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Murphy Mission (09/19/1984-09/25/1984)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 5/11/2011

File Folder BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING AND AMBASSADOR
MURPHY MISSION (9/19/84-9/25/1984)

FOIA

M10-361

Box Number 34

BIRD

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
109403	CABLE	JIDDA 3709 (ANNOTATED) R 10/12/2012 M361/2	6	9/19/1984	B1
109406	PAPER	RE BOMBING (INCLUDES TWO PAGES OF ATTACHMENTS) (ANNOTATED)	4	ND	B1 B3
109409	PAPER	RE REPORTS	4	9/20/1984	B1 B3
109416	PAPER	RE BOMBING (ATTACHMENT TO 109406)	2	ND	B1 B3
109417	PAPER	RE AMBASSADOR OAKLEY'S TRIP TO BEIRUT	4	ND	B1
109418	CABLE	STATE 283667 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/25/1984	B1
109420	CABLE	STATE 284126 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	5	9/25/1984	B1
109421	CABLE	DAMASCUS 06200	2	9/24/1984	B1
109422	CABLE	CAIRO 29360 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	3	9/25/1984	B1
109423	CABLE	CAIRO 29363 R 10/12/2012 M361/2	2	9/25/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/19

~~Bob:~~ → JMP

The attached was in RCM's
out box.

FYI or any possible
further action.

Jennie

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 04997

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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, MOPS, SA, US
SUBJECT: GULF SHIPPING: KING FAHD REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANC

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: IN THE WAKE OF THE SEPTEMBER 16 IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SHIPS SERVICING SAUDI PORTS, KING FAHD HAS REQUESTED (VIA PRIVATE SECRETARY SOLEIMAN) U.S. ASSISTANCE IN PROTECTING SUCH SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER AND BEYOND THE SAG'S OWN CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND EFFECTIVELY. KING FAHD SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE NAVAL ESCORTS OR ORGANIZE CONVOYS. I STRESSED SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO ANY SUCH UNDERTAKING BUT AGREED TO REFER REQUEST TO WASHINGTON. SUGGEST THAT, AS A MINIMUM RESPONSE, USG MIGHT MAKE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF CONCERN RE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MOST

BUD H/S
We need to get NSDD on Iran-Iraq out. I believe you still have it. State & Dg are working on a reply to this. There is nobody anxious to do convoys. Will propose that we respond with statement and a reclama to Fahd on doing AWACS, KC-135, Battle Group refueling exercise.

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RECENT ATTACKS. END SUMMARY

EXDIS

3. KING FAHD'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, MOHAMMED SOLEIMAN, CAME TO SEE ME SEPTEMBER 18 WITH FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

EXDIS

4. THE KING WAS DEEPLY UPSET BY THE SEPTEMBER 16 IRANIAN ATTACKS ON TWO SHIPS IN THE GULF. WHILE NEITHER SHIP WAS SAUDI OWNED OR REGISTERED, AND NEITHER WAS WITHIN SAUDI TERRITORIAL WATERS, BOTH WERE GOING TO OR FROM THE SAUDI PORT OF RAS TANURA. SAUDI ARABIA WAS COMMITTED TO PROTECTING ITS OWN SHIPS AND ITS OWN TERRITORIAL WATERS, AS IT HAD ALREADY DONE IN RECENT MONTHS. HOWEVER, ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS ON NON-SAUDI SHIPS TRADING WITH SAUDI ARABIA WAS ANOTHER MATTER WHICH EXTENDED BEYOND THE SAG'S CAPABILITIES. RECALLING THE U.S.' CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE GULF, THE KING WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER THE U.S. COULD HELP PROTECT SHIPS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. SPECIFICALLY, COULD THE U.S. PROVIDE ESCORTS FOR SHIPS TRANSITING INTERNATIONAL WATERS BETWEEN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND SAUDI PORTS>
OR PERHAPS ORGANIZE CONVOYS>

EXDIS

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5. THERE FOLLOWED A DISCUSSION OF THE EVOLUTION OF ATTACKS IN THE GULF, DURING WHICH I REMINDED SOLEIMAN THAT THE U.S. HAD PLEDGED TO TAKE STEPS, TOGETHER IF POSSIBLE WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS, TO PREVENT THE CUTTING OFF OF THE FLOW OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE GULF; THAT DESPITE RECURRENT ATTACKS, THAT FLOW CONTINUED; THAT WE HAD RESPONDED VIGOROUSLY TO SAUDI ARABIA'S NEED FOR SUPPORT IN STRENGTHENING ITS OWN CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE GULF; THAT IN FACT SAUDI ARABIA HAD REACTED FORCEFULLY AND THIS HAD SEEMED TO HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT

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ON IRAN; AND THAT IRAQ, BY CONTINUING ITS ATTACKS ON IRAN-BOUND SHIPPING, BORE A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY BY PROVOKING IRANIAN RETALIATION. I ALSO NOTED THE VERY LIMITED U.S. RESOURCES IN THE GULF AND THE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES THAT WOULD BE POSED BY ANY EFFORT TO ESCORT OR ORGANIZE INTO CONVOYS THE HUNDREDS OF SHIPS SERVICING SAUDI PORTS. I NOTED FURTHER THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES WERE COMPOUNDED BY OUR LIMITED ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IN THE GULF AREA AND THE RELUCTANCE OF GULF STATES TO UNDERTAKE WITH US CONTINGENCY PLANNING. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, I TOLD SOLEIMAN THAT I WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONVEY THE KING'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON WHERE, AS WAS ALWAYS THE CASE WITH SUCH PERSONAL APPEALS FROM THE KING, I WAS SURE IT WOULD RECEIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

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6. SOLEIMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THE POINT I HAD MADE. AS FOR IRAQ'S SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE KING THE SAG HAD INDEED "TALKED" TO IRAQ ABOUT ITS CONTINUING ATTACKS IN THE GULF. HE ALSO AGREED WITH ME THAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION FOR SAFEGUARDING GULF SHIPPING WAS ENDING THE WAR OR AT LEAST FINDING A WAY TO REMOVE THE GULF FROM THE AREA OF COMBAT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WONDERED IF THE U.S. MIGHT MAKE SOME SYMBOLIC GESTURE, SUCH AS A PUBLIC STATEMENT WARNING THE BELLIGERENTS AGAINST ATTACKS IN THE GULF'S INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR PROVIDING AN ESCORT OR ORGANIZING A CONVOY ON A ONE-TIME BASIS. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, HE INDICATED UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE SAG INTENDED TO PROTEST TO TEHRAN OR MAKE ANY OTHER REACTION OF ITS OWN REGARDING THE SEPTEMBER 16 ATTACKS. ALSO IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, SOLEIMAN SAID THE KING WAS NOT SEEKING

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HELP FROM ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 RIYADH 04997

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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, MOPS, SA, US
SUBJECT: GULF SHIPPING: KING FAHD REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANC

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7. COMMENT: WHILE I MADE IT AS CLEAR AS I COULD THAT I SAW REAL DIFFICULTIES IN OUR BEING RESPONSIVE TO FAHD ON THIS ONE, SOME AUTHORITATIVE REPLY WILL BE NEEDED. AT A MINIMUM, WOULD IT BE FEASIBLE TO FIND AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY FOR A USG SPOKESMAN TO REITERATE CONCERN ABOUT ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE ONES ON SEPTEMBER 16 ON SHIPS SERVICING SAUDI ARABI (AND WHICH INVOLVED THE FIRST FATALITIES IN SOME TIME) > THIS WOULD OF COURSE FALL FAR SHORT OF MEETING FAHD'S REQUEST. BUT IT WOULD AT LEAST SHOW WE SHARE THE SAG'S OWN CONCERN AND WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL U.S. POLICY REGARDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF. TO BE EFFECTIVE, ANY SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE RIGHT AWAY. END COMMENT

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ROUTINE

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FROM/LOCATION/

1. WH SEIRM

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1. ADM POINDEXTER — GRAND RAPIDS

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. _____
- 2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

HUGHES BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #171

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1984, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I'm sorry we're a little late in starting, but I wanted to get the very latest on the Beirut situation for you. Let me just say --

Q John, before you start, may I make a suggestion that you deal with the Embassy thing, then let's have a filing break, and then deal with other news.

A That's fine. That's fine. Sure, we'll deal with the Embassy first.

Q Can you speak up a little?

A Yes. In general terms, let me just say that the Secretary of State has expressed all our feelings about the senseless, brutal attack on Americans and Lebanese working in Beirut. This cowardly attack will be understood by the world as another reminder that rule of law and civilized norms of behavior are threatened by those who use terrorism as a political weapon.

Now, let me give you a rundown on where we stand as best --

Q Can we have a copy of that, John?

A Sure.

-- as best as we can understand it at this time. At 11:30 this morning Beirut time, which was 4:30 this morning our time, a van approached the north entrance access road at the Embassy Annex compound, northeast of Beirut. The Annex is located on a residential street blocked at both ends by barricades. The occupants -- we think there were two -- of the vehicle opened fire on the contract Lebanese guards at the barricade -- this was at the north end of the street running outside the Annex -- and disabled them.

The vehicle came under fire from other Embassy guards, but it maneuvered through the barricade behind the

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checkpoint and proceeded for about 500 feet toward the Embassy building. It was stopped by the firing -- the vehicle was apparently pretty badly shot up at that stage -- and the two occupants may indeed have been dead at that stage. But nevertheless, the vehicle stopped some 20 feet short of the northern end of the Embassy, still on the street, and at that point it exploded.

We understand that in addition to the Lebanese guards, there was fire onto the vehicle from Americans who came out of the Embassy, and we also understand that a guard who was with the British Ambassador, who was visiting the Embassy at the time, also opened fire on the vehicle.

