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File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversation –
Judge William Clark [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

Box: 48

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 8/10/2011

File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE
WILLIAM CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 48

JAUVERT/BROWER

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116462	MEMCON	RE. MEETING ON EXPORT CONTROL	5	6/25/1982	B1
116466	MEMCON	RE. JUDGE CLARK'S MEETING WITH PRIMINISTER MAUEL ULLOA <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	6/28/1982	B1
116467	MEMCON	RE. CLARK'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMISSIONERS <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	7/15/1982	B1
116468	CABLE	PARIS 35783 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	10/19/1982	B1
116469	MEMCON	RE. MEETING WITH CLARK AND PRESIDENT MITTERAND <i>R 5/21/2018 M371/1</i>	7	10/27/1982	B1
116542	MEMCON	RE. SECRETARY SHULTZ'S RECEPTION FOR FOREIGN MINISTER ABE OF JAPAN <i>PAR 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	3	1/19/1983	B1 B3
116546	CABLE	VIENNA 01832 [COPY OF DOC. 116547] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	2/11/1983	B1
116547	CABLE	VIENNA 01832 <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	7	2/11/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE
WILLIAM CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 48

JAUVERT/BROWER

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116548	MEMO	ROGER FONTAINE TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. CALL TO SECRETARY REGAN ON MTG. W/SCHWALB AND RODRIGUEZ [W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	2/28/1983	B1
116549	MEMCON	RE. MEETING BETWEEN CLARK AND VICE PRESIDENT SCHWALB AND RODRIGUEZ [ATTACHED TO DOC. 116548] <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	ND	B1
116555	NOTE	BUD TO CLARK RE. TAIWANESE HELP [W/NOTATION] <i>R 12/21/2015 351/1</i>	1	ND	B1
116550	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO CLARK RE. MEMCON WITH FREDERICK CHIEN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	5/23/1983	B1
116556	NOTE	BUD TO CLARK RE. TAIWANESE HELP [W/NOTATION; COPY OF DOC. 116555] <i>R 12/21/2015 351/1</i>	1	ND	B1
116551	MEMCON	CLARK, SIGUR, AND FREDRICK CHIEN <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	5/19/1983	B1
116552	MEMO	RE. PROJECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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File Folder MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE
WILLIAM CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-371

Box Number 48

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
116553	PAPER	RE. TAIWAN [ATTACHED TO DOC. 116552] <i>D 8/30/2012 M371/1</i>	2	ND	B1 B3
116554	MEMCON	CLARK AND YOSHIO OKAWAR RE. NAKASONE VISIT <i>R 6/22/2015 M371/</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

Withdrawer

RB 8/10/2011
W

File Folder

MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE WILLIAM
CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
371
JAUVERT/BROWI

Box Number

48

1

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116462	MEMCON RE. MEETING ON EXPORT CONTROL	5	6/25/1982	B1

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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

6

Casa

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOP

Please admit the following appointments on Thursday, June 24, 19 82

for William P. Clark of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Secretary Malcolm Baldrige

Senator Charles H. Percy
Congressman Paul Findley
Congressman Robert Michel
Michael Johnson (Aide to Congressman Michel)
Congressman Lynn Martin

John Welch (General Electric)
Lee Morgan (Caterpillar)
Donald Lennox (International Harvester)
Evans-Ericson (Sundstran)
John Panettiere (Fiat-Allis)
Robert Hanson (John Deere)

Kenneth Groff

NOTE: Mr. Panettiere's driver, David Buzewll,
will drive him to West Exec; 1981 Pontiac
Grand Lamans, DC Tag - 486-508

Under Secy of State (T) James Buckley

NSC

*Turkey Bailey
Roger Robinson*

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House Requested by Kathy McGraw
Room No. Situation Room Room No. WW Telephone 2255
Time of Meeting 9:00 a.m. Date of request June 23, 1982

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOP - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116466

7

4603

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of Judge Clark's Meeting with
Prime Minister Manuel Ulloa of Peru

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Roger W. Fontaine, Senior Staff Member
National Security Council

Manuel Ulloa, Prime Minister of Peru
Roberto Danino, Secretary-General of the
Ministry of the Economy, Peru
Alfonso Rivero, Minister-Counselor,
Embassy of Peru

DATE, TIME Monday, June 28, 1982, 11:45-12:00
AND PLACE: Judge Clark's office, The White House

Judge Clark welcomed Prime Minister Ulloa to the White House and conveyed the President's regards.

Prime Minister Ulloa remarked that with the events in the South Atlantic, the way might be cleared for fresh approaches and thus create the possibility of a dialogue. The Prime Minister remarked he had only talked to Secretary Haig by phone, but he had met with Secretary-designate Shultz on several occasions.

Prime Minister Ulloa then conveyed the feelings and mood of the region as he expressed these to Deputy Secretary Stoessel at State. He stated the problem of Argentina is a problem for us all. He is not optimistic about Argentina being able to pull together an effective government and that this would have a negative impact financially, inter alia, on the world system. If Argentina slides into anarchy, this will have a negative effect on all of us trying to make democracy more permanent.

Judge Clark stated our support for democratic and constitutional government and that we are helping as much as we can. He expressed the hope that our interruption of relations--in the broad sense of that term--will be short lived. But it depends on what government emerges. The Judge then asked the Prime Minister, what should we be doing that we are not doing?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 30, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

REF M371/1#116466

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Prime Minister Ulloa said that it was a delicate matter. There is a limit as to what the U.S. can do. Brazil and Peru can speak more directly and openly about political matters.

As for change in the OAS and the inter-American system, that should be played very coolly. The issue should remain dormant for a while. There is no unanimity of views, in any case.

The U.S. might place more emphasis on multilateral institutions. Issues like graduation that affect Mexico and Argentina are best handled by the World Bank, the IDB, and the IMF.

In general, nerves are irritated. Some realize there is no preferred relationship and that the U.S. has a global strategy. Argentina's defeat also caused Latin resentment against the U.S. and the British.

But there are fundamental ties, and setbacks are inevitable. The U.S. should try to soothe feelings and still not be patronizing. In the meantime, Brazil can exert a quiet influence.

At the same time, the left will fish in Argentina's muddied waters, but we should remain cautious and careful.

Finally, we should maintain our bilateral relations with individual countries in Latin America.

Returning to the Argentinian problem, the Prime Minister added that they have brought much of this upon themselves, but we cannot let Argentina go. Argentina remains a western nation--more so than most.

Judge Clark thanked the Prime Minister for his views and expressed strong support for U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz.

Prime Minister Ulloa said the U.S. Ambassador was doing well and had come out of his first months in Lima relatively unscathed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MW
9

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
~~WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

June 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

R2

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

At Tab I for your approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of your meeting with Prime Minister Manuel Ulloa of Peru.

Recommendation

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve *X*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED
~~WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

RW
8/12/11

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *rw 8-12/4*

ID 8204603

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 30 JUN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 30 JUN 82

10

KEYWORDS: PERU

AC

ULLOA, MANUEL

LATIN AMERICA

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CLARK MTG W/ PM OF PERU 28 JUN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 02 JUL 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

CP 7/2 Ponderstein approved *to*

ISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *FE* (C*40*)

National Security Council
The White House


270

RECEIVED

Package # 5020

82 JUL 21 AIO: 13

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	1		
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			



I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MW
12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

5020

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

INFORMATION

July 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK ✓

NOTED

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between You,
Etienne Davignon, and Wilhelm Haferkamp,
July 15, 1982

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of conversation between
you, Etienne Davignon, and Wilhelm Haferkamp, of the
European Community, on July 15, 1982.

