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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 3/3/2011

File Folder TERRORISM (APRIL 1982-JUNE 1982)

FOIA

M10-338

Box Number 111

GUNN

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
106303	CABLE	STATE 097730 R 7/1/2013 M338/1	1	4/12/1982	B1
106304	MEMO	TO ADMIRAL POINDEXTER RE TERRORISM PAR 4/10/2013 M338/1	1	ND	B1 B3
106305	PAPER	RE TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 106304) PAR 4/10/2013 M338/1	4	6/4/1982	B1 B3
106309	LIST	OF ADDRESSES D 7/10/2012 M338/1	3	ND	B1 B2 B3
106306	MEMO	CHRIS SHOEMAKER TO POINDEXTER THRY RICHARD BOVERIE RE TRIP REPORT R 11/23/2011 M338/1	1	6/14/1982	B1
106307	MEMO	RE TRIP REPORT (ATTACHMENT TO 106306) PAR 9/9/2013 M338/1	2	6/7/1982	B1
106308	REPORT	RE TRIP (ATTACHMENT TO 106306) PAR 2/19/2016 M10-338/1	12	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
106310	PAPER	RE LESSONS R 7/20/2011 M338/1	17	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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106303

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7730 DTG:122225Z APR 82 PSN: 036572
SIT483 DATE 06/08/82 TOR: 103/0410Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF HKY VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #7730 1022306
P 122225Z APR 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 4496

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 097730
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 4/8/88 (MEADE, FRAZIER)
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, RP
SUBJECT: LETTER ON TERRORISM

REF: MANILA 13772

1. ~~IC~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. APPARENTLY AS PART OF EFFORT TO DISCREDIT GRAND JURY INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF U.S. LAW IN CONNECTION WITH PHILIPPINE TERRORISM, PHILIPPINE OPPOSITIONISTS IN CALIFORNIA HAVE ALLEGED THAT THEY ARE VICTIMS OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN PRESIDENT MARCOS AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. THEY CITE AS EVIDENCE AN ALLEGED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARCOS CARRIED BY SECRETARY HAIG DURING HIS JUNE 1981 VISIT TO MANILA. ACCORDING TO PHILIPPINE NEWS, THE OAKLAND TRIBUNE, EARLY THIS YEAR, CITING A WIRE SERVICE STORY, STATED THAT MARCOS, IN PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING VISIT HAD QUOTED FROM PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS FOLLOWING UP WITH THE FBI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE THE PROSECUTION OF TERRORISTS OPERATING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BASED IN THE UNITED STATES END QUOTE. WE EXPECT THAT OPPOSITIONISTS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MAY CONTINUE TO USE THIS LINE AND THAT AS GRAND JURY NEARS CONCLUSION OF ITS WORK AND/OR ISSUES INDICTMENTS WE MAY BE PRESSED HARDER THAN WE HAVE SO FAR BY MEDIA TO CONFIRM OR DENY EXISTENCE OF SUCH A LETTER.

3. IN FACT, ONLY LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO MARCOS THAT WE ARE AWARE OF IS ROUTINE PRESIDENTIAL CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE (STATE 159395). SECRETARY HAIG'S TALKING POINTS INCLUDED REFERENCE TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM, BUT NOT IN PARTISAN TERMS OF ALLEGED QUOTE NOR PRECISELY IN TERMS OF MANILA REFTEL.

4. IF PRESSED BY MEDIA, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY FIRST THAT SECRETARY HAIG HAD REITERATED TO PRESIDENT MARCOS WELL

KNOWN U.S. OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM BUT NOT IN PARTISAN TERMS OF ALLEGED QUOTE. IF PRESSED FURTHER ABOUT PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED LETTER, WE WOULD SAY THE SUBJECT WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE LETTER.

5. BEFORE FINALIZING GUIDANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD APPRECIATE A) YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCOS'S PRESS CONFERENCE - SEE REFTEL; B) YOUR COMMENT AS TO HOW BEST TO ANSWER QUERY WITHOUT EMBARRASSING MARCOS, ASSUMING MARCOS MAY HAVE SAID SOMETHING ALONG LINES INDICATED. STOESSEL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M16-338 #106303

BY RW NARA DATE 7/11/83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
McFarlane	
Poindexter	1
HICKEY	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

HICKEY'S COPY
SENT TO HIM
IN EUROPE.

