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**Folder Title:** France (05/21/1984-08/15/1984)  
**Box:** 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 1/7/2008

**File Folder** FRANCE (5/21/84-8/15/84)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 14

NOUZILLE

70

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48535	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH GERGORIN <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	5/23/1984	B1
48536	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH GERGORIN <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	ND	B1
48537	CABLE	011640Z JUN 84	2	6/1/1984	B1
48547	TALKING POINTS	RE FRENCH PAPER <b>R 5/24/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	ND	B1
48548	PAPER	FRENCH POSITION ON MILITARY USE OF SPACE <b>R 5/24/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	3	6/11/1984	B1
48538	MEMO	COBB/MAHLEY TO MCFARLANE RE GALBRAITH'S LETTER <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	7/13/1984	B1
48539	MEMO	DRAFT COBB/MAHLEY TO MCFARLANE RE <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	7/13/1984	B1
48546	BIO	BIO	1	7/18/1984	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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70

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48540	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH GALBRAITH <i>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	8/3/1984	B1
48541	TALKING POINTS	FOR GALBRAITH MEETING <i>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	ND	B1
48542	LETTER	TRANSLATION CHEYSSON TO SHULTZ <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	5	ND	B1
48543	LETTER	CHEYSSON TO SHULTZ <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	4	ND	B1
48544	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH CHEYSSON <i>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</i>	1	8/8/1984	B1
48545	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST FOR CHEYSSON <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	8/7/1984	B1

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RECEIVED 22 MAY 84 08 /

TO MCFARLANE

FROM DARMAN, R

DOCDATE 21 MAY 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

SPEECHES

DARMAN REFERRAL

SUBJECT. DRAFT PRES TAPING RE D-DAY REMARKS FOR FRENCH TV

URGENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO DARMAN DUE: 22 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

SMALL

KIMMITT

SOMMER

MARTIN

SHULL

THOMPSON

COMMENTS DUE BY 10AM

URGENT

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Kimmit	X 5/22	for signature		
	MAY 22 1984	Kimmit spd		DA
	MAY 22 1984			OS, RK

DISPATCH *[Signature]* MAY 22 1984

W/ATTCH FILE *[Signature]* (C)

PA *[Signature]*

National Security Council  
The White House

WML

System # I

Package # 4120

RECEIVED

1174 2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>AM: 02</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>MAY 22 1984</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

34 MAY 22 1984

MEMORANDUM

4120

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Taping: D-Day Remarks for French  
Television

We have reviewed and concurred with the subject draft  
Presidential remarks, as modified.

Attachment  
Draft Remarks

cc: Richard G. Darman

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

URGENT

DATE: 5/21/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. TUESDAY, 5/22

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL TAPING: D-DAY REMARKS FOR FRENCH TELEVISION

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1984

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McMANUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HERRINGTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTWILER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WIRTHLIN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
			ELLIOTT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments/edits directly to Ben Elliott in room 100 by 10:00 a.m. TUESDAY, MAY 22, with an information copy to my office.

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman  
Assistant to the President  
Ext. 2702

REC-11115  
1984 MAY 21 PM 7:42

(Robinson/BE Edit)  
May 21, 1984  
7:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL TAPING: D-DAY REMARKS FOR FRENCH TELEVISION  
TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1984

This year, thousands of Americans are returning to the Normandy shores to revisit the scene of that momentous landing 40 years ago. <sup>This week,</sup> ~~Tonight,~~ hundreds are, like myself, guests in your country as we join in remembering that day. On behalf of all Americans, I thank you for your gracious hospitality.

Franco-American friendship has a long and proud past. Indeed, one of the great heroes of American history is a Frenchman. Scores of towns, streets, and squares -- even a college -- in America bear his name. A beautiful park that I look out upon each day -- directly across the street from the White House in Washington -- is named in honor of him. He was the Marquis Marie Joseph de Lafayette, and he served with George Washington as a General in the American Revolutionary Army. Yet despite the importance of Lafayette's skill, he took a step as a legislator that had even greater significance for the two centuries of friendship and alliance between your country and mine.

On July 11th, 1789, as Deputy in the French National Assembly, Lafayette introduced a bill calling for the passage of a declaration of the rights of man. Formally adopted by the Assembly 5 weeks later, the declaration appeared as the preamble to the French Constitution of 1791. This Declaration of the Rights of Man embodied the same fundamental beliefs about human liberty as those expressed the American Declaration of



Independence and Bill of Rights. Together, those French and American documents proclaim that all men are endowed with equal, God-given rights, that among these are, "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." It is this shared commitment to human freedom that has formed the bedrock on which our fast friendship has been built. And it was in the name of this human freedom that so many brave men gave their lives on the beaches of Normandy 40 years ago.

Those courageous men, living and dead, gave us a priceless legacy of peace and prosperity in Europe -- a legacy that has endured now for more than two generations. To preserve that legacy of peace, those of us who cherish liberty must continue to labor together.

Your country and mine are members of an Alliance committed *democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.* to the ~~liberty of Western Europe~~. Of course, membership in the Alliance imposes its burdens. To demonstrate the American commitment to this continent, thousands of American troops must be stationed here in Europe, far from their homes and families. France, the United States, and all the Alliance nations, must spend more on defense than any of us like to do in peacetime. But the burdens we must *continue to* bear in defending our freedom are far less than the horrors we would have to endure if we lost that freedom.

I believe that the best way we can honor those who gave so much 40 years ago, is by rededicating ourselves today to the cause for which they fought: Freedom -- freedom for ourselves, freedom for our children, and freedom for generations yet unborn.

Thank you and God bless you.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Presidential Taping: D-Day Remarks for French Television

USIA prepared the first draft of the subject Presidential remarks, which we reviewed, in coordination with Jim Rentschler, and then sent them on informally to the Speechwriters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Tab I Memo to Ben Elliott conveying our formal concurrence with the Speechwriters draft.

Approval   K   Disapproval \_\_\_\_\_

*Pete*  
Jack Matlock, *PAS* Karna Small, Jim Rentschler and Don Matley *Pete*  
concur.

- Attachments
- Tab I      Memo to Elliott
- Tab II     Draft Remarks

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 22, 1984

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*Pete*

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Approval   K  

Disapproval \_\_\_\_\_

*PMS* *PMS* *J* *PMS*  
Jack Matlock, Karna Small, Jim Rentschler and Don Matley concur.

