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File: Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** Memorandums of Conversations,  
President Reagan [June, 1981]

**Box:** 48

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 1/9/2009

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (8) [JUNE, 1981]

**FOIA**

F2002-072/1

**Box Number** 48

COLLINS

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60829	MEMCON	RR MEETING WITH FRENCH MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON <i>R 7/2/2013 M370/2</i>	3	6/5/1981	B1
60861	MEMCON	RR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KING JUAN CARLOS OF SPAIN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	5	6/8/1981	B1
60863	MEMO	BLAIR TO ALLEN RE TELEPHONE CALL <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	6/12/1981	B1
60864	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	6/15/1981	B1
60866	MEMO	DRAFT ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION <i>R 6/30/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1
60869	MEMCON	SUMMARY RR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR EPHRAIM EVRON OF ISRAEL <i>R 7/2/2013 M370/2</i>	3	6/11/1981	B1
60873	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF RR MEETING WITH PHILIP HABIB <i>R 7/2/2013 M370/2</i>	7	5/29/1981	B1
60875	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF RR MEETING WITH SAUDI AMBASSADOR SKEIKH FAISAL ALHEGELAN <i>R 7/2/2013 M370/2</i>	2	6/11/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 1/9/2009

**File Folder** MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (8) [JUNE, 1981]

**FOIA**

F2002-072/1

**Box Number** 48

COLLINS

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60878	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF RR MEETING WITH FIVE ARAB AMBASSADORS <i>R 7/2/2013 M370/2</i>	5	6/11/1981	B1
60880	MEMCON	SUMMARY RICHARD ALLEN'S MEETING WITH PM LEE KUAN YEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE	4	6/19/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 JUN 81 20

TO ALLEN

FROM BLAIR

*encl 1/9/09*

DOC DATE 10 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

AP

CHEYSSON, CLAUDE

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FRENCH MINISTER ON 5 JUN

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

COMMENTS *orig memcon not related to NSC/S etc*

REF# LOG 8103096 8103119 NSCIFID ( D / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>6/16</i>	<i>RVA ref memo</i>		
<i>DB</i>	<i>5/6</i>	<i>Went Leary to Premier</i>	<i>6/13</i>	
<i>Leary</i>	<i>5/6</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>6/16</i>	<i>Leary sup memo to Brennan</i>		<i>DB</i>

DISPATCH *et 6/16 by JCP* ✓ *done* *done* (W/ATTCH FILE *PA*) *dom*

*NSC/S*  
*was sent yes?*

60829 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

3403

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation between the President and French Minister Claude Cheysson

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Richard V. Allen  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
United States Ambassador to France, Arthur Hartmann  
National Security Council staff member, Dennis C. Blair

French Minister for External Relations, Claude Cheysson,  
French Ambassador to the United States, Francois de Laboulaye

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 5, 1981, 2:15 - 2:45 p.m.  
Oval Office

Minister Cheysson opened the meeting by commenting on President Reagan's message of congratulations to President Mitterrand, saying that the French President had "recognized the personal touch" of the message. He then explained the political situation in France, by comparing it to what had happened in the United States. He said that in France there had been "an emotion from the people" increasing in intensity since the election when it had been perhaps primarily a desire for change. It was now a "wave" to move France in a new direction. Minister Cheysson said that the election in France proved that democracy works. He then explained that President Mitterrand considered it essential to be "very, very clear on the important issues." Recognizing that some of its supporters had been communists, the Mitterrand government knew that it could not be ambiguous on basic international issues as could the Giscard government and it was for this reason it had spoken out forthrightly on the SS-20s, the importance of the Western alliance and so on. The Minister stated that France would be a "trusted, true and valuable ally." (C)

The President responded that he looked forward to such a relationship with France and asked how President Mitterrand was going about putting his government together after so long a time out of office. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 5, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 \*60829

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

Minister Cheysson responded, saying that there were differences between the French and American situations. It is not necessary in France to change everyone at the top; for example, there had been no change in ambassadors. For the same reason, the Mitterrand government had confirmed that all previous government commitments would be carried out, even those that the Socialists did not like very well. These actions had been necessary to avoid arousing the wrong fears. With the elections coming, President Mitterrand had wanted to place established and respected people in key positions, people who would not change after the election. He cited the Prime Minister, the economics and finance minister, and himself, the foreign minister, as examples of those who would not change after the elections. Again he emphasized that the government recognized that some of its supporters were communists and therefore it was important to be clear on important issues. (U)

The President noted that France had played an important stabilizing role in Africa in the past. (C)

Minister Cheysson responded that there would be some changes in France's African policy. For example, the special bureau within the foreign ministry on Francophone Africa had been abolished. This did not mean that France did not consider these countries special, but that it intended to treat them within the context of its overall relations with Africa. The Minister said that under the Mitterrand government France still might have to intervene in Africa in the future but it would only intervene after consultation with its concerned friends including the United States. (C)

The Minister continued to discuss President Mitterrand's concept of the French-American relationship. The French would be reliable partners and they expected to consult on many important issues that went beyond narrow bilateral and alliance concerns. President Mitterrand did not intend to extend the bounds of the Alliance nor to change the Alliance consultative machinery, but intended to discuss at high levels with the United States the broad questions which concerned both countries. (C)

The President responded that he looked forward to such consultations and meetings, although he of course was not able to specify exact timing. The President raised the possibility that the Vice President might go to France to visit personally with President Mitterrand after the French legislative elections. (C)

Minister Cheysson pointed out that there were at least two occasions on which the President would talk to President Mitterrand: at the Ottawa Economic Summit and perhaps at the Cancun summit. (U)

Minister Cheysson went on to other issues of joint concern: on Poland he said that the United States and France agreed completely in their approach. It was the French opinion that if the situation in Poland could stabilize, it would signal a "new chapter in the history of the Eastern Bloc." He believed that the West should do everything in its power to "give more patience to the Soviets" in order to gain time for the situation to stabilize in Poland. (C)

The President pointed out that the next few weeks were extremely crucial time in Poland. (C)

Minister Cheysson agreed, and went on to the subject of economic policy. He noted his meeting with Secretary Regan that morning in which he had expressed his understanding of the "very coherent American monetary policy." He said that he had pointed out to Secretary Regan, however, that Americans must understand that their domestic economic policies have repercussions in Europe. The high price of the dollar amounted to "a third oil shock" since the Europeans paid for oil in dollars. The high rates of interest forced Europeans to raise their own rates, making it difficult to generate the investment necessary to fight unemployment. Unless the Europeans could deal with the unemployment problem, high unemployment there could become a social and political problem. (C)

The President responded that this country suffered too and wanted the high interest rates to come down. He felt they would decrease as the overall rate of inflation came down. (U)

Minister Cheysson reiterated that the US economic policies were "your policies." He repeated that France would be reliable partner to the United States, and with its new political majority would be a stable partner with steady policies. One of the characteristics of partnerships was that the partners would tell each other about actions which affected them and would help each other. For example, France might be able to help the United States in the international problem of Southern Africa. (C)

Secretary Haig noted that in his discussions with Foreign Minister Cheysson that morning they had discussed Southern Africa and Minister Cheysson's unique background, special rapport and expertise would be very helpful to the United States. (C)

The President reiterated once more that he looked forward to consultation and cooperation with France. (U)

Minister Cheysson ended the meeting thanking the President for taking the time to receive him. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3403

5


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with French  
Minister Cheysson

Attached is a memorandum summarizing the President's meeting  
with French Minister for External Relations Claude Cheysson.  
It may be passed to those in the State Department whose  
duties require them to know its contents.

