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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files  
**Folder Title:** NSC 00001 6 Feb. 1981 [Caribbean Basin  
and Poland] (2)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING Files:  
RECORDS

**Withdrawer**

CAS 12/10/2004

**File Folder** NSC 00001 2/6/81 [CARIBBEAN BASIN AND POLAND]  
(2/2)

**FOIA**

2000-002

**Box Number** 91282

SKINNER

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
823	PAPER	RE POLAND	2	ND	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/6/2006</b>			
824	POINT PAPER	RE LATIN AMERICA	4	ND	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/6/2006</b>			
825	SUMMARY	OF CONCLUSIONS	2		B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/6/2006</b>			
826	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MEETING	3	2/5/1981	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/6/2006</b>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 06 FEB 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM SCHWEITZER

DOCDATE 05 FEB 81

White House C

11/28/97

~~CAS~~

11/21/08

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA

POLAND

CARIBBEAN

NSC

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR 6 FEB NSC MEETING

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

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ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8100295

3100309

NSCIFIED NSC00001

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C 2/6 noted by Allen

DISPATCH

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 6, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *RS*  
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Latin America

Attached is a paper on possible actions in dealing with Polish crisis for possible use in preparing your overview of that country at today's NSC meeting (Tab A).

More important for today -- or later -- is a paper on Latin America. In particular, the action steps, or recommendations, are valuable in that they will produce better focused NSC meetings on the region. All are the result of over a year's work (Tab B).

We will get papers like this to you in a more timely manner. Problem this first time was we were late in learning of the meeting and its agenda.

*2/6/81  
RA has seen*

ACTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE CRISIS IN POLAND

These are the following kinds of things we can do as the crisis builds in Poland:

I. Information

-- By use of the press and diplomatic channels, we can prevent the Soviets from surprising the Poles with an invasion.

-- Information can also affect public and elite attitudes in other East European states, creating tensions which present the Soviets a potentially larger problem than Poland at the same time.

-- Information about the Polish situation broadcasted to the USSR can cut two ways; it may constrain Soviet actions in Poland or it may prompt them because spread of the Polish workers' movement to the USSR would shake the regime's foundations.

II. Contingency Sanctions

-- The U.S. can make known some of its planned sanctions in the event of an invasion. This lets the USSR worry about the costs of the invasion. The effect in December was visible. Whether it will deter again is debatable.

-- The Alliance (NATO) can make known its sanctions. We were far down that road in December. The FRG, however, was timid. If Bonn joined the UK, France, and U.S. on trade, we would have a much more impressive threat.

III. Diplomatic Leverage

The Polish debt, of course, is critical for the USSR as well as Poland. Any debt assistance could be made contingent on a Soviet written diplomatic promise not to intervene. They might invade anyway, but the cost would not be small.

#### IV. Contingency Military Actions

We started some mobilization and readiness actions in NATO in December. The rationale is that a Soviet invasion of Poland would create large unknowns and uncertainties. NATO increased readiness, therefore, is needed to prevent accidental war or spillover into West Europe. The psychological effect on the Soviets, however, could be less than disturbing, increasing Soviet uncertainties about the consequences of intervention.

#### V. Actions Taken to Exploit the Public Reaction and the Political Climate in the Aftermath of a Soviet Intervention

A number of things in the defense area are too unpopular at present to carry the day with Congress and the public. Others are acceptable but at lower funding levels. We can use the public indignation to get support for some of these basic things that would otherwise cost any President a lot of political capital. For example:

- Revive the military draft.
- Accelerate our snail's pace civil defense program.
- Buildup a number of strategic stockpiles.
- In particular, re-authorize the Special Contingency Stockpile of Foreign Military Sales and fill it.
- Expand our industrial surge capability.

The effects of the actions would be enormous and enduring. Most of the other classes of actions would not.

#### VI. Strategic Realignment

I have in mind here the China option. We can make known that Soviet actions in Poland will force the U.S. to review its attitude toward a military relationship with China.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-002 # 824

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 6/6/06

POINT PAPER

Latin America -- What to Do?

