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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG): Records

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Date: 12/6/00
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Letter	[McFarlane] to [Don Regan], 1 p	n.d.	P1/B1
2. Brfg Memo	McFarlane to [Reagan], re: Meeting with the National Security Planning Group, 2 p.	8/25/84	P1/B1
3. Paper	NSDD 99 Work Program Conclusion Paper, 9 p.	4/16/84	P1/B1
4. Paper	U.S. Strategy for the Near East and South Asia, 3 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
5. Brfg Memo	Copy of Item #2, 2 p.	8/25/84	P1/B1

Handwritten notes in table:
 Row 2: R 10/5/12 F00-003 #139
 Row 3: R 11 11 #139
 Row 4: D 6/7/06 NSDD-003/1 #140; Part 10/5/12 F00-003 #140
 Row 5: R 10/5/12 F00-003 #141

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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SYSTEM II
90894 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 29, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL R. J. AFFOURTIT, USA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN, USA
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. CHRISTOPHER HICKS
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting Agenda (U)

The National Security Planning Group will meet on Friday, August 31, 1984, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon in the White House Situation Room. The subjects for discussion are Pakistan and the NSDD-99 Work Program. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A - Agenda

cc: Alton Keel
Donald Gregg

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlr NARA, Date 12/6/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

Friday, August 31, 1984
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Agenda

Pakistan

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| I. Introduction | Robert C. McFarlane |
| II. Key Intelligence Judgments | Director Casey |
| III. U.S. Policy Options | Secretary Shultz/
Secretary Weinberger |
| IV. Summary | Robert C. McFarlane |

NSDD-99 Work Program

- | | |
|--|---|
| I. Introduction | Robert C. McFarlane |
| II. Intelligence Assessment
o Soviet Posture towards
the Persian Gulf | Director Casey |
| III. Policy and Diplomatic Overview | Secretary Shultz |
| IV. Strategic Concepts, Military
Planning and Force Programs | Secretary Weinberger/
General Vessey |
| V. Status of Diplomatic and Military
Negotiations with Major U.S.
Allies and Friendly Countries
in the Region | Secretary Shultz/
Secretary Weinberger |
| VI. Summary | Robert C. McFarlane |

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By dlb

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_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Exec. Secretary
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_____	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
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_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ NSC MSG Center

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August 29, 1984

SECRET Attachment

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *Phil*
DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting (Friday, August 31, 1984): India-Pakistan and NSDD-99 Work Program

Pursuant to Bud's decision, Friday's NSPG will address both subjects. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum you could send to counterparts at State, DoD and CIA to formally announce the meeting and to provide an agenda.

also sent to ACDA.

Adelman will attend.

RMK 8/29

Attachment

Tab I - Kimmitt memo to Hill, Affourtit, Joulwan, Cormack
Tab A - Agenda

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997

By *dlb* NARA, Date *12/4/02*

SECRET Attachment

~~SECRET~~

(THIS IS TO REPLACE SEP. 14 NSC MTG)

NSPG - SITUATION ROOM

TUESDAY SEP 18, 1984 11:00

SUBJECT - NEXT STEPS FOR VIENNA

PRINCIPAL ONLY (* MAY BRING PLUS ONE)

ONP - 4213 VP / MURPHY

* STATE - 632 5804 Sheila Shultz / DAM

* DEFENSE - 659-6004 Rick Weinkinger

* CIA - [REDACTED] Casey

* JCS - 695-4824 ^{Can} Kelly / Moore

✓ OMB - 6190 - not attending

✓ USUN - 632-4⁸⁶⁴⁷~~100~~ Kierpatrick

✓ ACDA - 632-4766 (Mary Purningham) - Adelman
Hank Cooper
(ACDA told by JCS they were having +1)

MEESE - 2235

✓ BAKER - 6797

~~DEAVER - 6475~~

MCFARLANE

LINHARD / KRAEMER / LEHMAN

KIMMETT

✓ EDWARD ROWNY 3612

PAUL NITZE 4924

FOU OOB/1 #148
CVS 7/22/02

11:00-12:00

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Meeting
~~Thursday, Sep 14~~ ^{Fri} ~~Thurs, Sep 14~~
Cabinet Room
Subject: Arms Control
Principal Plus one

OVP - 4213 (Phyllis or Natalie) ✓

State - 632-5804 SHIELA ✓

Defense - 659-6064 (PL) RICH ✓

CIA [REDACTED] ✓

JCS 695-4824 LT. COL. O'CONNOR ✓

USUN 632-8647 } Principal MARY ✓

OMB 6190 } only KURT ✓ Paula

ACDA - 632-4766 + me Staples ✓

Meese 2235 ✓


Baker 6797 ✓ (hill to there)

Deaver 6475 ✓

Darman 2702 ✓ Jan

Kraemer

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NSA Date 7/22/02



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 12, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 99

United States Security Strategy for
the Near East and South Asia (S)

The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffirmed the basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The derivative and complementary regional security interests, objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4 are approved and restated herewith: (U)

U.S. Regional Interests

- to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. (S)
- to maintain continued access for the US and its principal allies to Gulf oil. (TS)

U.S. Regional Security Objectives

- to deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary. (S)
- to counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by other means. (TS)
- to protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of oil. (S)
- to ensure the security of Israel within secure and internationally recognized borders. (S)
- to obtain a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem based upon the principles outlined by the President on September 1, 1982. (U)
- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our interests. (U)
- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)
- to expand US influence with selected states in the region. (S)

Authority E.O. 12958, NSC-A, Subpart F, 99-3B
BY *[Signature]* 12/6/82

- to limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region.
- to discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities in the region. (S)

Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives

The most serious threats to our vital interests and objectives in the region are the power, influence, and activity of the Soviet Union. The geographic proximity of the USSR, and its determination to interfere, directly and indirectly, with the internal complexion and external alignment of countries which border it compound the threats. In this regard, the improvements in the regular military forces of the Soviet Union poised for use in the region and the enhanced power projection capabilities available for use in the Near East and South Asia, pose a formidable challenge. In addition, the inimical regional policies and activities of governments, such as the fundamentalist regime in Iran, pose a clear challenge to the moderate oil producing countries. Finally, our vital interests could be directly threatened by internal unrest and upheaval in the moderate Arab countries. (S)

