

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
File: Records, 1981-1985  
**Folder Title:** Nicaragua (06/02/1984 –  
08/04/1984) [Too Late to File]  
**Box:** RAC Box 33

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 7/17/2009

**File Folder** NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

**FOIA**

S09-251

**Box Number** 33

74

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74016	CABLE	WH04959 <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	2	6/2/1984	B1
74017	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEGOTIATIONS	2	7/12/1984	B1
74018	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE RESPONSE TO SENATOR MOYNIHAN	1	6/11/1984	B1
74019	LETTER	KENNETH DAM TO SENATOR MOYNIHAN RE NICARAGUA <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	5	ND	B1
74020	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO ROBERT KIMMITT RE DRAFT NSDD <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	1	9/18/1984	B1
74021	MEMO	THE SECRETARY TO HARRY SHLAUDEMAN RE INSTRUCTIONS <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	1	7/27/1984	B1
74022	DRAFT MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, ET AL RE DRAFT NSDD (DRAFT NSDD ATTACHED) <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	5	ND	B1
74058	ROUTING SLIP	<i>R 1/4/2013 M259/1</i>	1	7/27/1984	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 7/17/2009

**File Folder** NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

**FOIA**

S09-251

**Box Number** 33

74

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74024	DRAFT NSDD	RE NICARAGUA <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	4	ND	B1
74026	MEMO	RONALD REAGAN TO SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL RE NEXT STEPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	2	7/28/1984	B1
74027	CABLE	WH06132 <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	3	7/28/1984	B1
74029	MEMO	CAP TO BUD RE DRAFT NSDD <i>R 7/19/2010 M259/1</i>	1	7/28/1984	B1
74031	DRAFT NSDD	RE NICARAGUA (ANNOTATED) <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	4	ND	B1
74057	ROUTING SLIP	<i>R 1/4/2013 M259/1</i>	1	7/27/1984	B1 B3
74033	DRAFT NSDD	RE NICARAGUA <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	4	ND	B1
74036	MEMO	THE SECRETARY TO HARRY SHLAUDEMAN RE INSTRUCTIONS <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	1	7/27/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 7/17/2009

**File Folder** NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

**FOIA**

S09-251

**Box Number** 33

74

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74038	DRAFT MEMO	THE SECRETARY TO HARRY SHLAUDEMAN RE INSTRUCTIONS (ANNOTATED) <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	3	ND	B1
74040	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO DONALD GREGG, ET ALL RE ATTACHED PAPER (ANNOTATED) <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	6	7/26/1984	B1
74042	DRAFT MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO VICE PRESIDENT, ET AL RE DRAFT NSDD (W/ANNOTATED ATTACHEMENTS) <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	10	ND	B1
74044	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	2	8/8/1984	B1
74053	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO THE PRESIDENT RE THIRD ROUND OF TALKS <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	2	8/4/1984	B1
74055	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	2	8/8/1984	B1
74051	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO THE PRESIDENT RE THIRD ROUND OF TALKS <i>R 4/25/2017 M259/1</i>	2	8/4/1984	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

MJD 7/17/2009

**File Folder** NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

**FOIA**

S09-251

**Box Number** 33

74

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74056	MEMO	CONSTANTINE MENGES TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	1	8/6/1984	B1
74049	DRAFT MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT <i>R 4/22/2019 M259/1</i>	2	ND	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 JUN 84 10

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

MP  
7/17/04

DOC DATE 02 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . NICARAGUA

EL SALVADOR

ORTEGA, DANIEL

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ ORTEGA IN MANAGUA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

MENGES

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

System # II 2

Package # 90704

84 JUN 19 AIO: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	<u>JUN 19 1984</u> <u>[Signature]</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>log info</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>only North</u> <u>Menges</u> <u>Poindexter</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP ( Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

Seen by  
President  
6/2/84 3

WMB 147

SYSTEM II  
90704

74016

00 WTE13  
DE WTE #4959 1541123  
O 021129Z JUN 84  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
TO ASHFORD CASTLE //SITTO 036//  
ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ NODIS EYES ONLY WH04959  
ASHFORD CASTLE DELIVER BEFORE DEPARTURE TO GALWAY

DELIVER TO MR. KIMMITT FOR MR. MCFARLANE

THE FOLLOWING IS A RETRANSMISSION OF SECTO 6021 DATED  
2 JUNE 1984

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: ODAR  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: MEETING WITH ORTEGA  
DEPT FOR S/S ONLY

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS PRESIDEN'S PARTY EYES ONLY FOR MCFARLANE  
MY FRANK TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH DANIEL ORTEGA IN MANAGUA  
JUNE 1 REVEALED BOTH SANDINISTA WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO  
DISCUSSIONS AND THE DEEP GAP THAT SEPARATE US ON SUBSTANTIVE  
ISSUES.

HOWEVER, WE AGREED AT THE END THAT OUR TALKS WERE  
"CONSTRUCTIVE" AND "WORTHWHILE." HE SUGGESTED "POSITIVE"  
AND I SAID THAT SEEMED TO GO FURTHER THAN WARRANTED BY THE  
SUBSTANCE, AS DISTINCT FROM THE GOOD TONE, OF THE MEETING.  
I CAREFULLY FOLOWED OUR AGREED TALKING POINTS AND EMPHASIZED  
OUR FOUR-POINT AGENDA AND THE NEED FOR AN OVERALL SOLUTION  
THAT INCLUDED ALL FOUR POINTS. I SUGGESTED WE PROCEED BY STAGES  
IN ALL AREAS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

WE BOTH AGREED TAHT OUR DISCUSSIONS MUST SUPPORT AND FIT  
INTO THE CONTADORA FRAMEWORK.

ORTEGA DWELLED ON OUR MUTUAL DISTRUST AND THEIR FEAR  
THAT MY PRIMARY MOTIVE WAS PROPAGANDA (READ: CONGRESSIONAL  
SUPPORT FOR COVERT ACTIVITIES). HE SHOWED STRONG CONCERN ABOUT  
THE CONTRAS AND STRESSED THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE NICARAGUA  
HAD SUFFERED BOTH FROM FIGHTING AND THE CLOSING OF U.S.  
MARKETS (SUGAR: "ECONOMIC AGGRESSION"). ORTEGA SOUGHT AN  
EARLY, SYMBOLIC MEETING WITH YOU, WHICH I SAID WAS NOT  
APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE THEN REPHRASED HIS  
REQUEST AS MEANING A WILLINGNESS ON HIS PART TO VISIT  
WASHINGTON IN RECIPROICATION FOR MY STOP IN HIS COUNTRY.

ON THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS, HE NAMED VICTOR TINOCO  
(THEIR ABLE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER) TO BE HARRY SHLAUDEMAN'S  
COUNTERPART, AND WE AGREED ON A PROCESS OF SMALL, HIGHLY  
CONFIDENTIAL MEETINGS. ORTEGA MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO INVOLVE  
THE MEXICANS AS A THIRD PARTY "WITNESS" FOR OUR TALKS, WHICH

END OF PAGE 01

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M25911 # 74016

BY PLW NARA DATE 4/25/14

~~SECRET~~



I TURNED ASIDE. AS A GESTURE, I AGREED THAT SHLAUDEMAN AND TINOCO MEET NEXT IN MEXICO, TENTATIVELY ON JUNE 11. THE LOCATION OF FUTURE TALKS WILL BE DETERMINED BY OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND MAY ALTERNATE BETWEEN OUR TWO CAPITALS. ORTEGA THEN PROPOSED AS A COMPROMISE THAT WE KEEP THE MEXICANS INFORMED ON A PERIODIC BASIS. I POSED NO OBJECTION BUT SAID I WOULD ALSO KEEP AT LEAST THE CORE FOUR GENERALLY INFORMED AS WELL.

THE CONTADORA AND CORE FOUR MINISTERS, EXCEPT FOR SOME EXPECTED HONDURAN RESERVATIONS, WERE PLEASED AT OUR INITIATIVE WHEN I DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM IN SAN SALVADOR. SHALUDEMAN AND THE NSC'S RAY BURGHARDT STAYED IN THE AREA TO BRIEF OUR FRIENDS AND WILL VISIT SUAZO TOMORROW.

OUR DIFFERENCES SEEMED HIGHLIGHTED BY TWO ISSUES: THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DISCUSSING THEIR INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND THEIR DEDICATION TO A STRONG REVOLUTIONARY BOND WITH THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. AT THE SAME TIME ORTEGA WAS NONPOLEMICAL AND POLITE. THE U.S. FLAG AS WELL AS THEIR OWN WAS PLACED BEHIND US IN THE MEETING ROOM. ORTEGA THREE TIMES CALLED THE VISIT "VERY POSITIVE." THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CLEARLY IMPROVED OVER RECENT MEETINGS. WE HAVE BEGUN A PROCESS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO SERIOUS TALKS, BUT THIS IS STILL A VERY LONG SHOT.

0586  
#4959

NNNN

4  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 13 JUL 84 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 12 JUL 84 5

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
mo  
7/17/04

KEYWORDS . NICARAGUA

SUBJECT NEGOTIATIONS & PERSECUTION THE NICARAGUAN PARADOX

-----  
ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

-----  
FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (C / 5)

-----  
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

North

S JUL 14 1984

further action

C JUL 16 1984

Action completed per North ok

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

my 1248  
6

System # II  
Package # 90782

81 JUL 13 A 9: 06

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall		<u>wgh</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>discussed with President on 7/13</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Olle North</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Returned:  
w/ cable, per discussion  
N.

