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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/8/2008

File Folder FRANCE (10/16/84-12/19/84)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

72

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48604	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH GALBRAITH R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	10/19/1984	B1
48605	CABLE	131921Z NOV 84 R 5/28/2010 NLRRM07-081	5	11/13/1984	B1
48606	MEMO	RE POLITICAL PROFILE	5	11/19/1984	B1
48607	MEMO	SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE NEW FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	12/10/1984	B1
48608	CABLE	081328Z DEC 84 PAR 5/26/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/8/1984	B1
48609	MEMO	RINGDAHL TO MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST ITEM PAR 5/7/2011 M081/1	2	12/11/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8407838

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

amp 1/8/08

RECEIVED 18 OCT 84 15

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 19 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

GALBRAITH, V

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER MTG W/ GALBRAITH 19 OCT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	OCT 19 1984	<i>Pointexter noted</i>		<i>co</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(A)

National Security Council
The White House

lml 2

System # I
Package # 7838
1404

84 OCT 18 P 2: 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

= Information
 = Action
 = Retain
 = Dispatch
 = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

For Oct 19 mtg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7838

3

48604

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

October 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

NOTED

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Galbraith -- October 19, 1984

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Van Galbraith tomorrow at 10:30 a.m., to discuss an apparently sensitive topic. The request for the meeting was handled directly with your office on instructions of the DAS at State not to go through the NSC staff -- though I don't know if this is Van's directive or not. The subject of the meeting is "the same thing he will be talking to Ikle about." Frankly, I am not sure what that is, but Ikle will call you this afternoon to give you a "heads up" on the nature of the discussions.

There are no pressing issues, outside the economic realm, between us and Paris at the present time so I have not prepared contingency talking points. Given the nature of the request, I presume Van will want to meet with you alone.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO7-081 #98604

BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

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Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

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4
ID 8408026

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 26 OCT 84 16

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SOMMER *smf 11/8/05*

DOCDATE 26 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MARESCA, JACK

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR MARESCA W/ POINDEXTER DURING 30 - 31 OCT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

MATLOCK

COBB

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C *OCT 30 1984* *Poindexter approved*

PS!

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *27*

National Security Council
The White House

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System #

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Package #

8026

84 OCT 26 A 8:48

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Situation Room			
Florence	2A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	I

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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8026

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION

October 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment

Jack Maresca, DCM at our Embassy in Paris, will be in town next week and has asked to meet with you Tuesday, October 30, or Wednesday October 31. He wishes to discuss your upcoming visit to Paris to include terrorism, as well as the "other special topic." Ty is away at a conference, and I am not aware of the other topic.

Schedule meeting with Maresca _____ *f*.

Regret _____.

cc: Jack Matlock
Ty Cobb
Ollie North

If necessary. I just had lunch with him today. 10/29

Handled by Secum telephone call 10/30

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By *SMK* NARA, Date *1/8/08*

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Declassify on: OADR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1212
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * PARIS 43138

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: MIN 11/13/84
APPRV: MIN:JJMARESCA
DRFTD: MIN:JJMARESCA:CG
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MIN-2 AMB ORA
MNE POL-2 7

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FR
SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH CHEYSSON

EXDIS

48605

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A LENGTHY TOUR D'HORIZON OVER LUNCH WITH A SMALL GROUP OF ALLIED DCMS, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON TOUCHED ON THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ, LIBYA/CHAD, MOROCCO, AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING. CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FRANKLY AND ESPECIALLY REQUESTED THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC REFERENCE TO HIS STATEMENTS. HIS COMMENTS ARE TIMELY IN VIEW OF HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 19-20. THE PRINCIPAL NEW ITEM WAS CHEYSSON'S STATEMENT THAT, WHILE IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT QADHAFI VISIT FRANCE, IT WAS NONETHELESS NECESSARY THAT MITTERRAND MEET WITH QADHAFI. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT FANFARE IN A THIRD COUNTRY AND COULD OCCUR VERY SOON. END SUMMARY.

