

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files
Folder Title: NSC 00012 June 4, 1981 (1)
Box: 91282

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1

Box Number 1

SKINNER

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48988	MEMO	JIM LILLEY TO ADMIRAL NANCE RE SCOPE PAPER <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	2	6/2/1981	B1
48989	SCOPE PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP	7	ND	B1
48990	PAPER	RE CHINA	3	ND	B1
48991	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE PRESENTATION IN BEIJING (ANNOTATED)	3	6/4/1981	B1
48992	PAPER	DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE	2	ND	B1
48993	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE US-CHINESE RELATIONS <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	2	6/3/1981	B1
48994	PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	5	ND	B1
48995	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE US-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP - PART 2 <i>R 11/30/2012 M325/2</i>	2	6/4/1981	B1
48996	PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP - PART 2 <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	4	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1

Box Number 1

SKINNER

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48997	MEMO	JIM LILLEY TO ADMIRAL NANCE RE SCOPE PAPER (DUPE OF 48988) <i>R 9/26/2013 M325/2</i>	2	6/2/1981	B1
48998	SCOPE PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP (DUPE OF 48989)	7	ND	B1
48999	PAPER	RE CHINA (DUPE OF 48990)	3	ND	B1
49000	PAPER	RE CHINA (DUPE OF 48990)	3	ND	B1
49001	SCOPE PAPER	RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP (DUPE OF 48989)	7	ND	B1
49002	DISCUSSION PAPER	RE CUBA <i>PAR 6/12/2013 M325/2</i>	3	ND	B1
49003	DISCUSSION PAPER	RE CUBA (DUPE OF 48902) <i>49002</i> <i>PAR 6/12/2013 M325/2</i>	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>
6/4/81	China/Cuba Secretary Haig's Trip to the Far East.	<i>The President</i> The Vice President Admiral Daniel J. Murphy <u>State:</u> Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Dep Sec William P. Clark <u>OSD:</u> Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci <u>Commerce</u> Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige <u>OMB:</u> Mr. William Schneider, Jr. <u>CIA:</u> Admiral Bobby R. Inman <u>JCS:</u> General David C. Jones Lt General John S. Pustay <u>White House:</u> Mr. Edwin Meese III Mr. James A. Baker III Mr. Michael K. Deaver Mr. Richard V. Allen Admiral James W. Nance Mr. Frank Hodsoll Ms. Janet Colson

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

W/12 NAPA, Date 1/17/04

Handwritten notes:
NSC;
Secretary -
1981 meeting

CONFIDENTIAL

00012

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 4, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1991
WJZ NARA, Date 1/17/88

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: JANET COLSON
FROM: ALLEN LENZ *apl*
SUBJECT: Attendance List for National Security
Council Meeting, June 4, 1981 ~~(U)~~

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting which is scheduled for June 4, 1981, at 1:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. ~~(C)~~

The Vice President
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Chief of Staff to the Vice President)

State:
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Dep Sec William P. Clark

OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci

Commerce:
Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

OMB:
Mr. William Schneider (Associate Director for International and National Security Affairs)

USUN:
Amb Kirkpatrick is out of the country, therefore, no one will be attending from USUN.

CIA:
Admiral Bobby R. Inman (Deputy Director - Mr. Casey is out of town.)

JCS:
General David C. Jones
Lt General John S. Pustay

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Ms. Janet Colson

Lilley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on June 4 1982

NSC:

Mr. James Lilley
Mr. Roger Fontaine

Approved _____ As Amended _____

Attached is a proposed seating plan for this meeting. (b)

Attachment
Seating Plan

Clark Haig President Weinberger Carlucci Baldrige

Inman Jones Allen VP Meese Baker Deaver Schneider

Pustay Colson Murphy Lilley Fontaine *Nance*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 02 JUN 81 19

TO NANCE

FROM LILLEY

*WJP
11/11/8*

DOC DATE 02 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

EXPORT CONTROLS

IG

SUBJECT: STATE SCOPE PAPER & IG PAPER ON EXPORT CONTROL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 04 JUN 81 STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NANCE

NAU

GREGG

HUBERMAN

LENZ

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8103311

NSCIFIED NSC00012

B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 11/13</i>	<i>Handled at NSC mtg per Colson</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fian

The attached should
go in The NSL meeting
file, as necessary.
If not necessary, please
close out package. —

J

(I don't want it back.
Thanks.)

J.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3111

48988

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 2, 1981

~~SECRET~~

Lille
Chen
NSEC mh

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: JIM LILLEY *ml*

SUBJECT: State Scope Paper and IG Paper on Export Control (U)

Attached are my recommendations on two papers for our NSC meeting on Thursday at 1:30 p.m. Request you forward my comments, if appropriate, to Dick Allen and the President. (U)

Bud
Allen
10/1/81

Regarding export control policy, it is the recommendation of Ben Huberman and myself that Dick Allen should support the higher alternative on page 3 for these reasons:

(TAB B)

-- The lower alternative doesn't do enough and we want to soften up the Chinese for our moves on Taiwan; the higher alternative does this.

