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**Folder Title:** NSPG 0082 12/22/1983 [Iran-Iraq War]  
**Box:** 91306

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

**Withdrawer**

DLB 1/31/2007

**File Folder** NSPG 0082 12/22/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ]

**FOIA**

F1772

**Box Number** 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33360	AGENDA	DUPLICATE OF #4462; NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING - DECEMBER 22, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33361	AGENDA	DRAFT VERSION OF #33360 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33362	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: IRAN-IRAQ WAR PREPARATIONS	1	12/16/1983	B1
33363	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO [THE PRESIDENT], RE: NAITONLA SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 22, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	12/21/1983	B1
33364	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: US POLICY TOWARDS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: STATUS REPORT ON NSDD-114 <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	4	12/19/1983	B1
33365	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER, PHILIP DUR, WILLIAM MARTIN TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	12/21/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

**Withdrawer**

DLB 1/31/2007

**File Folder** NSPG 0082 12/22/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ]

**FOIA**

F1772

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JOYCE BATTLE

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33366	PAPER	TALKING POINTS - NSGP ON IRAN-IRAQ <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	6	ND	B1
33367	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #33365 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1		B1
33368	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #33366 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	6	ND	B1
33369	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: FOLLOW-UP ON IRAN-IRAQ NSPG <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	2	12/22/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DATE:  
12/22/83  
11:00am  
Room 208

SUBJECT:  
Iran-Iraq

PARTICIPANTS:  
OVP:  
The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy  
State :  
Sec George P. Shultz  
Treasury:  
Sec Donald Regan  
Defense:  
Sec Caspar W. Weinberger  
Mr. Richard L. Armitage  
Energy:  
Sec Donald Hodel  
OMB:  
Dr. Alton Keel  
CIA:  
Mr. William J. Casey  
USUN:  
Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick  
JCS:  
General John W. Vessey, Jr.  
BG George A. Joulwan  
White House:  
Mr. James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. James Jenkins  
NSC:  
Mr. Donald Fortier  
Mr. Geofferey Kemp  
Mr. Richard Beal

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 1/21/02



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SYSTEM II  
91509

~~SECRET~~

33360

AGENDA

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
Room 208, Old Executive Office Building  
Thursday, December 22, 1983  
11:00 - 12:00 p.m.

Iran-Iraq War

- I. Introduction (5 minutes) Robert C. McFarlane
- II. Intelligence Overview (5 minutes) William J. Casey
- Adequacy of our coverage of Iran
  - Indications of terrorist activity against key Gulf facilities
  - Basic warning indicators
- III. Diplomatic Measures (10 minutes) George P. Shultz
- Summary of political-military consultations
  - Next steps for ensuring Allied cooperation and burden sharing
  - Demarches to Iran and Iraq
  - Iranian terrorism in the Gulf and the protection of Americans
- IV. Military Planning (10 minutes) Caspar Weinberger
- Measures to reduce force closure time
  - Status of military to military talks
- V. Energy Preparations (10 minutes) Donald P. Hodel
- VI. Discussion (15 minutes) Principals
- VII. Summary (5 minutes) Robert C. McFarlane

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Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772# 33360

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/82

~~SECRET~~

**CHRON FILE**

SYSTEM II  
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12/17

Dispatched to all but

VITAIE, + Don Gregg.

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unable  
to dispatch.

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no one to take  
package

sent COX

Sent OVP Box

1130

1150

*[Signature]*  
DEC 19 1983

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506  
December 17, 1983

SYSTEM II  
91497

VIA LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. JOHN STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

DR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. JACQUELINE TILLMAN  
Executive Assistant to the US Representative  
to the United Nations

BGEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War  
Thursday, December 22, 1983  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. (S)

An NSPG meeting will be held in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building on Thursday, December 22, at 11:00 a.m. The purpose of the meeting is to describe for the President steps taken and contemplated to improve our ability to deter, or cope with the consequences of, a widening of the Iran-Iraq war. Specifically, the status of our military planning, diplomatic consultations, and energy security measures will be discussed. (S)

Attached is an agenda for the meeting. Attendance will be principals only. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987  
By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment (as stated)

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National Security Council  
The White House

**CHRON FILE** <sup>8/9/5</sup>

System # II  
Package # ~~91388~~  
91497

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>Approved. I its keep</u>		
John Poindexter	<u>it NSPG, we need</u>		
Executive Secretary <u>3</u>	<u>208 for the main</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>display capability.</u>		
Situation Room			<u>J</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

JP: Attached is Don Fortner's suggested <sup>(Date:Time)</sup>  
agendas with my suggested changes. I think  
we should consider making this an NSC  
meeting, unless there is a real need to  
restrict #s in 208. If we press for an  
NSPG, it may be difficult to get approval  
for 208.

