this I would like to put into your conscience..that we do not waste these two years, because we have now the end of '81 and until the end of '83 when we start deployment. It's just 24 months and we need to get an agreement a little earlier, otherwise we'll deploy and then all the things will become even more complicated and difficult.

The President: Yes, and I'm going to speak to our people. We don't want it lengthened. It was from the Soviet side that some spokesman for them said, "Well we'll spend the first year on definitions and things, and then the second year we'll get down to something else." My idea was, you sit down at that table and try to wind it up, get it through as quickly as possible.

Chancellor Schmidt: Right.

The President: And I would think, just between us, that he's got some problems on his side with the economy in his country and the hunger of his people, that he might be more amenable now to not spending so much on military.

Chancellor Schmidt: It's possible, although they can make their people acquiesce to the economic hardship. On the other side, your people and my people don't like unemployment and talk loudly about it.

The President: That's right.

Chancellor Schmidt: My letter consists of two parts. The first part deals with the economic situation in Europe, and I would rather like that they show it to you.

The President: Oh, I know that I will see it. It's just, I think they have been a little slow here. With this speech and setting up the world network and everything I think their minds maybe were on that. But no, I will speak and make very sure that I get as quickly as I can your letter.

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Chancellor Schmidt: I am quite sure that Brezhnev has great economic difficulties, especially as regards feeding his own people with grain and his cattle with grain and feeding the Poles and the Rumanians and all the rest. But we've got economic difficulties as well which are quite open for him to detect and to observe. So, I think he will for the first time in the oncoming years possibly even ask for Western credits. I would not be astonished if that would happen. I would not be astonished. Not officially, but, I mean, buy machinery on a credit basis, and pay a little later and so on. I would not be astonished. I have no notice so far but I understand that his balance of payments and his current account is getting into trouble as is the current account of almost any East European country, perhaps with the exception of Hungary. Hungary seems to be okay.

The President: Uh, huh. Well, all right, we'll keep that in mind too.

Chancellor Schmidt: When he leaves on Wednesday morning, I will immediately send State Secretary von Staden to Washington to inform the State Department about the talks.

The President: Good.

Chancellor Schmidt: So you will get a first-hand report by von Staden, who is the chief permanent official in our State Department, and if you like, I would also call you by telephone on Wednesday to tell you how the talks were going, if you are interested. I'm not going to spoil your time.

The President: No. Now we may have a little problem timewise.. (a discussion followed on the time difference between Germany and California).

Chancellor Schmidt: I will ask my chief advisor to get in touch with Mr. Meese and they might work it out whether it is advisable or not.

The President: Okay.

Chancellor Schmidt: Anyway I will send my chief diplomat to inform the State Department about the talks with Brezhnev and I'm very much looking forward to seeing you early in January when I will have my holidays in Florida and you were good enough to ask me to come by for a chat.

The President: Yes, I'm looking forward to it. All right. Then I shall look forward to seeing you and thank you very much for this call and for the letter and I'll get on them right away about that.

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Chancellor Schmidt: Well, thank you, Ronnie, and if anything is in the letter which you would like to correct, there is time enough between now and tomorrow night and somebody in the White House might tell me, because the talks with Brezhnev will only open up in 24 hours.

The President: Okay. All right. I shall.

(Goodbyes from both.)

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rw
8/14/11

CLASSIFICATION

26

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MODE

PAGES 06

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 11

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 242250Z NOV 81

ROUTINE

TTY #

1500 001 01 00 45

FROM/LOCATION/

1. MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN / THE SITUATION ROOM / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. DAVE FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT / THE RANCH

2. MR. DEAVER / THE RANCH

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

// SUBJECT: PHONE CALL FROM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT //

NOTE: RANCH COMM. CENTER. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MAY POSSIBLY BE CALLING THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW AND THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD LIKED TO BE INFORMED OF THE MATTER. SIGNAL HERE HAS ALREADY BEEN INFORMED. THANKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

911 24 P. 09
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM

6854

DL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 24, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DL*

SUBJECT: Schmidt's Phone Call to the President
(Wednesday, November 25, 1981)

In case Schmidt does call the President on Wednesday, as he offered to do when they spoke on Saturday, here is a memo from you to the President with background and talking points.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *DL* Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo to the President

Returned to California

cc: Muse / Baker / Danner / VP

11/24/81

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

RU 8/16/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

CLASSIFICATION :

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE :

PAGES 06

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 11

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY :

DEX # _____

DTG 242250Z NOV 81

ROUTINE :