Further action per secure phone call on 7/14

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 7/17/2009

*File Folder*

NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

*FOIA*

S09-251

*Box Number*

33

74

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

---

74017 MEMO

2 7/12/1984 B1

OLIVER NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE  
NEGOTIATIONS

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 JUN 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 11 JUN 84 9

LEHMAN, C

11 JUN 84

MENGES

11 JUN 84

KEYWORDS NICARAGUA

CCO

MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MOYNIHAN LTR RE INTL COURT JUSTICE FINDINGS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

JUN 12 1984

Poandexter approved

North

S JUN 12 1984

further action

C JUN 13 1984

action completed per North on

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

1203 10

RECEIVED

System #

Package #

II  
40685

84 JUN 11 P 9: 00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>		
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<del><u>B</u></del>		
Bud McFarlane	<del><u>A</u></del>		<del><u>X</u></del>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N/R</u>
Situation Room			
<u>North</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Return To file

Action taken W.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Withdrawer*

MJD 7/17/2009

*File Folder*

NICARAGUA (06/02/1984-08/04/1984) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

*FOIA*

S09-251

*Box Number*

33

74

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

---

74018 MEMO

1 6/11/1984 B1

OLIVER NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE  
RESPONSE TO SENATOR MOYNIHAN

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

12

TAB

I



WALTER S. HULLINGTON II  
JOSEPH R. BIDER JR. DEL.  
LARRY A. MOULTON  
PATRICK J. LEAHY VT.  
LLOYD BENTLEY TEN.  
DAN BURKE LA.

ROBERT L. BYRD W. VA. SEN. OFFICE  
ROBERT C. BYRD W. VA. SEN. OFFICE

ROBERT B. SHANNON STAFF DIRECTOR  
LARRY J. SCHWARTZ SENATE STAFF DIRECTOR

S/S 8416864

13

**United States Senate**  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON DC 20510

**URGENT**

June 11, 1984

84-2067

The Honorable Kenneth Dam  
Deputy Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Dam:

On My 10, the International Court of Justice indicated certain provisional measures with which the United States should comply pending its final decision in the proceeding instituted by Nicaragua.

I would appreciate a written statement from the Department of State as to whether the United States is now, and intends to remain, in compliance with those measures, in particular paragraphs B(1) and B(2). Please include the complete factual and legal basis for the Department's position.

As the Select Committee on Intelligence will be considering this matter on Tuesday, June 12, I ask that the statement be delivered at or before our meeting.

Sincerely,



Daniel Patrick Moynihan  
Vice Chairman

Enclosure

TAB  
II

# U.S. 'Should Cease and Refrain'

THE HAGUE, May 10 (AP)—Following is the official text of today's World Court interim ruling in the complaint filed by Nicaragua against the United States.

The court.

## A. Unanimously.

Rejects the request made by the United States of America that the proceedings on the application filed by the Republic of Nicaragua on 8 April 1984, and on the request filed the same day by the Republic of Nicaragua for the indication of provisional measures, be terminated by the removal of the case from the list.

B. Indivisibly, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on 8 April 1984 by the Republic of Nicaragua against the United States of America, the following provisional measures:

### 1. Unanimously.

The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from any action involving, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines.

### 2. By 14 votes to six.

The right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by the Republic of Nicaragua, like any other state of the region or of the world, should be fully respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any military and paramilitary activities which are prohibited by principles of international law, in particular the principle that states should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, and the principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States.

In Favor: President Elias, Vice President Vique-Camacho, Judge Lada, Member,

Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Musler, Odu, Agu, El-Khani, Sir Robert Jennings, de Lathouwer, Mbaya, Badjiawa.

Against Judge Schwelb.

### 3. Unanimously.

The governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua should each of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the court.

### 4. Unanimously.

The governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua should each of them ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the other party in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the court may render in the case.

### C. Unanimously.

Decides further that, until the court delivers its final judgment in the present case, it will keep the matters covered by this order continually under review.

### D. Unanimously.

Decides that the written proceedings shall first be addressed to the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the dispute and of the admissibility of the application.

And reserves the fixing of the time limits for the said written proceedings, and the subsequent procedure, for further decision.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this 10th day of May, 1984, in four copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the court, and the others transmitted respectively to the government of the United States of America, the government of the Republic of Nicaragua, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council.

(Signed) T.O. Elias, President

(Signed) Santiago Torres Bernardez, Registrar

16

TAB

III

Dear Senator Moynihan:

This is in response to your letter of June 11, 1984 requesting a statement as to whether the United States is now, and intends to remain, in compliance with the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice on May 10, 1984 in the proceedings instituted against the United States by the Republic of Nicaragua.

As you know, the United States considers the International Court to be without jurisdiction in this matter. Nevertheless, as indicated in the Department's statement of May 10, the United States respects the Court and the rule of law and intends to act accordingly.

The Department's statement further indicated that nothing contained in the measures indicated by the Court is inconsistent with current United States policy or activities with respect to Nicaragua. Without prejudice to the position of the United States that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this case, I am prepared to offer the following comments concerning the decision of the Court.

The Court, in paragraph 41.B.1. of its decision, called upon the United States to refrain from "any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines." As the Committee is aware, U.S. activities in support of mine laying by anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua terminated prior to the decision of the Court.

Paragraph 41.B.2. of the decision of the Court is not directed expressly at the U.S. or any alleged U.S. activities. Rather, the Court in this paragraph reiterates the principles of the U.N. and OAS Charters prohibiting the unlawful threat or use of force (Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations; Article 18 of the OAS Charter) without finding that the United States or any other party has violated these principles. Indeed, the Court expressly disclaimed any intent to prejudge any questions relating to the merits. (Paragraph 40 of the Decision of the Court). Nor did the Court, in reiterating these principles, in any way imply that it intended to restrict or qualify the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, which is expressly recognized in both charters, or to restrict other actions permitted by international law. Thus, this measure would not preclude the conduct or support of any military or paramilitary activities

which constitute a legitimate and proportionate exercise of collective self-defense to bring about the cessation of Nicaraguan armed attack, whether through overt or covert means.

This is, in fact, the explicit basis upon which the Congress has authorized the use of funds to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. In Title I of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1984, the Congress found that:

. . . by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical, command and control, and communications facilities) to groups seeking to overthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has violated article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States which declares that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . .

This statute authorizes funding for intelligence activities "for the purpose of or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. . . ." Presumably, the Congress saw the provision of such support as an exercise of collective self-defense not inconsistent with the international obligations of the United States.

Paragraphs 41.B.3. and 4. of the decision repeat the general admonitions to both parties which the Court customarily adds to any indication of provisional measures to preserve the status quo pending further proceedings.

In considering the intended scope of the Court's decision, it is important to note that the Court did not indicate the provisional measures requested by Nicaragua which would have precluded any U.S. support for military or paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, whether or not permitted by the right of individual and collective self-defense. This was Nicaragua's specific intention; in particular, Nicaragua's counsel repeatedly referred to the pending Administration request for funding of intelligence activities, and asked the Court to take action that would prevent the appropriation and use of such funds for any activities against Nicaragua.

The Court declined to do so, and instead adopted the more general formulation in the second provisional measure that clearly preserves the possibility of support of military or paramilitary activities that are consistent with the principles of international law. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggested in any way that it intended to go beyond this or to reach the result desired by Nicaragua.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORDS~~

In sum, the question of mining Nicaraguan ports is a moot issue. The Court did not in the remainder of its decision purport to preclude U.S. support for lawful uses of force directed against Nicaragua, and in fact rejected a Nicaraguan request for measures precluding the activities to be financed from the funds being requested by the Administration. The Department continues to believe that continued funding for lawful activities is essential to support our diplomatic efforts to bring about a comprehensive resolution of the problems of Central America.

Sincerely,

Kenneth W. Dam

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORDS~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

II ID 8490832

RECEIVED 28 JUL 84 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 27 JUL 84

KIMMITT

27 JUL 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MP 7/17/84

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

NSDD

SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TALKS & DRAFT NSDD RE DIALOGUE W/ NICARAGUA

ACTION: KIMMITT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE: 28 JUL 84 STATUS D FILES SI

FOR ACTION  
NORTH

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BURGHARDT

FOR INFO  
POINDEXTER

**URGENT**

COMMENTS \*\* ORIGINAL SHULTZ MEMO W/ MCFARLANE

REF# 8421411 8421335 LOG NSCIFID ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Kimmitt	X	For Decision		
	9/19	Kimmitt Approved		on
	OCT 29 1984	cy to USIA per Kimmitt		

DISPATCH ed Cox / D Short OCT 29 1984 W/ATTCH FILE (C)

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

I ID 8490832

20

RECEIVED 28 JUL 84 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 27 JUL 84

KIMMITT

27 JUL 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
mip  
7/17/09

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

NSDD

SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TALKS & DRAFT NSDD RE DIALOGUE W/ NICARAGUA

ACTION: KIMMITT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE. 28 JUL 84 STATUS D FILES STI

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

BURGHARDT

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS \*\* ORIGINAL SHULTZ MEMO W/ MCFARLANE

REF# 8421411

8421335

LOG

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

agencies	D	7/28	for comment		
North	S	7/28	recd State response		
North	S	7/28	further action		
North	S	JUL 30 1984	recd Dod response		
Ⓟ	Ⓟ	7/28	Pres sgd memo		on ✓

DISPATCH ed via COX / W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

1355  
91F  
21

System # II  
Package # 90832

84 SEP 18 P 7: 24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II  
90832  
Follow-on

74020

September 18, 1984

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Instructions for Talks and Draft NSDD regarding Dialogue with Nicaragua

The package at Tab I was forwarded for staff action. Within the attachment are the instructions provided by Secretary Shultz to Ambassador Shlaudeman for the July 31-August 1 bilateral discussions with the Nicaraguans. Also attached is a copy of our original NSDD as forwarded to the agencies for comment.

At Tab II is the memorandum signed by the President aboard Air Force One. Also enclosed in Tab II is a message copy of the President's memorandum and DOD's proposed changes to our original draft of the NSDD.

No further action is required on this issue. The President's signature on the memorandum at Tab II constitutes a decision on this action.

RECOMMENDATION

That you have this placed in the file for the record.