3. MIDDLE EAST. CHEYSSON WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ADVANCING TOWARD AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. AS HE SAW IT, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS TOO WEAK AND DIVIDED TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVES, AND SYRIA HAD NO INTEREST IN SEEING THE SITUATION EVOLVE. THE ONE EXCEPTION, ACCORDING TO CHEYSSON WAS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON; THIS WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS A COINCIDENCE BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI INTERESTS ON THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON HIMSELF SAW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS A NEGATIVE STEP WITH UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES. CHEYSSON ALSO SAID U.S. MIDEAST POLICY FOR THE LAST YEAR HAD BEEN AMBIGUOUS, AND THE STATES IN THE REGION DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT. THIS HAD GIVEN THE USSR OPPORTUNITIES, AND MANY MIDDLE EAST STATES WERE NOW FLIRTING WITH MOSCOW. THUS THE SOVIETS HAD MADE ADVANCES WITHOUT LIFTING A FINGER. CHEYSSON SAW MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO SYRIA PRIMARILY AS AN ACT OF WESTERN PRESENCE IN THE AREA, TO HELP OFFSET SOVIET GAINS, BUT WITH LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF CONCRETE RESULTS.

4. IRAN-IRAQ. CHEYSSON NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD FOR A LONG TIME BEEN THE ONLY WESTERN COUNTRY WHICH HAD RECOGNIZED IRAQ AS AN ESSENTIAL BARRIER AGAINST IRANIAN

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BY cd NARA DATE 5/25/10

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EXPANSION. HE THOUGHT MANY WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING THE US, WERE GRADUALLY COMING AROUND TO THE FRENCH VIEW. CHEYSSON CITED THE FACT THAT THE U.S. AND IRAQ WOULD REOPEN RELATIONS SOON AS EVIDENCE OF THIS EVOLUTION. PARTLY DUE TO GROWING WESTERN SUPPORT, IRAQ HAD NOW BLOCKED A POSSIBLE IRANIAN VICTORY, ALTHOUGH AN IRAQI VICTORY WAS ALSO NOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLE. THE STALEMATE WAS LIKELY TO DRAG ON, POSSIBLY FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS. BUT THIS WAS PREFERABLE TO A WAVE OF SHIITE INTEGRATIONISM OVERRUNNING THE REGION. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE KEY CHALLENGE FOR THE WEST WAS FINDING A WAY TO ATTRACT MOSLEM INTEGRATIONISTS, PARTICULARLY THE YOUTH, TO WESTERN IDEALS OF LIBERTY. HE THOUGHT THE WEST HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

