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CAS 5/11/2011

File Folder BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING AND AMBASSADOR
MURPHY MISSION (9/27/1984-9/28/84)

FOIA

M10-361

Box Number 34

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109465	NOTE	TO JOHN RE ATTACHED R 1/16/2013 M361/1	1	9/27/1984	B1
109443	CABLE	261341Z SEP 84	3	9/26/1984	B1 B3
109428	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06306 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	7	9/27/1984	B1
109429	CABLE	STATE 288110 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	1	9/27/1984	B1
109430	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06331 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/27/1984	B1
109431	CABLE	271831Z SEP 84	2	9/27/1984	B1 B3
109432	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06332 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	8	9/27/1984	B1
109433	CABLE	2610417 SEP 84	1	9/26/1984	B1
109435	CABLE	261906Z SEP 84	1	9/26/1984	B1 B3
109437	CABLE	271831Z SEP 84	2	9/27/1984	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109438	CABLE	BEIRUT 8375 <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	11	9/28/1984	B1
109442	CABLE	CAIRO 29556 <i>R 10/12/2012 M361/2</i>	2	9/28/1984	B1

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~~United States Department of State~~

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

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9/27
[Handwritten signature]

John -

See page 3 of the
attached. It's the source
of the item we saw.

Sounds like the Syrians
are not only pressuring
the Iranians, but are
also worried about air
attacks -

John

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BY KML NARA DATE 1/16/13

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TO:

Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Teicher

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AREAS UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY, THE ANSWER IS YES. KHADDAM THEN MADE A STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID WAS REALLY A REQUEST FOR ELABORATION. HE SAID, "THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR DECISION THAT THE LAF CAN MOVE INTO ANY AREA OF LEBANON VACATED BY THE IDF." I RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A BASIC PROBLEM OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH CAN ONLY BE IMPROVED WHEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO MILITARIES SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS MATTERS. AT THIS POINT KHADDAM HAD TO CUT SHORT OUR MEETING, AND WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 1700 LOCAL. I REPEATED TO KHADDAM THAT NEITHER THE SECRETARY NOR THE PRESIDENT HAVE DECIDED THAT USG SHOULD ENGAGE IN MEDIATION.

3. SUMMARY CONTINUED: WE BELIEVE KHADDAM MAY HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS, PERHAPS INCLUDING THE AREA OF UNIFIL OPERATION AND THE ROLE OF LAHAD'S FORCES. WE EXPECT TO GET SOME TOUGH QUESTIONS THIS EVENING, INCLUDING A RENEWED SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT LAF MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY TO ANY POINT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. I INTEND TO STICK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO MY GENERAL PRESENTATION, SEEKING TO FOCUS SYRIAN ATTENTION ON THE URGENT NEED FOR LEBANON TO SEEK A UN MANDATE EXPANSION AND FOR THE LEBANESE MILITARY TO ENTER DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELI MILITARY. IT APPEARS THAT THE SYRIANS WANT TO KEEP TALKING, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE. END SUMMARY.

4. MURPHY, GLASPIE AND STAFF MEMBERS MET NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM MORNING OF SEPT 27. KHADDAM WAS JOINED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AL-NAIB, AN INTERPRETER AND A NOTETAKER. MATTERS CONCERNING TERRORISTS IN LEBANON AND BILL FOR A JERUSALEM EMBASSY

REPORTED SEPTELS.

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5. AT OUTSET OF DISCUSSION ON SOUTH LEBANON, I STUCK TO FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN ISRAEL I MET FIRST WITH DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN IN TEL AVIV AND PRIME MINISTER PERES, WITH RABIN, IN JERUSALEM. FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS, WHO IS NOW A MINISTER-WITHOUT-PORTFOLIO, SAT IN ON BOTH MEETINGS AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (SHAMIR IN N.Y.). THUS, THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED REPRESENTED THE WHOLE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN JUST THE LABOR HALF OF THE COALITION. SENIOR PROFESSIONALS OF THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE ALSO PRESENT. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN, I HAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACHIEVED A CONSENSUS, HOWEVER DELICATE, ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS THE LIMITS ON HOW THEY GO ABOUT IT.

-- I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT I HAD MET IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESIDENT AND THAT IN EACH MEETING I HAD DESCRIBED A SET OF EIGHT AMERICAN IDEAS OR CONCEPTS WHICH I HAD WISHED TO EXPLORE WITH THE SYRIANS, WHICH I THEN SUMMARIZED FOR THEM. I SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE PRESIDENT DID NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE IDEAS. IN MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, HE STATED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TOLD SYRIA OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. PLAYING A ROLE IN OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE U.S. DOING SO. IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE STATED THAT THE LAF AND UNIFIL SHOULD PROVIDE SECURITY IN SOUTH LEBANON. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE MOST THAT SHOULD OR MAY BE DONE.

THE PRESIDENT STATED HE PREFERRED NOT TO GO INTO FURTHER, DETAILED COMMENT. I DID, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THE PRESI-



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DENT SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT OPPOSE A MOVE TO ENLARGE
THE UNIFIL MANDATE IF LEBANON REGARDED IT AS HELPFUL,
THOUGH UNIFIL SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ANY CLOSER TO
THE SYRIAN BORDER THAN IT NOW WAS.

--THE ISRAELIS WELCOMED AN AMERICAN ROLE IN DEALING
WITH BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR
INTENTION TO LEAVE LEBANON AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS
POSSIBLE BUT TO DO SO ONLY IF THEY WERE CONFIDENT
ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD NOT BE THREATENED AS A RESULT.
THEY ALSO REMINDED ME THAT ISRAEL WILL EXERCISE ITS
RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 52 OF THE U.N.
CHARTER IF ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS THREATENED AGAIN. IN
THE IMMEDIATE TERM, THE ISRAELIS ASKED US TO TALK TO
THE LEBANESE ABOUT TWO POINTS WHICH THEY CONSIDER TO
BE VERY IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO BEGIN A PROCESS WHICH
COULD LEAD TO A PROGRAM FOR FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, WHICH THEY AFFIRMED WOULD
NOT BE LINKED TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

--FIRST, THEY WANT US TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO
SEEK A CHANGE IN THE UNIFIL MANDATE. THE ISRAELIS
BELIEVE THAT THIS CHANGE SHOULD INCORPORATE THE
PRINCIPLE THAT THOSE AREAS VACATED BY THE ISRAELI
ARMY SHOULD BE FILLED BY UNIFIL. WE RECOGNIZE THAT
THE U.N. WOULD BE BETTER PLACED TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES
ON A NEW MANDATE ONCE THE GOL HAS TAKEN THE LEAD TO
SEEK AN EXTENSION. WE WOULD NOT PLAN TO DISCUSS
WITH THE LEBANESE THE DETAILS OF ANY PARTICULAR CHANGE
IN THE MANDATE.

