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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/4/2008

File Folder FRANCE (09/01/1983-11/30/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
54115	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	NSC/S PROFILE PAR 3/26/2018 M081/1	1	9/28/1983	B1 B3
48406	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE SHULTZ-MITTERRAND MEETING R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	10/5/1983	B1
48407	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH MITTERRAND R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/28/1983	B1
48408	MEMO	COBB TO CLARK RE SHULTZ-MITTERRAND MEETING R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	9/30/1983	B1
48409	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48407 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/28/1983	B1
48410	MEMO	COBB THRU TYSON TO KIMMITT RE STATE VISIT OF MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	10/12/1983	B1
48411	MEMO	KIMMITT TO RYAN RE STATE VISIT OF MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	10/12/1983	B1
48416	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE STATE VISIT OF MITTERRAND R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/30/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48418	MEMO	SITUATION ROOM NOTE	1	10/19/1983	B1
48424	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48422 <i>R 5/7/2011 M081/1</i>	1	10/19/1983	B1
48419	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48418	1	10/19/1983	B1
48422	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE TO REPORT ON MEETING <i>R 5/7/2011 M081/1</i>	1	10/19/1983	B1
48423	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48422 <i>R 5/7/2011 M081/1</i>	1	10/19/1983	B1
48421	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 48418	1	10/19/1983	B1
48425	CABLE	270130Z OCT 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	10/27/1983	B1
48426	MESSAGE	DRAFT SHULTZ TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULTATIONS <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	ND	B1
48427	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH ANDREANI <i>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	11/10/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48428	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH ANDREANI <i>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	3	ND	B1
48436	BIO	BIO	1	11/24/1981	B1 B3
48430	MEMO	PECK TO COBB RE ANDREANI MEETING <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	11/9/1983	B1
48431	CABLE	171424Z NOV 83 <i>PAR 8/10/2012 M081/1</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1
48433	CABLE	181558Z NOV 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	11/18/1983	B1
48434	CABLE	281846Z NOV 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	3	11/28/1983	B1

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54115	TRANSMITTAL SHEET NSC/S PROFILE	1	9/28/1983	B1 B3

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8306940

~~DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~

RECEIVED 29 SEP 83 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOC DATE 28 SEP 83

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

EO 13526 3.5(c)

NLRR M0811 # 54115

BY CN NARA DATE 3/26/18



KEYWORDS FRANCE

LEBANON

MITTERAND, FRANCOIS

CHAD

KAL FLIGHT 007

USSR

SYRIA

SUBJECT SHULTZ MTG W/ MITTERAND 28 SEP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 03 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

KEMP

WETTERING

MYER

FORTIER

SIGUR

SOMMER

LEVINE

ROBINSON

LILAC

*matlock
sur*

COMMENTS

REF# 8329901

LOG

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

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4 wd to Pres for info

~~*10/5*~~ *Pres noted*

Pres

1 OCT 0 5 1983

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Pres noted

CO, JM, PS

#54115

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

825

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

System #

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Package#

6940

Ra

83 SEP 30 P 4: 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>4</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>5</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>10/5</u>
Executive Secretary	<u>sent to Bus with</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>PDB</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Situation Room			
<u>Colib</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Ty: Run by Weltering & Tencher, because of lost IP comments

done

PDB etc.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6940

3
48406

~~SECRET~~

October 5, 1983

INFORMATION

MR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: Shultz-Mitterrand Meeting

The attached memorandum from George provides highlights of a very interesting meeting he had with French President Francois Mitterrand Wednesday. During the meeting Mitterrand:

-- Stressed that the USSR had embarked on a more aggressive foreign policy line even before the KAL incident.

-- Indicated he would work closely with us in dealing with Moscow, particularly on INF deployments.

-- Provided an optimistic view on Lebanon's future and forecast increasing unity among Lebanese factions and decreasing Syrian influence.

-- Indicated that France would resist any further Libyan movement in Chad.

-- Agreed that French and U.S. interests coincided for the most part on security and East-West issues.

Although Mitterrand has consistently maintained a tough stance vis-a-vis the USSR, France has been a thorn in our side recently over several foreign policy issues -- mutual cooperation in Chad, our fire support to the U.S. MNF contingent, and Central America. However, the Secretary's very positive evaluation of his session and good personal chemistry with Mitterrand indicates a potential for real improvement in Franco-American relations. Still, given the French track record I remain somewhat skeptical.