Attachment

Tab I Memcon

cc: Henry Nau
Roger Robinson
Richard Pipes
James Rentschler

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW DATE 8-12-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116467

13

THE WHITE HOUSE

5020

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of Judge Clark's Meeting with Etienne Davignon and Wilhelm Haferkamp, European Community Commissioners

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Norman Bailey, Senior Director of National Security Planning
Henry Nau, Director of International Economic Affairs
Etienne Davignon, Commissioner, European Community
Wilhelm Haferkamp, Commissioner, European Community

DATE, TIME July 15, 1982
AND PLACE: 4:40 - 5:10 p.m., Situation Room

Mr. Haferkamp: Due to an accumulation of factors, there is a perception of a concerted American offensive against Europe. Let's break down the package and deal with its elements separately. The export credit issue is settled. Let's see what we can do on steel. Matters we thought were settled are coming up again, such as the citrus question, on which you have brought a case in the GATT, despite prior agreements. You are attacking the basis of our arrangements with EFTA and with the Lome countries. This must be studied in depth. On this basis the Caribbean Basin Initiative would not be allowed. The steel issue will be the most difficult to resolve, then the pipeline issue. If AEG goes under or there are massive layoffs, the reaction will be very bad. (C)

Judge Clark: You are misreading President Reagan. Some of the problems you have created for yourselves. Did you not discuss the sanctions after December 29? Especially the Germans and the French are misreading the President. The President is guided by principle. His stand is based on human rights, although not un mindful of economic and legal implications. Schmidt and others are most concerned about domestic issues and not principle. (Remainder of remarks off-the-record.) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on
July 19, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 116467

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Mr. Haferkamp: As of 30 June, new export rates apply and the Soviet Union has been upgraded (in the OECD classifications). Why don't you set up a grain cartel? There are only five important countries. (e)

Mr. Davignon: I understand your frustration that we don't understand the motives of the President. We never had a discussion about what it is we are pressuring the Soviets to do. What are we going to achieve? On gas, the security argument simply does not stand up. Just as the Soviet situation is getting awful, you provide relief. (It was later clarified that he meant political relief.) How much delay can you force? There is no possibility now that the deal won't be made. What do we do now to confront the sanctions? We have an extraordinarily complex legal situation. Do we analyze this or not? U.S. suppliers will be perceived as unreliable. We will get the gas by 1985 whether the pipeline is finished or not. Note that you are supplying phosphates in return for urea. We do not want a confrontation. Is the U.S. Government going to take the steel company position or take its own decision? What do we do with the twenty turbines we already have? Thatcher will send the turbines. Some told us we shouldn't have come because the Americans don't want to listen. Others said the time is not ripe. The Russians tell us they will do it (build the pipeline) no matter what. (e)

Mr. Haferkamp: All of this is adding additional uncertainties for the business community. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Henry - please
check for accuracy
before this
goes forward

Barley

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *rw 8-12-11*
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

16
ID 8205020

RECEIVED 21 JUL 82 12 .

TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 19 JUL 82

KEYWORDS: EC

STEEL

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CLARKS JUL 15 MTG W/ ETIENNE DAVIGNON & WILHELM HAFERKAMP

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

RENTSCHLER

NAU

PIPES

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8204809

NSCIFID

(R /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 7/26</i>	<i>Ponderstein, not D</i>		<i>WB</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *82* (C) *RP*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116468

we
3# : file

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 5783
SIT809 AN006461

DTG: 191349Z OCT 82 PSN: 023243
TOR: 292/1439Z

17

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB /010
WHSR COMMENT: ~~CHECKLIST~~ *RDTG*

EXDIS

OP IMMED
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DE RUFHFR #5783 2921350
O 191349Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

EXDIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5091

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 35783

EXDIS

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WALLIS
NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
WHITE HOUSE FDR DEEVER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OTRA
TAGS: OCON, FR
SUBJECT: WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT
REF: CLARK/GALBRAITH TELECONS OCTOBER 18

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M3711 #116468
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/22/15*

EXDIS

1. *vc* - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PER REFTELCONS, WE CONTACTED ATTALI OCTOBER 18 TO ASK IF FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT OUR PROPOSED DATES OF MAY 20-21-22 FOR WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT. ATTALI SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD EVER HEARD THESE DATES, BUT, IN ANY CASE, AS HE HAD MADE CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MITTERRAND'S CALENDAR WAS SUCH THAT HE COULD ACCEPT NO REPEAT NO SUMMIT DATES BEFORE JULY 1. ATTALI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD JAPANESE ALSO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH DATES BEFORE JULY 1.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 5783

DTG: 191349Z OCT 82 PSN: 023243

SO FRENCH WERE NOT ALONE.

EXDIS

3. ATTALI STRESSED THAT IN HIS VIEW DATES FOR SUMMIT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AMONG THE SHERPAS. SINCE ATTALI IS STILL CHAIRMAN OF THE SHERPA GROUP UNTIL JANUARY 1, HE IS INVITING THE SHERPAS TO A MEETING HERE OVER THE FIRST WEEKEND IN DECEMBER. THE PROBLEM OF DATES, AND ALL OTHER PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SUMMIT, CAN BE DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME.

EXDIS

4. ATTALI WAS RESENTFUL THAT A COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN SENT DIRECTLY TO A FRENCH OFFICIAL (DUFOUR) BY PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MICHAEL DEEVER, INVITING HIM TO A MEETING IN WILLIAMSBURG. ATTALI SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO PUT ALL THE EXPERIENCE AND ASSISTANCE OF THE GOF AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE AMERICANS ORGANIZING THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT, BUT HE, ATTALI, WAS THE ONLY FRENCH SHERPA AND ALL COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE SUMMIT MEETING HAD TO BE ADDRESSED TO HIM. ATTALI ALSO BELIEVES THAT IT IS HIS PREROGATIVE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SHERPAS UNTIL JANUARY 1 TO CONVENE MEETINGS ON SUMMIT SUBJECTS.

EXDIS

5. WE RECOMMEND THAT A SINGLE POINT OF CONTROL FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE USG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THIS EMBASSY IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROPER HANDLING.

EXDIS

GALBRAITH
BT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711 #116469

BY RW NARA DATE 5/21/18

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Evan Galbraith, United States Ambassador
to France, notetaker

President Francois Mitterrand of France
Jacque Attali, Personal Advisor to Mitterrand
Mr. Thierry, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 27, 1982
AND PLACE: 6:30 - 8:30 p.m., Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The following sequence developed as reported by Amb. Galbraith:

There was a cordial exchange of greetings, Mr. Clark referring to President Mitterrand's request for meeting in Washington on March 12 and President Reagan's pleasure at the forthright nature of President Mitterrand's remarks at that meeting. Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for accepting President's request that President Mitterrand receive Mr. Clark on such short notice to discuss issues of serious consequence. Mr. Clark noted that since that time, however, problems have occurred and we want to be certain the facts relating to these problems are correct. If correct, it may become necessary to review some of our policies as they relate to France. Mr. Clark said that he did not expect complete answers this evening to all matters and encouraged President Mitterrand to make any additional comment later by direct communication and consultation with President Reagan. (S)

Of the matters discussed on March 12, Mr. Clark stated President Reagan believes several have been positive, others negative. Mr. Clark stated with President's permission, we would consider positive matters first.

a. U.S. interest rates were cause of concern to France at the time of the March meeting but President Mitterrand had said he would not criticize the U.S. for these rates, particularly at Versailles, and we are appreciative of that. Since that time, rates have dropped from the 16 percent range to 10 percent and Mr. Mitterrand acknowledged that this drop has been beneficial. (S)

b. Mr. Clark pointed out our inflation rate has dropped substantially from the March level to a September level of only two tenths of one percent. (S)

c. The U.S. still has an unemployment problem and ten percent bothers us. (C)

At the March 12 meeting President Reagan was pleased that President Mitterrand supported and continues to support the U.S. effort to rearm and generally stands by our policy with respect to defense and deterrence, having noted that after ten years of neglect, the Reagan policy was welcome and was in the best interest of the West. Mr. Clark also said President Reagan was pleased Mr. Mitterrand was reiterating his opposition to the various peace and nuclear freeze movements in Europe. (S)

On the positive side the U.S., assisted by France, has done a great deal in the Middle East toward achieving peace in Beirut and withdrawal of the PLO, the Syrians and the Israeli forces. Mr. Clark thanked the President for the quick reaction of the French to participation with us in the multinational force. Mr. Clark then added that we are encouraged by the reaction of the Arab delegation in Washington to President Reagan's peace initiative in the Middle East and expressed the hope that for the first time in thirty-five years there is a chance of actually establishing true peace. (S)

President Mitterrand said that before Mr. Clark moved away from the positive side of the balance sheet, he would like to express a few thoughts:

a. He cannot imagine that the negative aspects are really important because in the basic things, we see things very closely. France appreciates very much the drop in the interest rates and congratulates the U.S. in its victory over inflation. France is moving in the same direction, going from the 14 percent it inherited from Giscard d'Estaing to 10 percent at the end of 1982. Mitterrand expects an inflation rate of eight percent in 1983. Four to five percent is as low as they can go because if they tried to go any more and imitated the United States, he would be pumping the bicycle too fast and wind up with a heart attack and confined to bed. *(The point being that too big a squeeze against inflation would create intolerable political consequences in France.) Mitterrand said that the U.S. is lucky in that its unions are more responsible. He went on to say that the military relations were in good harmony. France supports the US position in Geneva but if the talks fail he would actively support the deployment of the Pershing and he talks to the other members of the NATO Alliance along this line. He said that the French military budget is not being reduced for all practical purposes and that the amount of three billion francs which might be regarded as a reduction is de minimus. He underlined there would be no reduction of the troops in Germany and that they were expanding their expenditures on airborne forces (helicopters) and nuclear forces, citing the 6th SSBN which was sped up by him and the 7th which he has now

*Neither Mitterrand nor the Government refer to the fact that their present and prospective inflation rates are based on a price and wage freeze and that such rates do not mean the same thing as inflation rates freely arrived at.