The building was severely damaged, although the floors did not collapse. We have varying reports on casualties including a number of deaths. Among the killed, we believe were two Americans. Among the wounded were 20 Americans. Four of them were treated and released and the rest have been confined to hospital. We do not have accurate figures on the number of Lebanese killed and injured at this time.

Beginning at 7 o'clock this morning, State Department officials began notifying the families of Americans stationed at the Embassy to provide them with information as it became available.

Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew was in the building at the time. He was in his office on the fourth floor. He was briefly buried under rubble, but he cleared that; he walked out of the Annex. He has cuts and bruises. He was taken to hospital for treatment of them. He is still in the hospital. We expect him to be there for another day or two. He is in charge from the hospital. He is telephoning various officials and is in touch with us directly by phone from his hospital room. He spoke to Secretary Shultz earlier in the morning; he spoke to the President earlier today.

As I say, the British Ambassador was in the Annex at the time, and he was slightly injured, I gather, along the lines of Ambassador Bartholomew.

The Department learned of the attack at 5:24 this morning. We established an open line with the Embassy office in West Beirut at 5:26. That line has remained open since. The Secretary of State and senior officials were informed immediately. The Secretary was at home at

the time, accelerated his departure, came to the office somewhat earlier, was in the Operations Center early this morning and went over to be with the President before the President left town.

Responsible officers were quickly assembled and a working group went into force at 8 o'clock under Arnie Raphel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. As I say, we've been in constant communication with the Embassy Office in West Beirut. Communications have now been established between the Department and the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Yarze, and a number of people from the Annex in east Beirut have moved into the Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The West Beirut Embassy office is closed for business, but is under guard.

The Secretary of State has asked Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy to lead a team to investigate the situation and lend assistance to Ambassador Bartholomew and his staff, and Secretary Murphy will be leaving swiftly. He will be joined by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who is Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning. Ambassador Oakley was in London when this tragedy took place, and he will make his way, also speedily, to Beirut.

All our diplomatic posts have been informed, and in fact, there was already in effect an alert following suggestions of threats against the Embassy a little earlier this month, so there already was an alert in effect. But since today's developments, embassies have been informed of what has happened and given the further warning to be alert.

The Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, on behalf of the Israeli Government, has been in touch with Ambassador Lewis, our Ambassador to Israel, and offered all possible assistance from Israel including hospital facilities. We have had similar offers from two other governments, the British Government and the Government of Cyprus. We have State Department medical officers assigned to Cairo and they will be traveling to Beirut even as we speak to assess the situation there.

That, basically, is what I have to bring you up to date on the situation --

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REMARKS BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE PRESIDENTIAL AWARDS CEREMONY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEPTEMBER 20, 1984

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Today, both the President and I have talked to Ambassador Reg Bartholomew from his hospital room in Beirut. His wife Rosie is there. And he says that he's just fine, just a few cuts, but in his characteristic way of courage and coolness under fire, he has given us his report on the situation in Beirut.

That coolness and courage, and the circumstances of it, serve to remind us all of the deeper meaning of public service. And, I think, particularly so for those agencies whose people, along with their families, serve overseas, often in conditions of danger.

There are no words to express the admiration that we all feel. We know from our reports -- which are still fragmentary and unconfirmed, so that I can't say in a definitive way precisely what has happened, or how many people are injured and how seriously -- we do know that there are some who are dead, some who are seriously injured, and many who have some injury. And as we get further reports, of course, those will be immediately available.

Beyond reminding us of the deeper meaning of public service and the importance of public service to our country, I think also this terrorist attack once again reminds us of the importance of the efforts that we are taking to combat terrorism; of the international dimension of this problem; and, of course, the importance of working with other countries as we do to combat it in every way that we can. And I can assure you that we are taking, and will continue to take, every measure we can to deal effectively with this problem.

We are an open society. Our embassies exist to show the United States around the world, to represent us, to deal with the people of the host countries and with our own people and others who are there. So we have, and must have, a flow of people who come in and out. We do work and we must work with our security problem with the recognition of that essential fact. Of course, what it means is that there is a risk, with all of our

efforts. So, again, I express my deep admiration for all of those who serve in our Foreign Service here in the State Department and in the overseas work of the other departments that are represented here, for the quality and depth of service that are given by our Americans who serve overseas.

This is an awards ceremony. The people who are receiving awards are receiving them because of their outstanding service and accomplishments demonstrated in many fields in which they undertake the work of our government and manage things well, observe well, represent us well and, of course, courageously. I see among them and sitting here Ambassador Bob Dillon and also Ambassador Draper, both of whom were present in Beirut when our Embassy there was blown up by a car bomb. In this case, our measures at least did not have that car penetrate the building the way it did before, so the casualties, while there, and we deeply grieve them, are less than they would have been if the same thing had happened again. But it only is a measure of the fact that this problem has been with us, and probably will be with us, but we must work on it.

