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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/21/2005

**File Folder** NSC 00138 3 OCTOBER 1986 (1/2) [SOUTH ASIA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA]

**FOIA**

2000-002

**Box Number** 91304

SKINNER

55

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2976	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO RR RE NSC MEETING <i>R 5/1/2007 NLRRM06-042</i> <del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del>	3	10/2/1986	B1
2977	AGENDA	FOR NSC MEETING <i>R 2/6/2007 M06-042</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1
2978	AGENDA	SAME TEXT AS 2977 <i>R 2/6/2007 M06-042</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1
2979	PAPER	RE SOUTH ASIA <i>R 5/1/2007 NLRRM06-042</i> <del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del>	4	ND	B1
2980	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC MEETING <i>R 5/1/2007 NLRRM06-042</i>	4	10/3/1986	B1
2981	LIST	OF ATTENDEES <i>PAR 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B3 B6
2982	MEMO	BAERBEL HOUCK TO RODNEY MCDANIEL RE ATTENDEES <i>PAR 6/6/2006 PAR UPHELD 6/11/2013 M325/1</i>	2	10/2/1983	B1 B3
2983	CHART	RE SEATING <i>PAR 6/6/2006</i>	1	ND	B3
2984	AGENDA	SAME TEXT AS 2977 <i>R 2/6/2007 M06-042</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/21/2005

**File Folder** NSC 00138 3 OCTOBER 1986 (1/2) [SOUTH ASIA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA]

**FOIA**

2000-002

**Box Number** 91304

SKINNER

55

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
2985	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 2976 <i>R 5/1/2007 NLRRM06-042</i>	3	10/2/1986	B1
<del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del>					
2986	AGENDA	SAME TEXT AS 2977 <i>R 2/6/2007 M06-042</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1
2987	AGENDA	ALMOST SAME TEXT AS 2977 <i>R 2/6/2007 M06-042</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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National Security Council  
The White House

181

System # II  
Package # 90679  
DOCLOG BT AIO



24 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u>2</u>	<u>My</u>	
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>DM 10/2</u>	<u>DN</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other RBM, AGK, WRP

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)



UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION  
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

*As 1/21/05*

RECEIVED 01 OCT 86 17

TO POINDEXTER

FROM TAHIR-KHELI

DOCDATE 01 OCT 86

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN

SOUTH ASIA

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES MTG PAPER FOR 3 OCT NSC MTG ON SOUTH ASIA

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS X FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8690674 8690677 NSCIFID NSC00138 (B *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 10/2</i>	<i>Information</i>		<i><del>SRT</del> VP, DR</i>
	<i>C 10/4</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>SRT</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90679

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1986

RR

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: October 3, 1986  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon  
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*

I. PURPOSE

To review ways in which the U.S. can build a U.S. legacy of peace in South Asia. Friendship between India and Pakistan can help change the strategic balance in the region and meet our non-proliferation goals.

II. BACKGROUND

Our key optimal goal in South Asia is peace between India and Pakistan. In practical terms, this means the conclusion of a peace treaty between New Delhi and Islamabad. Neither country wants war, both have major internal problems which necessitate a degree of cooperation. Within the last two years, normalization has proceeded along a broad spectrum of issues: liberalization of visa policy, fewer travel restrictions; exchanges of newspaper editors; freer government-to-government relations; cultural exchanges; trade within carefully prescribed limits.

A second-order attempt at rapprochement was initiated with active U.S. encouragement. Here, thornier problems were being tackled: a nuclear dialogue to test the limits of cooperation and seek agreement within those limits; discussion between senior defense officials to de-escalate fighting on the Siachin Glacier; discussions at the Foreign Secretary, Foreign Minister and Head-of-Government levels to see if both countries could agree to a peace treaty which could be formally signed at a historic journey to Pakistan by Rajiv Gandhi.

Progress in normalization has recently slowed. There are several reasons for the recent slowdown. First, a worsening internal situation in the Panjab has fed Indian suspicions

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cc Vice President  
Don Regan

DECLASSIFIED

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NLRR M06-042 #2976

BY AL NARA DATE 5/1/07

~~SECRET~~

-2-

~~SECRET~~

that Pakistan is bound to exploit the Sikhs against New Delhi. Whether or not the GOP is actually doing so has become secondary to the fear of potential involvement. The Panjab is currently Rajiv Gandhi's most vulnerable point. The fact that the state shares a long porous border with Pakistan has exacerbated Indo-Pak relations.