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ordered. This will give France the capability of having 4 SSBNs permanently underway. The defense budget is almost 4 percent of gross national product which is an increasing amount because the gross national product is increasing. France is not integrated into NATO but it is faithful to its alliance and will work closely with its other allies. As for the question as to how to deal with the Soviet Union he would leave that to Mr. Clark to discuss. (S)

Before allowing Mr. Clark to turn to the negative side of the ledger, Mr. Mitterrand said that he had discussed these military matters with Chancellor Kohl whose views coincided with those of Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Clark stated President Reagan was impressed with recent information that France and FRG were consulting in greater depth on national defense. (S)

Mr. Clark then addressed Latin America and Mitterrand reacted dramatically, saying that he had more or less forgotten about this region because they had greater concerns elsewhere, and implied that the United States was obsessed with the region. He backed off however and seemed impressed when Mr. Clark told him that Cuba had received one billion dollars worth of Soviet military equipment since January, comprising about four hundred thousand tons, the largest shipments ever. Mr. Clark went on to show the subversive activity of Cuba not only in Nicaragua but in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. (He offered to continue briefing designated members of the French government on these points.) Mr. Clark added that the financial problems of Mexico have also added to our concern there. (S)

Mr. Clark thanked President Mitterrand for maintaining their March promise of no further arms to Nicaragua. Mitterrand replied that his arms contract with Nicaragua was not substantial and he remained faithful to his commitment not to add new contracts. Mr. Clark noted that while President Mitterrand had stated at the March meeting he would not ask Mr. Castro to Paris, we understand he may be coming. President Mitterrand said there is no immediate plan for him to come to France. However, there is a rumor that Fidel Castro will go to Sweden and if that is the case he may pass through France but he will consider our concern in the matter. Mitterrand stated he thinks our policy towards Cuba is wrong but as time goes on it may be proven right due to the fact that Nicaragua is having more and more difficulty with its revolution. Mr. Clark added this is evidenced by increasing internal suppression of the Church and press and external subversion in Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama. (President Mitterrand was slightly sarcastic at this point, stating we will only be deemed right when a tragic development takes place in Central America.) Going back to his relations with Nicaragua he said their original contract was merely symbolic, but he realized the symbol had become dangerous as far as France was concerned because of the intense interest

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and concern the US had over Nicaragua. He mentioned that Unge was not a communist and was a friend of his and that Unge was forced into joining with revolutionary forces. (At this point Mitterrand confessed that France had a certain sympathy for revolutionary groups.) He then stated that as far as Cuba is concerned, the French relations don't amount to much. They are only verbal. He would be happy to speak of this question as to the proper politics in Latin America at a later date. His only opinion was that it might be a good idea to speak to Castro if he comes, mentioning that American Presidents meet with Soviets -- such as Nixon and Ford, with Brezhnev. He thought it a good idea to speak to one's adversary. Smiling, Mitterrand said he has had difficulties reaching the ears and hearts of the Americans with respect to his views on Central America. Mitterrand also commented that he did not think the Sandinistas were doing well because they were too divided but that he, Mitterrand, was not an expert on this subject despite his having spent fifteen minutes explaining the best policy in Central America. The impression left was that their interest in Central America and Cuba is waning. (S)

Mr. Clark then moved to Africa setting out President Reagan's early interest in the independence of Namibia and his own involvement in Southern Africa while Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Clark pointed out frankly that we felt the U.S. is in the best position to influence South Africa respecting both human rights (we agree not to berate them publicly in consideration for improvement) and Namibian independence. We feel progress has been made and that Angola appears ready to accept the concept of Cubans leaving, and the prospect for an independent Namibia is good. The U.S. has taken a very active role not for glory but out of global responsibility. However, we feel success impeded by some very unfortunate public statements made by the French at highest levels that the United States is an impediment to the development of Namibian independence causing confusion and anger on the part of a number of officials in the U.S. Government. (At this point Mitterrand appeared dumbfounded. He professed to not knowing what we were talking about even though he himself made such remarks while in Africa this month. The Ambassador referred to a statement made in Dar es Salaam, and Mr. Clark pointed out how US newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post report such statements within minutes of their having been rendered - even from the depths of African jungles. Mr. Clark said that if we fail in this effort to create a free Namibia only the USSR will gain. He further stated that if the process fails by reason of hardening by the front line states following Cheysson's statements, we will say so publicly. At this point Mitterrand intervened to say that the policy of the United States and France coincided and that we both wanted free elections in Namibia, a new independent country and removal of the Cubans. (Originally Mitterrand put the removal of the Cubans first but he changed his phraseology to put free elections first and the removal of the Cubans last as part of their three basic points. Mitterrand referred to the fact that he had recently

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been in the Congo where he had seen Cubans and he thought the presence of Cubans there and elsewhere in Africa was deplorable. Mr. Clark also reminded him that there were, at the end of last year, an estimated six thousand East Germans in Angola. President Mitterrand said they too must leave. He stated he felt a breakthrough was imminent and they would continue on the Angolan-Cuban aspect. (S)

Mr. Clark moved north to Libya, stating that while Mr. Qadhafi is not a direct threat to U.S., he continues to support subversive activity in twenty different countries. Mr. Clark said that while he realized embargoes are not always the answer, the fact is that Libya is now near the bottom of the list of petroleum suppliers as the direct result of our embargoes. Mr. Mitterrand replied that his first dealings with Libya when he took office were in connection with Chad where he said France had played an important role in getting Libya out of Chad. He then said quite frankly that his policy towards Libya was ambiguous and it is not clear what France will do in connection with future relations. He made reference to a possible visit of Qadhafi to France but he repeated he did not know what their future policies would be. Mr. Clark reminded President Mitterrand that France continues to give aid, including a MAG contingent that services Libyan MIGs. (S)

Turning to the MT-20, Mr. Clark recalled how pleased President Reagan was on March 12 when President Mitterrand volunteered not to supply the Soviet Union with the MT-20, and we are deeply disappointed that this is going to be done. We feel that the MT-20 will give the Soviet Union a substantial advantage in impeding our intelligence gathering effort and move the Soviets ahead at least five years in this respect. (S)

Mitterrand said that he too had been worried by this contract which he found facing him when he took office but that his experts differed from those of the United States and since the 12th of March the United States had taken steps which unilaterally interfered with French trade and Mitterrand said that he felt justified by this act in changing his mind. He emphasized that it was the only aspect discussed in which he had changed his mind. However, he stated his military people would work with ours to determine if modifications could be made to meet the objections of our military and intelligence people. (S)

Mr. Clark then stated clearly and emphatically that we were concerned by a series of recent public statements made by high French government officials, including President Mitterrand attacking the United States and its policies, and we wanted to know the reasons for this. He cited specifically the statements of Prime Minister Mauroy in the United Nations, Mr. Cheysson and President Mitterrand in Kinshasha and stated that we found it offensive to be criticized unreasonably in public by our friends

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and contrary to the way in which we did things. In the UN we historically have sat idly by while small nations, many of whom were proxies of the Soviet Union, attacked the United States, but now Ambassador Kirkpatrick speaks back and we have found that the unreasonable attacks on us have diminished. Mr. Clark stated that if such statements continue from the French government, we have no alternative but to respond to them publicly. Mr. Mitterrand intervened that Madam Kirkpatrick was well known in France and has made comments which have bothered the French. (There was some discussion on this point in which Mr. Clark said he was unaware of any such statement by Ambassador Kirkpatrick but would check. President Mitterrand would not be more precise on this point and in the end smilingly dismissed it as a peripheral item.) Mr. Mitterrand referred to Jean Kirkpatrick as having langue pendu tant. Mr. Clark responded that Jean is our greatest Francophile. (S)