TTY # _____

15 NOV 81 45

FROM/LOCATION/:

1. MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN / THE SITUATION ROOM / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT :

1. MR. DAVE FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT / THE RANCH

2. MR. DEEVER / THE RANCH

3. _____

4. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

*DACOM TO RICHARD DARMAN
1ST PAGE ONLY - COMMENTS
NO SPECIAL REC'D
CALL Kline*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

// SUBJECT: PHONE CALL FROM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT //

NOTE: RANCH COMM. CENTER. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MAY POSSIBLY BE CALLING THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW AND THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED OF THE MATTER. SIGNAL HERE HAS ALREADY BEEN INFORMED. THANKS

CLASSIFICATION :

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30

PHONE CALLS

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

November 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Call to Prime Minister Begin

I understand that Al Haig talked with you today on his talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir and Al recommended you call Prime Minister Begin tomorrow morning. Attached are some talking points for you. The call should be made between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. (Pacific Standard Time) on Saturday. This will be between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Jerusalem time. The White House Signal Switchboard has the Prime Minister's telephone number.

Tab A - Talking Points

cc: Ed Meese
James Baker
Michael Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW*, DATE 8/16/11

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT
REAGAN (11/19/1981-11/27/1981)

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116661	MEMO ALLEN TO RR RE. CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN	1	11/27/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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YOUR PHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGINWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMPERSONAL:

-- I WAS VERY CONCERNED TO LEARN THAT YOU BROKE YOUR THIGH BONE BUT UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE ON THE MEND. I WISH YOU A SPEEDY RECOVERY. I, MYSELF, SUFFERED A SIMILAR INJURY WHILE HORSEBACK RIDING NOT SO LONG AGO.

SINAI FORCE:

-- I AM GRATEFUL THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR WAS ABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON, ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE FOR TALKS WITH SECRETARY HAIG. THE ISSUE OF MULTILATERAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. SECRETARY HAIG AND MINISTER SHAMIR HAVE COME UP WITH A PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT WHICH I HOPE WILL PERMIT US TO PUT THIS ISSUE BEHIND US.

STRATEGIC COOPERATION:

-- WE HAVE MANY IMPORTANT PROJECTS AT HAND WHICH ARE INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. YOU NOW HAVE OUR PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. THIS IS, I THINK, A REASONABLE DRAFT TEXT. IT IS A BROAD AND FLEXIBLE AGREEMENT AND CAN EVOLVE OVER TIME.

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NLRR M3711 # 116662
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~ *rw 8/16/11*
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 28 NOV 81 10

33

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 27 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: VENEZUELA

AP

HERRERA CAMPINS, L

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & HERRERA CAMPINS OF MTGS ON NOV 17 - 18

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 30 NOV 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FONTAINE

NAU

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8134468 LOG 8134469 8134470 NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Nance</i>	<i>x 11/30</i>	<i>For Decision</i>	<i>12/2</i>	
	<i>C 12/2</i>	<i>Nance apud recom</i>		<i>FO</i>
	<i>C 12/2</i>	<i>Leg sy memo to Bremer</i>		<i>FO 13</i>

DISPATCH *done dm 12/03* W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *dm*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Reagan's Meeting with Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Ambassador William H. Luers
President Luis Herrera Campins
Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos
Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga

DATE, TIME November 17, 1981; 11:00 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Reagan welcomed President Herrera. He said that we are concerned about the deteriorating situation in Central America and are persuaded that we cannot permit Marxist subversion there to be successful. We are also doing everything we can to bring about elections in El Salvador and we support President Duarte. We would like to hear President Herrera's ideas on what more we can do.

President Herrera thanked President Reagan for the warm welcome that he has received. He said that all of Latin America has a great concern about what is happening in Central America. In Venezuela there is great expectation about President Herrera's visit to Washington and about these talks because the US and Venezuela both are democratic nations which try to project these values in their foreign policy. In the Caribbean and Central America there are two types of action where we should work jointly. One action is through government and private cooperation. We should try to help the nations of that region to overcome the difficulties that they face. President Herrera said he hopes that Mexico, the United

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711 #116665
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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- 2 -

States, Canada and Venezuela will achieve concrete results from what was begun at Nassau. We cannot allow the social/economic problems and the injustices in the region to be exploited by Communist forces to subvert these nations. President Herrera said we must, however, be conscious of the need not to act in such a way that creates problems for other countries in the area not already affected by Communist subversion. He said that the most delicate point which the President felt he should make concerned the great fear in Latin America that the principle of non-intervention not be violated. In its search for security, the U.S. must proceed with prudence and great wisdom or else the search could affect us all negatively and damage world peace.