I'll ask Ambassador Atherton, who's the chairman of this ceremony, to come now and preside and we will give out the awards.

Talk to Bud about Ken bringing
in some local people to talk about
the American Revolution.

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File Folder

BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING AND AMBASSADOR
MURPHY MISSION (9/19/84-9/25/1984)

FOIA

M10-361
BIRD

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
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1. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER - GRAND RAPIDS

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/20/84

John:

Qs/As done by
Ann/Teacher, revised by
Bud.

Bob

Q: Did you have any solid intelligence warning of this attack?

A: At any given moment in recent years there are always recurring threats. We have had reports of this kind -- many of them public -- warning of violence against our diplomats and facilities around the world. We have done a great deal to improve our security and our defenses, but it is difficult if not impossible to create impregnable shields against attack everywhere we are threatened. We must and will do more to guard against these attacks.

Q: Didn't we receive a recent warning from "Islamic Jihad", the group which claimed responsibility for this attack, that they would stage a spectacular assault on American interests in the Middle East (in response to our veto of the UNSC resolution on Israel's occupation of south Lebanon)?

A: Yes, I read the same press reports. But, we have received dozens of such warnings in the past which did not materialize. The point is we take these warnings very seriously, and we tighten our security everytime we think there is a plausible threat. There is a limit to what we can do and still function diplomatically. As I said this morning, we cannot allow ourselves to be driven into a hole everytime someone threatens harm. Our policies in the Middle East are based on principles and dedicated to the pursuit of peace. We simply cannot and we will not abandon those principles in the face of terror.

Q: How will we respond to this attack?

A: I will not speculate publicly about this subject. Let me reaffirm what I have said many times before in the wake of earlier incidents of this type. We will not be intimidated or deterred. Islamic Jihad is an umbrella covering a diversity of groups. It is virtually impossible to associate this act with specific elements.

Q: Do we have any intelligence which suggests Iranian (or Syrian) complicity in this attack?

A: Again, I will not comment on intelligence matters. Let me just point out that this so-called "Islamic Jihad" has been closely linked in the past to Iranian officials and the Iranian Government. I would not associate the Government of Iran with this specific act. While the degree or extent of foreign complicity in this particular act remains open to question, those states which fund and equip avowed terrorists and those which provide them a haven bear certain responsibility for their criminal conduct.

Q: Is this a further indication of your failed policies in the Middle East?

A: No, because I do not accept the premise that our policy is a failure. This is a terrorist act ^{like} ~~of a piece with~~ attacks in Belfast, London, and Kuwait, etc. Not related to Lebanon policy *per se*.

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ROUTINE

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2. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER } GRAND RAPIDS

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INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PRESS GUIDANCE
EMBASSY

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

LEBANON: EMBASSY ANNEX BOMBING

At this point we do not have as many details as we would like, but what I understand is:

At 1130 AM Beirut time, which is 0430 EDT, a van, approached the north entrance access road at the Embassy Annex compound in the Awkar district northeast of Beirut. The Annex is located on a residential street, blocked at both ends by barricades. The occupant or occupants of the van opened fire on the ~~Contract Lebanese~~ ^{Subsidiary Contract Lebanese} guards at the barricade, disabling them. Under fire from other ~~Contract Lebanese, external security,~~ ^{Embassy} guards, the vehicle maneuvered through the barricades and proceeded 500 feet toward the embassy building. It was stopped by the firing ~~20 feet~~ ^{about 20 feet} short of northern end of the embassy, still on the street. ~~[Outside the compound proper.]~~ At that point it detonated.

AM FIRED ON VEHICLE
GUARD W/ VEHICLE AMB.

The building was severely damaged although the floors did not collapse. We have varying reports on casualties, including many deaths. Among the killed we believe were two Americans. Among the wounded were twenty Americans, four were treated and released and the rest have been hospitalized. We do not have accurate figures on the number of Lebanese killed and injured.

Beginning at 0700 this morning Department officials began notifying the families of Americans stationed at the Embassy to provide information as it became available.

4TH FL.
BURNED UNDER ROBBLE / WALKED OUT

Amb. Bartholomew was slightly injured and treated at a hospital for cuts. He is now in charge ^{IN HOSPITAL} and has been in contact with the Department and ^{spoken with} Secretary Shultz. The British Ambassador was visiting the Embassy at the time and also was slightly injured.

The Department learned of the attack at 0524 and an open line was established with the Embassy office in West Beirut at 0526. That line has remained open since. The Secretary and senior officials were informed immediately and responsible personnel assembled. A working group was formed at 0800 under Arnie Raphael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. We have been constant communication with the Embassy Office in West Beirut. Communications have now been established between the Department and the the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Yarze. Operational staff have been moved there and the West Beirut Embassy Office is closed for business, but under guard.

The Secretary has asked Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy and *Amb. Robert B. Oakley, Director Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning* to lead a team to investigate the situation and lend assistance to Amb. Bartholomew and his staff.

