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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8100497)			
1. NSC profile	(1p) CAS c/r/01 w/ GUIDELINES	2/16/81	P-1
2. memo	from R. Allen to VP, et al. re: NSC meeting (1p) ll l	2/16/81	P-1
letter case (8100403)			
3. NSC profile	(1p) ll L	2/6/81	P-1
4. note	from B. Kimmitt to J. Colson re: attached memo (1p)	2/13/81	P-5
5. memo	from R. Kimmitt to R. Allen re: package (1p) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717477	2/17/81	P-1, P-5
6. memo	from R. Allen to the President re: package (4pp) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717475	n.d.	P-1, P-5
7. paper	re: background (1p) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717473	n.d.	P-1
8. memo	from W. Schneider to R. Allen re: proposal (3pp)	2/17/81	P-1, P-5
9. memo	from W. Schweitzer to R. Allen re: proposed decision (1p) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717469	2/18/81	P-1, P-5
10. letter	from H. Brown to Senator Sparkman re: proposal (4pp) A 10/28/05 M1268 #717467	5/9/78	P-1
11. memo	from R. Kimmitt to R. Allen re: package (1p)	2/13/81	P-1
12. memo	from R. Allen to the President re: package (1p) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717465	n.d.	P-1
13. memo	from R. Kimmitt to R. Allen re: package (1p) R 7/21/10 M1269 #717463	2/12/81	P-1
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00003 18Feb81 [2 of 2] Box 91282			12/12/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(e)

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential, commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - 16 U.S.C. 652(b)

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8100050)			
14. NSC profile (1p)	CAS 2/08/01 WH GUIDELINES	1/26/81	P-1
16. memo	from R. Allen to the President re: options, with notation (1p) A 10/28/05 M1269 # 719461	1/27/81	P-1, P-5
17. memo	from A. Haig to the President re: policy (4pp) A 10/28/05 M1269 # 717459	1/26/81	P-1, P-5
letter case (8100016)			
18. NSC profile (1p)	CAS 2/08/01 WH GUIDELINES	1/23/81	P-1
19. memo	from R. Allen to Sec. of State re: options paper (1p)	1/23/81	P-1
20. WASHFAX receipt (1p)	u u u	1/23/81	P-1
COLLECTION: EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rods (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER: NSC 00003 18Feb81 [2 of 2] Box 91282			12/12/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a))

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b))

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records
OA/Box: 91282
File Folder: NSC 00003 2/18/81 (2)

Archivist: cas
FOIA ID: M03-1269
Date: 3/19/07

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. memo	Richard Allen to the President re: options with notation - 1 p. (717461)	1/27/81	
17. memo	From Alexander Haig to the President re: policy (4 pp.) (717459)	1/26/81	

RECEIVED 17 FEB 81 19

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 16 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: NSC

FMS

CARIBBEAN

POLAND

SAUDI ARABIA

AGENDA

SUBJECT: D/R 029 NOTIFICATION OF 18 FEB NSC MEETING

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

LENZ

FONTAINE

PIPES

KIMMITT

KEMP

August 26, 1997
Date 2/28/01 #1

COMMENTS DONE VIA LDX

REF# LOG 8100403 8100502 NSCIEB NSC00003 (D / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting (U)

The President will chair an NSC Meeting on Wednesday, February 18 at 10:30 vice 10:15 AM. The meeting will last an hour. Principals only will attend. (C)

Principals have been advised of agenda items. Janet Colson or Admiral Nance may be contacted for additional details. (C)

Richard V. Allen

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 16, 1987

CAS

2/18/81

RECEIVED 10 FEB 81 16

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 06 FEB 81

SCHWEITZER

18 FEB 81

KIMMITT

17 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

FMS

NSC

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR 18 FEB NSC MTG RE F-15 AIRCRAFT ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE FOR SAUDIA ARABIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 19 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

SICK

NAU

- RUSSELL

COMMENTS

White House
CS

2/8/81 #3

REF#

LOG 8100497

8100502

NSCIFIED NSC00003

(L / J)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Allen X 2/17 Res for decision 2/19

Allen 1X 2/18 add-on / for info

- 2/18 action noted by Allen

C 2/20 OBE by 2/18 NSC mtg per Colson

RLC, GS/SC

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

IF 403

February 23, 1981

Bob,

Janet says that this package
is in limbo. The original
is in Secretariat.