-- China should be treated similarly to India and Yugoslavia. These countries can be models for China, East Germany is not.

-- The Chinese are backward and need the technology to build up their civilian sector where they are placing their emphasis. America, in turn, will make more money and the risks are manageable. (S)

Regarding the Scope Paper, we should have stronger language in here on Indochina (page 4). We should lay it on the line to the Chinese that Pol Pot and his gang have to be cleaned up. This is the first order of business. (S)

Regarding Taiwan, I believe that we have a new and constructive view which we should enunciate on this trip. This should be embodied in three principles governing our China policy:

(1) The U.S. has acknowledged the Chinese position that there is only one China. All Chinese favor peaceful means for reunification of China. Different political, economic and social systems have evolved without resort to warfare.

~~SECRET~~

Review on 6/2/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M325/2 #48988

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

(2) The U.S. views as positive developments the increasing communication and trade between the PRC and Taiwan.

(3) The U.S. favors strong Chinese military forces to deal with the Soviet Union and its allies which are the primary threat to both the PRC and Taiwan, and it looks with favor on moves to concentrate military power against this real threat to the peace and stability of the area. (S)

Our purposes in doing this are essentially two-fold: First, we want to set down a framework for future cooperation between Peking and Taipei without coercion on Taipei and without involving the U.S. in a broker's role. Second, by emphasizing the Soviet threat to both, we are establishing a rationale for future arms sales to Taipei without directly challenging Peking. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward these recommendations to Dick Allen and the President, if appropriate.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A State Scope Paper
- Tab B IG Paper on Export Control

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48989	SCOPE PAPER RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP	7	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48990	PAPER RE CHINA	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1

SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48991	MEMO ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE PRESENTATION IN BEIJING (ANNOTATED)	3	6/4/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48992	PAPER DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

NLRA M325/2 #48993

June 3, 1981

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: Analysis of US-Chinese Bilateral Relations (C)

Attached is the first section of our analysis of the record of the secret bilateral talks between Americans and Chinese starting in 1971 and going up to the Nixon visit of February 1972.

It is important that you read this analysis prepared by Jim Lilley of the NSC Staff before tomorrow's NSC meeting.

SUMMARY:

Before you frame China policy for this Administration, and before Secretary Haig goes on his June trip to China, it is essential that you and other key persons be informed of the essentials of the bilateral talks which we have had with the Chinese since 1971.

This paper can be read in 10 minutes. The key judgments are:

- From the beginning of our talks in 1971, the Taiwan issue was "up front." The Chinese said many of the same things then in 1971 they are saying now.
- The Chinese have insisted that the U.S. cannot use the Soviet threat to make China give too much on Taiwan.
- China has serious domestic constraints on how far it can go on Taiwan.
- The U.S. (Nixon and Kissinger) endorsed five principles on Taiwan which went far in meeting Chinese requirements (see pages 4 and 5).
- China emphasized a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question back in 1971, but would not renounce use of force.
- The U.S. indicated to the Chinese that normalization would take place in Nixon's second term, 1972-1976.

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 3, 1987

~~SECRET~~

The tone of these early sessions was largely determined by the Chinese. The talks were on their home turf -- they set the meeting times, provided the hospitality and put the foreign barbarians on the defensive. Kissinger, who later turned out to be a tough bargainer, in these earlier sessions was accommodating.

China was then viewed as a newly discovered important strategic asset. U.S. negotiators did not have in mind comparisons between China's turmoil and backwardness and Taiwan's progressive achievements. Taiwan was considered "an obstacle."

We know that you are determined to alter this trend, but we have to do so in light of the historic record described here.

Attachment:

U.S.-China Relationship: A Review

~~SECRET~~

THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: A REVIEW

This is the first part of a review of the US-China relationship based on an examination of the heretofore most secret documentary record of bilateral talks. The purpose is to trace the origins of the relationship, to try to determine the nature of the expectations and commitments that have evolved, and finally to assess the current state of play as it relates to future expectations. (S)

The Setting

A convergence of developments made possible the breakthrough that the U.S. and the PRC achieved in the early 1970s after two decades of animosity, including combat during the Korean War. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which China interpreted as a threat to itself, China began to emerge from its isolation of the Cultural Revolution and to put its own house in order after convulsive internal struggles. A Party Congress was held in April 1969, the first in more than a decade of upheaval (Great Leap and Cultural Revolution as well as the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance); in its wake Beijing began dispatching ambassadors to their posts as a demonstration of China's reentry into the international community. After the Sino-Soviet border crisis of spring-summer 1969 was brought under control, the Chinese positioned themselves in a notably flexible way to enhance their political and diplomatic leverage and thus to offset Soviet pressures in the Sino-Soviet cold war that had developed. (S)

