

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files  
**Folder Title:** NSC 00012 June 4, 1981 (2)  
**Box:** 91282

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 1/17/2008

**File Folder** NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

**FOIA**

F03-003/1

**Box Number** 1

SKINNER

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
49004	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO RICHARD ALLEN RE CHINA <i>R 11/30/2012 M325/2</i>	1	6/3/1981	B1
49005	ISSUE PAPER	RE CHINA (DUPE OF 48990)	3	ND	B1
49006	MEMO	JAMES LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE NSC MEETING <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	2	6/4/1981	B1
49007	CABLE	030420Z JUN 81 (STATE 143621) <i>R 11/30/2012 M325/2</i>	1	6/3/1981	B1
49008	MINUTES	OF NSC MEETING <i>R 6/6/2016 M5501</i>	9	6/4/1981	B1
49009	MEMO	JAMES LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE NSC MEETING	2	6/4/1981	B1
49010	MEMO	RICARD ALLEN TO NSC RE MEETING	3	6/4/1981	B1
49011	PAPER	RE CHINA (DUPE OF 48990)	3	ND	B1
49012	SCOPE PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP (DUPE OF 48989)	7	ND	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 1/17/2008

**File Folder** NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

**FOIA**

F03-003/1

**Box Number** 1

SKINNER

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
49013	DISCUSSION PAPER	RE CUBA (DUPE OF 49002) <b>PAR 6/12/2013 M325/2</b>	3	ND	B1
49014	MEMO	ROGER FONTAINE TO ADMIRAL NANCE RE NSC DECISION MEMO <b>R 11/30/2012 M325/2</b>	1	6/5/1981	B1
49015	MEMO	RE NSC DECISION	2	ND	B1
49016	MEMO	RE NSC DECISION <b>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</b>	2	ND	B1
49017	DRAFT NSDD	RE CHINA POLICY <b>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</b>	3	ND	B1
49018	MEMO	RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS <b>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</b>	2	6/6/1981	B1
49019	MEMO	RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS	2	6/6/1981	B1
49020	MEMO	RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS (W/ATTACHED DIRECTIVES)	5	6/8/1981	B1
49021	MEMO	RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS <b>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</b>	3	6/6/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 03 JUN 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER *WJH:Y*

DOCDATE 03 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R COCOM  
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS EXPORT CONTROLS  
NSC IG

SUBJECT: PAPER ON EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TWDS CHINA FOR 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 03 JUN 81 STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
LILLEY	GREGG	HUBERMAN	BERTA
	SCHWEITZER	LENZ	DEGRAFFENREID
	STEARMAN	BAILEY	COLSON
	NAU		NANCE

COMMENTS

REF# 8117232 LOG 8103181 8103274 NSC ID NSC00012 ( D / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i>	<i>6/04 Handled under 3181</i>		

8. . . . NSC/S <sup>2</sup>

3181 is in  
answer to  
3178. Please  
keep together

---

3178  
was used in  
a 6/4 NSC  
mtg —



8117232

23 12 3

449004

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


June 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Paper on Export Control Policy Toward China

The China Interagency Group has reviewed options to liberalize export control guidelines and procedures affecting sales of high-technology to China. The options range from current practices (inherited from the previous Administration) to removing China from COCOM. The Interagency Group reached a consensus that liberalization of export control policy toward China was necessary to properly reflect our strategic interest in a secure, friendly and successfully modernizing China.

The results of the IG's deliberations are attached for consideration by the National Security Council on Thursday, June 4, 1981.

*for*   
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

*for the record*

Attachment:

Paper on Export Control Policy Toward China

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS, 5/2/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-325/a #49004  
BY RW DATE 11/30/12

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49005	ISSUE PAPER  RE CHINA	3	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 04 JUN 81 15

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

*117108*

DOCDATE 04 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

TAIWAN

ARMS TRANSFERS

NSC

SUBJECT: ITEMS ON CHINA FOR 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: FCR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FCR ACTION

FCR CONCURRENCE

FCR INFO

ALLEN

GREGG

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103178

8103274

NSC IF

DE NSC00012

( B / C )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*Lilley*  
*↓*

*S 6/05*

*for further action*

*C 6/5*

*NEAR per Lilley*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_

(C)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

3181

49006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY

SUBJECT: Items for NSC Meeting on China on 4 June at  
1:30 pm (U)

This memo contains suggestions on China for the NSC meeting on 4 June. It should be read before the meeting which is scheduled for 1:30 pm. (U)

1. US/China Security Relationship - How Far Should We Go?

These key questions should be dealt with as indicators of our policy:

-- Should China be taken off the munitions control list? (Weinberger recommended this at the last meeting.) What are the implications of this among our allies, in the USSR? If taken off the list, should all items to be sold to China be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and should they be confined to certain defensive weapons only?

-- What levels, if any, of U.S. military visitors should go to China? There is talk of sending Admiral Long (CINCPAC), General Jones (JCS). Should they go, and if so, why? Should the Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff, General Liu, be invited here, and when?

-- What should be the level of technical military exchange with China? What sort of training should we give them? What do we get in exchange? (C)

2. China/Vietnam/Cambodia

-- What is our position as expressed to the Chinese on support of Pol Pot?

-- What do we do if China steps up military confrontation with Vietnam? (C)

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 6/4/87

NLRR M325/2 #49006

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. Arms Sales to Taiwan

-- What is the timetable for these sales?