Attachments

- Tab I      Memo to Elliott
- Tab II     Draft Remarks

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8404193

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 MAY 84 18

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

*smf*  
*1/7/08*

DOCDATE 23 MAY 84

KEYWORDS **FRANCE**

DEFENSE POLICY

GERGORIN, JEAN-LOUIS

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST W/ POINDEXTER FOR GERGORIN RE EAST - WEST ISSUES 24 MAY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( MD )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 5/24</i>	<i>Poinxter noted</i>		<i>CO</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA*

(C)MD

National Security Council  
The White House

1177 JF

System #

I

Package #

4193 9

RECEIVED

84 MAY 23 P 5: 21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 5/24 11<sup>00</sup> am  
(Date/Time)

*Sorry, I couldn't make it. Hope I didn't cause too much trouble. J*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4193

10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

May 23, 1984

48535

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jean-Louis Gergorin  
-- May 24, 1984 -- 11:00 a.m.

You have agreed to meet briefly with Jean-Louis Gergorin, the French Director of the Policy Planning staff at the Quai (roughly, Steve Bosworth's counterpart). Gergorin has been on the Policy Planning staff since its creation in 1973 and became Director in 1979. He has studied at Harvard and Rand and his English is excellent. Gergorin is one of the more influential career officers in the Foreign Ministry, having assumed his present position during the Giscard Administration.

Gergorin has been very critical of the SDI and is expected to raise it with you. He argues the whole idea has been poorly presented to the European public and risks creating false hopes about invulnerability. Worse, according to Gergorin, SDI plays into Soviet hands by undermining the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and reinforcing German fears of nuclear war.

On Iran/Iraq, the French detect an Iraqi shift toward the Soviets and may be contemplating a more balanced approach in the conflict. They continue to resist the idea of operational coordination. On East-West issues, the Sakharov case is having an enormous impact on French public opinion and is creating difficulties for Mitterrand's planned trip to Moscow on June 21-23 (which may be now postponed). Gergorin's overall analysis of Soviet strategy corresponds to our own: he argues that they are probing for ways to sting the U.S. in the election and expects a push in El Salvador and perhaps in Pakistan.

Ron Lehman and I will join you from the U.S. side; Matlock and Teicher will have seen him prior to your session. I see no reason for you to spend more than 15 minutes with him. Suggested talking points for your use are at Tab A.

Attachment  
Tab A - Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 248535  
BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH JEAN-LOUIS GERGORIN

- Welcome to Washington. We feel that Franco-American relations are extremely good following the highly successful visit by President Mitterrand. I think we have considerable unanimity of views on major issues, particularly those involving East-West relations.
- The President felt that his personal relationship with Mitterrand was strengthened during the visit and he looks forward to seeing him at Normandy and meeting with him at the London Summit.
- What is the status of Mitterrand's planned visit to Moscow given the Sakharov hunger strike? It appears that Moscow is doing its utmost at the present time to create an impression that it is impossible to do business with this Administration. Their Olympic pull-out decision seems largely based on the perceived necessity of creating a negative impression of the Reagan Administration world-wide.
- How do you assess current Soviet behavior? Do you think they are pushing for some sort of confrontation?
- What is your analysis of the escalation of the conflict in the Persian Gulf? Has France's tilt toward Iraq changed?
- As you know, we are limiting our SDI program to research and development. We are not committed to the deployment of any exotic space-based system, but given the demonstrated Soviet capabilities in this area we feel it is imperative to pursue this limited R&D program. I know European reactions to the SDI have been mixed. What is your assessment of this initiative?
- I appreciate your dropping by the NSC to see me and hope that your talks in Washington are useful.

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASABLE)  
NLRR 107-081 #48536  
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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*File Folder*

FRANCE (5/21/84-8/15/84)

*FOIA*

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

*Box Number*

14

70

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48537	CABLE  011640Z JUN 84	2	6/1/1984	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



M

Personal Message for George Shultz from Mr. Cheysson

6/5/84

My Dear Colleague:

You will recall our many exchanges of view on relations with the Soviet Union notably those which took place in the intimacy of the 16 at Wye. The steadfastness of the nations of the alliance in their defense effort has, we believe, always been linked in our minds with the will to look for opportunities for meetings and contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies, the object of which is to increase personal contact, but also to remind them of the fundamental principles which guide our action and which lead us in consequence to denounce the intolerable situations for which Moscow is responsible: Afghanistan, Poland, violation of human rights, and the breakdown of the balance of forces.

It is in this perspective that a meeting between my President and the President of the Supreme Soviet was agreed upon several months ago. It is a question of a step in our relations and not of a new policy departure, of course.

The visit, first envisaged for the autumn of 1983, then for the beginning of 1984, was finally postponed until the end of June. Now (i.e., post-Wye) assured of the common ideas of the principal

partners of the alliance, we have decided to set a definite date and a communique will be published this evening in Moscow and in Paris. Our statements in the days to come will note that this meeting takes place in the framework of policy thus (i.e., as above) defined and in line with the routine conversations between officials and exchanges of view between ministers which have characteristically marked recent months; you will recall in this regard my own trip to Moscow, which we have discussed many times.

I would be grateful if you would inform your President. We will have a chance to speak about this again on different occasions within the next few days. Be assured of my friendly and sincere best wishes.

Claude

Message personnel pour M. George SHULTZ

de la part de M. CHEYSSON

Citation:

Mon cher Collègue,

Tu te rappelleras nos nombreux échanges de vues sur les relations avec l'Union Soviétique, notamment ceux qui ont eu lieu dans l'intimité des Seize à Wye. La détermination des pays de l'Alliance dans leur effort de défense a toujours été conjuguée dans nos esprits avec la volonté de chercher les occasions de rencontres et de contacts avec l'Union Soviétique et ses alliés, dont l'objet est de multiplier les relations humaines, mais aussi de rappeler les principes fondamentaux qui guident notre action et qui nous amènent par conséquent à dénoncer les situations intolérables dont Moscou est responsable : Afghanistan, Pologne, violation des droits de l'homme, rupture de l'équilibre des forces.

C'est dans cette perspective que, depuis des mois, avait été convenu une rencontre entre mon Président et le Président du Soviet Suprême. Il s'agit d'un moment dans notre relation et non du point de départ d'une politique nouvelle, bien évidemment.


La visite, d'abord envisagée à l'automne 1983, puis au début de 1984, avait été finalement repoussée à la fin de juin. Maintenant assurés de la pensée commune des principaux partenaires de l'Alliance, nous avons décidé de préciser la date et un communiqué sera publié ce soir à Moscou et à Paris. Nos commentaires marqueront dans les jours qui viennent que cette rencontre s'inscrit dans le cadre de la

politique ainsi définie et sur la ligne des entretiens de routine entre fonctionnaires et des échanges de vues entre Ministres qui ont marqué les derniers mois ; tu te rappelleras à cet égard mon propre voyage à Moscou, dont nous nous sommes entretenus à plusieurs reprises.

