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NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON
1. (SEGRET - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 17 BILATERAL MEETING WITH CHEYSSON CONCENTRATED UPON LEBANON, WITH

CHEYSSON INFORMING THE SECRETARY OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO THE PREVIOUS DAY. CHEYSSON SAID THAT IN THEIR PRIVATE SESSION GROMYKO HAD ASKED A SERIES OF DETAILED QUESTIONS REGARDING FRENCH VIEWS AS TO THE CREATION OF A UN FORCE FOR BEIRUT. CHEYSSON SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT WISH TO BE TIED

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COMPLETELY TO THE SYRIANS AND MIGHT THEREFORE BE WILLING TO DEMONSTRATE SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE. HE INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW PURSUE THE QUESTION BOTH WITH THE SYRIAN AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS. OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND CHEYSSON INCLUDED CDE, THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE JUNE 6 D-DAY CEREMONIES IN NORMANDY. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE SECRETARY MET IN HIS HOTEL WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON 10/15 TO 10/45 ON JANUARY

17. ACCOMPANYING CHEYSSON WERE POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI, PM DIRECTOR RENOUARD, PLANNING DIRECTOR GERGORIN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT DELBOURG AND ELYSEE STAFFER VEDREEN. PARTICIPATING ON US SIDE ASST SECY BURT, ASST SECY HUGHES, PM DIRECTOR HOWE, NSC STAFFER MATLOCK AND DAS DOBBINS.

4. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HIS CDE SPEECH THAT AFTERNOON CONCENTRATED ON TWO PARTS: THE FIRST ON BEHALF OF THE EC AND THE SECOND ON THOSE THINGS EC MEMBERS DID NOT PERMIT HIM TO SAY ON THEIR BEHALF. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON DEFENSE ON BEHALF OF A GROUP WHICH RANGED FROM NEUTRAL (IRISH) TO NEUTRALIST (GREECE) TO NUCLEAR POWERS (UK AND FRANCE). THE SECOND HALF OF HIS STATEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A JUSTIFICATION OF INF DEPLOYMENT TO WHICH THE IRISH HAD OBJECTED AND A REAFFIRMATION THAT THE CDE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS NUCLEAR ISSUES, TO WHICH THE GREEKS OBJECTED.

. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY HIS EC COLLEAGUES, WITH WHOM HE HAD JUST HAD BREAKFAST, TO INDICATE THAT THEY APPRECIATED THE TONE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REFLECTED THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE

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AND IN THE BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. IS READY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE. IF GROMYKO RESPONDS POSITIVELY THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR AN EXCHANGE ON A BROAD AGENDA.

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6. CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH GROMYKO THE PREVIOUS DAY BOTH PRIVATELY AND IN A LARGER GROUP WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE ADVISERS. THE LARGER MEETING HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. THE SOVIETS HAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED THEIR UNHAPPINESS WITH U.S. ACTION AND SAW THE U.S. HAND EVERYWHERE. THIS WAS RATHER DISAPPOINTING. THEIR PRIVATE SESSION WAS MORE INTERESTING, HOWEVER. GROMYKO HAD IMMEDIATELY INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

7. RECALLING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ON OCCASION SHOWN SIGNS OF ADOPTING A POSITIVE POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN RECENT MONTHS, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 540 ON THE GULF AND FOR A CEASEFIRE IN TRIPOLI, CHEYSSON SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO BE A LITTLE MORE INDEPENDENT OF SYRIA. THEY HAD BROADER OBJECTIVES BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE PLO AND IRAQ, FOR INSTANCE. THIS SOVIET DESIRE NOT TO BE TIED EXCLUSIVELY TO SYRIA MEANT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE REGARDING LEBANON.

FRANCE HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF UN OBSERVERS THERE. AT THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY THIS WAS THE FIRST ISSUE GROMYKO ADDRESSED ASKING A SERIES OF SPECIFIC OUESTIONS. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD BT

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8. CHEYSSON SAID OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH GROMYKO HAD ASKED INCLUDED THE COMPOSITION OF A UN FORCE IN

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BEIRUT, WOULD THE FRENCH WISH TO STAY> WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER MNF PARTICIPANTS> WHAT WOULD THE MANDATE FOR SUCH A FORCE LOOK LIKE> CHEYSSON SAID HE HAS RESPONDED THAT AS FRANCE IS ALREADY A MEMBER OF UNIFIL. IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETAIN TROOPS IN BEIRUT AS A PART OF THE UN FORCE BUT WOULD NOT INSIST UPON DOING SO. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A FORCE SHOULD BE LEFT TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL. CHEYSSON TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT HE HAD IN FACT DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN PARIS THE PRECEDING WEEK. REGARDING THE MANDATE CHEYSSON SAID HE TOLD GROMYKO THAT IT WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. AND OF COURSE THE REQUEST WOULD NEED TO COME FROM THE LEBANESE. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED THAT GROMYKO HAD NOT ARGUED AGAINST A UN FORCE FOR EIRUT. AS THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN DOING UNTIL SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. ON THE BASIS THAT A UN FORCE WOULD BE AN INAPPROPRIATE INSTRUMENT TO RESPOND TO A DOMESTIC CONFLICT. CHEYSSON REPEATED THAT FRANCE NOW INTENDED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF A FORCE WITH THE SYRIANS. HE RECALLED THAT IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS HE HAD WITH KHADDAM. THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFIL GUARDING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BUT NOT A ROLE IN BEIRUT PROPER. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD TOLD GEMAYEL A MONTH AGO THAT THEY WOULD EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY. FRANCE WOULD NOW RENEW THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH GEMAYEL, THE FIRST MOVE HAVING TO COME FROM HIM.