Intra-regional conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the Arab-Israel conflict pose serious threats to our vital interests. Other potential regional conflicts which would pose grave danger to US interests include another Indo-Pakistani war and renewed fighting between the PDRY on the one hand and either Oman or the YAR on the other. These conflicts threaten our interests by creating potential superpower confrontations, opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, the spread of violence and instability, and the estrangement of key regional states. The continuing Soviet presence in Ethiopia and the PDRY poses threats to our vital LOCs and the projection of US forces into the area. Moreover, Soviet and Cuban support of local conflicts and insurgencies further destabilize the region. (S)

Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia

The foregoing validation of our national security interests and objectives in the region provides the basis for refining and revising our regional strategy, as necessary. To advance US interests requires a comprehensive political-military strategy which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic and security initiatives. This strategy must develop and exploit opportunities to strengthen the US strategic posture in the Near East and South Asia and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the US serves their national interests. In keeping with our core interests, we are committed to acquiring the capabilities to mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as possible, including Iran as appropriate. Our strategy is to

include balanced use of the three key US assets as perceived in the region: (S)

-- the US ability to deter and counter Soviet aggression; (S)

-- the unique capability among outside powers to take a leading role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; (S)

-- the technological, industrial, economic and military strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other countries. (U)

Strategic Concept for Near-Term Planning

Beyond the defense of NATO's southern flank, the Eastern Mediterranean and its littoral, our near term military strategy and the derivative concept and operations plans for the Near East and South Asia should focus on defending the oil fields, the transshipment points and the sea and air lines of communication to this theater. Our plans should, in any case, allow us to prevent control of these vital resources by the Soviet Union. Plans should be based on prudent assumptions regarding the active cooperation of countries in the region, and those outside the region that might provide enroute support. Until we have procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force structure and we have assured access to the base facilities necessary to undertake a robust forward defense of the Gulf region, our plans should be based on the existing and programmed capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and allies which are not forces "assigned" to NATO or their essential support. Together with others, we must be ready to move military assets forward first, to deter Soviet aggression on receipt of strategic warning, and secondly, to interdict the movement of Soviet combat forces to the Gulf region. I also want to reaffirm this Administration's determination to block any military moves by the Soviets, their surrogates or any other powers which threaten US and allied access to the critical resources of the region. (TS)

Cooperation with Other Countries

Because our vital interests in this part of the world are essentially shared interests, we must redouble our efforts to obtain the cooperation of our allies and other friendly powers in bringing stability to the region, deterring threats to vital Western interests and, in the final analysis, defending those interests. In addition, mindful of the need for cooperation in the security of energy, the U.S. remains committed to the goals of the International Energy Agency and other commitments enumerated in NSSD 9-82 and NSDD-87. (TS)

-- NATO Allies and Japan. To demonstrate our solidarity and enhance deterrence we should seek assistance in the form of

direct military contributions from our principal NATO allies with highly mobile and specialized military capabilities suitable to a variety of NE/SA scenarios, especially the UK and France. With regard to the potential contributions of the UK and France, we should be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the movement of their specialized forces to the region. In keeping with ongoing negotiations, our principal allies and the FRG and Japan, in particular, should be asked to contribute by assisting in the improvement of infrastructure which would facilitate defense of the oil fields and the critical transshipment points. They should also be encouraged to increase security and economic assistance to poor but important countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Egypt and Pakistan. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Turkey. Because Turkey occupies a strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes, our cooperation in contingency planning beyond the traditional NATO missions is of fundamental importance. To enhance Turkish confidence; promote the cooperation we seek; and, equally important, to help Turkey realize its military potential, we need a strategy for securing new and more meaningful increases in defense funding for Turkey. This may entail, inter alia, a serious effort to obtain help from allies and the Gulf States and imaginative steps to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean problems which impede allied cooperation and frustrate Congressional funding. Steps must be taken to develop immediate plans for exercising US and allied forces in Eastern Turkey on a more regular basis. To overcome concerns within NATO about activities beyond the treaty area, we need to make a strong case in NATO that the improvements we seek in Eastern Turkey are required in any event to cope with a Soviet attack in that area. Our efforts to upgrade co-located operating bases should be strengthened, and we should continue to explore other measures which would enhance the responsiveness of our forces. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Israel. I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the Near East and South Asia would be enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier. To this end, we should conduct an internal review on where we could profit militarily from cooperative planning for major Soviet involvement and aggression which threaten vital western interests in the Near East and South Asia. The emphasis should be on Israeli contributions which could serve our military objectives in countering Soviet capabilities. This review should commence immediately and the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense should be submitted to me not later than August 30, 1983. Thereafter, we will develop an interagency plan to implement the findings of this review as feasible and appropriate. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Arab Powers. Given the critical need for facilities access in the region and, in some instances, the potential of Arab military forces, we should continue and expand our cooperative planning with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. We should also consider what potential role Lebanon might play in our strategy in the future. Improvements in our strategic position in the Horn of Africa should be sought. This could well require increased efforts to weaken Soviet positions in the PDRY and Ethiopia. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Pakistan. Our efforts to promote cooperation with Pakistan to meet Soviet contingencies in the region must be pressed, including plans for joint exercises and access to facilities, bearing in mind the political and military challenges Pakistan faces. The precedent established by the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan and the potential for future Soviet encroachments in areas such as Baluchistan should be discussed anew with the Pakistanis. Bearing in mind Pakistani sensitivities, our future efforts should reemphasize the value of prior contingency planning and a program for Security Assistance which is rationalized with our own capabilities. In this regard our plans should recognize the importance of Pakistan in the interdiction of Soviet LOCs to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. We must recognize the importance of, and be willing to help plan to meet, those contingencies which the Pakistanis find most threatening. We should also continue with determination and clarity of purpose to discourage the further development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. (TS)