  
Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

DECLASSIFIED

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA SM, DATE 1/9/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 16, 1987



MEMORANDUM

3403

*[Handwritten initials]*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

June 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAKE *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with Cheysson

Attached for your signature is a memo forwarding the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with Minister Cheysson.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve *[Handwritten checkmark]* *[Handwritten: Thanks]* Disapprove         
*[Handwritten: RVA 6/15]*

Tab I Memo to VP, Meese et als.  
A - Memcon of meeting

*[Handwritten: Chan w/ Stake]*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

#3403

RECEIVED

81 JUN 11 A 9: 09

JANET COLSON	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
BUD NANCE	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
DICK ALLEN	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
IRENE DERUS	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
JANET COLSON	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
BUD NANCE	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
KAY	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	
CY TO VP	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	SHOW CC
CY TO MEESE	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	SHOW CC
CY TO BAKER	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	SHOW CC
CY TO DEAVER	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	SHOW CC
CY TO BRADY	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	SHOW CC

*Jp* 11/1844  
*De* 11/1430  
*WV* 14/1622  
*ijt* 15/0736  
*Jp* 15/1346

note for BLAIR



8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

ACTION

June 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: DENNIS C. BAKER 

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with French  
Minister Cheysson

Dick Allen instructed me (marginal note on Tab II) to pass the memcon of the President's meeting with Cheysson to the State Department. Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Jerry Bremer to that effect.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve 

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Jerry Bremer
  - A Memcon between the President and French Minister Claude Cheysson
- Tab II My memo to Richard Allen dated June 10, 1981

9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

June 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
EDWIN MEESE  
JAMES BAKER  
MICHAEL DEEVER

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RV*

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with Cheysson

Attached for your information is a memorandum summarizing the President's conversation with French Minister of External Relations Cheysson on June 5.

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
FROM STEARMAN *smf 1/9/07*

RECEIVED 12 JUN 81 15

TO ALLEN

DOC DATE 11 JUN 81

10

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

JUAN CARLOS

SUBJECT: TELECON TRANSCRIPT FM 9 JUN

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

RENTSCHLER

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( D / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 6/15</i>	<i>for info</i>		
<i>Stearman</i>	<i>6/19</i>	<i>for further action</i>	<i>6/19</i>	
<i>Allen</i>	<i>x 6/22</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>6/24</i>	<i>RVA pgs memo</i>		<i>Inley, BB, CT</i>

DISPATCH

*done don 6/21/81*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA*

*(x) don*

~~SECRET~~

60861

11

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

3407

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
His Majesty Juan Carlos  
King of Spain (calling from Madrid)

DATE AND TIME: June 8, 1981  
1548 -1556 p.m.

The President: Your Majesty, how are you?

King Juan Carlos: How are you?

The President: Just fine.

King Juan Carlos: Wonderful to hear you.

The President: Well, it is good to hear you.

King Juan Carlos: We are all delighted that you are well and working again for the good of the country and for the world.

The President: Well, thank you very much.

King Juan Carlos: Look, I was calling to you first, I was given by good Ambassador Todman, the dates of the 21st of September.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: And I wanted to tell you just one thing as a friend which is that the Prime Minister is, was telling me yesterday that in two weeks time we are going to know when exactly it is going to be taken the debate on the NATO -- in September exactly.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: Because then if the debate takes place around those dates I don't know if it would be better for me not to be outside. But in two weeks time I would know.

The President: All right. Well, then we will wait to hear from you. We will hold that date, but wait to hear from you in case it has to be changed.

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 11, 1987

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M371/1 # 60861  
BY RW  
DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

12

~~SECRET~~

2

King Juan Carlos: Wonderful.

The President: All right.

King Juan Carlos: And then by the way, yesterday we had this not very nice hint let's say of the Prime Minister Mauroy which at the Press Conference, I mean, he hinted yesterday that the right of asylum being paramount, his government would deny the extradition of the Spanish criminal, you know the Spanish ETA. The ETA man who was judged in France.

The President: Oh!

King Juan Carlos: And the, I mean he agreed that the France would not allow Basques terrorists in France, which is OK.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: I mean it is not that I want to ask you anything, but just for you to know that, I mean that once we would wanted to have very good relations with France, but the public opinion if they take that measure not to give us extradition -- I mean it is not going to be very good for forming the public opinion here in Spain.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: But I mean I wanted you to know because I think in terrorism we have all to be together.

The President: Yes. Yes, I do, I'll take that up with our people here.

King Juan Carlos: Fine.

The President: All right.

King Juan Carlos: But, because the French court has granted the extradition of the Spanish Basques responsible of many assassinations.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: But I don't know -- you know very well that the French, that the Government in France has the last word and he is entitled to annul the decision of the court. I mean we only hope that this very exceptional veto would not be exercised but I don't know, we, I can't ask Mitterand not to do it, and I was going to ring him up this afternoon, but he wasn't there. And I am going to talk to him tomorrow just for him to know that its not very, I mean I understand that the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Government, the French Government has to take a decision, and I am not going to ask to change its decision, but just to know that the public opinion in Spain is very, very ticklish, let's say, about terrorism, of course, as you know.

The President: Yes. Well I shall take that up with our people here and let them know.

King Juan Carlos: Yes.

The President: About that.

King Juan Carlos: I will tell the, also the Foreign Minister to let know the date.

The President: Yes. Yes, all right, fine.

King Juan Carlos: And apart of that I mean I was working like mad and I think that things are coming out and the we are getting a -- we got a very good agreement between the patrons /employers/ and syndicates /trade unions/ and the labor today in a band of 9% and 11% wages for one year and a half.

The President: Well!

King Juan Carlos: Which I think is a very good thing.

The President: Well that sounds good, yes!

King Juan Carlos: (indistinct)

The President: Wow, congratulations!

King Juan Carlos: And, and that also makes things a little bit smoother.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: The military part, I mean, is also a little bit more quiet.

The President: That's good.

King Juan Carlos: Of course, one of the problems that we are having is all the information sides -- calling information that say the journalists and the newspapers, television and radio that is just a little bit in hands of -- let's call it the left wing.

The President: Yes, (laugh) I know what you mean.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

4

King Juan Carlos: Ya! That is why between friends I tell you. I don't say publicly, but to you. And the I think that we are getting along fine, and we are hoping very much about the NATO thing, and that is one of the things that I am really pressuring and hoping everything goes well because that is a very important point for our armies.

The President: Well, we are hoping too.

King Juan Carlos: Yes, the decision, we know which one will going to be taken. It is going to be yes, and that is it, you know.

The President: Yes.

King Juan Carlos: But nevertheless it will be, you know, submit to some critical -- critics of some -- even probably some manifestations /demonstrations/ or whatever it is, you know.