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9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN THE US SUPPORT FOR MAINTAINING PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF WAS STRENGTHENING AGAIN AFTER SOME WEAKENING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE LONG COMMISSION REPORT. THE PRESIDENT'S OWN RESOLUTION IN THIS REGARD WAS VERY STRONG. THOSE IN THE US WHO ADVOCATED THE WITHDRAWAL, WHAT WAS BECOMING THE "CUT AND RUN"

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OPTION, WOULD FIND, THE SECRETARY SAID, THAT THEY HAD MADE A MISTAKE. PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT APPEARED TIGHTLY CONNECTED WITH SYRIAN ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTION OF THE MNF PARTNERS. WHEN THEY PERCEIVE THIS RESOLUTION TO BE STRONG. THE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. WHEN THEY PERCEIVE IT TO BE WEAK, THE SYRIANS BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO TALK TO. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO DEMONSTRATE THE FIRMNESS OF THE MNF PARTNERS. THE ISRAELIS WERE PROVING COOPERATIVE, THE SECRETARY SAID. THEY HAD EVEN COOPERATED REGARDING THE PLO EVACUATION FROM TRIPOLI VERY MUCH AGAINST THEIR OWN INCLINATION.

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10. CHEYSSON SAID THAT IN FRANCE THERE WAS NOT A PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING LEBANON. THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, SAW LITTLE THAT THEIR FORCES IN LEBANON COULD DO. EXCEPT DEFEND THEMSELVES. AND EVEN THIS COULD NOT BE DONE PERFECTLY. PROTECTION FOR FRENCH FORCES HAD BEEN IMPROVED AND AS A RESULT. FRENCH CIVILIANS HAD BECOME TERRORIST TARGETS. THERE WERE 7,000 FRENCH CIVILIANS IN LEBANON. FRENCH SCHOOLS. CULTURAL CENTERS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS WERE POTENTIAL TARGETS. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED WITH LEBANON SEEMED TO BE WORKING WELL. WHEN FRENCH FORCES WERE ATTACKED THEY RESPONDED, MORE SHIITES WERE KILLED AND THE SITUATION DETERIURATED FURTHER. THIS COULD NOT GO ON INDEFINITELY. CERTAINLY THE SITUATION COULD NOT BE ΒT

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12. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED CHEYSSON INQUIRED

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WHETHER A VISIT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO NORMANDY ON JUNE 6 HAD BEEN FIRMLY DECIDED UPON. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IT HAD. HE ASKED WHO ELSE WOULD BE PRESENT. CHEYSSON SAID THAT MITTERAND WOULD CERTAINLY ATTEND THE CEREMONIES IF PRESIDENT REAGAN WERE THERE. HE INDICATED IHAT MRS. THATCHER WAS PROBABLY ALSO COMING BUT SAID HE WOULD CONFIRM HER PARTICIPATION AND INFORM THE U.S.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

February 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu -- February 24 -- 3:15 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Hernu tomorrow for 30 minutes in your office. Accompanying Hernu will be the French Ambassador Bernard Vernier-Palliez and Francois Heisbourg, International Affairs Advisor to the Defense Minister. We have arranged to have the State Department Interpreter Alex Toumayan at the session, although you may not feel that it is necessary.

- Hernu will likely want to discuss means by which we can enhance U.S.-France military cooperation. As you know, Ambassador Galbraith has been in contact with Hernu, pressing for Van's plan to preposition military stocks in France, and the establishment of a joint defense policy working group.
- State, with DOD's belated approval, has sent a strong note to Galbraith directing that he not pursue with the GOF the idea of prestocking military materiel in France. The objections were substantive from JCS (no requirement for prepositioning) to politico-military by OSD and SACEUR (usurping of the successful channel Rogers enjoys with Lacaze). Hernu may have some thoughts on this.
- On formal military cooperation, Weinberger will raise with Hernu the suggestion that we announce regular consultations at the level of Minister/Secretary of Defense. I will provide you a heads-up on this as to Hernu's reaction, but I suspect that France will not be too enthusiastic over increasing the public visibility of our contacts.
- State will press Hernu on means by which we can foster U.S.-French cooperation in the defense of Central Europe. Mitterrand has been quite vocal recently on European security, particularly in a major speech at the Hague on February 7. We need to draw him out as to specific French initiatives to "counter pacifism and neutralism" that Mitterrand suggested.

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The French are tightening up on technology transfer, particularly now that the MOD has taken a strong role in the COCOM process. They should be encouraged not to slack off.

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The French have looked with concern at our Strategic Defense Initiative since they feel it will drive the Soviets along the same road, thus rendering French and British strategic systems useless as deterrents. Hernu should be reassured that the U.S. will do nothing in SDI hastily nor without full and frank consultations with all our Allies.

The French are concerned that NATO policy issues, such as Emerging Technologies, tech transfer, two-way street, are being handled too often by the various military committees, thus foreclosing French participation. Hernu should be told that with some imagination and flexibility, NATO should be able to work out the modalities for French cooperation, but that there must be a role for the military committees as well. (FYI: The French cannot have the benefits of walking out and staying in.)

Hernu may talk about waiver of R&D costs and offsetting two-way street U.S. purchases of French equipment as part of a French AWACS buy. This issue is being addressed by DOD (Dr. Delauer and Co.). The SecDef is authorized to waiver R&D costs on the basis of the promotion of NATO standardization and/or a compensatory "quid" for the U.S.

As time permits, you may also wish to probe current French thinking on the military situation in the Persian Gulf and Chad. You may also wish to express our concern over reports that the GOF is considering the sale of air defense systems to Nicaragua.



