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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Cable  
File: Records, 1982-1985  
**Folder Title:** Grenada Cables [October 25, 1983] (8)  
**Box:** 42

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Cable File  
**OA/Box:** Box 90784  
**File Folder:** Grenada Cables [October 25, 1983] (8)

**Archivist:** loj/loj  
**FOIA ID:** F94-066/4 Williams  
**Date:** 10/06/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<u>ENTIRE FOLDER</u>			
<del>1. cable</del>	<del>Caracas 09295, 2p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 #348	2202	
2. cable	Bridgetown 06654, 14p	10/25/83	P1/F1
	PART. #349	2203	
3. cable	5340, 2p	10/25/83	<del>P1/F1</del> B1, B3
	D 4/18/05 F94-066/4 # 350	2215	
4. cable	2011, 1p	10/25/83	<del>P1/F1</del> B1, B3
	D 4/18/05 F94-066/4 # 351	2216	
<del>5. cable</del>	<del>Kingston 10472, 1p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 # 352	2222	
<del>6. cable</del>	<del>Port of Spain 03274, 2p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	#353	2228	
7. cable	6943, 2p	10/25/83	<del>P1/F1</del> B1, B3
	D 4/18/05 F94-066/4 # 354	2235	
<del>8. cable</del>	<del>State 304731, 1p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 #355	2241	
9. cable	7584, 2p	10/25/83	P1/F1, B3
	D 4/18/01 F94-066/4 # 356	2245	
<del>10. cable</del>	<del>09300, 3p CARACAS 09300 3p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 #357	2246	
11. cable	2257, 2p	10/25/83	<del>P1/F1</del> B1, B3
	D 4/18/05 F94-066/4 # 358	2247	
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>San Salvador 09841, 1p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 #359	2248	
13. cable	7648, 2p	10/25/83	P1/F1, B3
	D 4/18/01 F94-066/4 # 360	2253	
<del>14. cable</del>	<del>Caracas 09301, 2p</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 4/26/02 F94-066/4 #361	2255	

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 13

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE490  
STU8234  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHCV #9295 2982202  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 252202Z OCT 83  
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7928  
INFO RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7000  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 5755  
RUEOHA/USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN//  
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CARACAS 09295  
PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINS, ASEC, VE  
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA ANNOUNCES ALERT STATUS

1. (U) DURING AFTERNOON OCTOBER 24 VENEZUELA RADIO CARRIED ANNOUNCEMENT OF MINISTER OF INTERIOR LUCIANO VALERO THAT "VENEZUELA'S FRONTIERS WERE IN ALERT STATUS" AND THAT "SECURITY MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN."
2. (C) DIRECTOR OF VENEZUELA'S POLITICAL POLICE (DISIP), ARPAD BANGO, TOLD EMBOFF SUBSEQUENTLY THAT GOV HAD ESTABLISHED ALERT BECAUSE IT BELIEVED US-OECS ACTION AGAINST GRENADA MIGHT RESULT IN POSSIBLE LEFTIST DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER REACTIONS IN VENEZUELA. BANGO SAID ALERT WOULD INVOLVE INCREASING PATROLS AND BEEFING UP SECURITY AT SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS.
3. (C) IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT EMBASSY WAS APPROACHED BY NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER THIS AFTERNOON INFORMING US THAT GUARD INTENDED TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF THE DETACHMENT ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. OFFICER ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT NATIONAL GUARD BE STATIONED AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE TO SUPPLEMENT METROPOLITAN POLICE REGULARLY ON DUTY THERE.
4. (C) COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS NO INTELLIGENCE INDICATING THAT LEFTIST ELEMENTS HAVE PLANNED ANY ACTIONS HERE AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA. WE WOULD BE SURPRISED, HOWEVER, IF IN THE DAYS AHEAD WE ARE NOT THE TARGET OF DEMONSTRATORS. LANDAU

BT  
#9295  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLS F94-066/4 #348

BY CJS, NARA, DATE 4/26/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 14

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: GRENADA  
 SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE564  
 STU8281  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHWN #6654/01 2982214  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
 O 252203Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7112  
 BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BRIDGETOWN 06654  
 NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THE WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GJ

SUBJECT: UNCLEARED, INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING  
 BETWEEN AMBASSADORS BISH AND MCNEIL WITH WEST INDIAN  
 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS GRENADA SITUATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADORS BISH AND MCNEIL AND GENERAL CRIST, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS GILLESPIE AND DCM FLOWER, MET IN GOB CABINET ROOM WITH ADAMS, CHARLES AND SEAGA, OCCASIONALLY JOINED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS TULL AND GALLEMORE, FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES, FROM 6:30 TO 9:15 SUNDAY EVENING. THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL MINUTES HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR MCNEIL.
3. AMBASSADOR BISH OPENED THE SESSION BY EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT BROUGHT MCNEIL AND CRIST TO BARBADOS. AMB. MCNEIL INFORMED THE WEST INDIANS THAT HE WAS THE PRESIDENT'S EMISSARY, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SECRETARY SCHULTZ. HE WOULD REPORT HIS CONVERSATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. MCNEIL TOLD THE WEST INDIANS THAT THE U.S. HAD THEIR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. HE STRESSED THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN YET. HE WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE, TOO, THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR A MILITARY INTERVENTION IN GRENADA MUST BE AT THE REQUEST OF THE OECS AND THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD. THE U.S. MIGHT BE WILLING TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE. MCNEIL SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE OECS PROPOSAL IN DETAIL ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. BECAUSE MILITARY ADVANCE PLANNING WAS A NECESSARY PERQUISITE TO ANY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION, GENERAL CRIST WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS WITH LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, ALSO ON A

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 NLS 794-0166/4 #349  
 By CAJ NARA, Date 4/26/02