C : Copy

O : Original

Rear Admiral John Poindexter
Military Assistant to the
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
White House Situation Room
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Phone: 456-2255

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency

106304

4




Washington, D. C. 20505

13526
E. O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3(b)(1),
3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral John Poindexter, USN
Military Assistant to the
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
White House Situation Room


FROM : [Redacted]
: Director of Global Issues
SUBJECT : Armenian Terrorist Threat to US Installations
[Redacted]

The attached memorandum is an assessment of the likelihood of retaliation by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia against US installations for the arrest on 30 May of three ASALA members in Los Angeles.



Attachment:
Armenian Terrorist Threat to
US Installations, [Redacted]
GI M 82-10124, dated 4 June 1982. [Redacted]

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NLRR M338/1 #106304
BY KML NARA DATE 4/10/13



[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

106305 5

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

13524
E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1),
3.5(c)

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NLRRM338/1#106305

BY KAL NARA DATE 4/10/13

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

4 June 1982

Armenian Terrorist Threat to US Installations

Introduction

We believe that a US installation, either in the United States or abroad, is likely to be targeted for bombing by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) during the next month. Three Armenians were arrested by the FBI in Los Angeles on 30 May for attempting to bomb an Air Canada freight terminal, and ASALA has a history of attacking installations of countries holding ASALA members to force their release. Such attacks usually occur soon after the arrest. The attack on Air Canada was almost certainly in retaliation for the arrest in late May of four ASALA members by Canadian authorities. ~~(S NF)~~

ASALA has demonstrated the capability to launch terrorist attacks in such major European cities as Paris, Geneva, Rome, and Athens. We believe an ASALA operation against US interests is more likely to occur in Europe than in the US because we believe it has more manpower and is better organized and supported in Europe. ASALA operations are characteristically well-planned, professionally executed, and operatives are rarely apprehended. ~~(S NF)~~

This memorandum was prepared for the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism by [Redacted] of the International Terrorism Branch, Office of Global Issues, Central Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated within the Intelligence and Operations Directorates of CIA. It contains information received by 2 June 1982. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, International Terrorism Branch at [Redacted]

[Redacted]

GI M 82-10124

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ASALA History and Tactics

ASALA began its campaign against Turkish targets in 1975 to avenge the alleged massacre of over a million Armenians by the Turkish government in 1915. ASALA's political orientation is Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialistic. We have no hard evidence of Soviet involvement with ASALA, but the group's pronouncements are pro-USSR. ~~(S NF)~~

Since its establishment, ASALA has been responsible for over 30 attacks on Turkish targets. Other countries have become targets when their security forces have arrested ASALA members for attacks on Turkish interests. Campaigns against non-Turkish targets have consisted largely of bombings carried out at night to minimize casualties. ~~(U)~~

The first campaign against non-Turkish targets began in October 1980, when two ASALA members were arrested in Geneva while building a bomb. Following that arrest, a group of ASALA members, which called itself the 3 October Organization for the day the two were arrested, began attacking Swiss government buildings, airline facilities, and tourist offices throughout Europe and in the Middle East. The ASALA members were given suspended sentences and expelled from Switzerland in Spring 1980.

~~(U)~~

[REDACTED]

During ASALA's campaign against Swiss interests, two attacks were carried out in the US.* In February 1981, an anonymous caller in Geneva claimed credit for the bombing of the Swiss consulate in Los Angeles in the name of Operation 3 (which was probably October 3). The caller mistakenly called before the bomb went off, allowing the police time to defuse it. In August 1981, a bombing of the Swiss Precision Instrument Company in Los Angeles was claimed by the 9 June Organization. ~~(U)~~

France became a target of an ASALA group called the Orly Organization after the arrest at Orly Airport of Monte Melkonian, an ASALA member carrying a false passport. ASALA carried out numerous bombings against French installations both in Europe and the Middle East until Melkonian was released about three weeks later. The French still hold four ASALA members involved in the seizure of the Turkish consulate in Paris last October, but contrary to its usual pattern, ASALA has not conducted a systematic campaign to gain their release. We have no information to explain why ASALA has not attempted a campaign to free them, but it is possible that a truce has been concluded with the French. ~~(S NF)~~