-- How are we going to decide on what we are going to sell?  
(Weinberger wants to go quite far on this one.)

-- How will this be handled in Peking with the Chinese?

-- What are we going to say to Taiwan and how is it going to be said? By a trip to Taiwan or here in Washington? (C)

4. Technology Transfer.

Earlier, I recommended you go for the high alternative. I now recommend against this in view of the following:

-- Haig, Weinberger and Baldrige are sending a Decision Memorandum to the NSC today, recommending we go for the IG recommendation or low option.

-- The Vice President's staff recommends he go for the same IG recommendation (low).

-- I suggest that you recommend that we break loose certain key computer cases (see attached telegram (Tab A) from the Department of State) as a symbolic move upward.

If we can't get all 3 cases broken loose, we can at least get 2, and I would emphasize the IBM 4331 in paragraph 4 and the hospital device in paragraph 3. The Hitachi computer in paragraph 5 can wait.

-- All of this should be done in close consultation with our allies and not unilaterally. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

10

PAGE 01 STATE 143621  
ORIGIN EA-12

9846

STATE 143621

49607

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00  
NSC-05 NSAE-00 COME-00 DOE-10 /057 R

7. FOR BEIJING: WILL PROVIDE STATUS REPORT ON THESE  
CASES AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. HAIG

DRAFTED BY EA/C: CWFREEMAN, JR.: HF  
APPROVED BY EA: MARMACOST  
EB: RMUELLER  
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION  
NSC, DOD, USDOC, DOE

-----#56310 030444Z /13

P R 030420Z JUN 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 143621

PARIS FOR OECD/EXCON

E.O. 12065: GDS 06/02/81 ARMACOST, MICHAEL)

TAGS: EE T, ESTC, CH, JA

SUBJECT: CHINESE REPRESENTATION ON COMPUTER CASES  
CHINESE REPRESENTATION ON COMPUTER CASES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CHINESE MINISTER LIN ,HAONAN CALLED ON EA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMACOST JUN 2 TO RAISE A NUMBER OF ISSUES, INCLUDING CHINESE PERPLEXITY OVER US FAILURE TO APPROVE THREE SPECIFIC COMPUTER CASES. LIN SAID THAT THESE CASES HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED IN BEIJING WITH US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.
- 3.) LIN SAID THAT IN MARCH 1979 THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAD SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE FOR A GE MODEL 8800 CATSCAM (TOMOGRAPH) SYSTEM. THE DEVICE WAS TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THE BEIJING HOSPITAL IN 1979. TO DATE NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE EXPORT CONTROL ASPECT FOR THIS DEVICE BY THE US GOVERNMENT. THE BEIJING HOSPITAL BADLY NEEDS IT, LIN SAID, AND THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THE US WILL COOPERATE IN PROVIDING IT.
- 4.) LIN REFERRED TO 20 IBM 4331 COMPUTERS AND ONE 4341 COMPUTER ORDERED FOR CHINA BY THE UNDP. NOTING THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE 4331 NO APPROVAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED. HE STATED THAT THESE COMPUTERS WERE BADLY NEEDED IN CHINA FOR THE CENSUS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO THEIR EXPORT.
- 5.) LIN ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF A HITACHI M180 COMPUTER WHICH JAPAN HAS SUBMITTED TO COCOM FOR APPROVAL. CHINA HAD LEARNED FROM OTHER COCOM DELEGATIONS THAT ALL COCOM MEMBERS OTHER THAN THE US HAVE APPROVED ITS EXPORT, BUT THAT THE US SEEMS UNWILLING TO DO SO. HE ASKED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT LOOK INTO THIS MATTER.
6. MR. ARMACOST REPORTED THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE, LIKE AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, DESERVE TIMELY AND EXPEDITIOUS RESPONSES TO EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS. THIS IS, IN FACT, REQUIRED BY US LAW. HE ASSURED MINISTER LIN THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT SUCH REQUESTS GOT MORE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST, AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE SPECIFIC CASES MINISTER LIN HAD RAISED.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-32512 #49007  
BY RWS : DATE 11/30/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#3181

—

BACK TO Jim  
Lilley — (6/5/81)

—

RECEIVED 31 DEC 81 13

TO MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 04 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *mjm 11/18/08*

KEYWORDS: MINUTES NSC

CHINA P R

HAIG, A

CUBA

FAR EAST

FOREIGN TRAVEL

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8190104

NSCIFIED NSC00012 ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_

(C)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90105

~~SECRET~~

49008

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Thursday, June 4, 1981

TIME AND PLACE: 1:30 -  
The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: China, Cuba, and Secretary Haig's  
Trip to the Far East

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan

Vice President George Bush

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

OMB

Associate Director William Schneider, Jr.