President Mitterrand said that sometimes language has to be revised although in the case of the gas pipeline, while our sanctions on the pipeline do not constitute imperialism, they do constitute hegemony and an unauthorized invasion of sovereignty (up to now, no reference had been made to the Polish-Soviet sanctions or "pipeline"). (S)

Mitterrand ended this point by saying we should all, including the French, make an effort to dampen down rhetoric and he would discuss it among the others. (C)

In reference to Mr. Mitterrand's remarks on "the pipeline" Mr. Clark stated that while he had not intended to get into the area for the reason that it was being managed by "the seven," he would accept the opportunity to describe the events leading up to the imposition of the sanctions to indicate the President's feeling and as a reflection of the President's principles and personality. In summary, during the Christmas holidays in December 1981, the President asked the Vice President and Secretary Haig, on an interagency approach, to come up with a recommendation which would give high visibility against Soviet intervention in Poland, all in the name of human rights. It was determined on December 29, 1981 that an embargo against transfer of oil and gas equipment and technology would be highly visible and damaging to the Soviet Union. At that point, Mr. Clark referred to later discussions between Secretary Haig and Gromyko suggesting that by summer some movement or relief would take place in Poland, such as the release of Walesa or easing of martial law, allowing the President to review the embargo and sanctions decision. This movement, of course, did not take place and President Reagan reacted against the lack of movement in Poland or at Versailles. (At this point Mitterrand intervened fairly vigorously saying nothing can happen in Poland. The very nature of the communist movement will not allow anything to happen. If necessary, they will act brutally but it is impossible for them to allow the society to become liberal. It can only get worse.) Mr. Clark referred then to

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the expectations of a strike on November 10 in Poland and how we expected to see the non-communist unions reassert themselves in Europe. President Reagan took his sanctions against Poland knowing that it was going to be costly in the United States, both economically and politically. (Mr. Clark said \$500 million this year) but he said the President felt strongly about it and that he would stick with sanctions unless and until another group of actions equivalent to the President's present policy is agreed to by the Alliance. (S)

President Mitterrand ended the meeting with a statement of goodwill. He complimented Mr. Clark for his being a good advisor and effective advocate, joking he wished he were on his own staff. He said that he would think on these matters and he appreciated the frank and serious discussion which had taken place. (S)

"From Ambassador Galbraith, Paris 079
To the White House for Jacquelyne Hill, Personal Secretary to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Please add the following paragraph below to draft I dictated yesterday. (C)

All in all Mitterrand put on quite a performance. Several times he played innocent, for example, when he poo-pooed our differences in Latin America; regarding Cheysson's public remarks on Cuban troop removal; and quoting an inoffensive passage from his eulogy on Mendes France as opposed to the offensive passage. He sprinkled in some intended humor, smiling often. He rattled off explanations and numbers with ease. He was conciliatory and generous in his attitude to Mr. Clark whose presentation obviously impressed Mitterrand. (Comment: Attali called Ambassador the next day "to clarify an important point," namely that Mitterrand's and other official comments on the dollar are not meant to be critical of President Reagan or the USG; it is the international monetary order which is at fault. (SIC))" (S)

At Mr. Clark's suggestion, we have avoided press on this visit - successfully. Two calls were received by Embassy asking who was going into the Elysee. Our press man responded he did not know - truthfully. (C)

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National Security Council
The White House

1425P

Package # 507

JAN 20 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A+I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

last PP, last page, fifth line -
 I think it should read Foreign
 Minister vice Prime Minister.
 iqrl J

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507

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *JS*

SUBJECT: MEMCON Between You, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe, January 19, 1983 - 6:30-7:20 p.m., At Secretary Shultz's Residence

RCM HAS SEEN

I attach for your information the MEMCON that you had on January 19, 1983 with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe and Secretary Shultz.

Attachment:
Tab A MEMCON

cc: C. Tyson

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Declassify: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 8-12-11

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110-10
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28

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Occasion: Secretary Shultz's cocktail reception for Foreign Minister Abe of Japan

Place: Secretary Shultz's private residence in Washington, D.C.

Time: 6:30-7:20 p.m., Wednesday, January 19, 1983

Attended by: Minister Abe
Presidential Advisor William P. Clark
Ambassador Hodson
Secretary Shultz
Two interpreters from the Japanese Embassy and U.S. State Department

1. Shultz-Abe Consultations

Secretary Shultz informed Mr. Clark that the Japanese Foreign Minister and he agreed earlier to have meetings four times a year to discuss issues involving the two nations, and that one of the four meetings would be set up specifically for the purpose of getting the two together independently from any other meetings at which both may happen to be present at the same time. Secretary Shultz said that although he had not reported to the President regarding this arrangement, he was certain that the President would approve. Secretary Shultz queried Mr. Abe if he would attend the ASEAN expanded foreign ministers meeting late June. Mr. Abe said he was planning to, and agreed that that would be an appropriate occasion for the two to meet.

2. Assessing the Prime Minister's Visit

Mr. Clark said that the people of the United States felt the Prime Minister's visit to have been very worthwhile. The President, himself, felt that the two leaders became good friends. The breakfast meeting enhanced the fruitful relations already in evidence yesterday, and it also gave additional opportunity for discussions of considerable substance. The Prime Minister's reference to the peace in his departure statement was truly moving. Secretary Shultz observed that because of the visit, a full partnership emerged on the basis of which the U.S. and Japan can work together to solve the problems besetting the world today.

3. President's Japan Visit

Mr. Abe asked if President Reagan would accept the Japanese invitation for his visit this year. Mr. Clark responded that the President would be unable to accept the invitation during the first half of 1983 because of the intense political agenda including the preparations

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NLRR M371/1 #116542
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

towards the Williamsburg Summit. The question of the possibility of a visit during the latter half of 1983 would be studied carefully, and the conclusions would be drawn sometime before June.

4. "Wisemen's Group"

Secretary Shultz briefed Mr. Clark regarding the joint U.S.-Japan effort currently underway to form a private advisory group similar to the Wisemen's Group, but with a broader perspective than just economical. The group would be small, and would have less emphasis in writing the final report, than keeping abreast of the current bilateral issues and periodically presenting thoughts and observations. Efforts were underway to conclude the work in time for the Secretary's Tokyo visit. Mr. Clark thought that the idea was appropriate.

5. CBI - Jamaica

Mr. Clark said that during the breakfast meeting the President thanked the Prime Minister on the Japanese aid to Jamaica, a model democracy in the Caribbean. Mr. Abe volunteered that Japan could contribute to CBI, and would be willing to continue to cooperate with the U.S. in that region. Secretary Shultz expressed his delight in this, and added that the special import measure that the Administration is asking the U.S. Congress to approve would benefit the Basin nations significantly, even though the trade flow occupies a small portion of the total U.S. import trade.

6. Aid to China

Minister Abe wished to know if the U.S. would extend to PRC economic aid at the time of the Shultz visit. Secretary Shultz informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that in view of the Chinese emphasis on modernization, some assistance as well as expanded trade would be helpful. The textile import issue is currently disputed between the two countries. In addition, efforts are underway to set out procedures for high technology export to China. The Secretary's own opinion, not supported by any of the China hands, but is based upon his experience in business development, was to organize efforts to transfer more readily available technology, rather than the high technology, because China is a relatively backward country. Asked what his opinion was on this matter, Mr. Abe replied that he also thought the high technology alone would be insufficient. Citing Japan's experience in aiding PRC efforts at Paoshan Steel Works that once failed, he said that Japan regards assistance to China in more basic technology to be more efficient. Steel production and TV station construction were given as examples of such less sophisticated technology.

7. 


8. Japanese Economic Mission to Moscow

Minister Abe said that a 200-man Japanese economic mission was scheduled to visit Moscow in February. The Japanese economic and business leaders wished to have government cooperation in this endeavor, but the foreign ministry declined to help, pointing out the pending Northern territories issue, and other problems. Siberian development whets the appetite of some Japanese businessmen suffering from domestic business downturn. The Ministry is also worried that President Andropov, himself, might extend hospitality to the group. Secretary Shultz told the Foreign Minister that the American Embassy in Moscow guided the U.S. business group that visited Moscow and furnished them with prompt oppositions against improper Soviet offers.