33361

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II

~~91388~~

91497

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
Room 208, Old Executive Office Building  
~~Thursday~~ Wednesday, December 21, 1983  
~~11:30~~ - ~~12:30~~ p.m.  
11:00      12:00

Iran-Iraq War

- I. Introduction Robert C. McFarlane  
- (5 minutes)
  
- II. Intelligence Overview William J. Casey  
- (5 minutes)  
- Adequacy of our coverage of Iran  
- Indications of terrorist activity against key Gulf facilities  
- Basic warning indicators
  
- III. Diplomatic Measures George P. Shultz  
- (10 minutes)  
- Summary of political-military consultations  
- Next steps for ensuring Allied cooperation and burden sharing  
- Demarches to Iran and Iraq  
- Iranian terrorism in the Gulf and the protection of Americans
  
- IV. Military Planning Caspar Weinberger  
- (15 minutes)  
- 10 Measures to reduce force closure time  
- Status of military to military talks
  
- V. Energy Preparations Donald P. Hodel  
- (10 minutes)
  
- VI. Discussion (15 minutes) Principals
  
- VI. Summary Robert C. McFarlane  
- (10 minutes)  
5

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*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

*Withdrawer*

DLB 1/31/2007

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NSPG 0082 12/22/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ]

*FOIA*

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33362 MEMO

1 12/16/1983 B1

DONALD FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE:  
IRAN-IRAQ WAR PREPARATIONS

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II  
91497

December 17, 1983

Via LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. JOHN STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

DR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War  
Thursday, December 22, 1983  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. (S)

An NSPG meeting will be held in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building on Thursday, December 22, at 11:00 a.m. The purpose of the meeting is to describe for the President steps taken and contemplated to improve our ability to deter, or cope with the consequences of, a widening of the Iran-Iraq war. Specifically, the status of our military planning, diplomatic consultations, and energy security measures will be discussed. (S)

Attached is an agenda for the meeting. Attendance will be principals only. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 1/31/07

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment (as stated)

SECRET

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL FROM  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE RECEIVED 20 DEC 83 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM FORTIER *alb 1/31/07* DOCDATE 20 DEC 83 10  
DUR 20 DEC 83  
MARTIN 20 DEC 83

KEYWORDS: NSPG IRAN  
IRAQ

SUBJECT NSPG MTG ON US POLICY TWDS IRAN / IRAQ WAR ON 22 DEC

ACTION. FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: STATUS X FILES IF

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( B *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>1 DEC 2 1 1983</i>	<i>see information</i>		<i>UP, GM, JB, MP</i>
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>1 DEC 2 1 1983</i>	<i>do for decision</i>		
	<i>DEC 2 2 1983</i>	<i>Mcfarlane noted</i>		
	<i>MAY 0 8 1984</i>	<i>MPB / Pres name not returned</i>		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)



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SYSTEM II  
91509

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1983

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DATE: Thursday, December 22, 1983  
LOCATION: The Crisis Management Facility  
TIME: 11:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

33363

FROM: Robert C. McFarlane *RCM*

DECLASSIFIED

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/11  
NLR REF 1772#33363

I. PURPOSE: To review the status of our current actions and planning to deal with possible developments in the Iran-Iraq War.

II. BACKGROUND: A State-DOD team has recently returned from a round of consultations with the Arab Gulf States on developments in the Iran-Iraq War. A military planning team led by USCINCENT representatives will be departing on December 26 to follow-up the political consultations and begin bilateral planning with key Gulf States for contingencies involving Iran.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from State which describes our recent efforts and outlines the broad areas for future action. George Shultz will provide more details at the meeting, including the results of Don Rumsfeld's meetings in Baghdad. The meeting agenda (Tab B) focuses on what we need to do next. As we have structured it, you will also receive a comprehensive review of the current intelligence from Bill Casey and a description of where we are in our military plans will be provided by Cap Weinberger and Jack Vessey. We will also review for you the implications of a sudden disruption in the flow of oil from the Gulf and the plans we have prepared to compensate for such a disruption. Both the international distribution picture and the contingency planning for domestic allocations will be reviewed.