Kay

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

[Handwritten initials and lines]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

rec. 403

2/20

Bob:

I have a copy of this entire package.

Per Dick's note, it's still an
active issue, even though the memo
has been a bit OBE'd by the NSC
meeting.

Thanks.

Janet

*These points are
what the President
used at the NSC
meeting*

2/13/81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JANET COLSON:

Attached is a copy of the F-15 memo. I recommend that Dick not forward it to the President at this time, since we have yet to hear from OMB or complete our analysis of this difficult subject. Precipitous action could strain our relations with OMB and could lead to a decision based on less than the complete record.

Bob Kinnitt

8100403
NSC 00003 (2/2)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

0403

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: F-15 Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia

At Tab A is the Haig-Weinberger memorandum recommending sale of F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia, balanced by additional security assistance to Israel. OMB's comments, which support the Secretaries' proposal but seek additional analysis of the Israeli portion, are at Tab B. We just received OMB's memorandum after a week's wait; in the future, you may have to call Bill Schneider directly to accelerate their response time. *ok*

At Tab I is a proposed memorandum from you to the President, styled as a brief for tomorrow's NSC discussion of the F-15 issue. It recommends that the President approve the Secretaries' proposal in principle, but that he hold final approval pending further analysis of the Israeli portion of the package.

During the years of considering the Saudi F-15 question, there was little discussion or analysis of providing the Israelis with compensating support. This oversight led to a very hurried review of ways to respond to Israel's needs; the result is a proposal that has yet to be fully analyzed in program, budget, or political terms.

For example, Israel already consumes almost forty percent of the FMS budget, and increases in its program invariably lead to additional requests by Egypt, which garners over twenty percent of the budget. We should therefore examine closely any increases in these two programs, since they very often come at the expense of other important programs, especially in Latin America and Africa. Also, assisting Israel in selling its Kfir aircraft, as the Secretaries suggest, will almost certainly cause a major row with General Dynamics, Northrop, and other aerospace companies currently competing with Israel for advanced aircraft sales in the Third World. Thus, before subjecting the overall package to public and congressional scrutiny, I believe it better to conduct a quick, but thorough, analysis of the Israeli component of the package. (OMB has begun work on this analysis with State and Defense.)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Robert Schweitzer and Gary *al* Sick concur.

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 17, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M12109 #717477

BY RW NARA DATE 7/21/10

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

0403

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: F-15 Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1269 717475

BY RW NARA DATE 7/2/00

At Tab A is the Haig-Weinberger memorandum recommending sale of F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia, balanced by a series of actions favorable to Israel. OMB's comments, which recommend more scrutiny of the Israeli portion of the package, are at Tab B. This topic will be discussed at today's NSC meeting.

I agree with the Secretaries' recommendation to proceed with the sale of F-15 enhancement items, since it is the linchpin to maintaining and improving our special relationship with Saudi Arabia. A strong, secure, and stable Saudi government is of vital importance to the United States for security and economic reasons, and we should demonstrate that belief by approving this sale.

At the same time, no country in the Middle East is more important to the United States than Israel, and our arms transfer decisions in that region must never threaten Israel's security. Thus, I agree with the Secretaries' assessment that we should balance the sale to Saudi Arabia with additional support to Israel. However, I also agree with OMB's belief that we need to study the Israeli portion of the package with more care. As OMB notes, there are significant budget consequences in providing Israel with additional F-15s and corresponding FMS credits. Also, a more forthcoming attitude on Kfir sales means that we will be enhancing Israeli marketing efforts in countries where US aerospace companies also are competing. I believe that we need further analysis of these and other factors before you give final approval to the Israeli portion of this package.