-- SECOND, THE ISRAELIS WANT THE LEBANESE TO AGREE TO
DIRECT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY DISCUSSIONS ON WITH-
DRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE ALREADY,
OF COURSE, URGED THE LEBANESE TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH
THE ISRAELIS. IT HAS LONG BEEN AN AMERICAN POSITION

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TO ENCOURAGE DIRECT TALKS. WHAT I CAN ADVISE TODAY IS THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE NOW AGREES THAT TALKS BE ON THE MILITARY LEVEL ALONE, THOUGH IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL BE BINDING ON THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLIS AND AREAS OF DEPLOYMENT FOR UNIFIL, LAF AND LOCAL FORCES. THIS AGAIN UNDERLINES THE NECESSITY FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY. IF ISRAEL AND LEBANON SHOULD AGREE ON AN EXTENDED UN MANDATE, THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN THE DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS OF OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF THE UNSYG AND THEN HIS TASK OF GETTING THE AGREEMENT OF TROOP CONTRIBUTOR NATIONS AND THE UNSC. ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM WOULD BE PHASED BUT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.

-- IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POINTS, ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT SYRIA TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF ARMED ELEMENTS INTO SOUTH LEBANON FROM BEHIND OR AROUND SYRIAN MILITARY LINES, AND THAT SYRIAN FORCES SHOULD NOT MOVE FORWARD AS THE IDF WITHDRAWS.

-- IN CLOSING, I WOULD ONLY ADD THAT THE ISRAELIS SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PRAGMATICALLY AND WERE NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION. THEIR OVERRIDING CONCERN IS TO ATTAIN SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR NORTHERN BORDER AREA.

6. AFTER DELIVERING ABOVE REPORT ON THE ISRAELI POSITIONS, I TOLD KHADDAM I WISHED TO MAKE ONE FURTHER PERSONAL COMMENT ABOUT THE ISRAELI OUTLOOK ON WITHDRAWAL. EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS NOT QUOTING ANY ONE ISRAELI OFFICIAL BUT READING BETWEEN THE LINES, I

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BELIEVED THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE ISRAELI OPTIONS ON
WITHDRAWAL:

- (A) AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATED AND AGREED THROUGH DIRECT TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE MILITARY AND WITH UNIFIL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

- (B) AN INCOMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, LEAVING THE IDF IN THE BLOA' OR WHEREVER ELSE THEY MIGHT FIND THEIR SECURITY THREATENED.

- (C) A RAPID, UNCOORDINATED WITHDRAWAL, FULL OR PARTIAL. I SAID THIS RAISED TO ME THE NIGHTMARE OF A WITHDRAWAL LIKE SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE SHUF AND THREATENED WIDESPREAD BATTLES AMONG LEBANESE FACTIONS.

-
7. FOLLOWING THE ABOVE PRESENTATION, UNINTERRUPTED BY KHADDAM EXCEPT FOR TRANSLATIONS, I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD QUESTIONS. HE SAID HE DID AND ASKED THE QUESTIONS REPORTED IN THE SUMMARY. AFTER AN AIDE BROUGHT HIM A NOTE HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CUT OUR MEETING SHORT. WHEN, HE ASKED, DID WE HAVE TO DEPART? I SAID WE COULD SPEND ANOTHER NIGHT IN DAMASCUS. KHADDAM SAID IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE A SECOND MEETING; HE WOULD HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS AND WANTED TO READ THE RECORD OF THIS FIRST MEETING. (THIS, OF COURSE, WILL ALSO GIVE HIM TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS

WITH ASAD.) WE SET A SECOND MEETING FOR 1700 HOURS LOCAL. (I PLAN TO DEPART TOMORROW MORNING FOR BEIRUT.)

-
8. FINALLY, I SAID I WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK. THE USG WANTSTOBE HELPFUL BUT HAS NO INTENTION OF BEING CAUGHT IN AN IMPASSE. THERE IS NO WASHINGTON DECISION AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD MEDIATE. OUR GOALS ARE STABILITY, WITHDRAWAL AND BORDER SECURITY.

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WE WILL NEED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S HONEST OPINION
THIS AFTERNOON AS TO WHAT I SHOULD RECOMMEND TO
THE SECRETARY. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT HE "CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD." GLASPIE

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TO:

Mr. McFarlane

Mr. Teicher

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Mr. Texcher

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BY CU NARA DATE 10/12/12

FROM MURPHY FOR S/S - HILL ONLY

REPEAT TO BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADORS ONLY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PORG, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING WITH KHADDAM--SUMMARY CABLE

REF: DAMASCUS 6306 (NODIS)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. KHADDAM OPENED OUR SECOND MEETING SEPT 27 WITH TWO QUESTIONS: WHAT WOULD BE THE TERMS OF AN EXPANDED UNIFIL MANDATE? AS ISRAEL VACATES AREAS, WOULD UNIFIL TAKE ON ANY AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE STATE? I EXPLAINED WE WERE TALKING ABOUT MATTERS WHICH THE GOL WOULD WORK OUT IN DETAIL WITH THE UN, BUT UNIFIL WOULD ONLY UNDERTAKE RESPONSIBILITIES AGREED BY GOL FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. KHADDAM SAID HE SAW NO ROLE FOR EITHER THE U.S. OR SYRIA IN THIS PARTICULAR MATTER.

3. HE THEN MADE FOUR COMMENTS WHICH HE INDICATED WERE OFFICIAL SYRIAN VIEWS: (1) THE UNDERTAKINGS

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REQUESTED FROM SYRIA ARE UNJUSTIFIED. (COMMENT: THIS SEEMED TO BE A REFERENCE TO NO SYRIAN FORWARD MOVEMENT AND PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION. RECALLING TACIT SYRIAN AGREEMENTS ON SIMILAR ISSUES IN 1974 AND 1976 AND TO AVOID A PREDICTABLY UNHELPFUL EXCHANGE ON THESE POINTS, I CHOSE NOT TO PRESS. GOI HAS NOW PUT SARG CLEARLY ON NOTICE THROUGH US ON BOTH POINTS. END COMMENT.) (2) SARG AGREES TO LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT UNIFIL AND LAF BE DEPLOYED IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA. (3) "LOCAL FORCES" CONFLICT WITH GOL SOVEREIGNTY, AND SYRIA DOES NOT APPROVE OF THEIR USE. (4) LEGALLY, THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE ARMISTICE COMMISSION STILL EXISTS AND CAN BE FRAMEWORK FOR ISRAELI AND LEBANESE OFFICERS TO MEET AND DISCUSS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

4. AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH (WE MET FOR OVER TWO HOURS), I REPEATEDLY CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS NEED BE ADDRESSED TO GET TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ISRAEL HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN LAF, DIRECT TALKS ARE THE BEST WAY TO BUILD UP CONFIDENCE, NEED FOR EXPANDED UNIFIL IS URGENT AND IT WOULD HELP IF SARG URGED GOL TO GET PROCESS STARTED. I STRESSED MAJOR ISRAELI CONCESSION OF NO LONGER SEEKING TALKS AT POLITICAL LEVEL. KHADDAM DID NOT BUDGE FROM HIS POSITION. FINALLY, I URGED THAT THE SARG PROVIDE US WITH ANY THINKING ABOUT DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS IN OTHER THAN THE ILMAC FRAMEWORK. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE TO GET HUNG UP OVER THE FRAMEWORK WHEN THE SUBSTANCE MEETS A SHARED GOAL OF SEEING ISRAEL LEAVE SOUTHERN LEBANON. AS MEETING WAS DRAWING TO CLOSE, I SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE FURTHER OCCASIONS TO BE IN CONTACT. SHARA' AND

I WOULD SEE EACH OTHER IN NEW YORK, AND I MIGHT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO DAMASCUS AFTER THE TALKS WITH PERES.

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IN WASHINGTON.

5. I ASKED KHADDAM TO TELL ME FRANKLY WHETHER HE SAW A ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN SEEKING A SOUTHERN LEBANON SOLUTION, NOTING THAT WE HAD BEEN BURNED BEFORE AND WERE HONESTLY RELUCTANT TO RISK THIS AGAIN. KHADDAM SAID, "IN OUR VIEW YOU CAN DO USEFUL THINGS." HE SAID THAT WE ALL AGREED ON IMPROVING LEBANESE STABILITY. WITH REGARD TO THE SOUTH, THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE WILL ONLY INCREASE WITH ITS STRIKES SPILLING OVER IN CROSS BORDER ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. SYRIA IS ANXIOUS TO SEE LEBANON RESTORED TO INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD DECIDE FUTURE US MOVES AFTER TALKING TO PERES. IF THE IDF WITHDREW, THE "LOCAL FORCES" WE TALK ABOUT WOULD NOT LAST ONE HOUR.

(COMMENT: LAHAD'S NAME WAS NEVER MENTIONED.) IF THE GOL WERE TO ACCEPT LOCAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH, IT WOULD WORK AGAINST LEBANESE UNITY AND STIMULATE THE APPETITE OF INDEPENDENT MILITIAS THROUGHOUT LEBANON. KHADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT ABOUT USING THE LAF TO TALK TO THE IDF TO GIVE ISRAEL MORE CONFIDENCE IN A GOL-LED ALTERNATIVE TO LOCAL FORCES. ILMAC, HE SAID, WAS THE ONLY FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO DO THAT, IN THE SYRIAN VIEW. AFTER I REITERATED A HALF DOZEN TIMES THAT ILMAC WAS DEAD FOR THE ISRAELIS AND WE SHOULD STRETCH OUR MINDS TO SOME OTHER FORMULA, KHADDAM CONCLUDED "ANYTHING YOU PUT FORWARD, WE WILL DISCUSS."

6. COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN WORTHILE BUT AS PERES AND RABIN NOTED, "IT WILL NOT BE EASY." END COMMENT. GLASPIE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT REPEATED BEIRUT & TEL AVIV

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TO: Mr. McFarlane
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BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12

FROM MURPHY FOR S/S - HILL ONLY

REPEAT TO BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADORS ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PORG, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING WITH KHADDAM - FULL ACCOUNT

REF: DAMASCUS 6331 (NODIS)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. MURPHY, GLASPIE AND STAFF MET FOR THE SECOND TIME WITH SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM IN LATE AFTERNOON OF SEPT 27 FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS; WITH KHADDAM WERE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AL-NA'IB, AN INTERPRETER, AND A NOTE TAKER. EXCHANGE ON TERRORISTS IN LEBANON REPORTED SEPARATE CHANNEL. REFTEL IS SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
3. KHADDAM OPENED THE DISCUSSION BRISKLY BY SAYING THERE IS A QUESTION WHICH SYRIA WANTS TO PUT FORWARD CONCERNING UN FORCES IN LEBANON. REFERRING TO MURPHY'S STATEMENT THAT THE GOL SHOULD ASK FOR A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE, KHADDAM ASKED WHAT IS MEANT BY

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THAT, AND WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED MISSIONS FOR THE FORCE? HE STATED THAT HE WAS ASKING THIS QUESTION BECAUSE MURPHY HAD SAID THAT UN FORCES WOULD ENTER AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF. SECOND, HE ASKED WHAT THESE FORCES WILL "BE CHARGED WITH." ARE THEY TO BE CHARGED WITH ANY "AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE LEBANESE STATE?" MURPHY RESPONDED THAT OCT 19 IS THE DATE FOR RENEWAL OF THE EXISTING UNIFIL MANDATE. THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES: NO RENEWAL; A SIMPLE RENEWAL, AS HAS BEEN DONE EVERY SIX MONTHS SINCE 1978; OR A NEW UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UN REGARDING CHANGED TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) FOR UNIFIL. WITH REGARD TO AN EXPANSION OF THE MANDATE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM RENEWAL, WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS TAKING POWERS AWAY FROM THE GOL. THE GOL MUST AGREE TO ANY TOUR FOR UNIFIL AND ONLY FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. IT IS NOT FOR THE U.S. -- OR FOR SYRIA -- TO DEFINE THE TOR WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE FOR 1984. IN ANY CASE, THE GOL MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE, EITHER FOR A SIMPLE RENEWAL, OR AN EXPANSION. THE U.S. RECOMMENDS THE SECOND COURSE BECAUSE THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE 1978. KHADDAM REJOINED BY AGREEING THAT THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE UN AND GOL TO WORK OUT. HE SAID HIS QUESTION WAS NOT PUT WITH THE INTENTION THAT SYRIA OR THE U.S. SHOULD PLAY A ROLE THAT IS PROPERLY LEBANON'S. MURPHY EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT URGING THE GOL TO MAKE A MOVE SOON. MURPHY CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT WITH REGARD TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S QUESTION ON MISSION OF UN FORCES ENTERING AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF, THIS IS A MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED INITIALLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE UN.

4. KHADDAM THEN PRESENTED SYRIA'S FORMAL RESPONSE

TO MURPHY'S PREVIOUS PRESENTATIONS. "FURTHER TO WHAT PRESIDENT ASAD TOLD AMBASSADOR MURPHY," IT

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IS SYRIA'S VIEW, IN SUMMARY, THAT:

-- FIRST, CONCERNING UNDERTAKINGS REQUESTED FROM SYRIA "TO WHICH SYRIA HAS NOT AGREED," SYRIA DOES NOT ACCEPT THESE UNDERTAKINGS BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING TO JUSTIFY THEM.