CIA

Admiral Bobby R. Inman

JCS

General David C. Jones  
Lt. General John S. Pustay

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III  
Mr. James A. Baker III  
Mr. Michael K. Deaver  
Mr. Richard V. Allen  
Admiral James W. Nance  
Ms. Janet Colson  
Mr. Frank Hodsoll

Office of the Vice President

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

NSC

Mr. James Lilley  
Mr. Roger Fontaine

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MO8-232 10/3/11 M. RANAN  
#090715  
BY LOT NARA DATE 6/6/16

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~MINUTES OF MEETING

Mr. Allen: There are several issues on the agenda. The first issue that we will take up will be China. Last week we had a preliminary discussion of five basic questions before Secretary Haig's trip to China, which is scheduled to start Wednesday of next week. State, Defense, and others have reviewed these questions, and in addition we had an interagency group question. Today, we have come back to these questions for decisions, and I recommend that our discussion center around these issues. State will lead us through these discussions with contributions from Secretary Weinberger and Admiral Inman. The paper that we have here is from State and was dated today.

Secretary Haig: What we should try to do is to collapse time as I am leaving next Wednesday and I have two other meetings in the intervening period. We circulated this Decision Memorandum and it deals with the issue which we will address today. We have Commerce concurrence, but Secretary Weinberger has some minor changes. We must understand that in going into this situation, it did not begin with our present situation. More than a year ago the Carter Administration made promises to the Chinese and our bureaucracy would not cooperate. We want to move the process a step forward and persuade the Chinese that we will deliver on it. On export control policy, we must understand that our strategic interests are served by preserving China against the USSR. China ties down one-quarter of the Russian forces, 52 divisions, not all manned. This is up from 46 divisions. We want to know what can be done now, and also to implement what the previous Administration promised and could not deliver on. The difference comes in the performance. There is not too great a difference in the guidelines but we want to see results quickly. For instance, there has been an 18-month licensing delay on computers for a UN census, and over a 2-year delay for a CATSCAM for a hospital in Peking. These must be approved quickly. We should instruct the Department (of Commerce) that several hundred pending cases should be resolved and reported back in 60 days to get this backlog out of the way. We have the interagency group consensus on technology transfer. The time, unfortunately, has been too brief for the National Security Council staff to review this and to comment.

Mr. Allen: We should have the President's views on any component herein, and a guidance document should be put out on the decisions made on the choices presented today. I note in passing that the level will be twice what the Soviets had before Afghanistan.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Secretary Weinberger: China is in a much outmoded status and is treated on the same basis as the USSR, and this is a major irritant to China to be treated this way. I believe that in the past this obsolescent legislation has limited the President's freedom of action, and we should have a review on a case-by-case basis, the same as any other friendly nation.

President Reagan: I see no reason not to approve this section.

Secretary Baldrige: I had some changes, but the State Department has preempted my position so I have no objection.

The next issue dealt with was arms transfers.

Secretary Weinberger: This is the process after you approve the policy.

Secretary Weinberger wanted to delete from the paper the section under Arms Transfer which said that these should take place consistent with guidelines established for dual use technology transfer. Weinberger wanted a case-by-case analysis and did not want the automatic transfer authority suggested in these guidelines. He said we have transferred technology in the past which has been converted by the Soviets to become a "rattlesnake." Weinberger commented that the term "consistent with dual technology transfers" was too fuzzy.

Secretary Baldrige: It is fuzzy, but that was our intention. What happened in the past when we loosened up on this was that in DOD people dug in their heels and they had their own separate way of stopping the transfers. We want this fuzzy guidance to expedite cases and we don't want people to lose cases.

Secretary Weinberger: We would not want to block cases by delay, but there is an inherent contradiction between the so-called position that they should be done according to dual technology guidelines, and the case-by-case decision.

Mr. Meese: But don't you need the guidelines?

Secretary Weinberger: We have the guidelines but they still should be handled on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. Meese: Aren't there guidelines for other countries?

Secretary Haig: Our intention is to make it easier, not harder.



Mr. Allen: I suggest that we have a footnote here governing our internal policy; i.e., a footnote which would say in effect....

Secretary Weinberger: I suggest that we take out this phrase about consistent with guidelines for dual technology. We don't feel it should be in there.

The President: I agree that it should be put in a footnote in our notes, but not what we say to the Chinese.

The next item was: Consultations on sensitive strategic matters.

Secretary Haig said that this was a new Administration and that these consultations should begin to establish a base with the Chinese.

Secretary Weinberger: I would rather substitute "at the Cabinet level" for "special emissary." We want to be sure that where Defense considerations are involved that we have Defense people involved. The special emissary could be used to exclude Defense.

Secretary Haig: We do not want to have these kinds of subtleties and we don't want to send a Cabinet officer every time we want to talk to them on sensitive matters.

Secretary Weinberger: On an interagency basis we want to be sure to have Defense in on it.

Mr. Allen: I would suggest that we put a footnote in here to the effect that Defense should participate in these discussions.

Admiral Inman suggested that we say that this would apply when we had matters concerning the Defense arena.

The next item was Taiwan arms sales.

Secretary Haig said that Weinberger wanted to insert that only if we are asked, will we tell the Chinese that we have not made a decision yet on such issues as the advanced aircraft. Weinberger felt that we should not volunteer this information. Weinberger then said for himself, "We don't want any indication that Taiwan sales take place only after consultations with the People's Republic of China. We can tell them they can read about it in the papers after we decide. We don't want to get them involved.

Mr. Allen: Yes, and I am concerned about what is meant by "quiet improvement" in the last line as applied to the Air Defense System.

Secretary Haig: We cannot live in a dream world on this. They are going to ask the questions on arms sales to Taiwan. I've just seen the Chinese Ambassador, and I know they are going to ask the question. They want to know what we are going to do as far as Taiwan arms sales are concerned and they will surely raise it.