For its part, the new Nixon Administration was intent on exploring a new relationship with China, particularly with an eye to a post-Vietnam War situation. Within days of his inauguration the President instructed Henry Kissinger to encourage this process. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 sharpened the Administration's perception of the geopolitical opportunities. In addition, the Administration hoped that an opening to China would put pressure on Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement. (S)

Thus, both sides had reason to look to a breakthrough toward developing a new relationship. One premise was a mutual interest in containing Soviet pressures as the US reduced its military presence in Asia in line with the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in mid-1969. Another premise was their interest in transforming their long frozen adversary relationship and to remove the "two Chinas" anomalies that bedeviled international politics. These two premises, interacting in complex ways, were integral parts of the logic of the political evolution that began in the early 1970s, and they remain so today as that process continues. Another continuing dimension, though difficult to identify with precision on the Chinese side, has been the changing strength of the domestic base from which each side moves the process along. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

Opening Lines of Communication

An early signal of Chinese interest in opening a serious dialogue came in November 1968 when the PRC proposed resuming the Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks a month after the new Administration was in office. Reasserting a longstanding demand, the Chinese insisted that the two sides address the fundamental issue, i.e., Taiwan, and not haggle over side issues -- a reference to U.S. attempts over the years to improve the atmosphere by trade, cultural and other exchanges. This meeting was called off by the Chinese at the last moment for unspecified reasons. In the coming months, however, the U.S. signaled through statements and unilateral moves to relax trade and travel restrictions that it was interested in exploring a new relationship with China. At the same time, the Administration used intermediaries, the Romanians and especially the Pakistanis, as a channel to communicate this interest. (S)

Central to this carefully orchestrated effort to open a dialogue was U.S. willingness to address the fundamental issues posed by the Taiwan question. At the Warsaw Talks, revived in early 1970, the U.S. proposed that communication be raised to a more authoritative level and in a more secure setting; the Chinese indicated willingness to receive a Presidential special envoy. By spring 1971, after "ping pong diplomacy" had helped improve the public atmosphere, the President had received an invitation to visit Beijing, to be preceded by a secret visit by Kissinger. The Chinese indicated in clear terms that the top priority issue was U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan. The U.S. was clear in its own mind on this and proceeded accordingly; indeed, a Kissinger memo to the President acknowledged that a resolution of the Taiwan question could not be in the context of "two Chinas." In effect, for the first time after years of sterile exchanges the two sides had a meeting of the minds on the basic direction their negotiations would move. (S)

In the high-level dialogue that ensued, which included Kissinger trips in July and October 1971 and the Nixon visit the following February, the rancor of the years seemed almost to dissipate. The strategic imperatives drawing the two sides together could not alone account for the accommodating spirit that pervaded their difficult negotiating sessions. Nor was it sentimental affinity; rather, the U.S. struck a highly responsive chord in declaring that it was motivated by American self-interest and would treat China as an equal having its own interests (Mao was moved to remark to Nixon that he preferred rightists and had "voted" for Nixon). The accommodating approach by both sides was evident not only in their sincere efforts to take account of one another's international interests, but perhaps more tellingly in their understanding of the other side's domestic constraints. (S)

The Soviet Angle

The Chinese were willing to recount the background of their dispute with the Soviets, but they were reticent about addressing the Soviet angle as a factor in the emerging US-China relationship. They seemed particularly concerned to resist any suggestion that the Soviet factor and the Taiwan question could be linked. Thus, when General Haig arrived in January 1972 to make advance preparations for the President's visit he delivered a reassessment of Soviet intentions as directed at an encirclement of China; in view of this, he said, the Nixon visit had acquired an immediate significance beyond the long-term considerations originally motivating it. Haig also presented a new U.S. version of the draft communique's section on Taiwan, urging the Chinese to give serious reconsideration to their approach in view of U.S. domestic opposition to the whole enterprise. (S)

Zhou brushed aside the suggestion that there had been a change of Soviet strategy, and he took exception to Haig's statement that China's viability was endangered. No country should rely on external forces to maintain its independence, Zhou said, or else it would become a protectorate. Though Zhou did not spell this out, such a concern had been at the root of the failure of the Sino-Soviet alliance. (S)

The Chinese accepted the President's offer to provide a highly secret intelligence briefing on Soviet forces deployed against China, which Kissinger delivered to Marshal Ye Jianying. Kissinger also told the Chinese that he and the President, anticipating a Chinese intervention in the Indo-Pakistani war that winter, had decided that if China came under attack from the Soviets as a result, the U.S. "would take whatever measures were necessary to prevent it." After Kissinger delivered the detailed intelligence report, Ye remarked that it was "an important indication of the sincere desire" of the U.S. to improve relations with China. (S)