-- SYRIA AGREES TO THE PROPOSAL FROM THE GOL PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT THE LAF AND UNIFIL SHOULD BE IN THE ZONE VACATED BY THE IDF -- THAT IS, THE BORDER AREA.

-- "LOCAL FORCES" ARE IN CONFLICT WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND SYRIA DOES NOT APPROVE OF THEM. (COMMENT: KHADDAM CONSISTENTLY USED THE PHRASE, "LOCAL FORCES," NEVER ONCE REFERRING TO LAHAD.)

-- FOURTH, ILMAC IS STILL LEGALLY IN EXISTENCE, AND IT INCLUDES MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WHO COULD MEET AND DISCUSS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
5. IN RESPONSE, MURPHY ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IN ACHIEVING FULL IDF WITHDRAWAL IS THAT IN THE PERIOD AHEAD THE LAF WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO THE JOB OF REPLACING ISRAELI FORCES IN THE WHOLE AREA TO BE VACATED. UN FORCES OPERATE AS PEACE-KEEPING, NOT PEACEMAKING, FORCES. IT IS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM -- CAN WE WAIT THROUGH THE INDETERMINATE PERIOD NECESSARY FOR THE LAF TO PREPARE ITSELF? HOW

LONG WILL THAT TAKE? LOCAL FORCES ARE NO ONE'S FIRST CHOICE; THE LAF IS THE FIRST CHOICE, BUT NOT A REAL ONE. LOCAL FORCES ARE TRANSITIONAL INSTRUMENTS UNTIL THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAN EXERT ITS AUTHORITY DOWN TO THE BORDER. THEY ARE A REALITY IN THE SOUTH

TODAY, KHADDAM INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT SHARE MURPHY'S VIEW ON THE LAF. IT IS TRUE THAT VARIOUS

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BRIGADES HAD COLLAPSED, BUT AFTER THE FORMATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU), THERE
WAS AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF STEPS TO UNIFY THE LAF.
ALL PARTIES IN THE GNU ARE AGREED IN IMPLEMENTING
THIS UNDERSTANDING ON THE LAF, IN ORDER TO REMOVE
THE ISRAELI PRETEXT OF OCCUPYING THE SOUTH IN
DEFENSE OF NORTHERN ISRAEL'S SECURITY. THE GOL
IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THAT SECURITY. EVERYONE IN
LEBANON IS CONVINCED OF THE LAF'S ABILITY TO
CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES IN THE SOUTH. THE LAF BRIGADES,
KHADDAM AVERRED, WHICH DID NOT COLLAPSE IN THE WAR,
ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THESE DUTIES. MURPHY
DISAGREED WITH KHADDAM, ADDING THERE IS ZERO
CONFIDENCE AMONG ISRAELIS IN THE LAF. IN ADDITION,
UN FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN CALLED UPON TO MOVE FROM
THEIR ENCLAVES SINCE 1982.

6. IN RESPONSE TO KHADDAM'S FOURTH POINT CONCERNING
ILMAC, MURPHY SAID THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE
ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON ILMAC. IT IS A DEAD ISSUE. HE
SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER WAYS TO BRING
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TOGETHER, AND EMPHASIZED
TO KHADDAM THE ENCOURAGING ATTITUDE IN THE PERES
GOVERNMENT THAT THE EARLIER REQUIREMENT FOR
POLITICAL-LEVEL TALKS HAS BEEN DROPPED. THIS IS
A BIG CONCESSION, BUT ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO GIVE
MORE BY AGREEING TO USE ILMAC. MURPHY STRESSED
THAT PERES WANTS TO DO SOMETHING PRACTICAL IN ORDER TO
START THINGS MOVING.

7. KHADDAM REPLIED THAT HE IS NOT DISCUSSING DETAILS

BECAUSE THIS DISCUSSION MUST BE WITH THE GOL, WHICH
HAS ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO BEAR. HOWEVER, IF THE
AIM IS TO CARRY OUT DISCUSSIONS, THEN THERE IS A
FRAMEWORK IN EXISTENCE. WHY SHOULD IT BE PUT ASIDE?
THERE IS NO LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PUTTING IT ASIDE.

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BECAUSE THE 1982 INVASION, IN ISRAEL'S WORDS, WAS NOT A WAR. IN ANY EVENT, THIS IS A LEBANESE RESPONSIBILITY. SYRIA MENTIONED THIS AS A SUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO SIT AND TALK. EVERYONE AGREES UN FORCES SHOULD HAVE A ROLE. MURPHY POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERS ILMAC TO HAVE BECOME DEFUNCT IN 1967. HE ASKED IF HE WAS CORRECT IN HEARING KHADDAM MENTION THE INVOLVEMENT OF UN FORCES AS A CONCEIVABLE MECHANISM INVOLVING THE UN IN DIRECT IDF/LAF TALKS? KHADDAM CLARIFIED THAT WHAT HE MEANT TO SAY WAS THAT IF THE LAF HAS NOT REGAINED ITS FULL STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES, THEN THE UN CAN HELP IT CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. ANY GAP WOULD BE FILLED BY THE UN.

8. MURPHY URGED KHADDAM TO CONSIDER OTHER MEANS TO BRING THE TWO MILITARY SIDES TOGETHER, REALIZING THAT FOR THE ISRAELIS, ILMAC IS A DEAD ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, COULD A UNSYG REPRESENTATIVE MEET WITH BOTH SIDES? WHAT ABOUT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ANOTHER NATION MEETING WITH THEM? MURPHY POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED ANY OF THESE IDEAS IN ISRAEL, WASHINGTON, OR NEW YORK, SO THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SIMPLY AS IDEAS. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO START THE PROCESS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE LAF, UNIFIL AND LOCAL FORCES TO PLAY A ROLE UNTIL CONFIDENCE IS BUILT. KHADDAM RETURNED TO HIS ORIGINAL POSITION, STATING THAT LEBANON DID NOT ENTER INTO THE WAR IN 1967, AND THUS THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ISRAELIS TO CONSIDER ILMAC DEAD. SYRIA PROPOSED THIS AS A FRAMEWORK TO ARRIVE AT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SYRIA HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE DETAILS

WITH THE GOL. ILMAC, KHADDAM SAID, IS A CONVENIENT COVER. MURPHY ASKED IF THIS POINT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DIRECTLY AND INDEPENDENTLY WITH THE GOL. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT "YOU CAN DISCUSS ANYTHING YOU WANT WITH THE GOL." BUT SYRIA'S VIEW IS THAT ILMAC PRO-

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VIDES THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK. ACCORDINGLY,
SARG HAS DISCUSSED ILMAC WITH LEBANESE LEADERS,

ALTHOUGH NOT IN DETAIL. AFTER STUDYING THE ENTIRE
MATTER, SYRIA FOUND THAT "THE ONLY REALISTIC CHOICE
WAS ILMAC."