The President: Yes. Well, we will be watching and praying.

King Juan Carlos: Yes.

The President: Well, all right. Well, I shall have our people look into this other.

King Juan Carlos: Wonderful.

The President: All right.

King Juan Carlos: Mr. President, all my best regards to Mrs. Reagan, please.

The President: And Your Majesty to Her Majesty, also from us.

King Juan Carlos: And I am longing to meet you.

The President: Well we are looking forward to it, and we will hope that the dates don't conflict, but if they do we will make a change.

King Juan Carlos: Wonderful, Mr. President.

The President: All right.

King Juan Carlos: Excuse me, excuse me to bother you but I like also to ring you up later.

The President: No bother. It is nice to talk to you.

King Juan Carlos: Wonderful, thank you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

15

~~SECRET~~

5

The President: All right.

King Juan Carlos: Bye-Bye, Mr. President.

The President: Goodbye, Your Majesty.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3407

*[Handwritten signature]*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 22, 1981

~~SECRET WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation  
with King Juan Carlos, June 9, 1981 (S)

In accordance with your instructions, here is a memo forwarding King Juan Carlos' and the President's conversation to Secretary Haig. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Secretary Haig at Tab I. (U)

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*[Handwritten initials]*

**SECRET**

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Secretary Haig
- A -- Telephone Conversation Between King Juan Carlos and the President

~~SECRET WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~  
Review on June 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 2006  
BY NARA *[Handwritten]* DATE *1/2/09*

~~SECRET~~

#3407

RECEIVED

81 JUN 22 P 7: 04

JANET COLSON

jc 23/8752  
X

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

Ma 23/1511

IRENE DERUS

igd 23/1540

JANET COLSON

XL

BUD NANCE

X

KAY

CY TO VP

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEAVER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

RVA HAS SEEN  
3407 Add-On

*aj*

18

60863

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

June 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLADEN *DB*

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Telephone Call to President  
by King Juan Carlos

The King brought to the President's attention the press conference remarks by French Prime Minister Mauroy that the French government might grant political asylum to ETA terrorist Tomas Linaza. The President said that he would take the matter up with his people. (C)

I passed the matter on to the State Department, with the result that Assistant Secretary Eagleburger telephoned Ambassador de Laboulaye. Eagleburger said that we did not intend to interfere in relations between allies but we were concerned along with the French with the strengthening of Spanish democracy, and with combatting international terrorism. De Laboulaye was quite prickly during the phone call. (C)

I recommend we now wait to see what the French do. If the government overrules the present court extradition order, I do not think we have any choice but to issue a statement opposing the action. In addition, it may be an item we want to pass to the Vice President when he goes to Paris on the 24th. (C)

cc: Bill Stearman

*High*

*Shanks*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 12, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #60863

BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

~~SECRET~~

return to NSC

MEMORANDUM

3407

19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

40864

June 15, 1981

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Your June 9 Telephone Conversation with King Juan Carlos of Spain

At Tab A for your information is the verbatim transcript of the telephone conversation you had with King Juan Carlos of Spain on June 9, 1981.

You will recall that the King called to alert you to a possible change of the date for your September 21, 1981 meeting with him. He also mentioned his concern about the possibility of France's granting asylum to a Basque terrorist, and he brought you up to date on recent developments in Spain.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 11, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711/1 # 40864

BY RW NARA DATE 6/28/85

~~SECRET~~

STARMAN Attached.  
BCC's #3407

RECEIVED

81 JUN 12 A 9:06

- JANET COLSON
- BUD NANCE
- DICK ALLEN
- IRENE DERUS
- JANET COLSON
- BUD NANCE
- KAY
- CY TO VP
- CY TO MEESE
- CY TO BAKER
- CY TO DEEVER
- CY TO BRADY

12/10/10  
 12/13/80 Copy to Haig, as  
 11/22/07 discussed?  
 15/0757 yes no  
 15/1734  
 (6/15/81)

SHOW CC  
 SHOW CC

19 JUNE

RE: #3407

NOTE FOR THE FILE:

I checked w/Mr. Darman's office inasmuch as this item had not been stamped "President has seen". Sara Emery advised me that the memcon was not seen by the Pres. and she is not certain why it did not go fwd (she and I surmised that possibly the fact that Pres. Reagan just sgd a ltr to Juan Carlos on yesterday, #3163, may have "OBE'd" the memcon). Hopefully, that is the correct conclusion.

Please note instruction on first routing slip, per exchange btw Janet & Mr. Allen, that a copy is to be sent to Sec. Haig "as discussed". Pkg is being returned for further action so that appropriate transmittal can be prepared to the Secretary.

JCP

6/19  
 I mentioned this note to Janet & she said OK

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3407 *af*

27

June 11, 1981

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: President-Juan Carlos Telecon of June 9

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President transmitting a verbatim transcript of the June 9, 1981 telephone conversation between the President and King Juan Carlos of Spain.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*RVA 6/15*

Attachment

Tab I     Memo to the President  
A        Telecon of the President's Conversation with the King of Spain

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *inf* DATE *1/12/09*

SECRET

Review on June 11, 1987

~~SECRET~~



Back for RR  
(6/19/81)

RECEIVED

#3407

81 JUN 18 P 7: 48

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*J*  
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# 3407  
Allen

RECEIVED

81 JUN 15 4 9: 28

JANET COLSON

Jr 15/1452

BUD NANCE

Jr 15/1600

DICK ALLEN

We 15/2306

IRENE DERUS

Wgl 16/1053

JANET COLSON

Jr

BUD NANCE

hi

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

~~SECRET~~

30

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3407

60864

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Your June 9 Telephone Conversation with  
King Juan Carlos of Spain

At Tab A for your information is the verbatim transcript of the telephone conversation you had with King Juan Carlos of Spain on June 9, 1981.

You will recall that the King called you to alert you to a possible change of the date for your September 21, 1981 meeting with him. He also mentioned his concern about the possibility of France's granting asylum to a Basque terrorist, and he brought you up to date on recent developments in Spain.

Attachment

Tab A Telecon of President's Conversation with the King of Spain

*Kathy's Book*

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 11, 1987

~~SECRET~~

BY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M371/1 #60866

*RW*

NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

3407

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with  
King Juan Carlos of Spain, June 9, 1981 (S)

As we discussed earlier, here is the summary of the telephone  
conversation between the President and King Juan Carlos. (U)



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Memcon between President and King of Spain

~~SECRET WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Review on June 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 2006  
BY NARA sm, DATE 1/12/09

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 16 JUN 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM TANTER

*sent 1/12/09*

DOCDATE 12 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

IRAQ

EVRON, EPHRAIM

FMS

NUCLEAR MATTERS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 11 JUN MTG W/ AMB EVRON

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

HUBERMAN

SCHWEITZER

KIMMITT

GUHIN

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103537

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

	6/17	RVA appt recon		
<i>RT</i>	S 6/17	Memor Lenz to Bremer	6/18	
	C 6/19	Lenz rpt Mem to Bremer		<i>RT</i>

DISPATCH

*done dom 6/19 6:00pm*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA*

(C)