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CONTINGENCY BASIS. MCNEIL TOLD THE WEST INDIANS THAT THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS WAS THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES. BARBADOS PRIME MINISTER ADAMS ASKED IF MCNEIL MEANT THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WERE EXCLUDED AS A U.S. OBJECTIVE. THAT IS, HE ASKED IF THE RESTORATION OF GRENADA TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT COULD BE A LEGITIMATE U.S. GOAL. AMB. MCNEIL SAID THAT WE MIGHT BE SUPPORTIVE OF SUCH A POLICY OBJECTIVE BUT ONLY IF SET BY LOCAL INITIATIVE AND FULLY SUPPORTED AT THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL. ADAMS ASKED HOW AN OFFER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL (RMC) OF SAFE PASSAGE FOR ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS WOULD AFFECT OUR DECISION. HE WONDERED IF THIS WOULD DIMINISH OUR ENTHUSIASM FOR HELPING THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO SET THINGS RIGHT ON GRENADA. MCNEIL RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT WHILE OUR CITIZEN INTERESTS WERE PARAMOUNT, WE WERE, NEVERTHELESS, AS CONCERNED AS EVERYONE ELSE ABOUT EVENTS ON GRENADA AND HOW TO END THE TERROR AND RESTORE THE RULE OF LAW BUT THAT IN THIS CAPACITY, THE EC WOULD HAVE TO LEAD THE WAY.

4. ADAMS, SEAGA AND CHARLES BRIEFED THE AMBASSADORS ON THE RESULT OF THE CARICOM HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. ESSENTIALLY, CARICOM EXPELLED GRENADA AND THE ACT OF EXPULSION REQUIRES A NEW TREATY AND THE CREATION OF "CARICOM II." IN THIS, GUYANA, THE ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE AGAINST THE EXPULSION WILL DROP OUT OF THE ASSOCIATION. THE EXPULSION WAS EMBODIED IN SOMETHING SEAGA TERMED "THE PROTOCOL OF PORT OF SPAIN."

5. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S.  
ADAMS TURNED THE CONVERSATION BACK TO THE QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE BY OBSERVING THAT APPARENTLY THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL WAY IN WHICH TO REQUEST U.S. ASSISTANCE HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY EITHER THE U.S. OR THE OECS. ADAMS SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN GRAPPLING WITH THE PROBLEM ALL AFTERNOON AND, IN FACT, HAD PRODUCED AN INITIAL DRAFT LETTER BUT THAT JAMAICA PRIME MINISTER SEAGA HAD PROBLEMS WITH SOME OF THE CONTENT. ADAMS SAID FOR HIS PART, BARBADOS WOULD HAPPILY GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER LANGUAGE AND CONTENT MET THE NEEDS OF OECS AND WOULD BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES. ADAMS INVITED SEAGA TO AIR HIS MISGIVINGS.

6. SEAGA POINTED OUT THAT A U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD QUICKLY RAISE THE HACKLES OF THE WORLD LEFTIST MOVEMENT. THEREFORE, THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION MUST BE PUT FORWARD. IN SEAGA'S VIEW, THE MAIN THRUST OF SUCH A JUSTIFICATION WOULD BE FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. WE SHOULD DRAW WORLD ATTENTION TO THE FACT

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THE OVERTHROW OF BISHOP WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY FORCES, HOSTILE TO THE VALUES OF THE CARIBBEAN AND COMING FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION (READ RUSSIANS AND CUBANS). IN HIS CONCEPTUALIZATION, THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS TOOK OVER GRENADA IN ORDER TO NOW HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE ISLAND AS A PLATFORM TO PROJECT THEIR POWER INTO THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH THE MILITARY USE OF THE NEW POINT SALINES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

BT

#6654

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SITUATION: GRENADA  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
 MESSAGE:

HCE565  
 STU8298  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHWN #6654/02 2982223  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
 O 252203Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7113  
 BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BRIDGETOWN 06654

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THE WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GJ

SUBJECT: UNCLEARED, INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING

7. FOR ADAMS, THE QUESTION WAS NOT QUITE SO BLUNT. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT DOUBT THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA BUT THAT THE BARBADIANS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PUT THEIR FINGER ON THE PRECISE ROLE IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ASSASSINATION OF BISHOP AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CIVILIZED SOCIETY ON GRENADA. BESIDES, ADAMS BELIEVES THAT THE CHARTER OF THE OECS PROVIDES ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR AN INTERVENTION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE LETTER OF REQUEST TO THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO MEET THE SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING PROMINENT MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, A MAJOR U.S. CONCERN. SEAGA INTERJECTED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WAS PALPABLE.

8. VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS AS TO COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WERE OFFERED INCLUDING ANOTHER DRAFT. ADAMS DEPUTIZED FOREIGN MINISTER TULL TO CHAIR A DRAFTING COMMITTEE ON THE SPOT AND TO PREPARE ANOTHER DRAFT FOR CONSIDERATION. THE MEETING TEMPORARILY MOVED ON TO OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

9. AMB. MCNEIL ASKED THE WEST INDIANS IF THE GRENADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL, PAUL SCOON, WOULD BE A LIKELY PERSON UNDER WHOSE AUSPICES AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE ESTABLISHED. THEY AGREED THAT SO FAR AS THEY KNEW, HE WOULD BE. ADAMS, HOWEVER, SAID THAT THE APPROACH TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL MIGHT BEST BE MADE THROUGH THE BRITISH. MCNEIL OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. HAD ALREADY BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THIS COURSE WITH THE BRITISH. IT WAS AGREED THAT ADAMS WOULD APPROACH THE BRITS IN THIS REGARD. NOTE: ADAMS DID SO AND SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED THE DCM EARLY OCT. 24 MORNING TO REPORT THAT THE BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER



SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DAVID MCNTGOMERY HAD SPOKEN WITH SCOON, WHO TOLD HIM THAT THE ONLY REASON HE HAD NOT CALLED FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION ALREADY WAS THAT IF HE DID, HE WOULD BE LIQUIDATED. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FURTHER ADDED HE WOULD FULLY CO-OPERATE IN AN INTERVENTION AND WOULD DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO FORM AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AFTERWARDS. 10. SEAGA TURNED THE SUBJECT AGAIN TO THE DRAFT OECS LETTER TO THE U.S. HE SAID THE DRAFT PROPOSED BY MCNEIL SEEMED TO REST MOSTLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE VACUUM OF AUTHORITY. HE FELT THAT THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL FORCES BEING PRESENT ON GRENADA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS USE AS A STAGING PLATFORM FOR AGGRESSION IN THE REGION WERE THE STRONGER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENTION.