Recently, there was an alert in effect in the region. After
 to day's events, the alert has
 all our diplomatic posts have been informed and ~~been placed~~
~~on alert.~~ been extended

Defence Minister Rabin on behalf of the Israeli government
 contacted Amb. Lewis and offered all possible assistance
 including hospital facilities. ~~Secretary Weinberger's~~ ^{has not} thanks
~~have been communicated to Rabin with the message that we~~
~~will be back in touch as soon as we can assess our needs.~~
 We have had similar offers from elsewhere, including from
 the Government of Cyprus.

State Department medical officers assigned to Cairo will be
 traveling to Beirut to assess the situation.

The Secretary has expressed all our feelings about the senseless brutal attack on Americans and Lebanese working in Beirut. This cowardly act will be understood by the world as another reminder that rule of law and civilized norms of behavior are threatened by those who use terrorism as a political weapon.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
109409	PAPER RE REPORTS	4	9/20/1984	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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109416	PAPER RE BOMBING (ATTACHMENT TO 109406)	2	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
109417	PAPER RE AMBASSADOR OAKLEY'S TRIP TO BEIRUT	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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National Security Council
The White House

System # 40

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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<u>I = Information</u>	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date)

Murphy Mission

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APPROVED BY P: MARMACOST
S/S : BMCKINLEY
S/S-0 : WGGRIFFITH
P: MRANNEBERGER

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INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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NODIS
FOR ASST SECY MURPHY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, EG, XF
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETINGS IN CAIRO

REF: DAMASCUS 6183

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT WITH THE EGYPTIANS YOU SHOULD DESCRIBE YOUR MISSION AS ONE OF RENEWED CONSULTATIONS WITH REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS ON KEY ISSUES BEFORE THE PERES VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IN THIS MODE, YOU CAN EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING A. U. S. POLICY IN THE REGION (NOT MERELY ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE ISRAELIS) AND FORESHADOW A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN WHICH WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH GOE AGAIN AFTER THE PERES VISIT.

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BY CA NARA DATE 10/2/02

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3. ON ISSUE OF SOUTH LEBANON, YOU SHOULD TELL KAMAL HASSAN ALI THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN SOME EXPLORATORY SOUNDINGS WITH CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS TO SEE WHETHER A BASIS FOR MORE ACTIVE MEDIATION EXISTS. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR EGYPTIANS AND OTHERS TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE AMENABLE TO MEDIATION. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONCERNED PARTIES MAY BE TOO GREAT TO PROVIDE ANY REALISTIC PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT. WE ARE NOW TRYING TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES. WE DO NOT SEE ANY USEFUL ROLE FOR GOE AT THIS POINT BUT IT MAY BE THAT LATER ON, IF IT APPEARS THAT RENEWAL/EXPANSION OF THE UNIFIL MANDATE MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE, GOE AS A FRIEND OF LEBANON AND MEMBER OF UNSC MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME. WE WOULD LIKE TO REMAIN IN TOUCH.

4. ON BILATERAL AND PEACE PROCESS ISSUES, WE SUGGEST YOU FOLLOW OUTLINE OF KEY OBJECTIVES PREPARED FOR THE SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 25 BILATERAL WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID:

(1) RECONFIRM COMMITMENT TO SEPTEMBER 1 PEACE PROPOSAL AND DISCUSS WAYS TO MOVE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. DISCUSS PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND URGE RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE ON GOE'S PART TO NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

(2) ASK ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUT EGYPT'S FMS DEBT BURDEN IN PERSPECTIVE.

(3) UNDERSCORE INTEREST IN RAS BANAS DEVELOPMENT.

(4) SOLICIT COOPERATION TO BLOCK CHALLENGES TO ISRAELI U. N. PARTICIPATION.

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(5) ENLIST SUPPORT FOR ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE
IN GA RESOLUTIONS.

5. FYI EMBASSY CAN BRIEF YOU ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN
THESE AREAS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO RAS BANAS AND
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND OSAMA AL-BAZ
PLANS TO TRAVEL TO AMMAN ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26. END
FYI.
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NEA: RPELLETREAU
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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NODIS
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, SY, IS, LE
SUBJECT: HANDLING THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON ISSUE

1. ~~15~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ON HANDLING THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON (ASL) ISSUE. AS YOUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS HAVE REAFFIRMED, THE STATUS OF THE ASL WILL BE A PRINCIPAL STICKING POINT IN ANY UNDERSTANDINGS ON SOUTH LEBANON. MANY OTHER ISSUES REGARDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH WILL, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TURN OUT TO BE MOOT. ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL CONTINUE AND WILL PROBABLY BE TACITLY ACCEPTED NO MATTER HOW LOUDLY CONDEMNED IN PUBLIC.

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GENERAL LAHAD'S ASL, HOWEVER, STRIKES AT THE HEART OF SYRIAN CONCERN ABOUT, AND ATTEMPTS TO MINIMIZE, ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN LEBANON, AND THREATENS THE GOL'S CENTRAL DEMAND FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS ALSO THE BASIS OF ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN SECURITY FOR ITS BORDER.