9. MURPHY ASKED KHADDAM WHAT THE GOL IS REQUESTING
FROM THE UN ON UNIFIL IN MILITARY TERMS. KHADDAM
REPLIED THAT IT SHOULD PREVENT INFILTRATION ON BOTH
SIDES OF THE BORDER. HE SAID SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES
CAN BE DISCUSSED IN LIGHT OF NEEDS AND OF SECURITY
COUNCIL PROCEDURES. THESE ARE TECHNICAL MATTERS
FOR THE UN.

10. MURPHY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS APPARENT
THAT THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT FOR THE MOMENT ON
MILITARY TALKS IN OTHER THAN THE ILMAC FRAMEWORK.
THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER THIS FURTHER AND WOULD WELCOME
SYRIA'S IDEAS. HE REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT GET HUNG UP ON FRAMEWORKS
WHEN THE SUBSTANCE IS A SHARED GOAL OF GETTING ISRAELI
FORCES OUT OF LEBANON. MURPHY SAID HE WILL DEPART
DAMASCUS TOMORROW (SEPT 28), BRIEF THE SECRETARY
ON SUNDAY, AND PARTICIPATE IN THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS
WITH SHARA' ON OCT 5. PERES AND SHAMIR WILL VISIT
WASHINGTON ON OCT 8-9. MURPHY TOLD KHADDAM THAT WE
WOULD BE IN TOUCH AFTER THE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARY HAVE CONSIDERED THE MATTER. IT IS CLEAR THERE

ARE THINGS TO BE DONE, BUT WE ARE NOT SURE THAT THE
U.S. IS THE ONE TO DO THEM. MURPHY SAID HE COULD
RETURN TO DAMASCUS BETWEEN THE PERES VISIT AND A
TRIP TO SOUTH ASIA LATER IN OCTOBER. KHADDAM SAID
FINE, AND ASKED MURPHY TO CONVEY HIS BEST REGARDS
TO SECRETARY SHULTZ.

11. AFTER THE MEETING, MURPHY STAYED BEHIND FOR A

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PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH KHADDAM (OTHER ELEMENTS REPORTED BY ANOTHER CHANNEL.) MURPHY POINTED OUT THAT THE U. S. HAD ALREADY BEEN BURNED BADLY IN LEBANON, AND HE WANTED TO ASK KHADDAM FRANKLY, IS THERE SOMETHING TO BE DONE BY US HERE? KHADDAM REPLIED, "IN OUR VIEW, YOU CAN DO USEFUL THINGS." WE ALL WANT A WITHDRAWAL. SYRIA HAS A MAJOR INTEREST IN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AS DOES LEBANON. THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN ISRAEL IS WORSENING AND THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE IN LEBANON IS GROWING. KHADDAM ADDED THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION WORKS AGAINST LEBANON'S INTERESTS AND AGAINST SYRIA'S EFFORT TO PROMOTE A STABLE LEBANON. MURPHY ASKED AGAIN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR THE U. S. TO PLAY A ROLE. THE REPLY WAS, "PERES IS COMING TO THE U. S. YOUR PRESIDENT CAN THEN DECIDE ON THE U. S. ROLE." SYRIA AND LEBANON WANT TO SEE LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE RESTORED. KHADDAM REMINDED MURPHY THAT ASAD TOLD THE GOL IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE GOL TO ASK THE U. S. TO PLAY A ROLE. "WHEN THE U. S. REFUSED, THAT IS WHEN THE GOL RESORTED TO THE UN."

12. MURPHY TRIED AGAIN ON DIRECT MILITARY TALKS. KHADDAM REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE A FORCE AVAILABLE TO MOVE SOUTH AND THAT ALL PARTIES IN LEBANON AGREE ON A LAF ROLE. IN RESPONSE TO MURPHY'S STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL DID NOT CONSIDER THE

LAF IN ANY WAY UP TO THE TASK, KHADDAM SAID, "IF THE IDF WERE TO WITHDRAW NOW, THE LOCAL FORCES YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT WOULD NOT LAST ONE HOUR AND WOULD MEET A FATE WORSE THAN THE LEBANESE FORCES (CHRISTIAN MILITIA) IN THE SHUF." WERE THE GOL TO ACCEPT LOCAL FORCES, OTHER MILITIAS IN OTHER AREAS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED, AND THIS WOULD WORK DIRECTLY AGAINST THE UNITY OF LEBANON. KHADDAM SAID THAT

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SYRIA HAS NO OTHER CONCEPT THAN ILMAC. IN OUR
DISCUSSIONS, THIS IS WHAT WE CAME UP WITH. MURPHY
ASKED ABOUT OTHER IDEAS. KHADDAM SAID ANYTHING
THE U.S. CARES TO PUT FORWARD CAN BE DISCUSSED.

13. DURING THE PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN KHADDAM
AND MURPHY, REMAINDER OF PARTY WAITED IN THE
ANTEROOM. SITTING WITH THEM WAS LEBANESE UNOFFICIAL
EMISSARY MICHEL SAMAHA, WHO PROBABLY WAS WAITING
FOR KHADDAM TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE APPROPRIATE
MESSAGE TO CARRY TO LEBANESE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.
SAMAHA SAID HE PLANNED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT THAT
NIGHT. GLASPIE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT REPEATED BEIRUT & TEL AVIV

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THE DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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September 28, 1984

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TO: NSC Mr. Robert McFarlane

Bud:

I've enclosed copies of all messages constituting the exchange between Murphy and State on this subject.