At today's NSC meeting, therefore, I recommend that you take the following approach:

- Indicate your support for selling F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia and balancing the sale with increased assistance to Israel.
- Because of budget and other consequences, however, ask the Secretaries to provide further analysis of the Israeli program, in coordination with OMB.
- To avoid charges of favoritism, the final decisions on both the Saudi and Israeli programs will be held until the additional analysis is received.

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 17, 1987

~~SECRET~~

Although these requests affect our own domestic politics and the Middle East peace process, we believe they should principally be seen in the wider context of US efforts to strengthen our overall security position in the region. Over time, as we succeed in developing a solid military position and a coherent strategy in the region, we hope to escape the situation where countries require particular arms as evidence of our overall commitment.

We have reviewed the Saudi requests carefully and recommend that you approve the following response:

- We agree to move forward now with Congressional notification to sell the conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L missiles, and indicate to the Saudis our agreement in principle to provide AWACS once we have determined together the type and number of aircraft they wish to buy. We will make clear to the Saudis that we want these sales to lead to broader US-Saudi cooperation across a range of security issues.

- We are prepared to be forthcoming about Saudi air refueling requirements (tankers) and will work with the Saudis to determine the most cost-effective means for the defense of Saudi Arabia.

- We will consider the Saudi requests for bomb racks, but defer a decision until after we have had an opportunity with the Saudis to study their air-to-ground requirements. (The Saudis have indicated that this would be satisfactory for now.)

After informing the Saudis of these decisions, we can then decide the timing and approach we should take in detailing to them the concrete measures that must be taken so that Saudi Arabia can make use of the outside help--from the US or other friends--that alone can provide security against threats that are much too big for Saudi Arabia to handle by itself.

While two of these decisions (fuel tanks and bomb racks) would go back on commitments that the previous Administration made to Congress in 1978, we believe that this decision can be justified on the basis of the enormous increase in the threat to the security of the region that has come about as a result of the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Israel's reaction to this sale will affect our future dealings with that country, as well as the Congressional and public attitudes. We expect the Israelis to complain about the decision, but we have received informal indications that they may be prepared to accept our decision, if we are prepared to do certain things for them. Therefore, we also recommend that specific steps be taken to demonstrate that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns:

- We would assure them that they have a role in our broader strategy for the region.

- We also would be prepared to offer Israel an additional squadron of F-15s and to provide credits (after FY 1982) to pay for them.

- In addition, we would in general take a more forthcoming attitude towards Israeli exports of their KFIR fighter aircraft (which contains US technology). The previous Administration had approved KFIR marketing to Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia, but not to a number of other countries. I have recently informed the Israeli Ambassador that we would look sympathetically on their request to sell KFIR to Ecuador that had previously been turned down. I also indicated a general willingness to be forthcoming on this issue, since it is in the US interest for Israel to have a strong defense industry.

We would also be departing from the approach that the Carter Administration took during the earlier debate on the F-15s themselves, when it treated as negligible the potential problems for Israel. We, on the contrary, would be in a position to argue that any problems created would be more than made up by the offsetting actions that we propose to take with Israel.

Even if we are fully successful in reassuring the Israelis, we will still have a problem on Capitol Hill. Our posture in public and with the Congress would emphasize (1) that we are sympathetic to Israeli security concerns, and (2) that these sales are not isolated actions, but instead fit into our overall security strategy for Southwest Asia. To ensure that our reasons for the sale are given a fair hearing, we must consult closely and extensively with the Congress.

We would personally carry out most of the discussions , but recommend that you be prepared to talk with certain leaders (e.g., Senators Baker and Byrd). If you approve this approach, we will recommend an appropriate time and we will provide you our suggested points to make on the subject.

Recommendation

That you approve the concept outlined above for responding to the Saudi requests, meeting Israeli concerns, and consulting with the Congress.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Background on Saudi Arabia's F-15 Request

During the 1978 Congressional debate over the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the Carter Administration stressed that the F-15 was primarily an air superiority fighter that would not threaten Israel. To underscore that assurance, Secretary Brown told Congress that we would not sell the Saudis multiple ejection bomb racks or conformal fuel tanks that would enhance the F-15's ground attack capabilities that existing Saudi air refueling tankers were not compatible with the F-15, and that there were no plans at the time to sell the Saudis the AIM-9L air-to-air missile or AWACS air surveillance radar aircraft. Congressional acceptance of the Saudi F-15 sales was premised on these assurances.