Secretary Weinberger: Then we are agreed that this will not be done unless the Chinese ask us.

Secretary Haig: We don't want to rub dirt in their face. This is not a theological question. Deng sits on a shakey throne and we do not want to contribute to his demise. What are we doing to try to prove our manhood here?

The President: I don't see where we have to consult with the PRC on this issue.

Secretary Weinberger: Regarding modernizing of their aircraft, how would we respond to Chinese demands on this issue?

Mr. Allen: I believe that General Jones has a comment on replacement aircraft.

General Jones: When people talk about replacement aircraft in arms sales, they are talking about the F-5E and the F-104, not the F-5G. The F-5G is implied in the previous statement.

Mr. Meese: It seems to me that this commentary here, if expressed the way it is now stated, could appear to preclude the decision (that we have not yet made) for instance on the F-16. We have to sell aircraft as some models in Taiwan are fast wearing out.

Mr. Allen: The last sentence again deals with then "quiet improvements" in the air defense system.

Secretary Haig: We have really only one pending case which involves the air defenses. There is a CIA analysis that effective ground air defense systems could be a better way to defend Taiwan.

The President: But we don't have to tell them that.

Secretary Haig: The current language here commits us to the F-5G.

Mr. Meese: I believe that we should inform the Chinese so that they not get upset. There should be no decision by the end of this year, and aircraft sales will be next year, and the President will have to make that decision.

Secretary Weinberger: I endorse all of the rest of the paper.

The President: I wouldn't like to have anybody worry about the fact that we had no foreign policy.

Mr. Schneider: We have requests for seven types of equipment that the Taiwan people have asked for which are already in train. This includes items such as Armed Personnel Carriers. What should we do about these?

Secretary Haig: We move very slowly, by the end of the year. There is the improved Chapparral missile. We are committed to this in terms of commitments for contractors already underway. We are going to have to replace and modernize prudently, but defensively in character.

Mr. Allen: Under the Taiwan Relations Act this has to be defensive.

Secretary Haig: Then we favor reconciliation and regard growth of interests favorably. The process should be peaceful and we should not get in the middle. I know we will have pressure from the Chinese for us to get Taiwan together with them.

The President: I would not want to feel that if they (PRC) wanted to use force, they could use force, and that any language here could be misinterpreted by them in this regard.

Mr. Allen: The Chinese say, according to Guang Ming Er Bao and their new English language paper, that the Taiwan Relations Act is null and void. They say that those sections which are counter to the Joint Communique are irrelevant. You, Mr. President, made it clear to both Ambassador Chai and Ji Chaozhv that you intend to carry out the Taiwan Relations Act. I believe it is important that Secretary Haig reaffirm that the Taiwan Relations Act is something that you intend to implement. With all the words they have used against it, if we say nothing, they will assume that they have carried the day.

Secretary Haig: We abide by the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. We have posturing by both sides, including by Taiwan in the New York Times. The Chinese will challenge it (TRA), but we will have to live by it and we will specifically address the Taiwan Relations Act.

The Vice President: We did have frank discussions with Deng and we have not retreated from this. The President made it clear to Ji and Ambassador Chai. This is a major thing to them.

The President: Then we should add that if the subject is raised, we will inform the Chinese that this is the law of the land. If they can cancel our laws, we can cancel their income tax.

Cambodia/Vietnam

Secretary Haig then read the section about a division of labor between the Chinese and ourselves; to which we will be continuing to apply political and economic pressure while allowing ASEAN to take the lead, with the Chinese applying pressure in their side. Haig emphasized that Pol Pot in no way is an acceptable alternative to the current regime.

Mr. Allen then suggested it might be a good idea to "debrief" the Taiwanese on these issues; that Jim Lilley was going with you and he could go quietly to Taipei and "debrief" the Taiwanese subject to your guidance.

Secretary Haig: I had the same proposal for Dick Walters. What worries me is the high profile visit and the possible press coverage. Dick is a higher profile, but Jim is not too low. I would suggest that we do this after the trip is over, and we tell them in Peking that we are going to do it. Then we could decide whether we want to send someone over or to handle it in a briefing here.

The President then commented that when he was in Taiwan and Kissinger was in Peking making arrangements, the Chinese came in everyday with Taiwan newspaper accounts of what he (the President) was saying in Taiwan.

Secretary Haig agreed that we have to do this briefing of Taiwan. But this is our first high-level meeting with the Chinese, and they are a very nervous regime. Haig saw David Rockefeller of the Trilateral Commission yesterday and Rockefeller said the Chinese were very anxious to have Haig come but remain very nervous about Taiwan. Haig then suggested that we brief the Taiwanese here.

Admiral Inman said, on technology transfer, the slowness in the bureaucracy on this came in the context that if we approved items for China, the Soviets would be following. It would, therefore, be very important as we have done here to separate the Soviets from China and then the resistance in the bureaucracy would disappear. On Cambodia, Inman said that even with cooperation of the Chinese and Chinese support for Pol Pot, there was not much potential in any resistance to change the situation in Vietnam.

Secretary Haig: The main idea is to get ASEAN to work and to get together. No one should be optimistic about this but there are positive things that can be accomplished.

The Vice President then asked if intelligence would come up on this trip and how it would be handled.