President Herrera said that one other example of how we can work together is the case of Jamaica, where Fidelist tactics received their major setback. We will be able to deliver a second noble blow to Communist subversion if we succeed in finding a democratic way out in El Salvador. The strongly-held collaboration between the United States and Venezuela could help this effort significantly. We have to demonstrate that Communist subversion in El Salvador does not today have the strength it had before. Also secondly, we must be certain that the forces of the Right do not think they can count on support from the US to carry out a coup against the existing government.

President Reagan said that he can personally assure President Herrera that the US considers both the Right and the Left as extremists and that the U.S. is working hard to support Duarte in his efforts to maintain a central government. The President said that the US and Venezuela are thinking more similarly perhaps than President Herrera realizes. He said that history has made Latin American countries suspicious of the Colossus of the North. This is precisely why the United States has proposed the Caribbean plan which should be worked out with the cooperation of other nations. The President said he also agreed fully that the Jamaica example has a great importance. If together we can show other nations that through our programs we mean not to interfere in their internal affairs but we mean to allow nations to find democratic ways to eliminate social injustice, then we will have accomplished a great deal. The President said that Venezuela is important in this process. We fully intend to work with Venezuela and learn from them. On the other hand,

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- 3 -

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the President added, he is concerned that time is not on our side. We see a significant military arms buildup in Nicaragua which is threatening Nicaragua's neighbors.

President Herrera said that he would like to recall an important event that is relevant to the situation in Nicaragua. In the last months of the Manley Government in Jamaica, the opposition party asked President Herrera to cut off petroleum shipments and economic assistance to the Manley Government. President Herrera said that he reviewed this request and decided to continue the assistance to Manley. The next time President Herrera saw PM Manley he assured Manley that he would fulfill his commitments to ship oil and provide some assistance. But President Herrera also said that there is a political problem that in Jamaica could be resolved by free elections. After the discussion, Manley promised to hold elections and set an appropriate date for them. President Herrera then told the opposition to make themselves ready for the elections since he believed Manley would agree to hold them. The elections were finally held and, of course, the opposition won. This is reality not theory.

The President, turning to Nicaragua, said he has grave concerns about the problems there: La Prensa, the large Cuban presence, the difficulties of the private sector and the trade unions. However, the President said, he believes this is a moment in which international political pressure can be brought to bear on the Nicaraguan Government by democracies, particularly Latin American democracies, that could lead to an opening up in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans are having serious problems economically including liquidity problems. They now are beginning to realize that they must do something. Internally it is essential that pluralist Nicaraguan forces that need support receive it; such as the political parties, the church, the press, the trade union movement and human rights organizations. The President said he believes that there is a possibility of changing the Council of State into a more important body -- with characteristics of a legislature. The President said that, as long as there is a chance for pluralism in Nicaragua, it is the obligation of the governments of the hemisphere to try to achieve an opening and to work toward expanding the forces of pluralism. That is why Venezuela continues to have cordial relations with the Junta and very friendly relations with the parties and other groups of the opposition.

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- 4 -

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President Herrera said that he realizes that it is difficult to learn much from a reading of the press which often distorts events. He said he believes security is a goal that every nation must try to achieve in its way. However, with the interdependence that exists in this hemisphere, and, indeed in the world, the unilateral search for security by one nation could damage the peace of the entire world and bring about insecurity for us all. As concerned as Venezuela is about events in Nicaragua, Salvador and Cuba, the President said he wanted to permit himself, as a friend of the United States, to urge that, in its search for security, the United States Government take steps that are very well thought out in advance because searches for security that are not well thought out might lead to the destruction of peace throughout the world.

President Reagan said that that is precisely why we are placing such emphasis on a political solution, through elections, in El Salvador.

President Herrera said that he was pleased to hear this. It must be clear, he added, that Salvador has become a neuralgic point for world Communism and Communist forces have set a victory in Salvador as a point of honor for them. Therefore, President Herrera said the defeat of Communism in Salvador will have worldwide significance that would have impact in favor of democracy throughout the world.

President Herrera said democracies have special qualities. For example, after the French/Mexican Communique, democratic and non-democratic nations in the hemisphere got together to ensure that further support did not develop for this damaging document. By acting quickly and concretely, we minimized the effect and turned the Communique into a negative factor. We believe that there is much ground for political action on the part of democracies.