*dom*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 # 60869

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

~~SECRET~~

33

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60869

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Ambassador Ephraim Evron of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President  
James Baker III, Chief of Staff to the President  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary  
of State for Political Affairs (attended  
meeting as Acting Secretary of State)  
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Raymond Tanter, Staff Member, National Security  
Council

Ambassador Ephraim Evron  
Mr. Eytan Bentsur, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

DATE, TIME Thursday, June 11, 1981, 3:30 - 3:50 p.m.,  
AND PLACE The Oval Office

Ambassador Evron: The Government of Israel is very concerned about the suspension of the F-16 shipments that were to be shipped from the United States to Israel on June 12, 1981. As a result of this concern, Ambassador Evron wanted to bring to the attention of the President the Government of Israel's reasons for conducting the raid against Iraq's nuclear facility. It is in a state of war with Israel. Iraq's stated objective is to destroy Israel. It is a country that is out to subvert Western-oriented states in the region. Iraq is against the Camp David peace process. It supports terrorism, and it is no secret that Iraq's stated objective of its nuclear program is an atomic bomb. Iraq has made it clear that such a bomb is not a threat to any country except Israel. (S)

The Government of Israel tried several times to use diplomatic channels to bring a halt to Iraq's nuclear program. In addition, the Government of Israel has tried often in the immediate past to stop the shipment of nuclear fuel from France. Thus, unless Israel took drastic action soon, the Iraqi nuclear program would have been irreversible. Unless the Government of Israel did something immediately, the reactor would have become radioactive. The removal of the threat posed by the Iraqi nuclear reactor

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Review June 12, 2001

Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13 (a)

could serve to strengthen the forces of moderation in the region. The Government of Israel understands the seriousness of the action that it undertook, and the President should recognize, moreover, that Israel acted in self defense. (S)

Ambassador Evron stated that he has no doubts of what his Arab colleagues said to the President, but he suspects that they did not shed any tears that Iraq has lost its nuclear capability. He went on to say that Israel's current objective is to proceed with the peace process as quickly and as vigorously as possible. Israel contends that its strike against Iraq will have the effect of helping the United States by diminishing the influence of Iraq in the Arab world. With the decline of Iraq's influence, the prospects for peace in the region should be enhanced. (S)

The perception of others as to the meaning of the delay in shipping the F-16 aircraft may be more important than the American intent itself. That is to say, others may perceive a weakening in the US-Israel relationship as a result of the delay in the F-16 shipment. Thus the Government of Israel appeals to the President to reconsider the decision as early as possible. Israel considers the suspension of arms supplies in the pipeline to be a grave step -- a kind of ultimate step. (S)

The President: We did the minimum we could do under our law. Now a Congressional Committee is in the process of checking on the facts of the case. But Mr. Ambassador, you should understand we are not reevaluating our relations with Israel; we are not engaged in any reassessment of our relationship. We were, however, caught by surprise. We wonder whether there were alternatives that were not considered by your government, for example, persuading France not to send the fuel might have been an alternative to the use of military force. (S)

We are concerned about the impact of the air strike on our ability to proceed with the peace process. For example, we would like to go forward with Ambassador Philip Habib's mission. And we also want to continue the Camp David peace process. In order to carry out our efforts for peace, we must maintain credibility with both sides. We have persuaded the Saudi Government to open up a diplomatic channel to the Syrians in order to defuse the potential for hostilities between Israel and Syria over the missiles in Lebanon. But in order to make peace, let me repeat, we need to maintain credibility with both sides. As we move to ensure credibility with all the parties, however, we are not retreating in our basic commitment to the security of Israel. (S)

Ambassador Evron: Thank you for these reassuring words, Mr. President. I am happy to hear them and I will transmit them to my government. On the other hand, as long as the suspension of the F-16s stays in place, it will be perceived that there is deterioration in US-Israel relations.

bound to weaken Israel in the eyes of Arab leaders. They may harden their negotiating stances and engage in a series of moves that challenge Israel.

Mr. President, my government acted in self defense against a country with which we are in a state of war. Furthermore, Iraq refuses to make peace with us. We did nothing to harm Saudi Arabia or other countries that are friendly with you. We did something to harm Iraq, a Soviet-oriented state. You must recall, Mr. President, that Iraq also invaded Iran, contrary to international law. Iraq has been attacking President Sadat for his valiant contribution to the peace process. Thus, it seems as if we are being punished for having acted in self defense against a state that is harming U.S. interests, and this seems very strange to us.

The President: Mr. Ambassador, please keep in mind our primary objective to influence moderate Arab states in the peace effort; in this light, the minimal actions of our Government may become clearer.

Ambassador Evron: The Government of Israel has been very cooperative with Ambassador Habib's mission. For example, our Government has not set any deadlines in order to facilitate Ambassador Habib's work.

The President: We greatly appreciate the fact that you have not set any deadlines.

Ambassador Evron: Mr. President, our Government took very seriously the statements that you and the Vice President made during the election, and these statements gave us hope that Israel would be treated as an ally.

The President: Please have confidence in us, and please communicate to your Prime Minister that I certainly emphathize with the concerns the Prime Minister expressed in his letter to me, especially regarding the children of Israel.

Mr. Ambassador, please be assured that the friendship between our peoples and the commitment to the security of Israel are very strong indeed. Moreover, I do not intend to allow Israel's qualitative advantage in military capability to be challenged. Indeed, I intend to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge.

Ambassador Evron: Thank you, Mr. President, for those kind words, and I trust that the F-16 suspension will be removed very soon.

The President: I hope so as well.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting  
with Israeli Ambassador Evron,  
Thursday, June 11, 1981

Attached for your information and distribution is a copy of  
the summary of the President's meeting with Israeli Ambassador  
Ephraim Evron on Thursday, June 11, 1981.

  
Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

Attachment:  
Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

June 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER **RT**

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Evron, Thursday, June 11, 1981


In the memorandum at Tab III, Richard Allen asked that we share with State the memorandum of conversation between President Reagan and Israeli Ambassador Evron. The memorandum for your signature to State at Tab I would do this. Also, at Tab II is the original memorandum of conversation to be forwarded to Ed Roberts for the President's files.