Admiral Inman said the agreement had been made earlier in the Administration that if the Chinese raised intelligence with the Haig group, that they would say that this should be handled in different channels (CIA).

### Cuba

Mr. Allen introduced the Cuban question by pointing out the interim measures being considered which came out of a SIG. These measures are only the first steps to be taken. A more detailed policy will follow. It was Mr. Allen's view that among the more important measures was establishing a Radio Free Cuba -- a measure which the President has long advocated.

Secretary Haig outlined the interim policy and requested the President's and NSC approval for the concept so the measures can be flushed out.

The Secretary added the Administration is committed to deal firmly with Cuba. Our long-range goal is to get Cuba out of Africa, the Caribbean and Central America. A long-range plan of action will be ready this fall. Meanwhile, we want the Caribbean Basin plan to have its effect.

The initial approach is to keep the Cubans off-balance, build a foundation for a long-range policy, and to convince Castro we mean business.

The Secretary then summarized the NSC discussion paper laying out the six initial steps we should take vis-a-vis the Castro regime. He then pointed out other steps which can be taken later.

The Secretary also stated the Caribbean Basin plan would be a preliminary measure because it gives us an aura of concern for social justice.

The Secretary informed the NSC that five days after the Lopez Portillo visit we will be releasing a White Paper on Cuban covert activities in the hemisphere. We will also be releasing a paper on the Soviet Union's disinformation campaign regarding El Salvador now being prepared by the CIA. This paper is unprecedented because it shows precisely how people are being manipulated: the National Council of Churches, Amnesty International, the Western Europeans, etc. In the Secretary's words, "the paper is a winner."

Admiral Inman stated that the CIA logo would not be on the White Paper.

Mr. Allen said we had recent information that shows Lopez Portillo will try to convince the President that Nicaraguans are not that well-armed. We are preparing a counter-talker for the President with the evidence showing that is not the case.

The Vice President said we need the pictures -- the physical evidence.

Admiral Inman pointed out some of the limitations of the pictorial evidence but what the CIA has will be provided.

The Vice President brought up the problem of the Cuban criminals in the U.S. He asserted that there is real trouble at Ft. Chafee and we need to speed this up.

Secretary Haig said we can once we approve the six steps.

The Vice President added we might have to take them to Guantanamo and push them through the gate.

The President said that the only thing that concerned him about that suggestion is it might cause problems for the local Cuban population.

Secretary Haig then highlighted how we propose to deal with the Cubans over the next six months. Recently, a Cuban official at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana flatly rejected any conditionality on settling Namibia and Angola. Castro is nervous about the President -- with enough pressure the Secretary believed we might break him away from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Allen reminded the NSC that Radio Free Cuba will probably fall under the Board for International Broadcasting. We need to explore the possibility of a Television Free Cuba.

Mr. Schneider of OMB said an RFC should be closely supervised by the U.S. Government. It will also be relatively expensive: \$7.5 million per year for a three-hour daily broadcast.

RECEIVED 31 DEC 81 13

TO ALLEN

FROM NANCE

DOC DATE 04 JUN 81

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*MAN  
11/7/08*

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

CUBA

LIBYA

AGENDA

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES BRIEFING MEMO & AGENDA & CONSENT ITEMS FOR 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8190105

NSC IFID NSC00012

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_

(C)

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49009	MEMO  JAMES LILLEY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE NSC MEETING	2	6/4/1981	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49010	MEMO  RICARD ALLEN TO NSC RE MEETING	3	6/4/1981	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
49011	PAPER  RE CHINA	3	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49012	SCOPE PAPER  RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP	7	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

4:9 013

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, DC 20520



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

INITIAL APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH CUBA

Cuba's international activities pose a major threat to U.S. political and security interests in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere.

The challenges Cuba poses for the U.S. are complex and have been with us for twenty-one years. It will take time to make definitive progress. We probably will not finish a comprehensive review of our Cuba policy until the fall. Over the past few months Cuba has been off balance and on the defensive. We need to maintain momentum by bringing into play some concrete actions. If we do not produce some actions soon, Castro may assume that this Administration's rhetoric is hollow and that he has nothing to lose by continuing to pursue his foreign policy goals aggressively.

On May 26 the Senior Interdepartmental Group agreed on an initial approach for dealing with Cuba. NSC endorsement of that approach is requested today.

Initial Approach

The SIG participants agreed that the U.S. should implement or begin planning now measures to be taken over the next six months to lay the groundwork for future actions we may wish to take after a full review of our Cuba policy has been completed.

Initial steps need to be carefully calibrated to underline our resolve to deal firmly with Castro without drawing undue attention to the Cuba issue or provoking bold Cuban retaliatory actions until we are prepared to block or counter them.

Our public and private posture toward Cuba should be cool and distant during this initial period. It should be guided by several general rules:

- make no positive reference to normalization, even as a distant goal;

MID-325/24903  
RW 6/12/03

-- keep direct contacts at a minimum, communicating publicly rather than privately whenever possible and pursuing talks only on issues that the U.S., not Cuba has an important interest in discussing; and

-- when we use threats, leave no doubt that we will respond, but avoid being too specific.

### Proposed Actions

Our initial approach will include steps to increase our military readiness, prevent repetition of the illegal boatlift from Mariel, bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba, and publicize Cuba's international activities. Some of these measures are outlined below.