In early 1980, spurred by the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudis requested all five items. A January 28 letter from Prince Sultan to Secretary Weinberger makes clear that the Saudis are expecting a rapid and responsive answer.

The Carter Administration stated publicly that it would take no decision on F-15 enhancement items without consulting Congress. In late November, the Carter Administration also indicated to the Saudis it was favorably disposed to sell the fuel tanks, the AIM-9L, and AWACS (for 1985 delivery), before finally informing the Saudis that the matter was being turned over to the new Administration for decision.

The Saudis have insisted that they will not accept a negative answer, but there have recently been some indications that they would be willing to accept a delay in the decision on aerial refueling, and to consider alternatives to bomb racks for enhancing their air force's ground attack capability. The Saudis also are also prepared to participate in technical studies on alternative aerial tankers and air-to-ground requirements.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1269 #717473

RW NARA DATE 7/21/00

8/19/95
NSA

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/19

RVA:

Is this OBE'd by the NSC meeting?

Janet

yes —
keep keep.
H's still in
the game.
2-20-81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JEAN P.

per telecon -
RA has already
seen & noted

BTM

2/18

2/18/81
has seen
per

add to folder. Thanks

MEMORANDUM :

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET
INFORMATION

February 18, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR ~~MI 12/69~~ #717469

BY RW NARA DATE 7/21/00

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: ROBERT SCHWEITZER
SUBJECT: F-15's for Saudi Arabia

You have my "concurrence with exception" additions of 17 February to the Kimmitt memo, this subject, of 17 February.

There is one additional point. The last time we offered F-15's to Saudi Arabia in 1978, Erich von Marbod (OSD/DSAA) drafted the attached letter of assurances for Congress (Tab A). He also negotiated these assurances with the Saudis.

While the promise of negotiations and new assurances is implicit in SecState Haig's memo we should make the need explicit. It may well turn out that Ambassador Same Lewis, Ambassador John West or Ambassador Pellatreau (OSD/ISA) have tidied this up, but we need to verify and accomplish if not done. For example, there is a Saudi Arabia base at Tabuk which the Saudis probably would not use, but if they wanted to do so the Israelis would oppose.

All of this shows we are some distance from an immediate decision.

NB

VP is aware and may raise -
Certain members on the Hill would like to teach the new administration "a lesson in humility" And would do so if we fail to fill in this square - - carefully
RLS

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

9 May 1978

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

Honorable John J. Sparkman
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NLS M1269 # 717467

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/28/25

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During recent conversations with you and other members of your Committee, a number of questions have been raised regarding the characteristics of the F-15 aircraft we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia and reassurances as to the purposes for which Saudi Arabia will use the aircraft. I would like to respond to these questions and attempt to resolve any uncertainties that members may have felt regarding the proposed sale.

I. The F-15 Aircraft

The F-15 we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia will have the same configurations as the interceptor model approved for the United States Air Force. During the developmental phase of the F-15, initial plans called for giving the aircraft a ground attack capability. However, the availability of other aircraft with superior strike capabilities led the Air Force to alter its plans and to limit the role of the F-15 to that of an air superiority fighter. Consequently, the development of new ground attack systems for the F-15 was discontinued in 1975.

Saudi Arabia chose the F-15 because of its extended patrol capability and superior air defense characteristics (including an advanced, all-weather air-to-air radar system). The F-15 best meets Saudi Arabian requirements for the air defense of a vast territory. In choosing the F-15, Saudi Arabia rejected aircraft with powerful ground attack capabilities such as the F-16.

As Saudi Arabia has selected the F-15 to defend its national territory, it would be folly, as the Chairman designate of the JCS, General David Jones, USAF, observed in testimony, to use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft. I am confident the Saudis have no such intention.