9. Why Abe Accepted the FM Post

Drawn out by warm words of praise Mr. Clark used to describe the Prime Minister's departure statement, and also by highly reassuring words the Secretary used to describe the "emergence of full partnership" between the U.S. and Japan (of point 2, above), Minister Abe said that Mr. Nakasone was a courageous leader. The Prime Minister had thought of declining to accept the Foreign Minister's position, but Nakasone asked him to help him implement such policies as: improving relations with Korea, permitting the arms technology exports to the U.S., further strengthening defense, and expanding access to the Japanese market. Given such close concurrence of opinions, Abe could not decline the offer of the FM post, even though he had competed with Nakasone for the premiership. He said that thus far things have developed smoothly, but the rough times are in the offing. Nonetheless, he was deeply satisfied that the U.S.-Japan relations were improved as a result of this visit.

NSC/S PROFILE

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RWS 2/12/11

ID 8300507

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 JAN 83 17

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 20 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

ABE, SHINTARO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CLARK MTG W/ FOMIN ABE 19 JAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8300479

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i> JAN 21 1983	<i>Measures noted</i>		<i>SU, CT</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *DA* (C) ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/14

JP: *[initials]*

Attached is draft memcon of
WC's mtg with Kreisky prepared
by Sol Polansky.

WC approves the memcon as
written and would like to
have finalized and appropriate
distribution made.

jh

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between Bruno
Kreisky and William P. Clark;
February 10, 1983; Vienna, Austria

Attached for your information and appropriate distribution is
a copy of the memorandum of conversation between William P.
Clark and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky which took place in Vienna,
Austria, February 10, 1983.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

RW
8-12-11 ~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~
(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

1/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TOR: 1747
CN: 03396
CHARGE: PROJ CLARK
CHRON

PLEASE PASS ONLY TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CLARK FROM
CHARGE

R.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AU, US
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON OF JUDGE CLARK - CHANCELLOR
- KREISKY MEETING

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT MEMCON OF YOUR FEBRUARY 10
MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL.
IF YOU WISH AND IT IS MORE CONVENIENT FOR YOU, WE COULD
TYPE MEMCON IN FINAL HERE, INCORPORATING ANY CHANGES YOU
THINK NECESSARY, AND FORWARD COPIES TO WASHINGTON. PLEASE
LET US KNOW YOUR PREFERENCE.

*eg in
this folder
approved
as is.*

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: CHANCELLOR KREISKY'S OFFICE

DATE: FEBRUARY 10, 1993

TIME: 10:30 - 11:20 AM

SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR KREISKY - JUDGE CLARK DISCUSS MIDDLE
EAST, EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: CHANCELLOR KREISKY
- JUDGE CLARK, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
- AMBASSADOR KLESTIL
- CHIEF OF CHANCERY AMRY
- SOL POLANSKY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MB7111 #116546

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION: NSC, DEPT. OF STATE: DEPUTY
- SECRETARY, UNDERSECRETARY FOR
- POLITICAL AFFAIRS, EUR, EUR/CE,
AFTER WELCOMING JUDGE CLARK, CHANCELLOR KREISKY EXPRESSED
PLEASURE OVER HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A
VERY FINE, POSITIVE TRIP. HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO
JUDGE CLARK, WHO CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO MAKING THE TRIP
POSSIBLE. KREISKY CONTINUED, NOTING THAT AUSTRIA WOULD
BE EXTREMELY LOYAL TO THE U.S. IF HE COULD CONTRIBUTE
IN ANY WAY, HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO DO SO. AT THE SAME
TIME, THE U.S. SHOULD BE AWARE AUSTRIA HAS ITS OWN
POLICIES WHICH FROM TIME TO TIME MAY NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE
WITH THOSE OF THE U.S. IF THE U.S. NEEDED ADDITIONAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIENNA 1332

CLARIFICATION FROM TIME TO TIME ABOUT AUSTRIAN POLICIES, KREISKY SUGGESTED THAT JUDGE CLARK SHOULD SIMPLY GET IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH HIM BY PHONE.

JUDGE CLARK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS. HE RECIPROCATED THE CHANCELLOR'S SUGGESTION CONCERNING DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WHEN TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE.

CHANCELLOR KREISKY SAID HE COULD MEET PEOPLE WE COULD NOT. THIS DID NOT MEAN HE SHARED THE VIEWS OF SUCH PEOPLE, BUT IT DID PROVIDE KREISKY THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL THEM THE TRUTH. THIS WAS SO, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINIANS.

KREISKY SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS SOME VIEWS ON AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT. HE SUPPORTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER 1 MIDDLE EAST PROPOSALS. HE FEARED, HOWEVER, ARAFAT WOULD HAVE TERRIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN FACING HIS OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PLO. IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST THAT ARAFAT HAVE THE FEELING HE HAD A FUTURE, AND BE ABLE TO CONTROL PALESTINIAN POPULATION. OTHERWISE, KREISKY FEARED THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM.

THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT, IN HIS EARLY CONTACTS WITH ARAFAT, HE HAD LAID DOWN A PRE-CONDITION WITH THE PLO LEADER CONCERNING ANY FUTURE RELATIONS WITH HIM: DON'T TOUCH A SINGLE RUSSIAN JEW LEAVING THE USSR IF ARAFAT WANTED KREISKY'S CONTINUING SUPPORT. KREISKY WAS HAPPY TO SAY THAT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOVIET JEWS HAD TRANSITED AUSTRIA WITHOUT LOSING A SINGLE ONE.

THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH ARAFAT THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE. THIS POSSIBILITY HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED. IF ARAFAT WERE TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS, WHICH COULD HAPPEN, WE WOULD HAVE TERRORISM IN EUROPE. KREISKY HELD THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EASTERN EUROPE ALLIES WERE PREPARING TERRORISM, AND THAT THEY HAD CONTACT WITH CARLOS IN THIS CONNECTION. KREISKY WISHED TO SHARE WITH JUDGE CLARK SOME CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: AUSTRIAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PLO COUNTERPARTS HAD

COOPERATED IN THE PAST TO STOP THE FLOW OF ARMS TO OR THROUGH AUSTRIA. THEY WERE ALSO CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF "OUTSIDERS". BUT IF ALL PALESTINIANS BECAME "OUTSIDERS", WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT SITUATION.

KREISKY SAID ONE HAD TO UNDERSTAND THE PLO'S POLITICAL SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THE PLO WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE KAHAN REPORT. HOWEVER, THE PLO HAD TO GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. IT COULD NOT GET RECOGNITION FROM ISRAEL, BUT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE PLO IF IT COULD GET RECOGNITION FROM THE U.S. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS IMPORTANT. A LARGE PART OF THE PLO WAS READY TO TAKE THE STEP OF RECOGNIZING ISRAEL. ARAFAT WAS STILL THE BEST OF ALL PALESTINIAN LEADERS EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT A STRONG MAN. HE DID, HOWEVER, HAVE A STRONG REPUTATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS.

THE CHANCELLOR NOTED HE HAD TOLD USIA DIRECTOR WICK IN FEBRUARY 1982 THERE WOULD BE A WAR WITHIN TWO YEARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF BEGIN REMAINED IN POWER. IN THE CHANCELLOR'S VIEW, ISRAEL WOULD BE CAUTIOUS WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA BECAUSE OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT FOR DAMASCUS. THE CHANCELLOR FELT BEGIN'S WAY OF THINKING WAS FAR DIFFERENT FROM OURS.

JUDGE CLARK SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS A PATIENT MAN, BUT HE HAD HIS LIMITS. THE MEETINGS AMBASSADOR HABIB WAS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING WERE CRITICAL. WE WERE NOW AT A CROSSROADS. WE HAD NOT EXPECTED SO QUICKLY THE PUBLICATION OF THE KAHAN REPORT. IT WAS GOOD TO SEE THE REPORT, WHICH DEMONSTRATED DEMOCRACY WAS WORKING IN ISRAEL. WE WERE CAREFULLY WATCHING BEGIN'S AND SHARON'S ACTIONS. WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, SAY ANYTHING PUBLICLY ABOUT THE REPORT SINCE WE DID NOT WISH TO INFLUENCE EVENTS OR DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS ADAMANT THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES HAD TO LEAVE LEBANON. ONCE THIS OCCURRED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TO THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS.