Second, Junejo has been slow to understand that there is a real chance for peace with India. Ironically, Gandhi's basic distaste for military regimes caused him to hold back from Zia. He has since found that political leaders tend to be far more wary of India in today's Pakistan than is the military leadership.

Third, the U.S. has not been fully engaged in Indo-Pak normalization in the last six months. There has been a direct correlation in the past between U.S. involvement and progress between India and Pakistan. We have helped as we let the Paks understand that their peace with India will not leave us disinterested in Pakistan's future. With Gandhi, our message has been that his vision of a technologically rich India requires a changed Indo-Pak equation. Our ability to help India will be enhanced by an overall condition of peace in South Asia, which is, after all, in India's self interest.

Fourth, the above message had to be in tandem with tangible proofs of Indo-U.S. cooperation. Gandhi needed some visible benefits of his cooperation with the U.S. in place before his journey to Pakistan and prior to any approval of a U.S. follow-on program for Pakistan. (A \$4.02 billion post '87 U.S. package was agreed to with the GOP in March.) Unfortunately, at the same time that the USG was moving ahead with the Pak package, two U.S. items of urgency for the GOI, the supercomputer and cooperation on building an Indian fighter, were slowed. Gandhi saw this as being indicative of traditional USG reluctance to help India and another tilt toward Pakistan. His own efforts then shifted in favor of influencing Congressional opinion against Pakistan where a waiver of the Symington amendment is necessary before U.S. assistance to Pakistan can be pledged for another six years after the current package runs out next year.

#### Priorities for Peace

The first order of business will be two-fold: (a) to rebuild our credibility with Gandhi. A corollary of the above is to reassure Gandhi along the lines you did last October in New York: the U.S. will continue to press Pakistan to drop its nuclear weapons program. India can help increase the incentives, but we are not trying to shift the onus onto the GOI; (b) to convince Junejo that it is in Pakistan's interest to push for improved relations with India, and, that peace can be something more than simply the absence of war.

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Secretary Weinberger's visit to India and Pakistan gives us a unique opportunity to influence both countries. In India, the Secretary's visit demonstrates high-level U.S. interest. Defense cooperation will be the key to improved Indo-U.S. relations. Given our commitment to Pakistan's security, Cap can reinforce the need for Junejo to press on the peace front with India (as he promised us in July). A number of specific confidence-building measures on the military front can be proposed by Cap: notification of exercises; observers; limited withdrawal from border; joint patrols, etc. The U.S. can be helpful in these measures which will reduce the risk of war.

Joint measures against terrorism and drugs offer two other important avenues for Indo-Pak cooperation. The U.S. can help in fashioning programs which make these countries a show-case for international collaboration in these priority areas for your Administration.

In the final analysis, peace cannot really be meaningful unless it includes some limits on the nuclear weapons programs of both countries. Thus we must facilitate progress on bilateral arrangements against attack on nuclear facilities (agreed to verbally by Gandhi and Zia last December). Additional steps can propose a deal on the non-manufacture, non-testing and non-transfer of nuclear weapons. We are planning to send another nuclear emissary to South Asia to probe India and Pakistan. Because the issues are tough and time consuming, I am proposing that it be a non-bureaucratic private individual who can travel as a Presidential emissary some time in the November/December timeframe.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the meeting after which we will discuss the issues on the agenda.

Prepared by:  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

Attachments

- |       |                      |
|-------|----------------------|
| Tab A | Agenda               |
| Tab B | List of Participants |



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~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90674

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, October 3, 1986

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

SOUTH ASIA

Agenda

I. Introduction	John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)
II. Intelligence Assessment	Director Casey (5 minutes)
o State of Afghan War	
o State of Indo-Pak Relations	
o Pakistani Nuclear Program	
III. Policy Options	Secretary Shultz (5 minutes)
IV. Goals of October Visit to China and South Asia	Secretary Weinberger (5 minutes)
V. Discussion	All Participants (35 minutes)
VI. Summary	John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M06-042#2977

BY LOI R. DATE 2/16/07

~~SECRET~~

Participants

The President

The Vice President

Department of State

Department of Defense

Department of Treasury

Department of Justice

Central Intelligence Agency

Chief of Staff to the President

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Additional Invitees

Office of Management and Budget

United States Mission to the United Nations

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

U.S. Information Agency

October 1, 1986

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *SK*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, October 3, 1986,  
Cabinet Room, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to the President regarding the subject meeting.