Like the USAF model 1, the F-15 for Saudi Arabia will be equipped with air defense armament, namely four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles and a 20 mm gun.

The aircraft can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane requested by Saudi Arabia will not be equipped with special features that could give it additional range. Specifically, the planes will not have conformal fuel tanks ("fast packs"), i.e., auxiliary fuel tanks that conform to the body of the plane, and Saudi Arabian KC-130 tankers do not have equipment for air refueling of the F-15.

Saudi Arabia has not requested that the plane be outfitted with Multiple Ejection Racks (MER 200) which would allow the plane to carry a substantial bomb load. The U.S. will not furnish such MERs, and testing and certification of a MER system for the F-15 would not be feasible by another country without U.S. authorization. While aircraft could conceivably carry three standard MK 84 bombs, they would each replace an external fuel tank; this would greatly shorten the aircraft's range and increase its vulnerability. Moreover, in contrast to the F-16, the F-15 does not have a radar system designed for bombing.

Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

Pursuant to our national security disclosure policy, certain highly sensitive subcomponents of the U.S. Air Force version of the F-15 (e.g., cryptologic equipment and some special electronic capabilities) will not be sold to Saudi Arabia.

In sum, it is clear that the F-15 will help Saudi Arabia deter and defend against those nations that are hostile to its role as a leading moderate Arab state.

II. Assurances

The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state; that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

We have specifically discussed these restrictions on use and prohibitions on transfer with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They have assured us that they intend scrupulously to comply with these prohibitions and restrictions. The record of Saudi Arabia in this respect is excellent. However, should the assurances be violated, the United States can take appropriate action, including suspension of services and of delivery of spare parts and other military equipment. Without such services the usability of the F-15 would degrade rapidly.

It is also important to note that the sales agreement reserves to the United States the right to suspend or cancel deliveries at any time "when the national interest of the United States so requires."

Further, under Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, no U.S. person employed under Foreign Military Sales contracts in Saudi Arabia or any other country would be permitted to perform services in support of combat operations.

Questions have been raised concerning the possible basing of the F-15 aircraft at Tabuk Air Base. I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khamis Mushait. Basing the F-15 at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15s, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided. These practical considerations, of which Saudi Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15s will not be based at Tabuk.

The question has also been raised whether the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to acquire additional combat aircraft from other countries. The Saudi Arabian Government has assured us that it does not intend to add to its inventory any combat aircraft from other countries while it is preparing for and receiving the sixty F-15s. The shortage of trained personnel in Saudi Arabia would severely constrain Saudi Arabia's ability to utilize any additional new aircraft beyond the F-15 during this period.

With respect to the security of the aircraft, the Government of Saudi Arabia has expressed its determination to provide carefully for the physical protection of the aircraft, manuals and other material related to it. Prior to the delivery of the aircraft, we will work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining access to the aircraft or information about it.

The proposal with respect to Saudi Arabia, like all such proposals, stands on its own merits, and I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you and that you and the members of your Committee will join in support of the Administration's proposals to sell aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: F-15 Enhancement Package
for Saudi Arabia ~~(S)~~

At Tab I for your signature is a brief memorandum to the President on the subject above. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I. ~~(U)~~

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 13, 1987

CLS

2/13/87 411

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM .

403

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: F-15 Enhancement Package for
Saudi Arabia (S)

The NSC Staff is reviewing, and coordinating with OMB, a recommendation from Secretaries Haig and Weinberger to provide an F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia. The Secretaries propose to sell fuel tanks and AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and to inform the Saudis that we are also prepared to be forthcoming on AWACS aircraft and to consider further the Saudi request for F-15 bomb racks. (S)

Because of Israeli sensitivity on this issue, the Secretaries also propose a series of actions to assuage Israeli security concerns. Specifically, they propose to sell an additional F-15 squadron to Israel, and to provide additional FMS credits to cover the cost of the purchase. Also, the Secretaries believe we should be more forthcoming in our attitude toward Israeli exports of its Kfir aircraft. (S)