The Threat to US Targets

Although ASALA has attacked US installations in the past, it has refrained from targeting US personnel. In December 1979, ASALA attempted to force the US-backed Tolstoy Foundation to close down its facility in Rome that processes Armenians emigrating from the Soviet Union. A pension housing Armenian emigrants and a TWA office in Rome were subsequently bombed, and the foundation cut back its activities. While ASALA has stated at press conferences that it still opposes Armenian emigration from the USSR because it considers Soviet Armenians already liberated, no further attacks on the emigration center have occurred. ~~(U)~~

*These were the only attacks that ASALA has carried out in the United States. The Armenian group that has been the most active in the United States, especially in California, is the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. JCAG has only targetted Turkish diplomats and institutions, does not share ASALA's Marxist Leninist orientation, and is allied with the Tashnak party. ~~(S)~~

In December 1980, an ASALA group claimed credit for bombing a TWA office in Madrid, saying that American intelligence had been responsible for an earlier attack in Geneva on a lawyer who was defending some Armenians. A bombing on 5 February 1981 of the TWA office in Paris was also claimed by the same group. (U)

As long as the three Armenians captured in Los Angeles remain imprisoned, ASALA is likely to target US installations in an attempt to get them released. We do not expect an attack on US personnel, however. As US courts are unlikely to take ASALA threats into consideration in sentencing the terrorists, the prospect is for continued attempts against US targets until they are sentenced and the case is appealed. Attacks could continue after that in an attempt to free them from prison. (S NF)

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Collection Name

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File

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CAS 3/3/2011

File Folder

TERROISM (APRIL 1982-JUNE 1982)

FOIA

M10-338

GUNN

Box Number

111

7

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
106309	LIST OF ADDRESSES	3	ND	B1 B2 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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106306

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE *B*FROM: CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*

NOTED

SUBJECT: Trip Report

Noel Koch has written you (Tab I) forwarding his trip report on recent discussions in Europe with counter-terrorist officials. In Europe he found a grudging but growing acceptance of the seriousness of our counter-terrorism efforts. Our recent reorganization and establishment of the Terrorism Incident Working Group were both helpful in underscoring our seriousness of purpose. (Noel's commercial message for White House management of terrorism should not go unnoticed.)

The report then outlines the information-sharing problem. There is no regularized mechanism for multilateral circulation of terrorism information. Noel thinks that SHAPE is the appropriate forum for this. My own conversations with British counterparts leads me to support this, while recognizing that philosophical differences and divergencies in threat perception will limit multilateral cooperation.

Noel obviously takes his counter-terrorism role seriously, and his report indicates that we are beginning to make some progress in dealing with Europeans on this issue. The joint UK-US exercise planned for this Fall will be a major step forward in this regard.

cc: Oliver North

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum from Noel Koch and report

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Cl'd. by Dir., P&R, ISA
Review June 1, 1988

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NLRR MIB-338 #106306

BY RW NARA DATE 4-28-11 *RW*

11-98-11

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



RECEIVED

00 JUN 9 P 6: 48

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

07 JUN 1982

In reply refer to:
I-22609/82

4053¹³
106307

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Trip Report (U)

(U) During the period 22 April - 8 May 1982, I visited Europe to observe Exercise FLINTLOCK and discuss terrorism issues with embassy, EUCOM, SHAPE and host government officials in London, Stuttgart, Rome, Vienna, Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, Mons, and Paris. I was accompanied by COL McGovern and by LTC Bouton and Mr. Eastham, State, for that part of the trip beginning in Rome.

(S) The overriding objective of the trip was to explore the environment for, and to generate movement toward, US integration in multilateral European fora on terrorism. Although the US has good bilateral relations with most of our allies and our counterterrorist (CT) operational capabilities are recognized, US CT efforts are not taken seriously in European fora, principally because they perceive problems in the USG management framework. (The UK's willingness to participate in a CPX is evidence of increased confidence that we are getting our house in order.) Through discussions in each country and strong expressions of support for US integration, momentum toward achieving this objective has been established. The diplomatic aspect of such involvement is of negligible consequence, and was not a permanent concern. What is needed is our inclusion at working levels, through various agencies, in European "old boy" nets.