-- We need to depart from errors and bromides of past which have confused, bewildered, and antagonized our Latin Allies to point where we would not find, at this moment, the key support we received from them in World War II.

● Many would pursue a neutral or even hostile course to our interests were World War III to occur now.

-- We should recognize need for new hemispheric relationship not unlike that which we share with Japan and Western Europe.

-- Cuba is the most challenging problem.

● Soviet brigade should not be tolerated even as a symbolic presence. But this is not to suggest military action.

● There are a raft of unused policy instruments that can be brought to bear.

-- We need to expose Castro for the weak, incompetent failure he is rather picture him as the formidable antagonist of U.S. myth.

-- When Barbara Walters served as his Social Secretary (as she did on his last visit to New York) and prominent Americans vied with each other to court him, we can see just how far we have gone.

-- By treating Castro as a respectable antagonist, we failed to spotlight for the world:

● His economic disaster where people go hungry under stringent rationing.

● Failure of tobacco and sugar crops this year in large part was due to refusal of workers to harvest.

● Enormous unemployment exists.

● Castro's current "major export" is not tobacco or sugar but troops for overseas wars, a fact hidden from his own people.

● Ugly story of racism in Oriente Province wherein tens of thousands of blacks of Hatian origin are forced to serve in Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mozambique and elsewhere.

~~SECRET~~

Review February 6, 1987

- By destroying climate for economic growth and stability in Cuba and throughout Central America, he denies possibility of distribution of new wealth.

- On 30 November 1979 Raul Castro, in a major speech, criticized failure of Cuban economy -- and blamed it not on U.S. embargo but on incompetence of Cuban regime.

- Shortly thereafter, Castro's foreign policy initiatives began to backfire. He had major trouble delivering nonaligned vote for Soviet Union at the UN.

- Political unrest within Cuba grew by leaps and bounds within Cuba. Unlikely he would win a truly free election.

- Derisive criticism of Fidel has appeared for first time throughout Havana.

- In January and February of 1980 after public fight, Fidel fired Raul as heir apparent; made him a mere special assistant and then fired all cabinet members.

- New repressive measures were instituted.

- One million of his people fled.

### U.S. Action Steps

-- U.S. policy initiatives should begin with overall interagency strategy review.

-- We need a program to bring the Cubans freedom which neutralizes and preempts any Soviet predeliction (which I would judge to be low) to assert a Brezhnev Doctrine for Cuba.

- However, we need to develop contingency plan should the Cuban people in their inevitable effort to become free find the Soviets coming to bolster Castro.

- We need to develop and send signals to the Soviets that we have no intention of allowing armed Soviet troops to interfere with the process of change in Cuba.

-- Revise our Conventional Arms Transfer policy with goal of making it more responsive to U.S. policy in the region.

-- Seek changes in current foreign assistance legislation which now limits numbers of personnel assigned to security assistance organizations, restricts activity they can perform, precludes military training to countries which do not have armed forces and prohibits arms sales and International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Argentina and Chile -- which, inter alia, will enhance their appreciation for human rights.



-- Increase amount of foreign military sales credits FMS. (Amount for FY-80 was less than \$30 million or less than 2 percent of worldwide FMS allocation.)

- By refusing to sell to Latin neighbors, we drive them to European and Soviet markets where they purchase inferior equipment at greater costs, thus reducing finance available to improve lot of their people.

- And we lose the relationship that comes with provision of security assistance.

-- Increase IMET funds for region to \$15 or \$20 million per year. Current levels so small as to have very little impact.

-- Re-establish military-to-military ties blocked (and even prohibited) by previous administration.

-- Expand unit-to-unit exchanges, combined exercises, high level visits, and individual personnel exchanges at staff and service school level.

-- Through these contacts, pursue mutual readiness and interoperability goals as well as Latin appreciation of U.S. interests, democratic values, and way of life.