The Goal of Normalization

The coming 1972 elections loomed over the negotiations, with Nixon explaining that he could do more than he could say at that time and that it was the direction of events that now counted. Nixon and Kissinger pressed the point that an explicit U.S. undertaking at that time risked aborting the whole initiative; they raised the expectation, however, that the momentum of events would lead to normalization during a second Nixon term. The Chinese for their part disclaimed any demand for the U.S. to set a specific time frame, though they picked up on the references to a Nixon second term. At one point Zhou En-lai, musing on the fragility of an obligation by a President whose successors might not follow through, said if the Chinese had to wait six years they would use "other means" to liberate Taiwan -- a rare reference to the use of force. Kissinger replied that the U.S. was not asking them to wait six years. (S)

As Kissinger observed, there was a tension in the negotiations between the Chinese thrust for clarity and a U.S. need for ambiguity on the terms of normalization. He explained the U.S. need as essentially one of domestic politics. The Chinese, for their part, repeatedly stressed their people's "very strong feelings" about the Taiwan question, presumably meaning that there was strong resistance in the leadership to compromise on fundamentals. Zhou at one point remarked to the President that the Chinese Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State (Rogers) both had limitations, suggesting that they could not take the large view in negotiating. Noting that both the U.S. and the Chinese had their domestic difficulties -- and that the Foreign Minister represented the Chinese people's feelings -- Zhou said it was possible to persuade the people because of Mao's prestige. Mao stood way above the fray and could override resistance. (S)

The Chinese, while generally willing to leave ample time for the evolution of events, were concerned to get the U.S. committed to explicit objectives such as acceptance of Beijing's fundamental principle that Taiwan was a part of China. The Chinese showed extreme sensitivity to anything that even hinted at the prospect that Taiwan could be severed from China's sovereignty. For example, they objected to a U.S. statement in the draft communique favoring "an equitable and peaceful" resolution of the Taiwan question, arguing that the term "equitable" might be subject to the interpretation that a plebescite could be held on Taiwan on the question of self-determination. Thus, not only were they rejecting requests for a commitment to peaceful means as an infringement of their sovereignty, but they were intent on foreclosing any possibility -- whether peaceful or not -- that Taiwan could be juridically independent of the PRC.* (S)

Consistent with the projected goal of normalization, the U.S. went far toward meeting China's requirements on the "crucial" question of Taiwan. In the February 1972 talks, the President endorsed five principles that Kissinger had agreed to accept the previous year:

- There is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part, and there would be no further U.S. statements that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined.

* Chinese sensitivity was also reflected in their displeasure over a State Department spokesman's remark in April 1971 that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined. Kissinger repeatedly emphasized that no more had been heard from Washington in that vein and disavowed any such position. (S)

- The U.S. would not support a Taiwan independence movement.
- The U.S. would discourage Japan from establishing a military presence as American troops withdrew.
- The U.S. would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.
- The U.S. would seek normalization of relations, recognizing that the Taiwan question was an obstacle to completing the process. (S)

Bargaining on the Taiwan section of the joint communique was intense and protracted, in effect running from Kissinger's extended October 1971 trip to the last day of the Nixon February 1972 visit. The result was a notable compromise that could not have been achieved had the two sides not raised the mutual expectation that a process had been set in motion toward normalization. Though Zhou, in the private talks, explicitly expressed China's desire to realize a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, the Chinese remained adamant against forswearing other means, and the U.S. did not press the matter. But despite their insistence that the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan was unconditional, the Chinese agreed to sign a joint communique in which the U.S. conditioned its ultimate objective of withdrawing all its forces from Taiwan on the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. (S)

As will be noted in the next part of this review, domestic difficulties on both sides undercut the momentum that had rapidly developed in the new relationship. Even apart from the domestic dimension, however, there were difficulties inherent in the process that would have required the greater clarity of commitment that the U.S. side had resisted. A very big effort had been made by the two sides to establish convergent expectations of the direction they were moving, but the modalities by which they were to carry through on this had been left purposely vague. What did it mean, for example, to expect normalization during a Nixon second term if the status of the U.S. treaty with the Nationalist government were not agreed upon? The Chinese, while providing what Nixon called "running room" by not requiring a U.S. commitment on the matter, said they would require abrogation of the treaty as a condition for normalization. The U.S., on the other hand, looked to a historical evolution leading to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, thus rendering the treaty issue moot. But in the absence of a peaceful settlement among the Chinese themselves (and could that be expected in the coming five years?), it appeared that normalization could not be reached without either China renouncing the use of force or the U.S. abrogating the treaty and withdrawing its forces. It was this dilemma that posed a challenge to negotiations for the remainder of the decade. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT:

Part Two of Our Review of U. S. - Chinese
Bilateral Relations (C)

Attached is Part Two of an analysis, prepared by Jim Lilley of the NSC staff, of the secret files covering the bilateral talks between the Nixon and Ford Administrations and the Chinese in the period 1973 through the Ford visit in December 1975. If at all possible, I ask that you read this four-page concluding installment before today's NSC meeting. (S)

Summary:

-- Both U. S. and Chinese sides were bogged down in domestic difficulties which inhibited action on moving the relationship ahead. On the U. S. side it was Watergate, -on the Chinese side it was the dominance of the Gang of Four and the imminent fall of Deng.