MCNEIL

SAID THAT AT THE MOMENT IT SEEMED AS THOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE MORE INVOLVED WITH THE CURRENT REGIME ON GRENADA BUT THAT THE CUBANS CERTAINLY WANTED TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES ON THE ISLAND. ADAMS CHIMED IN BY SAYING THAT IT WAS VERY HARD TO ESTIMATE THE TRUE EXTENT OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT ON GRENADA. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE MIXED UP IN IT, BUT HE HAD NO HARD EVIDENCE. HE SAW, HOWEVER, A TYPICAL SOVIET FOOTPRINT IN THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE FACTIONS OF THE PRG HAD NOW COME APART IN VIOLENT IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE. HE SAW THIS AS A TYPICAL RUSSIAN TACTIC FOR DESTABILIZATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CUBANS MIGHT BE AS SHOCKED AS OTHERS BY THE BRUTALITY OF THE VIOLENT SCHISM NOW APPARENT IN THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT. SEAGA AGAIN SAID THAT JUST THIS KIND OF EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT MADE OECS INTERVENTION ALL THE MORE CREDIBLE, AND FURTHER, THAT IT LEFT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS THE ONLY POINT OF LEGITIMACY. ADAMS OFFERED THE THOUGHT THAT THE LETTER'S VALIDITY WOULD REST ON THE CHARTER, WHOSE LANGUAGE SHOULD BE QUOTED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, I.G., ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 4. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE BY MEMBER COUNTRIES IN THE INTEREST OF THEIR COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

11. MCNEIL OBSERVED THAT IF NOTHING ELSE, IT COULD BE SAID THAT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE ON GRENADA PROVIDED THE AMBIANCE EVEN IF NOT THE SPARK FOR THE VIOLENCE AND COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY. MCNEIL WENT ON TO SAY HE DID NOT NEED TO TAKE BACK THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE LETTER TO THE U.S. A GOOD START WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR THE MOMENT, WITH THE FINAL LETTER TO FOLLOW AS SOON AS  
BT

#6654

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SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE566  
STU8309  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHWN #6654/03 2982232  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 252203Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7114  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BRIDGETOWN 06654  
NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THE WHITE HOUSE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GJ

SUBJECT: UNCLEARED, INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING  
AGREEMENT ON THE LANGUAGE COULD BE REACHED AMONG THE  
PARTIES. MCNEIL SAID, TOO, THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND  
IF THE OECs COUNTRIES WOULD PREFER NOT TO SUBMIT THE  
FINAL LETTER UNTIL THEY KNEW BEFOREHAND THAT THE  
PRESIDENT'S DECISION WOULD BE AFFIRMATIVE.  
12. COMING BACK TO THE SUBJECT OF GRENADA AS A THREAT  
TO THE EC, ADAMS REMINDED THE GROUP THAT TWICE SINCE  
THE PRG ASSUMED POWER, GRENADA HAD CARRIED OUT OVERT  
AGGRESSION AGAINST ST. VINCENT. HE ALLUDED TO THE  
UNION ISLAND UPRISING IN 1981 AND MORE RECENTLY TO  
AN ARMED FRA INCURSION ONTO ST. VINCENT'S TERRITORY  
(A GRENEDINE ISLAND) IN SEARCH OF ESCAPEES FROM GRENADA.  
IN A LECTURING TONE, ADAMS SAID THAT WE ALL (REFERRING  
TO EC LEADERS) KNEW WHAT BISHOP WAS ALL ABOUT FROM THE  
VERY BEGINNING. HE SAID THAT WE KNEW THAT THE IN-  
STABILITY INTRODUCED INTO OUR SPHERE OF SMALL PARLIA-  
MENTARY DEMOCRACIES BY BISHOP'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKE-  
OVER WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO WHERE WE ARE TODAY. TO  
DATE, GRENADA'S ONLY REAL DEFENDERS IN THE REGION HAVE  
BEEN GUYANA AND OCCASIONALLY THE SMALLEST, MOST VULNERABLE  
STATES WHO FEARED FOR THEIR CONTINUED EXISTENCE. ADAMS  
SAID THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BE OVER-ESTIMATING THE ADVERSE  
PUBLIC REACTION TO INVOLVEMENT IN AN INTERVENTION.  
MCNEIL SAID THAT HE WOULD PUSH FOR A QUICK DECISION BY  
THE PRESIDENT.  
13. SEAGA AGAIN RETURNED TO HIS NEED FOR THE STRONGEST  
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION IN ORDER TO SELL JAMAICA'S  
PARTICIPATION AT HOME. HE SAID THAT THE JAMAICAN CON-  
TINGENT, PERHAPS SMALL BY COMPARISON TO THE FORCES THAT

