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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 12/4/2008

**File Folder** LEBANON 11/30/83

**FOIA**

M08-099/2

**Box Number** 43

STOCKER

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57389	COVER SHEET	RE TERRORIST THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN LEBANON <b>D 1/21/2004 NLRRF01-120 #1</b>	1	11/30/1983	B1 B3
57390	MEMO	TO CIA DIRECTOR RE TERRORIST THREAT <b>PAR 1/21/2004 NLRRF01-120 #2</b>	1	11/30/1983	B1 B3
57391	SUMMARY	RE TERRORIST THREAT <b>PAR 1/21/2004 NLRRF01-120 #3</b>	1	ND	B1 B3
57392	PAPER	RE TERRORIST THREAT <b>PAR 1/21/2004 F01-120 #4; PAR 10/10/2012 M09-279 #57392</b>	9	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Country Files  
 Box Number: 91353  
 File Folder: Lebanon Vol X 1/1/84-2/29/84 [1/84]  
 (2 of 8)

Archivist: srj/srj  
 FOIA ID: f2001-120;Newman  
 Date: 07/25/01

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cover sheet	1p. D. 1/21/04 NEWRF01-120 #5	1/12/84	B1, P1, F3
2. summary	re: terrorist threat to US personnel in Beirut. 4p. PART. " " #6	1/12/84	B1, P1, F3
3. cover sheet	for Wash Fax. 1p. D. " " #7	1/12/84	B1, P1, F3
4. cover sheet	1p. D. " " #8	1/12/84	B1, P1, F3
5. summary	duplicate of item #2. 4p. PART. " " #9	1/12/84	B1, P1, F3

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Country Files  
 Box Number: ~~91353~~ 43  
 File Folder: Lebanon Vol IX ~~10/1/83-12/31/83~~ [11/30/83]

Archivist: srj/srj  
 FOIA ID: f2001-120;srj  
 Date: 07/25/01

~~(5 of 7)~~

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cover sheet	re: terrorist threat to western interests in Lebanon. 1p. D. 1/21/04 NLRRFOI-120 #1	11/30/83	B1, P1, F3
2. memo	to Director CIA re: terrorist threat to western interests in Lebanon. 1p. PART. 1/21/04 NLRRFOI-120 #2	11/31/83	B1, P1, F3
3. summary	re: terrorist threat to western interests in Lebanon. 1p. PART. 1/21/04 NLRRFOI-120 #3	11/83	B1, P1, F3
4. paper	re: terrorist threat to western interests in Lebanon. 9p. PART. 1/21/04 NLRRFOI-120 #4	n.d.	B1, P1, F3

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30 NOV 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM: [REDACTED]  
Acting Director of Global Issues  
SUBJECT: Terrorist Threat to Western Interests in Lebanon

1. Action. Forward to the Long Commission.

2. Background. The attached memorandum was prepared in response to your request for an assessment of the terrorist threat to Western interests in Lebanon to be provided to the Long Commission. It has been coordinated with the Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis, [REDACTED] of the DDO, and Graham Fuller, NIO/NESA. The memorandum indicates that the threat to US facilities and personnel remains extremely high and could get worse if large numbers of radical Palestinians filter into Beirut once conditions in Tripoli settle down.

[REDACTED]

Attachment:  
Terrorist Threat to Western Interests in Lebanon

[REDACTED]

GI [REDACTED]  
November 1983

Copy [REDACTED]

DERIVATIVE CL BY [REDACTED]  
DECL OADR  
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F2001-120 #2

By LOJ, NARA, Date 1/21/04

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Terrorist Threat to Western Interests in Lebanon

Summary

The terrorist threat to Western interests in Lebanon remains very high. US and French Multinational Force (MNF) troops continue to be key targets at the same time that diplomatic personnel and facilities of those countries also are at great risk. We are especially concerned about signs of increased cooperation among individual Shia extremist groups, the increased filtering into Beirut of radical Palestinians returning from Tripoli, and indications [redacted] that Syria may be stepping up its support for radical Shia leaders involved in terrorist activities.