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TO THE WHITE HOUSE SECSTATE WASH DC SECDEF WASH DC

AT THE CONCLUSION OF A LENGTHY SESSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SAID THAT HIS MILITARY STAFF HAD PICKED UP INFORMATION SUGGESTING THAT THE FRENCH AND THE U.S. CONTINGENTS ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACK. HE URGED US TO EXERCISE SPECIAL VIGILANCE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. FULL REPORT ON MITTERAND MEETING WILL FOLLOW. BT

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PASSING INSTRUCTIONS: WHITE HOUSE FOR MCFARLANE SECSTATE FOR SECRETARY AND BURT PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR CIA FOR DCI CASEY DOD FOR SEC. WEINBERGER

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE, FEBRUARY 15, 1984

AFTER PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SAID THAT IT WAS GOOD TO SEE THE VICE PRESIDENT AGAIN, THE VICE PRESIDENT REVIEWED HIS TRIP, NOTING HIS TALKS WITH MRS. THATCHER, HIS VISIT TO LUXEMBOURG, HIS JOURNEY TO THE ANDROPOV FUNERAL, AND HIS QUICK VISITS TO ROME AND THE VATICAN.



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MITTERRAND THEN RECALLED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS ONE OF THE VERY FIRST VISITORS IN HIS OFFICE AND THAT HE WAS ALWAYS INTERESTED IN WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD TO SAY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND LEBANON, NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE PRESIDENT THE FOLLOWING DAY AND WAS INTERESTED IN REPORTING MITTERRAND'S VIEWS AT THAT TIME.

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE TRIED IN MOSCOW TO CONVEY TO THE LEADERSHIP THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IMPROVING RELATIONS IN A WIDE ARRAY OF AREAS, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. ON START, HE TOLD CHERNENKO THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO ENGAGE IN A GIVE-AND-TAKE AS A WAY OF ENCOURAGING THE SOVIETS TO RESUME THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

IN HIS MEETING WITH CHERNENKO, HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. CHERNENKO WAS NOT POLEMICAL, BUT ALSO WAS NOT CONCILIATORY. HE SEEMED TO BE IN CONTROL; HE LOOKED BETTER IN THE HALF-HOUR MEETING THAN DURING THE FUNERAL. HE PROJECTED STRENGTH AND AUTHORITY.

IN SUM, THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW UP WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MOVE.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN RECALLED MITTERRAND'S BUNDESTAG SPEECH AND NOTED THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE'S SUCCESS ON INF. HE TOLD MITTERRAND THAT START WAS RAISED IN MOSCOW BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT IT WAS EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAN INF. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAD USED SOME STRONG WORDS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, IS NEVER THE LESS GENUINELY SINCERE ABOUT SEEKING BETTER RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. THIS WAS NOT MERELY AN ELECTION PLOY.

IN RESPONSE, MITTERRAND SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE GIVEN SOME TIME; THEY COULD NOT WIPE THE SLATE CLEAN OVER NIGHT. BUT HE WAS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONVINCED THAT MOSCOW WOULD RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. PERHAPS MOSCOW WANTED TO PLAY WITH DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AS THEY HAD IN EUROPE, BUT HE DIDN'T THINK SO; IN THREE MONTHS THINGS WOULD BE DIFFERENT. THE SOVIETS HAD TO SAVE FACE -- THEIR COUNTERMEASURES IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT REALLY CHANGE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

TURNING TO A POSSIBLE SOVIETS EFFORT TO INCLUDE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES IN START, MITTERRAND SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD A REPLY. BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WARHEADS, PERHAPS 9,000 APIECE, AND WITHIN THIS EQUATION, 98 FRENCH AND 64 BRITISH MISSILE WARHEADS LOST THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. WHILE FRANCE REMAINED ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO INCLUDING FRENCH FORCES IN NEGOTIATIONS, PARIS WOULD NEVER SIMPLY SAY "NO" TO THIS DEMAND, BUT TAKE THE CHINESE LINE WHICH WAS THAT BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SHOULD CUT THEIR FORCES BY 50 PERCENT BEFORE ENTERING ANY NEGOTIATIONS. A GREAT DEAL OF WATER WILL FLOW UNDER THE BRIDGE BEFORE THAT HAPPENS, MITTERRAND OBSERVED.

MRS. THATCHER AGREES WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, MITTERRAND ADDED. IF EVENTS LEAD TO DISCUSSIONS OF THE INCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL, MITTERRAND ASKED THAT WASHINGTON INFORM PARIS SO THAT A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE COULD TAKE PLACE. MITTERRAND ENDED HIS STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL BY SAYING THAT HE WISHED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RESUME TALKS BUT THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD LET NATURE TAKE ITS COURSE. IN THREE MONTHS, HE SAID, THE U.S. WOULD SEE SIGNS OF SOVIET INTEREST.

THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED AGREEMENT AND NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET NON-NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA WAS FULL, INCLUDING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MBFR AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. HE SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE THE U.S. AND THE USSR COULD WORK TO LOWER TENSIONS.