-- Cooperation with India. Consistent with our goals for cooperation with Pakistan we should adopt a diplomatic strategy which more explicitly recognizes India's strategic importance in both regional and global terms. This strategy should have as its initial objective, the improvement of relations between India, the PRC and Pakistan and the gradual weakening of India's military dependency on the Soviet Union. To this end we must continue our efforts to broaden our economic and military ties with India including closer liaison between our military establishments. We must continue our efforts to convince the Indian Government of the need to resist Soviet expansion and our determination to do so and to discourage regional disputes which can only redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. (TS)

Implementation

I would like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a comprehensive agenda of the preferred ways to implement the military and diplomatic strategies outlined above. A comprehensive examination of requirements for contingencies in the region is needed to include prepositioning, communications, access to enroute and in-theater facilities as well as a detailed

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examination of the relationship between our own arms transfer policies and other Western arms sales. The work program should be developed and the reviews should be completed on a priority basis. The work program should be submitted to the NSC by 30 July and thereafter periodic reports should be submitted to me to describe progress and to discuss problems which may arise. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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NLRR F00-003 #138

BY RW NARA DATE 10/5/12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1984

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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: August 31, 1984
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*

I. PURPOSE

To review the work study program completed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense on our strategy for the Near East and South Asia. The work program was undertaken pursuant to National Security Decision Directive 99 (NSDD-99) (Tab A). Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger have recommended this meeting to brief the findings of the work program.

II. BACKGROUND

Following an NSC meeting on this subject on July 11, 1983, you signed NSDD-99 which directed State and DoD to undertake a comprehensive review of requirements and to prepare recommendations on the measures necessary to implement our military and diplomatic strategies for the Near East and South Asia. This review has now been completed and the memorandum at Tab B from Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger forwards a summary of the study and some conclusions. The meeting will afford you the opportunity to review the findings of this study effort in more detail and to examine several important issues and conclusions which have arisen in the course of the study. The purpose of NSDD-99 was to ensure that our capabilities were brought more into line with our extensive interests in the vital Persian Gulf region. We have made progress, but important issues remain. As Iran appears to be entering the beginning of a possible succession struggle, it is more than timely that we revisit this issue. Moreover, quite apart from immediate needs, the oil of the Gulf will remain -- well into the 1990's -- the source of the largest quantity of low-cost energy in the world. While we focus primarily on avoiding disruptions, we need to realize that we must also prevent a resource of this magnitude from falling into Soviet hands, as this would fully transform the global power balance. Attached at Tab C

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is a scope paper which focuses on several issues in more detail. As noted in the memorandum from George and Cap, we do not believe that this particular meeting should produce new decisions. We do think it is important for you to review and assess the work which has been completed and that you be briefed on the problems we face. Finally, this meeting will afford an opportunity to raise several initiatives we could consider in the future to mitigate some of the problems that will be highlighted during this meeting. Should you want to touch on these issues at the end of the meeting, suggested talking points for your use are at Tab D.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary George P. Shultz
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
William J. Casey
Robert C. McFarlane
General John W. Vessey, USA

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject, after which Bill Casey will provide an update on the Soviet threat to our vital interest in the region. Secretary Shultz will review our interests and objectives and summarize the status of our relations with the key countries of the region. Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey will brief you on our military plans and programs. No specific decisions are being requested. An agenda for the meeting is at Tab E.

Prepared by:
Philip A. Dur
Donald R. Fortier

Attachments

- Tab A - National Security Decision Directive 99
- Tab B - Shultz and Weinberger Memo (Summary and Conclusions Paper Attached)
- Tab C - Scope Paper
- Tab D - Suggested Talking Points for the President
- Tab E - Agenda for NSPG

cc: Vice President
Secretary Regan
Edwin Meese
James Baker

NSDD 99 Work Program Conclusion Paper

(S) As directed by the National Security Decision Directive on US Security for the Near East and South Asia (NSDD 99), a State-DoD interagency Coordinating Group has studied how to implement the President's decisions and has submitted its findings in six reports. Summaries of the reports are attached. Since NSDD 99 was issued in July 1983, several other policy decisions have been made (NSDDs 111, 114, and 115). The Coordinating Group included the effects of these decisions in the findings of the Work Program.

(S) This paper examines our ability to implement the policy in NSDD 99 in the near term, updates the Work Program in light of recent events, and recommends courses of action that should be taken in the coming year.

Military Planning and Requirements

(S) The JCS have tasked development of a series of plans to protect vital US interests in the Persian Gulf region. The plans range from defending forward in Iran against a Soviet invasion to protecting the oil fields, facilities, and shipping routes through the Persian Gulf by establishing a military presence on the Arabian Peninsula. The plans also address non-Soviet contingencies and provide a range of options from providing assistance to friendly governments to employment of US forces.

(TS) Plans to defend vital Western interests in SWA against a Soviet invasion are based on a number of key assumptions, including:

- Early and decisive use of strategic warning time. This includes use of presidential authority to call up 100,000 Reserve Component personnel about three weeks before a Soviet invasion. It is also assumed that US forces would begin moving to the region 16 days prior to the Soviet invasion. (C-day=D-16)
- Use of some "NATO-assigned" naval and air assets.
- Deployment to SWA of US-based support units that are also designated for NATO contingencies.
- Use of bases in eastern Turkey for air interdiction.

- Access, no later than C-day, to en route and and in-theater reception facilities.
- Extensive pre-positioning of equipment and supplies in the theater and agreements to use airbases and rear support facilities in a number of SWA countries.

(e) We can, of course, not be certain that the political decisions could be taken to make decisive use of the warning time due to the possible ambiguous nature of the warning. If the Soviets had enough time to plan an attack on Iran, they would likely make a major effort to deny us warning through deception, in particular by creating alternative interpretations for their preparations. Under such circumstances it may be impossible to obtain Allied and friendly SWA concurrence for transit to, and early deployment in, the region. It is also uncertain whether Turkey would permit use of its eastern bases for air interdiction.