While we do not anticipate the need for major new decisions coming out of this meeting, it will provide the NSPG with timely opportunity to discuss our plans for next steps and to reaffirm the decisions reached at the November 9, 1983 meeting on this subject.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The National Security Planning Group  
Secretary Regan  
Secretary Hodel  
Director Stockman

IV. PRESS PLAN: None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: See agenda (Tab B)

Attachments

Tab A - State Paper of Dec. 19, 1983  
Tab B - Agenda

Prepared by:  
Donald Fortier  
Philip Dur

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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cc Vice President

E Meese; J Baker;  
M Deaver



NLRR F.1772 # 33364

BY CW NARADATE 3/25/88

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

System II/Add-91509

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54

December 19, 1983

33364

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: US Policy Towards the Iran-Iraq War:  
Status Report on NSDD-114

To aid the discussion at the December 22 NSPG on the Iran-Iraq war, this memo summarizes the steps we have taken recently and others we are planning as part of our implementation of the NSDD-114 strategy on the Iran-Iraq war and Persian Gulf security.

We are pursuing both diplomatic steps and military planning measures. Our immediate priority is to take all possible diplomatic and political actions to bring about a negotiated settlement and, failing that, to prevent an escalation of the war. The military planning element of our approach is to undertake with key Allies and regional friends the advanced planning for military cooperation required to ensure an effective multinational response to military threats to freedom of navigation for non-belligerents in the Gulf or to attacks on regional states, when assistance is requested.

Diplomatic

We are currently pursuing four diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing escalatory pressures, giving Iran an incentive to end the war, and establishing the basis for Western action within the UN should the conflict escalate.

- Discussions with Iraq: Ambassador Rumsfeld plans to raise (December 20) with Saddam Hussein our concern that Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil exports, with the likelihood of Iranian counter-escalation and a possible resulting disruption of oil supplies, would be damaging to oil importing countries throughout the world and could undermine sympathy in those countries towards Iraq. We will also be encouraging other countries who may have some influence with Iraq (e.g., Japan) to reinforce this message.



On a related issue, our charge in Baghdad has informed Iraq that we take very seriously reports that Iraq has used CW against Iran and that this damages Iraq's international image as well as our efforts in the UN and elsewhere to halt all CW use. The Iraqi official who received our demarche denied any Iraqi CW use. We will nonetheless continue our effort to bring about a halt of Iraqi CW activity, including possible use of intermediaries to carry our message to Baghdad and acknowledgment in the UN of public reports of Iraqi CW use.

• Halting Western Arms to Iran: We have also asked several countries to consider halting or reducing their arms sales to Iran, pointing out that such transfers are unhelpful to the world community and make it easier for Iran to continue the war without paying a heavy price. In general, the initial, albeit incomplete, responses to our demarche have been mildly encouraging, with many Allies agreeing that the issue of arms sales to Iran is a legitimate area for diplomatic discussion. In some cases, however, concern has been expressed about the impact of an arms cut-off on other commercial relations.

• US Export Controls on Iran: We are recommending further controls on U.S. exports to Iran. We are moving to add Iran to the terrorist list, thereby subjecting Iran to controls similar to those in effect for Syria and South Yemen. We are also considering the idea that, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce, we formulate an Iran-specific foreign policy export control for aircraft and aircraft parts containing a presumption of denial for military end users.

• UN Action: UNSC Resolution 540 called for renewed mediation efforts by the SYG as well as a ceasefire in the Gulf. Iran formally rejected 540, but has supported previous mediation efforts by the SYG and wants an updated UN investigation of war damages, the subject of a previous UN report. Iraq, however, supports this only if Iran accepts 540. We are encouraging the SYG to reactivate his efforts, and urging others to do so. He is probing for openings and has sent Under SYG Cordovez to Stockholm to discuss a new mission by the SYG's special envoy, Olaf Palme.

We are also consulting with the British on their proposal to have a draft UN Security Council Resolution available in the event of imminent or actual escalation of the war in the Gulf. Such a resolution might be useful to preempt unfriendly moves in the UNSC, or to reaffirm the principle of freedom of navigation.



