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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG): Records, 1981-1987

Folder Title: 0094 31 August 1984 [India/Pakistan/Afghanistan] (1) **Box:** 91307

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NATIONAL

SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG): Records

File Folder: NSPG 0094 31 Aug 1984 [India/Pakistan/Afghanistan] (1)

Box 91306

Archivist: dlb

Date: 12/6/00 Skinner/F00-003

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. List	Attendees for Meeting, (partial), 1p. 128 128	n.d.	P3/B3
2. Brfg Memo	Robert McFarlane to [Reagan], re: Meeting with the National Security Planning Group, 4 p.	8/30/84	P1/B1
3. Paper	re: India-Pakistan, 5 p.	8/84	P1/B1
4. Memo	Donald Fortier, Philip Dur, Shirin Tahir-Kheli to McFarlane, re: Additional Subject for the NSPG Meeting on August 31, 1984, 1 p.	8/30/84	P1/B1
5. Talking Pts	Talking Points for NSPG: Pakistan, 3 p. # 132	n.d.	P1/B1
6. Memo	Fortier to McFarlane, re: NSPG on South Asia, 1 p.	8/30/84	P1/B1
7. Memo	JCS to Ass't. Sec. of Def., re: OSD/JCS Input to State Paper Supporting, 4 p.	8/29/84	P1/B1
8. Draft Memo	Richard Murphy, John Chain to Shultz, re: NSPG Meeting on Nuclear Policy and Reducing, 7 p.	8/30/84	P1/B1
9. Annex	to Item #8,2 p. NIGPOU-003/1 #136	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

- Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 P-1 National security classified information ((a)(1) of the PRA).
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA).
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
- the PRAI.
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

the FOIA].

- Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

 B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

 B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]. Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of

TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DOCDATE 840831

PARTIC PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT ADELMAN, K

CASEY, W GATES, R ARMITAGE, R

WEINBERGER, C MOREAU, A VESSEY, J

FORTIER KEEL, A DUR

MURPHY, D MURPHY, R SHULTZ, G

MCFARLANE MEESE, E REGAN, D

R0601 * END OF DOCUMENTS IN LIST > ENTER RETURN OR ANOTHER COMMAND.

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

VYCKY LARA Vychy - TO

SUBJECT:

Attendance List for National Security Planning

Group Meeting, August 31, 1984 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Planning Group meeting on India-Pakistan / NSDD-99 which is scheduled for August 31, 1984 in the Situation Room from 11:00 to 12:00. (8)

The President

The Vice President's Office Vice President Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Mr. Richard Murphy (Asst Secretary for Near East Affairs)

Treasury:

Secretary Donald P. Regan

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Mr. Richard Armitage

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel

ACDA

Kenneth L. Adelman

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

Mr. Robert M. Gates

JCS

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

By White Hous

100 Ed 1997

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
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SECRET

White House:	
Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. James A. Baker, III	
Mr. Michael K. Deaver	
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane	
NSC Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt F	ortin .
Ma	y sunth with Sherin, of desired. Both connot attend.
	Both connet attend.
Approved	As Amended K
Attached for your approva meeting.	l is a seating plan and agenda for this
(seating plan) Approved	As Amended K
(agenda) Approved	As Amended

Attachments: Seating Plan Agenda

SECRET Declassify: OADR



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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP Friday, August 31, 1984 White House Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Agenda

Pakistan

I. Introduction Robert C. McFarlane

II. Key Intelligence Judgments Director Casey

III. U.S. Policy Options Secretary Shultz/
Secretary Weinberger

IV. Summary Robert C. McFarlane

NSDD-99 Work Program

I. Intelligence Assessment
O Soviet Posture towards
the Persian Gulf

III. Policy and Diplomatic Overview

Secretary Shultz

IV. Strategic Concepts, Military
Planning and Force Programs

Robert C. McFarlane

Director Casey

Secretary Shultz

Secretary Weinberger/
General Vessey

V. Status of Diplomatic and Military Secretary Shultz/
Negotiations with Major U.S. Secretary Weinberger
Allies and Friendly Countries
in the Region

VI. Summary

Robert C. McFarlane

White House Gi

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Declassify on: OADR



MSG FROM: NSCEC --CPUA

TO: NSGVE --CPUA

08/21/84 10:55:03

Ser

To: NSGVE --CPUA

NOTE FROM: CAROL E. CLEVELAND

Subject: Forwarding Note 08/21/84 10.28 nsc/nspg meetings

Please give copies of this note to appropriate staffers and a copy for your mee ting file and one for our office. Thank you.