State will proceed with measures to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba and publicize Cuba's international activities. We will kick off this campaign in June by releasing a special report on "Cuban Covert Activities in Latin America." We will also increase our efforts to enforce the trade embargo (which Cuba is trying harder to circumvent) and to persuade non-communist countries to reduce their trade with and credits to Cuba.

State is already staffing out the NSC's proposal to set up a Radio Free Cuba. We have in mind a professionally run station, closely supervised by the U.S. Government, that would exploit the Castro regime's vulnerabilities.

State will begin staffing out a proposal for a private demarche to Cuba on the return of hardened criminals and other undesirables sent in the Mariel boatlift. The status of the hardened criminals is a potential time bomb. Their continued detention has been challenged in the courts, and if we are unable to return them to Cuba, the courts may order us to release dangerous criminals onto American streets. But we would not offer concessions other than to process Cuban emigrants to the U.S. in a more expeditious manner.

13526

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

3.3b(1)(6)

State and Justice, with DOD and Coast Guard participation, will proceed with planning already well underway to prevent a repetition of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. This will probably involve new legislation, a high-level policy statement underlining our resolve to prevent future illegal flows, and an increase in our naval presence and Coast Guard patrols in the Florida straits.

DOD will staff out military readiness measures, which are critical to this initial approach. At the SIG, DOD representatives expressed reservations about some of the suggested military readiness actions, such as shadowing Cuban freighters enroute to and from Nicaragua, transferring U.S. air squadrons to Florida, making capital improvements at Guantanamo, and upgrading our air defense installations in the southern U.S. The actions chosen need not be these particular ones, but we must have some military measures to make our approach credible.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

RECEIVED 05 JUN 81 18

TO NANCE

FROM FONTAINE

DOCDATE 05 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

NO? 11710 ✓

KEYWORDS: CUBA

NSC

SUBJECT: NSC DECISION ON CUBAN INTERIM MEASURES

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 08 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

STEARMAN ✓

BAILEY ✓

LENZ ✓

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103336

NSCIFID

( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 6/9 See 3336 for final action FO, NB, ST*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*IF*

*(C)MB*

81 JUN 5 P 6: 10

Re-DONE  
for distribute  
using New  
log #

Jc 5/1916

# 3336

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

43  
~~3287~~  
RF  
49014

SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 5, 1981

URGENT ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BUD NANCE

FROM: ROGER FONTAINE **RF**

SUBJECT: NSC Decision Memorandum on Cuban  
Interim Measures

Attached at Tab I is the NSC decision memorandum implementing six initial measures directed at Cuba.

RECOMMENDATION

That Mr. Allen sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Mr. Allen's signature

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
Review 6/5/01

DECLASSIFIED  
ALFR MID-325/2 #49014  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/30/12

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1 10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
49015	MEMO  RE NSC DECISION	2	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 05 JUN 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM KEMP

DOCDATE 05 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*MJD  
11/29/08*

KEYWORDS: LIBYA

MEDIA

FMS

MILITARY OPERATIONS

NSC

SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 08 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

WETTERING

NAU

KAMINSKY

SCHWEITZER

KIMMITT

LENZ

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103294

NSCIFID NSC000124 J 1 )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

           C 6/9 See 3294 for final action OK, WG, SC

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*(UF)* (C) *H*

1 cc Attached

81 JUN 5 AM 10

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

*#3294*  
*Re-Done for*  
*Distrib. using*  
*New log*

3289

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

June 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Libya

Attached at Tab I is a decision memorandum on U.S. policy toward Libya reached at yesterday's NSC meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
by WJ NARA, Date 11/7/08

Attachment

Tab I Decision Memorandum on  
U.S. Policy Toward Libya

~~SECRET~~

Review June 5, 1987

~~SECRET~~

3289

49016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Libya

At the meeting of the National Security Council held on June 4, 1981, the President approved the following actions concerning U.S. policy toward Libya:

-- A media campaign to focus world attention on Libyan misdeeds.

-- An approach to European and regional governments to both inform them of our policy and enlist maximum cooperation.

-- An approach to countries which have provided military sales or training to Libya with the aim of eliminating or cutting back this activity.

-- Sixth Fleet naval maneuvers for August in international waters now illegally claimed by Libya.

-- A commitment in principle to more tangible measures such as increased FMS levels (some already approved), training, and joint maneuvers with countries most threatened by Libya (such as Tunisia and Sudan).

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Review June 5, 1987

NLRR M375/2 #49016

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

-- Contingency studies for evacuation and other emergencies and proposals for coping with Soviet initiatives to support Libya in some new aggressive action.

-- An action plan designed to prevent Libya from obtaining nuclear weapons.