(S) Intelligence exchanges and reporting were briefly discussed at each post, but I did not dwell on these issues as they fall beyond my charter. The problem of circular reporting was addressed as was the need for a multilateral clearing house to resolve it within the NATO community. SHAPE staff officers indicated that the SHAPE counterintelligence office would be a logical candidate to provide control over this problem. SHAPE has initiated efforts to obtain increased reporting on terrorism threat information from its national representatives that would be releasable to the Alliance.

(S) Physical security was discussed and the need to find economical alternatives to the armored car option was emphasized. SHAPE is examining the possibility of establishing a vehicle fleet for

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Review on 1 June 1988

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/9/13

13524
E.O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3b(1)
3.5c

the high number of Headquarters flag officers that would consist of local cars that would blend in with the environment. There is a need to review NATO policy on personal protection, unchanged since 1955, which places the full burden of off-base security on host governments. I will initiate this review with OSD/ISP.

(S) I raised the need to obtain information on internal jurisdictional peculiarities in each country to improve our understanding of allied terrorism crisis management and internal organizational complexities that could adversely affect US assistance to national efforts in terrorist incidents. US officials indicated they would be providing this information.

(U) A report of my trip is enclosed for your information.



Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs

Attachment

Distribution:

- State (AMB Sayre)
- CIA [REDACTED]
- DOE (Mr. Wade)
- DOJ (Mr. Guiliani)
- FBI (Mr. Castanguay)
- Treasury (Mr. McBrien)
- DOT (Mr. Lally)
- NSC (RADM Poindexter) ←

13574
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b) (1) (5) (6)

~~SECRET~~

106308
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(3)

TRIP REPORT

(C) During the period 22 April-8 May 1982, Mr. [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED], and LTC [REDACTED] conducted visits to the UK, FRG, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and France to observe Exercise FLINTLOCK and conduct discussions with US and host government officials on terrorism matters (itinerary at enclosure 1). Mr. Eastham, State/M/CT was present during discussions held with US embassy officials and with host government officials in Rome, Vienna, the Hague, Brussels and Paris.

JCRX FLINTLOCK '82

(S) During USEUCOM's annual unconventional Warfare Joint-Combined Readiness Exercise FLINTLOCK '82 we observed planning and operational activities in England, West German, and Italy. The exercise includes twelve sub-exercises in ten European, Mid-East and African nations; elements of the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups, NAVSPWARGP II, 1st SOW and 7575 Special Operations Wing under control of Special Operations Task Force Europe. Some four thousand personnel participate annually during the April/May time frame. FLINTLOCK is the unconventional warfare counterpart to the autumn REFORGER exercises. We observed training at West Raynham (SOTFE Hqs), Schulthorpe (10th SFG and NAVSPWARGP II) and Weathersfield (7575th SOW) airbases in northeastern England, operational special forces teams in the Black Forest south of Stuttgart, FRG, and SF teams operating with the Italian 9th Parachute Assault Bn near Pisa, Italy.

(S) The exercise is an excellent opportunity to work with allied and friendly foreign countries to improve operational planning, deployment and employment techniques, and standardize procedures and support requirements. The extensive planning of SOTFE, coupled with EUCOM, CONUS, and host country coordination, produced realistic training and real-time interfaces between US Army, Navy, and Air Force components and host country military units. The exercise also provided a unique opportunity for employment of special forces teams with ground based beacon guidance systems for both F-111 and B-52 air strikes. Consideration should be given to expanding this joint training to include special forces use of laser target designators for manned aircraft and possibly cruise missiles.

(S) Apart from the accidental death of a special forces team member during a STAR exercise, several issues were raised that need addressing. Overall special operations forces need improved state of the art communications. I understand that new equipment is being programmed, basically the AN/PRC 70 and 99 series radios.

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Review on 1 June 1988

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NLRR 1/338/1 #10300
BY CN NARA DATE 2/9/10

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However, there is some question that this is more 1960's or 70's vintage equipment rather than 1980's technology. As adjuncts to the basic radio family, satellite links, secure modes and high speed burst capability are necessities.