FORWARDED NOTE

To: NSPBT --CPUA

--\ SEOREF --

SECRET

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt SUBJECT: nsc/nspg meetings

- -- tuesday, 8/28, nsc meeting from 11-12 in the cabinet room on the subject of imf for poland. principal plus one are invited. treasury, str, commerce, and usia, in addition to our regulars, should be invited. we need today a notice to state and treaury that also tasks them to prepare papers for the meeting. papers due cob 8/23. action dobriansky, comment robinson.
- -- friday, 8/31, nspg meeting from 11-12 in the sit rm on nsdd-99 followup. principals only, except that state, osd, jcs, and cia may bring plus one. action dur, comment kemp and fortier. (note that this is a new date for the nspg, based on the higher priority of the poland nsc.)

cc: NSRCM --CPUA **NSJMP** --CPUA **NSDRF** --CPUA **NSTCS** --CPUA **NSWGH** --CPUA --CPUA NSKWZ --CPUA **NSFEG NSCEC** --CPUA --CPUA **NSBTM** --CPUA NSRA

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelin , August 28, 1997

Friday August 31, 1984 Subject: NSDD-99 (11:30-12:00) INDIA PAKISTAN (11:00 -11:30) PRINCIPAL ONLY (*may bring plus one) 11:00 - 12:00 Situation Room OVP-4213 (PHyliss) VP / murphy M* STATE-632-8338 (CHARLES) SHUCTZ/ Richard MURPHY unt see NEA *JCS-695-4824 Myessey/moreau/Annotage 2344 *CIA-CONTOS2-864/7 not attending
MERCE ---₩EESE -2235 → BAKER - 6797 √ DEAVER - 6475 MCFARLANE KIMMITT Forther 5076 TREasury - per Bob Secretary Regar obly to be invited - Regar Sitvation Rm - Gilda

> CVs F00-003/1 #128 CVs 7/27/02

ACDA-632-4766

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To:	Officer-in-charge Appointments Center					
	Room 060, OEOB					
Pleas	e admit the following appointments on	August	31		, 1	9_84
for_	The President	of	Wh	ite Hous	е	
101_	(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)	01		(AGENO	Y)	•
14	The Vice President's Office Vice President Admiral Daniel J. Murphy		Mr. Mr.	e House Edwin Me James A. Michael	Bake	r, III
)/	State Secretary George P. Shultz Mr. Richard Murphy	1	Mr.	Robert C	. McF	arlane
\	Treasury Secretary Donald P. Regan	77	Mr. Mr.	Donald F Philip A	ortie . Dur	er
]]	Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinber Mr. Richard Armitage	ger				
	OMB Dr. Alton Keel					
7	ACDA Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman					
7]	CIA Mr. William J. Casey Mr. Robert M. Gates					
"	JCS General John W. Vessey, Jr. Admiral Arthur S. Moreau					
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		ate of request_				

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8/29/84

MEMORANDUM

TO:

ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM:

FREDERICK J. RYAN. JR.

SUBJ:

APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING:

with National Security Planning Group

DATE:

August 31, 1984

TIME:

11:00 am

DURATION:

60 minutes

LOCATION:

Situation Room

REMARKS REQUIRED: Agenda to be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE:

None

FIRST LADY

PARTICIPATION:

No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

R. Darman

J. Rosebush

R. Kimmitt

R. Deprospero

R. Scouten

B. Elliott D. Fischer B. Shaddix

W. Sittmann

C. Fuller

W. Henkel

L. Speakes

E. Hickey

WHCA Audio/Visual WHCA Operations

G. Hodges C. McCain

A. Wrobleski Nell Yates

B. Oglesby

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SUBJECT: NSPG MTG REVIEW OF NSDD 99 WORK PROGRAM

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SYSTEM II 90894 Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1984

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: August 31, 1984

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE TEM

I. PURPOSE

This topic has been added to the agenda for the NSPG meeting previously requested to review our strategy for Southwest Asia.