*DK*  
Dennis Ross concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *SK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Agenda  
Tab B List of Participants

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CS* NARA, Date *1/21/05*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 SEP 86 15

*CAS 1/2/05*

TO MCDANIEL

FROM TAHIR-KHELI

DOCDATE 29 SEP 86

KEYWORDS: INDIA PAKISTAN  
AFGHANISTAN NSC  
AGENDA

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 3 OCT NSC MTG ON SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS X FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCDANIEL RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCID NSCOO138 (B/H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C10/01</i>	<i>McDaniel sgl</i>		<i>SR1, WRP</i>

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National Security Council  
The White House

System # II

Package # 90274

DOCLOG 7/1 A/O       

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>L</u>
Rodney McDaniel		<u>MU</u>	
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>ASW 10/1</u>	<u>0</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

VIA LDX  
90674

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

AMBASSADOR HUGH MONTGOMERY  
Deputy U.S. Representative for  
United Nations Political  
Affairs

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELICK  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER  
Executive Assistant to  
the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

Mr. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Executive Secretary  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General and  
Chief of Staff  
Department of Justice


MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR  
Executive Secretary  
U.S. Information Agency

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY  
Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on South Asia  
Friday, October 3, 1986 (U)

There will be a National Security Council Meeting on South Asia  
on Friday, October 3, at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room.  
Attached for your information is the agenda for this meeting.

(C)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

As stated

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~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
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DECLASSIFIED  
White House LHM 10/28/87  
By AK NARA, Date 1/2/05

**SECRET**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, October 3, 1986

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

SOUTH ASIA

Agenda

- |   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| I. Introduction                                       | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes)   |
| II. Intelligence Assessment                           | Director Casey<br>(5 minutes)       |
| o State of Afghan War                                 |                                     |
| o State of Indo-Pak Relations                         |                                     |
| o Pakistani Nuclear Program                           |                                     |
| III. Policy Options                                   | Secretary Shultz<br>(5 minutes)     |
| IV. Goals of October Visit to<br>China and South Asia | Secretary Weinberger<br>(5 minutes) |
| V. Discussion   | All Participants<br>(35 minutes)    |
| VI. Summary   | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes)   |

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECORD**

Log Number 90674

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Date October 1, 1986

Subject: NSC MTG ON 3 OCT

*CJS 1/10/05*

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

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<input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Donley	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Lucas	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Tillman
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Dornan	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mahley	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Rye	<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Thompson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Pearson	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Douglass	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Martin	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sable	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wigg
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Burghardt	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fortier	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Matlock	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sestanovich	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wood
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cannistraro	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Grimes	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Menges	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sigur	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wright
<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Childress	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kraemer	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McMinn	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Small	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat
<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Cobb	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Laux	<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. North	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sommer	<input type="checkbox"/> Sit. Room
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Covey	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. C. Lehman	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Raymond	<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Stark	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Admin.
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cox	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. Lehman	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Reger	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Steiner	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. De Graffenreid	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Levine	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Ringdahl	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Tahir-Kheli	

**EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:**

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THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	10-1-86	1125	<i>[Signature]</i>
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Execsec/Room 7241	1/LDX	10-1-86	1118	<i>[Signature]</i>
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422	LDX			
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	LDX			
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State	LDX			
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup	LDX			
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon	LDX			
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB	1	10-1-86	11:30	<i>S. Via</i>
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.	LDX			
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119	1	10/1/86	14:25	<i>André K. Matthews</i>
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.	1	10-1-86	1346	<i>Miss Beverly Telford</i>
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street.				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

**DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE**



# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

03 SEP 31 All: 28

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFICATION

cas 11/21/05

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES two  
FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL H.S.C. 456-2224  
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSC MTG ON 3 OCT  
NSC LOG# 90674

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>NICHOLAS PLATT</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>ROBERT B. ZOELICK</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>CIA</u>	<u>JOHN H. RIXSE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>USUN</u>	<u>AMB. HUGH MONTGOMERY</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>JCS</u>	<u>CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>WILLIAM STAPLES</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	

REMARKS URGENT

# DISTRIBUTION RECORD

CK 1/21/86 Date October 1, 1986

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OF ALL ENCLOSURE(S)