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40

AVOID THE DEPLOYMENT OF BOTH MISSILES. WE WERE HOPEFUL ABOUT THE CURRENT ROUND OF THE START AND INF TALKS. HISTORY WAS NOT VERY HELPFUL ABOUT RESULTS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS, BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO TALK.

JUDGE CLARK SAID HE WISHED TO TURN TO A LIGHTER ISSUE, AND WAS PLEASED TO INFORM THE CHANCELLOR WE PLANNED TO REOPEN A CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENT IN SALZBURG.

THE CHANCELLOR WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE NEWS, ADDING THAT SENATOR PELL HAD BEEN HELPFUL ON THIS GENERAL ISSUE.

JUDGE CLARK NOTED SENATOR PELL WAS A FORMER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER. HE WAS INTERESTED IN THE FUNCTIONS OF EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES. HE HAD ALSO GREETED MRS. VON DAMM'S APPOINTMENT AS THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRIA. THE CHANCELLOR SAID, WITH RESPECT TO SUPERPOWER SUMMITS, HE HAD STATED AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LAST WEEK THAT NEITHER SUPERPOWER NEEDED AN INTERMEDIARY IN THIS MATTER. HE RECOGNIZED THEY HAD GOOD COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS.

THE CHANCELLOR NOTED HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE HAD NOT WANTED TO SET A DATE FOR THE MOSCOW TRIP BEFORE HE COMPLETED HIS U.S. VISIT. HE WOULD BE CALLING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR NEXT WEEK TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE MOSCOW VISIT. WHILE HIS FORMAL HOST IN MOSCOW WOULD BE PREMIER TIKHONOV, WHO IN HIS OPINION WAS NOT A POLICY-MAKING OFFICER, HE WAS CERTAIN HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH ANDROPOV.

THE CHANCELLOR CLOSED THE MEETING SAYING THAT AS CANCUN CO-CHAIRMAN, HE FELT IT HIS DUTY TO MAKE SOME PROPOSALS AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE MEETING THERE. HE BELIEVED SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE, AND ADDED HE WOULD SEND A LETTER OR NON-PAPER TO JUDGE CLARK FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

POLANSKY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIENNA 01832

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*SUBJECT: Memcon of Clark/Kreisky Meeting
February 10, 1983; Vienna, Austria

Judge Clark has approved for distribution the attached draft memcon (Vienna 1832) of his meeting with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna, Austria, February 10, 1983. At Tab I is a memo to State forwarding the memcon for their information.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO✓
—

—

That you send the memo at Tab I to State

Attachment:

Tab I	Memo to State
Tab A	Vienna 1832

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW* . DATE 8-12-11

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIENNA 1832

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CN: 03896
CHRG: PROS CLARK
CHRON

42

PLEASE PASS ONLY TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CLARK FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AU, US
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON OF JUDGE CLARK - CHANCELLOR
- KREISKY MEETING

ACTION COPY

good reporting

~~centralized in section. initials:~~

*(should in go back to Vienna) *slate*

*eg in trip folder
approved as is.*

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT MEMCON OF YOUR FEBRUARY 10 MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL. IF YOU WISH AND IT IS MORE CONVENIENT FOR YOU, WE COULD TYPE MEMCON IN FINAL HERE, INCORPORATING ANY CHANGES YOU THINK NECESSARY, AND FORWARD COPIES TO WASHINGTON. PLEASE LET US KNOW YOUR PREFERENCE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: CHANCELLOR KREISKY'S OFFICE

DATE: FEBRUARY 10, 1983

TIME: 10:30 - 11:20 AM

SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR KREISKY - JUDGE CLARK DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST, EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: CHANCELLOR KREISKY
- JUDGE CLARK, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
- AMBASSADOR KLESTIL
- CHIEF OF CHANCERY AMRY
- SOL POLANSKY

Weller

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3711/#116547

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION: NSC, DEPT. OF STATE: DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, EUR, EUR/CE,
- AFTER WELCOMING JUDGE CLARK, CHANCELLOR KREISKY EXPRESSED PLEASURE OVER HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A VERY FINE, POSITIVE TRIP. HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO JUDGE CLARK, WHO CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO MAKING THE TRIP POSSIBLE. KREISKY CONTINUED, NOTING THAT AUSTRIA WOULD BE EXTREMELY LOYAL TO THE U.S. IF HE COULD CONTRIBUTE IN ANY WAY, HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO DO SO. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. SHOULD BE AWARE AUSTRIA HAS ITS OWN POLICIES WHICH FROM TIME TO TIME MAY NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE U.S. IF THE U.S. NEEDED ADDITIONAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIENNA 1832

CLARIFICATION FROM TIME TO TIME ABOUT AUSTRIAN POLICIES, KREISKY SUGGESTED THAT JUDGE CLARK SHOULD SIMPLY GET IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH HIM BY PHONE. 43

JUDGE CLARK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS. HE RECIPROCATED THE CHANCELLOR'S SUGGESTION CONCERNING DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WHEN TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE.

CHANCELLOR KREISKY SAID HE COULD MEET PEOPLE WE COULD NOT. THIS DID NOT MEAN HE SHARED THE VIEWS OF SUCH PEOPLE, BUT IT DID PROVIDE KREISKY THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL THEM THE TRUTH. THIS WAS SO, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINIANS.

KREISKY SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS SOME VIEWS ON AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT. HE SUPPORTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER 1 MIDDLE EAST PROPOSALS. HE FEARED, HOWEVER, ARAFAT WOULD HAVE TERRIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN FACING HIS OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PLO. IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST THAT ARAFAT HAVE THE FEELING HE HAD A FUTURE, AND BE ABLE TO CONTROL PALESTINIAN POPULATION. OTHERWISE, KREISKY FEARED THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM.

THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT, IN HIS EARLY CONTACTS WITH ARAFAT, HE HAD LAID DOWN A PRE-CONDITION WITH THE PLO LEADER CONCERNING ANY FUTURE RELATIONS WITH HIM: DON'T TOUCH A SINGLE RUSSIAN JEW LEAVING THE USSR IF ARAFAT WANTED KREISKY'S CONTINUING SUPPORT. KREISKY WAS HAPPY TO SAY THAT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOVIET JEWS HAD TRANSITED AUSTRIA WITHOUT LOSING A SINGLE ONE.

THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH ARAFAT THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISM IN EUROPE. THIS POSSIBILITY HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED. IF ARAFAT WERE TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS, WHICH COULD HAPPEN, WE WOULD HAVE TERRORISM IN EUROPE. KREISKY HELD THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EASTERN EUROPE ALLIES WERE PREPARING TERRORISM, AND THAT THEY HAD CONTACT WITH CARLOS IN THIS CONNECTION. KREISKY WISHED TO SHARE WITH JUDGE CLARK SOME CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: AUSTRIAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PLO COUNTERPARTS HAD

44

COOPERATED IN THE PAST TO STOP THE FLOW OF ARMS TO OR THROUGH AUSTRIA. THEY WERE ALSO CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF "OUTSIDERS". BUT IF ALL PALESTINIANS BECAME "OUTSIDERS", WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT SITUATION.

KREISKY SAID ONE HAD TO UNDERSTAND THE PLO'S POLITICAL SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THE PLO WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE KAHAN REPORT. HOWEVER, THE PLO HAD TO GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. IT COULD NOT GET RECOGNITION FROM ISRAEL, BUT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE PLO IF IT COULD GET RECOGNITION FROM THE U.S. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS IMPORTANT. A LARGE PART OF THE PLO WAS READY TO TAKE THE STEP OF RECOGNIZING ISRAEL. ARAFAT WAS STILL THE BEST OF ALL PALESTINIAN LEADERS EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT A STRONG MAN. HE DID, HOWEVER, HAVE A STRONG REPUTATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS.