3. THE ASL PROBLEM HAS BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS. WITH THE OCTOBER 19 DEADLINE FOR RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE QUICKLY APPROACHING, IT SEEMS ADVISABLE

TO AVOID TRYING TO MIX THE UNIFIL AND ASL ISSUES AT THIS TIME. THIS WOULD UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATE RENEWAL OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE. IN ADDITION, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT TIME BETWEEN NOW AND OCTOBER 19 TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SOME FORMULA FOR THE ASL THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES COULD LIVE WITH.

4. NEVERTHELESS, THE ISSUES ARE OBVIOUSLY RELATED. BOTH URQUHART AND RABIN HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY OVERLAPPING OF ASL AND UNIFIL AREAS OF OPERATION IN THE SOUTH. THE MAJOR PLAYERS DISAGREE, HOWEVER, ON HOW UNIFIL'S AREA OF OPERATIONS SHOULD BE DEFINED. UNIFIL AND THE ARAB PARTIES WOULD LIKE IT TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE OF EXTENSION TO THE ISRAELI BORDER. ISRAEL WANTS UNIFIL TO DEPLOY NORTH OF ITS PRESENT POSITIONS INCLUDING IN THE BIQA AND TO LIMIT ITSELF TO A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE ALONG THE BORDER. SYRIA OPPOSES ANY MOVEMENT CLOSER TO ITS BORDER. THE GOL WANTS AN EXPANDED UNIFIL MANDATE -- AS YET UNDEFINED. IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT SO LONG AS THE ASL ISSUE IS NOT DEALT WITH DIRECTLY, IT WILL NOT GO AWAY AND COULD BE USED AT ANY POINT AS A PRETEXT BY THE SYRIANS TO DISRUPT NEGOTIATIONS ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE

SOUTH. IF NEGOTIATIONS WILL ULTIMATELY FAIL, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO KNOW THIS BEFORE GETTING INVOLVED IN FRUITLESS

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DISCUSSIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AVAILABILITY OF SUCH A SYRIAN OBJECTION DOES NOT MEAN THEY WILL EXERCISE IT. IF THEY WANT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BADLY ENOUGH, THEY MIGHT ACQUIESCE IN SOME FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR PRESERVING THE ASL PROVIDED THEY ARE NOT OBLIGED SPECIFICALLY TO AGREE TO IT.

5. BEYOND THE ISSUE OF HOW WE TACTICALLY HANDLE THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT SOLUTION MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE FOUND TO RESOLVE THE ASL PROBLEM. AT ONE EXTREME, THE SYRIANS IDEALLY WANT TO SEE THE ASL COMPLETELY DISSOLVED AND PERHAPS GENERAL LAHAD AND HIS OFFICERS FINISHED. AT THE OTHER EXTREME IS THE ISRAELI OPTIMAL POSITION OF AN EXPANDED ASL UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL ACTIVELY WORKING AS THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT SECURITY FORCE IN THE SOUTH. (WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF RABIN AND PERES MIGHT SEE THE ASL PLAYING A MORE LIMITED ROLE, THAN WAS ENVISAGED BY ARENS. WITH CURRENT LEVELS OF ABOUT 2100 MEN, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE ASL AFTER AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COULD DO MUCH MORE THAN OPERATE IN THE OLD HADDAD ENCLAVE.)

6. IF THE ASL PROBLEM IS TO BE RESOLVED, A FACE-SAVING FORMULA WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND THE SYRIAN POSITIONS. THERE IS A RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES

BUT ALMOST ALL INVOLVE SOME FORM OF NOMINAL INTEGRATION OF THE ASL INTO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHILE ACTUALLY REMAINING UNDER SUFFICIENT ISRAELI CONTROL TO INSPIRE ISRAELI CONFIDENCE.

7. CLOSEST TO THE SYRIAN POSITION PERHAPS WOULD BE AN OPTION CALLING FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF ALL ASL MEMBERS AS INDIVIDUALS INTO EITHER THE LAF, ISF OR BOTH, TO SERVE

IN DESIGNATED AREAS ALONG THE BORDER. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD FIND THIS

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ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABLE.

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8. ANOTHER VARIATION WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THE ASL INTACT AS A LOCAL MILITIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF LARGELY CHRISTIAN VILLAGES IN THE SOUTH. THIS LOCAL OR TERRITORIAL FORCE WOULD REMAIN SEPARATE FROM THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BUT WOULD BE UNDER ITS NOMINAL SUPERVISION EVEN WHILE IT MAINTAINED TIES WITH THE ISRAELIS. THIS WOULD LEAVE THE ISRAELIS UNHAPPY WITH THE ASL'S REDUCED AREA OF OPERATIONS BUT WOULD PROBABLY SATISFY THE GOL AND POSSIBLY SYRIA.