-- The U. S. had opened up an official installation in Peking but there was no momentum on normalization despite our earlier indication that it would take place in Nixon's second term.

-- U. S. attempts to play up the Soviet menace fell on unresponsive Chinese ears. The Chinese needed Kissinger on U. S. grain sales and technology sales to the USSR, contrasting these with his tough rhetoric against the USSR.

-- The Japanese model for normalization came up during the 1975 Ford visit and the Chinese seized on this as the right way to normalize; i.e., no official relations with Taiwan.

-- Mao raised the prospect that "liberation" of Taiwan would take a long time, up to 100 years. (S)

During this period of time the Chinese again controlled the tone and the mood of the meetings. All the meetings took place in China. The Chinese, sensing American weakness at home and in Vietnam, attacked U. S. positions which they felt were vulnerable and sought to put the U. S. on the defensive. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 4, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MIB-325/2 #48995

BY RW NARA DATE 11/30/2

SECRET

-2-

The honeymoon period was clearly over. The Chinese, after caving in on establishing liaison offices in Washington and Peking, while letting the U. S. keep an Embassy in Taipei, began to set the stage for the more important normalization talks by laying down their three conditions early by seizing on American suggestions and interpreting them as commitments (normalization on the Japan model) and by pressuring for normalization soon but delaying the eventual "liberation" of Taiwan. (S)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker
Michael Deaver

SECRET

THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: A REVIEW (Part 2)

The momentum behind the new U.S.-China relationship during the first term of the Nixon Administration had raised Chinese expectations that the process of normalization could be completed during a second term. The momentum was still in evidence during Kissinger's visit to Beijing in February 1973, a year after the first Nixon visit, when the Chinese agreed to the establishment of Liaison Offices. This decision, with its risks for the Chinese of creating a "two Chinas" syndrome, showed that the two sides perceived both a strategic purpose being served by the relationship and an evolutionary process that would culminate in diplomatic relations. Their mutual expectations were reaffirmed during Kissinger's November 1973 trip to Beijing (as Secretary of State), but by that time developments had begun emerging that would stall the process and sour the accommodating atmosphere that had marked the first years of the relationship. (S)

Domestic Constraints

As noted in the first part of this review, a continuing dimension in the developing U.S.-China relationship has been the changing strength of the domestic base from which each side moved the process along. The momentum generated in the early phase derived from the two sides' willingness to apply the political will required to break through years of deadlock, and this meant above all that the Nixon Administration agreed to China's fundamental premise that Taiwan is a part of China. There remained a gap, however, between the ultimate objective of normalization based on that premise and agreement on the modalities by which this would be realized. Now that it had become time -- the second Nixon term -- to address that task, the domestic political base on both sides had been seriously eroded. (S)

The most salient development was, of course, the Watergate affair (Mao in November 1973 told Kissinger of his dismay over the American obsession with the matter). The weakened Presidency diverted the interest in pushing the normalization process further, and the prospect of normalization was deferred until after the 1976 elections, thus in effect forfeiting the expectation earlier raised of completing the process by that time. (S)

This period was also a time of tensions in Chinese domestic affairs as the Mao/Zhou succession crisis approached. The gravely ill Zhou relinquished his role to Deng Xiaoping, but Deng's enemies from the radical faction took to the offensive and toppled Deng shortly after Zhou's death in January 1976. Deng's fall was connected with internal events and was not related to his foreign policy role. His hard line with Kissinger probably resulted in part from his desire to pre-empt the left. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

... NLRR M325/2 * 48996
BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

Mao did show some signs of senility -- at times he could hardly communicate, drifted into religious symbolism "God has invited me" and talked of death rather than politics. Mao's death followed that September, and both China and the U.S. entered a period of transition.(S)

The Strategic Dimension

The U.S.-China relationship also ran into difficulty in its international aspect, which the Chinese repeatedly emphasized as their main concern. To Kissinger's consternation they would recite the line from the Party Congress in August 1973 that the Soviets were making "a feint in the East in order to attack the West," a line that they reinforced with lessons from the pre-World War II era on the folly of appeasement and of attempts in the West to direct the aggressor's thrust to the East. In this context the Chinese minimized the Soviet threat to China, arguing that the Soviet forces arrayed in the East were insufficient to invade China and were in any case directed first of all at the U.S. and Japan. (S)