Je te serai reconnaissant d'informer ton Président. Nous aurons l'occasion d'en reparler à plusieurs reprises dans les prochains jours. Je t'assure de mes sentiments amicaux et fidèles.

Claude

Fin de citation

WHSR ROUTE SLIP		Time Stamp
STAFF	C/O	18 RECEIVED
McFarlane		 JUN 12 12:38
Poindexter	C	
Kimmitt		
Shull	C	WIRE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
KRAEMER	C	<i>Bud</i>
		<i>This is not helpful. I have asked Ron to prepare a cable</i>
Thompson		
Merchant		LDX <i>from you</i>
NSC S/S	C	Approval: <u>                    </u>

C : Copy      O : Original *attali.*  
*J. John Z please*

DEPARTMENT STATE

84 JUN 12 P12:38

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

JUN 12 P12:38

**B**

S/S #

WAVE OF USE  
SITUATION ROOM

Urgent

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

gmp 1/7/08

MESSAGE NO. 4038 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 4

FROM: Bill Courtney P 1574

(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION French Space Arms Control

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	John Poindexter	456-2257	
	Sven Kraemer	395-5010	

FOR CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:

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S/S Officer: Pompeo [Signature]

TALKING POINTS USED BY  
ARMACOST TODAY WITH FRENCH AMB.  
FRENCH PAPER ON MILITARY USE OF SPACE

-- Appreciate your sharing your paper with us on ASAT and SDI issues.

-- Very concerned that your intention to present paper in the CD could have damaging consequences for the West, to the sole advantage of the Soviet Union.

-- We have made a point of consulting closely with you on both subjects. We understand many of your concerns; we want to manage this issue to avoid damage to our common political and security interests.

-- We are committed to continuing private discussions with you and other key Allies; you indicated yesterday that you want to continue dialogue. However, introducing your paper into the CD now would undercut the spirit dialogue is based on.

-- It would, moreover, coming in the wake of the Soviet propaganda campaign on SDI, contribute to the misimpression that it is the US which is somehow seeking to "militarize" outer space. As we know from the history of the INF debates over the past several years, it is extremely difficult to correct such misimpressions once they are given credence by reputable figures.

-- Washington NAC, London Summit very successful showcases of Western unity, especially on East-West issues, arms control. Last thing we need is impression of Western disunity, while Soviets continue to stonewall on nuclear arms control.

-- Introducing your paper in the CD now would have exactly this effect, undercutting the Western position there and elsewhere.

-- Washington is in the midst of policy consideration of outer space arms control. A public French initiative would be seen as an effort to force our hand, and could provoke the opposite reaction to what you desire.

-- Many of your points on ASAT bear careful study.

-- On SDI, however, the paper does not take account of the fact that SDI is a research program, not a weapons development effort. Only possible result of stirring up political debate on SDI now would be to block Western research, leave field open to Soviets.

-- Must therefore request in strongest terms that you not present paper in CD, but continue private consultations with us and other allies on the handling of outer space issues.

(6977A)

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASE)

NLRR MUF-081 #48517

BY CN NARA DATE 5/24/10

*ambassade de France*

*aux Etats Unis*

DELIVERED BY VERNIER-PALLET  
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

20

YESTERDAY TO ARMACOST,

Washington to June 11, 1984

48548

French Position on Military Use of Space

I - The prospects for the development of new antiballistic technologies are cause for concern for several reasons :

Deterrence, which has played an essential role in maintaining peace in Europe, is based on the maintainance in the face of an attack, of an assured capacity for response. It has been possible to maintain this capacity to date, however technologies may have evolved.

But France, like the whole international community can only be concerned today when it sees the appearance of new technologies that could threaten the stability--and thus the peace-- that has resulted so far from the invulnerability of the means of nuclear response and from the direct mastery of these means of response by the political authorities.

A situation in which each of the two principal powers sought to make its territory totally invulnerable, that is, to escape any response without, moreover any guarantee of success, would be fraught with danger :

- On the one hand, the mere declaration of the intention of going ahead in developing such systems constitutes in itself an incentive to renewing the race for offensive weapons : each power will seek to saturate the antiballistic systems planned by the other and to increase non-ballistic missiles (in particular cruise missiles).

Far from promoting the reduction of offensive systems, the perspective of the deployment of new defensive systems would therefore be very likely to lead to developments having the opposite effect.

- On the other hand, these measures, which are in part automatic, would, for reasons inherent in the techniques implemented, threaten to take the place of political decision in an incontrollable way.

These important research programs have developed thus far on both sides without contravening the provisions of the existing international agreements, in particular the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty (on the antiballistic missile systems) of 1972. Nevertheless they are likely to create, from now on, dynamics working against the reestablishment of strategic balances at the lowest possible level.

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This is why France is concerned with the efforts undertaken, both by the United States and the Soviet Union, to accelerate the development of these new antiballistic systems.

II - France asks that new and future antiballistic technologies be the subject of serious negotiations in view of drawing up an agreement on verifiable limitations that would take effect before irreversible developments occur.

All the countries of the world have in fact the same interest in reestablishing and maintaining strategic balance, then lowering the level of armaments, and thus in the outcome of the bilateral negotiations begun between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Of course this is also in the interest of France. Last fall, France confirmed before the United Nations General Assembly under what conditions it might in its turn participate in the effort to reduce nuclear arms; and France stressed the prime importance of maintaining the limitation on the ABM systems.

In the past France has welcomed the effort of reciprocal limitation that marked the 1972 bilateral American-Soviet treaty on antiballistic systems, although this treaty authorized the maintenance in each country of a not insignificant capacity whose modernization is foreseen by the treaty.

Lastly, France, a party to the 1967 Space Treaty, is very attached to the respect of this accord. But as the President of the Republic noted in his remarks before the 38th General Assembly of the United Nations, this treaty brings only a partial answer to the questions raised by the development of space technologies, since it bars only permanent stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of massive destruction.

III - France proposes that all the countries concerned --and the United States and the Soviet Union first of all-- engage in a genuine multilateral dialogue with a view to establishing duly controlled limitation on the new antiballistic technologies.

Given the interaction that exists between antisatellite means and the antiballistic missiles systems, it believes that both these systems must be the subject of an in-depth study.

Today it is no longer realistic-- and it would not necessarily be desirable-- to take as an objective complete demilitarization of space. However, it is desirable and possible to arrive at commitments that would be :

- Limited : They should prevent destabilizing military developments without affecting military activities that contribute to strategic stability, and those that can contribute to the control of disarmament agreements, by taking into consideration the joint character of some civilian and military uses of space;
- Progressive : Priority should be put on limiting those developments that would be of a nature to establish de facto circumstances that would be irreversible because they could not be subsequently verified;
- Verifiable : All States must have confidence in the respect for the implementation of such limitations and none must find itself in a position to benefit from a violation or evasion of the agreed-upon limitations.