Military Planning

• Allied Consultations: As directed by NSDD-114 the State Department, with DoD participation, has launched an intensified round of politico-military consultations with key Allies and the GCC states. Representatives from the UK, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Australian and New Zealand embassies in Washington were briefed in late November on our assessment of the threat in the Gulf and our plans for dealing with it. In a subsequent round of discussions with these allies, we requested the UK, France, Italy, Australia and New Zealand to begin the process of combined military planning for Gulf contingencies. The British have agreed to our request. These US/UK military planning talks will begin in mid-January. Politico-military teams from the US and UK have exchanged visits to share assessments. Prime Minister Thatcher has ordered that a review of UK Persian Gulf policy be completed by 21 December. We are awaiting official responses from the others. In the meantime, we are reviewing the 1980 understandings that were reached on US/Allied protection of shipping in the Persian Gulf.

• Gulf Consultations: In early December, a State/DoD team completed politico-military consultations with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states on diplomatic measures and joint military planning to deter or defend against Iranian attacks on neutral shipping or Gulf state oil facilities. Oman, UAE, Qatar and Bahrain agreed to receive a US military team which would assess the Iranian threat in various escalation scenarios, US response capabilities, and our requirements for Gulf state military support and cooperation. Saudi Arabia requested an assessment of threat scenarios, which we have provided to both high-level political and military officials. Although the Saudis have not made a final decision on whether to proceed with joint operational planning on the basis of this threat assessment briefing, they have kept the door open to further consultations. A US military team will visit Oman and Bahrain later this month to begin detailed bilateral contingency planning for combined operations. The team will also visit the UAE and Qatar, which have indicated they may be receptive to a US presentation that suggests combined military operations and access for the US military. It will also visit Kuwait, which wishes to expand intelligence exchanges with us, but feels too exposed to enter into joint planning.

In addition to continuing the consultations begun under NSDD-114, we are exploring several measures to establish a long-term framework for US security cooperation with the Gulf



states, including upgrading intelligence sharing, air defense improvements, and support for internal security. We are also suggesting greater involvement of the GCC as an organization in our Gulf security efforts (without relying on the GCC as a vehicle for closer cooperation with the Gulf states). As a first step in this process, we are briefing the GCC Secretary General on our consultations in the Gulf and will renew our encouragement for the creation of a GCC regional integrated air defense system (RIADS) based on common procurement of advanced US air defense equipment.

Consultations with Others

● Selected Friends and Allies: We informed the Israelis during the Shamir visit of our plans to consult with the Gulf states. Following completion of the military talks with the Gulf states, we will brief selected countries (e.g., Morocco, Spain, Portugal) who may be asked to support US deployments and others, including those concerned about security in the Gulf and major oil producers. Finally, we have briefed Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan on our consultations with Gulf countries.

● The Congress: Because Congress is in recess and consultations with Allies and the Gulf states have not yet been completed, calls to Members or staff on this specific issue are unnecessary at this time. We will brief the Senate leadership and other key Members as opportunities arise prior to the reconvening of Congress. It would be appropriate to brief Congressional leaders during Secretary Shultz's breakfast with the House and Senate leadership (tentatively scheduled for January 25).

*Charles Hill*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary



National Security Council  
The White House

16

83 DEC 21 P 4: 13

System # II  
Package # 91509  
Add On pa

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 12/22 11<sup>00</sup> am  
(Date/Time)



~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91509 add on

MEMORANDUM  
ACTION

December 21, 1983  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

33365

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER  
PHILIP A. DUR *W*  
WILLIAM F. MARTIN *W*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for NSPG on Iran-Iraq  
Thursday, December 22, 1983

Attached (Tab A) are your talking points for tomorrow's NSPG meeting. We have been working with Rich Beal to ensure that your introduction, as well as the Defense, CIA and Energy presentations are reinforced by suitable audio-visual aids. We have avoided creating a visual dog-and-pony show which distracts from the discussion and have sought instead simply to highlight, as unobtrusively as possible, the major themes we want to stress.

The real purposes of the meeting are of course two fold: 1) to bring the President up to date on both the situation he faces and the steps we have already taken; and 2) to keep the pressure on military planners to reduce force closure times as much as possible. The difficulty with any simmering or embryonic crisis is maintaining our military preparedness edge and diplomatic creativity during the period of waiting. In this case, as your introduction makes clear, we have no alternative. Our margin for error is very slight. Destruction of one or two unique oil production facilities could be catastrophic. Warning times will be short. And the demonstrated inability of the Saudis or ourselves to protect facilities will have large political spillover effects, internally and externally. We have the capability to deal with the threat; the question is readiness.