- (S) The C-130 Combat Talons and HH53 heavy helicopters used to transport SOF units and equipment are nearly twenty years old and badly in need of replacement. The outfitting of old aircraft with modern electronic and navigational aids to improve performance to the upper limits of the platform is incongruous. New SOF aircraft in greater numbers are required.

- (S) The Red Flag exercises at Nellis AFB provide a realistic enemy air environment. The Combat Talon crews, who must penetrate this environment on their own and return through it, should have participation in Red Flag exercises.

- (S) The Navy Seals, while participating with counterparts such as the French, should be allowed, in principle, to employ host country equipment, including underwater breathing apparatus, that is safe by reasonable international standards.

Headquarters USEUCOM

(S) The visit to EUCOM included an office call with General W. Y. Smith, USAF, the D/CINC and LTG Robert Haldane, the Chief of Staff; a visit to a custodial storage site secured by the host nation (FRG), and a half day at Heckler and Koch GMBH of Oberndorf, a leading high technology arms manufacturer.

(S) Both JCRX FLINTLOCK and the counterterrorism aspects of my European visit were discussed with General Smith. He is supportive of allocating more resources to combat terrorism in the EUCOM area of responsibility, particularly in enhancing personal protection against terrorist acts. His concern is manifest in the establishment of a new special assistant's office for security, physical security surveys conducted and programming underway to improve protection.

(S) At the Grossengstingen custodial storage site, which has been enhanced both through the NATO sponsored program and the initiative of the local German commander, we observed an alert exercise and viewed the internal and external security, which is impressive to somebody who doesn't know anything about it.

(S) The visit to Heckler and Koch GMBH, maker of the German Army family of NATO standard weapons and a wide array of special weaponry, was excellent. The H&K firm, a spin off from Mauser, is a young, high quality, advanced technology firm that manufactures weapons by

~~SECRET~~

families with 60% interchangeability of barrels for both NATO 7.62 mm and 5.56 mm. They provide all the small arms for the German Bundeswehr. Of particular interest were their outstanding products in the special weapons field including those for counterterrorist forces, snipers, security forces and new revolutionary technology. An opportunity was provided to fire weapons of interest at their firing range after the factory tour.

London

(S) My visit to London included talks with Embassy USDAO representatives, Mr. J. S. Pilling of the Home Office and responsible for counterterrorism and a briefing by Control Risks Ltd, a London based firm active in kidnap negotiations. The discussion with Joe Pilling, whom I had met previously on Exercise QUILL PEN, was cordial, frank, and productive. I explained my concern for better multilateral intelligence exchange on international terrorism matters and satisfaction with the operational coordination between [REDACTED]. Both of us agreed that our bilateral cooperation was excellent. He allowed that improvements in intelligence exchange could be made but considered the TREVI Group to be a good forum for that purpose - TREVI Group being a "club" of European Community Interior ministers which meet for informal exchanges of views, information, and methods to resolve issues in an "old boy" setting. In closing, Pilling agreed that the UK could support US participation in the TREVI Group either as an observer at the ministerial level or on a subcommittee of experts formed for intelligence exchange.

(S) The visit to Control Risks Ltd was useful because of their unique role in international hostage negotiations and kidnappings. The firm, representing multinational corporations, has been directly involved in over 60 incidents of kidnapping, hostage-taking and ransom. With this extensive experience, they specialize in advising international business leadership on crisis management during terrorist incidents or extortion. Their singular experience may be valuable to us in the planning and preparation for future terrorist acts against US personnel or interests abroad.

ITALY

(S) On 28 April, we met with AMB Raab and embassy personnel including ARMA, RSO, and representatives from the Political Section, [REDACTED] FBI, OSI, and, later, with CDR, 650th MI Group, SHAPE. As with all my subsequent visits with US embassy officials, I stated that my visit was to provide for an exchange of views on terrorism issues, with particular concern with USG management of terrorist incidents, the level of intelligence exchange existent and the need for US involvement in multilateral European fora that address terrorism. During the course of our discussions, the principal substantive views expressed were:

- Dozier kidnapping.

-- From Embassy perspective, USG approach was disorganized (AMB). There is a need to clarify the command and control relationships between the Ambassador and military elements that are involved with a terrorist incident (Pol Counselor). Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the command/control issue was being addressed in Washington.