In this perspective, a concerted international effort must be rapidly begun concerning :

- 1) Very strict limitation of antisatellite systems, including in particular prohibition of all those that could reach satellites in high orbit, since their preservation is the most important from the point of view of strategic balance;
- 2) A ban, for a renewable period of five years, on the deployment--on the surface, in the atmosphere, or in space--of energy directed weapons systems, able to destroy from a great distance ballistic missiles or satellites and, as a corollary, a ban on corresponding tests;
- 3) Strengthening the existing system of declaration, with each State or launching body committing itself to supply more detailed information on the characteristics and missions of objects launched in order to improve verification possibilities;
- 4) Commitment by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning the immunity of certain spatial objects, provisions to which they have already made a bilateral agreement among themselves./.

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOC DATE 13 JUL 84 23

MAHLEY

13 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

EUROPE EAST

GALBRAITH, V

FRANCE

NATO

STRATEGIC FORCES

NUCLEAR DEFENSE

SUBJECT AMB GALBRAITH LTR RE EUROPEAN DEFENSE

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3	✓	
Bud McFarlane	4	M	T
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	
NSC Secretariat	6		N
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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MEMORANDUM  
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE *JWC* *gm*

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB/DONALD A. MAHLEY

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Ambassador Galbraith's Letter Regarding European Defense

Van Galbraith has provided you a courtesy copy of a letter written to Mr. Irving Kristol, Editor of Public Interest magazine (Tab A). In the letter, which is apparently part of an on-going correspondence with Kristol on Alliance military strategies, Galbraith notes:

- Any conventional Soviet attack which could overwhelm the Alliance would only come about after a 10-day period, during which we would be prepared to strike every military target in Eastern Europe. *very unlikely*
- It must be made clear to the Soviets that any attack will be met by tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet rear; in his opinion, the French will do this during the first few hours.
- French strategy following the initial tactical nuclear strike, if unsuccessful, probably envisions the employment of strategic missile systems (although the Soviets may already have consumed most of West Germany, Denmark and Holland).
- Kristol has a standing invitation to lunch, dinner and breakfast.

We were concerned that Galbraith was discussing sensitive and controversial Alliance issues in a public forum. However, Van called Ty yesterday and ascertained that this was strictly private correspondence. Ty stressed that it is important, particularly in the next few months, that our representatives do not engage in public discussions on these sensitive issues. The Ambassador agreed, but indicated that he felt we needed to initiate a dialogue with the conservative intellectual elite in the U.S. who are becoming increasingly inclined to reject our traditional approach to Alliance requirements.

We remain concerned with the letter, which contravenes several points of present NATO/SACEUR planning and the objectives of NATO improvements now underway. The assertions with respect to French strategic thinking are controversial and probably erroneous. Finally, his thinking regarding our inability to detect a limited Soviet attack and the likelihood that the Soviets will secure substantial territorial gains initially runs counter to our planning assumptions and NATO strategy.

We do not think any further action is required at this time, but we can further emphasize our concerns with Van the next time he is in town.

cc: Jack Matlock, Ron Lehman, Peter Sommer

Attachment - Tab A - Galbraith Letter

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*Please do*

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BY *Q* NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~To Mallock~~  
~~Sammy~~  
~~Call~~

nice, unclassified  
discussion

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RCM HAS SEEN

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
PARIS

June 28, 1984

Dear Mr. Kristol,

It is true I have shifted the argument, but I have not abandoned my primary position, namely by maintaining forces in Europe which, with our allies, are capable of containing a surprise attack by the Soviet first echelon already in place near the border, we can prevent a Soviet attack from ever taking place. We can hit Soviet assembly and choke points and delay second and third echelon forces moving up, but we must have sufficient forces in place to stop an immediate breakthrough by Soviet forces which have not been substantially reinforced by a detectable buildup. Any conventional attack which could overwhelm us immediately would only come about after say a ten-day period of intensive transfer of men and supplies. During this ten-day period, we could go into a wartime status, prepared to strike every military target in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely the Soviets would then risk an attack. Their better option is to strike with no warning with a smaller portion of their troops. This reduced number might not succeed unless the second echelon moves up quickly, but we can only contain them if we keep our forces at least at the present level. As things now stand, the Soviets must either build up and thus be detected or attack with airborne and limited ground forces capable of sustaining an offensive for several days without reinforcements. As long as we can keep them in doubt about their capability to do the latter, we probably can keep

Mr. Irving Kristol  
Co-Editor,  
Public Interest Magazine,  
10 East 53rd Street,  
New York, N.Y. 10022.

the peace and freedom indefinitely and avoid the agonizing choice of annihilation of the U.S. or the loss of Europe. It must also be made clear to the Soviets that any attack will be met by tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet rear. Indeed, in my opinion the French will do this during the first few hours.

This leads me to my alternative case. (My favorite case in law school of pleading in the alternative was a defense against a demand that a valuable vase be returned to the plaintiff: (a) I did not take it; (b) I already returned it; (c) In any case, it is mine.) The role of French land forces under a Soviet attack envisions a nuclear tactical response, and the survival of French troops is based on the Soviets' breaking off the attack after tactical nuclear bombs have hit Soviet bases in Eastern Europe. If that does not work, then they may try a strategic missile, hoping the Soviets will then stop (perhaps with one-half of West Germany and Denmark and Holland for their troubles).

You have a standing invitation to lunch, dinner or breakfast.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

*Evan Galbraith*  
Evan G. Galbraith



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MEMORANDUM

~~ACTION~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 13, 1984

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cc: Jack Matlock, Ron Lehman, Peter Sommer

Attachment - Tab A - Galbraith Letter

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BY CU NARA DATE 4/20/10

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TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

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DOCDATE 03 AUG 84

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03 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

GALBRAITH, VAN

SUBJECT POINDEXTER MTG W/ GALBRAITH 8 AUG BACKGROUND INFO & TALKING POINTS

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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Should be seen by: 6/8 10<sup>00</sup> am ntz  
(Date/Time)

Talking points for Admiral's meeting  
with Galbraith on Wed.

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48540

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

August 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Galbraith  
-- Wednesday, August 8 -- 10:00-10:30 a.m.

NOTED

You and I are slated to meet with Van Galbraith for 30-minutes on Wednesday, at his request. Van is in the midst of a six-week trip that has taken him to France's Caribbean possessions and a number of U.S. cities for speaking engagements and other public appearances.