Approve   K   Disapprove       

cc: Constantine Menges  
Raymond Burghardt  
Jacqueline Tillman

*Thanks, Ollie. I'm glad someone on the staff recognizes the importance of a complete record.*

Attachments

- Tab I - Shultz Memo to the President of July 27, 1984 w/attachments
- Tab II - Presidential Memo of July 28, 1984 w/attachments

*Bob  
9/19*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M25911 # 74020

BY DW NARA DATE 4/25/17

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90832

84 JUL 27 P 8: 53

July 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz. *GPS*  
Subject: Talks with Nicaragua

Pursuant to today's NSC meeting, I have given Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman the enclosed instructions for the conduct of his July 31-August 1 talks with the Government of Nicaragua.

Attachments: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By MIP NARA, Date 7/19/04

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

TAB

I

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90832

74021

July 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM  
SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: S/SE - Harry W. Shlaudeman  
FROM: The Secretary *WRS*  
SUBJECT: Instructions for the July 31-August 1 Bilateral  
Dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua

You are authorized to hold talks with the representatives of the Government of Nicaragua in Manzanillo, Mexico July 31-August 1.

In these talks you should attempt to focus discussion on substance. Specifically, you should:

- 1) Raise and seek Nicaraguan comment on and agreement to the end-situation objectives described previously by you in the June 25-26 talks in Manzanillo.
- 2) Seek Nicaraguan agreement to pursuit and joint development of a calendar of reciprocal steps to be taken by the Central American and Contadora nations and the United States that would create the environment for a successful outcome of the Contadora process.
- 3) Discuss the methodology behind development of a calendar of reciprocal steps, but you should not provide details of specific steps beyond the description of categories previously provided. You should not state or imply that implementation of first steps can be begun before negotiations are completed on all steps.

With respect to procedure, you may agree to continue, for the foreseeable future, with the procedural arrangements agreed to for the July 31 meeting: a Mexican venue but no third-country participation. You have discretionary authority to work toward a less formal negotiation and may agree to a somewhat expanded unsigned joint minute if the Nicaraguans agree to revert to the note-taking practice of the first two meetings. You should not agree to use of stenotype machines or tape recorders. You should restate the U.S. position on confidentiality.

ARA/CEN: JRHamilton/ARA: LCJohnstone *J*

Cleared: ARA/CEN: NSSmith *#*  
S/SE: HWSlaudeman *#*

**DECLASSIFIED**

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

NLRR M25911 # 14021  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *7/25/17*



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90832

26  
74022

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on  
Dialogue with Nicaragua (NSDD- ) (S)

The President has formally approved the National Security Decision Directive on Dialogue with Nicaragua, discussed at the National Security Council meeting held on July 27, 1984. Because of the sensitivity of the document, we will hand-deliver one copy. We request that you make no copies and limit knowledge of this document to the absolute minimum number of people due to the extreme sensitivity of the NSDD. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment  
NSDD-

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR M 259/1 # 74022  
BY rw NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security  
Decision Directive

**DRAFT**

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world. (S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

BY fw NLR/Masg/1 #740224  
NARA DATE 7/22/19

DECLASSIFIED

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

### Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

- Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America. The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)
  - Preserving U.S. Flexibility. Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)
  - Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process. (S)
  - Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S)
  
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in urging Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans. (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

74058

**URGENT**

**URGENT**

84 JUN 27 P10: 33

MESSAGE NO. 425 CLASSIFICATION Secret PAGES 4  
 FROM Bob Kimmitt 456 2224 WH / WW  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft NSDD

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>B- State</u>	<u>C. Hill</u>		
<u>D- Defense</u>	<u>R.J. Affourtit</u>		
<u>A- CIA</u>	<u>DUANE CLARRIGE</u>		
<u>D- JCS</u>	<u>ART MOREAU</u>		

REMARKS Need Secretarial comments by ~~0900~~ <sup>NOON</sup> Saturday,  
7/28. Thank you.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 NLRR MD9-259/1 # 74058  
 BY RW NARA DATE 1/4/13

~~SECRET~~

74024

32

SYSTEM II  
90832

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security  
Decision Directive

**DRAFT**

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world. (S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

BY AW  
NLR # 11-14-84  
NARA DATE 4/22/19

DECLASSIFIED

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

### Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

- Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America. The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)
  - Preserving U.S. Flexibility. Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)
  - Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process. (S)
  - Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

**DRAFT**



**DRAFT**

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S)
  
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in urging Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need, (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

35  
SENSITIVE  
**DRAFT**

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans. (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

**DRAFT**

TAB

II

~~SECRET~~ 37THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SY II 90832

~~SECRET~~

July 28, 1984

**Historical File**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Central America

My policies for the achievement of our goals in Central America are thoroughly elaborated in previous NSDDs. Recently, as an adjunct of these policies, I authorized efforts to renew a high-level dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua. My purposes were to determine whether such a dialogue might facilitate progress toward our four basic goals for the relationship and also to explore whether Nicaragua might agree, over time, to a regional accommodation as contained in the Contadora 21 points. I continue to believe that these exchanges can be of value. (S)

As we move from procedural to substantive issues, our negotiator, Ambassador Shlaudeman, should seek over time to develop a calendar of reciprocal steps which if agreed in toto by the Core Four countries and Nicaragua could form the basis of a multi-lateral treaty. As Ambassador Shlaudeman works toward this end, he is to be guided by certain principles. (S)

A. Globality: No commitments should be made to implement any step in the sequence of reciprocal steps until negotiations have been completed and agreement reached on all steps. (S)

B. Links to Contadora: It is essential that our efforts be, and be seen to be, directly related to the Contadora process. Specifically, in advancing positions we must have the support of the Contadora countries and in particular the Core Four. (S)

C. Verification: Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. (S)

D. Protecting the U.S. Position in Central America: We must use the talks to safeguard our strategic political and military position in Central America. Specifically, we should (1) take no action which would interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLR # 74026  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/25/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

threats in the region from or through Nicaragua and threats from the Soviets or Cuba not involving Nicaragua; (2) keep Cuba, Soviets, and the U.N. out of the negotiating process; (3) assure that interim stages are time-limited to maintain our flexibility and are contingent upon satisfactory compliance by Nicaragua; and (4) ensure that the talks are limited to Central America and in no way impinge on U.S. treaty obligations with, or presence in, Panama. (S)

Ambassador Shlaudeman is further directed to make a special effort to increase the real and perceived involvement of the Core Four countries, such as by seeking to establish regular visible meetings of the four foreign ministers together at which the status of the talks would be assessed and next steps agreed. As a variant, perhaps Contadora "perm reps" could be designated to meet routinely as a standing advisory body. These are only ideas. The objective is to establish a visible functioning regional process of multilateral diplomacy. (S)

At the next meeting with Nicaraguan representatives, July 31-August 1, Ambassador Shlaudeman should proceed as follows:

1) Raise and seek Nicaraguan comment on and agreement to the end-situation objectives described previously in the June 25-26 talks in Manzanillo. (S)

2) Seek Nicaraguan agreement to pursuit and joint development of a calendar of reciprocal steps to be taken by the Central American and Contadora nations and the United States that would create the environment for a successful outcome of the Contadora process. (S)

3) Discuss the methodology behind development of a calendar of reciprocal steps. Do not provide details of specific steps beyond the description of categories previously provided. Do not state or imply that implementation of first steps can be begun before negotiations are completed on all steps. (S)

*Ronald Reagan*

cc: The Vice President  
The Director of USIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90832 39

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date OCT 29 1984

Subject: CENTRAL AMERICA

*107/1789*

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  ~~SECRET~~  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

## INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input type="checkbox"/> Amb. McFarlane	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Dornan	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. Lehman	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Pollock	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Teicher
<input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter	<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Dur	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Levine	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Raymond	<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Thompson
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fontaine	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Lilac	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Reger	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tyson
<input type="checkbox"/> Sit. Room	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fortier	<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Linhard	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Robinson	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wattering
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Beal	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Helm	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Martin	<input type="checkbox"/> Gen. Russell	<input type="checkbox"/> Exec. Secretary
<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Childress	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kemp	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Matlock	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Rye	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat
<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Cox	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kraemer	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Menges	<input type="checkbox"/> Cpt. Shull	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Registry
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. De Graffenreid	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Laux	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McMinn	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sigur	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Admin.
<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Dobriansky	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. C. Lehman	<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. North	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sommer	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC MSG Center

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241				
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.	1	10/29/84	18:20	James D. Anderson
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

7/17/69

MESSAGE NO. 430 CLASSIFICATION SECRET NODIS PAGES 3

FROM R. MCFARLANE (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NEXT STEPS IN CENTRAL AM (S)

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>SEC STATE</u>		
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>SEC DEFENSE</u>		
<u>ALPHA</u>	<u>DIR CASEY</u>		
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>CHAIRMAN, JCS</u>		

REMARKS - FOR SUNDAY A.M. DELIVERY -

- EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRINCIPALS ONLY -

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

# A

4 J 21 12:49

JUL 20 AM '69

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF THIS CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MESSAGE NO. 430

CLASSIFICATION SECRET NODIS

PAGES 3

FROM R. MCFARLANE

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NEXT STEPS IN CENTRAL AM

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO

EXTENSION

BRAVO

SEC STATE

DELTA

SEC DEFENSE

ALPHA

DIR CASEY

DELTA

CHAIRMAN, JCS

REMARKS

FOR SUNDAY A.M. DELIVERY

EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRINCIPALS ONLY



WASHFAX

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

23

JUL 1981

01:51

04 J 12:49

ROOM

# C

# D

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

MP 7/17/81

MESSAGE NO. 430 CLASSIFICATION SECRET NODIS PAGES 3

FROM R. MCFARLANE  
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NEXT STEPS IN CENTRAL AM (S)