RECOMMENDATION:

- 1. That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That you forward the original memorandum of conversation at Tab II to Ed Roberts for file.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to State/Bremer
- Tab II - Original memorandum of conversation
- Tab III - Memorandum to RVA from Raymond Tanter

SECRET ATTACHMENT

#3451

RECEIVED

81 JUN 16 P 4: 23

JANET COLSON

*JC 16/1700*

BUD NANCE

*BN 12/1745*

DICK ALLEN

*DA 16/2240*

IRENE DERUS

*ID 17/0730*

JANET COLSON

*JC*

BUD NANCE

*BN*

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3451

*[Handwritten initials]*

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET  
ATTACHMENT

June 12, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Evron (U)

The memorandum of conversation between the President and Israeli Ambassador Evron is attached at Tab A for your approval for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

Approve *[initials]* As amended         

*6/17*

Attachment

Tab A - Memcon (President and Amb. Evron)

*Share w/ State, pls*

SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 15 JUN 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM TANTER

*sent 1/9/09*

DOC DATE 12 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL  
LEBANON

SYRIA

HABIB, P

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ HABIB 29 MAY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID ( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	6/17	RVA apud person		
RT	5/17	Memorandum to Bremer	6/18	
	6/19	Leah Def Memor to Bremer		RT

DISPATCH *MS 6/19 8:00p*

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *MS*

~~SECRET~~

41

60873

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Special Emissary Philip Habib, Former  
Under Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State  
Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President  
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff to the  
President  
Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff  
to the President  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near East and South Asian  
Affairs  
Raymond Tanter, Staff Member, National  
Security Council

Ambassador Philip Habib, Special Emissary  
of the President

DATE, TIME Friday, May 29, 1981; 9:20-10:00 a.m.;

AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The group was greeted by the President in the Oval Office. The discussion concerned the effects of Israel's air strikes and ground raids against Libya/PLO targets on the western border of Lebanon near the Mediterranean coast. These military actions occurred on Thursday, May 28-29, 1981.

Secretary Haig: The air strikes and commando raids taken last night by Israel will raise tensions. We are far from being out of the woods on this one. The threat of military confrontation between Israel and Syria over the missiles in Lebanon continues.

Ambassador Habib was showing the President on a map where the air strikes were located, while the Secretary was talking.

~~SECRET~~

Review May 29, 2011  
Extended by R.V. Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #60873

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

42

2

The President: I have grave concerns that the overnight incidents might result in a general escalation that no one desires.

Ambassador Habib: The strikes have created ripples throughout the area, e.g., the Saudis are not happy, and the Lebanese are concerned that Beirut itself may heat up. The fact that the strikes occurred after my departure will bring about charges of U.S. collusion with Israel. I had asked Begin to exercise restraint. Begin promised to be prudent, but were these strikes prudent? I do not think so. By the way, Begin never talked about his election campaign but you and I know that he is a politician and that these air strikes may have been initiated due to the pressure of his election fight with Shimon Peres, the leader of Israel's Labor Party.

Secretary Haig: We sent a message to Begin last night expressing dismay about the air strikes. We acted in order to keep this situation away from the Presidential level, since the whole thing could fail.

Ambassador Habib: I am afraid that we will lose the Saudis if there is a continuation of these air strikes. The Saudis are the key to a return of the status quo ante. Begin has been pretty good -- he never gave me a deadline for removal of Syrian missiles from Lebanon. Now, even Begin is going around in public saying that he has not given a deadline. After our first meeting Mr. President, I sent a message to Begin and all parties concerned to exercise restraint. As a result, we have the image of being a peacemaker.

We need to defuse the current overnight developments in order to refocus attention on the purposes you sent me out to accomplish; we should give all the elements an opportunity to fall in place.

(The prior discussion generally refers to Israel's air strikes and ground raids against Libya/PLO targets on the western border of Lebanon near the Mediterranean coast. These took place 28-29 May 1981. The following discussion concerns Syrian missiles in Central Lebanon, as well as those within Syria, along the Syria-Lebanese border.)

The President: I gather there are missiles in two places -- some on Syrian soil and some on the Syria-Lebanese border. Does Begin want the Syrians to move all the missiles, including those on the Syrian side of the border?

~~SECRET~~

Ambassador Habib: Begin wants Syria to take out the additional missiles that were recently placed along the border inside of Syria. Habib then went on to discuss the different types of Syrian missiles and where they are located.

Begin is a very shrewd and tough bargainer, but he gave in on his initial demand for Syria to remove all the missiles, including those on the Syrian side of the border. Begin's original position was modified as a result of our efforts.

Also, Assad has modified some of his initial positions. At first, Assad wanted Israel to give up all reconnaissance flights in Central Lebanon. I pointed out that Israel always conducted such overflights, and Israel, of course, would continue. The issue was not whether such overflights would continue but how frequent, where, and under what circumstances the flights will occur.

Begin's main point however, and it is a valid point, concerns Israel's ability to deter Syrian provocations. If Israel allows Syria to make unilateral changes in the military status quo and get away with it, what comes next? Further encroachments may follow from allowing the Syrians to get away with unilateral changes in the current situation.

Even the Saudis agree that the status quo ante concerning such things as the missiles, overflights, the Syrian army on the Sannin Ridge, etc. is the answer. I was surprised that the Saudis came to this conclusion so easily. Then I learned that the Saudis do not want you, Mr. President, placed in the position where you are forced to take a stand that causes a great deal of controversy in the Arab world. Even though the Saudis have supported the status quo ante position, I am concerned that they may back off from this view. After the Tunis meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers came out with such strong support for the Syrian position, the Saudis came under considerable pressure to avoid appearing as too moderate.

Prince Fahd gave me an oral message. Fahd said he was hopeful, suggesting that the Saudi Government is the best channel through which our current diplomatic efforts should operate. Meanwhile, Begin does not want to hit the Syrian missiles in Lebanon because of domestic pressure on Begin not to take casualties. There is widespread agreement in Israel to avoid a war with Syria that would risk large-scale casualties. Begin also recognizes that he is not doing badly in the political race. War with Syria and a large number of casualties would be very unpopular in Israel and may cause Begin to lose. Begin passed on a message to you, Mr. President, that if you ask how he is doing politically, he said, "Tell him I am doing fair!" (smiles)



The President: The situation in Lebanon looks as if it could lead to a war that no one wants. It reminds me of the World War I crisis that resulted in a war that no one wanted. Anyway, it is my understanding that Syria cannot defeat Israel.

Ambassador Habib: Assad told me that he would rather that the Israelis take out the missiles by force rather than for him to remove them voluntarily. Withdrawal of the missiles in response to Israel's threats would be a moral defeat. Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, however, disagreed with the moral defeat idea. Fahd said that what is important are the consequences of not removing the missiles.

The Arabs know the importance of casualties to Israel. Therefore, even if Israel used military force, the Syrians or the PLO could absorb a temporary setback until the time is ripe for taking military initiatives themselves. Although the two most potent military forces in the area may be the Israel Defense Forces and the Christian militias, the Syrians and their allies are less fearful of casualties than are the Israelis.

The President (raised questions about the different political/religious factions in Libya): Are the Maronites split among themselves?

Ambassador Habib: The Phalange is the military wing of the Maronites. Phalange leader Bashir Jumayyil has passed a message to the Syrians that he is now ready to negotiate. Jumayyil does not want to be hit by the Syrians at this time. His basic purpose is to defend the Christian community at all costs, even at the risk of being associated with Israel.

The Vice President (referring to Habib): You have indicated that the Israel Air Force's strikes have a great escalatory potential and that they are not prudent. From looking at the map, however, it does not appear to me that these strikes are as serious as you suggest.

(Ambassador Habib did not directly respond to the Vice President's query. Habib presented a detailed discussion of the location of various Lebanese groups, Syrian army units, United Nations forces, and Palestinian army units. The Habib description was like a Who's Who in Lebanon across space and time.)

The President: Is there any answer to Lebanon's problems?