-- Additional steps for dealing with the long-term security threat posed by Libya.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

cc: Edwin Meese III  
James A. Baker III  
Michael K. Deaver

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 05 JUN 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLY

DOCDATE 05 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REQUEST OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

*MS  
11/7/08*

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R NSDD  
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS ARMS SALES  
TAIWAN

SUBJECT: PRES DIRECTIVE ON CHINA POLICY

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 09 JUN 81 STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

NANCE

*STEADMAN  
Hubertman  
Kimmitt*

BERTA

DEGRAFFENREID

BAILEY

GREGG

*Lenz  
Schweitzer*

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8103178 8103181 NSC FID NSCC0012 (M / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 5 23 See 3335 for final action*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



NEEDS ADD  
See Del  
to addresses

Handled by



JANET COLSON	_____	SHOW CC
BUD NANCE	_____	SHOW CC
DICK ALLEN	_____	SHOW CC
IRENE DERUS	_____	SHOW CC
JANET COLSON	_____	SHOW CC
BUD NANCE	_____	SHOW CC
KAY	_____	SHOW CC
CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC
CY TO KEESE	_____	SHOW CC
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC
CY TO DEAYER	_____	SHOW CC
CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 5, 1981

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~w/SECRET~~ Attachment

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on China Policy

Attached at Tab A is a Directive which I have prepared based on our meeting yesterday.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to the President for his approval and for forwarding to the addressees.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987  
By WJH NARA, Date 1/17/08

UNCLASSIFIED  
W/SECRET Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~SECRET~~ Attachment

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on China Policy

Attached (Tab A) is a National Security Decision Directive which reflects the decisions made by you at the NSC meeting on 4 June.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the distribution of this Directive to the addressees noted.

UNCLASSIFIED  
w/~~SECRET~~ Attachment

*msb  
1/17/02*

~~SECRET~~

3311

49417

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

ALRR M325/2 #49017

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: China Policy (U)

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on June 4, 1981, at 1:30 p.m., the following directives are to be carried out:

Technology Transfer

Secretary Haig is authorized to state to the Chinese in Peking that the Administration has decided to make good on past United States Government commitments to liberalize U.S. export controls on dual use technology. This will respond to Beijing's expressed needs and further our mutual interests in bolstering China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviets and their allies. The proposed change will allow technology transfers at levels twice that which was exported to the USSR prior to Afghanistan. The attached directive on export control policy is approved. (S)

Amendment of Legislation Lumping China with the Soviets

The Secretary is authorized to inform the Chinese that we are reviewing all legislation that prohibits cooperation by the Government or private industry with China due to its earlier association with the Soviet bloc. The Administration will seek appropriate Congressional action to end past discrimination no longer consistent with our present strategic relationship. (S)

Arms Transfers

The Secretary is authorized to inform the Chinese that we intend to suspend China from the list of embargoed destinations for arms transfers and to adopt the same case-by-case approach

~~SECRET~~

Review on 6/5/87

~~SECRET~~

taken with other friendly countries.\* This decision will not be announced until after China's Vice Chief of General Staff revisits the United States this summer to outline Chinese defensive needs against the Soviets and after we have consulted with our allies and friends as well as with key members of Congress. (S)

#### Consultations on Sensitive Strategic Matters

The Secretary is authorized to seek Chinese agreement to conduct regular secret consultations with the United States on sensitive strategic matters. Such consultations to be designed to advance strategic cooperation between us.\*\* (S)

#### Taiwan Arms Sales

The Secretary is not to raise the issue of arms sales to Taiwan unless the Chinese raise it. The Chinese are not to be given the impression that we are consulting with them on this matter. The Secretary is authorized to refer to Chinese assurances that they intend to take a peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue. He is to inform the Chinese, if asked, that new arms sales to Taiwan will go forward on a prudent and restrained basis. He is authorized to tell them, if asked, that no decision has been made or is expected before the end of this year on whether to sell a more advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Before the end of next year, however, it will be necessary to sell aircraft as some Taiwan fighter models are fast running out or becoming obsolete. Should the Chinese raise the issue of the Taiwan Relations Act and their opposition to it, the Secretary is instructed to say that the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of our land and will govern our relations with Taiwan. (S)

#### China/Taiwan Reunification

The Secretary is authorized to state that we favor reconciliation between the Chinese on the mainland and Taiwan, and regard the growth of indirect contacts over the past year as favorable developments contributing to that end. He is to emphasize that this process must be managed peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The U.S. does not see a direct role for itself in promoting such contacts or in brokering a settlement. (S)

---

\* The transfer of technology inherent in arms transfers is to be consistent with guidelines established for dual use technology transfers. Nevertheless, in every instance sales to China from the list will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

\*\* The Department of Defense will be involved in consultations on sensitive strategic matters.

China/Vietnam/Kampuchea

The Secretary is authorized to tell the Chinese that the only way to make the Vietnamese bend is to maintain the present tacit division of labor. China can continue to apply military pressure on the Vietnamese and we, ASEAN and others will keep up political and economic pressure. The United States will assist the ASEAN states to augment their defensive capabilities. The U.S. will consider material assistance to the non-Communist Kampuchean resistance in light of changes in the composition and effectiveness of the resistance and the ASEAN position. In this connection, the Secretary is authorized to stress that the Pol Pot group is not acceptable to the U.S. nor to the international community as an alternative to the present regime and he must not be allowed to return to power in Phnom Penh.