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>SEC STATE</u>		
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>SEC DEFENSE</u>		
<u>ALPHA</u>	<u>DIR CASEY</u>		
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>CHAIRMAN, JCS</u>		

REMARKS - FOR ' SUNDAY A.M. DELIVERY -  
- EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRINCIPALS ONLY -

43

SYSTEM II  
90832 74027

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 0003 DTG: 281950Z JUL 84 PSN: 059302  
SIT504 AN009359 TOR: 210/2128Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: PRES /001  
-----

*Clid by  
JP.  
LB*

OP IMMED  
O 281950Z JUL 84 ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

**DECLASSIFIED**

*NLRR M25911 # 74027*

**BY RW NARA DATE 4/25/17**

INFO THE VICE PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~ NODIS EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH06132

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

MY POLICIES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR GOALS IN CENTRAL AMERICA ARE THOROUGHLY ELABORATED IN PREVIOUS NSDDS. RECENTLY, AS AN ADJUNCT OF THESE POLICIES, I AUTHORIZED EFFORTS TO RENEW A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA. MY PURPOSES WERE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH A DIALOGUE MIGHT FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR FOUR BASIC GOALS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP AND ALSO TO EXPLORE WHETHER NICARAGUA MIGHT AGREE, OVER TIME, TO A REGIONAL ACCOMMODATION AS CONTAINED IN THE CONTADORA 21 POINTS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THESE EXCHANGES CAN BE OF VALUE. (S)

AS WE MOVE FROM PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, OUR NEGOTIATOR, AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMANN, SHOULD SEEK OVER TIME TO DEVELOP A CALENDAR OF RECIPROCAL STEPS WHICH IF AGREED IN TOTO BY THE CORE FOUR COUNTRIES AND NICARAGUA COULD FORM THE BASIS OF A MULTI-LATERAL TREATY. AS AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMANN WORKS TOWARD THIS END,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

44  
OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 0003 DTG: 281950Z JUL 84 PSN: 059302

HE IS TO BE GUIDED BY CERTAIN PRINCIPLES. (S)

A. GLOBALITY: NO COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO IMPLEMENT ANY STEP IN THE SEQUENCE OF RECIPROCAL STEPS UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND AGREEMENT REACHED ON ALL STEPS. (S)

B. LINKS TO CONTADORA: IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR EFFORTS BE, AND BE SEEN TO BE, DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE CONTADORA PROCESS. SPECIFICALLY, IN ADVANCING POSITIONS WE MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES AND IN PARTICULAR THE CORE FOUR. (S)

C. VERIFICATION: GIVEN THE "UNILATERAL ENFORCING NATURE" OF ANY AGREEMENT FOR US, BUT NOT FOR NICARAGUA, WE MUST ASSURE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WHICH ARE EFFECTIVE AND WHICH THE CORE FOUR COUNTRIES INDICATE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. (S)

D. PROTECTING THE U.S. POSITION IN CENTRAL AMERICA: WE MUST USE THE TALKS TO SAFEGUARD OUR STRATEGIC POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHOULD (1) TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY TO OPERATE, EXERCISE, OR RESPOND TO THE THREATS IN THE REGION FROM OR THROUGH NICARAGUA AND THREATS FROM THE SOVIETS OR CUBA NOT INVOLVING NICARAGUA; (2) KEEP CUBA, SOVIETS, AND THE U.N. OUT OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS; (3) ASSURE THAT INTERIM STAGES ARE TIME-LIMITED TO MAINTAIN OUR FLEXIBILITY AND ARE CONTINGENT UPON SATISFACTORY COMPLIANCE BY NICARAGUA; AND (4) ENSURE THAT THE TALKS ARE LIMITED TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN NO WAY IMPINGE ON U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS WITH, OR PRESENCE IN, PANAMA. (S)

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN IS FURTHER DIRECTED TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO INCREASE THE REAL AND PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT OF THE CORE FOUR COUNTRIES, SUCH AS BY SEEKING TO ESTABLISH REGULAR VISIBLE MEETINGS OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS TOGETHER AT WHICH THE STATUS OF THE TALKS WOULD BE ASSESSED AND NEXT STEPS AGREED. AS A VARIANT, PERHAPS CONTADORA "PERM REPS" COULD BE DESIGNATED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

45  
OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 0003 DTG: 281950Z JUL 84 PSN: 059302

TO MEET ROUTINELY AS A STANDING ADVISORY BODY. THESE ARE ONLY IDEAS. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO ESTABLISH A VISIBLE FUNCTIONING REGIONAL PROCESS OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. (S)

AT THE NEXT MEETING WITH NICARAGUAN REPRESENTATIVES, JULY 31-AUGUST 1, AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN SHOULD PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) RAISE AND SEEK NICARAGUAN COMMENT ON AND AGREEMENT TO THE END-SITUATION OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY IN THE JUNE 25-26 TALKS IN MANZANILLO. (S)

(2) SEEK NICARAGUAN AGREEMENT TO PURSUIT AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF A CALANDAR OF RECIPROCAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CONTADORA NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES THAT WOULD CREATE THE ENVIRONMENT FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS. (S)

(3) DISCUSS THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND DEVELOPMENT OF A CALENDAR OF RECIPROCAL STEPS. DO NOT PROVIDE DETAILS OF SPECIFIC STEPS BEYOND THE DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORIES PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED. DO NOT STATE OR IMPLY THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST STEPS CAN BE BEGUN BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETED ON ALL STEPS. (S)

SIGNED

RONALD REAGAN

0736

~~SECRET~~

✓ 5. 1274

II 90832

North/NSDD on Dialogue with Nicaragua  
7/28 - RCM prepared memo fm Pres to SecState  
SecDef, DirCI, & Chm, JCS  
subject: Next Steps in Central America.  
RR signed memo and memo was transmitted  
from AF One (26000) to Washington for  
delivery to addressees

National Security Council  
The White House

47

System # TT

Package # 90832

84 JUL 30 P 3: 54

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N -</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>put in Sys. IT file and send to North Burghardt</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other for info

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Bob  
 This is OBE but you might want to route to staff for info.  
J



~~SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SYSTEM II  
90832 Response

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

74029

84 JUL 30 P 3: 55

28 JUL 1984

*Bud*

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Suggested Changes to draft NSDD on Dialogue with  
Nicaragua

The attached copy of the draft NSDD on Dialogue with Nicaragua contains my suggested changes. The last two bullets (on page 4) are particularly important, in that they reflect the President's views at the NSC that none of the steps should be implemented unless the whole package is in place. Also, the requirement for prior coordination with the Core Four is responsive to the President's position at the NSC that we ought to make sure the Contadora countries don't think we are bargaining ahead without them.

It would be desirable to have instructions issued soonest on the problem of the Honduran-El Salvador border dispute. As I recommended in my memo to you, we should make a major effort to induce Honduras and Nicaragua quickly to reach an agreement that would permit their military cooperation in the border region. Such an agreement could be to protect the legal case of either side from being affected by their willingness to collaborate militarily. A way of facilitating this important military cooperation would be to have General Gorman instructed to work with the two countries, with the support of our Ambassadors in order to work out such an agreement. Cooperation in this border region could be a major advantage to us in the event of a fall offensive of the insurgents.

*Saps*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR MD9-259/1 #74029  
BY RW NARA DATE 7/19/10

~~SECRET~~

74031

49

THE WHITE HOUSE

SYSTEM II  
90832

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

*National Security  
Decision Directive*

**DRAFT**

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world.  
(S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M259/1 #74031

BY *bw* NARA DATE 7/28/19

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE



AMONG THE NATIONS IN THE REGION SUPPORTIVE OF

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE  
**DRAFT**

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

A COMPLETE AND

Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

● Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America.

The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)

-- Preserving U.S. Flexibility. <sup>OUR</sup> Discussions must not <sup>CONTEMPLATE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD</sup> interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)

-- Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to our negotiating process. (S)

-- Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S) *THE PROPOSALS TO THE CORE FOUR, INTENDED FOR PRESENTATION TO NICARAGUA, WILL BE FIRST COORDINATED WITHIN THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS.*
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each <sup>MIGHT</sup> stage, ~~soliciting their assistance in urging~~ Nicaragua ~~to~~ <sup>BECOMES</sup> more forthcoming, both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)

AND ENCOURAGE A COHESIVE AND EFFECTIVE POSITION BY THE CORE FOUR, TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS THAT

NICARAGUAN VIOLATION OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT OR, PRIOR TO AN AGREEMENT

~~SECRET~~

PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM TO PRODUCE DECISIONS IN THE EVENT OF VIOLATIONS

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

MUST FIND THE VERIFICATION PROVISION

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective, and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans. (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

IN SUCH A PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM MUST BE IMPLEMENTED FIRST.

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

84 JUL 27 P10: 33

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

URGENT

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

URGENT

53

74057

MESSAGE NO. 425 CLASSIFICATION Secret PAGES 4  
 FROM Bob Kimmitt 456 2224 WH / WW  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft NSDD

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B - State</u>	<u>C. Hill</u>		
<u>D - Defense</u>	<u>R.J. Affourtit</u>		
<u>A - CIA</u>	<u>DUANE CLARRIGE</u>		
<u>D - JCS</u>	<u>ART MOREAU</u>		

REMARKS Need Secretarial comments by ~~0900~~ <sup>NOON</sup> Saturday,  
7/28. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLRR m09-259/i # 74057  
 BY RW NARA DATE 1/4/13

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

54033  
SYSTEM II  
90832

~~SECRET~~

National Security  
Decision Directive

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world.  
(S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M259/1 #74033  
BY FW NARA DATE 4/22/01

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

#### Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

- Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America. The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)
  - Preserving U.S. Flexibility. Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)
  - Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process. (S)
  - Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S)
  
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in urging Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need. (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

57

~~SECRET~~

4

SENSITIVE

**DRAFT**

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans. (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

**DRAFT**



National Security Council  
The White House

System # II

Package # 90832

84 JUL 27 P 8: 56

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Action North  
 Cmt Burghardt  
 Info Poindexter (hand carry to  
 John ASAP)

Bob -  
 orig to Rom - to take to Co. He would  
 like this stopped. Done

~~SUPER SENSITIVE~~  
8421411

84 JUL 27 10:53

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
Subject: Talks with Nicaragua

*modified*

Pursuant to today's NSC meeting, I have given Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman the enclosed instructions for the conduct of his July 31-August 1 talks with the Government of Nicaragua.