-- State communications are inadequate and, without [REDACTED] the Embassy's management of the Dozier case would have been extremely difficult. It is vital to resolve the issue over provision of [REDACTED]. It was suggested that a TAC-SAT system could be pre-positioned in State's operations center under control of the military representative (Pol. Counselor).

- US participation in multilateral European fora.

-- There was agreement that such participation should be sought, but also recognition that it would be politically difficult to achieve.



- US awards for Italians who rescued Dozier.

-- In response to our query on the state of play concerning this issue, AMB Raab indicated that he would recommend to State that the President announce the awarding of DoD awards to those Italians involved in Dozier's rescue during a short ceremony at the Italian Presidential Palace in June. SecDef has approved the award of the SecDef Outstanding Public Service Medal to the Italians who participated directly in Dozier's rescue and they are being provided to the embassy for the June ceremony.

(S) A meeting with COL Fletcher, CO, 650th MI Group, SHAPE, was held in Rome due to his availability there while visiting the area.

Discussions with COL Fletcher focused principally on protection of US military personnel assigned to NATO HQs and the problem of circular intelligence reporting. COL Fletcher informed us that:

- Allies have been requested by SHAPE to provide more intelligence assessments of the terrorist threat that can be distributed within the Alliance. The US should take the lead in this to stimulate allies to provide more data. Caveats on intelligence must be reduced in order to permit wide dissemination of threat assessments, particularly to the host governments who are responsible for security of NATO personnel off NATO installations. Originator of intelligence reports should determine what information is releasable to NATO.

- The problem of circular reporting can be minimized by establishing a central coordinating center for intelligence on terrorism.

- When the threat data is general in nature, the host nation will not normally be able to apply stringent protective measures to all potential targets, thus requiring the sending nation to provide for such protective measures to the extent deemed necessary.

- SHAPE is providing defensive driving training in Belgium and other major command locations.

- To respond to specific threats directed at NATO personnel or facilities, NATO should develop a contingency protection package that could be provided in response to those threats.

- It is important to create understanding that living in an area where a general threat exists requires general security precautions and increased awareness and care, but not individual protection, except where the visibility of key personnel dictates. There is no need for each flag officer to have an armored car. Authorization of personal weapons is not recommended.

- The security surveys for key personnel need to be standardized with DoD/DIA insuring the Army and Navy do for their key personnel what Air Force is doing for its key personnel.

(S) On 29 April, we met with the Chief of Staff of the Carabinieri, MG Desena and his designated replacement, BG Richero, and representatives of SISME and SISDE. MG Desena expressed his satisfaction with existing liaison between his organization and the US Embassy and DoD. To continue improvement of operational working relationships, he wants to send three to five specialists to exchange information [REDACTED]

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(S) Meetings with SISME and SISDE representatives included threat assessment briefings, [REDACTED]

AUSTRIA

(S) On 30 April, we met with the Charge, RSO, ARMA, [REDACTED] at the embassy and Dr. Eggers, Ministry of Interior Terrorism Referant. Information provided during these discussions included:

- No indigenous terrorist threat exists, but, due to the cosmopolitan character of Vienna and its position as a crossroads between East and West and between Europe and the Middle East, the transiting of Austria by international terrorists creates a potential threat to US interests. GOA is highly supportive in providing protective services requested by the Embassy.

- Despite excellent Austrian cooperation with US concerning the possibility that Dozier had been abducted to Austria, cooperation between Italy and Austria during the Dozier case and in general on terrorism matters is poor.

- Charge expressed the view that USG was disorganized in its approach to terrorism.

- Austria has a very small intelligence capability. Its neutrality limits the degree to which bilateral cooperation on operational CT matters can be achieved.

- The Austria Interior representative expressed his belief that the recent [REDACTED]

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GERMANY

(S) On 3 May, we met with BG Wegener, Bundes Grenz Schutz-West, followed by briefings and a tour at GSG-9. General Wegener expressed the following views:

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
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(S) Our tour of GSG-9 produced no surprises inasmuch as we spent a half day with Heckler and Koch earlier examining and firing their inventory. Items of particular interest displayed by GSG-9 were two-man silenced ladders and stabilizing binoculars.