Background

- As you know, the normally sleepy summer months in Paris have witnessed some dramatic political developments this year. The Mauroy Government has been replaced by a new government under Prime Minister Laurent Fabius. The Communist Party, foreseeing a continuation of austerity policies that strike at its working class constituency, has left the cabinet.
- The change of government, which most observers had expected to occur this fall, was precipitated by the Socialists' difficulties over their education bill. Mitterrand deftly deflected the issue and seized the occasion to rejuvenate the government. For the moment, the Socialists have succeeded in putting the opposition on the defensive, but this may do little to help the government's popularity over the longer-term, unless the economy rebounds from its present stagnation.
- Like his predecessor, Prime Minister Fabius has little experience in international affairs, and we expect Mitterrand and his staff to maintain firm control over foreign policy. Foreign Minister Cheysson's departure from the Quai d'Orsay has been rumored for some time, but he was retained largely because no appropriate job could be found for him outside the government.

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BY CX NARA DATE 4/29/10~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- You might wish to indicate to Van how pleased the President was with Mitterrand's performance in Moscow, particularly on the Sakharov issue. On security matters, we really have an extraordinary congruence of views except for a few key issues such as SDI, Third World debt and Nicaragua. And, even on Central America, we have seen significant progress, as demonstrated by the excellent reception accorded Duarte. I believe that the improvement in Franco-American relations reflects a steady decline in the influence of Foreign Minister Cheysson -- and when he departs this fall, we will have the opportunity to remove a few more irritants.

Van remains one of our more outspoken Ambassadors. In an interview last month, he suggested that the Fed should move vigorously to reduce interest rates, a statement with which the French would agree. However, he went further to advocate a spurt in money supply growth and questioned the efficacy of Paul Volcker's performance. He also recently sent Bud a copy of a letter to Irving Kristol, part of a long-running discussion on NATO strategy, which contained information that we felt bordered on classified. It further addressed some sensitive aspects of French military strategy and NATO doctrine that we prefer not to raise in public -- he has stressed to me that the correspondence is personal and private.

The Ambassador may also wish to continue private discussions he has had with you in the past on sensitive matters, particularly on the necessity of keeping him in the loop. He will also be meeting with Ed Meese on Wednesday, and with Republican Party officials.

Suggested talking points are attached at Tab A.

Jack Matlock *JM* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab A for your meeting with Ambassador Galbraith.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A - Talking Points

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TALKING POINTS

- Is Cheysson still likely to be replaced by the Minister for European Affairs, Roland Dumas, or someone else?
  
- When Cheysson departs, will he bring the French around on Central America? Outer space arms control? Cooperation against international terrorism?
  
- Is Mitterrand seeking to move toward a coalition with centrist groups? Can this strategy succeed?
  
- The President was quite pleased with Mitterrand's strong performance in Moscow and called him to state his backing for Mitterrand's firm stance. The French have not always been this helpful -- do you think it will continue?
  
- What has been the reaction to the Ambassador's press conference in Paris in which he suggested that the U.S. Federal Reserve should lower interest rates?

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Message From Chey Sga

Informal Translation provided by S Staff

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My Dear George:

Last Sunday on the telephone we spoke about an eventual "surgical operation", quick and short, in the Near East and of of the unusual concentration of American naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean. I will not return to this in as much as these subjects have been broached since then with your Ambassador in Paris and in Washington with McFarlane's deputies.

You also said to me that you would be interested in my personal reflections on the situation in the midst of the Lebanese conference in Geneva. Here they are: this meeting can and ought to represent notable progress: we must note with satisfaction this moment of Lebanese unity, and this around the elected president, that is to say the legal and legitimate authority in Lebanon. This was a major hope of the four participants at the October 27 meeting in La Celle Saint Cloud. We must encourage the Lebanese on this path. The recent reception of President Gemeyal by my President in Paris was meant to do this. And we are acting in the same spirit with all the Lebanese with whom we meet (Camille Chamoun was with me yesterday, there will be many other occasions). The position of the great American ally must stay crystal clear. We know that nothing will be able to stop the rapid move towards the consolidation of the partition of Lebanon into three distinct entities--even more--if the Lebanese are not capable of expressing themselves jointly, better yet with one sole voice on the vital questions concerning the future of their people and their state.

There is thus a problem with regard to the May 17 agreements according to all the Lebanese meeting together. That is an affirmation that cannot be ignored. Whatever the difficulty. Particularly for you as the patron of the Khalde negotiations.

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I hasten to add that understandably the security of Galilee and Israel must be assured and guaranteed by texts and on the ground. The withdrawal is not something directed only at the Israelis, all of the foreign forces must leave.

The position of your government--and that of Israel--is different from that of the European governments--from the Government of France in particular--with regard to the Palestinians. We are convinced that Lebanon will not recover her full sovereignty her full independence if several thousands of men, women, and children, for whom all hope for the future is forbidden, remain on her soil. It is not a question of intergrating them into the Lebanese community as if they were in Jordan, Syria...that would be beyond all reason. It is necessary thus, that the Palestinians have the certainty of a homeland that they consider their own. This poses the problem of the withdrawal from the territories currently occupied by Israel (Resolution 242).

This presupposes the existance of a Palestinian authority capable, when the moment comes, of engaging the Palestinian people. For the Europeans, this authority is the PLO, nine out of ten of them have affirmed this many times. It does not come as a surprise that the forces which are imposing the partition of Lebanon are equally engaged, actively engaged, in the annihilation of this organization. This is, in our view, a tremendous political mistake. We will Yassar Arafat. We will not longer have any other solutions for dealing with the Palestinians then by going through Jerusalem and Damascus, the confirmed masters of two halves of this people--that is something which shocks the conscience

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and compromises the middle or in any case the long term--the direct actors in Lebanon itself of the manipulation of the Palestinians who remain there. As comfortable as they may be, new UN (refugee) camps do not represent in any manner an alternative. The great mistake of 1949 must not be repeated in 1984. This analysis explains the hostility of Syria (and the attitude of Israel) vis-a-vis Yassar Arafat. As it also clarifies our support for the PLO, in Beirut fourteen months ago and in Tripoli for the last two months. I am happy that in Tokyo you called for a ceasefire in North Lebanon. I know that our analyses remain different on this subject.

We come then to the Syrians. They believe that they have in their hands all the trump cards. This pretension is not without reason. Without war or in a local war Assad plays his game with coldbloodedness, determination and cynicism. Whether he appears as the accomplice of Israel or the enemy of the loyalist Palestinian troops, does not embarrass him in the least. He wants to control the Palestinians and become their champion in their fight against Israel. Thus could begin the propagation of disorder in the Gulf. He affirms his right of direct or indirect sovereignty over the essential part of Lebanon.