Another purpose of the meeting, of course, is to force DOE more actively into this issue. We have to integrate the energy security work into our broader crisis planning. We suggest that you stress the need to avoid an international scramble for oil, which has in the past led to severe economic effects. You will want to stress that oil inventories are very low and that while there is some eight million barrels a day of worldwide oil spare production capacity, only three mbd lie outside the Gulf. U.S. leadership in reassuring the oil industry and restraining our allies will be critical.

Geoff Kemp concurs.

Recommendation

That you use the talking points at Tab A in the NSPG meeting.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment: Tab A, Talking Points

~~SECRET~~  
DEclassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF 1772# 33365

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12



## TALKING POINTS - NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ

33366

Thursday, December 22, 1983

Introduction

- Mr. President, after our last NSPG meeting on the Iran-Iraq war, you directed that we take action to attempt to deter a widening of that conflict and, in the event deterrence failed, to ensure that we are prepared to protect the oil lifelines to the West, as well as the key facilities of non-belligerent Gulf states.
- Our purpose today is to review events that have taken place since our last meeting; and to describe the steps that have been taken, and those that remain, to advance our preparations.
- The intelligence community has now provided strategic warning that Iraq has increased its military capability to launch attacks on Iranian oil and transshipment points in the Gulf. Clearly Iraq hopes to increase Iranian incentives to negotiate or, failing that, to trigger the kind of escalation that would require Western nations to intervene.

- We know that a successful Iraqi attack on Kharg Island could trigger Iranian action to disrupt shipping or to launch terrorist or conventional military attacks against the key oil facilities of our friends.
  
- The crisis could simmer on for some time, or it could explode quite rapidly. This fact imposes harsh requirements for our own readiness. We don't know precisely when the war will widen; but we know that -- given the short flight times between Iran and the Gulf states, the unique character of some of the oil production infrastructure, and the incalculable internal political instability that even small attacks might trigger -- that our margin for error is very small.
  
- We know too that the actual disruption of shipping or production could trigger panic buying and create a very adverse domestic and international energy situation. The cushion of oil stocks we had in 1980 is largely gone and we face the prospect of other nations -- far more dependent on Gulf oil -- rushing to the market and setting in motion another wave of price increases.
  
- Let me turn now to Director Casey for an intelligence update.



- Secretary Shultz, would you like to discuss the diplomatic steps we have taken to date.

Possible Intervention Questions on State's Presentation

- George, have we been able to correct Saddam Hussein's perception that he would have the sympathy of the West in any major escalation of the hostilities against Iran?
- Have the Japanese or others been able to approach the Iranians, either to urge restraint or to better ascertain the likely character of any Iranian counter-retaliation?
- Secretary Weinberger, could we ask you to provide an update on our own military preparedness and planning.

Possible Intervention Questions on Defense Issue

- Has CJCS discussed ways to cover the gap in CV station in North Arabian Sea?
- Have ROEs for USN forces (surface ships and TACAIR) been adjusted to permit interdiction of hostile acts (such as mining Hormuz or attack on international shipping)?

- Have we identified units available for anti-sapper missions in Saudi Arabia?
- Have we discussed the status and readiness of the Near-Term Preposition Force at Diego Garcia?
- Has CJCS given us an assessment of the adequacy of Saudi Air Defenses to cope with air attacks against truly critical and unique Saudi facilities?

#### Energy Considerations

- As I mentioned at the outset, we have seen a sizable reduction in commercial oil stocks worldwide. The question of stocks is of course crucial for psychological as well as objective reasons. While we have eight million barrels per day in in worldwide spare oil production capability, only three million barrels a day are outside the Gulf.
- Only the U.S. has built a meaningful strategic oil reserve. Moreover, while U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil has dropped to only five percent of total oil imports, the other OECD countries still depend on the Gulf for over half of their imports.



- If Persian Gulf oil is important to our allies, then it must be important to us. We cannot work for military coupling, as we do in INF, while trying to distance ourselves on issues of energy security. We have to play a leading role in the international effort to minimize economic damage should the war deteriorate.