Subject: NSC MTG ON 3 OCT

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

## INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Donley	_____ Mr. Lucas	_____ Mr. Rosen	_____ Ms. Tillman
_____ Mr. Pearson	_____ Mr. O'Drnan	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. Burghardt	_____ Col. Douglass	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Sable	_____ Mr. Wigg
_____ Mr. Cannistraro	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Mr. Sestanovich	_____ Mr. Wood
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Grimes	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Mr. Wright
_____ Col. Cobb	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Ms. Small	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ Sit. Room
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	
	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Ringdahl	_____ Ms. Tahir-Kheli	

## EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	10-1-86	11:25	John A. Owens
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	1			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
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NSC LOG# 90674

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SUBJECT: PROPOSED MEMO TO SECDEF / TALKING POINTS RE / LEGACY OF PEACE /  
SOUTH ASIA / STRATEGY NSC MTG 3 OCT

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE / DECISION

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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other PLR/AGK/RBm

COMMENTS

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Attached refers to NSC meeting on South  
Asia - brief points refer to China.



PL

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A Legacy of Peace in South Asia: A Strategy (S)

Our key optimal goal in South Asia is peace between India and Pakistan. In practical terms, this means the conclusion of a peace treaty between New Delhi and Islamabad. However, peace cannot really be meaningful unless it includes some limits on the nuclear weapons programs of both countries. Thus, we hope to facilitate progress on bilateral arrangements which institutionalize the Gandhi-Zia December 17, 1985 agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and add to it a deal on the non-manufacture, non-testing and non-transfer of nuclear weapons. (S)

The U.S. is uniquely placed to play a role. We alone can provide sufficient incentives for both India and Pakistan. India needs us for Gandhi's ambitious program of technological progress. It is also in New Delhi's interest to ensure that the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship remains Afghanistan related. Junejo needs ties to the U.S. He must demonstrate to the Pak military that, albeit a civilian, he can provide for substantial sums of U.S. money and access to American weapons systems. The economic component of the U.S. \$4.02 billion post-'87 program for Pakistan enables Junejo to ensure the domestic prosperity which is key to his sustaining internal support. Without it, Benazir Bhutto has a better chance to engage the average Pakistani who currently feels fairly well off and thus less amenable to sustained political agitation on behalf of Bhutto. (S)

Progress Thus Far

Change of leadership in India in 1984 provided the impetus for improved Indo-Pak relations. Gandhi's main agenda was moving India forward economically. He thus envisioned a set of regional relationships which kept India's leadership but acknowledged the necessity for peace. This changed environment enabled the GOI to become more responsive to pending GOP proposals. In less than two years, we saw normalization along a broad spectrum of issues: liberalization of visa policy, fewer travel restrictions; exchanges of newspaper editors; freer government-to-government relations; cultural exchanges; increased trade within carefully prescribed limits. (S)

A second-order attempt at rapprochement was initiated with active U.S. encouragement. Here, thornier problems were being tackled: a nuclear dialogue to test the limits of cooperation and seek agreement within those limits; discussion between senior defense officials to de-escalate fighting on the Siachin Glacier; discussions at the Foreign Secretary, Foreign Minister and Head-of-Government levels to see if both countries could agree to a peace treaty which could be formally signed at a historic journey to Pakistan by Rajiv Gandhi. (S)

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### Recent Setbacks

There is a direct correlation between U.S. involvement and above mentioned progress. The top leadership may still be committed to peace, but the U.S. needs to continue to facilitate progress, which has slowed. In the past, the President's personal involvement has helped nurture our policy. (S)

There are several reasons for the recent slowdown. First, a worsening internal situation in the Panjab has fed Indian suspicions that Pakistan is bound to exploit the Sikhs against New Delhi. Whether or not the GOP is actually doing so has become secondary to the fear of potential involvement. The Panjab is currently Rajiv Gandhi's most vulnerable point. The fact that the state shares a long porous border with Pakistan has exacerbated Indo-Pak relations. (S)

Second, Junejo has been slow to understand that there is a real chance for peace with India. Ironically, Gandhi's basic distaste for military regimes caused him to hold back from Zia. He has since found that political leaders tend to be far more wary of India in today's Pakistan than is the military leadership. (S)

Third, the U.S. has not been fully engaged in Indo-Pak normalization in the last six months. We have helped in the past as we let the Paks understand that their peace with India will not leave us disinterested in Pakistan's future. With Gandhi, our message has been that his vision of technologically rich India requires a changed Indo-Pak equation. Our ability to help India will be enhanced by an overall condition of peace in South Asia, which is, after all, in India's self interest. (S)