(s) Moreover, the conflicting requirements for NATO assets could create difficulties. The Work Program defined the NSDD 99 constraint on using "NATO-assigned" forces in SWA as applying only to those forces that are "in-place or dual-based." However, if the term "NATO-assigned forces" used in NSDD 99 were taken literally without qualification, Air Force assets and, in the future, Army units would be affected. Under this restriction, three-quarters of the tactical fighter squadrons that are being used for planning would be precluded from use in SWA. This would seriously affect our capability for timely deployment and interdiction. In the future, one of the planned five Army divisions would not be available to USCINCENT. It should also be noted that all LANTFLT carriers are "NATO-assigned." In sum, literal interpretation of the constraint on the use of "NATO-assigned" forces would seriously jeopardize our ability to execute the SWA strategy.

(s) To avoid the problem of multiple tasking of units, the JCS have issued guidance on plan development for global war so that major combat units are available to only one theater commander in a given scenario.

(e) In light of the uncertainties as to the US ability to take advantage of strategic warning and to gain access to important Allied and friendly bases, it is essential to have alternative strategies for coping with Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia. Hence, in addition to pursuing the means to implement the current strategy, the strategy remains under continuing review to identify possible adjustments or alternatives.

(S) Over the past several years, we have progressed in our planning and ability to deploy to and fight in Southwest Asia. Currently, we could deploy in seven weeks (C+49) a force consisting of approximately three Army divisions, 1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces, and four tactical fighter wings. These forces could be supported by as many as three carrier battle groups. By the end of FY 1985, the addition of currently programmed airlift and sealift assets will improve this capability by one Army division. Our goal by FY 1989 remains to be able to deploy within seven weeks and sustain in the region five Army divisions, two MAFs, and seven TFWs.

(S) There are crucial limitations--primarily in the areas of mobility and combat service support--to programmed capabilities. Although considerable progress will have been made in mobility programs by FY 1989, we still will experience shortfalls during the course of the deployment flow to SWA. Even with programmed improvements to airlift, including buys of additional C-5s and KC-10s, our airlift capability will fall almost 25% short of our worldwide long-term goal. In addition, we will lack sufficient readily available sealift to close portions of the last two Army divisions on schedule. In the area of combat service support, there are about 31,000 Army support personnel needed for Southwest Asia who also have missions in Europe on NATO D-Day. These 31,000 comprise about 20% of the support personnel requirement for SWA. We are attempting to fill this gap through allied compensation, regional host nation support, revisions to our force structure, and by increasing the readiness of later-deploying NATO support forces to cover part of the D-Day shortfall. (Should these supporting personnel not be available in the European theater, the 31,000 spaces would represent about 10% of the total requirement to support the 10-division D-Day force.)

(S) Faced with the decision to counter a Soviet invasion of Iran today, the US is capable for only a limited period of time of countering Soviet moves to gain control of the Persian Gulf oil facilities or deny their use. The preferred defense would be to keep the Soviets as far away as possible from the Gulf, which would prevent their control of the Gulf and reduce the effectiveness of air strikes against the oil facilities. In Iran, the preferred defensive line would be established in the Zagros Mountains, forward of the oil fields, facilities, and sea routes, where we could take advantage of the defensive terrain. We would probably not want to fight in Iran unless most of the Iranian people and armed forces were at least passive toward a US intervention.

(S) If a Soviet invasion could not be halted in Iran, it might be possible to form a defensive line on the Arabian Peninsula. However, while we might be able to prevent Soviet control of the Gulf from such a line, the Soviets would be in a much better position to deny us access to the Gulf. Another

option would be the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, but it is unclear whether this would increase our chances of success. The best courses of action, therefore, are to continue improving our conventional force capabilities for SWA, to enhance regional defenses, and to solicit allied cooperation to supplement US efforts. The improved conventional capabilities contained in the current FYDP will reduce the likelihood that the US would be forced to choose between escalation and disengagement. At the same time, these actions will strengthen deterrence, the crux of our Southwest Asia strategy.

(S) The requirements identified by USCINCCENT and cited in Section II of the Work Program represent the total requirements for countering a Soviet invasion of Iran, as well as the unique requirements for other, smaller contingencies that we may face in the region. Most of the requirements have yet to be validated through the planning, programming, and budgeting process. In establishing priorities among these requirements, we intend to concentrate in the near term on those which contribute to meeting both the most demanding and the most likely scenarios. This, in effect, is what we are doing by planning and negotiating with regional states on actions designed to deter or counter an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, as directed by NSDD 114. For contingencies of the lesser nature, our response would involve modest US air and naval forces in support of regional forces. Such a US force might consist of one or two tactical fighter squadrons, plus surveillance and support aircraft, one carrier battle group, ten surface combatants, and one helicopter mine-countermeasures squadron.

Cooperative Planning with Regional States

(S) In recent months, regional anxieties have grown in proportion to the rising number of threats and conflicts in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This has generated an opportunity for the US to pursue a range of initiatives leading to closer security cooperation with the countries that are disturbed by regional events, particularly the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, Libya's continued adventurism, Jordan's precarious position vis-a-vis Syria (especially if the King moves toward the peace process), the unresolved issue of the Palestinians, continued Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and increased terrorism throughout the area, all present a threat to both US and regional interests. Thus, it is important that we vigorously pursue security cooperation with key regional countries now.

(S) At the same time, we must recognize the limitations and obstacles that will be encountered in the near-term as we attempt to satisfy the cooperative security requirements needed with regional states to execute our overall strategy. Success in obtaining these requirements will be incremental. Our success will also be affected by regional perceptions of the security situation, i.e., the intensity of the threat, as well as by our efforts in the Middle East peace process.

(TS) In implementing NSDD guidance, the US is seeking security cooperation with Israel to counter Soviet threats in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, and to counter Soviet/Syrian threats against Israel and Jordan. Given our commitment to Israel's security and its ability to assist in safeguarding US security interests in the region, we have begun to define specific areas of cooperation with Israel in Joint Political-Military Planning Group meetings.