We will then examine ways of deterring Soviet and Indian actions, sustaining the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship while dealing with the problems arising from Pakistan's nuclear program.

BACKGROUND II.

State has chaired an interagency review of our current policy in light of a growing body of evidence which points to the likelihood of more severe Soviet-Afghan reprisals against Pakistan as well as a possible Indian move against Pakistan's nuclear research facilities. The key judgments of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SMIE) on this problem are at Tab A.

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
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How we present this message to Zia and who delivers it are almost as important as the elements of our negotiating strategy. In the first place, Zia must be convinced of the Indian threat and of our ability to sustain support if he accepts our arguments and pressure from the Soviets continues to mount. The messenger must be perceived in Islamabad as a top-level and credible envoy. Secondly, the mission requires the utmost in discretion. Put starkly, the issue is so sensitive that we simply cannot afford any leaks or press-play.

My recommendation is that you review the intelligence and listen to the discussion of the risks and opportunities at the NSPG meeting. If you are persuaded that this is a critical situation which requires urgent action, I recommend that you convey a decision to send a high-level emissary to Islamabad. Following the NSFG, George and I could discuss the modalities with you.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary George P. Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Director William J. Casey
Kenneth L. Edelman
Robert C. McFarlane
General John W. Vessey, USA

IV. PRESS PLAN

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V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

at Tab B.

I will introduce the subject

George Shultz will summarize the key judgments of the policy review we have just completed and Cap will comment on our options for increased security assistance including U.S. deployments. An agenda for both subjects to be addressed at the meeting is attached

Prepared by:
Donald R. Fortier
Philip A. Dur
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

BI

Attachments

Tab A - Key Intelligence Judgments, Special National Intelligence Estimate 31/32-84
Tab B - Agenda

cc: Vice President

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SFORET

I. Introduction

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

Friday, August 31, 1984
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Agenda

Pakistan

II.	Key Intelligence Judgments	Director Casey					
III.	U.S. Policy Options	Secretary Shultz/ Secretary Weinberger					
IV.	Summary	Robert C. McFarlane					
	NSDD-99 Work Prog.	ram					
I.	Introduction	Robert C. McFarlane					
II.	Intelligence Assessment o Soviet Posture towards the Persian Gulf	Director Casey					
III.	Policy and Diplomatic Overview	Secretary Shultz					
īV.	Strategic Concepts, Military Planning and Force Programs	Secretary Weinberger/ General Vessey					
V.	Status of Diplomatic and Military Negotiations with Major U.S. Allies and Friendly Countries in the Region	Secretary Shultz/ Secretary Weinberger					
VI.	Summary	Robert C. McFarlane					

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Robert C. McFarlane

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August 30, 1984



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

DONALD A. FORTIER PHILIP A. DUR MIL Jul for SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI Jul for

SUBJECT:

Additional Subject for the NSPG Meeting on

August 31, 1984

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum you could send to the President which covers the additional subject we have added to the NSPG agenda. We have included for the President's review the key judgments in the recent Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Indo-Pak problem. As discussed, we have not attached the interagency paper because it is not finished and, moreover, we do not think it would be useful in preparing for the meeting tomorrow. We have instead covered the subject in the background section of your briefing memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

That	you	sign	the	attached	memorandum	at	Tab	I	to	the	President.
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Approve D:	:approve
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Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane memo to the President

Tab A - Key Intelligence Judgments, Special National

Intelligence Estimate 31/32-84

Tab B - Agenda

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SECRET

I. Introduction

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP


Friday, August 31, 1984
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Robert C. McFarlane

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TALKING POINTS FOR NSFG: PAKISTAN

- -- Mr. President, the first subject on our agenda is Pakistan.