Fourth, The above message had to be in tandem with tangible proofs of Indo-U.S. cooperation. Gandhi needed some visible benefits of his cooperation with the U.S. in place before his journey to Pakistan and prior to any approval of a U.S. follow-on program for Pakistan. (A \$4.02 billion post '87 U.S. package was agreed to with the GOP in March.) Unfortunately, at the same time that the USG was moving ahead with the Pak package, two U.S. items of urgency for the GOI, the supercomputer and cooperation on building an Indian fighter, were slowed. Gandhi saw this as being indicative of traditional USG reluctance to help India and another tilt toward Pakistan. His own efforts then shifted in favor of influencing Congressional opinion against Pakistan where a waiver of the Symington amendment is necessary before U.S. assistance to Pakistan can be pledged for another six years after the current package runs out next year. (S)

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### Priorities for Peace

The first order of business will be two-fold: (a) to rebuild credibility with Gandhi that the U.S. remains committed to Indo-U.S. relations. A corollary of the above is to reassure Gandhi along the lines the President did last October: the U.S. will continue to press Pakistan against a nuclear weapons program. India can help increase the incentives, but we are not trying to shift the onus onto the GOI; (b) to convince Junejo that it is in Pakistan's interest to push for improved relations with India, and, that peace can be something more than simply the absence of war. (S)

In the interim, we must be careful in how we proceed during the next twelve months when we have the greatest opportunity before the GOI and GOP focus on the end of the Administration. During these months, we must not make decisions on any major weapons systems for Pakistan which are dual-use items, such as M-1 tanks, aerial tankers, and AWACS. These items are bound to generate controversy and will jeopardize the chances for further progress on Indo-Pak issues. Also, there is no money for major systems for Pakistan until the follow-on program begins in 1987 with the Symington waiver in place. (S)

### Military CBMs

A variety of measures can be proposed during your meetings with Prime Minister Gandhi which will help avert accidental war and reduce tension in the region. (C)

- Notification of exercises. This would be especially useful prior to the large exercises that India is slated to conduct on the Pakistani border in early 1987. (S)
- Observers at exercises. As a first order measure, India and Pakistan can invite observers to selected exercises. Later, a more comprehensive schedule can be established. If helpful, the U.S. can offer its own observers to India and Pakistan for the duration of the exercise. (S)
- Periodic U.S. air missions to fly to observe force formations in order to ensure that there is no build-up of forces. This could help lower the threshold against pre-emption. (S)

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-4-

- Positioning by Pakistan of U.S. equipment on the Western border away from India, e.g., Zia pledge to put copperhead in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. (S)
- Limited disengagement of troops along the Indo-Pak border. Even a mile will have important confidence-building consequence. (S)
- Joint India-Pakistan patrols to prevent smuggling of narcotics and crossings by terrorists. (S)

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NSC Meeting  
White House Cabinet Room  
Friday, October 3, 1986  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

TALKING POINTS

INTRODUCTION

- On South Asia, peace between India and Pakistan is key optimal goal.
- Will help change strategic balance in South Asia.
- Peace requires cooperative Indo-Pak agreement on nuclear proposals.
  - non-attack of nuclear facilities.
  - non-manufacture of weapons.
  - non-testing.
  - non-transfer.
- U.S. uniquely placed to play key role.
- Indians need us for technology and to put some constraints on security cooperation with Pakistan.
- Junejo needs U.S. follow-on package to placate Pak military and to satisfy economic needs.

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NLRR 1106042 # 2980

BY CW NARA DATE 5/1/07



-- Unfortunate slow-down in our South Asian agenda. Variety of reasons.

- Punjab
- Junejo less committed than Zia.
- Delay on supercomputer.

-- We need to push agenda for peace. This requires -

- We convince Gandhi that U.S. remains committed to good relations with India. And that we are not shifting the burden of our nuclear problem with Pakistan onto India.
- We need to move faster on practical cooperation with India, e.g., the Light Combat Aircraft.
- We need to convince Junejo that peace with India is in Pak interest, despite temporary setbacks.

-- Progress may be slow, but we must keep pressing.

-- Some areas <sup>of interest</sup> are particularly worth noting: Anit-Terrorism; anti-drug; military confidence-building measures.