MITTERRAND AGREED, ASSERTING THAT MOSCOW WAS NOT IN THE POSITIONS NOW TO CREATE PROBLEMS -- THERE WAS TOO MUCH UNCERTAINTY AT HOME. BUT

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THE SOVIETS, HE OBSERVED, WERE PROUD AND SUFFERED FROM 70 YEARS OF PERCEIVED ENCIRCLEMENT. THEY ARE A GREAT POWER, BUT STILL POSSESS THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A SMALL POWER.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT AT CHEQUERS WITH MRS. THATCHER, HE HAD MET WITH PROFESSOR BORDEAUX, AN EXPERT ON RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION. HE TOLD THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT IN RECENT VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION, HE HAD FOUND AVERAGE PEOPLE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF WAR AND AFRAID OF THE UNITED STATES. HIS EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS NEEDED TO PUMP UP THE FEAR OF WAR TO DISTRACT CITIZENS FROM ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AT HOME. MITTERRAND INTERJECTED THAT THIS WAS A SOUND VIEW AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A KEEN SENSE OF REALITY. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION OF SEEKING A CONFLICT WITH THE USSR.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN TURNED TO LEBANON, SAYING THAT WASHINGTON WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION THERE, INCLUDING THE COLLAPSE OF THE LAF. HE EXPLAINED THE PRESIDENT'S REDEPLOYMENT DECISION, NOTING THAT THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ACCELERATED BECAUSE OF PRESS LEAKS. HE NOTED AND REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATE TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT OF US NAVY SHELLING WAS CONTROVERSIAL AND STATED THE US VIEW THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PROTECT US INTERESTS IN LEBANON, BT

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INCLUDING THE MARINES AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. HE SAID THAT THE US HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE, BUT IF THIS WERE TRUE, THE ALLEGATIONS WOULD BE FULLY DOCUMENTED BY THE MEDIA. SO FAR, THE SHELLING APPEARED TO HAVE SURPRESSED ARTILLERY FIRE IN BERUIT, THE VICE PRESIDENT REPORTED.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WASHINGTON BELIEVED THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE TOTAL ANARCHY IN WEST BERUIT AND THAT IT WAS POSSIBLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRANIAN AND OTHER RADICAL ACTIONS. WHILE THE MARINES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO OFFSHORE SHIPS, GEMAYEL'S FORCES WOULD BE GIVEN INCREASED ANTITERRORIST SUPPORT AND COUNTER-ARTILLERY TECHNOLOGY. ON THE MARINE REDEPLOYMENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT AN EXACT TIMETABLE HAD NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED, BUT THAT IT WOULD MOST LIKELY TAKE SOME 3Ø DAYS WITH SOME MARINES STAYING BEHIND TO PROTECT THE US EMBASSY AND RESIDENCE. NOTING THE RECENT FRENCH INITIATIVE AT THE UN, THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED MITTERRAND'S VIEWS ON LEBANON.



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MITTERRAND SAID THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE NOW VIEWED AS THE TWO PRINICIPAL SUPPORTERS OF GEMAYEL. BECAUSE GEMAYEL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOVE TOWARDS RECONCILIATION WITH OTHER FACTIONS IN LEBANON, PARIS AND WASHINGTON WERE NOW VIEWED AS SUPPORTING A CHRISTIAN ARMY FIGHTING AGAINST THE MOSLEM WORLD. HE NOTED THAT FRANCE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT; THAT AGREEMENT HAD SERVED NO USEFUL PURPOSE. INDEED, IT NOW PROVIDED SYRIA WITH THE PRETEXT FOR ITS CURRENT ACTIONS. IF THE MAY 17 "OBSTACLE" WERE LIFTED, MITTERRAND SAID THAT SYRIA MIGHT BE WILLING TO DEAL WITH GEMAYEL, A YOUNG BUT INTELLIGENT MAN.

WHILE SOME OBSERVERS WERE NOW CALLING ASSAD A GENIUS MITTERRAND OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT DIFFICULT FOR SYRIA TO HAVE INFLUENCE IN LEBANON, THEY WERE RIGHT THERE. HE NOTED THAT ASSAD REPRESENTED A MINORITY IN HIS OWN COUNTRY AND THAT AS A RESULT, HE HAD TO WORRY ABOUT THE SUNNIS WHILE HE COULD NOT TRUST THE SHIITES. FURTHERMORE, ASSAD COULD NOT TRUST JUMBLATT. NOTING THAT JUMBLATT HAD A COMPLICATED MIND, MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE (JUMBLATT) HAD DEALINGS WITH BOTH THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS AND THAT HE MIGHT NOT LAST MUCH LONGER THAN GEMAYEL.

MITTERRAND THEN SAID THAT THE GEMAYEL "POLITICAL CARD" WAS STILL ON THE TABLE AND THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PICK IT UP, BUT THAT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT REMAINED THE MAJOR OBSTACLE. AT THE SAME TIME, GEMAYEL'S CHANCES WERE DWINDLING AND THE SYRIANS WERE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER CHRISTIAN. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR THE WEST TO INVOLVE ITSELF TOO DIRECTLY IN LEBANON. FRANCE AND THE US, HE SAID, HAD ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES TOO CLOSELY WITH GEMAYEL AND FOR FRANCE, THIS MEANT THE LOSS OF 84 MEN -- PROPORTIONATELY THE SAME LOSS THE US HAD SUFFERED. MITTERRAND SAID HE WANTED TO REMAIN LOYAL TO GEMAYEL, THAT HE TALKED TO HIM BY TELEPHONE THAT MORNING AND WOULD TALK TO HIM AGAIN LATER TONIGHT, BUT THE LAF WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH, THEY REALLY NEEDED ANOTHER YEAR TO ORGANIZE; THERE WERE ONLY 3Ø,ØØØ LOYAL TROOPS ALTOGETHER. OF COURSE, GEMAYEL COULD CONTINUE TO RESIST, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE FRUITFUL TO HAVE A HEAD OF STATE OF A SMALL AREA. THE TIME HAD COME, MITTERRAND SAID, TO HELP GEMAYEL COME TO



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TERMS WITH SYRIA. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS TO CONSIDER HIM A LOST CAUSE.

SPEAKING HYPOTHETICALLY, MITTERRAND SAID HE WOULD TELL SHAMIR THAT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT NO LONGER HAD ANY USE; THAT WITHOUT GEMAYEL IT HAD NO FORCE.