Behind all of this lay Chinese apprehension over inclinations in West Europe and the U.S. to seek detente with the USSR, and particularly over the implications for China if the West proved politically and militarily unable to stand up to the Soviets. Kissinger, who had been so adroit in developing the China connection in the early phases, now seemed rather desperate in defending his policies toward Moscow and reassuring the Chinese. This was evident in November 1974 when he visited China after the Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok on strategic arms limitation. Vladivostok was a poor choice for the meeting place as far as the Chinese were concerned, as it linked the U.S. to Soviet presence in the Far East. In a manner that could hardly have been convincing to his hosts, Kissinger attributed Washington's detente policies to domestic considerations and pandered to the Chinese by saying that he personally agreed with their assessment of the world situation. The Chinese, however, were not disposed to give the benefit of the doubt. Deng tormented Kissinger about sales of grain and technology to the USSR, complaining that this served to make up for Moscow's main weaknesses. And, in a particularly sharp slap, Deng tried to extend through Kissinger an invitation to Defense Secretary Schlesinger, Kissinger's main rival and a well-known proponent of firm policies toward the USSR. Kissinger parried the thrust by offering a Ford visit instead. (S)

It was especially during the Kissinger advance trip in October 1975 before the Ford visit that the Chinese vented their frustration. After Deng and Kissinger had again jostled, Mao dismissed as "not reliable" Kissinger's remark that China's perception of the world situation was closest of any country to that of the U.S. Mao said that in U.S. priorities the USSR stood first, followed by Europe and Japan; then, tapping both his shoulders, he said: "We see that what you are doing is leaping to Moscow by way of our shoulders, and these shoulders are now useless." Later, having thus suggested that China had been used, Mao returned to the matter of the Schlesinger invitation: "We would like to invite him here for the

~~SECRET~~

Soviets to see," Mao said, adding that the Chinese would like for him to visit China's northeast, Mongolia, and Xinjiang -- the areas facing the Soviet troops. (Schlesinger was dismissed in the period between the Kissinger advance visit and the Ford trip to China that December.) (S)

The Modalities of Normalization

Domestic and international developments having undercut the momentum toward normalization, there was little possibility for the two sides to agree on modalities. The Chinese held up the Japanese model -- Japan had moved quickly to recognize the PRC in the wake of the Nixon visit to China in 1972 -- as the only acceptable arrangement, but the U.S. pointed to the complications, both domestic and international, posed by the formal defense treaty with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan. Kissinger probed the Chinese for a formula that would accommodate the U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and tried to appeal to China's strategic interests by saying that the anti-Soviet front would be jeopardized if the Taiwan question became a contentious issue in American politics. In what proved to be a non-starter, he suggested reversing the existing arrangement by putting the Liaison Office in Taipei and an Embassy in Beijing. (S)

The Chinese at this time were not interested in incremental advances, giving the U.S. the option of completing the process at one fell swoop or deferring normalization indefinitely. Mao, however, while agreeing with other Chinese leaders that there was no need to rush the process, began to show his frustration over the receding prospect of completing his revolution in his generation's lifetime. In a long talk with Kissinger in November 1973, Mao said he did not believe in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and called the Nationalist Chinese "a bunch of counterrevolutionaries." He did not, however, suggest that forcible liberation was a matter of urgency, saying that liberation could take 5, 10, 20 or 100 years. (S)

The Ford visit in late 1975 demonstrated that the normalization process had become stalled. During the Kissinger advance trip the U.S. presented a draft communique with a formulation somewhat strengthening the commitment to one China, but the Chinese rejected it out of hand. Kissinger strongly objected to the Chinese draft for laying out the two sides' differences rather than registering any progress. In contrast to the intense but accommodating process that led to the Shanghai communique, there was little give and take this time, and the Ford visit went without a joint communique. The Chinese draft, however, had codified the three conditions for normalization that Beijing would press in subsequent negotiations: that the U.S. sever diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government, abrogate the defense treaty, and withdraw all its troops from Taiwan. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Ford visit proved to be a rather hollow one, though the President reaffirmed the commitment to normalization and indicated that after the 1976 election the process could be resumed "along the model" of the Japanese solution. He also said the U.S. "would certainly anticipate that any solution" of the Taiwan question would be by peaceful means. In the event, it was left to a new Administration to resume the process of finding mutually acceptable modalities. (S)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 02 JUN 81 19

TO NANCE

FROM LILLEY *11/108*

DOCDATE 02 JUN 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

EXPORT CONTROLS

IG

SUBJECT: STATE SCOPE PAPER & IG PAPER ON EXPORT CONTROL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 04 JUN 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

NANCE

NAU

GREGG

HUBERMAN

LENZ

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID *DSC00012* (B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C/112</i>	<i>per Colson, handled at NSC Meeting</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

IF FILE

(C)

~~SECRET~~

3111

ajk
48997

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 2, 1981

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

NLRR M325/2 #48997

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

BY KML NARA DATE 9/26/13

FROM:

JIM LILLEY *W*

SUBJECT:

State Scope Paper and IG Paper on Export Control (U)

Attached are my recommendations on two papers for our NSC meeting on Thursday at 1:30 p.m. Request you forward my comments, if appropriate, to Dick Allen and the President. (U)

Regarding export control policy, it is the recommendation of Ben Huberman and myself that Dick Allen should support the higher alternative on page 3 for these reasons:

-- The lower alternative doesn't do enough and we want to soften up the Chinese for our moves on Taiwan; the higher alternative does this.