-- For the next 12 months, before the Pak follow-on program, we need to be careful that we do not commit controversial major systems, e.g., M-1 tanks, aerial tankers, AWACS.

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-3-

- We have some important milestones ahead.
  
- Secretary Weinberger's visit this month can build on our relationships, enhance defense cooperation and offer ideas on military confidence-building measures. We need to help reduce the threat of war -- permanently.

INTELLIGENCE

- Ask Casey for intelligence on Indo-Pak relations
  
- State of Pak nuclear program
  
- Status of war in Afghanistan

SECDEF VISIT

- Your trip to China and South Asia comes at a significant time. With the Reykjavik meeting, China, India, and Pakistan will be most alert to their own relationships with us and with the USSR. We will keep Cap closely informed at each stop.

~~SECRET~~

- For China, we see your visit as another step within the context of developing the relationship's security aspects. The Chinese have responded with coolness to Gorbachev's speech; you can applaud and encourage this.
  
- Ask Weinberger to discuss the goals of his visit.
  
- Way in which the visit can contribute to our overall strategy in South Asia.
  
- Encourage Weinberger to propose specific military CBM's to Gandhi, Zia and Junejo.

POLICY

- Ask Shultz for his views on ways the U.S. can reinforce the message of peace between India and Pakistan.
  
- How can we help the two countries overcome recent setbacks and retain progress already made.

SUMMARY

- Summarize discussion.

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, October 3, 19 86  
for The President of \_\_\_\_\_:  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

See Attached List

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Room No. Cabinet Room

Time of Meeting 11:00 a.m.

Requested by Baerbel Houck

Room No. GF/WW Telephone 2224

Date of request 10/2/86

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

✓ The Vice President

~~Craig Fuller~~

✓ Donald Gregg

STATE

✓ John Whitehead

4/2/22

[REDACTED]

✓ Michael Armacost

4/15/37

[REDACTED]

TREASURY

✓ Secretary James Baker

DEFENSE

✓ Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

✓ William H. Taft, IV

9/13/45

[REDACTED]

JUSTICE

✓ Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA

✓ Director William Casey

✓ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OMB

✓ Director James Miller

✓ L. Wayne Arny

USUN

✓ Amb. Vernon Walters

1/13/17

[REDACTED]

JCS

✓ Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr.

✓ Lt. Gen. John H. Moellering

2/4/38

[REDACTED]

USIA

✓ Marvin Stone

✓ Edward T. Penney

2/26/24

[REDACTED]

1/14/35

[REDACTED]

ACDA

✓ Ken Adelman

✓ Michael Guhin

6/9/46

[REDACTED]

WH

✓ Donald Regan

✓ John M. Poindexter

✓ David Chew

✓ Al Keel

NSC

✓ Rodney B. McDaniel

✓ Shirin Tahir-Kheli

✓ James Kelly

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NLS F00-002 #2981

By LDT, NARA, Date 6/6/06

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
Rodney McDaniel	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	A
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	3		D
Situation Room			



I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: BAERBEL K. HOUCK <sup>B</sup>

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on South Asia,  
Friday, October 3, 11 a.m., Cabinet Room

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting:


The Vice President  
Craig Fuller

STATE  
Deputy Secretary John Whitehead  
Michael Armacost

TREASURY  
Secretary James Baker

DEFENSE  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
William H. Taft, IV

JUSTICE  
Attorney General Edwin Meese

CIA  
Director William Casey  
~~To be decided~~ 

FOIA(b) (1)  
FOIA(b) (3)

OMB  
Director James Miller  
L. Wayne Army

USUN  
Ambassador Vernon Walters

JCS  
Admiral William J. Crowe  
Lt. Gen. John Moellering

ACDA  
Kenneth Adelman  
Michael Guhin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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NLS FOO-002#2982  
By LOI, NARA, Date 6/16/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USIA  
Acting Director Marvin Stone  
Edward T. Penney

WHITE HOUSE  
Donald Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
David Chew

NSC  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli  
James Kelly

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attached at Tab I is a proposed seating arrangement for the meeting.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attached at Tab II is a copy of the agenda which we plan to put in the individual meeting folders.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- TAB I Proposed seating arrangement
- TAB II Proposed agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



BH

Moellering

Gubin  
Penney

Armacost  
Raphet

Taft  
Armitage

Army

Crowe

Adelman  
Stone

Whitehead

PRESIDENT

Weinberger

Meese

Miller

Stone

Walters

Casey

Poindexter

VP

Baker

Regan

Penney

[REDACTED]