NETHERLANDS

(S) On 4 May, we met with the DCM, DATT, RSO, ODC and  representative and with Dutch representatives of the justice,

intelligence, and security agencies having responsibility for CT in their respective agencies. We received briefings from the Dutch representatives on their command and control arrangements as well as interworkings with their neighbors. Our discussions included:

- Minister of Justice is responsible for anti-terrorism and chairs the national crisis center whenever national police or the Royal Marine CT unit is employed. When terrorist incidents at the local level occur, a plan to counter them is made locally and submitted to national authorities for approval.

- In discussions on need for US to become part of the multi-lateral European exchanges that occur on terrorism, the Dutch raised the TREVI Group as a possibility but indicated that it would be difficult to achieve. They agree that the US must be integrated into European CT efforts either through a TREVI Subgroup or some new configuration involving the same players.

- Throughout lunch at the DCM's, Commissioner Platenkamp, the Dutch Justice representative, cited examples of the rapidity, efficiency and efficacy of the European old-boy CT net.

- Europeans are confused by our process for dealing with terrorism and are unconvinced of our ultimate seriousness. Implicit was a concern that broad, fuzzy definitions of terrorism, linked with such US involvement as El Salvador, which totally troubles them, may make real cooperation politically impossible.

BELGIUM

(S) On 5 May, we met with US Mission NATO officials and [REDACTED] chairman of NATO's Security Committee, the Charge and others in the US Embassy, Brussels, and General Lawson and members of his staff at SHAPE.

(S) During discussions at NATO, views on the following issues were expressed:

- NATO policy is that security is a host government responsibility for NATO personnel off NATO installations. NATO funding is adequate for installation security. If the host government assesses the threat as serious enough, it must provide adequate protection, including armored cars. Quarters security is a national responsibility.

- At a recent TREVI Group meeting, US participation was addressed and rejected. However, the US could be provided information on the Group meetings by the rotating Group President.

- USG policy on relations with European allies on terrorism must be fully integrated among all relevant agencies before making a major initiative to obtain US participation in European fora because the Europeans will note any splits among US agencies, which would increase the difficulty of integrating the US in European activities.

- US Mission has initiated a program to lease non-US produced cars as a means of reducing the visibility of key personnel during movement. This is based on view that anonymity provides protection for personnel below the highest level.

- There is a need to keep the US Mission NATO informed on US efforts to enhance protection of its personnel in Europe. It appears that all three military Services are developing their own personnel protection programs, while a unified approach would be better. The establishment of a central focal point at EUCOM to coordinate EUCOM-wide anti-terrorism efforts are applauded.

(C) During our visit with the US Embassy Brussels it was suggested that the collection of jurisdictional information for each European country should be accomplished by circulating a standard list of questions to each Mission. This will be done through DIA.

(S) Discussions at SHAPE were focused on the efforts of the HQs Task force, chaired by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to enhance protection for NATO-assigned personnel and the problems the Task Force is dealing with. Of particular interest is the following:

- NATO policy that the host government is responsible for protective security off the installation was established in 1955 and should be reviewed and changed to reflect the current situation. Until this policy is changed, SHAPE is unable to take positive action requiring NATO funding to enhance security of personnel off the installation. Presently, with the brunt of responsibility on host governments, there may be pressure on some hosts (e.g., FRG, Italy, Belgium) to estimate the terrorist threat in a manner that would reduce protective security requirements on their over-taxed resources.

- SHAPE has requested NATO to review this policy but no action has been taken. For this policy to be reviewed substantively, it will require one or more member nations to raise the policy issue. It was suggested that the US raise the policy issue in NATO since most European allies would be reluctant to do so because they are host governments and would not want to appear self-serving in trying to reduce their responsibility.

- The SHAPE Task Force has instituted a General Officer-drive link and devised simple recognition signals between them, expanded the patrol areas of SHAPE security personnel off-base in coordination with the Belgium police, established family quarters security criteria that must be considered before private quarters are approved for lease, established liaison with EUCOM's focal point for terrorism, and have reviewed and improved the awareness program for assigned personnel and their families.

- The problem of circular intelligence reporting is recognized and efforts to resolve it under study. The Counterintelligence Branch in SHAPE HQs is the logical focal point within SHAPE to control such reporting. The existing SHAPE system for receiving national intelligence inputs has been stimulated by SHAPE requests for monthly summaries of terrorist activity and situation reports as appropriate. The US must meet its reporting responsibilities in this regard, including maximizing the information that can be released to NATO. The originator of intelligence reports should make such a determination when he initially distributes his report.