Intelligence Exchange

If the Chinese raise the matter of intelligence exchange and cooperation, the Secretary is to say that these matters will be handled in other channels (CIA). (S)

RECEIVED 10 JUL 81 09

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DDC DATE 06 JUN 81

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

MO  
11/17/08

KEYWORDS: LIBYA

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES DECISIONS ON LIBYA RE 4 JUN NSC MIC

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES      DUE:      STATUS C      FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#      LOG 8103178      8103181      NSC IFID NSC00012 (E / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

~~SECRET~~

49018

3294

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 6, 1981

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Presidential Decisions (U)

At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting held on June 4, 1981, the President made the following decisions:

U. S. Policy Toward Libya

-- A media campaign will be initiated to focus world attention on Libyan misdeeds. (S)

-- An approach will be made to European and regional governments to both inform them of our policy and enlist maximum cooperation. (S)

-- An approach will be made to countries which have provided military sales or training to Libya with the aim of eliminating or cutting back this activity. (S)

-- Sixth Fleet naval maneuvers will be conducted in August in international waters now illegally claimed by Libya (S)

-- A commitment in principle is made to more tangible measures such as increased FMS levels (some already approved), training, and joint maneuvers with countries most threatened by Libya (such as Tunisia and Sudan). (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review June 6, 2001  
Extended by Richard V. Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M325/2 #49018

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE


-2-

-- Contingency studies will be made for evacuation and other emergencies and proposals for coping with Soviet initiatives to support Libya in some new aggressive action. (S)

-- An action plan will be designed to prevent Libya from obtaining nuclear weapons. (S)

-- Additional steps will be developed for dealing with the long-term security threat posed by Libya. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 22 JUL 81 16

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 06 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*11/7/08*

KEYWORDS: CUBA

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES DECISION ON CUBA FM 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES      DUE:      STATUS C      FILES TEM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8102336

NSCIFIED NSC00012 (E / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)      ASSIGNED      ACTION REQUIRED      DUE      COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
<i>Document Description</i>				
49019	MEMO	2	6/6/1981	B1
RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS				

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 10 JUL 81 09

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 06 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*mp 1177/08*

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

ARMS TRANSFERS

NSC

SUBJECT: D/R 178Z PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON CHINA

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES      DUE:      STATUS CD      FILES IFM      0

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: CY FURNISHED NSC/S BY LILLEY'S OFFICE. NOT PROCESSED OR

DISPATCHED THROUGH SYSTEM. NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION MADE.

REF#      LOG 8103178      8103181      NSCID NSC00012      ( C / C )

ACTION OFFICER (S)      ASSIGNED      ACTION REQUIRED      DUE      COPIES TO

*C 6/8 Allen sgd to agencies*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 1/17/2008

*File Folder*

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (2/2)

*FOIA*

F03-003/1  
SKINNER

*Box Number*

1

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
49020	MEMO	5	6/8/1981	B1
	RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS (W/ATTACHED DIRECTIVES)			

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

4902

3335

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Presidential Decisions (U)

At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting held on June 4, 1981, the President made the following decisions:

U. S. Policy Toward China

The Secretary of State is authorized to:

-- Make good on past U. S. Government commitments to liberalize U. S. export controls on dual-use technology. This will respond to Beijing's expressed needs and further our interest in bolstering China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviets and their allies. (The proposed change will allow technology transfers at levels roughly twice that which was exported to the USSR prior to Afghanistan. It would continue to treat the Chinese less favorably than countries like India, which have a major military relationship with the Soviets.) (S)

-- Inform the Chinese that we are reviewing all legislation that prohibits cooperation by the Government or private industry with China due to its earlier association with the Soviet bloc. We will seek appropriate Congressional action to end past discrimination no longer consistent with our present strategic relationship. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review June 6, 2001  
Extended by Richard V. Allen  
Reason: NSC 1.13(g)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M325/2 #49021

BY KML DATE 9/26/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

-- Inform the Chinese that we intend to suspend China from the list of embargoed destinations for arms transfers and to adopt the same case-by-case approach taken with other friendly countries. This decision would not be announced until after China's Vice Chief of the General Staff revisits the U. S. this summer to outline Chinese defensive needs against the Soviets, and we have consulted with our allies and friends, as well as key members of Congress.\* (S)

-- Seek Chinese agreement to conduct regular, secret consultations with the United States on sensitive strategic matters. Such consultations are to be designed to advance strategic cooperation between us.\*\* (S)

-- Refer to Chinese assurances that they intend to take a peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue. The Chinese should be informed (if they ask) that new sales to Taiwan will go forward on a prudent and restrained basis. They should be told that no decision has been made or is expected before the end of this year on whether to sell a more advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Before the end of next year, however, it will be necessary to sell aircraft as some Taiwan fighter models are fast wearing out or becoming obsolete. (S)

-- State that we favor reconciliation between the Chinese on the mainland and Taiwan, and regard the growth of indirect contacts over the past year as favorable developments contributing to that end. He should, however, indicate that this process must be managed peacefully by the Chinese themselves. We do not see a direct role for ourselves in promoting such contacts or in brokering a settlement. (S)

-- Tell the Chinese that the only way to make the Vietnamese bend is to maintain the present tacit division of labor. China can continue to apply military pressure on the Vietnamese, and we, ASEAN and others will keep up the political and economic pressure. We will assist the ASEAN states to augment their defense capabilities. We will consider material assistance to the non-communist Kampuchean resistance in light of changes

\* Transfer of technology inherent in arms transfers should be consistent with guidelines established for dual use technology transfers. (S)

\*\* The Department of Defense will be involved in consultations on sensitive strategic matters. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

in the composition and effectiveness of the resistance, and the ASEAN position. In this connection, the Secretary should stress that the Pol Pot group is not acceptable to the U. S. or the international community at large, and that he must not be allowed to return to power in Pnom Penh. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~