GEMAYEL NEEDED THE LEEWAY TO EXPLORE NEW OPENINGS WITH SYRIA, MITTERRAND ASSERTED. ASSAD NEEDED TO DEFEND HIMSELF AGAINST THE FANATICS AND HIS OWN MAJORITY, THUS HE HAD AN INTEREST IN KEEPING OPEN THE GEMAYEL OPTION BUT GEMAYEL COULD NOT DEAL WITH SYRIA UNTIL HE SHED THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT.

MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE WAS NOT GIVING ANY SPECIFIC ADVICE TO WASHINGTON, BECAUSE FRANCE HAD NOTHING ITSELF TO DO WITH THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED BY THE US REDEPLOYMENT DECISION; HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HEAR SOONER, BUT THAT WAS NOT A TRAGEDY. NOTING HOW CLOSELY US AND FRENCH FORCES HAD COOPERATED IN THE LEBANON "FURNACE," HE SAID THAT IF PARIS AND WASHINGTON WERE LUCKY, THERE WOULD BE SOME KIND OF RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON. THIS WOULD GIVE WASHINGTON AND PARIS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A DIGNIFIED DEPARTURE BUT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT HAD TO GO.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED ABOUT THE FRENCH UN INITIATIVE, SAYING THAT WHILE WASHINGTON MIGHT BE INTERESTED, WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT EXCESSIVE SOVIET DEMANDS.

MITTERRAND SAID THE SOVIETS COULD NOT PUSH TOO FAR. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR BEIRUT WOULD BE AN HONORABLE OUTCOME. THE SOVIETS HAD SET FOUR CONDITIONS AND AT LEAST TWO SEEMED ACCEPTABLE: THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF; AND THE EXCLUSION OF ANY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FROM AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. NOTING A THIRD SOVIET DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US FLEET, MITTERRAND SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY A DEMAND FOR US SHIPS TO PULL BACK MUCH FURTHER THAN JUST BEHIND LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE FOURTH DEMAND -- THAT THERE BE NO FUTURE INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON'S



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AFFAIRS -- WAS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM, HE ADDED. MITTERRAND SAID HE WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES. PERHAPS THEY WANTED A FULL CHRISTIAN DEFEAT OR IN MAKING THESE DEMANDS WERE SIMPLY PLAYING FOR TIME. IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIET POSITION SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPAL. THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TOLD THEIR CONDITIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND THEN SEE WHAT HAPPENS. HE REITERATED THAT A UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE PARIS AND WASHINGTON AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT BY THE END OF THE WEEK TIME MAY HAVE RUN OUT.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD A REPORT THAT GEMAYEL WAS GOING TO GIVE A SPEECH ADDRESSING THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT AND WONDERED WHAT MITTERRAND HAD HEARD. MITTERRAND SAID THAT IN THE EARLIER TELEPHONE CALL, GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT GIVE UP ON THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT WITHOUT US ACQUIESENCE. HE CALLED GEMAYEL AN HONORABLE MAN. THE VICE PRESIDENT AGREED AND EXPRESSED THANKS FOR MITTERRAND'S DETAILED APPRAISAL OF THE LEBANON SITUATION. HE THEN ASKED FOR MITTERRAND'S VIEWS ON THE US SHELLING. MITTERRAND SAID THAT WHEN THE SHELLING WAS DONE TO PROTECT US FORCES, THE ARAB WORLD WOULD UNDERSTAND BUT HE WARNED OF THE DANGER THAT THE SHELLING WOULD BE SEEN AS PART OF A US EFFORT TO CREATE A SMALL CHRISTIAN STATE, THUS EMBROILING WASHINGTON IN A RELIGIOUS WAR. HE SAID THAT THE US SHELLING SHOULD BE HIGHLY ACCURATE AND THAT PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT WASHINGTON WAS SENSITIVE TO THE PUBLIC OPINION ASPECT AND TO THE NEED TO HELP GEMAYEL.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT: Reporting Message on Vice President's Meeting with French Prime Minister Mauroy (S)

At Tab A is a reporting message done by Peter Sommer of our staff on the Vice President's February 15 meeting in Paris with French Prime Minister Mauroy. It has been cleared by the Vice President's office and we ask that you send it by immediate NODIS cable, Feburary 17, to Paris for review and further dissemination. (S)

Robert M. 1 Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

Attachment TAB - A Reporting Message

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR MOTOSI #4600 BY _____ NARA DATE 4/23/10

FROM: SECSTATE

TO: AMEMBASSY PARIS NODIS

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Prime Minister Mauroy

COMMENT: There follows reporting message on the VP's meeting with Mauroy. The VP's office has cleared it and asks that it be sent EXDIS from AmEmbassy Paris to State as action addressee, with Moscow, Managua, and San Salvador as info addressees. You may modify text or addresses, as you deem appropriate.

1. SECRET Entire Text.

2. Summary. In a 50-minute meeting at the Hotel Matignon on February 15, Vice President Bush and Prime Minister Mauroy focused on (a) their initial impressions of new Soviet leader Chernenko -- both came away from Moscow impressed -- and (b) the situation in Central America, especially Nicaragua. While much of

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the Central American discussion revolved around the political philosophy behind the Sandinista revolution, it was clear that the French remained prepared to give the Sandinistas the benefit of the doubt. Ortega has asked France for air defense help; the GOF is reviewing the Sandinista request. The Vice President expressed deep concern over the Sandinistas' continuing attack on the Catholic church. End summary.