The most likely types of terrorist attacks to be attempted—car bombs, human "kamikaze" bombs, snipings, and kidnappings—require minimal material resources and manpower; they are, therefore, relatively easy for terrorists to execute. The environment in Beirut militates against attempts by the Lebanese authorities and security elements of the MNF to counter the threat of new terrorist violence. Beirut is an armed camp where radical Muslim and Palestinian groups that oppose the MNF presence can operate freely. The Shia in particular are prepared—even anxious—to sacrifice themselves as martyrs in terrorist operations. [redacted]

This memorandum was prepared by the [redacted] Branch of the DDI's Office of Global Issues [redacted]

GI [redacted]  
November 1983

Copy [redacted]

DERIVATIVE CL [redacted]  
DECL OADR  
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F2001-120 #3

By [redacted], NARA, Date 1/21/04

13524  
E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)  
3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Terrorist Threat to Western Interests in Lebanon

The threat to Western interests in Lebanon continues at a high level, and may actually have increased since the bombings of the US and French MNF contingent headquarters.

[REDACTED]

Iran also is continuing to encourage its Lebanese allies to attack US and French interests and, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] may be planning attacks of its own. Radical Shia groups seek to retaliate for the French and Israeli airstrikes against Shia camps in the Bekaa Valley. They see the United States as an accomplice in those airstrikes. Syria, for its part, is providing direct or indirect support to numerous groups willing to undertake terrorist acts.

[REDACTED]

1  
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M09-279#57392  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/10/12

[REDACTED]

Internally, Lebanon continues to suffer from violent political competition among a number of domestic sectarian groups, some of whom consider the MNF troops to be less peacekeepers than supporters of the Maronite Christian faction of the Lebanese ethnic fabric. This perception was strengthened when the United States demonstrated its willingness to use naval gunfire in support of the Lebanese Army in its battles against Muslim elements in the Shuf mountains in September.

Internationally, Lebanon serves as an arena for violence carried out by, or on behalf of, foreign governments (such as Syria and Iran), each of which has its own political and/or religious goals for the country and sees the MNF presence as impeding the achievement of these objectives. In addition, some of the more radical Palestinian factions in Lebanon are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] considering anti-US attacks in an effort to generate domestic pressure for the withdrawal of MNF troops and to punish the US for its support of Israel.

Targets for Terrorism. Identifying specific targets is risky because terrorists--including those in Lebanon--usually will exploit the most vulnerable targets of opportunity. Nevertheless, some facilities or personnel will be particularly attractive. The US and French Multinational Force contingents will continue to be among those. These troops present highly visible representations of governments against whom a number of groups would seek to launch attacks that will carry messages concerning Lebanon and other international issues. In addition to the US Marine compound buildings in the vicinity of Beirut



[REDACTED]

airport and the French MNF facilities nearby, other targets of terrorist attacks could include:


- o US Embassy offices in the Durraford Building and in the adjacent British Embassy
- o the US Ambassador's residence in Yarze
- o US ships at anchor off the coast of Beirut


US and French military and civilian personnel and/or their dependents also could be tempting targets for kidnapping attempts.



Although Italian troops suffered several minor injuries from terrorist incidents earlier this year, they and British forces have thus far avoided serious losses. Neither would appear to be a primary political target because the Palestinians and their supporters see London and Rome as being more even-handed in the Arab-Israeli dispute and less prone to favor one Lebanese faction over another. Moreover, both Great Britain and Italy have managed to remain farther removed than the United States and France from international quarrels with Syria or Iran. The British forces also have effectively kept a low profile while the Italians have sought to ingratiate themselves with local Muslims by establishing personal links through public service work. The proximity of British diplomatic facilities to those of the United States could, however, make them an incidental target in the event of an anti-US attack.

#### Sources of the Threat

The most immediate threats to US and other Western interests in Lebanon will emanate from:



 members of these groups are planning to use carbombs once again, as well as human "kamikaze" bombs, to strike at MNF



Iran will continue to encourage and provide aid to these groups for the commission of acts of terrorism, particularly against US and French targets. Iran may also seek to use its own assets--the Revolutionary Guards resident in the Bekaa--where feasible to pull off terrorist acts. These irregular forces, if able to secure the assistance of Lebanese and/or Syrians in control of checkpoints, could get to Beirut where they would willingly sacrifice themselves in terrorist acts. In our view, Iran is more likely to provide support to and rely on its Lebanese surrogates because of their proven effectiveness and because this allows Tehran to mask its involvement.

The radical Shias, while acting on their own and with Iranian support, almost certainly have secured at least the acquiescence of Syria since they operate within and across Syrian lines. In addition, [redacted]

[redacted] the Syrian leadership may have promised additional support to radical Shia leaders to enable them to step up their anti-Western terrorism.