5. LIBYA/CHAD. ASKED ABOUT THE FRENCH-LIBYAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM CHAD; CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH OBSERVERS IN THE NORTH OF CHAD, AND FRENCH AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE BULK OF LIBYAN TROOPS AND ALL "HEAVY EQUIPMENT" HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN HE ALSO CITED A RECENT FRENCH TV FILM OF THE LIBYAN WITHDRAWAL (NOTE: THE TV REPORTER STATED HE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO CIRCULATE RELATIVELY FREELY IN NORTHERN CHAD, AND WAS CONVINCED THE WITHDRAWAL WAS GENUINE). OF COURSE, CHEYSSON SAID, HABRE COULD NOW ATTEMPT TO MOVE NORTH AND RETAKE FAYA LARGEAU OR FADA. BUT IF HE DOES THIS HE WILL FIND THAT THE PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH OF CHAD, WHICH CHEYSSON THOUGHT WERE EVEN MORE SERIOUS, WOULD INCREASE AND PERHAPS OVERWHELM HIM. AS FOR QADHAFI, CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS A MEDITERRANEAN LEADER WITH INFLUENCE AND MONEY TO SPEND. THIS MONEY DID NOT COME FROM THE SOVIETS. IT CAME FROM OIL "PRODUCED BY AMERICAN FIRMS AND BOUGHT BY US EUROPEANS." QADHAFI THEN RECYCLED THIS MONEY BACK TO EUROPE THROUGH THE IRA AND BASQUE TERRORIST MOVEMENTS, AMONG OTHERS. QADHAFI COULD THEREFORE NOT BE IGNORED. CHEYSSON HAD MET WITH HIM, BUT IT WAS NOW URGENT FOR MITTERRAND TO MEET WITH HIM, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF QADHAFI'S INFLUENCE IN SEVERAL NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES (ALGERIA, TUNISIA, EGYPT AND CHAD) WITH WHICH FRANCE HAS CLOSE TIES. ASKED IF THIS MEANT A QADHAFI VISIT TO PARIS, CHEYSSON VEHEMENTLY SAID THAT SUCH A VISIT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE CHALLENGE WAS TO AVOID THE FANFARE
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OF A VISIT TO FRANCE AND TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND QADHAFI IN A THIRD COUNTRY. THIS COULD HAPPEN "WITHIN A FEW DAYS -- WHY NOT?" SAID CHEYSSON. (COMMENT: WE WONDER WHETHER CHEYSSON IS THINKING OF SUCH A MEETING DURING MITTERRAND'S TRIP TO SYRIA AT THE END OF THE MONTH. END COMMENT.)

6. MOROCCO. CHEYSSON COULD NOT SEE WHAT MOROCCO HOPED TO GAIN, OR HAD GAINED, FROM THE OUJDA ACCORD. THE LIBYANS HAD CEASED DELIVERING ARMS TO THE POLISARIO SINCE 1983, AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO CONFIRM THIS. THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT IN OUJDA WAS A SPECIFIC NOSE-THUMBING AT THE ALGERIANS. (CHEYSSON IMITATED AN EXCITED CHADLI BENJADID: "BUT MR. CHEYSSON, THEY SIGNED IT AT OUJDA, YOU UNDERSTAND? AT OUJDA! WHY AT OUJDA?") THE CONSEQUENCES HAD BEEN PREDICTABLE: THE ALGERIANS HAD NOW INCREASED THEIR SUPPLY OF SOVIET ARMS TO THE POLISARIO, INCLUDING THE FIRST SAM-7'S SEEN IN POLISARIO HANDS IN 18 MONTHS. THE OAU SITUATION HAD TURNED DRASTICALLY AGAINST THE MOROCCANS ON THE POLISARIO ISSUE. AND THE LIBYANS WERE STILL OPENLY FRIENDLY TO THE POLISARIO LEADERSHIP. MEANWHILE, THE ALGERIANS WERE EXCITED AND NERVOUS, WITH OLD ANIMOSITIES REVIVED.

7. AFGHANISTAN. CHEYSSON WAS RATHER SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE ABOUCHAR CASE. HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN EMBARRASSED BY THE FACT THAT THEY CAPTURED A WELL-KNOWN TV JOURNALIST. CHEYSSON SAID HIS FIRST FEAR WAS THAT ABOUCHAR WOULD BE SHOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS CAPTURE. WHEN THAT DID NOT HAPPEN, HE WAS MORE HOPEFUL FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING IN NEW YORK WITH GROMYKO, THE SOVIET HAD POINTEDLY ASKED HIM THREE TIMES IF ABOUCHAR WAS REALLY A FAMOUS TV PERSONALITY. CHEYSSON CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO TEACH WESTERN JOURNALISTS A LESSON, BUT THAT WHEN THEY REALIZED THEY HAD CAPTURED A RELATIVELY WELL-KNOWN ONE, BACKED BY A MAJOR TV CHANNEL, THEY WANTED TO GET RID OF HIM. CHEYSSON IRONICALLY REFERRED TO AFGHANISTANIAN "INDEPENDENCE" BY CITING THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SAID PRIVATELY HE WOULD BE SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS AND RELEASED ONE WEEK LATER, WHEREAS HE WAS ACTUALLY SENTENCED TO 18 YEARS AND RELEASED TWO DAYS LATER.