Attachments: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1993  
By *MSJ* NARA, Date *7/17/05*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM  
~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

TO: S/SE - Harry W. Shlaudeman  
FROM: The Secretary *HWS*  
SUBJECT: Instructions for the July 31-August 1 Bilateral Dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua

You are authorized to hold talks with the representatives of the Government of Nicaragua in Manzanillo, Mexico July 31-August 1.

In these talks you should attempt to focus discussion on substance. Specifically, you should:

- 1) Raise and seek Nicaraguan comment on and agreement to the end-situation objectives described previously by you in the June 25-26 talks in Manzanillo.
- 2) Seek Nicaraguan agreement to ~~pursuit~~ and joint development of a calendar of reciprocal steps to be taken by the Central American and Contadora nations and the United States that would create the environment for a successful outcome of the Contadora process.
- 3) Discuss the methodology behind development of a calendar of reciprocal steps, but you should not provide details of specific steps beyond the description of categories previously provided. You should not state or imply that implementation of first steps can be begun before negotiations are completed on all steps.

With respect to procedure, you may agree to continue, for the foreseeable future, with the procedural arrangements agreed to for the July 31 meeting: a Mexican venue but no third-country participation. You have discretionary authority to work toward a less formal negotiation and may agree to a somewhat expanded unsigned joint minute if the Nicaraguans agree to revert to the note-taking practice of the first two meetings. You should not agree to use of stenotype machines or tape recorders. You should restate the U.S. position on confidentiality.

ARA/CEN: JRHamilton *H* / ARA: LCJohnstone *J*

Cleared: ARA/CEN: NSSmith *#*  
S/SE: HWS Shlaudeman *#*

**DECLASSIFIED**

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

NLRR M2591 # 74036  
BY HWS NARA DATE 4/25/17

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

61  
74038

MEMORANDUM  
SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: S/SE - Harry W. Shlaudeman  
FROM: The Secretary  
SUBJECT: Instructions for the July 31-August 1 Bilateral  
Dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua

You are authorized to hold talks with the representatives of the Government of Nicaragua in Manzanillo, Mexico July 31-August 1.

In these talks you should attempt to focus discussion on substance. Specifically, you should:

- 4
- 1) Raise and seek Nicaraguan comment on and agreement to the end-situation objectives described previously ~~by you~~ in the June 25-26 talks in Manzanillo.
  - 2) Seek Nicaraguan agreement to pursuit and joint development of a calendar of reciprocal steps to be taken by the Central American and Contadora nations and the United States that would create the environment for a successful outcome of the Contadora process.
  - 3) Discuss the methodology behind development of a calendar of reciprocal steps, ~~but you should not~~ provide details of specific steps beyond the description of categories previously provided. ~~You should not~~ state or imply that implementation of first steps can be begun before negotiations are completed on all steps.

Do  
Do  
With respect to procedure, you may agree to continue, for the foreseeable future, with the procedural arrangements agreed to for the July 31 meeting: a Mexican venue but no third-country participation. You have discretionary authority to work toward a less formal negotiation and may agree to a somewhat expanded unsigned joint minute if the Nicaraguans agree to revert to the note-taking practice of the first two meetings. You should not agree to use of stenotype machines or tape recorders. You should restate the U.S. position on confidentiality.

ARA/CEN: JRHamilton/ARA: LCJohnstone

Cleared: ARA/CEN: NSSmith  
S/SE: HWSlaudeman

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M2591 #74038  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/25/17

62  
US - Sov

Sov - Germ (Hitler) entente

Not telling us land in USSR in WWII

~~SECRET~~

-2-

A. Globality: No commitments should be made to implement any step in the sequence of reciprocal steps until negotiations have been completed and agreement reached on all steps. (1)

B. Links to Contadora: All understandings, agreements, etc., reached through bilateral dialogue should be funneled into the Contadora process. Ambassador Shlaudeman should maintain close contact with the Contadora countries, seeking their advice and exerting a constructive influence on the pace and direction of the Contadora talks.

C. Verification: Given the unilateral enforcing nature of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must accord high priority to assuring that for each step we have strong verification provisions.

D. Protecting the U.S. Position in Central America: We must use the talks to safeguard our strategic political and military position in Central America. Specifically, we should (1) take no action which would interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to the threats in the region from or through Nicaragua and threats from the Soviets or Cuba not involving Nicaragua; (2) keep Cuba, Soviets, and the U.N. out of the negotiating process; (3) assure that interim stages are time-limited to maintain our flexibility and are contingent upon satisfactory compliance by Nicaragua; and (4) ensure that the talks are limited to Central America and in no way impinge on U.S. treaty obligations with, or presence in, Panama. (3)

E. Building Domestic and International Support: We should continue to keep the initiative, putting forth serious and realistic proposals, which protect and promote U.S. interests in the region. Our approach should offer positive economic incentives, as well as the removal of anti-Nicaraguan measures.

F. Enhancing the Core Four's Position: We should coordinate carefully with the Core Four countries at each stage of the talks. Fundamental fears must be allayed. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of Core Four countries without their approval

The talks should remain confidential, without third-party mediation. Secretary Shultz will provide continuing guidance to Ambassador Shlaudeman, as needed. Ambassador Shlaudeman should report periodically to me through the Secretary of State.

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

74040

July 26, 1984

84 JUL 26 10:59

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOMSECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg - 8421323  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs  
Office of the Vice President

Colonel R. J. Affourtit - 8421324  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel - 8421325  
Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack - 8421326  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

Ambassador Harvey Feldman - 8421327  
Washington Representative for U.S.  
Ambassador to the United Nations

Brig. General George A. Joulwan-8421328  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt - 8421329  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Negotiations with Nicaragua

Attached is a paper developed ad referendum by the Security Policy Working Group as a basis for discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council on July 27, 1984.

*B. Kimmitt*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

Attachement:  
Dialogue with Nicaragua

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M2591 #74040  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/25/17

65

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Central America Security Policy Group  
Working Paper for July 27 NSC Meeting

Subject: Dialogue with Nicaragua

The President's foreign policy is characterized by strength, realism and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve U.S. national objectives. We have not shrunk, when necessary, from challenging and testing the intentions of our adversaries. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world.

IN  
P.1

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have used the instruments of pressure to achieve our objectives. Realism -- We have recognized the problems, the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to see if a peaceful solution could be found.

IN  
w/ NSC  
P.1

These three elements of our Nicaraguan policy are inter-related. Pressure is necessary to achieve results in dialogue. Dialogue is necessary to demonstrate the need for pressure. Realism must guide both pressure and dialogue. We must know what we want as well as what we can achieve.

In this sense the dialogue element of our Nicaraguan policy has been critical. It provides a peaceful alternative to the Nicaraguans should they realize that they have created a regime-threatening dilemma for themselves. By demonstrating publicly our flexibility, it has effectively reduced domestic and international pressure on us to go softer on Nicaragua. Thus the negotiations process has become an essential component of our pressure tactics. Over three years we have built a consistent record of periodic attempts at dialogue that demonstrates our good faith and willingness to deal -- provided Nicaragua is also ready to do so.

OUT

The latest U.S. initiative beginning with Secretary Shultz' June 1 meeting in Managua is an extension of this process. The new effort at dialogue, led by Ambassador Shlaudeman, is designed again to test Nicaraguan intentions, put some guts into the

IN  
w/  
NSC  
P.2

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M75911 #74040a  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/25/17



Contadora process, and publicly demonstrate U.S. willingness to seek a peaceful solution to the Central American conflict, supportive of the principles of the Contadora "21 points."

IN W/  
MOD.

U.S. Objectives

MAIN  
THING  
LEFT  
OUT

Our objectives have remained consistent. In both the Secretary's meetings and in the Shlaudeman-Tinoco talks, we have proposed a process of reciprocal steps designed to achieve a situation in Central America that would:

IN  
W/  
MOD.

- 1) remove Cuban/Soviet Bloc military/security personnel from Nicaragua;
- 2) end external support for insurgencies;
- 3) limit the size of Central American military forces and restrict armaments; and
- 4) provide for free and fair democratic elections.

Aside from the U.S. proposals, the talks so far have focused almost exclusively on procedural issues. With those essentially resolved, the talks will turn to more substantive issues. The following guidelines will set the parameters for the U.S. position in future.

OUT

U.S. Negotiating Principles

In conducting these talks the U.S. side has been, and should continue to be, guided by the following principles:

A. Overall Approach: The principles of "comprehensiveness", "preservation of U.S. security interests", "strengthening Contadora" and "adequate verification" are key:

(1) Comprehensiveness. Any acceptable agreement must meet all of our essential concerns. In proceeding on the step-by-step approach, Ambassador Shlaudeman will preserve balance, comprehensiveness and simultaneity by ensuring that each of the four phases implements elements from each of the four basic U.S. objectives.

IN  
P. 4

(2) Balance. It is essential to the horizontal, step-by-step approach that we have a clear balance at each step -- so that results achieved at any point (even with a breakdown in dialogue) will serve our net interests.

OUT

(3) Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must accord high priority to assuring, at each step, that we have strong verification provisions.

IW  
P. 4

B. Safeguarding U.S. Position in Central America: We must use the talks to protect our strategic political and military position in Central America.

(1) Preserving U.S. Flexibility: Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviets or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region reflects protection of vital U.S. national interests, critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence is disruptive, requiring U.S. efforts to reduce and eliminate it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which should in no circumstances be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area.