Syria can use a variety of radical Palestinian groups and has used them in the past to commit terrorist acts on its behalf. While many radical Palestinians, particularly those [redacted] have been preoccupied with the fighting in Tripoli, others--both within and outside the [redacted] have been filtering back into Beirut. The number of fighters who have returned to Beirut is not known, [redacted]

[redacted]

in and around Beirut from which they can launch attacks against the MNF.

Should the Palestinian fighting in Tripoli wind down, the radicals could redirect their attention to Beirut, thereby significantly increasing the risk of Palestinian-sponsored terrorism there. Palestinian groups have their own reasons for seeking to hit Western--and particularly US--targets, and Lebanon presents them with an attractive locale. Moreover, they would have access to arms caches still secured in the Beirut environs.

[redacted]

Although local Lebanese leftists were reported to be at least one source of the sniping attacks against MNF troops earlier this year, their forces and capabilities were seriously reduced by the Israeli invasion and occupation of the country. There has been little recent information on the activities of local leftist groups, but they probably retain some capability for small-scale terrorist attacks--perhaps in coordination with radical Palestinian elements. The Druze have no record of terrorist activity and are unlikely to pose a threat to Western interests.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

southern Beirut, could be coopted by the radical breakaway factions to take part in terrorist activity.

Countering the Threat

We do not think the terrorist threat to Western interests in Lebanon can be readily eliminated. The environment--a nation beset by eight years of civil war, where competing ethnic groups and their militias have amassed and indiscriminately used arms to advance their goals--is not conducive to the creation of effective security, whether by local or foreign forces. In this already troubled milieu, disaffected Muslim groups who view the United States as the Gemayel government's protector also blame the United States for the continued Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. These groups hope that attacks against MNF forces might influence American public opinion and lead to the eventual withdrawal of those forces.

Beirut, in particular, is an armed camp in which indiscriminate killing is now commonplace. Nearly every household possesses firearms, and mortars and rocket-propelled grenades also are common. Radical groups have proved their ability to exploit the virtual freedom of maneuver that such a setting provides. They are, moreover, on familiar ground in a relatively permissive environment where the central government has been unable thus far to establish the kind of intelligence and security services that might intimidate terrorists. Finally, high casualty terrorist acts are relatively easy to perpetrate yet hard to stop. The types of attacks mounted thus far in Beirut--and those most likely to be attempted, [redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

require little in the way of material resources or manpower, making them particularly difficult to intercept in the planning stage.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: Terrorist Threat to Western Interests in Lebanon

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

DDI/OGI,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F2001-120 #10

By MS, NARA, Date 1/21/04



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

12 January 1984

The Terrorist Threat to US Personnel in Beirut

Summary

[Redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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[Redacted]

(b)(3)

2

[Redacted]


[Redacted]



Who is Involved?

Radical Lebanese Shias and anti-Arafat Palestinian dissidents, based in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut, are the primary elements of an emerging terrorist network in Lebanon. Shia extremist groups, such as Islamic Amal, Hizb Allah, the Husayni Suicide Forces, and the Muslim Students Union, are committed to the goal of replacing the Christian-dominated Lebanese Government with an Iran-style Islamic republic. Their members--perhaps totaling as many as 1,000--view the MNF contingents as President Amin Gemayel's principal supporters, and therefore their immediate objective is to force the MNF out of Lebanon. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

The Iranian Government encourages and materially supports the terrorist activities of the radical Shia groups.



These Shia and Palestinian groups, as well as their Iranian and Syrian sponsors, almost certainly believe that the bombing at

3

[REDACTED]


(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

the Marine compound in October has influenced US public opinion and put pressure on US policymakers to withdraw from Lebanon. They are therefore convinced that an intensifying campaign of terrorist violence against the MNF will advance their objective. [REDACTED] (b)(3)

Shia extremists are increasingly willing to sacrifice their lives in attacks on the MNF. Confident that they are serving the will of Allah, [REDACTED]



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

4

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Outlook

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)  
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

5-

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F2001-120 #9

By 101, NARA, Date 1/21/04

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

12 January 1984

The Terrorist Threat to US Personnel in Beirut

Summary

[Large Redacted Block]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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[Large Redacted Block]

(b)(3)

2

(b)(3)

Who is Involved?

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(b)(3)

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(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

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Outlook

[Large redacted block]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

[Redacted]

5