Hugh Montgomery

Attachments:

- BC 261041Z
- BC 261906Z
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FROM MURPHY FOR SS HILL ONLY

DEPARTMENT PASS DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV FOR CHARGE AND
AMBASSADOR ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL AND KARAMI

1. 8 - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: TOGETHER WITH BARTHOLOMEW, I MET WITH GEMAYEL, KARAMI AND COLONELS RUHAYYIM AND KHALIL FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS SEPTEMBER 28. I PROVIDED OVERVIEW OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL AND DAMASCUS, GIVING EXTENSIVE PRESENTATION ON MY EXCHANGES WITH ASSAD AND KHADDAM. EMPHASIS WAS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON TAKING INITIATIVE TO EXPAND UNIFIL AND CAUTIOUS SYRIAN OPENING TO PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TALKS, COLORED BY STRONG SYRIAN PREFERENCE FOR ILMAC FRAMEWORK. I GAVE MUCH BRIEFER TREATMENT TO DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI LEADERS, STRESSING READINESS OF NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO SEE WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDED THEY WERE CONFIDENT OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. MY FOCUS WAS ON ISRAELI DESIRE FOR EXPANDED UNIFIL

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MANDATE AND NECESSITY OF DIRECT MILITARY LEVEL TALKS (BUT NOT IN ILMAC FRAMEWORK), IF LEBANESE HOPED TO RESTORE ANY ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER LAF AEGIS AS OPPOSED TO CURRENT ISRAELI PREFERENCE FOR LAHAD'S ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON. GEMAYEL AND KARAMI AGREED THAT LATTER WOULD INITIATE LEBANESE REQUEST TO EXPAND UNIFIL MANDATE WHEN HE MET WITH SYG IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. RE DIRECT TALKS, KARAMI SAID THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE, INCLUDING ON THE MILITARY LEVEL. BY END OF OUR SESSION, HOWEVER, GEMAYEL SAID THAT GOL WOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR DIRECT TALKS THAT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. BOTH GEMAYEL AND KARAMI, AND PROBABLY ALMOST ALL LEBANESE, DESPERATELY WANT US TO COME UP WITH SOLUTIONS. THEY TEND TO SEE THE PROBLEM DIFFERENTLY. KARAMI IS MOST ADAMANT THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS LIKE DIRECT TALKS OR GOL ACCEPTANCE OF LAHAD. GEMAYEL'S MOST URGENT CONCERN SEEMS TO BE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ABRUPT IDF WITHDRAWAL, UNCOORDINATED WITH THE GOL AND LEADING TO RENEWED INTER-COMMUNAL STRIFE. THIS IS NOT A TEAM WHICH HAS A CLEAR, AGREED SET OF OBJECTIVES FOR SOUTH LEBANON. NONETHELESS, I BELIEVE I HAD PARTIAL SUCCESS IN FOCUSING THEM ON WHAT THE GOL ITSELF CAN DO IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY BARTHOLOMEW AND MACK, I MET FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS, INCLUDING LUNCH, AT GEMAYEL'S RESIDENCE IN BIKFAYYA. WE WERE ALONE WITH GEMAYEL AND RUHAYYIM FOR SEVERAL MINUTES PRIOR TO KARAMI'S ARRIVAL. GEMAYEL TOLD US THAT HE HAD RECEIVED AN EMISSARY FROM DAMASCUS, BUT HAD FEW DETAILS ABOUT

OUR MEETINGS THERE. I GAVE HIM A QUICK SKETCH OF OUR MEETINGS IN BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. I EMPHASIZED

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THAT IN DAMASCUS I PRESSED KHADDAM ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF URGENT STEPS TO EXPAND THE ROLE OF UNIFIL AND GET
LEBANESE-ISRAELI DIRECT MILITARY TALKS UNDERWAY.
GEMAYEL MADE NO PARTICULAR COMMENT.

4. AFTER KARAMI'S ARRIVAL AND TWO MINUTES OF
PLEASANTRIES BEFORE THE TELEVISION CAMERAS, I GAVE
A LENGTHY PRESENTATION DURING WHICH BOTH GEMAYEL
AND KARAMI WERE MOST ATTENTIVE AND RUHAYYIM AND
KHALIL TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES. I SPOKE ALONG LINES
OF TALKING POINTS PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED TO
DEPARTMENT, ADDING A NEARLY VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF
MY INITIAL PRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT ASSAD OF THE
EIGHT IDEAS AND AN EXTENSIVE READ-OUT OF THE SYRIAN
RESPONSES ON BOTH OF MY VISITS TO DAMASCUS.

5. MY DESCRIPTION OF DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL WAS MUCH
MORE CONDENSED, FOCUSING ON ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR
LEBANESE INITIATIVES TO EXPAND UNIFIL MANDATE AND
START DIRECT MILITARY TALKS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
I STRESSED THE SYRIAN POSITION THAT IT SUPPORTED
A LEBANESE INITIATIVE WITH THE UN SO LONG AS LEBANESE
SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT INFRINGED IN THE PROCESS. I
TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT KHADDAM HAD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD
OUR POINT ABOUT USING THE LAF TO TALK TO THE IDF AND
GIVING ISRAEL MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE GOL-LED ALTERNA-
TIVE TO LOCAL FORCES. ALTHOUGH ILMAC WAS THE ONLY
FRAMEWORK THAT SYRIA SAW AT THIS POINT, I HAD
EMPHASIZED THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT ILMAC WAS DEAD.
KHADDAM FOR HIS PART HAD TOLD ME HE WAS PREPARED
TO DISCUSS ANY OTHER CONCRETE FORMULA WHICH MIGHT
BE PROPOSED.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DAMASCUS & TEL AVIV.

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6. I TOLD THE LEBANESE THE ISRAELIS HAD ASKED US TO MAKE TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. FIRST, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING EXPANSION OF UNIFIL. GEMAYEL SAID THIS WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. I EXPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE UNIFIL TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REPLACE THE IDF IN THE AREA WHICH IT VACATES. GEMAYEL SAID THIS WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. I ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE MORE INTERESTED IN SEEING UNIFIL EXPAND NORTH TO THE AWALI THAN SOUTH TO THEIR MUTUAL BORDER. GEMAYEL SAID THIS WAS NO PROBLEM. WHEN I STRESSED THE URGENT NEED TO GET THIS PROCESS UNDERWAY, GEMAYEL AND KARAMI CONFERRED IN ARABIC, AND GEMAYEL TOLD US LATER IN THE MEETING THAT KARAMI WOULD MAKE THE REQUEST TO SYG DE CUELLAR WHEN THEY MET IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK.

7. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF DIRECT TALKS, I SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD ASKED US TO STRESS THE NEED FOR TALKS ON THE MILITARY LEVEL ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THE ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE GOL IF POSSIBLE, BUT HAVE OTHER OPTIONS. THEY MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, STAGE A QUICK PULL OUT FROM AT LEAST PART OF SOUTH LEBANON WITH INEVITABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. THIS WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLY OUTCOME. GEMAYEL THEN SAID THE GOL HAS

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EVIDENCE THAT IN RECENT DAYS OVER 100 ISRAELI AGENTS HAVE ENTERED BEIRUT FROM THE EASTERN SIDE AND ARE NOW OPERATING ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CITY. ISRAELI AGENTS ARE ACTIVE IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. (COMMENT: I CAN ONLY INTERPRET THIS PECULIAR INTERVENTION AS REFLECTING GEMAYEL'S CONCERN THAT THIS IS A PRELUDE TO AN ABRUPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.) WILL THE U. S. HE ASKED JUST BE A SPECTATOR? I RESPONDED THAT NEITHER CONTINUED OCCUPATION NOR CHAOS IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE U. S. OR OF ANY PARTY. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT U. S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS COORDINATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON RE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF, BUT IT TAKES TWO SIDES TO MAKE THIS WORK. GEMAYEL HARKED BACK TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF. HE CHARGED THAT IT WAS LEBANON'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A SPECIAL INDEPENDENT STATUS FOR THE SHUF WHICH CAUSED THE ISRAELIS TO DO WHAT THEY DID. HE FEARED A SIMILAR EXPERIENCE IN THE SOUTH.