-- Increase intelligence collection, rebuild our lost human intelligence capability (HUMINT); freely provide intelligence to friendly countries on Cuban/Soviet support for insurgency active at some level in every country in Latin America

-- Re-establish very modest military assistance grant aid program of approximately \$100 million for very poor countries which do not have financial capability to purchase small amounts of needed defense equipment and which are most threatened by armed Marxist insurgencies.

-- Take steps to revitalize current hemispheric defense arrangements such as Inter-American Defense Board, Joint Mexican-US Defense Commission, Conference of the America Armies and the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA).

-- In all of these things, an honest information program for the region is the key which will highlight Castro's repression and failures, counter the presently effective Cuban/Soviet propaganda efforts and capitalize on the very significant Cuban/Soviet vulnerabilities.

- Fidel is an incompetent socialist failure when measured in any of the abysmal historical standards of Marxist socialism.

- We simply need to demythologize him in U.S. and world public opinion.

-- Far from a risk, this is an opportunity to take the banner away from the Soviets, give them another theater to have to worry about.

● Where neither they nor Castro can prevail -- provided we get our act together.

-- All of this clearly implies a detailed examination of U.S. interests, goals, and policies under SecState.

RECEIVED 13 FEB 81 12

TO COLSON

FROM DEAL

DOCDATE 12 FEB 81

*CAC*

*28 1997  
11/21/09*

KEYWORDS: CARIBBEAN

POLAND

NSC

SOC

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 6 FEB NSC MIG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 22 FEB 81 STATUS CD FILES IFM O

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FOR INFO

COLSON

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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: JANET COLSON  
FROM: TIM DEAL *TD*  
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting On February 6

Attached, as requested, is the Summary of Conclusions for the NSC meeting on February 6.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

February 6, 1981

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Time and Place: 1:30 p.m. - 2:40 p.m., The Cabinet Room

Subject: Caribbean Basin; Poland (C)

Participants

The President  
The Vice President

State:  
Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.

Defense:  
Caspar T. Weinberger

Treasury:  
Secretary Donald T. Regan

Justice:  
Attorney General William French Smith

DCI:  
Mr. William J. Casey

JCS:  
General David Jones

White House:  
Mr. Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President  
Mr. James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff to the President  
Mr. Richard Allen, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Adm. James Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Vice President's Office:  
Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, Chief of Staff

National Security Council:  
Janet Colson  
Timothy E. Deal  
Charles Tyson

CJS

11/21/81

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~BY LA 6/6/06Summary of Conclusions

The NSC agreed that the US has a vital stake in the stability and security of the Caribbean basin. The President's pre-inaugural meeting with Mexican President Lopez Portillo, the visit of Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga, and the upcoming meeting with Lopez Portillo underscore our strong interest in this region. (S)

Central America and the Caribbean are in turmoil. The many small states in the region are beset by domestic economic and political problems and vulnerable to outside force. The middle class is demanding a greater stake, but these societies cannot easily cope with the need for change. They could probably manage, however, if it were not for Cuba. Cuba's role is a central fact. Cuba exploits internal difficulties through subversion and the exportation of arms. (S)

The US needs a comprehensive policy for the Caribbean basin which reflects the basic fact that actions taken with respect to one country will inevitably influence others. Such a policy would, among other things, involve finding ways to cope with the Cuban problem and the situation in El Salvador, the question of foreign assistance, and the transfer of technology. At the same time, we must keep our priorities in order. In the Jamaican case, for example, we are deeply concerned about marijuana trade, but we did not make this an issue during Seaga's visit. Jamaica is more likely to curtail the drug traffic if we can point to some positive action that we have taken first to help Jamaica economically. (S)

The situation in El Salvador is critical. The Cubans are supplying arms to the Salvadoran insurgents, primarily through Nicaragua. The flow of arms into El Salvador is so massive and from so many sources (e.g. Vietnam) that not even the Cubans are capable of orchestrating this effort alone. Other communist countries are obviously helping. We probably have enough evidence on hand about Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran revolutionaries to cut off aid to Nicaragua. We have raised the issue with the Nicaraguans. They plead ignorance, but the record does not support them. (S)