IW  
P. 2

(2) Keeping Cuba out of the Negotiations Process: It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process.

IW  
P. 2



(3) Interim Measures: In discussing reciprocal steps it is important that any interim stage be specifically time-limited to prevent it from becoming an agreement in its own right. Moreover, each phase must be contingent upon satisfactory compliance by Nicaragua with its obligations.

OUT

(4) Preserving our Role in Panama: The talks will be strictly confined to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama.

IW  
P. 2

C. Building Domestic and International Support: We should use these talks to build support for our policies in Central America by demonstrating both strength and flexibility. The Secretary of State's visit to Managua and these talks enable us to take the high ground critical to the Administration on the "reasonableness" issue -- thus countering criticism of the

OUT

President as warlike, while also helping to build greater European and Latin American understanding and support for our defense against Soviet/Cuban expansionism.

OUT

D. Building a Record: Whatever the outcome of the talks, a key principle should be to build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the United States is serious, realistic and balanced in its approach and substantive proposals. Ambassador Shlaudeman should make it clear to the Nicaraguans that the United States would be prepared to take specific reciprocal action if the Nicaraguans take concrete and verified steps to meet our four basic concerns. Our approach contemplates positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative incentives. This will improve chances of success and strengthen and support our later ability to act if the talks fail. The talks must in no way inhibit U.S. ability to act in the event of need, e.g. the introduction of MiG aircraft, or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests.

OUT

In  
w/  
NAVO  
MOO.  
P.3

E. Strengthening our Friends in Central America: Enhancing the Core Four's position, and our relationships with them, is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. We want to strengthen the democratic structures and the economies of our friends in Central America. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be carefully coordinated with the Core Four, to meet their legitimate interests and assist their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("The Acta"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to advance in bilateral dialogue verification schemes agreed with the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. Ambassador Shlaudeman will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and taken into account. The U.S. will not make or imply commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their approval.

In.  
P.3

F. Supporting Contadora Framework: The linkage to the Contadora process is valuable to us and noxious to the Nicaraguans. Despite its deficiencies from our point of view, the Nicaraguans find significant parts of the Contadora "Acta" to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that Ambassador Shlaudeman brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in pressuring Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. This puts us in a position to influence the pace of events within Contadora. The

In  
P.3

objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal bilateral agreements.

G. Style of Approach: Several procedural and "style" aspects are important to achieving our objectives in the talks. These include (1) confidentiality and minimal public discussion, to demonstrate that we are serious, and to enhance our ability to explore sensitive issues -- emphasizing confidentiality also makes it possible to turn any Nicaraguan public disclosures to our advantage; (2) direct talks, without third party participation, to avoid posturing or being trapped into mediation situation. Ambassador Shlaudeman should reject all efforts by the Nicaraguans or by others to interject third parties into the bilateral dialogue; (3) restricted size of delegation, and those involved in decision process, to minimize grandstanding and leaks; (4) systematic Core Four/Contadora consultations are critical to achieving our objectives as the issues evolve, to avoiding suspicions and, should talks fail, to assuring that our position is widely understood and accepted; (5) care of written commitments, in recognition of the importance of preserving full U.S. flexibility on security issues, we should avoid "treaty-like situations," exercising care with written submissions so as to preserve U.S. flexibility to continue to act in accord with our interests.

OUT

~~SECRET~~

74042

SYSTEM II  
90832

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on  
Dialogue with Nicaragua (NSDD- ) (S)

The President has formally approved the National Security Decision Directive on Dialogue with Nicaragua, discussed at the National Security Council meeting held on July 27, 1984. Because of the sensitivity of the document, we will hand-deliver one copy. We request that you make no copies and limit knowledge of this document to the absolute minimum number of people due to the extreme sensitivity of the NSDD. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment  
NSDD-

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR mas9/1 #41042  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II

90832

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security  
Decision Directive

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world. (S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR/MS/11 #74062a  
BY AN NARA DATE 4/22/19

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

- Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America. The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)
  - Preserving U.S. Flexibility. Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)
  - Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process. (S)
  - Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S)
  
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in urging Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)



~~SECRET~~

74

~~SECRET~~

4

SENSITIVE

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans. (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

75  
SYSTEM II  
90832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security  
Decision Directive

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world.  
(S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have used the instruments of pressure to achieve our objectives. Realism -- We have recognized the problems, the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to see if a peaceful solution could be found. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our broader policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M25911 #74D426

BY RW NARA DATE 4/22/19

30.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

76

SYSTEM II  
90832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OBE

SENSITIVE

SECRET

National Security  
Decision Directive

Dialogue with Nicaragua

The foreign policy of the United States is characterized by strength, realism, and dialogue, providing the military and diplomatic capacity and the flexibility to advance our interests and achieve our national objectives. These principles are central to our global policy, applying to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union and to other parts of the world.  
(S)

These same elements have guided our policy toward Nicaragua. Strength -- We have provided assistance to friendly governments to help them resist Nicaraguan threats and aggression. Realism -- We have recognized the problems and the risks posed to U.S. security interests, and faced up to them. Dialogue -- We have at all stages been willing to sit down and discuss with our adversaries their concerns and ours to achieve a peaceful solution. The continuing dialogue with Nicaragua must also support our policy objectives in Latin America:

- to support democracy;
- improve living conditions; and
- help friendly governments defend themselves against Soviet Bloc/Cuban subversion and aggression. (S)

U.S. Objectives

Meetings between the President's Special Envoy for Central America and representatives of the Government of Nicaragua will be conducted for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a verifiable comprehensive regional settlement which meets all twenty-one Contadora objectives. The dialogue must also be designed to achieve our requirements for normal relations with Nicaragua as stated in NSDD-124:

- genuine implementation of democracy;
- verified end to export of subversion;
- verified removal of Soviet Bloc/Cuban personnel; and
- verified reduction of Nicaragua military forces to regional parity. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M059/1 #74042c  
BY RW NARA DATE 4/20/19

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

These negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government representatives should be oriented toward obtaining early agreement on our ultimate goals in Central America, as outlined in the twenty-one Contadora objectives. In the course of the meetings, the Special Envoy should explain the benefits which would be available to Nicaragua, if Nicaragua would reach agreement with the other countries of Central America on verifiable implementation of the Contadora twenty-one points. (S)

### Principles Guiding the U.S. Approach

In conducting these talks, the U.S. side must be guided by certain inviolable principles. These principles will be applied throughout the process and govern all discussions with the Core Four and the Nicaraguans: (S)

- Safeguarding U.S. Security Interests in Central America.  
The talks must protect our strategic political and military position in Central America. (S)
  - Preserving U.S. Flexibility. Discussions must not interfere with the ability of the U.S. military to operate, exercise, or respond to threats in the region. Hence, the conduct of the talks and the nature of the U.S. commitments will always be defined in a way that gives the U.S. flexibility to meet regional security commitments and threats from or through Nicaragua, as well as threats from the Soviet bloc or Cuba not involving Nicaragua. U.S. military presence in the region is to the purpose of protecting vital U.S. interests, e.g. critical lines of communication and the Panama Canal. Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence threaten these interests and warrant U.S. efforts to reduce and contain it at every stage. Hence, negotiations should not interfere with our traditional strength and presence in the area, which, in no circumstances are to be equated with Cuban/Soviet Bloc presence in the area. (S)
  - Keeping Cuba, the Soviets, and Others Outside the Region Out of the Negotiation Process. It would be contrary to U.S. interest to allow the institutionalization of a Cuban, Soviet, or UN role in Central America by admitting them to the negotiating process. (S)
  - Preserving our Role in Panama. The talks will be strictly confined in scope to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. They will not involve in any way the U.S. presence or treaty commitments in Panama. (S)

**DRAFT**

- Strengthening our Friends in Central America. Enhancing the Core Four's position and our relationships with them is also essential to an outcome in Central America that serves U.S. long-term interests. The U.S. dialogue with Nicaragua must be fully coordinated with the Core Four to meet their legitimate interests and to foster their negotiations on the Contadora Final Act ("Treaty"). For example, such coordination could enable the U.S. to propose in bilateral dialogue, verification schemes agreed to by the Core Four, thus facilitating later agreement in Contadora. The Special Envoy will consult Core Four countries between each session with the Nicaraguans and before each session at which the U.S. side intends to put forward new proposals. Core Four views will be solicited and the U.S. will not make any proposals that have not been previously agreed upon by them. The U.S. will not make or imply any commitments on the part of the Core Four countries without their prior and explicit approval. (S)
  
- Supporting the Contadora Framework. The linkage to the Contadora objectives and process is valuable to us and essential to our friends. The Nicaraguans find parts of the current draft Contadora treaty to be unacceptable. Maintaining the links between the bilateral dialogue and Contadora will require that the Special Presidential Envoy brief and debrief the four Contadora countries at each stage, soliciting their assistance in urging Nicaragua to be more forthcoming both procedurally and substantively. The objective of the talks, in sum, is to strengthen Contadora, not to achieve formal or informal bilateral agreements. In so doing, the U.S.: (S)
  - Must build a record of having put forward a negotiating position that demonstrates that the U.S. is serious and realistic in its approach and substantive proposals. (S)
  
  - May propose positive, economic incentives as well as the removal of negative sanctions in order to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty. (S)
  
  - Is in no way inhibited in its ability to act in the event of need, (e.g., the introduction of advanced aircraft into Nicaragua) or to speak out clearly on Nicaraguan political issues. We will preserve full freedom to act consistent with our interests. (S)

**DRAFT**

④ ②

- Verification. Given the "unilateral enforcing nature" of any agreement for us, but not for Nicaragua, we must assure verification provisions which are effective and which the Core Four countries indicate are completely acceptable to them. ~~The verification issue should be our lead item of discussion with the Nicaraguans.~~ (S)
- Comprehensiveness. To be acceptable, any agreement must include all four of our requirements for Nicaragua and must include all 21 Contadora objectives. There will be no partial implementation of any kind until a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora treaty has been signed. (S)
- Implementation. Implementation of the accord will not commence until the five countries of Central America have signed it. Implementation can be effected in a phased, step-by-step manner if all parties so agree. Such a step-by-step implementation process should be discussed with the Core Four, Contadora countries and Nicaragua to further the process of negotiating a comprehensive agreement. (S)

RECEIVED 04 AUG 84 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 04 AUG 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*msd  
7/17/84*

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W

SUBJECT: THIRD ROUND TALKS W/ NICARAGUA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MENGES

NORTH

BURGHARDT

COMMENTS

REF# 8422010

LOG

NSCIFID

( K / *B* )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mohrline</i>	<i>1</i> AUG 07 1984	<i>Pres for decision</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	AUG 08 1984	<i>decision</i>		
	AUG 10 1984	<i>Pres approved</i>		<i>MA</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90861

74044

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: State Department Report on US Talks with Nicaragua  
in Mexico on July 31-August 1, 1984

Issue

Report from Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam on the third round of talks with Nicaragua (Tab A).