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3. After exchanging amenities during the photo session, Prime Minister Mauroy suggested that he and the Vice President compare impressions of their visits to Moscow. Lebanon was also high on his agenda, but, said Mauroy, since he knew President Mitterrand would concentrate on the Middle East in his meeting with the Vice President, there was no need for them to address it. He added that he would also like to review the situation in Central America.

4. Mauroy noted that the funeral ceremony for Andropov was very similar to Brezhnev's, though the level of Western delegations, especially from Europe, was higher. This could not, he thought, be attributed to Andropov's standing, but rather to world tensions and hope for progress. The French press has cast Chernenko in a particularly bad light. Mauroy continued that the French press was missing the "scope of the man." He had met with Chernenko two years ago and found him remarkably similar physically in Moscow yesterday. He had some difficulties mounting stairs, just as he had two years ago. But his physical condition did not appear to have declined in the intervening two-year period. He is strong willed with a keen intellect. Chernenko also seems, said Mauroy, to be able to make a distinction between running a government and directing party philosophy. Mauroy said he had detected signs of compromise with the younger leadership; Gorbachev was in evidence. He had joked to his Soviet contacts that it used to be easier to know the pecking order -- all you had to do was look at how Soviet leadership lined up in a photo. Now pictures apparently do not tell the whole story. Mauroy continued that he had also had a measured review of East-West relations with Premier Tikhonov. The Soviets had as well made it clear that they sought enhanced economic cooperation with France.

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5. The Vice President replied that his own observations were very much in line with Mauroy's. Initially U.S. Sovietologists thought a younger man might replace Andropov, but we see some hope with the designation of Chernenko. The Vice President continued that he found Chernenko to be self-confident; he clearly was in charge of the meeting. Moreover, his physical condition in person was far better than he appeared when seen from a distance walking slowly and deliberately. Senator Baker and Ambassador Hartman, who accompanied the Vice President, shared his impressions. Chernenko demonstrated some humor, and stuck to his speaking notes, but when asked questions answered without help. Chernenko set forth traditional Soviet positions, such as no first use of nuclear weapons; yet in most cases, said the Vice President, Chernenko avoided specifics, but apparently understood the issues well. While not conciliatory, the overall tone was generally positive. Chernenko professed that the Soviets want improved relations with the U.S. The jury is still out on who will wield the real power, but I come away, concluded the

Vice President, more impressed than I thought I would be. The Vice President underscored that the U.S. seeks a constructive and realistic relationship with the Soviet Union and asked the French to keep us informed of their views on the emerging Soviet leadership and its attitudes.

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6. Mauroy then turned to Nicaragua. Ortega had asked to meet with him in Moscow. Their paths seem to cross often. Ortega's sad manner ig troubling; he acts as if he were carrying the weight of the world on his shoulders. Ortega proclaimed that Nicaragua would hold elections in 1984. In response to the Vice President's query, Mauroy said elections are being moved up from 1985 to 1984. Ortega did not, however, announce a definite date in 1984. Ortega also asked why the Americans want elections in El Salvador, when the El Salvadoran leaders do not want them.

7. In noting that Ortega has a chronic fear of U.S. intervention, Mauroy said he tried to reassure him that it would not happen. Mauroy jokingly added that he told Ortega the U.S. cetainly would not intervene in an election year. He underlined that Ortega had utilized last week's air attacks by small combat aircraft to ask for French air defense assistance. Mauroy observed that the French believe Nicaragua's air defense is adequate to meet the threat, while adding that the government is reviewing Ortega's request. No decision has been made.

8. The Vice President asked if the Sandinistas are really worried about a U.S. "invasion" or are they using this false threat to cover up the unfulfilled promises of their revolution.

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Mauroy opined that when he met with Ortega in Buenos Aires in December at the time of Alfonsin's inauguration, Ortega held deep seated fears. In Moscow, Ortega appeared less worried. But it was clear that he sought the meeting to request air defense help. The Vice President said he coundn't really believe that the Sandinistas thought the U.S. would intervene, but he did recognize that after Grenada they convinced themselves that Nicaragua would be next. French Roving Ambassador for Latin America Blanca interjected that Nicaraguan fears reached their highest point last November; by December these fears had slackened. Blanca opined that the Sandinistas currently are not overly concerned about possible U.S. intervention. Oretga has just won a major internal power struggle against Borges, which resulted in confirmation of the decision to hold elections in 1984. Hence, the Sandinistas are currently relatively confident, said Blanca.

9. The Vice President asked for the French view on what had gone wrong with the Sandinista revolution. Mauroy replied that it began as a national revolution based on a form of *&*Ommunism -but not the Soviet model. The revolution then encountered both the difficulties of governing and an internal power struggle. Ortega now appeared to be on top of the situation and the French find the Sandinistas relatively reasonable, taking all factors into account. Mauroy said he has been particularly struck in Buenos Aires that other Latin American leaders accepted the Sandinistas as part of the larger Latin family. The Contadora process is evidence of their regard for the Sandinista revolution. Blanca added that the French do not expect a split in the Sandinista leadership along the lines of the Coard-Bishop struggle in Grenada. The Vice President asked if the Sandinista resolution prevails will Nicaragua become a pure Marxist state. Blanca answered that most of the Sandinista leadership is composed of young revolutionaries from bourgeois backgrounds; Castro is their hero. Regional realities bring out contraditions, and Nicaragua will not follow the Soviet medel. Mauroy noted that even the French Socialists had drawn from the Marxist model, but had adapted it to conditions in France. It is clear that the Sandinistas see Castro's Cuba as a point of reference, but they are searching for their own identify. Blanca continued that the French are seeking to establish regular contact with political groupings of all shades in Latin America.