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JUDGE CLARK SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING THE NEXT DAY WITH AMBASSADORS ROWNY AND NITZE. NITZE WAS AUTHORIZED TO LISTEN IN AN EXPLORATORY WAY TO ANYTHING THE SOVIETS HAD TO SAY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT WAS INTENT ON KEEPING OUR COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY THE PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES ON SCHEDULE. WE KNEW THE SOVIETS WERE NERVOUS ABOUT THESE MISSILES. THE PERSHING II TOOK 8 MINUTES TO ARRIVE AT THEIR TARGETS. IF THE SOVIETS WERE SINCERE IN THEIR ANNOUNCED HOPE FOR DISARMAMENT, THEY KNEW HOW TO

48

AVOID THE DEPLOYMENT OF BOTH MISSILES. WE WERE HOPEFUL ABOUT THE CURRENT ROUND OF THE START AND INF TALKS. HISTORY WAS NOT VERY HELPFUL ABOUT RESULTS OF SUMMIT MEETINGS, BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO TALK.

JUDGE CLARK SAID HE WISHED TO TURN TO A LIGHTER ISSUE, AND WAS PLEASED TO INFORM THE CHANCELLOR WE PLANNED TO REOPEN A CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENT IN SALZBURG.

THE CHANCELLOR WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE NEWS, ADDING THAT SENATOR PELL HAD BEEN HELPFUL ON THIS GENERAL ISSUE.

JUDGE CLARK NOTED SENATOR PELL WAS A FORMER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER. HE WAS INTERESTED IN THE FUNCTIONS OF EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES. HE HAD ALSO GREETED MRS. VON DAMM'S APPOINTMENT AS THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRIA. THE CHANCELLOR SAID, WITH RESPECT TO SUPERPOWER SUMMITS, HE HAD STATED AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LAST WEEK THAT NEITHER SUPERPOWER NEEDED AN INTERMEDIARY IN THIS MATTER. HE RECOGNIZED THEY HAD GOOD COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS.

THE CHANCELLOR NOTED HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE HAD NOT WANTED TO SET A DATE FOR THE MOSCOW TRIP BEFORE HE COMPLETED HIS U.S. VISIT. HE WOULD BE CALLING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR NEXT WEEK TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE MOSCOW VISIT. WHILE HIS FORMAL HOST IN MOSCOW WOULD BE PREMIER TIKHONOV, WHO IN HIS OPINION WAS NOT A POLICY-MAKING OFFICER, HE WAS CERTAIN HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH ANDROPOV.

THE CHANCELLOR CLOSED THE MEETING SAYING THAT AS CANCUN CO-CHAIRMAN, HE FELT IT HIS DUTY TO MAKE SOME PROPOSALS AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE MEETING THERE. HE BELIEVED SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE, AND ADDED HE WOULD SEND A LETTER OR NON-PAPER TO JUDGE CLARK FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

POLANSKY

BT

#1832

NNNN

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8301216

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 FEB 83 15

TO WHEELER

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 23 FEB 83

WHEELER

23 FEB 83

49

KEYWORDS: AUSTRIA

KREISKY, BRUNO

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CLARK / KREISKY MTG ON FEB 10 IN AUSTRIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 23 FEB 83 STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

(M / M)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 2/23 Wheeler signed memo to Bremer

DE MW

DISPATCH

128 2/23

W/ATTCH FILE

(C) *128*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116548

MW

1332

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1983

50

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE *RW*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Treasury Secretary Regan Following Your Meeting with First Vice President Schwalb and Finance Minister Rodriguez of Peru on Saturday, February 26, 1983

At Tab A are the minutes of your meeting with Peruvian First Vice President Fernando Schwalb and Minister of Economy, Finance and Commerce Carlos Rodriguez Pastor on Saturday, February 26 in the Situation Room.

As you know, the Peruvians are counting on Treasury coming through with that stabilization fund loan. That decision will be made within a week, according to staff level sources at Treasury and, moreover, I have been told such a loan may well not be given.

In light of this, I suggest you call Secretary Regan, letting him know of your concern and interest in the matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Secretary Regan on the Peruvian request.

Approve

Disapprove

Decided against at Queen's dinner

That you read and approve the attached minutes of your meeting.

Approve

Disapprove

[checkmark]

up

Attachment

Tab A Minutes of Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM371/1 # 116548

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116549

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MINUTES: Meeting of Judge Clark with Peruvian First Vice President Schwalb and Finance Minister Rodriguez

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: Saturday, February 26, 1983 - 11:30 a.m. White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS: Judge William P. Clark
First Vice President Fernando Schwalb and Minister of Economy, Finance and Commerce, Carlos Rodriguez Pastor of Peru, and Alfonso Rivero, Acting Ambassador from Peru to the U.S.

First Vice President Schwalb, who was appointed president of the Council of Ministers in Peru two months ago, introduced Peru's new finance minister, Rodriguez Pastor, who proceeded to outline Peru's current economic position.

Peru's economic recession, which began in 1981, was caused in large part by low prices for the country's exports, principally minerals. 1982 was no better, and the nervous international financial markets have meant credits are now difficult to obtain. The finance minister reported, however, that Peru has been helped by getting an early agreement with the IMF and by sticking to the guidelines. But Peru still needs credit, and this has become harder to obtain after the Falklands War, with bankers very cautious in lending toward the whole region--a caution reinforced by Mexico, Brazil and Argentina's financial problems. By the end of 1982 only short-term credit was available and Peru, according to the finance minister, has not gotten its share.

Rodriguez Pastor then outlined the new cabinet's economic policies. First, there is greater reliance on Peruvian resources, e.g., through raising real interest rates. Second, they have been successful in obtaining a structural loan from the World Bank, and they hope to get funds from the Ex-Im Bank and the Treasury Department. They need, however, \$1 billion from private banks. Treasury's support is critical, and Peru hopes to obtain \$400 million from the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This would symbolize U.S. support at a time when Peru is negotiating with the commercial banks.

Judge Clark replied that Peru was in better shape than many countries in the region. Moreover, our economic recovery will have a positive effect on Peru as well. He characterized U.S.-Peruvian relations as excellent and complimented the Vice President on his speech to the Peruvian Congress the past week. Judge Clark then asked if there is anything we can do

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NLRR M3711 # 116549

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52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to help the Vice President in setting up his Washington speeches.

The finance minister once again raised the question of Treasury's stabilization fund. Judge Clark assured the Peruvians that he would be in touch with Secretary Regan. Judge Clark complimented the Peruvian government for meeting its obligations--a determination reminiscent of Brazil's President Figueiredo.

Rodriguez Pastor reiterated President Belaunde's determination to meet obligations. "The best card we have," he remarked, "is our record." The Vice President added that President Belaunde was ready to risk his own popularity to make sure the austerity program worked.

Prepared by:
Roger W. Fontaine



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

559

Package # 1332

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<i>Boverie</i>	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<i>B</i>	<i>A</i>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<i>m</i>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<i>✓</i>	<i>A</i>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54
ID 8301332

RU 8-12-11
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 28 FEB 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 28 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: PERU
AC

INTL FINANCE

SCHWALB, FERNANDO
RODRIGUEZ PASTOR, C
REGAN, D

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF CLARK MTG W/ SCHWALB & RODRIGUEZ PASTOR 26 FEB & TALKERS
FOR CALL TO REGAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 02 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8301297

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	MAR 07 1983	<i>Clark approved</i>		50

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pw 8/2/11

ID 8303520

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 MAY 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOC DATE 23 MAY 83

55

KEYWORDS: TAIWAN

CHIEN, FRED

DEAN, DAVID

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF CLARK MAY 19 MTG W/ CHIEN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8303375

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C JUL 0 6 1983	Clark noted		8u

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W/ATTCH FILE *(initials)* *(ci)*

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 3520

1983 MAY 23 PM 5:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>SAPIA-BOSCH</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>I</u>

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DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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NLRRM 3711, #116555

57

Judge Clark BY RW NARA DATE 12/21/15

Subject: The Quid for Taiwanese Help in Central America

As Tab C makes clear the Taiwanese have been helping out to a small extent for years. This is good. Now they are trying to get some credit for it. Ultimately if we elevate what they do to a role in US-Taiwan relations it will come back to haunt us.

57

In short we should keep this on the scale that "This is something you do because it is the right thing to do--indeed we would begin to worry about you if you didn't help the Central American

But we shouldn't start joint planning.

As you know we are already exposed on this score with Israel because of the way we have handled it. In that case it was somewhat mitigated because we were (are) in extremis. But we should be very loath to formalize their help to the level of being a major litmus test of our relations. If they really want to help they would get busy on the Hill in support of our aid requests.