- SHAPE is examining long term solutions to the vehicle issue regarding protective security. It is recognized that not every senior officer should have armored cars available. One solution may be to acquire over time a vehicle fleet of local cars, thus complicating the terrorist targeting problem.

FRANCE

(S) On 6-7 May we met with embassy officials, including the Ambassador, and attended briefings and demonstrations by GIGN, the French CT element. Discussions with embassy officials included the following:

- The embassy effort to coordinate terrorist issues internally and with the GOF is not well integrated despite a tough personal stance by the AMB. A substantive embassy officer should be the terrorism coordinator instead of the Admin Officer. (Pol. Section).

- Although the GOF has expressed its intention to adopt tough measures to combat terrorism, largely due to the recent series of terrorist acts directed at French citizens in and outside of France and the willingness of the political opposition to use GOF policy on terrorism to attack the government, it is uncertain how long this tough stance will be sustained. Moreover, the GOF cannot be expected to change the traditional liberal French policy on political asylum.

- French policy of opposing US participation in multilateral European fora is unlikely to change, nor is its policy on opposing

international discussions on terrorism which are perceived as infringing on French policy of political asylum.

- GOF is angry that the US has been unwilling to take action against Syria, which is thought to be behind much of the recent terrorist activity against the French. This attitude will undercut our effort to persuade the French to act against the Libyans for their support for international terrorism.

- Although the French are trying to prevent a repetition of the Chapman and Ray incidents, it is quite possible that such incidents will be repeated. The French are poorly equipped to deter terrorism. Their police methods are antiquated, have little computer support, movement in and out of France is easy, and a much greater resource commitment is necessary. The US should continue to pressure the French on terrorism but, at the same time, offer assistance in modern hardware even though the French may refuse it (Pol-Mil Officer).

- The TREVI Group is an EEC "club" where no policy decisions are taken. A better level for US participation may be in expert working groups set up under the TREVI or other EEC groups. US experts could initially be invited as observers [REDACTED]

- From an intelligence viewpoint, bilateral relations are much better, as multilateral exchanges are watered down.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] supports obtaining authorization for payment of rewards for information on terrorism. He had previously recommended such authorization be obtained. He indicated that a provision for resettlement in the US should be included.

- The Curriel Net does not appear to be re-emerging as earlier reporting had indicated.

- The RSO indicated that the French response to embassy requests for protective security has been excellent, much better than to requests from other embassies. Civilian license plates have been provided for use by embassy personnel designated as requiring protection (53), and additional civilian plates have been requested.

- Assistant ARMA stated that the DAO has requested hand-held radios from DIA and the request is currently under review.

(S) During the briefing by GIGN, it was emphasized that they operate under a policy of [REDACTED]. As GIGN has been actively engaged in over 300 hostage situations, resolved three highjacking and operated against over 50 deranged individuals, they have found that lethal force is frequently not required. Additional items of interest are:

[REDACTED]

- During our visit to GIGN, we observed and were informed that six personnel from the Lebanese Armed Forces were undergoing six weeks of training with GIGN, during which they would be exposed to most, if not all, of the operational aspects of the force. This training had been directed by the political leadership in the Government. We also learned that GIGN has provided training assistance to [REDACTED]

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CW 5/3/11

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TERRORISM

SUBJECT: TRIP REPORT RE OBSERVATION OF EXERCISE FLINTLOCK

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 11 JUN 82 STATUS S FILES

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KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

MILITARY EXERCISES

SUBJECT: DOE RPT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXERCISE RISING STAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES

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Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585

JUN 30 1982

Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

Enclosed please find the executive summary of Lessons Learned - Exercise Rising Star. The summary is in two parts: Part I deals with interagency lessons learned; Part II documents major findings regarding the exercise process.

The enclosure represents a compilation of inputs from all participating agencies, assembled by the Rising Star working group.

I would appreciate your review and concurrence in the Summary, by COB July 9. After receiving and integrating any additional comments, the Summary will be officially transmitted to the IG/T.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Troy E. Wade II
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Defense Programs

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