 We want to review with you the current situation on the

 Pak-Afghan border and some disturbing intelligence on Indian
 activities.
- -- The problem, as we see it, is three sided:
 - -- the Soviets and the Afghans may continue to increase the pressure on Pakistan's northern border;
 - -- President Zia's refusal to safeguard the nuclear enrichment facility and indications of intensified nuclear weapons research; and
 - -- growing tension in Indo-Pak relations and indications that India may be preparing to pre-empt Pakistan's nuclear facility.
- -- While this is dangerous situation, it also may afford us a unique opportunity to:
 - -- demonstrate our interest and concern for Pakistan's security in the face of increased Soviet pressure;

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- -- at the same time, make very clear to the Pakistanis that cur long-term security relationship turns on safeguards for Pakistani nuclear facilities; and
- -- remove a possible incentive (or excuse) for Indian military action against Pakistan.
- -- In short, we want to consider these issues together and devise a strategy which exploits the unique opportunity which the situation provides us.
- -- I'd like to turn first to Bill Casey for an update and some key judgments from recent intelligence.

-- Bill Casey --

-- George, could you and Cap discuss the elements we could consider in a new initiative we could present to the Pakistanis.

-- George Shultz --







Points which may be raised during discussion

- -- Doesn't the confluence of the trends offer us a unique opportunity to curb the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent? Isn't Zia concerned enough for visible support in the face of Soviet pressure, not to mention the information we could provide about a possible Indian strike, to make possible some steps toward safeguards?
- Pakistan suffice? If he is really prepared to undertake a transition to safeguards, shouldn't we offer a more graphic and visible expression of our support, either leasing E2Cs or temporary deployment of AWACS? This type of demonstration would have a beneficial spill-over on the Indian problem.





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ACTION

August 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

PHILIP A. DUR MINISTER JUNIOR

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Your Use at the NSPG (Pakistan) Friday, August 31, 1984 - 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

Attached at Tab I are talking points you could use to introduce the agenda item on Pakistan at tomorrow's NSPG meeting.

Recommendation

That you use the talking points at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment

Tab I Talking points

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO:

The Secretary

FROM:

NEA - Richard W. Murphy

PM - John T. Chain, Jr.

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Nuclear Policy and Reducing Tensions

in South Asia

I. Objectives

The NSPG meeting is being held to consider a study (Tab A), prepared at NSC request, which deals with our nuclear non-proliferation policy toward Pakistan in the context of an effort to reduce tensions and head off the possibility of conflict in South Asia during the next few months.

Our objectives are to obtain:

(1) Approval of the option-packages of measures we propose to deal with the rise in tensions in South Asia, especially the need to assure Pakistan on its security;

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- (2) Approval in principle to tell the Pakistanis, in a connection with the nuclear steps below, that we are prepared to consider continuing our program of security assistance beyond FY-87 at levels comparable to those now funded;
- (3) Approval for a message from the President to President Zia expressing our grave concerns about uranium enrichment in Pakistan and seeking reaffirmation of earlier Pakistani assurances;
- (4) A decision on whether to link continued US security assistance to Pakistani compliance with their assurances against production of highly enriched uranium.

II. Setting

This meeting is occasioned by our concerns that: (a) that Pakistan may soon be able to produce weapons quantities of highly enriched uranium; (b) that Indian anxiety over Pakistan's nuclear progress could lead India to decide to strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities, with the prospects of wider conflict; and (c) that rising tensions and incidents on both the Indo-Pakistan ceasefire line in Kashmir and the Pak-Afghan frontier could escalate into wider Indo-Pakistan or Pak-Afghan conflict.