(TS) Of equal importance, as stated in NSDD guidance, and in parallel with our efforts regarding Israel, we intend to strengthen our security relationship with moderate Arab states. Capitalizing on Gulf state concerns due to the Iran-Iraq war, we recently began political and military consultations with area states on measures to deter and defend against a possible escalation of the war. These consultations have revealed agreement among the Gulf Arab states and the US concerning the Iranian threat to the Gulf and a desire for continued dialogues, although there have been no agreements yet on actual cooperation in meeting Iranian threats. We plan to continue them to gain additional cooperation, particularly with countries like UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, where we have just started bilateral military dialogues. In order to encourage further cooperation, as well as to enhance interoperability, a review of our current advanced fighter aircraft policy for the Gulf should be conducted immediately. In Oman and Saudi Arabia, we intend to expand our existing cooperation to include other areas, using mechanisms already in place, e.g., the Contingency Planning Group in Saudi Arabia. Since most Gulf states tend to take their lead from Saudi Arabia when dealing with the US on security issues, we should continue to consult with the Saudis concerning our plans, while not seeking their approval for arrangements we intend to pursue with other states. This way, if they prefer (as they have before), they can keep their distance, while quietly lobbying other Gulf states on our behalf. While regional threat perceptions remain high, we should seek to increase security cooperation with Jordan and Pakistan, as we have with Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan.

(TS) In sum, to meet the objectives of NSDDs 99, 111, 114 and 115, it is important that we pursue security cooperation with both Israel and the moderate Arab states, even though we can expect criticism from both parties about our arrangements with the other. Not only can Israel play a valuable role in assisting US security planning in the region, but cooperation with Israel will help smooth Congressional approval for cooperation with the Arab states. Without cooperation with the moderate Arabs, our Southwest Asia strategy cannot be implemented. Thus, it is important for Israel to understand that we are prepared

to fight in Congress to obtain approval for military assistance programs for the moderate Arab states, such as the US-Jordanian Joint Logistics Planning program.

Allied Cooperation

(S) NSDD 99 directs that we transform general allied recognition of the value of our SWA policy into specific contributions to deterrence in SWA and, more generally, to the defense of NATO and the Pacific. Within NATO, we will continue to press our allies to produce a meaningful package of measures to compensate for US forces that might be diverted from reinforcement of Europe to SWA. Our requirements for allied assistance for US deployments to SWA will continue to be refined and agreements negotiated with specific allies. We will put greater emphasis on our bilateral efforts to obtain direct military contributions in the SWA region from selected allies.

(S) Allied contributions will vary. While we hope to receive contributions from our allies in the form of compensation and facilitation, direct allied participation with us in SWA defense and deterrence will be less comprehensive. Except for the British and the French, our allies are not well equipped to provide significant levels of military support for US operations in SWA. It will be with those two countries that we will continue to concentrate our efforts. For some allies, such as West Germany, Australia, and New Zealand, the bulk of what we can expect is compensation within their respective regions. For Japan, our efforts will focus on encouraging vigorously a steady expansion of Japanese military capability to protect the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from the home islands, thus possibly freeing US assets for use in SWA. In addition, we will continue to urge Japan to increase its already substantial economic assistance to countries in SWA. For others, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, facilities support for the deployment of US forces will be the focus. Our objective is to develop a division of labor among our allies so that each is asked to make both an appropriate and constructive contribution, and so that our allies are seen as supportive of our policy. Even limited allied assistance contributes significantly to deterrence.

(S) Of particular importance to our Southwest Asia strategy is Turkey. As highlighted in NSDD 99, Turkey occupies a strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes into Southwest Asia. The presence of staging bases in eastern Turkey, for example, would significantly increase the deterrent value of our SWA policy and, should deterrence fail, could greatly enhance our ability to interdict the movement of Soviet forces. Turkey has agreed to the construction of Collocated Operating Bases in

eastern Turkey for US aircraft. However, under the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding, they are intended specifically to support NATO missions. While we should continue to pursue low-key Southwest Asia initiatives with Turkey, we should not expect a change in Turkey's "NATO-missions only" policy for US bases. However, the MOU does not preclude non-NATO use, and the presence of the bases (as well as the large standing Turkish forces) greatly complicates Soviet planning and increases their uncertainty of success for any SWA adventure.

Arms Transfer Policies

(S) The Work Program reviews our arms transfer policy for the region and recommends air defense, coastal surveillance/defense, and mobile ground forces as areas with the highest political-military payoff. Improvements in each of these mission areas would help regional states contribute to a more rationalized division of labor for regional defense. In addition, purchase of US equipment by regional states will assist USCENTCOM in its logistics and maintenance planning for contingencies in the area. The Work Program also recommends consideration of a more expansive view of technology transfer policies to the Gulf area so that total weapon system capability may be addressed. Examples of the types of weapon systems that should be considered are air-to-air missiles and C3I systems. The Work Program calls for US assistance to Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan to help them maintain their Soviet equipment rather than replacing it with US or Western origin material, which they cannot afford.

Recommended Courses of Action

(S) Actions are already underway to implement our Near East and South Asia policy. These include the political and military consultations with regional states about the Iran-Iraq war, the successful first round of Joint Political-Military Group talks with the Israelis, continued military planning for this region, establishment of an afloat forward headquarters element for USCENTCOM, the pre-positioning of materiel both on land and afloat in the region, and plans to move ahead on implementing the Joint Logistics Planning program for Jordan. In addition, over the next 12 months we intend to pursue the following:

- reaffirm the programmed force for Southwest Asia and ensure funding in FY 1986-1990 to support and equip these forces;
- review our Gulf states fighter aircraft sales policy; along these same lines, make a major effort to improve interoperability in critical areas such as communications, IFF, munitions, ground attack capabilities, and command and control data;

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- consider a more expansive view of technology transfer policies to the Gulf area so that states, capable of absorbing new technology might have greater access to it; at the same time, we will have to guard against the risks of technology transfer to the Soviet Union or other unfriendly states (e.g., Libya);
- undertake a review of our policy regarding transfer of C³I and early warning systems to Gulf states as part of our effort to deter/counter Iranian aggression and improve security cooperation, e.g., the E-2 aircraft;
- conduct a high-level visit by a government official to the Arabian Peninsula to show US concern and commitment there;
- take advantage of the current cooperative atmosphere and lay the groundwork for more military-to-military talks with Persian Gulf states. In particular, brief the Saudis through the Contingency Planning Group (CPG) on our concept for countering a Soviet invasion of Iran. Following thereon, seek Saudi approval for combined planning through the CPG for Saudi contingency support.
- make a concerted effort to establish at least one communications station in the region to support even limited contingencies involving US forces;
- approach regional states in an effort to satisfy USCENTCOM fuel support requirements;
- achieve US-host nation medical cooperation and support arrangements for US and host nation casualties occurring in host countries as a result of terrorist incidents or military operations;
- continue to seek permission to locate additional land-based pre-positioning sites and staging bases in the region, with appropriate host nation support, especially in those nations near the Persian Gulf where our access is limited;
- consider a State-Defense trip to Europe to continue discussions with our allies concerning cooperation in Southwest Asia; and
- continue to press in NATO for inclusion in nations' defense plans, and implementation of, specific measures to compensate for the possible diversion of US forces from the reinforcement of Europe to SWA.