8. CENTRAL AMERICA. CLEARLY CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, CHEYSSON SAID CENTRAL AMERICA WAS FAR FROM FRANCE AND FRENCH INTERESTS. FRANCE WOULD THEREFORE TAKE NO INITIATIVES IN THE AREA, THOUGH IT DID FROM TIME TO TIME RESPOND TO REQUESTS FROM COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. THE FRENCH ALSO RECOGNIZED THIS WAS AN AREA OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S., WHICH IS MUCH BETTER INFORMED ABOUT EVENTS THERE THAN IS FRANCE. THAT BEING SAID, CHEYSSON STATED THAT THERE WERE SOME ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION ON WHICH FRANCE AND THE U.S. AGREE, AND OTHERS ON WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES DISAGREE.

THOUGH FRANCE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE ON THE SALVADORIAN ELECTIONS, DUARTE HAD BEEN ELECTED AND HAD PROVEN TO BE A CREDIBLE "COURAGEOUS" LEADER. THIS HAD ADDED NEW HOPE. BOTH THE SALVADORIAN AND NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS HAD BEEN IMPERFECT. BUT CHEYSSON JUDGED THE NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS TO HAVE BEEN FAIRER. IF ORTEGA PLAYS HIS PROPER ROLE, HE SHOULD BE GIVEN HIS DUE AS AN ELECTED LEADER. CHEYSSON ASSERTED THAT NICARAGUA IS NOT YET A COMMUNIST STATE, BUT COULD EASILY BECOME ONE. HE ADVCCATED A STRONG AID PROGRAM TO THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON ANTICIPATED FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CENTRAL AMERICA DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

9. SOUTHERN AFRICA. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS LESS WELL INFORMED ON SOUTHERN AFRICA THAN ON OTHER SUBJECTS BUT HE NONETHELESS MADE SEVERAL POINTS INDICATING HIS PREJUDICES. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD "LET GO" OF NAMIBIA, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WAS POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT TO THEM ECONOMICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY. HE ALSO NOTED THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, BUT SAID IT WAS AN UNRELATED ISSUE AND OF FAR LESS IMPORTANCE THAN THE QUESTION OF SHOWING THAT A BLACK STATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA COULD EXIST AND PROSPER. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT, ACCORDING TO CHEYSSON, IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID.

10. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. CHEYSSON WAS PLEASED WITH

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 43138

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THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION OF LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USSR. HE THOUGHT A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS WAS ESSENTIAL, AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD PURSUE THIS POSSIBILITY.

11. WEU. CHEYSSON NOTED THE LIMITATIONS ON THE WEU, WHICH COULD NOT REPLACE NATO. NONETHELESS, HE THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE POLITICAL DESIRE AMONG EUROPEANS TO DISCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES. THE FRENCH DID NOT BELIEVE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS. BY GIVING AN IMPULSE TO THE WEU THEY HOPED TO CONCENTRATE DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE ISSUES IN THE WEU ASSEMBLY. CHEYSSON ADDED THAT SEVERAL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EC (GREECE, IRELAND AND TO A LESSER EXTENT DENMARK) WERE IN FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THEIR FELLOW MEMBERS ON DEFENSE ISSUES. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE WEU WAS TO GROUP TOGETHER THE REMAINING EC MEMBER STATES, WHO WERE IN BASIC HARMONY ON SUCH ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE NECESSITY OF A NUCLEAR COMPONENT FOR WESTERN DEFENSE. CONTINUING, CHEYSSON SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE FORMAL APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE WEU (PORTUGAL) AND TWO OTHER COUNTRIES (SPAIN AND NORWAY) WERE SAID TO BE INTERESTED. CHEYSSON THOUGHT SUCH MEMBERSHIPS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE THEY WOULD CONTRADICT THE EXISTING HARMONY OF INTERESTS AND VIEWPOINTS IN THE WEU AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED.

12. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION CHEYSSON WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO BE FRIENDLY AND COURTEOUS TOWARD THE U.S., DESPITE THE OBVIOUS POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED PRIVATELY TO DCM THAT WE GET A DETAILED READOUT OF RECENT FRENCH CONTACTS WITH LIBYA AND OF THE FRENCH OBSERVERS WHO VISITED NORTHERN CHAD (SEPTEL). HE SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. GALBRAITH

BT

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 31 JAN 85 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ALLEN, ED

smf 1/8/88

DOC DATE 19 NOV 84

12

KEYWORDS FRANCE

DUMAS, ROLAND

SUBJECT: ROLAND DUMAS POLITICAL PROFILE

ACTION:	APPROPRIATE ACTION	DUE:	STATUS S	FILES PA
	FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
	COBB			FORTIER
				MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(CB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Cobb - 2/1</i>	<i>- Close Out</i>			
	<i>C 2/1</i>	<i>No Action Required per Cobb</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *(RC)*

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 0836

13

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Stuff to</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Cobb</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/8/2008

File Folder

FRANCE (10/16/84-12/19/84)

FOIA

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

Box Number

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72

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
48606	MEMO RE POLITICAL PROFILE	5	11/19/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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19
ID 8408958

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 DEC 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

smf 1/8/85

DOCDATE 10 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

DUMAS, ROLAND

SUBJECT: NEW FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 13 DEC 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CT)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 15 FEB 1985 mcfarlane noted

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National Security Council
The White House

1472

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System # I 20

Package # 8958

84 DEC 10 P 6: 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>G</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>/</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

Information
 A = Action
 R = Retain
 D = Dispatch
 N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETINFORMATION

December 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: New French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas

At this morning's staff meeting, you indicated interest in having more information on France's new Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas. At Tab A is an updated profile on Dumas -- sent in by Embassy Paris over the week-end. As I said, I believe Dumas' arrival will help overcome the rather major schism between the Elysee and the Quai. It is unlikely that Dumas will stake out, at least publicly, positions substantially different from Mitterrand's. At the same time, he has worked for many years as Mitterrand's private lawyer, and undoubtedly is willing to give him frank advice in private. It seems to me that Dumas is someone we should try to cultivate. Indeed, Secretary Shultz has requested a meeting with Dumas on the margins of the NATO Ministerial.

Unlike many Frenchmen, Dumas does not have much direct experience with Black Africa. He has, however, worked often with North Africans, and was heavily involved with the private negotiations leading up to the withdrawal of French troops from Chad. This was typical of the role of special emissary that Mitterrand has often called on Dumas to play. By the way, he has a reputation of being pro-Arab.

Ty has the primary lead on France in our office and may wish to elaborate on what I have said.

Attachment

Tab A - Dumas Profile

cc: Jack Matlock
Ty Cobb
Phil Ringdahl
Howard Teicher

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #48607
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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48608

PAGE 01 PARIS 6807 DTG: 081328Z DEC 84 PSN: 031735
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 46807

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: AN UPDATED PROFILE ON NEW FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER ROLAND DUMAS

REF: PARIS 25127

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE SUPPLEMENTS AND UPDATES PREVIOUS EMBASSY
BIOGRAPHIC REPORTING. [REDACTED]

3. BY CHOOSING ROLAND DUMAS TO REPLACE CHEYSSON, MITTERRAND HAS PLACED A CLOSE POLITICAL CONFIDANT AND A PERSONAL FRIEND IN CHARGE OF THE QUAI. CHEYSSON WAS NEVER A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S INNER CIRCLE OF ASSOCIATES. DUMAS, BY CONTRAST, HAS KNOWN MITTERRAND FOR ALMOST FORTY YEARS, SERVING AS MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL LAWYER, AS A DISCREET NEGOTIATOR IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL MATTERS AND AS A COUNSELOR TO MITTERRAND ON A WIDE RANGE OF POLICY MATTERS. DUMAS MAINTAINS A PARIS LEFT-BANK APARTMENT ON THE SAME SMALL STREET AS MITTERRAND.