He wants also to be recognized as the grand Arab chief of the Machrak. Iraq is paralyzed by war into which it jumped against a more revolutionary Iran, more heavily populated and also more nationalist than itself. The Palestinian entity is little by little relegated to a dream. And Assad acts as if he was resigned, even ready to divide the region and its people with Israel.

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How to contain him short of being able to repulse or diminish him? An Iraq liberated from war, a PLO strengthened with the support of the most determined and perhaps the most advanced of the Arab peoples would be the active agents. In this case Egypt could renounce its traditional periodic retreat to the Nile. But this has not actually happened yet.

It is necessary to impress upon the Syrians the unity of the Lebanese, the cohesion of Jordan, the power of Israel, the support of their European and American friends to which one and the other contribute. The necessity for Syria to hold onto the financial support of the Gulf must be brought home to the ruling circles in Damascus. This is why without having any illusions, I attach so much importance to the timid and rare ~~remonstrances~~ <sup>remonstrations</sup> of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the GCC...I also hope that the Arab summit currently planned for December in Riyadh or Taif will finish by reunifying them. There the contradiction between the discourse of Damascus in favor of the unity of the Machrak, of Lebanon, of the Palestinians and of the Arab nations and the policy of Syria which <sup>separates</sup> divides and opposes will become evident.

It is necessary thus, to hold on to our relations with the Syrians as you said at La Celle Saint Cloud, to encourage the Arabs to work together to comfort Iraq...

I will go one step further at the risk of surprise: The Soviet Union is not entirely satisfied with the grandiose posture of its former protege. Its protection has succeeded so well that it has transformed itself in <sup>to</sup> the dependence of Moscow on Damascus,

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which has come to disturb the Soviet game and the Soviet ambition in Iraq and the rest of the Near East. <sup>Nothing says</sup> ~~There is nothing to say~~ that one day the Kremlin will not be interested in neutralizing the most menacing forces which would be capable of going beyond the line or the attitude decided in Moscow. It is true that this is only a hypothesis. We will have a good deal of time to reflect on it.

Today we must stand firm, avoiding blows, terrorists above all, aiding our friends, containing the others, utilizing all of our means which are different, my dear George, even though ours are more reduced than yours. They count because of their <sup>antiquity</sup> ~~age~~, their roots in the depth of the cultures, and the national and regional pride of the Near East.

My letter is long. You had asked me to reflect deeply. This message brings you the echo of that reflection from Athens on the margins of a meeting between the ten ministers of the European community. I will telegraph you soon to propose one or two dates for a future meeting with our German and British colleagues. Without waiting I assure you of my friendly sentiments.

Claude Cheysson

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NLRR M07-081 #46593

BY W NARA DATE 5/19/18

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MON CHER GEORGE, DIMANCHE DERNIER AU TELEPHONE, NOUS AVONS PARLE D'UNE EVENTUELLE "OPERATION CHIRURGICALE", PONCTUELLE ET BREVE AU PROCHE ORIENT ET DE L'INHABITUELLE CONCENTRATION NAVALE AMERICAINE EN MEDITERRANEE ORIENTALE., JE N'Y REVIENDRAI PAS, D'AUTANT MOINS QUE CES SUJETS ONT ETE ABORDES DEPUIS LORS AVEC TON AMBASSADEUR A PARIS ET A WASHINGTON AVEC L'ADJOINT DE MC FARLANE.

TU M'AS AUSSI DIT QUE TU SERAIS INTERESSE PAR MES REFLEXIONS PERSONNELLES SUR LA SITUATION AU LENDEMAIN DU CONGRES LIBANAIS DE GENEVE. LES VOICI :

CETTE REUNION PEUT ET DEVRAIT REPRESENTER UN PROGRES NOTABLE : NOUS DEVONS NOTER AVEC SATISFACTION CE MOMENT D'UNITE LIBANAISE, ET CE AUTOUR DU PRESIDENT ELU, C'EST A DIRE DE L'AUTORITE LEGALE ET LEGITIME DU LIBAN. C'ETAIT UN SOUCI MAJEUR DES 4 PARTICIPANTS A LA REUNION DE LA CELLE SAINT CLOUD LE 27 OCTOBRE. IL FAUT ENCOURAGER LES LIBANAIS SUR CETTE VOIE. LA RECEPTION IMMEDIATE DU PRESIDENT GEMAYEL PAR MON PRESIDENT A PARIS VA DANS CE SENS ET NOUS AGISSONS DANS LE MEME ESPRIT AUPRES DE TOUS LES LIBANAIS QUE NOUS RENCONTRONS (C.CHAMOUN ETAIT HIER CHEZ MOI., IL Y A BIEN D'AUTRES OCCASIONS). LA POSITION DU GRAND ALLIE AMERICAIN DOIT RESTER CLAIRE ET NETTE. NOUS SAVONS QUE RIEN NE POURRA ARRETER LA RAPIDE DERIVE ACTUELLE VERS LA CONSOLIDATION DU PARTAGE DU LIBAN EN 3 ENTITES DISTINCTES - VOIRE PLUS - SI LES LIBANAIS NE SONT PAS CAPABLES DE S'EXPRIMER CONJOINTEMENT, MIEUX ENCORE D'UNE SEULE VOIX SUR TOUTES LES QUESTIONS VITALES CONCERNANT L'AVENIR DE LEUR PEUPLE ET DE LEUR ETAT.

IL Y A DONC PROBLEME PAR RAPPORT A L'ACCORD DU 17 MAI, DECLARENT ENSEMBLE LES LIBANAIS. VOILA UNE AFFIRMATION QUI NE PEUT ETRE IGNOREE, QUELQUE SOIT LA DIFFICULTE, POUR VOUS EN PARTICULIER QUI AVEZ PATRONNE L'EXERCICE DE KHALDE. J'AJOUTE QUE BIEN SUR, LA SECURITE DE LA GALILEE ET D'ISRAEL DOIT ETRE ASSUREE ET GARANTIE PAR DES TEXTES ET SUR LE TERRAIN. L'EVACUATION NE CONCERNE PAS UNIQUEMENT LES ISRAELIENS., TOUTES LES FORCES ETRANGERES DOIVENT PARTIR.

.../...