- III. Objectives and Talking Points
- 1. Obtain approval for option packages to respond to South Asian contingencies.
- -- We are concerned about a recent rise in tensions in South Asia.
- -- We wish to take steps to head off the possibility of conflict in South Asia in a manner which contributes to Pakistan's sense of security and to our non-proliferation goals in Pakistan.
 - -- Tensions in the area focus on:
- (a) recent cross-frontier attacks unrepulsed from an area of heavy fighting on the Afghan side of the border against <u>mujahidin</u> staging/access areas in Parachinar in Pakistan;
- (b) incidents on the ceasefire line in Kashmir and a general down-turn in Indo-Pakistan relations -- possibly an accompaniment to the start of the Indian election campaign.
 - (c) the conclusion of the Intelligence Community that

"India will probably feel compelled at some point to take military action to prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons."

- -- There are differences among concerned agencies about the likelihood or imminence of conflict; there are no differences among us on the need to be reassuring to Pakistan and on the importance, in terms of our broader policy concerns -- including Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance -- in heading off the possiblity of conflict in South Asia.
- -- Our paper proposes a series of additive option-packages of diplomatic, security assistance, and military measures aimed at accomplishing this, depending on the imminence of conflict. We seek your approval of this.

2. Continuation of Security Assistance.

-- We seek approval, in principal, of the proposal that we assure Pakistan, as part of our discussions of our nuclear concerns, that we intend our security assistance levels to continue beyond FY-87 at levels comparable to those now being funded.

3. Obtain approval for a Presidential message to Zia

4. Decide whether to draw a "red line" on production of high enriched uranium.

At a SIG held August 17, all participants agreed that we should deliver another message from President Reagan to President Zia candidly and explicitly expressing our grave concerns about uranium enrichment in Pakistan. We would also ask for a written reaffirmation of Zia's oral assurance that Pakistan would not enrich uranium above the five percent level. There is also agreement that we should pursue a longer-term effort to encourage India and Pakistan to take confidence-building steps in the nuclear area. There was disagreement, however, on how directly we should link continuation of U.S. security assistance to Pakistani compliance with such an assurance, i.e., on whether to draw a firm "r.d line" on uranium enrichment.

- -- Whether to draw a "red line" on uranium enrichment is the key Pakistan nuclear issue.
- -- Proponents of a "red line" believe that treating enrichment differently than the other nuclear activities "red lined" by the President in December 1982 would encourage the

Pakistanis to press forward with production of weapons-usable nuclear material.

- -- Proponents further argue that Congress will in any event not permit continued security assistance if Pakistan acquires material for a nuclear explosive, and that failure to draw a clear "red line" would undercut our global non-proliferation policy.
- -- Opponents argue that a firm "red line" would remove vital flexibility in responding to Pakistani nuclear developments.
- -- We should pursue efforts to get Pakistan to accept safeguards, or other unilateral or bilateral non-proliferation measures, but recognize that prospects for success are not high in the current Indo-Pakistan climate.

Drafted by:NEA/PAB:HGHagerty;PM/RSA:SAoki:rms

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Annex C: Military Cooperation Initiatives

o US-Pakistani combined exercises could be conducted with all Services. Possible initiatives include special operations exercises, F-15/16 deployments, and passing exercises. (Note: TACAIR deployment in itself could be construed as a destabilizing shift in the overall regional balance, and might precipitate an Indian request for similar assistance from the Soviets.)

o Operational cooperation could include AWACS deployments, perhaps in the form of bilateral training. This would raise Pak defensive capability and offer highly visible US support for Pakistan. Increased frequency of US Navy ship visits to Karachi, including the USCENTCOM forward headquarters element, is another possibility. Routine operational visits by US P-3s could also be initiated. It should be noted that a recently concluded survey of Pakistan's air surveillance requirements will recommend to the Pakistanis a three-tiered approach, including the upgrade of existing land-based radars, augmentation by tethered balloons in specific locations, and eventually the purchase of airborne early warning aircraft.

o Pakistan could enhance USCINCCENT's capability to respond

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to contingencies in Pakistan by agreeing to provide host nation support in the following ways: establishing POL storage facilities in Karachi; providing Karachi port facilities for sustainment and maintenance of the Near Term Prepositioned Force; and establishing a communications facility.

o The US could urge other countries with security interests in the Indian Ocean to help support Pakistan in ways similar to those mentioned above.