President Reagan replied that the U.S. had agreed and welcomed Venezuela's actions and believe that it was an unfortunate statement that French and Mexicans had made. He said the U.S. seeks a political solution in Salvador through elections. But he added we also know that the other side is building up its forces, strengthening and arming the forces of subversion. President Herrera replied that he believes that there are ways

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to dissuade or deter the forces of subversion from being successful. President Reagan said we would be very interested over the next two days in hearing President Herrera's thoughts as to how this could be accomplished.

The two Presidents then moved from the Oval Office into the Cabinet Room to meet the larger delegations.

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WHL

Drafted:ARA:WHLuers:nf:abh
x23338 11/19/81

Cleared:S/S
NSC

S/S Number _____

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. PRINCIPAL: Presidents Reagan and Herrera Campins

DATE: 11/17/81 TIME: 11:30 a.m. PLACE: Cabinet Room

NOTETAKER: Ambassador William H. Luers

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President	Ambassador William H. Luers
The Secretary of State	Assistant Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense	Thomas O. Enders
Mr. Edwin Meese, III	Mr. Roger Fontaine, NSC
Mr. Richard V. Allen	(see attached sheet)

2. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED (include number of attached cables if appropriate)

F-16's
Caribbean Basin Initiative
El Salvador
Global Negotiations

3. ACTION COMMITMENTS:

- 1) To make strong arguments to Congress in favor of sale of F-16's to Venezuela.
- 2) To speed up delivery of some of aircraft as much as possible

4. FOLLOW-UP:

None

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR M3711 # 116669
 BY LW NARA DATE 12/21/15

VENEZUELAN PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
Finance Minister Ugueto Arismendi
Defense Minister Leal Puchi
Minister of Energy Calderon Berti
Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos
Minister of Agriculture Zapata
Ambassador Perez Chiriboga
Ambassador Cardozo
Ambassador Sosa Rodriguez
Admiral Lanz Castellanos



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Reagan's Expanded Meeting with
Venezuelan President Herrera Campins

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

- The President
- The Vice President
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- Mr. Edwin Meese, III
- Mr. Richard V. Allen
- Ambassador William H. Luers
- Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas O. Enders
- Mr. Roger Fontaine, NSC

VENEZUELAN

- President Herrera Campins
- Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
- Finance Minister Ugueto Arismendi
- Defense Minister Leal Puchi
- Minister of Energy Calderon Berti
- Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos
- Minister of Agriculture Zapata
- Ambassador Perez Chiriboga
- Ambassador Cardozo
- Ambassador Sosa Rodriguez
- Admiral Lanz Castellanos

DATE, TIME AND PLACE November 17, 1981, 11:30 a.m.
Cabinet Room

President Reagan briefly reviewed for the enlarged group what he and President Herrera had discussed in the Oval Office. The President then asked Secretary Haig what might be covered in this meeting. The Secretary said that Secretary Weinberger might wish to discuss the F-16's. We should also touch on the residual petroleum nationalization issues and on the follow-up to Cancun. The Secretary said President Herrera might also have some matters to raise.

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NLRR M3711 #116666
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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Secretary Weinberger said that the Reagan Administration has agreed to the sale of F-16's to Venezuela, but for tactical reasons the proposal was not submitted to Congress until recently, so that this sale would not become confused with other arms sales problems. Now we believe that Congress will approve the sale. The Congress is, however, an independent body and one can never be certain. Secretary Weinberger said that we will make strong arguments and we are confident we will see it approved by Congress. We will also try to speed up delivery of some of the aircraft as much as possible.

President Reagan asked whether President Herrera would like to bring up other issues. President Herrera said that there are three main issues, aside from bilateral questions between our two governments, that he believes should be discussed during his visit to Washington:

-- First is the concrete and rapid implementation of the discussions of the four nations at the Nassau Meeting.

-- Second is an effective search for a democratic way out in Salvador.

-- And third is the follow-up to Cancun on global negotiations.

These three issues relate to the support for democracy in the world. The first two relate directly to democracy. If we can be successful we will achieve a worldwide blow against Communism. On the follow-up to Cancun, democracies should come up with some proposals that will demonstrate that democracies are more creative and more able than other systems to deal with the changing world. He said that these three topics can be discussed at later meetings. President Herrera thanked Secretary Weinberger for his comments on the F-16.

President Reagan concluded the meeting by saying that in the Wednesday meeting the two Presidents should discuss Cancun and bilateral issues.