Secretary Haig has informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that the first order of business in East-West relations is not arms control, but rather the need to deal with Soviet activity in Afghanistan and the use of Cuban proxies in troubled areas. The US will not stand by idly and be drawn into another Vietnam. (S)

The US needs to establish better relations with both North and South America. We need to change our approach so that we do not bring down governments in the name of human rights. We will not throw out friends simply because their human rights record is not perfect. (S)

In the case of El Salvador, the government has repelled the recent offensive. The insurgents have now adopted a classic guerrilla posture. But the government still has serious problems. Its professional officer corps is thin. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

A victory in El Salvador is essential. It would set a good example for the region. There are a number of steps underway and contemplated which could help the Salvadoran regime. We have improved the lines of communication with the government and are providing substantial military assistance. In addition, we could undertake certain covert actions to train and help the local militia and police throughout the region intercept weapons coming from Cuba, although we would probably need new guidelines on covert activity. Furthermore, we might consider increasing the number of US military advisers in Latin America, providing more training in the US to Latin American military officers, and shifting additional funds from our security assistance budget to the hemisphere. (S)

We also need to improve public understanding of the situation. Most knowledgeable people in the US probably believe that Latin American regimes are repressive and that the US should avoid doing anything provocative. We must create greater awareness of the danger facing the US in the Caribbean basin and prepare the stage for stronger action if that becomes necessary. ICA and other agencies should present our case to the outside world and take action to counter massive propaganda efforts underway by the Cubans and their Communist allies designed to undermine international support for our Latin American policies. Another effective way to put pressure on Cuba would be through repeal of the Clark Amendment, which makes it impossible for us to provide aid to those forces fighting the Cuban-supported regime in Angola. (S)

RECEIVED 05 FEB 81 18

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 05 FEB 81

CAS

1st 28, 1991  
11/21/81

KEYWORDS: CARIBBEAN

POLAND

NSC

SUBJECT: PRES TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MTG ON 6 FEB

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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Pres Briefing  
Paper

MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ACTION

February 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for National Security Council Meeting Friday, ~~January~~ *Feb.* 6, 1981 from 1:30 to 2:20 p.m.

The purpose of this session is to inaugurate the meetings of the National Security Council. It is anticipated that these meetings will occur as required but I estimate they will be every week or ten days. In addition to the statutory members of the National Security Council -- the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense -- Ed Meese and Jim Baker will also be members. In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisors to the National Security Council.

The meeting will be informational in nature, and the hour devoted to it will cover three topics:

- U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin
- U.S. Policy toward Poland
- Future Topics for NSC Meetings

You may wish to include the following points in your opening remarks:

TALKING POINTS

- The interagency working group procedures for the National Security Council are not yet complete, but I understand that these are being worked on and anticipate that these matters will be decided within the near future.
- I intend to have the National Security Council meet frequently. The National Security Council is a valuable institution, and I intend to make good use of it.

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 5, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-002 #826~~SECRET~~BY LOT NARA DATE 6/6/06

- I want members of the National Security Council and those directly associated with the NSC's work to function as a team. A team effort is important if we are to realize successful and sound policies for this Administration. To that end, I urge cooperation at all levels, and I ask that no one stand on bureaucratic ceremony, since there is so much that needs to be done.
  
- During the campaign I pledged to formulate and implement a new foreign policy for the United States. I consider our foreign policy to be a key ingredient of our national security, and I will look to this forum to advise me in that regard.
  - Of equal importance is our defense policy. The smooth integration of these two key areas, along with considerations bearing on intelligence, international economic issues, trade issues and energy issues, will guarantee the success of our policy.
  
- The intelligence community is a vital component of our national security, and I am dedicated to the task of restoring the vigor and effectiveness of the intelligence community. That is one reason why I am so pleased to have Bill Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. He is a team player, and I know he shares the urgency of this mission.
  