Ambassador Habib: We should not get too involved in the internal jockeying for power among the Lebanese factions; and we should continue to support the unity, independence, and integrity of Lebanon as our overall policy goal. Both Assad and Begin, more or less but for different reasons, agree with that policy. Also, most of the Lebanese groups tend to favor an independent unified Lebanon. Of course, there have been rumors that the Maronites wanted partition, but I doubt that the Maronites currently favor partition. On the other hand, they may favor some type of Swiss confederation-like scheme.

Mr. Baker: From intelligence reports, one can infer the outlines for an agreement where Syria would remove its missiles if Israel would cease overflying the Bekaa Valley.

Ambassador Habib: Such an agreement may be made somewhere down the line. Israel's press was full of such speculation, so I put it to the test and asked the Prime Minister. Begin replied: "Absolutely not." Thus, my first move is to get agreement on the status quo ante. Agreement on the status quo ante requires a description of the prior pattern of overflights. For example, Israel overflew the Bekaa approximately three times a month before this crisis as opposed to a rate of perhaps 30 times a month during the crisis. Ezer Weizmann, former Defense Minister of Israel, explained to me the intelligence needs that make it necessary for Israel to overfly the Bekaa Valley. (The import of Habib's remarks may have been that the number of overflights could be decreased without compromising Israel's needs as a part of a package deal with the Syrians.)

Secretary Haig: Mr. President, there are four problems on which we need to focus. As you know, the press is clamoring for a meeting with Phil. For example, Meet the Press has a slot open for him on Sunday. We do not think he should engage in any high visibility public relations activity now.

Here are the four questions. First, was the mission a success or a failure -- so far we've had limited success. We can play up the success of the mission as having avoided military hostilities. Second, was there American collusion with Israel because of the strikes by Israel's aircraft that followed so quickly upon Phil's departure? Of course there was no collusion, but we must handle this in a very subtle way. Third, we must communicate to the parties that any military action will be unhelpful, and that any change in the military status quo would be unhealthy. Four, what are

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the prospects for a resolution of this crisis? We still think that the prospects for success are uncertain and it is a long shot for us to succeed, but the mission continues nevertheless.

Ambassador Habib: Let us not be too specific in public until the Saudis give us an indication of where things are. Also, a reason not to be too specific is in order to let the dust settle on Israel's air strikes and commando raids. Moreover, we need to get a sense from Begin that he will be more restrained in the future. A question I have not yet answered concerns where is the best place to start on my second round of negotiations assuming, Mr. President, that you want me to go back. For example, should Beirut be the first stop again, since Lebanon is the center of controversy? If the four party conciliation committee has met in Beirut, it might make sense to meet there. The four party group might suggest that units from other Arab states might be added to the Arab Deterrent Force. This would be a welcome development because it could give the Syrians a way out.

The President: When Prince Turki from Saudi Arabia was here, he stressed President Assad's domestic problems as a constraint on his actions vis-a-vis Israel.

Ambassador Habib: President Assad is an Alawite Muslim. That is, he belongs to a minority sect in Syria. Assad is trying to govern a country that has a Sunni Muslim majority. For example, the Alawites dominate the army. The Muslim Brotherhood is a leading opponent of Assad and reflects the cutting edge of some of the Sunni opposition to Assad. Interestingly, Assad's problems with the Brotherhood have declined as his confrontation with Israel became more acute. As Arabs have rallied around Assad, his domestic difficulties have declined. In short, the crisis has strengthened Assad's domestic political base.

Mr. Allen: To what extent have the Soviets been helpful in defusing the confrontation between Israel and Syria? (Question directed to Secretary Haig.)

Secretary Haig: I spoke with Ambassador Dobrynin last night. The Soviets have been up and down on this one and have told the Syrians to hang tough but also to be restrained. Dobrynin made it very clear that Syria would do nothing in this very delicate period. From the tone of his voice, I inferred that he was speaking in an authoritative fashion. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda is increasingly anti-Habib.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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Ambassador Habib: The Soviets are very unhappy concerning Saudi mediation, and the Saudis themselves are worried about the reintroduction of Soviet influence in the area. The Saudis definitely want the U.S. to continue in the peace maker role meanwhile. Assad has the good sense not to strike at Israel's manned aircraft yet. He only shoots at unmanned aircraft or drones.

Secretary Haig: Prince Turki is back in town, and I saw him last night concerning AWACS and a couple of other matters. I told him we were upset about Israel's commando raids and air strikes, that we were sending a message to Riyadh. He said that the Saudi Government was also very upset, but that the Arab reconciliation group would meet nevertheless.

I received a call from Secretary Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary. Yasir Arafat, leader of the PLO, called Waldheim. Arafat was infuriated by the commando raids and air strikes, at which point, I said (to Waldheim) we were surprised by Israel's military actions.

The President: Is there anything further we could do on this end?

Ambassador Habib: No, I am very happy and have no problems with the press spokesmen. This is the first diplomatic mission I have undertaken where the Washington press spokesmen have not complicated the mission! (smiles)

The meeting ended at 10:00.

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81 JUN 16 A 9:31

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BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

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Dick - Do you want any distribution on this? B.D.

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MEMORANDUM

3514 add-on

49

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

June 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting  
with Special Emissary Philip Habib,  
May 29, 1981

In the note at Tab III, Richard Allen asked that we provide State the memorandum of conversation between President Reagan and Special Emissary Philip Habib. The memorandum for your signature to State at Tab I would do this. Also, at Tab II is the original memorandum of conversation to be forwarded to Ed Roberts for the President's files.

RECOMMENDATION:

- 1. That you sign the memorandum to State at Tab I.

APPROVE *RT* DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That you forward the original memorandum of conversation at Tab II to Ed Roberts for file.

APPROVE *RT* DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to State/Bremer
- Tab II - Original memorandum of conversation
- Tab III - Note from RVA

SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting  
with Special Emissary Philip Habib,  
May 29, 1981

Attached for your information and distribution is a copy of the  
summary of the President's meeting with Special Emissary Philip  
Habib on May 29, 1981.

  
Allen J. Lenz  
Staff Director

Attachment:  
Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3514 *AS*

51

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET  
ATTACHMENT

ACTION

June 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation; President's Meeting with Special Emissary Philip Habib, May 29, 1981

At Tab A is the memorandum of conversation between the President and Ambassador Habib on May 29, 1981.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the memcon for the President's files.

Approve ✓ As amended \_\_\_\_\_

*Send up to State RVA 6/17*

Attachment

Tab A - Memcon

SECRET ATTACHMENT



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 16 JUN 81 14

*smf 1/12/09*

TO ALLEN

FROM KEMP

DOC DATE 12 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

ISRAEL

ALHEGELAN, FAISAL

IRAQ

NUCLEAR MATTERS

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

*Mem con*

SUBJECT: ~~SUMMARIES OF~~ PRES 11 JUN MTG W/ SAUDI AMB ALHEGELAN & FIVE ARAB AMBS

RE ISRAELI RAID ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

KIMMITT

NAU

GUHIN

HUBERMAN

SCHWEITZER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103443

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( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 6/19</i>	<i>LVA apud Mem cons</i>		<i>GK</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

*Cen*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60875

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Saudi Ambassador Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff to  
the President  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Geoffrey Kemp, Staff Member, National Security  
Council

Ambassador Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan, Saudi  
Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Thursday, June 11, 1981; 1:30 - 1:40 p.m.;  
The Oval Office

Ambassador Alhegelan brought best wishes from King Khalid and the Crown Prince. They both were looking forward to seeing you at sometime in the near future and asked that he deliver this letter.