McDaniel

Tahir-Kheli

Kelly

Fuller

Gregg

Chew

FOIA(b) (3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS FOO-002 # 2983  
By 101, NARA, Date 6/6/06

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SYSTEM II  
90674

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, October 3, 1986

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

SOUTH ASIA

Agenda

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| I. Introduction                                       | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes)         |
| II. Intelligence Assessment                           | Director Casey<br>(5 minutes)             |
| o State of Afghan War                                 |   |
| o State of Indo-Pak Relations                         |   |
| o Pakistani Nuclear Program                           |   |
| III. Policy Options                                   | Deputy Secretary Whitehead<br>(5 minutes) |
| IV. Goals of October Visit to<br>China and South Asia | Secretary Weinberger<br>(5 minutes)       |
| V. Discussion   | All Participants<br>(35 minutes)          |
| VI. Summary   | John M. Poindexter<br>(5 minutes)         |

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

REF MD6-042 #2984  
BY MI NARA DATE 2/6/07

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD0042 #2985

BY DL NARA DATE 5/1/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90679

October 2, 1986

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: October 3, 1986

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*

I. PURPOSE

To review ways in which the U.S. can build a U.S. legacy of peace in South Asia. Friendship between India and Pakistan can help change the strategic balance in the region and meet our non-proliferation goals.

II. BACKGROUND

Our key optimal goal in South Asia is peace between India and Pakistan. In practical terms, this means the conclusion of a peace treaty between New Delhi and Islamabad. Neither country wants war, both have major internal problems which necessitate a degree of cooperation. Within the last two years, normalization has proceeded along a broad spectrum of issues: liberalization of visa policy, fewer travel restrictions; exchanges of newspaper editors; freer government-to-government relations; cultural exchanges; trade within carefully prescribed limits.

A second-order attempt at rapprochement was initiated with active U.S. encouragement. Here, thornier problems were being tackled: a nuclear dialogue to test the limits of cooperation and seek agreement within those limits; discussion between senior defense officials to de-escalate fighting on the Siachin Glacier; discussions at the Foreign Secretary, Foreign Minister and Head-of-Government levels to see if both countries could agree to a peace treaty which could be formally signed at a historic journey to Pakistan by Rajiv Gandhi.

Progress in normalization has recently slowed. There are several reasons for the recent slowdown. First, a worsening internal situation in the Panjab has fed Indian suspicions

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Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President  
Don Regan

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-2-

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that Pakistan is bound to exploit the Sikhs against New Delhi. Whether or not the GOP is actually doing so has become secondary to the fear of potential involvement. The Panjab is currently Rajiv Gandhi's most vulnerable point. The fact that the state shares a long porous border with Pakistan has exacerbated Indo-Pak relations.

Second, Junejo has been slow to understand that there is a real chance for peace with India. Ironically, Gandhi's basic distaste for military regimes caused him to hold back from Zia. He has since found that political leaders tend to be far more wary of India in today's Pakistan than is the military leadership.

Third, the U.S. has not been fully engaged in Indo-Pak normalization in the last six months. There has been a direct correlation in the past between U.S. involvement and progress between India and Pakistan. We have helped as we let the Paks understand that their peace with India will not leave us disinterested in Pakistan's future. With Gandhi, our message has been that his vision of a technologically rich India requires a changed Indo-Pak equation. Our ability to help India will be enhanced by an overall condition of peace in South Asia, which is, after all, in India's self interest.

Fourth, the above message had to be in tandem with tangible proofs of Indo-U.S. cooperation. Gandhi needed some visible benefits of his cooperation with the U.S. in place before his journey to Pakistan and prior to any approval of a U.S. follow-on program for Pakistan. (A \$4.02 billion post '87 U.S. package was agreed to with the GOP in March.) Unfortunately, at the same time that the USG was moving ahead with the Pak package, two U.S. items of urgency for the GOI, the supercomputer and cooperation on building an Indian fighter, were slowed. Gandhi saw this as being indicative of traditional USG reluctance to help India and another tilt toward Pakistan. His own efforts then shifted in favor of influencing Congressional opinion against Pakistan where a waiver of the Symington amendment is necessary before U.S. assistance to Pakistan can be pledged for another six years after the current package runs out next year.