4. PERSONAL TIES TO MITTERRAND EXPLAIN IN PART DUMAS' PROMOTION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. DUMAS, HOWEVER, HAS ALSO ESTABLISHED A SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF THE QUAI. SINCE TAKING OVER THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO LAST JANUARY, DUMAS HAS Poured CONSIDERABLE ENERGY INTO MASTERING THE TECHNICALITIES OF EC FUNCTIONING, SHAPING FRENCH POLICY AND HAMMERING OUT COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. ONE OF DUMAS' ADVISORS RECENTLY BOASTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT "NO ONE IN THIS GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BETTER THAN DUMAS." DUMAS IS WIDELY CREDITED AS A MAJOR DRIVING FORCE BEHIND FRANCE'S SUCCESSFUL EC PRESIDENCY EARLIER THIS YEAR. THE RECENT DUBLIN ACCORD ON EC WINE PRODUCTION WAS HAILED IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE BY AGRICULTURE MINISTER ROCARD AS "A TRIUMPH OF ROLAND DUMAS' DIPLOMACY." ROCARD IS NORMALLY PARSIMONIOUS WHEN IT COMES TO PRAISING MINISTERIAL

5. DUMAS' 11-MONTH TENURE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS PROVIDED THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER WITH ACCESS TO ALL EC HEADS OF STATE, AS WELL AS A WIDE RANGE OF EUROPEAN CABINET OFFICIALS. FROM A PARIS PERSPECTIVE, DUMAS IS SEEN AS HAVING SMOOTH WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH THATCHER AND KOHL, AS WELL AS EXCELLENT PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH FELIPE GONZALEZ.

6. OVER THE PAST YEAR, DUMAS HAS ALSO CONTINUED TO ACT AS MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL ENVOY ON OTHER DELICATE INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. DUMAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN NEGOTIATING THE CHAD WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT WITH KHADAFI. WHILE CHEYSSON'S EFFORTS WERE MORE WIDELY PUBLICIZED, IT WAS DUMAS WHO SET THE PROCESS IN MOTION IN A MEETING WITH KHADAFI IN AUGUST 1983, SHORTLY AFTER FRENCH TROOPS WERE INTRODUCED INTO CHAD. AFTERWARDS, DUMAS MULTIPLIED HIS CONTACTS WITH A VARIETY OF NORTH AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARIES IN AN EFFORT TO OPEN CHANNELS TO KHADAFI. DUMAS WAS AT MITTERRAND'S SIDE WHEN CHEYSSON WAS DISPATCHED TO TRIPOLI TO CONSUMMATE THE WITHDRAWAL ACCORD. ASKED HOW DUMAS IS REACTING NOW TO KHADAFI'S APPARENT DUPLICITY, AN ADVISOR SAID ONLY "PHILOSOPHICALLY."

7. IN A CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF DECEMBER 7, A PERSONAL ADVISOR AND LONG-TIME FRIEND OF DUMAS GAVE THE FOLLOWING, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER'S PERSONAL PRIORITIES:

A. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. DUMAS IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN UNITY. IN RELATIONS WITH THE US,

FOR EXAMPLE, DUMAS BELIEVES IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EUROPE DEAL WITH WASHINGTON FROM A STRONG COMMON POSITION ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. DUMAS PREFERS TO EMPHASIZE THE US-EUROPE RELATIONSHIP, RATHER THAN ENCOURAGE EUROPEAN STATES TO PURSUE BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE US.