The President then read the letter from King Khalid. Well, it appears very warm and I hope that this whole crisis can be defused. I believe that it can. We've made our position known on the facts of the Israeli raid. We are waiting for the Senate Committee to report on the question of whether the law was violated. As I will say to you and your colleagues later on today, we must not lose sight of the fact that suspicions and hostilities abound in the Middle East and that there is an obligation on the part of all of us to work for a peaceful solution.

Ambassador Alhegelan: Those are the wishes of our leaders, too. We shouldn't let any elements in the region disrupt the search for peace. We must work together with you and we have been working very closely with you for four weeks on

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Review June 12, 2001  
Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen  
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #60875

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

the Lebanon crisis and we were almost successful. We've also had our representative in Geneva helping, too. We are working together to bring peace and stability in two areas therefore: the Middle East and oil.

Sometimes we feel that certain elements are trying to spoil the desire for peace and to disrupt the chances for a wider solution to the problem. We see in the Israeli attack, an attack against a country for which it has no frontiers. The Israelis overflowed Saudi Arabia and embarrassed us. This was very hard medicine for the Kingdom to take. What we are looking for is the future. What can we expect from this? Unless it gets the right message, Israel may feel it can do anything. Your decisions have been important, Mr. President. All of us respect you. However, the Israelis should feel that they can't get away with this. Otherwise, after the election they will make unrealistic demands for peace.

The President: We are going to pursue peace. I'm delighted that you have helped us so far. We were very pleased when you helped us in Lebanon, but Lebanon is the first step. Beyond Lebanon we need to achieve peace throughout the Middle East.

Ambassador Alhegelan: There is a feeling now that stability may be possible in Lebanon. We are planning a second meeting of the four Arab leaders in Riyadh on June 27 and then we hope to return for a third meeting in Lebanon on July 4. We hope to achieve more reconciliation between the various parties in Lebanon. I want to assure you that my leaders, King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd will continue to work toward peace. This is a benefit to everybody. The other side as well. We must help the other side to find new ways toward peace. The New York Times has even said Israel is not helping itself. On this issue, I agree with Joe Kraft in his column today about the Israelis weakening their own case.

Mr. Allen: We all know how difficult it is to agree with Joe Kraft.

The President then concluded by saying that we would acknowledge the letter from King Khalid very soon and thanked Mr. Alhegelan for presenting it.

The meeting ended at 1:40 p.m.

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55

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of the President's Meeting with  
Five Arab Ambassadors

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
Edwin Meese III, Counsellor to the President  
James Baker III, Chief of Staff to the  
President  
Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Ambassador Nicholas Veliotos, Assistant  
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian  
Affairs  
Geoffrey Kemp, Staff Member, National Security  
Council

Ambassador Abdulaziz Abdulrahman Buali,  
Acting Dean of the Arab Ambassadors and  
Bahraini Ambassador to the United States  
Ambassador Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan, Saudi  
Ambassador to the United States  
Ambassador Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador  
to the United States  
Ambassador Al-Sharif Fawaz Sharaf, Jordanian  
Ambassador to the United States  
Ambassador Omer Salih Eissa, Sudanese  
Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME, Thursday, June 11, 1981; 2:20 - 2:55 p.m.;  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Ambassador Buali: On behalf of the Chiefs of Mission in Washington, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to meet with us. We are very grateful. We know you are very busy. We want to see you to talk about the aggression that took place last Sunday. All of us felt disappointed and grieved by the action of Israel on Sunday. If you will allow, Mr. President, I'm now going to turn to the Ambassador from Sudan to make some points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review June 12, 2001  
Classified and Extended By: Richard V. Allen  
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #60878

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

Ambassador Eissa: We are here to express the feelings of the Arab world regarding the actions of last Sunday and to tell you about the outrage, anger, and disappointment that has set in. We feel this action sets a serious precedent for undermining international law. It was a shock. Israel is taking the law into its own hands without concern for the rest of the world. It decided upon itself what consists a threat, breaching the very sanctity of international law.

We are friends of the United States and it is difficult for us to dissociate the United States from this action. Israel would not have felt so disrespectful of international law were it not for U.S. support. There is no proof of American participation, but the rest of the world thinks there is. We appreciate the actions that you have taken in the suspension of arms, but we agree with the rest of the world that this does not solve the problem. It's a token gesture because of the great military strength of Israel supported by United States arms. The use of American arms and the violation of the law leads to criticism of the United States by the rest of the world. We believe there will be forgiveness by the United States of Israel. This creates problems. We feel a great deep sense of insecurity if the President of the United States allows Israel to get away with this action.

We have studied U.S. policy over the years and know your concern about the Soviet Union, but the Arab world is faced now with a demonstration of a real threat. Even a country at war with Iraq has condemned the Israeli action. We'd like to see that these attitudes are reflected in your relations with Israel and the extent to which you hold it responsible. Israel must not act outside the rules of international law. We believe that it's the moral imperative of the United States to explain to the rest of the world the extent of its relationship with Israel and what it believes constitutes security. We are afraid that the statement of Israel, namely that they are acting in their own self-defense, will undermine progress toward peace in the Middle East.

We stress that the steps taken by the United States are positive, but we have to urge that the United States provide the rest of the world with evidence that Israel will abide by international law. The United States must use its power to do this.

The relationship between the Arab world and the American people has a long history. We believe the Americans should show strength in the Arab world which is now going to be difficult given what has happened. I now turn to my colleague, the Ambassador from Morocco.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Ambassador Bengelloun: Thank you, Mr. President, it was good of you to hear us and to give us time for us to tell you how we feel. We see how much importance you attach to this meeting. We note the presence here of distinguished high officials -- the Vice President, Mr. Meese, and Mr. Stoessel. We've met already this week several times amongst ourselves and we all feel shaken.

Mr. President, I'd like to report to you a phone call I just had with His Majesty King Hassan. His Majesty extends his very best wishes and how happy he is that you are leader of the United States. He told me to tell you about the embarrassing situation that your friends in the Arab world -- your traditional friends, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- are in as a result of this action by Israel. What Israel did was very bad for your friends. We expect something more from the United States, although we appreciate what you have already done.

Ambassador Sharaf: Thank you for letting us talk to you, Mr. President. We come here as friends. We have come to see you, the representative of a great nation. You personally, sir, have a reputation -- a long-established reputation -- for fairness. Now, because of this shocking military act, there is soul searching in the Arab world. Concepts relating to the independence and sovereignty of the countries around the world have been upset by the Israeli action. What does it mean to have secure boundaries now? What does it mean? Nothing to us in Jordan if your skies are not free. To what extent can you have progress if Israel can decide what, when, and how its interests are threatened? If they can determine what technologies we should or should not have, soon they will determine what sort of education we should provide for our children. There was a trend toward peace with Israel. Many thought this was possible, but now the problem is much worse. We all thought that given the right circumstances peace could come. But now, what sort of peace if Israel can attack any country? How safe are we? How can we rely on the word of the United States as we think about our security? Israel likes to create differences between the Arab countries and the United States. We don't want to tolerate this. There are ways to resolve these problems. The United States is a good friend, a reliable friend, but we feel threatened. How are we to explain this to our people now that Israel can violate our sovereignty? We have to find ways to stop Israel using military power at will. If military power is to be the judge of international law, then what sort of peace will this bring? We want peace but not at any costs. We want peace that gives us pride.