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MIGHT BE USED BY THE U.S., WAS NEVERTHELESS LARGE IN CARIBBEAN TERMS. IF JAMAICA WERE TO SEND 150 SOLDIERS AND 30 WERE TO BE KILLED, A JUSTIFICATION IN ABSTRACT POLITICAL TERMS ("VACUUM OF AUTHORITY") WOULD BE INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO THE JAMAICAN MASSES. AMB. MCNEIL SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SEAGA'S POINT: HE SAID THAT IT DIDN'T SEEM TO MAKE SENSE FOR AN OPERATIONAL COMMANDER TO EXPOSE THE INEXPERIENCED REGIONAL FORCES TO THE SAME RISKS AS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED AMERICAN TROOPS. GEN. CRIST SAID THAT IN AN INTERVENTION SUCH AS THE ONE BEING CONTEMPLATED, OVERWHELMING FORCE WOULD BE CALLED FOR IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE RESISTANCE. SEAGA ASKED RHETORICALLY, "WHO'S GOING TO STAY ON AFTER THE INITIAL INVASION?" ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION: HE SAID THE CARIBBEAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY, AND THIS COULD BECOME DIFFICULT WITH THE GUERRILLAS IN THE HILLS AND OTHER NASTY AFTER EFFECTS. AGAIN, HE SAID, HE NEEDED A TOUGH, BELIEVABLE JUSTIFICATION LIKE FOREIGN INTERVENTION TO MAKE HIS CASE AT HOME.

14. CHANGING THE SUBJECT SOMEWHAT, SEAGA SAID THAT A VENEZUELAN TEAM HAD COME TO SEE HIM IN PORT OF SPAIN. THEY TOLD HIM THAT RESENTMENT ON GRENADA AGAINST THE CUBANS WAS RUNNING VERY HIGH AND THAT THE VENEZUELAN CHARGE HAD TAKEN TO FLYING HIS AUTOMOBILE FLAG IN ORDER TO HELP DISTINGUISH HIM FROM THE CUBANS. SEAGA SAID, TOO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN TOLD HIM THAT COARD'S CAR HAD BEEN SEEN DAILY AT PRA HEADQUARTERS, AND SO HE DIDN'T DOUBT THAT COARD WOULD EVENTUALLY REAPPEAR AS THE COMMUNIST PUPPET. ADAMS JOINED THIS TOPIC BY SAYING THAT THE ANTI-CUBAN SENTIMENT WAS CLEARLY STRONG AND PRO-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WAS GROWING QUICKLY. HE POINTED OUT THAT SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS FIRED ON BY THE PRA AT MARKET SQUARE HAD CARRIED PRO-AMERICAN PLACARDS, ONE SAYING "AMERICA, WE LOVE YOU." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A LARGE RESERVOIR OF UNDERLYING CULTURAL AFFINITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WEST INDIANS HAD LIVED AND WORKED THERE OR HAVE RELATIVES THERE. INDEED, IT WAS HARD TO TELL THE WEST INDIES APART FROM THE U.S. ADAMS SAID IT WAS HIS PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. IS SO USED TO DEALING WITH COUNTRIES WHERE THE U.S. IS UNPOPULAR, THAT IT MAY NOT KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS POPULAR, OR AT LEAST NOT UNPOPULAR.

15. TO FINALLY CLOSE THE SUBJECT, SEAGA SAID HE WOULD NEED A DRAFT LETTER TO TAKE TO HIS OWN CABINET TOMORROW AFTERNOON AND THAT IN THE MEANTIME HE AND ADAMS WOULD WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES, SETTLING THEM BEFORE HE LEFT.

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ADAMS REMANDED THE DRAFT TO THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE  
HEADED BY BARBADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOUIS TULL AND  
JAMAICAN FOREIGN MINISTER NEVILLE GALLIMORE AND INCLUDING  
SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF OF ALL GOB FOREIGN MINISTRY.  
16. THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO ELECTIONS. SEAGA SAID HE  
WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF SETTING A TIMETABLE FOR ELECTIONS.  
THERE WERE TOO MANY PROBLEMS ON GRENADA. TO DO IT

BT

#6654

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SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE567  
UTS3844  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHWN #6654/04 2982241  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 252203Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7115  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BRIDGETOWN 06654  
NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THE WHITE HOUSE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GJ  
SUBJECT: UNCLEARED, INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING  
RIGHT WOULD TAKE TIME. NOT TO DO IT RIGHT WOULD RISK  
A RETURN OF THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS. HE SAID NOW WAS  
THE OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD A DEMOCRACY FOR THE FUTURE.  
MISS CHARLES SAID SHE THOUGHT A VOTER LIST COULD BE  
COMPILED AND AN ELECTION HELD WITHIN THREE MONTHS.  
SEAGA DEMURRED, SAYING THERE WERE JUST TOO MANY  
OBSTACLES. AMB. MCNEIL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE UNITED  
STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
IN THIS AREA TO ASSURE AN EARLY AND FAIR ELECTION.  
ADAMS SAID THAT BARBADOS WOULD BE HAPPY TO HELP AS WELL,  
AND THAT THE BARBADOS ELECTION OFFICE WAS QUITE EX-  
PERIENCED IN THESE MATTERS, HAVING PARTICIPATED IN  
ELECTIONS IN UGANDA, ST. VINCENT, ST. LUCIA AND ZIMBABWE.  
17. ADAMS, TAKING UP SEAGA'S POINT ABOUT THE FOREIGNERS  
RETURNING, SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF THE NEW JEWEL MOVE-  
MENT REMAINDER AND THE CUBANS AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD  
REQUIRE A VERY CAREFUL ANALYSIS. HE WENT ON TO SAY  
THAT AN EARLY ELECTION WOULD BE DESIRABLE BECAUSE WHILE  
THE U.S. INTERVENTION ON GRENADA WOULD BE VERY POPULAR,  
HE DIDN'T WANT TO SEE THE PURITY OF THE MOTIVE COME TO  
BE QUESTIONED IN A LONG AND DRAWN-OUT INTERIM GOVERNMENT  
AND ELECTION PROCESS. AMB. MCNEIL SAID IT WOULD BE VERY  
IMPORTANT FOR THERE TO BE GOOD, EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL  
SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTION IN ORDER THAT ITS FAIRNESS  
COULD NOT BE LATER QUESTIONED. ADAMS AGREED AND SAID  
THAT GRENADA WOULD BE VOTED BACK INTO CARICOM AND THAT  
THAT ORGANIZATION COULD PROVIDE THE AUSPICES FOR SUPER-  
VISION. ADAMS ACCEPTED AMB. MCNEIL'S HYPOTHETICAL OFFER  
OF ASSISTANCE, OBSERVING THAT 3/4 OF A MILLION DOLLARS

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ASSURE A FAIR ELECTION WOULD BE WORTH IT. THE DISCUSSION MOVED ON TO A POSSIBLE TIMETABLE. IN THE END, ADAMS, CHARLES AND SEAGA ALL AGREED THAT SIX MONTHS WOULD BE ABOUT RIGHT.