LA POSITION DE VOTRE GOUVERNEMENT - ET DE CELUI D'ISRAEL - EST DIFFERENTE DE CELLE DES GOUVERNEMENTS EUROPEENS - DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANCAIS EN PARTICULIER - A PROPOS DES PALESTINIENS. NOUS SOMMES CONVAINCUS QUE LE LIBAN NE RECOUVRERA PAS SA PLEINE SOUVERAINETE, SA COMPLETE INDEPENDANCE SI DEMEURENT SUR SON SOL PLUSIEURS CENTAINES DE MILLIERS D'HOMMES, DE FEMMES ET D'ENFANTS A QUI TOUT ESPOIR, TOUT Avenir EST INTERDIT. IL N'EST PAS QUESTION DE LES INTEGRER DANS LA COMMUNAUTE LIBANAISE - COMME ILS LE SONT EN JORDANIE, EN SYRIE, ... -, CELLE-CI SERAIT BOULEVERSEE AU DELA DE TOUTE RAISON. IL FAUT DONC QUE LES PALESTINIENS AIENT LA CERTITUDE D'UNE TERRE, D'UNE PATRIE QU'ILS CONSIDERENT COMME LEUR. CECI POSE LE PROBLEME DE L'EVAQUATION DE TERRITOIRES ACTUELLEMENT OCCUPES PAR ISRAEL (RESOLUTION 242).

CECI COMPORTE AUSSI L'EXISTENCE D'UNE AUTORITE PALESTINIENNE CAPABLE, LE MOMENT VENU, D'ENGAGER LE PEUPLE PALESTINIEN. POUR LES EUROPEENS, CETTE AUTORITE EST L'OLP., LES 9 PUIS LES 10 L'ONT AFFIRME MANTES FOIS. NULLE SURPRISE A CE QUE LES FORCES QUI IMPOSENT LE PARTAGE DU LIBAN SOIENT EGALEMENT ENGAGEES, ACTIVEMENT ENGAGEES, DANS L'ANEANTISSEMEENT DE CETTE ORGANISATION. C'EST, D'APRES NOUS, UNE GRANDE FAUTE POLITIQUE. Y. ARAFAT NOUS MANQUERA. NOUS N'AURONS PLUS D'AUTRE SOLUTION POUR TRAITER DES PALESTINIENS QUE DE PASSER PAR JERUSALEM ET DAMAS, MAITRES CONFIRMES DE DEUX PARTIES DE CE PEUPLE - CE QUI CHOQUE LA CONSCIENCE ET COMPROMET LES MOYENS OU EN TOUT CAS LE LONG TERME -, ACTEURS DIRECTS AU LIBAN MEME DANS LA MANIPULATION DES PALESTINIENS QUI Y DEMEURERONT. SI CONFORTABLES SOIENT ILS, DE NOUVEAUX CAMPS DES NATIONS UNIES NE REPRESENTENT DE NULLE MANIERE UNE ALTERNATIVE. LA GRANDE ERREUR DE 1949 NE DOIT PAS ETRE REPETEE EN 1984.

L'ANALYSE QUI PRECEDE EXPLIQUE L'ACHARNEMENT DE LA SYRIE (ET L'ATTITUDE D'ISRAEL) EN FACE DE YASSER ARAFAT, COMME ELLE ECLAIRE NOTRE SOUTIEN A LA DIRECTION DE L'OLP, A BEYROUTH IL Y A 14 MOIS, A TRIPOLI DEPUIS 2 MOIS. JE SUIS HEUREUX QUE DE TOKYO, VOUS AYEZ APPELE A LA CESSATION DES COMBATS AU NORD-LIBAN. JE SAIS CEPENDANT QUE NOS ANALYSES DIFFERENT A CE SUJET.

.../...

PAGE TROIS

VENONS-EN AUX SYRIENS. ILS ONT LE SENTIMENT D'AVOIR EN MAINS LES ATOUTS MAJEURS., CETTE PRETENTION N'EST PAS DEMESUREE. SANS GUERRE OU DANS LA GUERRE LOCALE, H. EL ASSAD MENE SON JEU AVEC SANG-FROID, DETERMINATION ET CYNISME. APPARAITRE COMME LE COMPLICE D'ISRAEL OU COMME L'ENNEMI DES COMBATTANTS LOYALISTES PALESTINIENS NE LE GENE PAS LE MOINS DU MONDE. IL VEUT CONTROLER L'ESSENTIEL DES PALESTINIENS ET DEVENIR LEUR CHAMPION DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE ISRAEL, AINSI PEUT-ETRE QUE DANS LA NAISSANCE ET LA PROPAGATION DU DESORDRE DANS LE GOLFE. IL AFFIRME SON DROIT DE SUZERAINETE DIRECTE OU INDIRECTE SUR L'ESSENTIEL DU LIBAN.

IL VEUT AUSSI ETRE RECONNU COMME LE GRAND CHEF ARABE DU MACHRAK. L'IRAK EST PARALYSEE PAR LA GUERRE DANS LAQUELLE IL S'EST JETE AVEC LEGERETE CONTRE UN IRAN PLUS REVOLUTIONNAIRE, PLUS PEUPLE ET AUSSI NATIONALISTE QUE LUI., L'ENTITE PALESTINIENNE EST PEU A PEU RAMENEE A L'ETAT DE REVE. ET ASSAD AGIT COMME S'IL ETAIT RESIGNE, SINON PRET, A PARTAGER LA REGION ET SES PEUPLES AVEC ISRAEL.

~~///~~, COMMENT LE CONTENIR, FAUTE DE POUVOIR LE REFOULER OU LE DIMINUER ? UN IRAK LIBERE DE LA GUERRE, UNE OLP FORTE DE L'APPUI DU PLUS DETERMINE ET PEUT ETRE DU PLUS AVANCE DES PEUPLES ARABES SERAIENT DES AGENTS ACTIFS., DANS CE CAS, L'EGYPTE POURRAIT RENONCER A SON TRADITIONNEL PERIODIQUE REPLI SUR LE NIL. MAIS CECI NE PEUT ACTUELLEMENT ARRIVER.

IL FAUT IMPRESSIONNER LES SYRIENS, ~~///~~ L'UNITE DES LIBANAIS, LA COHESION DE LA JORDANIE, LA FORCE D'ISRAEL, L'APPUI DE LEURS AMIS EUROPEENS ET AMERICAINS AUX UNS ET AUX AUTRES Y CONTRIBUENT. LA NECESSITE POUR LA SYRIE DE GARDER LE SOUTIEN FINANCIER DU GOLFE DOIT RESTER PRESENTE A L'ESPRIT DES DIRIGEANTS A DAMAS. C'EST POURQUOI, SANS ME FAIRE D'ILLUSION, J'ATTACHE DE L'IMPORTANCE AUX TIMIDES ET RARES REMONTRANCES DE L'ARABIE SEOUDITE, DE KOWEIT, DU CCEAG,... J'ESPERE AUSSI QUE LE SOMMET ARABE, UN MOMENT PREVU POUR DECEMBRE, A RIYAD OU TAIEF, FINIRA PAR SE REUNIR. Y APPARAITRA NECESSAIREMMENT LA CONTRADICTION ENTRE LE DISCOURS DE DAMAS - EN FAVEUR DE L'UNITE DU MACHRAK, DU LIBAN, DES PALESTINIENS, DE LA NATION ARABE,... - ET LA POLITIQUE DE LA SYRIE - QUI DIVISE, MORCELLE, OPPOSE,... -

.../...