8. I PICKED UP THE THREAD HERE TO STRESS THE ISRAELI LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE LAF TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE BORDER AREA, THE AREA OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL. ONE OF THE BASIC REASONS WHY THE ISRAELIS PREFER LAHAD'S FORCE TO THE LAF IS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH GENERAL LAHAD. GEMAYEL SAID WRYLY THAT THE LAF DOESN'T HAVE ANY GENERAL LAHADS TO TALK TO THE IDF. LAHAD IS PART OF THE ISRAELI STRUCTURE.

9. I SAID I KNEW THAT GEMAYEL HAD TOLD US THAT THE GOL CANNOT ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS. NONETHELESS,

I SAID, AT NO TIME DURING MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS DID SYRIAN LEADERS TELL ME THEY OPPOSED DIRECT TALKS AT

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THE MILITARY LEVEL. THEY STATED THEIR STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TALKS IN THE ILMAC FRAMEWORK, BUT THEY ALSO AGREED TO DISCUSS OTHER CONCRETE PROPOSALS. I SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT ALL THE POSSIBILITIES. I SAID THAT DESPITE THE ISRAELI PREFERENCES THEY ARE NO LONGER ASKING FOR POLITICAL LEVEL TALKS. THE POINT IS TO BEGIN TALKS ON AN URGENT BASIS IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLANS AT A TIME WHEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SEEMS PREPARED TO SHOW ITS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY.

10. I CLOSED MY PREPARED PRESENTATION AS I HAD OPENED IT, BY EMPHASIZING THAT I HAD NOT MADE THESE VISITS AS A MEDIATOR. MY EFFORTS WERE EXPLORATORY ONES. WE HAVE SAID WE ARE READY TO HELP LEBANON IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL WHEN LEBANON ESTABLISHES A FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS AND HAS CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO MAKE. THAT REMAINS OUR POSITION, BUT I CAUTIONED THAT WASHINGTON HAS NOT AUTHORIZED US TO ENGAGE IN MEDIATION.

11. GEMAYEL INVITED KARAMI TO RESPOND. KARAMI SAID THE GOL WISHES TO SEE THE U.S. ACT AS A MEDIATOR AND MAKE ISRAEL WITHDRAW WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE GOL CANNOT MAKE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL, AND THAT INCLUDES MILITARY CONTACTS. KARAMI SAID THEY COULD, AS THE SYG HAD PROPOSED, MEET IN NAQOURAH (JUST NORTH OF THE ISRAELI BORDER) IN SEPARATE ROOMS WITH A MEDIATOR. KARAMI SAID THAT LAHAD CANNOT REPRESENT THE GOL TO ISRAEL NOR ISRAEL TO THE GOL. UNIFIL, HE SAID, IS NO PROBLEM. IT CAN WORK WITH THE LAF TO HELP EXTEND GOL SOVEREIGNTY TO THE WHOLE SOUTH, INCLUDING THE SOUTHERN BLOA VALLEY.

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12. ADDRESSING THE PRIME MINISTER, I SAID I WAS NOT ASKING THE LEBANESE TO ABANDON ANY PRINCIPLE. I WAS ASKING THAT LEBANON DO WHAT IT CAN IN A PRACTICAL WAY IN THE VERY NEAR TERM. WE ALL HOPE THAT IN THE END WE WILL SEE PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLE MERGE. THE GOL IS NOW OPEN TO NEW APPROACHES. WE MUST LOOK FOR WAYS TO EXPLOIT THE POSSIBILITIES NOW AVAILABLE FOR MOVEMENT. WE RESPECT LEBANESE PRINCIPLES, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ONE CANNOT FIND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO FACILITATE THE IDF WITHDRAWAL. SOME OF THE ARRANGEMENTS NEED NOT BE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED. DO YOU THINK, ASKED KARAMI, THAT LAHAD IS MORE CAPABLE THAN THE LEBANESE ARMY? THE ISRAELIS DO, I REPLIED. GEMAYEL SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS DEAL WITH LAHAD, THEY HAVE ISRAELI OFFICERS WITH HIM, AND HE THEREFORE ENJOYS CREDIBILITY. AS LEBANESE SAID GEMAYEL, WE BELIEVE IN PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS, BUT THE GOL MUST ALSO GUARD ITS HONOR. IT CANNOT, SAID GEMAYEL, REACH A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION FOR THE SOUTH UNLESS THE USG IS WILLING TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO PREVENT REPEAT PREVENT A FAST WITHDRAWAL. THE GOL NEEDS TIME TO WORK OUT A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SAVE ITS CREDIBILITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND HONOR.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT THROUGHOUT)

13. THE LAF WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH AND CREDIBLE ENOUGH, SAID GEMAYEL, IF IT WAS ABLE TO DEPLOY ON A "FAIR BASIS." THE GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING TO FIND A NATIONAL CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE LAF MORE SUPPORT. AN UNCOORDINATED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOUTH WOULD LEAD TO INFILTRATION BY PALESTINIANS AND PROBLEMS WITH ALL LEBANESE FACTIONS. CAMILLE CHAMOUN, WHO IS CLOSE TO LAHAD, HAS TOLD THE CABINET THAT EVEN THE CHRISTIANS OF THE SOUTH WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH LAHAD. ONLY THE LAF, WITH THE HELP OF UNIFIL, CAN CREATE AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURE TO PREVENT INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM.

14. DISCUSSION CONTINUED OVER LUNCH, WHERE WE TOUCHED ON A VARIETY OF POINTS, MOST NOTABLY THE SYRIAN ROLE. GEMAYEL SAID SARG HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI, AND ARE NOW STARTING TO SQUEEZE THE IRANIAN NATIONAL GUARD AND LEBANESE SHIA EXTREMISTS IN THE BLOA. THE EXTENSION OF THE SECURITY PLAN INTO THE SHUF, WHICH COULD PERHAPS BEGIN BEING IMPLEMENTED IN A FEW DAYS, DEPENDED ON THE ABILITY OF THE SARG TO GET THE AGREEMENT OF THE PSP.