[REDACTED]

19. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL RAISED THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD INTERVENTION TAKE PLACE. ADAMS SUGGESTED, THAT SHOULD IT COME TO FORMING SUCH A GOVERNMENT, THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WOULD BE THE ONLY REMAINING LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY AND A GOOD PROSPECT TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. SEAGA INTERJECTED THAT WHOEVER FORMED IT, WE (MEANING THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES) SHOULD HAVE A HAND IN IT. MCNEIL ASKED THE GROUP IF THEY HAD CONSIDERED ANY NAMES AS POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT FIGURES IN THE TRANSITION. ADAMS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF ANY GROUP EVENTUALLY CHOSEN SHOULD BE A STRONG ANTI-GAIRY BIAS AS WELL AS ANTI-BISHOP BIAS. MCNEIL SAID THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON THOSE SPECIFICALLY NOT TO BE SELECTED FOR A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

[REDACTED]

20. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE ACTION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. SEAGA IMMEDIATELY SEIZED THE IDEA AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE OAS TO ACT FIRST IN ORDER TO PREEMPT AN UNFAVORABLE RESOLUTION IN THE U.N. OFFERED BY A COMMUNIST COUNTRY LIKE NICARAGUA. THE WEST INDIANS AGREED THAT AN INITIATIVE IN THE OAS WOULD BE WORTHWHILE AND THAT EUGENIA CHARLES WAS THE LEADER TO CARRY IT THERE.

21. ADAMS ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT TO DO WITH THE CUBANS. SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED TO FINISH THE AIRPORT? MCNEIL SAID, "NO!" CUBANS SHOULD GO; THEY SHOULD BE INVITED TO LEAVE ON THE FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION. THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD INVITE THE RUSSIANS, THE LIBYANS AND ALL OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES TO DEPART AS WELL.

[REDACTED]

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 721

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

[REDACTED] SEAGA  
AGREED AS WELL, BUT ASKED ABOUT THE CUBAN DOCTORS. AMB.  
MCNEIL SAID COMPETENT MEDICAL PERSONNEL COULD BE FOUND  
ELSEWHERE FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. COSTA RICA, FOR  
INSTANCE, HAS A SURPLUS OF DOCTORS. SOME AID ARRANGE-  
MENT COULD BE WORKED OUT.

22. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE ARMY? THE WEST

BT

#6654

NNNN

SENSITIVE



SITUATION: GRENADA  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
 MESSAGE:

HCE568  
 STU8332  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHWN #6654/05 2982250  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
 O 252203Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7116  
 BT  
 S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 BRIDGETOWN 06654  
 NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THE WHITE HOUSE  
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GJ

SUBJECT: UNCLEARED, INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING  
 INDIANS ALL AGREED THAT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY  
 ARMY SHOULD BE DISBANDED AND THEIR ARMS THROWN INTO THE  
 SEA. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH A MAXIMUM PUBLIC  
 VISIBILITY. MISS CHARLES SAID, DRAWING ON HER OWN  
 EXPERIENCE, ARMIES (DEFENSE FORCES) CAN GO SOUR, BECOMING  
 A HUGE PROBLEM. IT WAS AGREED, TOO, THAT THE POLICE  
 FORCE WAS MUCH LESS POLITICIZED AND COULD POSSIBLY BE  
 SALVAGED. ADAMS SUGGESTED THAT A POLICE TRAINING FUNCTION  
 BE SHIFTED TO A POLICE COLLEGE ON BARBADOS OR  
 IN JAMAICA IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS  
 OF POLICE OFFICERS WOULD BE PROPERLY EDUCATED.  
 23. DISCUSSION TURNED TO WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE REVOLU-  
 TIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL. AMB. MCNEIL OFFERED THE  
 THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE TWO OPTIONS: TRIAL  
 AND PUNISHMENT (THE NUREMBERG SOLUTION), AND EXILE.  
 DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT WAS INDETERMINATE.

IN THE END, THE  
 GROUP SEEMED TO SETTLE FOR BRINGING THE CRIMINALS TO  
 JUSTICE IN THE NORMAL WAY: ARREST, TRIAL AND CON-  
 VICTION ACCORDING TO LAWS OF THE LAND. IN OTHER WORDS,  
 TREATING RMC MEMBERS EQUALLY WITH THOSE CHARGED WITH  
 SIMILAR CIVIL CRIMES.

24. THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS CAME UP.  
 IT WAS AGREED: RELEASE THEM IMMEDIATELY. ADAMS  
 CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT NOT ALL OF THE DETAINEES WERE  
 IN FOR "POLITICAL" CRIMES. SOME, HE SAID, WERE VICIOUS

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

KILLERS OR JUST PLAIN CRIMINALS. ADAMS SAID THE SPECIAL BRANCH CHIEFS OF THE OECS COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO SORT THEM OUT. ADDITIONALLY, HE MENTIONED SOMEONE NAMED JOHN DONNELSON, WITH THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY IN TRINIDAD, AS SOMEONE WHO WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

25. FINALLY, BARBADOS FOREIGN MINISTER LOUIS TULL AND HIS DRAFTING COMMITTEE PRODUCED A NEW DOCUMENT FOR CONSIDERATION AS THE OECS LETTER TO THE UNITED STATES. SEVERAL MINOR ADJUSTMENTS WERE QUICKLY AGREED UPON AND THE WEST INDIANS, INCLUDING SEAGA, ORDERED THAT THE LETTER BE PRODUCED IN FINAL FOR SIGNATURE, TO BE CARRIED TO WASHINGTON BY AMB. MCNEIL. BISH  
BT

#6654  
NNNN

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 10

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE496  
STU8276  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHKG #0472 2982223  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 252222Z OCT 83  
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6009  
INFO RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 4991  
RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 4088  
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 4676  
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KINGSTON 10472

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, JM

SUBJ: THREATENED DEMONSTRATION BY COMMUNIST  
WORKERS PARTY OF JAMAICA DOESN'T MATERIALIZE

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. THREATENED DEMONSTRATION AGAINST EMBASSY AND/OR  
JAMAICAN PARLIAMENT DID NOT MATERIALIZE TODAY.

APPARENTLY DR. TREVOR MUNROE, GENERAL SECRETARY  
AND GUIDING LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST WORKERS' PARTY  
OF JAMAICA (WPJ) REQUESTED PERMISSION TO STAGE A  
DEMONSTRATION. HIS REQUEST WAS DENIED. MUNROE  
ACQUIESCED BUT REPORTEDLY SAID, "I CAN'T BE CERTAIN  
WHAT MY PEOPLE WILL DO."

3. JAMAICA DEFENSE FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR  
GENERAL ROBERT NEISH (PROTECT) TOLD DATT THAT HE  
DID NOT ANTICIPATE ANY ACTIVITY BY THE WPJ TODAY.  
(DRAFTED:POL:LSHEA;APPROVED:DCM:WRWARNE) HEWITT

BT

#0472

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FR4-046/4 #352

BY

CH

NARA, DATE

9/26/02

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE615  
VSK1709 620 STU8302  
00 RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUEHSP #3274 2982229  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK (CCY CAPTION AD251401 6290 MCN NAR)  
O 252228Z OCT 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1967

BT

~~SECRET~~ PORT OF SPAIN 03274

EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADOR EVANS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, OAS, GJ, US, XK, XL, XS

SUBJECT: GOTT REACTION TO US POLICY TO EASTERN CARIBBEAN  
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

REF. STATE 303760

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT ABOUT 2:15 P.M. EDT TODAY I WAS ADVISED THAT PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERS WISHED TO SEE ME AT HIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM AN EMERGENCY CABINET MEETING CALLED AFTER NEWS OF THE MILITARY ACTION THIS MORNING REACHED HIM. I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED AND MET HIM AT HIS OFFICE.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER BEGAN BY ASKING ME WHAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE USG WERE. THIS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED ME SINCE AS EARLY AS 7:15 THIS MORNING ATTEMPTS HAD BEEN MADE TO CONTACT THE PM. INFORMATION IN REFTEL HAD BEEN PASSED ON TO THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR DELIVERY TO THE PM. AFTER EXPLAINING TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT OUR POLICY HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO HIS GOVERNMENT FIVE HOURS EARLIER, HE REQUESTED TO SEE THE TEXT. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS THEN PRESENTED OUR INFORMAL NOTES TO THE PM, WHO WAS CLEARLY EMBARRASSED BY THIS INEFFICIENCY BY HIS OWN GOVERNMENT.

4. AFTER READING THE MATERIAL, HE THEN CHANGED HIS QUESTION AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTION TAKEN. AGAIN I REMINDED HIM OF THE INFORMATION GIVEN HIM ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, AT WHICH TIME A REQUEST FOR AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT ON HIS PART WAS ALSO MADE. IT WAS THEN THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS BEING AGAINST ANY MILITARY ACTION AT THIS TIME.

5. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ADVANCE STATEMENT AS TO TIME AND PLACE OF THE MILITARY ACTION AND

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FR4-066/4 #353

BY CNS, NARA, DATE 4/26/02

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT SUCH NOTIFICATION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED. I RE-EMPHASIZED THAT THE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO VERY DEFINITE AND URGENT REQUESTS FROM GRENADA'S NEIGHBORS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) PLUS JAMAICA AND BARBADOS, AND THAT IT IS TRULY A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. HE THEN ASKED TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE ON THE PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION, WHICH I DID. THERE FOLLOWED QUESTIONS RELATING TO WHETHER THE FOREIGN NATIONALS WERE SAFE, COULD THEY BE EVACUATED, AND HOW LONG US FORCES EXPECT TO REMAIN IN GRENADA.

6. ALTOGETHER, EXCEPT FOR THE ANTICIPATED DEMONSTRATION BY THE LEFTIST PEOPLE'S POPULAR MOVEMENT (PPM) AND THE FEB. 18 MOVEMENT, THE INITIAL REACTIONS TO US ACTIONS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE. SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE CALLED OR WRITTEN TO COMMEND US FOR THE US ACTION. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOW HAVING SERIOUS SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ISOLATIONIST POSITION OF THE GOTT. WHETHER THE GOTT INTENDS TO JOIN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

7. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO DEFENSE FORCE STANDS BY TO SEND TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF THE US AND CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCES IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND EVACUATE ITS OWN NATIONALS, IF A POLITICAL DECISION TO THAT EFFECT IS MADE. THE GOTT HAS DISCUSSED USING A BWIA PLANE IN AN AIRLIFT, OR DEPLOYING TRINIDAD'S OWN COAST GUARD VESSELS TO TRANSPORT ITS TROOPS. ANY SUCH ACTION WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE IN BARBADOS. A SENIOR MEA OFFICIAL TOLD US THIS MORNING, "WE MUST BE SEEN TO BE PROTECTING TRINIDADIAN WHO ARE IN GRENADA." THE CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF STANDS READY TO MOVE HIS TROOPS ON TWO-HOUR NOTICE. EVANS