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(U) The interagency Coordinating Group will continue to monitor the progress in implementing these actions, as well as others described in the Work Program, and to review our Near East and South Asia policy. It will meet biannually and submit its findings through the Secretaries of State and Defense to the President.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Caspar W. Weinberger *CW*

Subject: NSDD 99 Conclusion Paper (U)

(S) We have concluded the Work Program that addresses issues in the National Security Decision Directive on US Strategy for the Near East and South Asia (NSDD 99). The attached conclusion paper is a summation of our findings, including specific areas of interest that are of high-level concern and recommended near term actions that would contribute to implementing the strategy.

(U) We believe these findings and recommended near term actions are of sufficient concern that they should be discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council. This should be an information meeting as this paper is not designed to be used as the basis for decisions on possible strategy alternatives.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 12/16/00

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Declassify on OADR

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~~MEETING~~
11:00 - 12:00
September 14, 1984
Subject: Arms Control
Principal ~~Room~~
~~Principal Room~~

Discuss UNGA

OVP - 4213 - Phyllis

State - 632-5804 - Sheila

Defense - 659-6064 wcb

CIA - ~~██████████~~

JCS - 695-4824 - Sgt Orr - Gen ~~blowing~~ John A. Wickham, Jr. Acting Chairman

~~OMB~~ - 6190 - 10 - desinitated

USUN - 632-8647 - Mary/Kirkpatrick

ACDA - 632-4766 ADELMAN / CODPER (Staples)

MEESE - 2235 - out of town

BAKER - 6797 - Barbara

DEAVER - 6475 - Donna

~~BERMAN~~ - 2702 no Joe

KRAEMER no - Kraemer

MCFARLANE - Florence

Lehman - Ellie

Ximmitt - Florence

Tell Lehman


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By CS, NARA, Date 7/22/02

AMB. EDWARD L. ROWNY

Chair US STATE

AMB. PAUL H. NITZE

Special Rep for Arms Com
DASATM.



U.S. Strategy for the Near East and South Asia

ISSUE: The Conclusions Paper prepared by State and DoD highlights several problems that are of high-level concern. The most important conclusion is that our current planning to block a major Soviet thrust through Iran to the Gulf is complicated by a variety of questionable assumptions and shortfalls. For example:

- We need to move on warning of a Soviet invasion, but if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a prologue, that warning may be ambiguous.

- Our access to the necessary staging bases enroute to the Persian Gulf area (in Europe or north Africa) appears problematic until and unless the Soviets actually mount an invasion.

- Because of the well-known reluctance of the moderate Arabs to engage in planning to support the deployment of our forces in a contingency, we have not been able to prepare detailed arrangements for the deployment of -- and logistics support for -- the number and types of forces we would have to move in any major contingency involving the Soviets.

- If the Soviets were to posture (e.g., mobilize) their forces facing NATO, even as they prepared to move toward the Gulf, we would face very difficult choices. In short, many of the forces we would need to defend in Southwest Asia are also committed to NATO. Moreover, the lift (airlift and sealift) we would need to move and sustain forces in Southwest Asia would be required to reinforce NATO.

DISCUSSION:

In view of the foregoing difficulties and uncertainties which complicate our plans for dealing with major Soviet aggression in this critical region (and it will remain critical for the foreseeable future), we need to at least consider whether our current strategy and the derivative strategic concept (e.g., establishing a forward defense in the Zagros mountains of Iran) are valid guides for planning.

While the strategy, and the force requirements derived from the strategy, provide certain direction for our future defense programs and budgets, it is so fraught with risks that it may not provide sensible direction for our contingency planners concerned with the near-term. At least two of the problems we have identified really beg the question of whether the strategy makes sense even for long-term programs and budgets.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
SEC. 1.4 (c)

If the [redacted] continue to refuse to enter into meaningful discussions and realistic plans for our use of their bases including the prepositioning of adequate supplies to support the forces we would deploy in a major contingency, should we continue to program and budget on the assumption that they will? While risky and politically difficult on a variety of counts, an alternative approach would be to redraw our strategy and structure our plans to rely on Allies [redacted] and on forces which are not so heavily dependent on secure access to forward bases in the early stages of a crisis which could culminate in a Soviet move to the Gulf (e.g., naval projection forces and prepositioned sealift). While we could not operate indefinitely without bases in the region [redacted], this alternative posture might permit a much more rapid response and provide the capabilities to move quickly into those bases when they become available -- or when we decide it has become imperative to avail ourselves of them.


Given the simultaneous requirements to improve NATO defenses in Europe and procure adequate forces to respond to Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia, can we afford to continue on the present track (improving our readiness for both)?

This is perhaps the most difficult and contentious issue arising from the study, but we must face it squarely and recognize that there may be alternatives, however unattractive.

One would be to freeze our NATO commitment at roughly the present level, with due allowance for modernization. We could simply tell the Europeans that competing demands for our forces elsewhere are such as to require them to bear more of the brunt of improving NATO's conventional defenses in the future.

Another option would be to press the Europeans much harder, than we have to date, to make direct contributions to the defense of the Gulf and its resources. Either way the Europeans will have to bear a much greater defense burden than they have to date.