9. THE ASL COULD ALSO BE INTEGRATED AS A UNIT INTO THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THIS IS VERY MUCH LIKE THE SOLUTION THAT WAS FOUND FOR MAJOR HADDAD AND HIS MEN UNDER THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. HADDAD HIMSELF WAS TO HAVE RETURNED TO THE LEBANESE ARMY AS A DEPUTY COMMANDER OF A NEWLY CONSTITUTED TERRITORIAL BRIGADE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY ALONG THE ISRAELI BORDER. EVEN THOUGH GENERAL LAHAD HAS ALREADY RETIRED AND IS A LESS CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE THAN HADDAD, THIS ALTERNATIVE WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOL AND THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT IF ONLY BECAUSE IT COMES SO CLOSE TO THE ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT UNDER THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. THE SYRIANS WILL INTERPRET RETENTION OF LAHAD AS AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A COSMETICALLY ACCEPTABLE BUT REAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH. IF, HOWEVER, THE ASL WAS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL LAF UNITS OPERATING UP TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, ITS EXISTENCE WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO DAMASCUS. MOST LIKELY, LAHAD WOULD HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO RETIREMENT AND REPLACED BY AN OFFICER AT LEAST OSTENSIBLY APPOINTED BY

THE GOL. AFTER A DECONTAMINATION PERIOD, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RESURFACE IN SOME SORT OF GOL CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN THE SOUTH. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT AMONG HIS OTHER LIABILITIES IS THE FACT HE IS A CHAMOUN MAN, AN ELEMENT IN THE CHAMOUN FAMILY'S EFFORTS

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TO REBUILD THEIR POLITICAL FORTUNES IN THE SOUTH WITH A VIEW EVENTUALLY TO CHALLENGE GEMAYEL AND THE PHALANGE.

10. WE CANNOT PREDICT HOW ISRAEL MIGHT REACT TO FORMULAS WHICH EXCLUDE A CONTINUING ROLE FOR LAHAD. ONE OF THE REASONS ISRAEL INSISTED ON A CONTINUING ROLE FOR HADDAD WAS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE HIS INVOLVEMENT AND "LEGITIMIZATION" REPRESENTED TO ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION. ANOTHER WAS THE IMPLICIT MESSAGE HIS RETENTION GAVE TO HIS SUBORDINATES: IT IS OK TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH ISRAEL. BOTH THESE FACTORS ARE STILL PRESENT, BUT PERHAPS TO A LESSER EXTENT WITH THIS GOVERNMENT THAN THE LAST AND WITH LAHAD AS COMPARED TO HADDAD.

11. WITHIN THESE ALTERNATIVES OTHER VARIATIONS CAN UNDOUBTEDLY BE FOUND AND FURTHER REFINEMENTS ARE POSSIBLE REGARDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRECISE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ASL, LAF AND IDF UNDER EACH OPTION. WE HAVE ALSO NOT ADDRESSED THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE ONE FORCE THAT CAN IN FACT GUARANTEE THAT PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS WILL STAY OUT OF SOUTH LEBANON: THE SYRIAN ARMY. NO SCENARIO ENVISAGED BY THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE AN ASL STRONG ENOUGH TO SEAL THE BORDER WITHOUT ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM SYRIA, ISRAEL OR BOTH. THE DILEMMA IS THAT ONLY SYRIA CAN GUARANTEE THE BORDER BUT THAT NEITHER SYRIA NOR ISRAEL MAY BE WILLING TO PAY THE POLITICAL COST INVOLVED IN MAKING THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, US
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY BEGAN HIS ONE AND A QUARTER HOUR MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK BY BRIFFING HIM ON HIS TALKS IN LEBANON, SYRIA, AND ISRAEL ABOUT THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT TOOK UP THE FIRST HALF OF THE MEETING. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ, AMBASSADOR VELIOTES, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR SHERMAN, AND NA/ARN COUNTRY DIRECTOR MACK ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETIN.
3. IN THE EXCHANGES THAT FOLLOWED, PRESIDENT MUBARAK OUTLINED AN APPROACH WITH ISRAEL, KING HUSSEIN, AND THE PALESTINIANS LOOKING TOWARD RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AFTER OUR ELECTIONS AND CULMINATING IN A MEETING HE HOPES TO HAVE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE END OF FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH. MUBARAK CONFIRMED THAT HE IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER PERES ABOUT A

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SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM, WHICH MUBARAK SAID MUST HAVE ASSURED CONCRETE RESULTS. THOSE RESULTS MUST BE RESOLUTION OF TABA AND AGREED "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES" BY THE ISRAELIS IN DEALING WITH PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK. HE LEFT ASIDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, INDICATING THAT THE SINCERITY OF THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO DO SO WAS NOT IN QUESTION. MUBARAK NOTED EGYPT WISHED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US TO INFLUENCE HUSSEIN INTO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANNELS. OSAMA IS GOING TO AMMAN ON SEPTEMBER 27 (PER OUR SUGGESTION) IN PARTICULAR TO TELL HUSSEIN TO COOL IT ON HIS MOVES TOWARD MOSCOW. HE ASKED MURPHY TO SEND VELIOTES A MESSAGE AFTER HIS MEETING TOMORROW WITH HUSSEIN TO HELP GUIDE OSAMA IN HIS SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