In short, this could be the sternest foreign policy test we face as an Administration.

- Don, could you elaborate on the work that DOE is going to ensure international cooperation.

Possible Intervention Points in Energy Presentation

- Have we discussed with our allies the need to avoid overly rapid restocking during crisis?
- If there are serious imbalances in member countries of the IEA, won't we need to review the necessity of triggering the IEA energy sharing system?

Conclusion

- Need to recognize that an Iraqi air attack on Kharg Island or major round<sup>ed</sup> air strikes on shipping bound for Iran is the strategic warning indicator of Iranian reprisals.
- We should key our operational planning to reduce force closure times to reliable intelligence of impending Iraqi attacks.
- Another key indicator of likely Iranian action which argues for the best, most comprehensive coverage of Iran (Photint, SIGINT, COMINT) is Iranian readiness (communications, force movements, etc.) to mine Hormuz, strike Gulf facilities or deploy sapper teams.



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24

National Security Council  
The White House

83 DEC 20 P 4: 48

System # II  
Package # 91509

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>-</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>IC</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Rem / Florence

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: 12/21 3:00 pm  
(Date/Time)

*For Thursday's NSPG.*



25  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dec 20

CAROL / BOB

Phil notes to you that he included Secretary Regan in the list of those to attend, because of implications of economic disruption to be dealt with in this NSPG, even tho' Regan did not attend the previous NSPG on this subject.

Sally S.



~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91509

20

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

December 20, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER  
PHILIP A. DUR *MD*  
WILLIAM F. MARTIN *JFM*

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on U.S. Policy Toward the  
Iran-Iraq War, Thursday, December 22, 1983,  
11:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President concerning Thursday's NSPG meeting on the subject. Your suggested talking points will be supplied separately in a follow-on package.

Geoff Kemp concurs. *GK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve   ✓  

Disapprove       

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
- Tab A - State Paper reviewing current actions and plans, dtd Dec. 19, 1983
- Tab B - Agenda
- Tab II- Clearance List for Attendees

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987  
By *dh*        NAFA, Date *11/21/07*

~~SECRET~~

# EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

27

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1983

for The President of \_\_\_\_\_:  
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

- The Vice President
- George P. Shultz
- Caspar W. Weinberger
- William J. Casey
- General John W. Vessey, Jr.
- Robert C. McFarlane
- Donald T. Regan
- Donald P. Hodel
- David Stockman

### MEETING LOCATION

Building OEOB

Room No. 208

Time of Meeting 11:00 A.M.

Requested by DONALD R. FORTIER/S. SHERMAN

Room No. 392 Telephone 5026

Date of request Tuesday, December 20

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

**DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM**



~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

SYSTEM II  
91509 add on

MEMORANDUM  
ACTION

December 21, 1983  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

33367

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER  
PHILIP A. DUR  
WILLIAM F. MARTIN

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for NSPG on Iran-Iraq  
Thursday, December 22, 1983

Attached (Tab A) are your talking points for tomorrow's NSPG meeting. We have been working with Rich Beal to ensure that your introduction, as well as the Defense, CIA and Energy presentations are reinforced by suitable audio-visual aids. We have avoided creating a visual dog-and-pony show which distracts from the discussion and have sought instead simply to highlight, as unobtrusively as possible, the major themes we want to stress.

The real purposes of the meeting are of course two fold: 1) to bring the President up to date on both the situation he faces and the steps we have already taken; and 2) to keep the pressure on military planners to reduce force closure times as much as possible. The difficulty with any simmering or embryonic crisis is maintaining our military preparedness edge and diplomatic creativity during the period of waiting. In this case, as your introduction makes clear, we have no alternative. Our margin for error is very slight. Destruction of one or two unique oil production facilities could be catastrophic. Warning times will be short. And the demonstrated inability of the Saudis or ourselves to protect facilities will have large political spillover effects, internally and externally. We have the capability to deal with the threat; the question is readiness.

Another purpose of the meeting, of course, is to force DOE more actively into this issue. We have to integrate the energy security work into our broader crisis planning. We suggest that you stress the need to avoid an international scramble for oil, which has in the past led to severe economic effects. You will want to stress that oil inventories are very low and that while there is some eight million barrels a day of worldwide oil spare production capacity, only three mbd lie outside the Gulf. U.S. leadership in reassuring the oil industry and restraining our allies will be critical.