Alternatively, and especially if we desire to mount a serious effort to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, [redacted]





While there are a variety of reasons not to press the Japanese for direct force contributions for the defense of the Gulf, we could argue for more offsets from Japan to defray the cost of what we are doing to protect the oil resources. This could include more Japanese forces for defense of the Pacific and/or having Japan share the economic burden of improving base structure in the Gulf and helping to procure adequate supplies for U.S. forces which might be deployed in the region.

SUMMARY: The issues raised in this scope paper do not require immediate action. The twin dilemmas we face in trying to defend countries which are reluctant to be seen as cooperating with us and attempting to unilaterally protect resources which are vital to the entire Western world will eventually require resolution. For the moment, we should recognize the problems and begin thinking about our options for the future.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/5/12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1984

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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: August 31, 1984

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review the work study program completed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense on our strategy for the Near East and South Asia. The work program was undertaken pursuant to National Security Decision Directive 99 (NSDD-99) (Tab A). Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger have recommended this meeting to brief the findings of the work program.

II. BACKGROUND.

Following an NSC meeting on this subject on July 11, 1983, you signed NSDD-99 which directed State and DoD to undertake a comprehensive review of requirements and to prepare recommendations on the measures necessary to implement our military and diplomatic strategies for the Near East and South Asia. This review has now been completed and the memorandum at Tab B from Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger forwards a summary of the study and some conclusions. The meeting will afford you the opportunity to review the findings of this study effort in more detail and to examine several important issues and conclusions which have arisen in the course of the study. The purpose of NSDD-99 was to ensure that our capabilities were brought more into line with our extensive interests in the vital Persian Gulf region. We have made progress, but important issues remain. As Iran appears to be entering the beginning of a possible succession struggle, it is more than timely that we revisit this issue. Moreover, quite apart from immediate needs, the oil of the Gulf will remain -- well into the 1990's -- the source of the largest quantity of low-cost energy in the world. While we focus primarily on avoiding disruptions, we need to realize that we must also prevent a resource of this magnitude from falling into Soviet hands, as this would fully transform the global power balance. Attached at Tab C

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is a scope paper which focuses on several issues in more detail. As noted in the memorandum from George and Cap, we do not believe that this particular meeting should produce new decisions. We do think it is important for you to review and assess the work which has been completed and that you be briefed on the problems we face. Finally, this meeting will afford an opportunity to raise several initiatives we could consider in the future to mitigate some of the problems that will be highlighted during this meeting. Should you want to touch on these issues at the end of the meeting, suggested talking points for your use are at Tab D.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary George P. Shultz
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
William J. Casey
Robert C. McFarlane
General John W. Vessey, USA

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject, after which Bill Casey will provide an update on the Soviet threat to our vital interest in the region. Secretary Shultz will review our interests and objectives and summarize the status of our relations with the key countries of the region. Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey will brief you on our military plans and programs. No specific decisions are being requested. An agenda for the meeting is at Tab E.

Prepared by:
Philip A. Dur
Donald P. Fortier

Attachments

- Tab A - National Security Decision Directive 99
- Tab B - Shultz and Weinberger Memo (Summary and Conclusions Paper Attached)
- Tab C - Scope Paper
- Tab D - Suggested Talking Points for the President
- Tab E - Agenda for NSPG

cc: Vice President
Secretary Regan
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Mike Deaver

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 12, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 99

United States Security Strategy for
the Near East and South Asia (S)

The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffirmed the basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The derivative and complementary regional security interests, objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4 are approved and restated herewith: (U)

U.S. Regional Interests

- to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. (S)
- to maintain continued access for the US and its principal allies to Gulf oil. (TS)

U.S. Regional Security Objectives

- to deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary. (S)
- to counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by other means. (TS)
- to protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of oil. (S)
- to ensure the security of Israel within secure and internationally recognized borders. (S)
- to obtain a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem based upon the principles outlined by the President on September 1, 1982. (U)
- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our interests. (U)
- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)
- to expand US influence with selected states in the region. (S)

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BY NARA Date 12/16/07

- to limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region.
- to discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities in the region. (S)

Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives

The most serious threats to our vital interests and objectives in the region are the power, influence, and activity of the Soviet Union. The geographic proximity of the USSR and its determination to interfere, directly and indirectly, with the internal complexion and external alignment of countries which border it compound the threats. In this regard, the improvements in the regular military forces of the Soviet Union poised for use in the region and the enhanced power projection capabilities available for use in the Near East and South Asia, pose a formidable challenge. In addition, the inimical regional policies and activities of governments, such as the fundamentalist regime in Iran, pose a clear challenge to the moderate oil producing countries. Finally, our vital interests could be directly threatened by internal unrest and upheaval in the moderate Arab countries. (S)

Intra-regional conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the Arab-Israel conflict pose serious threats to our vital interests. Other potential regional conflicts which would pose grave danger to US interests include another Indo-Pakistani war and renewed fighting between the PDRY on the one hand and either Oman or the YAR on the other. These conflicts threaten our interests by creating potential superpower confrontations, opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, the spread of violence and instability, and the estrangement of key regional states. The continuing Soviet presence in Ethiopia and the PDRY poses threats to our vital LOCs and the projection of US forces into the area. Moreover, Soviet and Cuban support of local conflicts and insurgencies further destabilize the region. (S)

Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia

The foregoing validation of our national security interests and objectives in the region provides the basis for refining and revising our regional strategy, as necessary. To advance US interests requires a comprehensive political-military strategy which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic and security initiatives. This strategy must develop and exploit opportunities to strengthen the US strategic posture in the Near East and South Asia and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the US serves their national interests. In keeping with our core interests, we are committed to acquiring the capabilities to mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as possible, including Iran as appropriate. Our strategy is to

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include balanced use of the three key US assets as perceived in the region: ~~(S)~~

-- the US ability to deter and counter Soviet aggression; ~~(S)~~

-- the unique capability among outside powers to take a leading role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; ~~(S)~~

-- the technological, industrial, economic and military strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other countries. (U)