#### Priorities for Peace

The first order of business will be two-fold: (a) to rebuild our credibility with Gandhi. A corollary of the above is to reassure Gandhi along the lines you did last October in New York: the U.S. will continue to press Pakistan to drop its nuclear weapons program. India can help increase the incentives, but we are not trying to shift the onus onto the GOI; (b) to convince Junejo that it is in Pakistan's interest to push for improved relations with India, and, that peace can be something more than simply the absence of war.

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Secretary Weinberger's visit to India and Pakistan gives us a unique opportunity to influence both countries. In India, the Secretary's visit demonstrates high-level U.S. interest. Defense cooperation will be the key to improved Indo-U.S. relations. Given our commitment to Pakistan's security, Cap can reinforce the need for Junejo to press on the peace front with India (as he promised us in July). A number of specific confidence-building measures on the military front can be proposed by Cap: notification of exercises; observers; limited withdrawal from border; joint patrols, etc. The U.S. can be helpful in these measures which will reduce the risk of war.

Joint measures against terrorism and drugs offer two other important avenues for Indo-Pak cooperation. The U.S. can help in fashioning programs which make these countries a show-case for international collaboration in these priority areas for your Administration.

In the final analysis, peace cannot really be meaningful unless it includes some limits on the nuclear weapons programs of both countries. Thus we must facilitate progress on bilateral arrangements against attack on nuclear facilities (agreed to verbally by Gandhi and Zia last December). Additional steps can propose a deal on the non-manufacture, non-testing and non-transfer of nuclear weapons. We are planning to send another nuclear emissary to South Asia to probe India and Pakistan. Because the issues are tough and time consuming, I am proposing that it be a non-bureaucratic private individual who can travel as a Presidential emissary some time in the November/December timeframe.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the meeting after which we will discuss the issues on the agenda.


Prepared by:  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of Participants

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SYSTEM II  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, October 3, 1986

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

SOUTH ASIA

Agenda

I. Introduction	John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)
II. Intelligence Assessment	Director Casey (5 minutes)
o State of Afghan War	
o State of Indo-Pak Relations	
o Pakistani Nuclear Program	
III. Policy Options	Secretary Shultz (5 minutes)
IV. Goals of October Visit to China and South Asia	Secretary Weinberger (5 minutes)
V. Discussion	All Participants (35 minutes)
VI. Summary	John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)

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NLS Mal-042 #2986

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 2/6/07

~~SECRET~~

T  
A  
B  
B



Participants

The President

The Vice President

Department of State

Department of Defense

Department of Treasury

Department of Justice

Central Intelligence Agency

Chief of Staff to the President

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Additional Invitees

Office of Management and Budget

United States Mission to the United Nations

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

U.S. Information Agency

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~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

VIA LDX  
90674

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

AMBASSADOR HUGH MONTGOMERY  
Deputy U.S. Representative for  
United Nations Political  
Affairs

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER  
Executive Assistant to  
the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

Mr. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Executive Secretary  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General and  
Chief of Staff  
Department of Justice

MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR  
Executive Secretary  
U.S. Information Agency

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY  
Associate Director for National  
Security and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on South Asia  
Friday, October 3, 1986 (U)

There will be a National Security Council Meeting on South Asia  
on Friday, October 3, at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room.  
Attached for your information is the agenda for this meeting.

*bet*

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
by *CS* NARA Date *1/21/05*

National Security Council  
The White House

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SEQUENCE TO      HAS SEEN      DISPOSITION

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Rodman/Cockell	_____	_____	_____
Al Keel	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SYSTEM II  
90674

September 29, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI *Shi*

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting  
Friday, October 3, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

Attached is the agenda for the NSC meeting for distribution to appropriate agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached agenda.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:  
Agenda for October 3 NSC Meeting

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CS* NARA, Date *1/21/05*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING  
Friday, October 3, 1986  
White House Cabinet Room  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

SOUTH ASIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction John M. Poindexter  
5 (~~10~~ minutes)
  
- II. Intelligence Assessment Director William Casey  
(5 minutes)
  - State of Afghan war
  - State of Indo-Pak relations
  - Pakistani nuclear program
  
- III. Policy Options Secretary George Shultz  
5 (~~10~~ minutes)
  
- IV. Goals of October Visit to China and South Asia Secretary Caspar Weinberger  
5 (~~10~~ minutes)
  
- V. Discussion All Participants  
35 (~~20~~ minutes)
  
- VI. Summary John M. Poindexter  
(5 minutes)