Geoff Kemp concurs.

Recommendation

That you use the talking points at Tab A in the NSPG meeting.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment: Tab A, Talking Points

~~SECRET~~

DEclassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772 #33367

BY RIN NARA DATE 2/21/12

TALKING POINTS - NSPG ON IRAN-IRAQ

33368

Thursday, December 22, 1983

Introduction

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SYSTEM II  
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**CHRON FILE**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DAVID PICKFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COL (P) JOHN STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

DR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. JACQUELINE TILLMAN  
Executive Assistant to the US Representative  
to the United Nations

BGEN GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War  
Thursday, December 22, 1983  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. *LS*

Attached is the paper prepared by the Department of State for  
tomorrow's NSPG meeting. *(H)*

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
State Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *dh* NARA, Date *1/21/07*



# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

83 DEC 21 P 3: 18

## URGENT

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 757 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES 5  
 FROM Bob Kimmitt 395-3044  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSPG Agenda 22 Dec

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
B-STATE	CHARLES HILL	SS/I	
	JACKIE TILLMAN	USUN	
K-TREASURY	DAVID PICKFORD	EX SEC	
D DOD	JOHN STANFORD	EX SEC	
	BG JOULWAN	JCS	
A CIA	THOMAS CORMACK	EX SEC	
I DOR	WILLIAM VITALE	EX SEC	

REMARKS: URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 23 DEC 83 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

*dlb 1/31/07*

DOCDATE 22 DEC 83

KEYWORDS. IRAN  
NSPG

IRAQ

SUBJECT. FOLLOW UP ON IRAN / IRAQ NSPG MTG

-----  
ACTION. FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS C FILES IF

FOR ACTION  
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8391497 8391509 NSCIFID *NSTG:092* ( B / B )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*DEC 22 1983*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91522

33369

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 22, 1983

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Iran-Iraq NSPG

A few quick points on today's meeting:

- The force closure issue continues to concern me, but I think we have pushed on this as hard as we can. I would prefer to get minesweeping capability into Diego, but it's obvious the JCS is not prepared to bite.
- In some respects, I think we can live with a little more slack on minesweeping than with TACAIR. The latter is crucial for being able to defend against extremist attacks against our forces and the oil facilities. We have continued to press this point since the meeting, particularly with regard to the gap in carrier coverage. As a result, ISA is now prepared to recommend (and we believe JCS will concur) on station relief in the event of further intelligence on Iranian suicide missions against our forces.
- The points on the Shamir visit, I thought, were very unjustifiable. The political military mission's summary cable is clear as a bell: In spite of the Shamir visit, we deepened our security relationship with all of the Gulf States we visited, and we took significant strides toward new forms of joint planning and cooperation. Since this morning, I have learned that the Kingston meetings in Saudi Arabia have also gone very well. I asked Ikle to LDX the cable that Kingston sent in on his talks with the thought that you might want to show it to the President tomorrow morning as a way of quietly rebutting the implication that the Shamir visit has tied up our Persian Gulf planning (Tab A).
- I think Rich Beal felt a little crushed by Secretary Shultz' comment that the room was "intimidating." I think the room can dramatically enhance certain kinds of presentations, but may be unsuitable for others. We have some bugs to work out, but I thought the Energy material went very well in the 208 setting. We would welcome your own thoughts for our future planning.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772 # 33369

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

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- One thing that does please me is the extent to which bureaucracy took us at our word when we recommended that they seize upon the current crisis as an opportunity to deepen cooperation and move forward on regional security programs that have been stalled. This has happened.
- Howard tells me that the Iraqis showed considerable interest in the talking points we provided Rumsfeld on pipeline expansion. They would like to hear more. Harry Rowen is in high gear on this subject. If we have something to offer, it can be useful not only in encouraging restraint but also as leverage for the Iraqi-Turkish options we have been considering to increase pressure on Syria.

Attachment

Tab A - AMEMBASSY JIDDA Cable 10802 dtd Dec. 21

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National Security Council  
The White House

System # II  
Package # 91522  
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>✓</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Bud: Note that WH/NSC were the only people in town not to receive the Kingston cable at Tab A. Don had to ask Sibley to LDX it. I recommend you ask Cop to share with us any cable traffic they send to State. This still protects intra-DOD communications.