- During the campaign I frequently spoke of the need to "restore the margin of safety." That means providing this nation with the best military establishment in the world.
  - I am intent upon implementing those pledges, and I particularly welcome the opportunity to work with General David Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the purpose of achieving that objective. We will be seeing a great deal of General Jones, and I welcome his cooperation with the members of the NSC and with our staff.
  
- Once I have made a decision, I will expect the departments and agencies to implement it smoothly and without hesitation. I know I can count on your close cooperation in this regard.

~~SECRET~~

- We will work through Ed Meese, Counsellor to the President, and we will establish "tracking mechanisms" to ensure that our teamwork produces the desired results.
- Among the specific pledges made during my campaign, none could be more important than the communication of our policy in clear, concise and understandable language. I believe that we have a great communications opportunity, not only within the United States but also for the rest of the world.
  - In order to build the consensus we need, the American message must be told effectively and repeatedly. In that connection, I will shortly be making appointments in those agencies concerned with communicating our policy.
- Beyond the formal members of the National Security Council, we will frequently be calling other members of the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet to assist us in our endeavors.
  - While the National Security Council will not become another Cabinet exercise, it is imperative that we take account of the needs of many agencies to participate in our work, if only because they are affected by the decisions that will emerge from the National Security Council framework.
- The decisions will be mine, but your advice and close cooperation will be the basis for good decisions.
  - While I recognize that there will be disagreements, and while I will insist upon hearing all points of view, once the decisions are made we should all pull together to implement them.
- The National Security Council staff will function as an integral part of the White House and will be available to assist in the coordination of the matters that come before this body. Since all of you know and have worked with Dick Allen, you also know that he places high value on the smooth management of these affairs. Dick is working closely with Ed Meese and Jim Baker and he will have the task of seeing that these meetings accomplish the objectives which we set for them.
- Now, I would like to call on Dick to give us an overview of today's agenda.

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 05 FEB 81 15

TO AGENCIES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 05 FEB 81

*Write How*  
CAS

*Just 28, 1997*  
11/21/97

KEYWORDS: POLAND

CARIBBEAN

AGENDA

NSC

SUBJECT: D/R 019 AGENDA FOR NSC FEB 6 MTG ON US POLICY

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: STATUS CD FILES IFM O

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COMMENTS MEMO SENT VIA LDX


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# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



FEB 5 12 52 PM '81

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MESSAGE NO. UOM 871 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. PAGES 1

FROM Richard V. Allen *returned to* Tyson's Ctc (Extension) \_\_\_\_\_ (Room Number) \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION National Security Council Meeting

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Dept/Room No.</u>	<u>Extension</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Sec. State</u>	_____	_____
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REMARKS: SENT

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MAR 11 1981  
FBI - WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting

There will be a meeting of the National Security Council at 1:30 p. m., Friday, February 6. The meeting will be informational and will last one hour.

The agenda for the meeting will include:

- U. S. Policy - Caribbean Basin
- U. S. Policy - Poland
- Future Topics for NSC Meetings

Principals only are requested to be present.

  
Richard V. Allen

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 5, 1987

White House Cl  
By CAJ

August 28, 1997  
le 1/21/84

URGENT

Log Number: 02C 5  
Date: Feb 5, 1961

Subject: National Security Council Meeting  
(include PRM, PD or DR # when applicable)

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED  
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THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Const Ave NW				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 100 Independence Avenue, NW				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 251 7th Street SW				

By: *[Signature]* Date: 11/21/84

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(Edwin Meese)                      1                      2/5/81                      1:50                      Patsy Larkin

Chief of Staff to the President  
(James Baker)                      1                      2/5/81                      1:51                      Patsy Skidmore

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1981

TO: RICHARD ALLEN  
FROM: CRAIG FULLER  
SUBJECT: NSC



The National Security Council meeting was set for 1:30 p.m.  
to 2:30 p.m., Friday, February 6.