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Ambassador Alhegelan: I'd like to add a few words, Mr. President. First, what took place last Sunday was very dangerous precedent. We don't want to see it happen again. After the United States has condemned Israel, the Israeli Prime Minister now says that he'll do it again. This is very dangerous. It influences people everywhere.

I hope you'll give a message to Israel: that no one doubts your friendship with the Government of Israel, but what sort of Israel -- an aggressive Israel or a peace loving Israel? We appreciate what you did, Mr. President. We have lots of interests in common. With peace, all people, including the Palestinians, living in their own country can find peace in the Middle East. There can be hope for all. The Middle East could then be an example for the rest of the world.

The President: First, let me answer one thing. No one was more surprised than we were with the Israeli attack. We were surprised and dismayed, especially given the sensitivities of the Habib Mission. We have been most appreciative of Saudi Arabia in the efforts to persuade Israel and Syria to back down over the missile crisis. And this brings up another point. Yes, there are actions we wish they had not taken, but there was a threat to them. When Iran tried to knock out the Iraqi reactor last fall, Iraq said that the real purpose of their nuclear program was for Israel, not Iran. However, we think there were alternative ways. If they had come to us and asked us to put pressure on France, we would have tried. But they didn't and we were taken by surprise.

Let me say that this tragedy comes about out of insecurity in the region. This tragedy highlights the pressing need for a settlement of the Lebanon crisis and the need to bring peace to the entire area. To me this incident shows how little has been done to bring about peace in the region. We will continue to work for peace and we need your help.

The Congress is examining whether the law was violated. We don't know what they will say. We feel strongly that this incident must be put behind us and hope that there will be peace for all in the region, including the Palestinians.

You didn't actually surprise me by what you've said though. I'd already had two messages from your leaders and I can only again tell you that we want to see peace that is just and fair for all.

Ambassador Eissa: Thank you. I'd like to make a few remarks on Lebanon, Mr. President. You must realize that to establish peace you must first establish confidence. Now, it is difficult to persuade the neighbors of Israel that it means

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peace. We have the feeling that Israel "couldn't care less." I think the United States is called upon morally to help project an image of Israel that comes across as peaceful. It is very difficult to believe that Israel wants peace. It is a psychological problem and will complicate the peace process not only in Lebanon but throughout the region.

The President: Now, Mr. Ambassador, from the psychological standpoint, I'd like to make a point. Here is a country small in comparison to its neighbors, outnumbered by a hundred to one, and many of these countries have never retreated from their argument that they will never rest until Israel no longer exists. The Palestinians, in particular the PLO, never admitted that Israel can exist. All of us can understand the hunger of the Palestinians to be a nation, but doesn't it begin with the right of every nation to exist?

Ambassador Alhegelan: The Palestinian problem is a difficult one. The Resolution of the United Nations in 1947 was that there should be a Jewish and Palestinian state. After the 1967 war, most of the Arabs accepted Resolution 242 which admits Israel's right to exist. But then after the 1967 war Israel continued to occupy Palestinian lands. It's a long story, Mr. President. We hope and pray that we are in a time of history that a great man like you can help bring peace to the region.

The President: Let me assure you I'll do everything I can in this office. Unfortunately, all of you seem to live in the area where wars can spread. I've noted to my ancestors in Ireland that they've managed to fight a war for over twenty-five years without having it spread beyond their borders. This doesn't happen in the Middle East, but I will try and I ask that you believe that we are sincere.

The meeting terminated at 2:55 p.m.



Time of process

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (8) [JUNE, 1981]

*FOIA*

F2002-072/1

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*Box Number*

48

Time of process: 12

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
60878	MEMCON  SUMMARY OF RR MEETING WITH FIVE ARAB AMBASSADORS	5	6/11/1981	B1

Time of process

*No of*

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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81 JUN 15 P 4: 20

JANET COLSON

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J 12/0920

DICK ALLEN

W 18/1145

IRENE DERUS

rjd 18/1730

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

[Signature]

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*OK*  
RVA HAS SEEN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

61

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

ACTION

June 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Summaries of the President's Meetings  
with Saudi Ambassador Alhegelan and  
Five Arab Ambassadors, June 11, 1981

For your review and the President's file at Tabs I and II respectively are the memoranda of conversation of the President's meetings with Saudi Ambassador Alhegelan and five Arab Ambassadors on June 11, 1981, concerning the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the memoranda of conversation at Tabs I and II.

APPROVE            ✓

DISAPPROVE           

Attachment

Tab I Memcon between President and Saudi Ambassador

Tab II - Memcon between President and Five Arab Ambassadors

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
FROM GREGG

RECEIVED 30 JUN 81 14

DOC DATE 29 JUN 81

62

TO ALLEN

*snf 1/9/09*

KEYWORDS: SINGAPORE

VISIT

**YEE, LEE K**

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF ALLEN MTG W/ PM LEE ON JUN 19

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 02 JUL 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

TYSON

COMMENTS

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( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	<i>7/01</i>	<i>EVA apvd recom w/comment</i>		
<i>AG</i>	<i>5 7/2</i>	<i>Redo</i>	<i>7/2</i>	<i>JL</i>
	<i>C 7/13</i>	<i>close per Greg</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PM* (C)

*PM*  
*cm*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/9/2009

File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT  
REAGAN (8) [JUNE, 1981]

FOIA

F2002-072/1

COLLINS

Box Number

48

12

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60880	MEMCON  SUMMARY RICHARD ALLEN'S MEETING WITH PM LEE KUAN YEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE	4	6/19/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RVA HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

June 29, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Your June 19 Meeting with Prime Minister Lee

Attached is a memorandum of your conversation with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of the Republic of Singapore on June 19, 1981.

One of the topics Mr. Lee brought up was his suggestion that there be an exchange of letters between the White House and himself.

RECOMMENDATION

That I draft the first letter to Lee.

Approve ✓ *needs change on p 3 to clarify meaning* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*MEMCON*

If approve, when would you like the first letter drafted.

Draft July 20<sup>th</sup> (approx)

*Thanks, Don*

Attachment Tab I MEMCON of June 19, 1981

cc: J. Lilley

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *smf* DATE *1/12/09*

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 29, 1987

~~SECRET~~

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81 JUN 30 P 7: 11

*JC 30/1934*

JANET COLSON

\_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE

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DICK ALLEN

*AW 1/12/10*

IRENE DERUS

*1/13/45*

JANET COLSON

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CY TO VP

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1. STAFF DIRECTOR

2. NSC SECRETARIAT

COMMENT:

*Correction made.  
In files.*

JEAN PALAGINO