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ES for WHL

Drafted: ARA/AND: WHLuers
x23338 11/19/81

Cleared: S/S
NSC

S/S Number _____

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. PRINCIPAL: Presidents Reagan and Herrera Campins

DATE: 11/18/81 TIME: 11:30 a.m. PLACE: Oval Office

NOTETAKER: Ambassador William H. Luers

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

- The Secretary
- Mr. Richard V. Allen
- Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco
- Minister of the Presidency Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos
- Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga

2. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED (include number of attached cables if appropriate)

- President Reagan's arms limitation speech of 11/18/81
- Caribbean Basin Initiatives
- Global Negotiations
- El Salvador
- Oil Expropriation/Compensation

3. ACTION COMMITMENTS:

- 1) to present specific ideas on Caribbean Basin Initiative by the first of 1982.
- 2) to promote broader participation in El Salvador electoral process (exclusive of terrorist groups)
- 3) to encourage international supervision of elections in El Salvador.

4. FOLLOW-UP:

- 1. Consider an approach to the left wing of the German Social Democrats to urge that they encourage Social Democrats in El Salvador to participate in the electoral process.

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR M3711 #116667
 BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Reagan's Wrap-up Meeting with
Venezuelan President Herrera Campins

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Secretary
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Ambassador William H. Luers
President Luis Herrera Campins
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco
Minister of the Presidency
Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos
Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga

DATE, TIME, November 18, 1981; 11:30 a.m.,
PLACE: Oval Office

President Herrera said that he listened to the President's speech that morning from the Press Club on arms limitations and was left with a magnificent impression. He said the entire delegation had listened to it in Blair House with much sympathy. He said it would make a great contribution to the relaxation of tension in the world. The Venezuelans welcomed this initiative taken at such a difficult moment in international relations. The President congratulated President Reagan most sincerely and cordially on the speech. He said the only thing he regretted was that because the Venezuelans had already scheduled the noon luncheon at the Press Club, President Reagan had to speak in the morning.

President Reagan thanked President Herrera for his kind remarks.

President Reagan then said we are going forward on our Caribbean plan and we should have some specific ideas ready by the first of next year. He said we are also ready to move ahead on global negotiations on the basis of the terms agreed to at Cancun. The President said that he thought that the Caribbean plan would provide

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BY FW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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some showcases on how, in practical ways, the ideas we have in mind might work in developing relations between the industrialized and developing countries. The President said he would welcome President Herrera's ideas.

President Herrera thanked President Reagan for mentioning the global negotiations in his morning speech. This reference, he said, will contribute greatly to the attitudes of the countries in the developing world which will recognize that the highest authority in the United States has expressed himself publicly again in favor of moving forward. President Herrera said he had been talking that morning with his principal adviser on these issues, Ambassador Perez Guerrero, who is optimistic that we can begin soon on these negotiations. He said there was no desire on the part of the Third World nations, who have a majority in the United Nations, to impose their will on the minority -- the industrial nations. The developing nations seek a consensus approach to these very important issues.

President Herrera said that a beginning could be made by discussing issues relating to agriculture and food or even trade and energy, leaving until later the more delicate issues such as monetary reform. President Herrera also agreed with President Reagan that if the four Nassau nations could design programs for economic cooperation and place into action these programs for the development of the Caribbean region, this would be evidence that specific results from the North/South relationship are possible. President Herrera said he believes that in the Caribbean we should take advantage of Canada's special connection with the English-speaking islands. He said the Canadian Ambassador who recently presented his credentials in Venezuela had stressed Canada's desire to cooperate closely with the US and Venezuela on this Caribbean initiative. Herrera said that we must continue to maintain contacts on this matter at the political level and at the technical level. He reiterated his interest in including private and public sector elements in the program.

President Reagan said that we are moving well along now on these matters. He asked President Herrera how he would like to move forward on elections in El Salvador and to help our friend Duarte. President Reagan also asked what were the possibilities that steps could be made to press some elements of the FDR into the electoral

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process.

President Herrera responded by saying there were a number of things that must be done. First, we must make certain that the Duarte Government has enough sense of stability that it is and can be confident in implementing the elections. In order to assure the stability of Duarte, we must support the Junta against all forces from the Right and from the Left. President Reagan replied that we did everything we could during the visit of President Duarte to demonstrate to all that we support his central government against both extremes, on the Left and on the Right. Duarte met with members of Congress and the press and he impressed upon them his task and problems.