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10. Referring to the recently released Kissinger Commission report, the Vice President said the Sandinistas made a major mistake in giving a cold reception to the Commission members when they visited Nicaragua. He thought they would have been smart enough to appeal to the differing views among the members. This was a major tactical error, added the Vice President. In defending the Sandinistas, Blanca said they had been up tight and overly concerned about U.S. intervention when the Commission visited. This was during the period, he continued, when the oil refinery had been attacked by air. The attack was so perfectly planned that the Sandinistas were convinced that the guerrillas could not possibly have planned it on their own. The Vice President expressed dismay over the fact that when opposition forces make similar attacks in El Salvador no one has the same feeling of outside support being behind them.

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11. Discussions then turned to a philosophical review of the underlying causes for revolution in Latin America. Mauroy noted that President Betancur, a charismatic leader, had made a profound impression on hig. In comparing their family backgrounds, Mauroy told Betancur that he came from a family of seven. Betancur commented that he was one of twenty-two children, but it was the burying of seventeen of them that killed his mother. This underlined in Mauroy's mind the bleak economic conditions behind Latin America's ills. Like America, Maurov said France prefers the path to democracy, but false democracy for the privileged few is not the answer. Moreover, it is difficult for democracy to flourish in an environment in which the economic situation is directed toward survival. The Vice President replied that his travels of the past few days had left a deep impression. Yesterday he attended a funeral in Red Square in which God was not present, i.e., there is no religion in the Soviet Union. This morning, continued the Vice President, he had seen the Pope in Rome and they had reviewed the tragic situation in Lebanon and Poland. Against this background, he was shocked by the Sandinistas' treatment of the Catholic church. We must address ourselves to the needs of the poor and the downtrodden, said the Vice President. But we should not tolerate those who degrade the church. Mauroy said he appreciated the generous American vision of faith and goodwill. But his own analysis of society's ills indicated that Marxist states do have a basic value system. France does not agree with their basic political phiosophy, but European societies are often more permissive than those under Communist rule. Communist countries are motivated by basic fundamentals, said Mauroy. Communism denies the existence

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of God, but it does permit the development of a basic value system. The Vice President asked that as France tries to understand and help in Central America, they give some though to what he called "faith with freedom." The Sandinistas' failure to respect the Catholic church has greviously harmed their reputation in the U.S. and elsewhere. The Pope is also concerned about advancing basic freedoms in Poland within the confines of the communist system. The Vice President underscored that the Pope gives hope to those who don't want to live under a Communist system. In concluding, Mauroy agreed, but added that he felt the Pope had been a little too conservative on his trip to Latin America. He personally had hoped that the Pope would have spoken out more forcefully and directly.

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12. In addition to Blanca, Mauroy was joined by Garcia and Van Doorne. The Vice President was accompanied by Admiral Murphy, Ambassador Galbraith, Burt, Gregg, and Sommer.



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Unclassified w/ SECRET Attachment 1285

BIGNED

ACTION

February 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

PETER SOMMER FROM:

Reporting Message on Vice President's Meeting with SUBJECT: Prime Minister Mauroy

RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to our conversation, recommend you sign the memo to Hill at Tab I.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Memo to Hill Tab A - Reporting Message

Unclassified w/ SECRET Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x-2702)
cc: McFarlane / Files

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Jeorge Shultz This is a column Bill Buckley I written re the Inlbuith incident RN

On the right

L'Affaire Galbraith

Malcolm Toon is a professional diplomat, formerly the ambassador to the Soviet Union, a very able man who however rides a crotchet or two, least surprising of which is that, really, non-professional diplomats aren't very useful. Last week someone in the State Department quoted Mr. Toon in connection with the affair in Paris involving Ambassador Even Galbraith, indisputably a non-professional. What happened?

On a radio program in Paris, conducted in French, five journalists were having at Mr. Galbraith, who has made himself enormously accessible in Paris during his two years there. He has been the source of some commotion because when he arrived in France, where he had lived for many years as a young banker-lawyer, he made it plain that he was unapologetically enthusiastic about the political philosophy of Ronald Reagan. The notion that Ronald Reagan should send a Reaganite to Paris shook the establishment in France, which for a while, at least, nursed the consoling illusion that America had sleepily elected a simpleton to the White House who however would never be so simple as to send to Paree someone who shared his antideluvian views. However, Galbraith having arrived, it proved difficult to cope with him, in part because he was resolute in expressing his own and the President's opinions, in part because his charm, wit, and intelligence, tend to disarm.

And so, on this interview program, the subject got on to the French Communist Party. And Ambassador Galbraith said of it, "One knows very well that the French Communist Party has a special relation with the Soviet world. Everybody knows very well that the soviet foreign policy is followed by the French Communist Party. Thus, one mistrusts people who are linked with the Communist Party."

There followed in rapid sequence two questions. The first was: Did Ambassador

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Galbraith imply that a French Communist was less than one hundred per cent a Frenchman? Before Galbraith could answer, the second question rang out: Did that mean Galbraith thought that President Mitterand's Transport Minister, Charles Fiterman, was less than one hundred per cent a Frenchman?

Mr. Galbraith, replying to the first question, said that French Communists were "poor Frenchmen gone awry." Well, the press relayed this as Galbraith's having said that Mr. Fiterman was a poor Frenchman, gone awry. Now although the rules of logic are pretty unyielding on the ruthless application of the syllogism (All Athenians are sophists. Pythagoras is an Athenian. Therefore Pythagoras is a sophist), in fact Mr. Galbraith didn't by name depreciate the Frenchhood of Mr. Fiterman.