Facts

On July 27, 1984 the NSPG met for the third time (others were June 25 and June 29) to provide you with differing viewpoints on the US discussions with Nicaragua. The following day you issued your second written instruction on US negotiations with Nicaragua (Decision Directive issued from Air Force One on July 28, 1984).

The report from Acting Secretary Dam notes that the meeting of July 31-August 1 moved beyond procedure into substantive exchanges which "put all our issues on the table".

Discussion

The Department of State notes that the Nicaraguan negotiator said any agreement between the two sides must be subject to "mechanisms of verification and inspection that ensure full compliance by the parties".

The Department of State notes that Ambassador Shlaudeman stressed that democratization based on free elections is an essential part of any agreement, and that no actions would be taken until a comprehensive agreement was reached.

Ambassador Shlaudeman will brief the Central American countries from August 6 to August 8 on the recent talks; and, the next meeting with Nicaragua is tentatively scheduled from August 15-16.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 2591 # 74044  
BY AW NARA DATE 4/22/11

~~SECRET~~



82

~~SECRET~~

2

SECRET

Recommendation

That you read the Department of State report on negotiations (Tab A) and the report on "Lessons From the Korean Armistice and Indochina Peace Accords" (Tab B).

OK

No

all

\_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A      State Department memorandum to you dated August 4, 1984

Prepared by:  
Constantine C. Menges

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2.0

TAB A

DECLASSIFIED

S/S 8422010  
System II  
90861

NLRR M2591 # 74053  
BY DW NARA DATE 4/25/17

74053  
23

84 AUG 4 11:30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Acting Secretary - Kenneth W. Dam *KWD*  
Subject: Third Round of Talks with Nicaragua

Ambassador Shlaudeman held the third round of talks with the Nicaraguans July 31 - August 1 in Manzanillo, Mexico.

This meeting moved past procedure and into substantive exchanges. It put all our issues on the table.

The agreement on procedures essentially confirmed the tentative arrangements worked out in Atlanta, but the Nicaraguans agreed to Ambassador Shlaudeman's suggestion that interpreters and stenographers not be used in exchange for a joint minute that briefly summarizes the meeting, any points of coincidence and points of disagreement.

There were several interesting developments in this round. Reading a long proposal on agenda, Tinoco said that the agreement the two sides might reach must be subject to "mechanisms of verification and inspection that ensure full compliance by the parties." He also stated that such an agreement will clear the way for a successful outcome to the Contadora process. Tinoco agreed to the inclusion of these two statements in the joint minute. That is a helpful step in light of our guidelines on verification and on links to Contadora.

It is also worth noting that, although Tinoco maintained that Nicaragua's internal political arrangements could not be a subject for discussion, he proposed that "U.S. interference" in Nicaragua's internal affairs should be on the agenda. That ensured a full exchange on democratization in which Ambassador Shlaudeman pressed the argument that there is no way to reach a settlement in the absence of national reconciliation in Nicaragua and that democratization based in free elections open to all elements is essential to such a reconciliation.

~~SECRET~~

85  
24

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Tinoco's proposal puts all our security concerns on the table. It implicitly links support for the anti-Sandinista armed opposition with Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and relates the U.S. military presence in the region to foreign military/security advisers and negotiation of "a reasonable balance of forces" with Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

The proposal calls for dealing with security issues first. But Tinoco did not directly dispute Ambassador Shlaudeman's repeated insistence that there could be no partial agreement, that no actions would be taken until a comprehensive agreement was reached. Ambassador Shlaudeman stressed this principle of globality, as well as links to Contadora and verification through the two days of talks.

On methodology, Tinoco was not prepared to discuss the concept of jointly developing a calendar of reciprocal actions, limiting himself to one or two questions of clarification. Discussion of final objectives was extensive but inconclusive. Much remains to be done in terms of defining those objectives. That will give us a good opportunity to press the Nicaraguans on matters now at issue within the Contadora process, such as the extent and nature of the verification mechanisms to be established and the real meaning of Nicaragua's commitment to democratization as a signatory of the Contadora Document of Objectives.

A next meeting was scheduled tentatively for August 15-16, barring conflict with a possible meeting of the Contadora Technical Commission. Ambassador Shlaudeman is visiting the Core Four countries beginning Monday to brief them on the talks.

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

*wml* 86

System # I

Package # 90861

RECEIVED

128<sup>x</sup>

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>PI2:54</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>as modified</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt		<u>B</u>	<u>RR initiated 'ok'</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		
Situation Room	<u>5</u>	<u>WNC</u>	<u>DACOM to Bud</u>
<u>Nosie / Jennie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>Done</u>	<u>Correction</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

I would not recommend sending Tab B in connection with this report.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By MSH NARA, Date 7/22/05

~~SECRET~~

ACTIONS TAKEN ON 8/9 (3)

DACOMS TO CALIFORNIA

<u>Dacom No</u>	<u>Page No</u>	<u>Sys No</u>	<u>Action Off</u>	<u>Subject</u>
-----------------	----------------	---------------	-------------------	----------------

(PAPERS BACK FROM RR ON 8/9)

285/236	1287	90861	Menges	State Dept Rpt on US Talks w/Nicaragua in Mexico on July 31-Aug 3, 1984 - RCM signed memo to President on 8/8. Will dacom to Ranch. - <u>9/8 (back fm Ranch) RR</u> <u>initialed under "OK"</u>
---------	------	-------	--------	---

~~SECRET~~

74055

88

SYSTEM II  
90861

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

SUBJECT: State Department Report on US Talks with Nicaragua  
in Mexico on July 31-August 1, 1984

Issue

Report from Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam on the third round of talks with Nicaragua (Tab A).

Facts

On July 27, 1984 the NSPG met for the third time (others were June 25 and June 29) to provide you with differing viewpoints on the US discussions with Nicaragua. The following day you issued your second written instruction on US negotiations with Nicaragua (Decision Directive issued from Air Force One on July 28, 1984).

The report from Acting Secretary Dam notes that the meeting of July 31-August 1 moved beyond procedure into substantive exchanges which "put all our issues on the table".

Discussion

The Department of State notes that the Nicaraguan negotiator said any agreement between the two sides must be subject to "mechanisms of verification and inspection that ensure full compliance by the parties".

The Department of State notes that Ambassador Shlaudeman stressed that democratization based on free elections is an essential part of any agreement, and that no actions would be taken until a comprehensive agreement was reached.

Ambassador Shlaudeman will brief the Central American countries from August 6 to August 8 on the recent talks; and, the next meeting with Nicaragua is tentatively scheduled from August 15-16.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M259/1 #74055  
BY fw NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~

89

~~SECRET~~

Recommendation

That you read the Department of State report on negotiations (Tab A) and the report on "Lessons From the Korean Armistice and Indochina Peace Accords" (Tab B).

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A State Department memorandum to you dated August 4, 1984

Prepared by:  
Constantine C. Menges

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



90

A

84 AUG 4 11:30

74051

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Acting Secretary - Kenneth W. Dam *KWD*  
Subject: Third Round of Talks with Nicaragua

Ambassador Shlaudeman held the third round of talks with the Nicaraguans July 31 - August 1 in Manzanillo, Mexico.

This meeting moved past procedure and into substantive exchanges. It put all our issues on the table.

The agreement on procedures essentially confirmed the tentative arrangements worked out in Atlanta, but the Nicaraguans agreed to Ambassador Shlaudeman's suggestion that interpreters and stenographers not be used in exchange for a joint minute that briefly summarizes the meeting, any points of coincidence and points of disagreement.

There were several interesting developments in this round. Reading a long proposal on agenda, Tinoco said that the agreement the two sides might reach must be subject to "mechanisms of verification and inspection that ensure full compliance by the parties." He also stated that such an agreement will clear the way for a successful outcome to the Contadora process. Tinoco agreed to the inclusion of these two statements in the joint minute. That is a helpful step in light of our guidelines on verification and on links to Contadora.

It is also worth noting that, although Tinoco maintained that Nicaragua's internal political arrangements could not be a subject for discussion, he proposed that "U.S. interference" in Nicaragua's internal affairs should be on the agenda. That ensured a full exchange on democratization in which Ambassador Shlaudeman pressed the argument that there is no way to reach a settlement in the absence of national reconciliation in Nicaragua and that democratization based in free elections open to all elements is essential to such a reconciliation.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
BY *fw* NLRR M259/1 #74051  
NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~

31

- 2 -

Tinoco's proposal puts all our security concerns on the table. It implicitly links support for the anti-Sandinista armed opposition with Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and relates the U.S. military presence in the region to foreign military/security advisers and negotiation of "a reasonable balance of forces" with Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

The proposal calls for dealing with security issues first. But Tinoco did not directly dispute Ambassador Shlaudeman's repeated insistence that there could be no partial agreement, that no actions would be taken until a comprehensive agreement was reached. Ambassador Shlaudeman stressed this principle of globality, as well as links to Contadora and verification through the two days of talks.