NOTE BY OC/T: CAPTION DOWNGRADED TO EXDIS PER S/S-0

BT

#3274

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~~8~~  
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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 734

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE586  
OO RUEHC RUEHDT  
DE RUEHC #4734 2982251  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 252241Z OCT 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE 4411  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 304734

NODIS  
FOR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MILI, UN, GJ, US, XL  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
CONCERNING US RESPONSE TO GRENADA SITUATION

REF: STATE 303760

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. REFTEL CONTAINS DRAFT TEXT OF LETTER FROM US PERMREP TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WE UNDERSTAND THIS LETTER WAS TRANSMITTED TO SECRETARY GENERAL EARLIER TODAY.
3. BY INADVERTENCE, REFTEL DID NOT RPT NOT INDICATE SUBSTANTIVELY IDENTICAL LETTER SHOULD ALSO BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL.
4. PERMREP REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THIS LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT TODAY. SHULTZ

BT  
#4734  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS #94-066/4 #355  
BY CAJ NARA, DATE 4/26/02



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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SITUATION: GRENADA  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

## MESSAGE:

HCE618  
 STU8326  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHCV #9300 2982247  
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 O 252246Z OCT 83  
 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7932  
 INFO RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 2267  
 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 1249  
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1144  
 BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CARACAS 09300

EXDIS

E.O. 112356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, GJ, XL, VE

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO GOV ON GRENADA

REF: STATE 303755

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AFTER TALKING TO PRESIDENT HERRERA, FOREIGN MINISTER ZAMBRANO AND CANDIDATES LUSINCHI AND CALDERA, I BELIEVE THAT WHILE VENEZUELA DOES NOT WANT TO BE OUT OF STEP WITH ITS CONTADORA AND ANDEAN PACT PARTNERS, IT APPROVES OUR ACTION PRIVATELY. PUBLICLY, IT WILL EITHER WAFFLE OR GIVE OUR ACTION LUKEWARM ENDORSEMENT. MOST OF THEM STRESSED THE NEED FOR BRITAIN TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE AND SAW ULTIMATE SOLUTION FOR RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA THROUGH ACTION OF GOVERNOR GENERAL STANDING ABOVE POLITICAL PARTIES OR IDEOLOGIES. END SUMMARY.

3. IN RAPID SUCCESSION I CALLED ON PRESIDENT HERRERA, FOREIGN MINISTER ZAMBRANO AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES LUSINCHI AND CALDERA MORNING OCTOBER 25 TO ACQUAINT THEM WITH CONTENTS REFTEL AND TO ASK FOR PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DECISIONS TAKEN. I ALSO ASKED FOR GOV SUPPORT IN THE OAS AND UN. PRESIDENT HERRERA SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT SITUATION AND HE HAD TO BALANCE CAREFULLY PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. WHILE VENEZUELA WAS IN FAVOR OF NONINTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, THE MURDER OF BISHOP AND HIS ASSOCIATES AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN GRENADA WERE WORRISOME.

4. REGARDING MY REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC POSITIVE DECLARA-

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F94-066/4 #357

BY

CWS

NARA, DATE

4/24/02

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TION, HE SAID HE WANTED TO GO CAREFULLY UNTIL HE FOUND OUT FIRST WHAT U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION WOULD BE AND WHAT THE BRITISH WOULD DO. A UK POSITIVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE ACTIONS OF ITS FORMER CARIBBEAN COLONIES WAS MOST IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE LEGAL TIES THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK AT THE SITUATION WITH THE GREATEST OBJECTIVITY POSSIBLE, KEEPING IN MIND VENEZUELA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS; HIS CONTADORA INTEREST, AND HIS INTEREST IN THE ANDEAN PACT. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD TAKE PREFERENCE WITH VENEZUELA 160 MILES FROM GRENADA. THE ACTION OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN ISLANDS, JAMAICA, BARBADOS AND THE U.S. ADDED SECURITY TO VENEZUELA DIRECTLY AND TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA SO CLOSE AND SO IMPORTANT TO THE GOV. IF THE GOV WATCHES OTHERS DOING DIRTY WORK FOR THEM, IT SHOULD AT LEAST GIVE ITS VERBAL SUPPORT AND NOT CRITICISM.

5. I ALSO URGED THAT HE SEND APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS AMBASSADORS AT THE OAS (WHO AFTER THE CONTADORA MEETING IS STILL IN CARACAS) AND THE UN (WHO HAS RETURNED TO NEW YORK) TO VIEW WITH SYMPATHY THE INITIATIVES OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN.

6. COMMENT: HERRERA WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MY PITCH. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WILL COME OUT WITH ANY RINGING ENDORSEMENT FOR OUR SIDE, BUT I ALSO DOUBT THAT HE WILL CRITICIZE US, BARBADOS AND JAMAICA-- ALL IMPORTANT COUNTRIES TO VENEZUELA.

7. I RECEIVED SIMILAR REACTIONS NEXT FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ZAMBRANO. HE SAID THE ART WOULD BE TO DRAFT A GOOD COMMUNIQUE WHICH, WHILE SUPPORTING THE PRINCIPLES OF NONINTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, WOULD MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT VENEZUELA WAS IN FAVOR OF ENDING THE CHAOS NOW REIGNING IN GRENADA AND A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY THERE. NATURALLY, ZAMBRANO WAS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE GRENADA SITUATION ON WOBBLY CONTADORA (SEE SEPTTEL).