-- China should be treated similarly to India and Yugoslavia. These countries can be models for China, East Germany is not.

-- The Chinese are backward and need the technology to build up their civilian sector where they are placing their emphasis. America, in turn, will make more money and the risks are manageable. (S)

Regarding the Scope Paper, we should have stronger language in here on Indochina (page 4). We should lay it on the line to the Chinese that Pol Pot and his gang have to be cleaned up. This is the first order of business. (S)

Regarding Taiwan, I believe that we have a new and constructive view which we should enunciate on this trip. This should be embodied in three principles governing our China policy:

(1) The U.S. has acknowledged the Chinese position that there is only one China. All Chinese favor peaceful means for reunification of China. Different political, economic and social systems have evolved without resort to warfare.

~~SECRET~~

Review on 6/2/87

~~SECRET~~

(2) The U.S. views as positive developments the increasing communication and trade between the PRC and Taiwan.

(3) The U.S. favors strong Chinese military forces to deal with the Soviet Union and its allies which are the primary threat to both the PRC and Taiwan, and it looks with favor on moves to concentrate military power against this real threat to the peace and stability of the area. (S)

Our purposes in doing this are essentially two-fold: First, we want to set down a framework for future cooperation between Peking and Taipei without coercion on Taipei and without involving the U.S. in a broker's role. Second, by emphasizing the Soviet threat to both, we are establishing a rationale for future arms sales to Taipei without directly challenging Peking. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward these recommendations to Dick Allen and the President, if appropriate.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A State Scope Paper
Tab B IG Paper on Export Control

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48998	SCOPE PAPER RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP	7	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48999	PAPER RE CHINA	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL

RECEIVED 03 JUN 81 12

TO AGENCIES

FROM NANCE

DDC DATE 03 JUN 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

mon 7/08

KEYWORDS: AGENDA

CHINA P R

CUBA

NSC

SUBJECT: AGENDA ITEMS FOR 4 JUN NSC MTG

ACTION: NANCE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM 0

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8103178 8103181 NSC IFID NSC0012 (E / E)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Copies LDX'd to

Sec State
Sec Defense
Director of CIA
Amb. Kirkpatrick
Chairman, JCS

copies delivered
to the V.P.
Meece
Baker
Deaver
OMB

6-3-81

6/5/81
returned for
files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 THE U. S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
 THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 THE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
 AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
 MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: National Security Council (NSC) Meeting
 Thursday, June 4, 1981, 1:30-3:00 p.m.

There will be an NSC meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, June 4, 1981. The two agenda items will be:

1. U. S. Policy Toward China (Tab A).
2. U. S. Policy Toward Cuba (Tab B).

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


 Richard V. Allen
 Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
 MJD NARA, Date 11/7/08

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 3, 1987

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1

SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49000	PAPER RE CHINA	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/17/2008

File Folder

NSC 00012 JUNE 4, 1981 (1/2)

FOIA

F03-003/1
SKINNER

Box Number

1

9

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
49001	SCOPE PAPER RE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP	7	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

INITIAL APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH CUBA

Cuba's international activities pose a major threat to U.S. political and security interests in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere.

The challenges Cuba poses for the U.S. are complex and have been with us for twenty-one years. It will take time to make definitive progress. We probably will not finish a comprehensive review of our Cuba policy until the fall. Over the past few months Cuba has been off balance and on the defensive. We need to maintain momentum by bringing into play some concrete actions. If we do not produce some actions soon, Castro may assume that this Administration's rhetoric is hollow and that he has nothing to lose by continuing to pursue his foreign policy goals aggressively.

On May 26 the Senior Interdepartmental Group agreed on an initial approach for dealing with Cuba. NSC endorsement of that approach is requested today.

Initial Approach

The SIG participants agreed that the U.S. should implement or begin planning now measures to be taken over the next six months to lay the groundwork for future actions we may wish to take after a full review of our Cuba policy has been completed.

Initial steps need to be carefully calibrated to underline our resolve to deal firmly with Castro without drawing undue attention to the Cuba issue or provoking bold Cuban retaliatory actions until we are prepared to block or counter them.

Our public and private posture toward Cuba should be cool and distant during this initial period. It should be guided by several general rules:

- make no positive reference to normalization, even as a distant goal;

-- keep direct contacts at a minimum, communicating publicly rather than privately whenever possible and pursuing talks only on issues that the U.S., not Cuba has an important interest in discussing; and

-- when we use threats, leave no doubt that we will respond, but avoid being too specific.

Proposed Actions

Our initial approach will include steps to increase our military readiness, prevent repetition of the illegal boatlift from Mariel, bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba, and publicize Cuba's international activities. Some of these measures are outlined below.


State will proceed with measures to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba and publicize Cuba's international activities. We will kick off this campaign in June by releasing a special report on "Cuban Covert Activities in Latin America." We will also increase our efforts to enforce the trade embargo (which Cuba is trying harder to circumvent) and to persuade non-communist countries to reduce their trade with and credits to Cuba.