4. RAS BANAS. THE PRESIDENT RECONFIRMED THE DECISION CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR VELIOTES YESTERDAY BY OSAMA EL-BAZ--THAT EGYPT CANNOT INCLUDE THE U.S. IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASE AT RAS BANAS UNDER THE LEGAL CONDITION SET UP BY AMERICAN LAW. EGYPT WOULD CONSTRUCT THE FACILITIES ON ITS OWN, BUT MORE GRADUALLY, HE SAID, AND OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC EYE. HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES FIRMLY AND CLEARLY THAT EGYPT, "IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM A FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRY" (THE RAS BANAS FORMULA), WOULD MAKE ANY MILITARY FACILITY AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS DISAGREEMENT OVER RAS BANAS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DAMAGE THE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EGYPT. HE STRESSED HIS JUDGMENT THAT GOING FORWARD WITH CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASE AS NOW PROPOSED WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, CREATING PROBLEMS FOR HIS GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HARM RATHER THAN HELP EGYPTIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND HAMPER RATHER THAN ENHANCE FUTURE MILITARY COOPERATION. MUBARAK, SECONDED BY EL-BAZ, SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING

TO WORK IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE AND WOULD COOPERATE IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE MEDIA AND CONGRESS. THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED THE PROPOSED VISIT

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TO EGYPT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER OCTOBER 13-14,
NOTING THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN PERSONALLY AT THAT TIME HIS
DECISION ON RAS BANAS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESIDENT
WAS WILLING TO SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO WASHINGTON TO
EXPLAIN HIS DECISION, IF THAT WOULD HELP MATTERS.

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5. SUGGESTED ACTION: IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MEGUID, WE
RECOMMENDED THAT THE SECRETARY NOTE THE USEFUL EXCHANGES
BETWEEN MUBARAK AND MURPHY ON THE FUTURE OF ISRAELI-
EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, THE PEACE PROCESS AND OTHER REGIONAL
INTERESTS. ON RAS BANAS, WHILE EXPRESSING HIS DISAPPOINT-
MENT, WE RECOMMEND THE SECRETARY TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER
THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO TRY TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IN OUR
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS AND IN THE MEDIA. IT WILL
NOT BE EASY, AND WE WILL NEED GOE COOPERATION.

6. FULL MEMCON IS BEING SENT SEPTTEL. VELIOTES

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NLRR MID-361/2 # 109423
BY CW NARA DATE 10/12/12

S/S FOR HILL ONLY FROM MURPHY

PLEASE REPEAT TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND DAMASCUS FOR AMBASSADOR
AND CHARGE ONLY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE
SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON TALKS WITH ISRAELIS - SUMMARY
- MESSAGE

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN SEPARATE MEETINGS AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WITH
RABIN, ARENS AND AIDES FOLLOWED BY A MEETING IN
JERUSALEM WITH PERES, RABIN, ARENS AND AIDES, MURPHY
DISCUSSED HIS TALKS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON. ISRAELIS
WERE ATTENTIVE AND CLEARLY FASCINATED TO HEAR SYRIAN
ATTITUDES. THEY OBVIOUSLY DESIRE TO KEEP PROCESS MOVING
AND WANT MURPHY TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION ON TWO SEPARATE
TRACKS: (1) DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIANS TO OBTAIN THEIR
AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: FIRST, NO MOVEMENT
FORWARD OF SYRIAN ARMY AS IDF WITHDRAWS, SECOND,
PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION FROM BEYOND SYRIAN LINES INTO
SOUTH LEBANON, AND THIRD, PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT MILITARY
LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS. (2) AGREEMENT

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OF LEBANESE TO AN EXPANSION OF UNIFIL MANDATE TO COVER THE WHOLE AREA FROM WHICH IDF WOULD WITHDRAW AND SECONDLY, LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO ENTER DIRECT TALKS ASAP ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH LEBANON FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS ENCOURAGED MURPHY TO CONTINUE ON TO SYRIA AND THEN HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. THEY ARE AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE FUTURE ROLE OF LAHAD'S FORCES, BUT THEY WANT TO SEE SOME CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, EVEN IF MANY QUESTIONS ARE LEFT TO BE WORKED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS WITH BOTH SYRIANS, THROUGH U. S. MEDIATION, AND DIRECTLY WITH LEBANESE, PERHAPS WITH A U. S. PRESENCE IN THE LATTER MEETINGS. FULL REPORTING CABLE ON MEETING TO FOLLOW SEPTEMBER 26. VELIOTES

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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