Strategic Concept for Near-Term Planning

Beyond the defense of NATO's southern flank, the Eastern Mediterranean and its littoral, our near term military strategy and the derivative concept and operations plans for the Near East and South Asia should focus on defending the oil fields, the transshipment points and the sea and air lines of communication to this theater. Our plans should, in any case, allow us to prevent control of these vital resources by the Soviet Union. Plans should be based on prudent assumptions regarding the active cooperation of countries in the region, and those outside the region that might provide enroute support. Until we have procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force structure and we have assured access to the base facilities necessary to undertake a robust forward defense of the Gulf region, our plans should be based on the existing and programmed capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and allies which are not forces "assigned" to NATO or their essential support. Together with others, we must be ready to move military assets forward first, to deter Soviet aggression on receipt of strategic warning, and secondly, to interdict the movement of Soviet combat forces to the Gulf region. I also want to reaffirm this Administration's determination to block any military moves by the Soviets, their surrogates or any other powers which threaten US and allied access to the critical resources of the region. ~~(S)~~

Cooperation with Other Countries

Because our vital interests in this part of the world are essentially shared interests, we must redouble our efforts to obtain the cooperation of our allies and other friendly powers in bringing stability to the region, deterring threats to vital Western interests and, in the final analysis, defending those interests. In addition, mindful of the need for cooperation in the security of energy, the U.S. remains committed to the goals of the International Energy Agency and other commitments enumerated in NSDD 9-82 and NSDD-87. ~~(S)~~

-- NATO Allies and Japan. To demonstrate our solidarity and enhance deterrence we should seek assistance in the form of

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direct military contributions from our principal NATO allies with highly mobile and specialized military capabilities suitable to a variety of NE/SA scenarios, especially the UK and France. With regard to the potential contributions of the UK and France, we should be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the movement of their specialized forces to the region. In keeping with ongoing negotiations, our principal allies and the FRG and Japan, in particular, should be asked to contribute by assisting in the improvement of infrastructure which would facilitate defense of the oil fields and the critical transshipment points. They should also be encouraged to increase security and economic assistance to poor but important countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Egypt and Pakistan. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Turkey. Because Turkey occupies a strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes, our cooperation in contingency planning beyond the traditional NATO missions is of fundamental importance. To enhance Turkish confidence; promote the cooperation we seek; and, equally important, to help Turkey realize its military potential, we need a strategy for securing new and more meaningful increases in defense funding for Turkey. This may entail, inter alia, a serious effort to obtain help from allies and the Gulf States and imaginative steps to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean problems which impede allied cooperation and frustrate Congressional funding. Steps must be taken to develop immediate plans for exercising US and allied forces in Eastern Turkey on a more regular basis. To overcome concerns within NATO about activities beyond the treaty area, we need to make a strong case in NATO that the improvements we seek in Eastern Turkey are required in any event to cope with a Soviet attack in that area. Our efforts to upgrade co-located operating bases should be strengthened, and we should continue to explore other measures which would enhance the responsiveness of our forces. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Israel. I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the Near East and South Asia would be enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier. To this end, we should conduct an internal review on where we could profit militarily from cooperative planning for major Soviet involvement and aggression which threaten vital western interests in the Near East and South Asia. The emphasis should be on Israeli contributions which could serve our military objectives in countering Soviet capabilities. This review should commence immediately and the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense should be submitted to me not later than August 30, 1983. Thereafter, we will develop an interagency plan to implement the findings of this review as feasible and appropriate. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Arab Powers. Given the critical need for facilities access in the region and, in some instances, the potential of Arab military forces, we should continue and expand our cooperative planning with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. We should also consider what potential role Lebanon might play in our strategy in the future. Improvements in our strategic position in the Horn of Africa should be sought. This could well require increased efforts to weaken Soviet positions in the PDRY and Ethiopia. (PS)

-- Cooperation with Pakistan. Our efforts to promote cooperation with Pakistan to meet Soviet contingencies in the region must be pressed, including plans for joint exercises and access to facilities, bearing in mind the political and military challenges Pakistan faces. The precedent established by the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan and the potential for future Soviet encroachments in areas such as Baluchistan should be discussed anew with the Pakistanis. Bearing in mind Pakistani sensitivities, our future efforts should reemphasize the value of prior contingency planning and a program for Security Assistance which is rationalized with our own capabilities. In this regard our plans should recognize the importance of Pakistan in the interdiction of Soviet LOCs to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. We must recognize the importance of, and be willing to help plan to meet, those contingencies which the Pakistanis find most threatening. We should also continue with determination and clarity of purpose to discourage the further development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. (PS)

-- Cooperation with India. Consistent with our goals for cooperation with Pakistan we should adopt a diplomatic strategy which more explicitly recognizes India's strategic importance in both regional and global terms. This strategy should have as its initial objective, the improvement of relations between India, the PRC and Pakistan and the gradual weakening of India's military dependency on the Soviet Union. To this end we must continue our efforts to broaden our economic and military ties with India including closer liaison between our military establishments. We must continue our efforts to convince the Indian Government of the need to resist Soviet expansion and our determination to do so and to discourage regional disputes which can only redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. (PS)

Implementation

I would like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a comprehensive agenda of the preferred ways to implement the military and diplomatic strategies outlined above. A comprehensive examination of requirements for contingencies in the region is needed to include prepositioning, communications, access to enroute and in-theater facilities as well as a detailed

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examination of the relationship between our own arms transfer policies and other Western arms sales. The work program should be developed and the reviews should be completed on a priority basis. The work program should be submitted to the NSC by 30 July and thereafter periodic reports should be submitted to me to describe progress and to discuss problems which may arise. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Caspar W. Weinberger

Subject: NSDD 99 Conclusion Paper (U)

~~(S)~~ We have concluded the Work Program that addresses issues in the National Security Decision Directive on US Strategy for the Near East and South Asia (NSDD 99). The attached conclusion paper is a summation of our findings, including specific areas of interest that are of high-level concern and recommended near term actions that would contribute to implementing the strategy.

(U) We believe these findings and recommended near term actions are of sufficient concern that they should be discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council. This should be an information meeting as this paper is not designed to be used as the basis for decisions on possible strategy alternatives.

Attachment

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/6/00

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