Bud *[Signature]*

[Signature]

(but let's take advantage)

~~SECRET~~

3520

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RMK

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1983

58

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Frederick Chien

David Dean, of the American Institute in Taiwan, has prepared a Memorandum of Conversation on your meeting on May 19 with Dr. Frederick Chien (Tab A). Dave's memo covers the salient points made by Fred in his comments to you.

Attached also is Fred's memorandum dealing with projects on economic development for Central America (Tab B). I asked the CIA to provide us with what projects Taiwan has been supporting in Central America over the past several years. That information is forwarded to you at Tab C.

Taiwan is suggesting an expansion of their present activities in and with Central America, with American funds. Also, Taiwan proposes the fact that U.S. money is behind these projects should be discreetly made known to the government authorities concerned. The possible adverse political ramifications of these kinds of joint projects between the U.S. and Taiwan must be carefully considered by us. I mean specifically the reaction of the PRC if these activities become a matter of public knowledge. However, whether we decide for or against cooperation with Taiwan, as Chien's proposals outline, we should express our appreciation to them for their willingness to be of assistance in an area of critical importance to us.

Attachments:

- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation
- Tab B Chien's Memorandum
- Tab C CIA Paper

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Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M371/1 # 116550

BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED 116556
NLRR M3711 #116556
BY kw NARA DATE 12/21/15

59

Judge Clark

Subject: The Quid for Taiwanese Help in Central America

As Tab C makes clear the Taiwanese have been helping out to a small extent for years. This is good. Now they are trying to get some credit for it. Ultimately if we elevate what they do to a role in US-Taiwan relations it will come back to haunt us.

In short we should keep this on the scale that "This is something you do because it is the right thing to do--indeed we would begin to worry about you if you didn't help the Central American

But we shouldn't start joint planning.

As you know we are already exposed on this score with Israel because of the way we have handled it. In that case it was somewhat mitigated because we were (are) in extremis. But we should be very loath to formalize their help to the level of being a major litmus test of our relations. If they really want to help they would get busy on the Hill in support of our aid requests.

Bud
[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]
(but let's take advantage)



~~SECRET~~

116551

AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN

1700 N. Moore St.
17th Floor
Arlington, Virginia 22209
(703) 525-8474

60

May 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: William Clark
Gaston Sigur
Fredrick Chien
C. J. Chen
David Dean

PLACE AND DATE: AIT/W, 2:15 p.m., May 19, 1983

Dr. Chien expressed his pleasure at meeting Judge Clark. He extended President Chiang Ching-kuo's greetings and warm regards to President Reagan. Dr. Chien said that in the four-and-a-half months since he had arrived in Washington, he had noticed a gradual improvement in his side's relations with the U.S. He felt this was due to both sides' emphasis on practical matters, cooperation rather than confrontation, and sincere attitudes.

Dr. Chien said arms sales were needed not only as a deterrent, but also because of a possible Soviet threat due to the increased Soviet naval presence in East Asia. Taiwan hopes that sensitive arms sales can be worked out quietly without public attention. Dr. Chien added that arms sales were also important for the confidence of Taiwan's public. He said that last year investment and confidence had been affected by the world recession and the August 17 communique. This year he said confidence (and investment) was better because the U.S. had revealed the planned amounts of military sales (to Congress).

Dr. Chien said Taipei's stock market dropped 25% when Mitterand's recent visit to Peking was accompanied by a rumor that France was going to sell the PRC mirage 2000's.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M37111 #111551
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/85

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61

Dr. Chien then referred to Central America. He said Taipei always has had the friendliest attitude towards the U.S. and will do whatever it can to help. He added that because they didn't have bilateral diplomatic ties, this factor causes some constraints on their actions. Dr. Chien referred to President Reagan's Caribbean initiative and said that Taiwan has friendly relations in Central America and the Caribbean and have had technical assistance programs there. He handed over a paper on economic and other projects to help in Central America.

Enclosure:

Dr. Chien's paper on projects on economic development for Central America

AIT/W:David Dean:mlb

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Projects on Economic Development for
Central America

1. My country may, in collaboration with the United States, assist countries in Central America in their economic developments for the betterment of the standard of living and quality of life of their peoples.
2. Such joint projects could be undertaken in the form of the provision of personnel and technique by my country, with funds provided by the United States.
3. The scope of such projects could cover the following:
 - a. to expand technical cooperation projects already existing between my country and countries in Central America;
 - b. to assist in the planning, designing and providing equipment and techniques for the development of agricultural products and light industries;
 - c. to assist in the planning and implementation of land reform programs;
 - d. to establish a vocational training center in Taiwan for technicians from Central America;
 - e. to assist in training psywar specialists and officers from Central America.
4. In order to avoid the possible exploitation of anti-American sentiments in Central America by the Communists, and to maximize the results of such joint projects, it is suggested that they be announced as undertaken by my Government, and that the government authorities concerned be discreetly advised that the projects are, in fact, funded by the United States.
5. My country will formulate a detailed program on the projects for further consultation with the United States, provided the latter agrees in principle to the suggestions as outlined above.

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NLRR M37/1 #116552
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE WILLIAM
CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

M10-351/M10-
371
JAUVERT/BROWI

Box Number

48

1

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116553	PAPER RE. TAIWAN [ATTACHED TO DOC. 116552]	2	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

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RW 3/12/11

ID 8303526

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RECEIVED 23 MAY 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM SIGUR

DOC DATE 23 MAY 83

65

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

OKAWARA, YOSHIO

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ JAPANESE AMB & CLARK ON MAY 19

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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MAY 31 1983

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 3526

1900
MAY 23 1983

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Provide state a copy.

3526

5-23-83

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John Poindexter :

Do we share memcons
with other agencies?

Bob Kimmitt

We do on case by
case basis.

MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED/w
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 23, 1983

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Mat*SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Japanese Ambassador
Yoshio Okawara on May 19, 1983

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with
Japanese Ambassador Okawara.

Attachment:
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED w/
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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3526

116554

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

69

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Gaston J. Sigur, Director for East Asian
Affairs, National Security Council

Japan

Yoshio Okawara, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.
Makoto Watanabe, Minister (Political), Japanese
Embassy

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, May 19, 1983
3:00-3:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Situation Room

SUBJECT:

Nakasone Visit

On Thursday, May 19, Judge Clark met with Japanese Ambassador Okawara at the Ambassador's request. First of all, he wanted to express the thanks of Prime Minister Nakasone for the May 7 personal message of the President. This was in response to one previously received from Nakasone. Then, he had one major request to make which concerned the meetings on May 27 between the President and Prime Minister Nakasone. He asked that the subject of defense be avoided because of the sensitivity of this subject in Japan as a result of Nakasone's hard line on the matter. He used the coming June election to bolster his case.

It is thought some Japanese officials close to the Prime Minister are concerned that he may push too hard on the defense issue if the President raises the matter. (However, it seems it would appear very strange indeed if the President does not refer to it. He can state that he is gratified at the steps the Prime Minister has taken to bolster Japan's defense efforts and, at the same time, he understands the public image problem he faces. But it is necessary that our people, both Americans and Japanese, realize that the maintenance of peace is only possible if we have the military power and will to stand up to the Soviet Union.)

After Judge Clark left, Okawara expressed concern over the stance our USTR delegation took recently in Tokyo over the issue of beef and citrus quotas. He is worried about the hardening attitude within the

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NLRR M37111 #116554
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/15

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70

Japanese Ministry of Agriculture brought about by what he termed the "inflexible stance" of the U.S. side. He seems to think that we should seem more willing to give, even though we don't actually do so on any major point.

One last item, Okawara said also that Nakasone may bring up at Williamsburg, or here on May 27 with the President, a proposal for a war on cancer by those countries participating in the Summit.

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~~SECRET~~

REFERRAL

DATE: 31 MAY 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPT OF STATE

71

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: CLARK

SOURCE: SIGUR

DATE: 23 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

OKAWARA, YOSHIO

SUBJ: MEMCON W/ JAPANESE AMB & CLARK ON MAY 19

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

Michael E. Norton
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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MEMORANDUMS OF CONVERSATION - JUDGE WILLIAM
CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116555	NOTE BUD TO CLARK RE. TAIWANESE HELP [W/NOTATION]	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CLARK [06/24/1982-05/31/1983]

FOIA

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371
JAUVERT/BROWI

Box Number

48

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
116556	NOTE BUD TO CLARK RE. TAIWANESE HELP [W/NOTATION; COPY OF DOC. 116555]	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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