President Herrera continued by saying that a second objective should be to promote broader participation in the process from other groups, even those that are not now political parties, and assure all opposition elements that they will have adequate time to prepare for the elections to the constitutional assembly. We must promote political contacts with Ungo and other social democrats to try to infuse them with more enthusiasm for this electoral process.

Thirdly, President Herrera said, we should encourage international supervision of the electoral process in El Salvador to demonstrate the serious democratic intention of the Duarte Government. Organizations, such as the OAS and other international bodies, could participate in the supervision. The Duarte government has indicated it welcomes this approach. President Herrera then said, we should discourage those who are pressing for the participation of the guerrillas or subversives in the electoral process. No government would be able to accept the inclusion of terrorists in the government or in the armed forces as a precondition for elections.

President Reagan said that he agreed with those points. But, he said, the problem we are facing today is that the moderates who are in the FDR refuse to join the process and are not inclined to separate themselves from the guerrillas. President Reagan agreed that there is no way the terrorists should be included in the government. If, however, we are to attract moderates on the Left to support the elections, Venezuela would probably be far more effective than the United States in this endeavor.

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President Herrera said Venezuela has identified some elements that would be useful in this regard. For example, the Herrera Government has held discussions with the Venezuelan social democratic party, Accion Democratica. Accion Democratica (AD) has close working relations with other social democratic parties. Herrera's Government has tried to motivate AD to establish contacts with visiting members of the Salvadoran Junta. During some recent visits to Venezuela these relations have become quite cordial.

President Herrera said there is one card that has not been played but that might be considered. We should approach the left wing of the German social democratic party -- the followers of Willy Brandt through the German liberal party on which the coalition government of Helmut Schmidt depends. He believes that if we could convince the liberals to influence the social democrats in Germany we could perhaps move the SD's to encourage the social democrats in El Salvador to participate in the electoral process.

President Herrera said finally that subversion threatens to destabilize a country both economically and politically. The political situation in El Salvador depends very much on the economic situation. We should not forget, therefore, the need over the coming months to keep the economy as healthy as possible.

President Reagan said he wanted to make clear that, in bringing about a settlement in El Salvador, we must be careful to steer clear of elements that could be permanent destructive factors in the society. The President used the example of Laos, where we persuaded a government to join with hard core Communists in a coalition. The hard core Communists eventually became the government of Laos.

Secretary Haig said that there was one more issue that the Treasury Department had raised with President Herrera -- the question of the claims against the nationalization of petroleum companies. The Secretary said that he believes we should continue to discuss this problem to try to put it behind us. President Reagan agreed and the meeting disbanded.

The two Presidents then went to make their press statements.

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ES for with

Drafted:ARA/AND:Amb. W. H. Luers

Cleared:S/S
NSC

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JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEAVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

[Handwritten signature/initials]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


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December 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations Between the
President and President Herrera Campins
(S/S 8134468)

The NSC approves the memoranda of conversations between
the President and President Herrera Campins of Venezuela.


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RJ*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations Between the President and President Herrera Campins

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum, for your signature, informing State that the NSC has approved the memoranda of conversations between the President and President Herrera Campins of Venezuela.

It is requested that the attached memorandum be forwarded to State.

- Tab I Approval Memorandum
- Tab II Fontaine/Nance memo dated Nov. 30

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~
RW 8/16/11

ACTION November 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RJ*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations Between The President
and President Herrera Campins

Attached at Tab A are the State Department's memcons of
the President's meetings with Venezuelan President Herrera
Campins. The meetings were held in the Oval Office,
November 17 and 18, 1981.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memcons.

Approve *OK* Disapprove _____

Don't we need a memo or something to
State telling them OK.
BUL

Attachments

Tab A Memoranda of Conversations



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XR-8134469-70-71

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 27 1981

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

RW
8/14/11

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memoranda of Conversations between Presidents
Reagan and Herrera Campins

Attached are three memoranda of conversations covering talks held between the President and Venezuelan President Herrera Campins on November 17 and 18, 1981. We request your approval. No distribution will be made within the Department of State prior to such approval.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Memoranda of conversation.

UNCLASSIFIED

S/S Number _____

57

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. PRINCIPAL: Presidents Reagan and Herrera Campins

DATE: 11/17/81 TIME: 11:00 a.m. PLACE: Oval Office

NOTETAKER: Ambassador William H. Luers

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Richard V. Allen

Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillo
Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga

2. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED (include number of attached cables if appropriate)

Containment of Communism in Caribbean Basin region
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Jamaica

3. ACTION COMMITMENTS: Continued support to Duarte regime in El Salvador.

4. FOLLOW-UP:

None