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15. AS LUNCH DREW TO A CLOSE, GEMAYEL ASKED WHAT USG PLANNED TO DO NEXT. I SAID WE HAD NO SET PLANS. IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT ALL THREE PARTIES WANTED AN ACTIVE USG ROLE. WE WANT TO HELP; THE QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN.

16. ALTERNATIVE TO A STRONGER U.S. ROLE, SAID GEMAYEL, WAS CHAOS. HE AGAIN SUGGESTED THE RHODES FORMULA FOR PROXIMITY TALKS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY ASKING THAT THE USG TRY TO SET THEM UP.

17. I STEERED GEMAYEL BACK TO WHAT THE GOL WOULD DO IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM. HE CONFIRMED THAT KARAMI WOULD SPEAK TO DE CUELLAR ABOUT UNIFIL. THAT LEFT, I SAID, THE PRECISE FORMAT FOR TALKS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, BEARING IN MIND THE ISRAELI REJECTION OF ILMAC. THERE MUST BE AN ANSWER THE GOL CAN DEVISE CONSISTENT WITH ITS POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. THERE IS A NEW GOI WITH A NEW SPIRIT, BUT IT STILL CONSIDERS IT CANNOT TRUST THE WORD OF THE GOL AND THAT THE LAF IS INEFFECTIVE. YOU HAVE TOLD ME THAT THE LAF CAN BE EFFECTIVE; IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS.

18. AS IF HE WERE THINKING OUT LOUD (POSSIBLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF KARAMI), GEMAYEL SAID THERE WERE THREE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES IN SOUTH LEBANON-- UNIFIL, ILMAC AND UNTSO. PERHAPS YOU COULD USE ONE OF THOSE THREE STRUCTURES IN WHICH BOTH GOL AND UN HAVE A PRESENCE FOR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE COULD USE THE ILMAC STRUCTURE WITHOUT CALLING IT ILMAC. (GEMAYEL THEN REPEATED ALL

OF THIS TO KARAMI IN ARABIC, CONCLUDING BY ASKING, "ISN'T THAT SO?") THE ISRAELIS, GEMAYEL ADDED, COULD DENY IT WAS ILMAC.

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19. FINALLY KARAMI BROKE HIS SILENCE, SAYING THAT EVERYTHING INDIRECT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. CHOOSE AN INDIRECT MEANS OF CONTACT. I STRESSED THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT SEEM UPSET ABOUT DIRECT MILITARY CONTACTS. KARAMI REPLIED, IN ARABIC, "THEN LET ISRAEL RECOGNIZE THE ARMISTICE." GEMAYEL, ANSWERING KARAMI IN ARABIC, SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD RECOGNIZED THE ARMISTICE, BUT NOW THEY'VE TRANSGRESSED IT.

20. GEMAYEL RECALLED THAT DE CUELLAR HAD SUGGESTED PROXIMITY TALKS IN NAQOURAH. IN ANOTHER ARABIC EXCHANGE KARAMI SAID THAT URQUHART HAD SAID THE UN WAS READY TO PLAY THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR, SO WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM? GEMAYEL RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WAS UNENTHUSIASTIC. WITHOUT INDICATING THAT I THOUGHT ANY BETTER OF THE IDEA, I SAID I WOULD TRY TO SEE URQUHART IN NEW YORK FOR GENERAL TALKS ON SOUTH LEBANON.

21. I SAID THAT WE WERE BOTH AGREED ON MILITARY LEVEL TALKS. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE STRUCTURE. WE SHOULD BOTH OF US BE THINKING OF VARIOUS FORMULAS AND EXCHANGE OUR IDEAS. I NOTED I MUST NOW RETURN TO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY. THERE WOULD BE THE CHANCE TO SEE KARAMI IN NEW YORK. PERES AND SHAMIR WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 8-9. THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD TURNED THE PAGE ON THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH BOTH THE USG AND GOI THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD AGREEMENT. THE NEW TEAM IN ISRAEL WANTS TO GET THE ARMY OUT OF LEBANON BUT NOT WITHOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE WOULD STAY IN TOUCH WITH GEMAYEL THROUGH AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW.

22. I CAUTIONED THAT I WOULD GET A SKEPTICAL RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON. LEBANON HAD BEEN AN UNPLEASANT EXPERIENCE. THE LEGANESE NEED TO SHOW US THEY CAN BUILD UP THE LAF'S

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CREDIBILITY WITH THE ISRAELIS THROUGH DIRECT TALKS.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOL SHOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS
TO REORGANIZE THE LAF AND PLAN FOR ITS EFFECTIVE RE-
DEPLOYMENT. IF AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS, THE IDF COULD BE OUT IN 6-9 MONTHS. WOULD
THE LAF BE READY? GEMAYEL ASKED COLONEL KHALIL
FOR HIS VIEWS. KHALIL (A SENIOR SHIA OFFICER)
REPLIED THAT WITH POLITICAL AGREEMENT TWO LAF BRIGADES
COULD BE FIELDED IN SOUTH LEBANON NOW. KHALIL EMPHASIZED
THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON WOULD GIVE STRONG SUPPORT
TO LAF AND HELP IT PREVENT INFILTRATION. GEMAYEL CAUTIONED
THAT GOL COULD NOT IMPLEMENT ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTH
UNTIL THE SHUF WAS SECURE.

23. AS WE ROSE TO LEAVE, GEMAYEL SAID THE GOL WOULD WORK
ON THE ISSUES WE RAISED. HE HOPED TO COMMUNICATE THE
RESULTS TO US AT AN EARLY DATE THROUGH AMBASSADOR
BARTHOLOMEW.
BARTHOLOMEW

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TAGS: PREL, EG, IS
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT MUBARAK ATTITUDE TOWARD
LEBANON

REF: CAIRO 29360 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL SUGGESTS THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK MAY HAVE DOWN-
GRADED THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON
AS AN ISSUE IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. UPON REFLEC-
TION, WE WANT TO CAUTION THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAS NOT
DROPPED OFF THE SCREEN IN RESPECT TO THE CONDITIONS PUT
BY THE GOE FOR RETURNING ITS AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL.
MUBARAK CONVEYED HIS RELATIVE SATISFACTION WITH THE
DIRECTION IN WHICH THE NEW PERES GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE
MOVING. SHOULD AN IMPASSE OCCUR, HOWEVER, OR IF THINGS
MOVE AT A GLACIAL PACE IN COMING MONTHS, WE CAN EXPECT
THE ISSUE AGAIN TO BECOME PROMINENT--TOGETHER WITH TABA
AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS.

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BY CW NARA DATE 07/12/12

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THE THREE POINTS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL REMAIN THE PUBLIC
CONDITIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL. VELIOTES