State is already staffing out the NSC's proposal to set up a Radio Free Cuba. We have in mind a professionally run station, closely supervised by the U.S. Government, that would exploit the Castro regime's vulnerabilities.

State will begin staffing out a proposal for a private demarche to Cuba on the return of hardened criminals and other undesirables sent in the Mariel boatlift. The status of the hardened criminals is a potential time bomb. Their continued detention has been challenged in the courts, and if we are unable to return them to Cuba, the courts may order us to release dangerous criminals onto American streets. But we would not offer concessions other than to process Cuban emigrants to the U.S. in a more expeditious manner.

3.3b(1)(6)

State and Justice, with DOD and Coast Guard participation, will proceed with planning already well underway to prevent a repetition of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. This will probably involve new legislation, a high-level policy statement underlining our resolve to prevent future illegal flows, and an increase in our naval presence and Coast Guard patrols in the Florida straits.



DOD will staff out military readiness measures, which are critical to this initial approach. At the SIG, DOD representatives expressed reservations about some of the suggested military readiness actions, such as shadowing Cuban freighters enroute to and from Nicaragua, transferring U.S. air squadrons to Florida, making capital improvements at Guantanamo, and upgrading our air defense installations in the southern U.S. The actions chosen need not be these particular ones, but we must have some military measures to make our approach credible.

610
49003

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, DC 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

RW M10-325/2# 49003
4/12/13

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

INITIAL APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH CUBA

Cuba's international activities pose a major threat to U.S. political and security interests in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere.

The challenges Cuba poses for the U.S. are complex and have been with us for twenty-one years. It will take time to make definitive progress. We probably will not finish a comprehensive review of our Cuba policy until the fall. Over the past few months Cuba has been off balance and on the defensive. We need to maintain momentum by bringing into play some concrete actions. If we do not produce some actions soon, Castro may assume that this Administration's rhetoric is hollow and that he has nothing to lose by continuing to pursue his foreign policy goals aggressively.

On May 26 the Senior Interdepartmental Group agreed on an initial approach for dealing with Cuba. NSC endorsement of that approach is requested today.

Initial Approach

The SIG participants agreed that the U.S. should implement or begin planning now measures to be taken over the next six months to lay the groundwork for future actions we may wish to take after a full review of our Cuba policy has been completed.

Initial steps need to be carefully calibrated to underline our resolve to deal firmly with Castro without drawing undue attention to the Cuba issue or provoking bold Cuban retaliatory actions until we are prepared to block or counter them.

Memorandum

① Our public and private posture toward Cuba should be cool and distant during this initial period. It should be guided by several general rules:

- make no positive reference to normalization, even as a distant goal;

-- keep direct contacts at a minimum, communicating publicly rather than privately whenever possible and pursuing talks only on issues that the U.S., not Cuba has an important interest in discussing; and

-- when we use threats, leave no doubt that we will respond, but avoid being too specific.

Proposed Actions

Our initial approach will include steps to increase our military readiness, prevent repetition of the illegal boatlift from Mariel, bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba, and publicize Cuba's international activities. Some of these measures are outlined below.

2 State will proceed with measures to bring economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on Cuba and publicize Cuba's international activities. We will kick off this campaign in June by releasing a special report on "Cuban Covert Activities in Latin America." We will also increase our efforts to enforce the trade embargo (which Cuba is trying harder to circumvent) and to persuade non-communist countries to reduce their trade with and credits to Cuba.

2 State is already staffing out the NSC's proposal to set up a Radio Free Cuba. We have in mind a professionally run station, closely-supervised by the U.S. Government, that would exploit the Castro regime's vulnerabilities.

3 State will begin staffing out a proposal for a private demarche to Cuba on the return of hardened criminals and other undesirables sent in the Mariel boatlift. The status of the hardened criminals is a potential time bomb. Their continued detention has been challenged in the courts, and if we are unable to return them to Cuba, the courts may order us to release dangerous criminals onto American streets. But we would not offer concessions other than to process Cuban emigrants to the U.S. in a more expeditious manner.

13624

3.3b(4)(6)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

4
State and Justice, with DOD and Coast Guard participation, will proceed with planning already well underway to prevent a repetition of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. This will probably involve new legislation, a high-level policy statement underlining our resolve to prevent future illegal flows, and an increase in our naval presence and Coast Guard patrols in the Florida straits.

5
6
[REDACTED]

DOD will staff out military readiness measures, which are critical to this initial approach. At the SIG, DOD representatives expressed reservations about some of the suggested military readiness actions, such as shadowing Cuban freighters enroute to and from Nicaragua, transferring U.S. air squadrons to Florida, making capital improvements at Guantanamo, and upgrading our air defense installations in the southern U.S. The actions chosen need not be these particular ones, but we must have some military measures to make our approach credible.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~