While I believe the Secretaries' proposals have considerable merit, I would like to receive OMB's comments on the budgetary aspects of the proposals and then analyze more carefully the important regional and political issues involved. A coordinated package will be sent to you early next week. (C)

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 13, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1219 #717465

BY RW NARA DATE 7/21/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 12, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: F-15 Enhancement Package for
Saudi Arabia (S)

We have received a memorandum from Secretaries Haig and Weinberger recommending the approval of an F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia. I am coordinating this action with OMB and appropriate members of the NSC Staff, and will forward it for your review once their comments are received. Because of the importance of this package, however, I thought you should know that it has been received by the NSC, in the event that you receive questions concerning it. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 12, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MIA #717463

BY RW NARA DATE 7/21/10

NSC SECRETARIAT:

done Please put in system. Original to *done*
go to the President ~~via~~ Ed Meese. *got a*
Copy provided to the Vice President.
Please provide a copy to Roger Fontaine.

January 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *rw*
SUBJECT: El Salvador

You asked for a short paper reviewing the options for United States policy toward El Salvador. The Secretary of State has sent this response. ~~(S)~~

You will note his remark that he has "not found a comprehensive analysis of the background and current status available in State or any other agency." He also stresses that our most important problem has been that we have not had a consistent policy, with the result that no one knew where we stood. ~~(S)~~

To achieve any measure of success through stabilization of the military situation, the supply of arms from outside, principally from Cuba via Nicaragua, must be stemmed. The Secretary will provide an action plan shortly. ~~(S)~~

This paper will form the basis of an agenda item at the first NSC meeting. Therefore, you need not act to approve the Secretary's plan. ~~(S)~~

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 # 717461

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

~~SECRET~~


Derivative SecState 1/26/81
Review on January 26, 1990

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

(Entire Text)

January 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: El Salvador

We have been very lucky in El Salvador. The Durarte military/civilian government fortunately defeated the major January offensive despite the fact that almost no U.S. military assistance had reached them at the time the offensive opened. Six helicopters and substantial other arms and ammunition have now been supplied. Given the regular and recently increasing flow of arms from Castro and his friends to the insurgents, the outcome might have been quite different. Perhaps the key factor was that the general population gave little support to the communists. There is still a flow of equipment and perhaps people to the insurgents from outside El Salvador. We shall have to deal with that problem in a more general context.

We need to address the El Salvador problem in a comprehensive way while quickly rectifying the policy and implementation errors of the previous Administration.

Surprisingly, I have not found a comprehensive analysis of the background and current status available in State or any other agency. Our first step must be to understand fully the nature of the problem before you commit the administration to a policy. Several key factors in this background emerge from the initial interagency work I have started:

-- El Salvador is a small overpopulated coffee republic with a tradition of oligarchical rule and military repression of popular discontent. Over the last few years, it has become a classic case of internal unrest capitalized upon by foreign communists to increase violence and attack our interests.

-- The Salvadoran security forces total about 16,000. The 8,300-man Army is the most disciplined core of the security forces but is composed of conscripts on 18-month duty. The ranks of the National Guard

~~SECRET~~

XDS-3 1/26/90

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1268 #72459

BY ANF, NARA, DATE 10/28/05

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(3,000), National Police (3,500), and Treasury Police (1,200) have traditionally been filled with former soldiers. The police and National Guard man outposts throughout the country and have often been used by leaders of the local power structure as their private enforcers, leading to abuses against the population.

-- The Salvadoran general staff estimates that total guerrilla strength exceeds 9200, including 3700 full-time guerrillas and 5500 militia. (We believe these figures are inflated -- 3,000-4,000 guerrillas is probably more accurate.)

-- The guerrillas have commitments of support from the Cubans, the Soviets and the PLO. The guerrillas have acquired quantities of arms (many Western-made) from Soviet and Eastern European sources. Cuba has helped in smuggling arms and has provided training for perhaps as many as a thousand guerrillas.