B. SPAIN. AS A COROLLARY TO THE ABOVE, DUMAS IS A STRONG PARTISAN OF SPANISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET. PARTLY THIS REFLECTS HIS INTENSE WISH THAT GONZALEZ AND THE PSOE SUCCEED IN CONSOLIDATING SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. DUMAS SEES EC MEMBERSHIP AS THE NECESSARY PRE-CONDITION FOR A FIRM SPANISH COMMITMENT TO NATO. HOWEVER, DUMAS REPORTEDLY SEES SPAIN'S NATO ROLE AS POSSIBLY LESS THAN FULL INTEGRATION, I.E., ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP WITHOUT MILITARY INTEGRATION (BUT WITH A CONTINUED US PRESENCE ON SPANISH SOIL).

BT

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NLRR 1007-081 #48608
BY GW NARA DATE 5/26/10

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23

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EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 46807

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, FR

SUBJECT: AN UPDATED PROFILE ON NEW FRENCH FOREIGN

C. EAST-WEST RELATIONS. DUMAS SHARES MITTERRAND'S VIEWS ON THE NEED TO CONFRONT MOSCOW WITH A SOLID WESTERN DEFENSE. HOWEVER, DUMAS PRIVATELY URGES THAT THE DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BE KEPT OPEN. IN DUMAS' VIEW, ARMS TALKS WITH THE USSR ARE AN OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE.

8. WHILE DUMAS WILL, LIKE ANY GOVERNMENT MINISTER, BE SUBJECT TO OCCASIONAL PRESSURES FROM THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT HE WILL BE A FORCEFUL PROponent OF "SOCIALIST" POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HIS LEFTISM IS MORE INHERITED THAN ACQUIRED. DUMAS' FATHER, A MINOR CIVIL SERVANT IN SOUTH WEST FRANCE AND A COMMITTED SOCIALIST, WAS CAPTURED AND EXECUTED BY THE GERMANS IN WORLD WAR TWO. DUMAS HIMSELF SURVIVED THE WAR THANKS LARGELY TO PROTECTION FROM THE FRENCH RESISTANCE. DUMAS WAS DRAWN INTO A SOCIALIST ORBIT AT AN EARLY AGE, AND HIS FORAYS INTO DOMESTIC POLITICS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WITHIN A SOCIALIST FRAMEWORK. HOWEVER, DUMAS HAS GENERALLY SHUNNED AN ACTIVE ROLE WITHIN THE SOCIALIST PARTY ITSELF.

9. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF HIS CELEBRATED LAW PRACTICE IN PARIS, DUMAS HAS CULTIVATED A LARGE NETWORK OF FRIENDS IN POLITICAL, ARTISTIC AND MEDIA CIRCLES. THESE FRIENDSHIPS, HOWEVER, ARE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL MATTERS BY DUMAS. DISCRETION IS ONE OF HIS MOST PROMINENT ATTRIBUTES--A QUALITY WHICH MITTERRAND OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATES.

10. DUMAS ALSO ENJOYS A GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPUTATION WITHIN THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, DATING BACK TO AT LEAST 1965 WHEN DUMAS NEGOTIATED PCF SUPPORT FOR MITTERRAND'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY. DUMAS WAS ALSO ONE OF A VERY FEW SOCIALIST FIGURES TO SIGN THE PCF-BACKED "APPEL DES CENT" DISARMAMENT PETITION IN 1982. FOLLOWING THE PCF PULLOUT FROM GOVERNMENT LAST SUMMER, DUMAS WAS REPORTEDLY DIS-

PATCHED BY MITTERRAND TO SOUND OUT FORMER PCF MINISTER MARCEL RIGOUT ON COMMUNIST INTENTIONS. THAT MISSION, LIKE MANY OF DUMAS' ERRANDS FOR MITTERRAND, HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICIZED.