42-A

PAGE QUATRE

IL FAUT DONC GARDER DES RAPPORTS AVEC LES SYRIENS, TU L'AS DIT A LA CELLE SAINT CLOUD, ENCOURAGER LES ARABES A TRAVAILLER ENSEMBLE, CONFORTER L'IRAK,...

J'IRAI PLUS LOIN ENCORE, AU RISQUE DE SURPRENDRE : L'UNION SOVIETIQUE N'EST PAS ENTIEREMENT SATISFAITE DE LA GRANDIOSE EPOPEE DE SON ANCIEN "PROTEGE"., CETTE PROTECTION A SI BIEN REUSSI QU'ELLE S'EST PARFOIS TRANSFORMEE EN DEPENDANCE DE MOSCOU PAR RAPPORT A DAMAS, QU'ELLE EN EST VENUE A TROUBLER LE JEU ET L'AMBITION SOVIETIQUE EN IRAK, DANS LE RESTE DU PROCHE ORIENT. RIEN NE DIT QU'UN JOUR LE KREMLIN NE SERA PAS INTERESSE A STERILISER OU NEUTRALISER LES FORCES LES PLUS MENACANTES, CELLES QUI PEUVENT ENTRAINER AU DELA DE LA LIGNE OU DE L'ATTITUDE DECIDEE A MOSCOU.

CECI, IL EST VRAI, N'EST QU'HYPOTHESE, NOUS AURONS BIEN DU TEMPS POUR Y REFLECHIR.

AUJOURD'HUI, IL FAUT TENIR, EVITER LES COUPS, TERRORISTES SURTOUT, AIDER NOS AMIS, CONTENIR LES AUTRES, EN JOUANT DE TOUS NOS MOYENS QUI SONT DIFFERENTS, MON CHER GEORGE., BIEN QUE LES NOTRES SOIENT PLUS REDUITS QUE LES TIENS, ILS COMPTENT PAR LEUR ANCIENNETE, LEUR ENRACINEMENT DANS LA PROFONDEUR DES CULTURES ET DES FIERTES NATIONALES OU REGIONALES DANS LE PROCHE ORIENT.

MA LETTRE EST LONGUE. TU M'AVAIS DEMANDE DE REFLECHIR TOUT HAUT. CE MESSAGE T'APPORTE L'ECHO DE CETTE REFLEXION, A ATHENES, EN MARGE D'UNE REUNION ENTRE LES 10 MINISTRES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE.

JE TE TELEGRAPHIERAI SOUS PEU POUR PROPOSER UNE OU DES DATES POUR NOTRE FUTURE REUNION AVEC NOS COLLEGUES ALLEMAND ET ANGLAIS.

SANS ATTENDRE, JE T'ASSURE DE NOS SENTIMENTS AMICAUX.  
CLAUDE.

SIGNE : CHEYSSON



NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8405836

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 08 AUG 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

*sent  
11/7/83*

DOCDATE 07 AUG 84

KEYWORDS FRANCE

AP

CHEYSSON, CLAUDE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ PRES BY FOMIN CHEYSSON 19 - 21 SEP

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO RYAN DUE: 13 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

MARTIN

FORTIER

SOMMER

MATLOCK

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8422162

LOG

NSCIFID

( CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*Mcfarlane X 8/10 for decision*

*- AUG 13 1984 Ponderites approved*

*Thompson S AUG 13 1984 signature*

*C 8/13 Thompson Sgl Mem*

*CO, CU, PT*

DISPATCH *8/13 W*

W/ATTCH FILE *PK*

National Security Council  
The White House

87  
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Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

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John Poindexter	3	✓	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Thompson	4		A

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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I think meeting with the VP would be sufficient.

46

National Security Council  
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JAF

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Paul Thompson	1		
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	<b>A = Action</b>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

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5836

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

48

August 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Cheysson (C)

Thank you for the suggestion that the President meet with French Foreign Minister Cheysson; the President's schedule, however, will not permit such a meeting. (C)

*Paul B. Thompson for*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *sm* NARA, Date *1/7/08*

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5836

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48544

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

August 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Cheysson

State has requested a meeting with the President (Tab I) for French Foreign Minister Cheysson, citing precedent (the President will have met with Genscher, Howe, and Andreotti) and our current excellent relationship with the French. However, to my mind Cheysson, who will lose his post in the next two months, has been less than helpful on a range of issues -- Central America, Mid-East, SDI, etc. Therefore, I recommend against our pursuing this State request, which I understand was submitted without a great degree of enthusiasm.

*Jim* Jack Matlock, *can* Constantine Menges, and *PSF* Peter Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Kimmitt to inform State (via the memo at Tab II) that the President's schedule does not permit this meeting.

Approve *J*

Disapprove       

Attachment

- Tab I - Incoming from State
- Tab II - Kimmitt to Hill Memo

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M07-0811 #48544  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 7, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 AUG 7

PIO: 32

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48545

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Appointment Request for Claude Cheysson,  
French Minister of External Relations

French Minister of External Relations Claude Cheysson will visit Washington at his request September 19-21, proceeding from here to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly. In addition to his meeting with Secretary Shultz, he has requested meetings with the President and Vice President. The French Embassy is also planning a breakfast and meetings for Cheysson with Congressional leaders.

The Department recommends that the President meet briefly with Cheysson. He has at times been a difficult interlocutor on certain issues; however, a meeting would build on the close relationship between the Reagan and Mitterrand administrations evidenced by the very successful State visit in March and the high degree of consensus on East-West and security issues. Cheysson was received by the President in June 1981 soon after the socialists took power and was part of the State visit and NAC delegations to the White House. Apart from the initial get-acquainted session, the President has not had the opportunity to meet privately with Cheysson. By contrast, the President has met with both the German and British Foreign Ministers in the last year and a meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister is planned for August 13. We feel that a meeting with Cheysson would be consistent with our practice of arranging occasional Presidential contacts with foreign ministers of major allied partners, and would help sustain the positive trend in our relations with France which has been evident over the past year.

*Charles H. Hill*  
Charles H. Hill  
Executive Secretary

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NLRR m07-061 #48545  
BY dt NARA DATE 5/19/10

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