On methodology, Tinoco was not prepared to discuss the concept of jointly developing a calendar of reciprocal actions, limiting himself to one or two questions of clarification. Discussion of final objectives was extensive but inconclusive. Much remains to be done in terms of defining those objectives. That will give us a good opportunity to press the Nicaraguans on matters now at issue within the Contadora process, such as the extent and nature of the verification mechanisms to be established and the real meaning of Nicaragua's commitment to democratization as a signatory of the Contadora Document of Objectives.

A next meeting was scheduled tentatively for August 15-16, barring conflict with a possible meeting of the Contadora Technical Commission. Ambassador Shlaudeman is visiting the Core Four countries beginning Monday to brief them on the talks.

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

92

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 285

RELEASER

PRIORITY

NON-SECURE FAX #

DTG

ROUTINE

TTY #

8

072354Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO # 2361

2.

3.

4. TOT: 080015Z AUG 84 MLM (initials)

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

84 AUG 7 P 8: 32

SITUATION ROOM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MAN 7/17/03

~~Secret~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

74056

SYSTEM II  
90861

93

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *ccm*

SUBJECT: State Department Report on US Talks with Nicaragua  
in Mexico on July 31-August 3, 1984

Your memorandum to the President forwards the Department of State report on the most recent round of discussions with Nicaragua and places this in context with the most recent NSPG meeting and decisions on this subject.

Since the Nicaraguans have agreed with us that verification to assure mutual compliance is a major part of any agreement, you also provide the President with a very brief synthesis of lessons to be learned from massive and pre-planned communist violations of all four major agreements involving Korea and Indochina since 1953 (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward your memorandum to the President (Tab I).

Ollie North concurs; Ray Burghardt is on travel.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Your memorandum to the President
- Tab A State Department memorandum to the President dated August 4, 1984
- Tab B Analysis of "Lessons From the Korean Armistice and Indochina Peace Accords"

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M259/1 #74056

BY *pw* NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~

94

B

## LESSONS FROM THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AND INDOCHINA PEACE ACCORDS

Stephen T. Hosmer  
The Rand Corporation

95

The U.S. experience with war termination agreements in Korea and Indochina provides some cautionary lessons on negotiating such agreements with communist belligerents in the Third World. The communist signatories have consistently and massively violated the 1953 Korean Armistice, the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, and the 1975 Paris Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

### MASSIVE AND PREPLANNED COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS

Despite the supervisory and control mechanisms designed to deter breaches of these agreements, the communist signatories were able to circumvent key provisions of all the agreements with relative ease and at little political cost. They began the most massive and militarily significant violations immediately after the agreements went into effect, suggesting that they were planning the infringements even as they were negotiating. For example:

- They started to violate subparagraph 13d of the Korean Armistice, which prohibited the introduction of war materiel into Korea except on a "piece-for-piece" replacement basis, within days of the truce signing, when communist MIGs began a major staging from Manchuria onto hastily reconstructed airfields throughout North Korea.
- North Vietnam made only the barest pretense of complying with Article 2 of the 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which required the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos "in the shortest time possible." Of the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 NVA forces in Laos in 1962, only 40 left the country through International Control Commission checkpoints.
- North Vietnam reneged immediately on its obligations under the 1973 Paris Accords to cease firing in South Vietnam, withdraw its forces from Cambodia and Laos, and refrain from introducing additional troops and war materiel into South Vietnam except on a one-for-one replacement basis. North Vietnam never observed the cease-fire and troop withdrawal requirements, and within little more than two months after it had signed the peace agreements, it had already infiltrated some 30,000 additional troops and over 30,000 tons of military equipment into South Vietnam.

96

## THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE OR DOCUMENT VIOLATIONS

While omissions, ambiguities, and other weaknesses in treaty language sometimes facilitated communist evasions, they were not the major cause. Rather, the failure to officially monitor, investigate, and document violations as massive as those cited above was directly attributable to

1. The representation of East European states on the supervisory bodies and
2. The systematic obstructionism of the local communist signatories.

East European states were represented on all the so-called neutral nation and international supervisory commissions charged with facilitating and overseeing the execution of the Korean and Indochina war termination agreements. Because of the voting rules and/or numerical balance of the commissions, the East European states had a veto over nearly all important matters involving the commissions. And since the East Europeans acted as agents for their Asian communist clients, they invariably vetoed or otherwise attempted to obstruct any investigation, ruling, or other supervisory and control activity that might militarily hinder or politically embarrass their clients. At the same time, the East Europeans proved zealous in opposing any commission actions that might ease constraints on noncommunist forces and in urging the investigation of all possible violations by the noncommunist signatories.

Massive and systematic violations also went unmonitored, uninvestigated, and undocumented by the supervisory bodies because of the noncooperation and active obstructionism of the local communist signatories. Among the stratagems and evasions employed to thwart investigations and monitoring were the Asian communists' *refusal* to:

- Use the checkpoints designated in the agreements for controlling and monitoring the introduction of arms or withdrawal of forces.
- Allow supervisory teams access to communist-controlled checkpoints or military bases. North Korea, for example, never permitted Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission teams to monitor the ports of entry designated for all replacement arms transfers to North Korea.
- Provide the local transport or liaison officers necessary for supervisory team inspections in communist-controlled areas.
- Guarantee the safety of supervisory teams in communist-held areas. International Commission of Control and Supervision teams were forced to withdraw from several monitoring sites in



South Vietnam in 1973 because their aircraft or team members were fired on from communist-controlled areas.

Numerous other dodges and delaying tactics could be cited, but it should suffice to say that the Asian communist signatories were capable of impeding or blocking any supervisory or control activity that required their active or passive cooperation.

## THE FAILURE TO DETER VIOLATIONS

Except where the agreements were to the communists' advantage or unimportant to the achievement of their long-term objectives, they complied only with those provisions of the agreements that the United States and its allies appeared *willing* to enforce and *capable* of enforcing on the battlefield. For example, while the North Koreans and the Chinese communists knew that a resumption of attacks across the Demilitarized Zone would invite a devastating (and probably nuclear) U.S. military response, they also realized that the United States and the other United Nations cobelligerents were unlikely to abrogate the Korean Armistice or resume hostilities simply to enforce the provisions constraining arms shipments to North Korea.

Similarly, once the North Vietnamese found that the United States would not mount a military response to their initial breaches of the 1973 Paris Accords, massive communist violations were inevitable. In short, the United States was unrealistic to assume that it could obtain terms from the peace table that it was unable or unwilling to enforce on the battlefield.

## OFFENSIVES AS A PRELUDE TO AGREEMENT

Prior to the conclusion of the Korean Armistice and the various Indochina agreements, communist forces launched major attacks in an attempt both to strengthen their bargaining leverage in the negotiations and to improve their comparative battlefield position for a later resumption of the struggle. Thus, we saw communist forces suffer 135,000 casualties in a series of offensives during the weeks immediately preceding the July 1953 Korean truce; the Vietminh overrun Dien Bien Phu during the 1954 Geneva conference; the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese rout the rightist Lao forces at Nam Tha in early 1962 during the final phases of the Geneva conference on Laos; and the North Vietnamese invade and launch a country-wide offensive against South Vietnam in spring and summer 1972. The Vietnamese communists also mounted a series of land grabbing attacks throughout South Vietnam both before and after the 1973 cease-fire was scheduled to take effect.

In the event that the United States again participates in negotiating a war termination agreement with communist belligerents in the Third World, decisionmakers must remember that

- 1 If the agreement is to succeed, the United States or its allies must have (or be perceived to have) the capability and will to enforce the agreement on the battlefield.
- 2 Even in the absence of East European or other communist states on the supervisory body, the local communist authorities will be capable of frustrating any enforcement activities that require their active or passive cooperation.

98

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90861

74049

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: State Department Report on US Talks with Nicaragua in Mexico on July 31-August 1, 1984

Issue

Report from Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam on the third round of talks with Nicaragua (Tab A).

Facts

On July 27, 1984 the NSPG met for the third time (others were June 25 and June 29) to provide you with differing viewpoints on the US discussions with Nicaragua. The following day you issued your second written instruction on US negotiations with Nicaragua (Decision Directive issued from Air Force One on July 28, 1984).

The report from Acting Secretary Dam notes that the meeting of July 31-August 1 moved beyond procedure into substantive exchanges which "put all our issues on the table".

Discussion

The Department of State notes that the Nicaraguan negotiator said any agreement between the two sides must be subject to "mechanisms of verification and inspection that ensure full compliance by the parties". ~~In that connection, I am attaching at Tab B an analysis prepared by an independent scholar under the auspices of the Department of Defense which distills the lessons from the massive and preplanned communist violations of all four negotiated agreements involving Korea and Indochina since 1953.~~

The Department of State notes that Ambassador Shlaudeman stressed that democratization based on free elections is an essential part of any agreement, and that no actions would be taken until a comprehensive agreement was ~~rescheduled~~.

Ambassador Shlaudeman will brief the Central American countries from August 6 to August 8 on the recent talks; and, the next meeting with Nicaragua is tentatively scheduled from August 15-16.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M259/1 #74049

~~SECRET~~

BY PN NARA DATE 4/22/19

*The President is under no illusions about the Communist violations.*

99

~~SECRET~~

100

~~SECRET~~

Recommendation

That you read the Department of State report on negotiations (Tab A) and the report on "Lessons From the Korean Armistice and Indochina Peace Accords" (Tab B).

OK

No

Attachments:

- Tab A State Department memorandum to you dated August 4, 1984
- ~~Tab B Analysis of "Lessons From the Korean Armistice and Indochina Peace Accords"~~

Prepared by:  
Constantine C. Menges

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~