11. COMMENT: IN DUMAS, WE EXPECT TO HAVE AN INTERLOCUTOR WHO REFLECTS MITTERRAND'S THINKING MORE ACCURATELY THAN DID CHEYSSON. ONE OF DUMAS' FIRST PRIORITIES, WE BELIEVE, WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE UNCOORDINATED INITIATIVES AND GAFFES WHICH DAMAGED CHEYSSON'S CREDIBILITY ARE NOT DUPLICATED UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. DUMAS' PERSONAL LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT, PLUS HIS INCLINATION TOWARDS DISCRETION, WILL FACILITATE THIS TASK. WE WILL BE REPORTING ON DUMAS' SETTLING-IN PROCESS AT THE QUAI AND ON HIS FIRST MOVES AS FOREIGN MINISTER IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES. END COMMENT. GALBRAITH
BT

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

Florence

24

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on December 11, 1984, 19

for Admiral John Poindexter of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Canada

Dr. Fred Doucet, Senior Advisor to PM Mulroney
Lee Richardson, Dep. Chief of Staff
Dean Drysdale, Exec. Asst. to Dr. Doucet
Ambassador Allan Gotlieb

The above group will be arriving at NW Gate --
Embassy Car -- Rogers office has been so notified.

State

James Medas

AT THE END OF THIS MEETING, THEY WILL MEET IN
ROOM 361 OEOB. THEY WILL RETURN TO THE WEST
WING TO MEET WITH RICHARD DARMAN (4:00 p.m.)
AND MICHAEL DEEVER (4:30 p.m.)

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing

Requested by Tyrus Cobb/Jeanne Hickie

Room No. Situation Room

Room No. 361 Telephone 5076

Time of Meeting 2:30 p.m.

Date of request December 10, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

Neil Gates
25

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

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for Admiral John Poindexter of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM RINGDAHL

KEYWORDS: CHAD

FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

LIBYA

CHEYSSON, CLAUDE

SUBJECT: BREAKFAST ITEM RE FRANCE & CHAD

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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	<i>C 0/12</i>	<i>Pointexter noted</i>		<i>PRV</i>

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

8993

INFORMATION

December 11, 1984

48609

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHIL RINGDAHL PR

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - France and Chad

Based on recent talks with senior French officials, France has apparently decided on a policy of non-action in Chad: 1) French troops would not be reintroduced there, 2) no military effort will be made to get Libyans out, and 3) French aircraft only would be used against the Libyans if they push south beyond the 16th parallel. In sum, Mitterrand appears to have decided to ride out domestic opposition/media criticism on Chad, instead of getting stuck again in the Chad tar pit. France has grown tired of Chad, and even more so of Habre.

President Mitterrand is presently attending the Franco-African summit in Burundi, where he can expect criticism from moderate African states. France has warned Chad President Habre to watch his tongue and not stir up anti-French feeling there, and has made veiled threats about reducing assistance if he does. France is dangling the prospect of more assistance/money to Habre if he moves to seek a political solution with southern dissidents, but privately have implied that they would like to see Habre "dry on the vine", and that they might seek an alternative to him. The French say privately they will not "permit" Habre to start anything against the Libyans.

We should keep pressure on the French to see through their responsibility in Chad, but to do so in a way that will not be counter-productive or harm bilateral relations. We have already counseled Habre to go public on his request for a re-introduction of French troops, which should put an end to the French story that Habre doesn't want them. State has also gone on with talking points to be used discreetly with senior officials in friendly African countries, acknowledging current French policy, pointing out the continued Libyan occupation, and suggesting that acquiescence in this situation will only stimulate further Libyan aggression in Chad and the region. We should also hold the French feet to the fire in private conversations with senior French officials in Washington and Paris, and continue to share intelligence, which helps those in the French Government opposed to the current policy. It is my impression that Dumas will be no better than Cheysson on Africa, as he apparently was one of the architects of France's recent Libyan approaches and traveled there secretly to negotiate with Qadhafi.

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/9/11

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E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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