The extent of the future problem will obviously depend on how much outside support the guerrillas continue to receive. If such support is not contained, it would be necessary to expand the size of the Salvadoran military and provide it with major amounts of modern arms. The 700 officers of the Salvadoran military are generally well trained - a majority have some US training. But they do not have experience with larger than guerrilla operations and are woefully weak on logistics. A major training effort would be required by U.S. forces. The presence of substantial numbers of U.S. military in the country would run major risks of polarizing the situation in El Salvador, uniting the people against the foreigners, and of polarizing the U.S. along Vietnam lines.

If substantial support from outside can be cut off, it appears the current or modestly expanded Salvadoran forces can control the situation so long as we provide the fairly modest amounts of materiel needed.

In the major interagency study now underway we shall analyze the above preliminary findings. On a separate sensitive track we shall be working on ways to curtail outside support for the insurgents. We shall provide you a comprehensive action plan in about 10 days.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

On Saturday State chaired an interagency meeting to develop options on El Salvador. There was substantial interagency agreement, including DOD, CIA, AID, ICA, OMB, NSC.

I believe we need to await the more comprehensive study before acting on the principal interagency action item, a strong statement of consistent reliable support for the Government of El Salvador. However, I shall proceed with the following agreed recommendations:

-- Provide immediately the \$5 million from the unexpended portions of FY '81 FMS credit and the 506 determination grant funds to supply El Salvador ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns and other military equipment.

-- Commit quickly the \$17.9 million in unexpended AID and PL-480 assistance for El Salvador.

-- Begin staff work immediately to develop in consultation with Duarte an integrated policy plan for El Salvador; staffing will demonstrate domestic and foreign policy trade-offs and include public initiatives essential to gain the necessary Congressional and public support.

In addition I have recalled Ambassador White from El Salvador for consultations and then reassignment. I believe we need a strong man to take over that mission quickly - one who can work quietly and effectively with the government and stay out of the limelight.

The biggest problem with the previous Administration's policy on El Salvador was that it was not steady and consistent. Assistance was promised one day, turned off the next. Neither the Salvadorans nor our friends around the world knew where we stood. We need to establish a firm policy and stick with it.

Defense strongly recommends that we send additional military training teams to El Salvador. There is major interagency disagreement on the introduction of significantly greater number of Americans, both on the need and the political implications in El Salvador and here. I note that both President Duarte and his Foreign Minister have urged that we not send additional US military personnel to El Salvador. At the same time we may have to send some additional people in order to attain our objectives. This issue will receive careful study.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the action plan outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 23 JAN 81 11

TO HAIG, A

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 23 JAN 81

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR

NSC

SUBJECT: D/R 003 PRES REQUEST FOR EL SALVADOR OPTIONS PAPER

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO HAIG

DUE: 26 JAN 81 STATUS CD FILES IFM C

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COLSON

NANCE

ats

³⁻³⁻¹⁹⁸¹
2/08/01 *18

COMMENTS VIA LDX - ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW

REF#

LOG 8100050

8100502

NSCIFID NSC00003

(H / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

16

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: El Salvador Options Paper:
President's Request ~~(S)~~

The President has requested a presentation of options available to him with respect to El Salvador. ~~(S)~~

We would appreciate receiving a paper from the Department by 0900 Monday, January 26. ~~(S)~~

It is anticipated that this subject will be an agenda item for an NSC meeting, tentatively scheduled for that week. ~~(U)~~

for James W. Nance
Richard V. Allen

Cts.

ust 26, 1997
2/08/01 #19

~~SECRET~~

Review January 23, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT

23 JAN 1981

SITROOM:

Pls. LDX to SECRETARY OF STATE
for APPROPRIATE ACTION.

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 1981

COMMENT: Original to follow

Thanks,
H. West
NSC/S
X3724

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 833 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 1

FROM H. West MSC/S 3724
(NAME) (RETURN TO) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION El Salvador Options Paper: President's Request (S)

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Secretary of State</u>		

REMARKS: URGENT

Due Date: 26 Jan 1981

Comment: Original with follow.

CS

2/28/81 #20