And this was a technically important point. Because after the newspaper had misreported the exchange, Premier Pierre Mauroy called in our ambassador to reproach him for violating a protocol. That protocol is that no foreign ambassador can criticize personal appointments of the President of the 3

host country. Mr. Galbraith trotted out the transcript, and Mr. Mauroy was instantly appeased, and Galbraith exited on splendid terms. 4


But a great furore has arisen. Because now all of France is revisiting the touchy subject of what on earth are four Communists doing in Mitterand's government, given that their loyalty is so plainly to Moscow, as has been the case since the party's founding. Poor Mr. Fiterman put his foot in it by calling Galbraith "a crude and stupid personality," and Georges Marchais, the chief French comrade, exclaimed, "Where does he think he is, this American ambassador? In Grenada?" On assumes that the Transport Minister laments the interruption of the building of the Soviet airfield on Grenada.

But soon these gentlemen came to regret that they had publicized Mr. Galbraith's statement about the loyalty of French Communists, even as Oscar Wilde came to regret that he had publicized the accusations against his manhood. And Mr. Fiterman has now addressed an urbane open letter to Galbraith, widely viewed as conciliatory, the purport of which is, Can't we just forget this whole thing?

Back to Mr. Toon. What Galbraith did is precisely what a professional diplomat would tend not to do, because professional diplomats, usually for the best of reasons, simply do not like to stir things up. But to stir things up when there is virtue in stirring things up is the job of all good men bent on aiding their country, as the Wall Street Journal, commenting on the episode, Evan Galbraith has correctly observes. reminded the French people that there is an aberrant minority in France which year after year, generation after generatrion, defends Stalin, Gulag, Budapest, Prague, Afghanistan. Okay, it's a free country. But Communists should occasionally be reminded that in fact they behave like cretins, and it is usually amateurs who get around to doing this.

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EVES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER//////

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: FR. US SUBJECT: BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH

REF: PARIS 7350

1. SENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING, FYI, IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO IKLE AND PERLE FOLLOWING LATEST SAULNIER LETTER (REFTEL):

QUOTE: EYES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY IKLE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERLE FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH

1. JACK MARESCA HAS KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON A DEFENSE EXPERTS GROUP FOR COCOM. WITH THE HERNU VISIT COMING UP, I WANTED TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY VERY STRONG FEELINGS THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO CONCLUDE THIS AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH AND GET THE DEFENSE EXPERTS GROUP STARTED.



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2. I REALIZE THAT SAULNIER'S LATEST MESSAGE TO YOU, AND HIS PROPOSED TEXT FOR PARAGRAPH FIVE. ARE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY, BUT I BELIEVE THAT OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN AT THIS POINT SHOULD BE TO CREATE THE DEFENSE EXPERTS GROUP AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE HERNU VISIT PROVIDES TO DO SO.

3. THE FRENCH MOD IS CLEARLY WILLING TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION WE WANT: IN FACT, THEY ARE EAGER TO DO SO. BUT THERE ARE SOME THINGS WHICH THEY CANNOT PUT IN AN AGREEMENT WITH US BECAUSE IT THEN HAS TO BE APPROVED BY OTHER MINISTRIES, WHICH ARE LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA OF A DEFENSE EXPERTS GROUP. ONCE THE GROUP GETS GOING, HOWEVER, THE MOD WILL CONTROL FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTIVITIES.

4. FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW ACCEPT WHAT THE FRENCH ARE OFFERING AND GET THIS ACTIVITY STARTED. THEY HAVE COME A LONG WAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL OPPOSITION TO THIS GROUP (THANKS PRIMARILY TO SAULNIER'S EFFORTS) AND THEIR PRESENT POSITION GIVES US THE POSSIBILITY WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO HAVE A DEFENSE EXPERTS GRDUP ON COCOM IN PARIS. THIS DID NOT SEEM POSSIBLE A YEAR AGO.

5. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE ACCEPT THE LATEST FRENCH OFFER, AND URGE YOU TO ARRANGE FOR SIGNING THE AGREEMENT DURING THE HERNU VISIT. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT AND A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. IF YOU WANT TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER, WE CAN DO SO ON THE PHONE. WITH BEST REGARDS. GALBRAITH. UNQUOTE.

3. MARESCA AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED IDEA OF A SIDE LETTER OR AGREED MINUTE WITH GENERALS SAULNIER AND BLANC ON FEBRUARY 23. SAULNIER SAID IT WAS STILL A POSSIBILITY

SECRET Department of State



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PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 PARIS Ø7543 24112ØZ CØ5/10 Ø08573 AND HE HAD ASKED HERNU FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE IDEA. MARESCA TOLD BLANC FRANKLY THAT WITHOUT A SIDE LETTER OR AGREED MINUTE REFLECTING THE POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN DELETED FROM PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE AGREEMENT, IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT DURING THE HERNU VISIT.

4. BLANC RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT. HE SAID HE WOULD DRAFT SOMETHING ON THE PLANE WITH HERNU AND GET TOGETHER WITH IKLE UPON ARRIVAL TO SEE IF THE TEXT IS ACCEPTABLE AND A SCENARIO CAN BE AGREED.

5. MEANWHILE, IKLE HAS SENT A REPLY TO SAULNIER EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE LATEST FRENCH POSITION. IN IT, IKLE REITERATES ALL THE CONCESSIONS MADE BY THE U.S. SIDE THUS FAR, BUT ENDS BY SAYING HE WILL BE PREPARED TO WORK WITH BLANC DURING THE HERNU VISIT TO SEE IF THINGS CAN BE WORKED OUT.

6. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST AT THIS POINT IS TO SIGN THIS AGREEMENT DURING THE HERNU VISIT AND GET THE DEFENSE GROUP STARTED. IF YOU CAN BRING YOUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN THAT DIRECTION, IT WOULD HELP IMMENSELY. GALBRAITH