8. MY CALLS ON LUSINCHI AND CALDERA ARE COVERED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. THEY, MORE THAN HERRERA AND ZAMBRANO, LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE LANDING IN GRENADA. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT ANY FLACK FROM THEM. SUPPORT IS THERE AND WILL BE EXPRESSED CAUTIOUSLY. BOTH STRONGLY RAISED THE NEED FOR BRITISH INVOLVEMENT AND IN THEIR VIEW ACTION BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS THE ONLY HOPE TO BRING

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 709

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
DEMOCRACY BACK TO GRENADA. LANDAU  
BT  
#9300  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

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~~15~~ LISTED ON THE  
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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 716

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE614  
STU8321  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHSN #9841 2982248  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 252248Z OCT 83  
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0271  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAN SALVADOR 09841

LIMDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADOR PICKERING  
E.O. 12356:

TAGS: PREL, MILI, OAS, GJ, US, XK, XL, SX, ES

SUBJECT: GRENADA: U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

REF: A) STATE 303760; B) STATE 303758

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO AN URGENT REQUEST PRESIDENT MAGANA  
SAW ME MID-MORNING OCTOBER 25. I PRESENTED HIM WITH TALK-  
ING POINTS AND LEFT A READING COPY BEHIND.

3. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY THE REASONS FOR OUR  
ACTION AND FELT THAT THE REACTION IN EL SALVADOR WOULD  
BE BASICALLY POSITIVE. BOTH NICARAGUA AND CUBA WOULD TAKE  
CAREFUL NOTE OF OUR EFFORT IN GRENADA.

4. WITH REGARD TO OUR REQUEST FOR SUPPORT IN THE OAS AND  
CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION, PRESIDENT MAGANA  
SAID HE WILL SEND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SALVADORAN  
OAS DELEGATION TO CONCERT AND COOPERATE WITH US WHEN THE  
SUBJECT COMES UP.

5. PRESIDENT MAGANA ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO KEEP HIM  
INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AND THANKED ME FOR SEEING HIM  
SO RAPIDLY ON THE ISSUE. PICKERING

BT

#9841

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

794-066/4 #359

BY

CAJ

NARA, DATE

4/26/02

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 710

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/18/83//322

SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE617  
STU8335  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHCV #9301 2982256  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 252255Z OCT 83  
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7933  
INFO RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 2268  
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 1250  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1145  
BT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CARACAS 09301  
EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CU, GJ, XL, VE  
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO GOV ON GRENADA--LUSINCHI AND  
- CALDERA  
REF: STATE 303755

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.
- 
2. I CALLED ON ACCION DEMOCRATICA'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDI-  
DATE, JAIME LUSINCHI, TO ASK FOR PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING  
AND SUPPORT FOR THE ACTION IN GRENADA. LUSINCHI WAS  
ACCOMPANIED BY KEY PERSONALITIES OF ACCION DEMOCRATICA--  
OCTAVIO LEPAGE (HIS CAMPAIGN MANAGER), SIMON ALBERTO  
CONSALVI, LEANDRO MORA, PLUS EUGENIO SOLER. THE POLI-  
TICAL COUNSELOR ALSO PARTICIPATED.
- 
3. I NOTED MY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK TO  
LUSINCHI AND STRESSED HOW VENEZUELA'S SECURITY INTERESTS  
WERE AFFECTED BY RECENT EVENTS IN GRENADA. I RECALLED  
THAT THERE HAD BEEN HELPFUL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF  
ACCION DEMOCRATICA IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. THE CANDIDATE  
WAS CAUTIOUS BUT, IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION,  
CALLED THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL "A GROUP OF  
BANDITS"; HE DOUBTED THAT IT HAD MUCH INTERNAL SUPPORT.  
THERE WERE PRINCIPLES--NOTABLY THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-  
INTERVENTION--AND THERE WERE FACTS--CRIME AND CHAOS.  
THEY COULD NOT BE OUT IN FRONT AND WOULD CAREFULLY  
CONSIDER HOW TO FORMULATE THEIR PUBLIC DECLARATIONS ON  
THIS MATTER.
- 
4. LUSINCHI SAID PRESIDENT HERRERA HAD CALLED HIM THIS

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F94-066/4 #361  
BY CAJ NARA, DATE 4/26/02



SITUATION: GRENADA  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE II

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MORNING AND HE HAD SPOKEN WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ZAMBRANO. HE WONDERED ABOUT GRENADA'S STATUS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, THE BRITISH POSITION AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE QUEEN. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A SITUATION WHERE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SHOULD TAKE POWER AND ASK FOR INTERVENTION TO RESTORE ORDER. A CLEAR LEGAL BASIS NEEDED TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND AND ITS RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE. PERHAPS THE BRITISH COULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS PROCESS.

5. IN CONCLUDING, I AGAIN ASKED FOR STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSION AND SUPPORT FROM HIS PARTY WHEN THE ISSUE COMES BEFORE THE OAS AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. LUSINCHI CLEARLY WAS SYMPATHETIC TO WHAT WE HAD DONE; BUT HE MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON A FAVORABLE STATEMENT. I THINK THEY WILL BE QUIETLY IN SYMPATHY BUT WILL NOT MAKE AN OUTRIGHT DEFENSE OF OUR PRESENCE; INSTEAD, THEY WILL SAY THAT THEY ARE NON-INTERVENTIONIST BUT THAT THIS IS A SPECIAL CASE.

6. CALDERA, THE COPEI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, RECEIVED ME ALONE. HIS RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION WAS THAT VENEZUELA STANDS FOR PEACE. THE MATTER WAS COMPLICATED. THE SITUATION ON THE ISLAND HAD BEEN ONE OF CHAOS. VENEZUELA ACCEPTS THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT THE SITUATION WAS ONE WITHOUT PRECEDENT. HE ACCEPTED MY ARGUMENT THAT VENEZUELA'S INTERESTS WERE AFFECTED BUT WONDERED ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE US CONGRESS AND THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. CALDERA ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE BRITISH, WHO WERE HIGHLY REGARDED, IN RESTORING ORDER AND DEMOCRACY. BASICALLY, I THINK, CALDERA--LIKE LUSINCHI--WILL BE CIRCUMSPECT IN WHAT HE SAYS BUT IS SYMPATHETIC.

LANDAU  
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