Tab A Shultz memo

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081-48406
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

RECEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

48407

93 SEP 29 12:12
~~SECRET~~

September 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with French President Mitterrand

I had an especially interesting meeting today (September 28th) with Francois Mitterrand. We covered a wide range, including East-West issues, Lebanon, Chad, and the US-French bilateral relationship. Although a full record of the meeting will be sent to you and Bill Clark shortly, I wanted to give you a few highlights right away.

On East-West relations, Mitterrand believes as I do that even before the Korean airliner incident the Soviets had embarked upon a more aggressive course -- a course resulting in large part from their recognition that despite their best efforts the Western Alliance had held together and INF deployments would proceed as planned. Mitterrand said he thus saw the need for the West to prepare for a "chillier" climate internationally and not lose its nerve when dealing with Moscow. In this context, he, like us, is paying close attention to developments in Bonn and recognizes full well that Helmut Kohl is facing a difficult set of challenges in the coming months. I believe we can count on Mitterrand to be helpful in this regard.

We spoke next of Lebanon, about which he was surprisingly upbeat, saying that the next step beyond the cease-fire was for the Gemayel government to push ahead in its efforts toward promoting national reconciliation and strengthening its armed forces. Mitterrand suggested that rather than relying upon external pressure to get the Syrians out, we ought to consider adopting a longer term perspective, one which was based on his conviction that the nationalist tendencies shared by all the competing Lebanese factions would gradually bring them together. At the end of this process, he believed the Syrian presence would come to be viewed as an irritant by most Lebanese and the Syrians would be left with few options but to withdraw. I found this vision an intriguing one, and have asked my Middle East specialists to explore it and see if it can be used to our benefit.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR/M07-081 #218407

BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/10

5

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Mitterrand defended French policy in Chad, saying that those portions of the country now occupied by Qadhafi do not provide him a base from which to destabilize black Africa. Moreover, if the Libyans in Chad were to try to move south, France is prepared to resist. While stating that France was not going to use military force against Libyan territory for fear of being viewed as a colonial power, Mitterrand stressed his determination to thwart Qadhafi's ambitions in Africa.

When we turned to our own relationship, I made a strong pitch to Mitterrand on the need for enhanced consultation and cooperation. I added that while we would disagree at times, more often than not our interests coincide, especially in the key spheres of security and East-West relations. He seemed to agree.

In short, I came away from the session heartened. I have now met with President Mitterrand on several occasions and believe we are developing the kind of good personal chemistry that I hope can be used to minimize the misunderstandings which all too often bedevil one of our most important relationships.

~~SECRET~~

48408

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Mitterrand Meeting

The attached memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President summarizes a rather interesting meeting the Secretary had with Mitterrand Wednesday. Your memorandum to the President provides highlights of that session and a brief, somewhat wary, evaluation of the French President's remarks.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum and forward it to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Jack Jack MacLack and Peter Sommer concur.
Peter Fred Wettering and Howard Teicher concur.

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Shultz memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-D81/1 #48408
BY *RW* NARA DATE 10/1/10

RECEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

SEP 28 11:12
SECRET

September 28, 1983

48409

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
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SECRET
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 107-081 *48409
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Mitterrand defended French policy in Chad, saying that those portions of the country now occupied by Qadhafi do not provide him a base from which to destabilize black Africa. Moreover, if the Libyans in Chad were to try to move south, France is prepared to resist. While stating that France was not going to use military force against Libyan territory for fear of being viewed as a colonial power, Mitterrand stressed his determination to thwart Qadhafi's ambitions in Africa.

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In short, I came away from the session heartened. I have now met with President Mitterrand on several occasions and believe we are developing the kind of good personal chemistry that I hope can be used to minimize the misunderstandings which all too often bedevil one of our most important relationships.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 30 SEP 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 30 SEP 83

smf
11/4/83

KEYWORDS FRANCE

AP

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT STATE VISIT OF FRENCH PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 04 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

FORTIER

MYER

MATLOCK

SOMMER

TYSON

Kimmitt

COMMENTS

REF# 8329971

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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Originals Ret'd to NSC/S

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *(B)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6972

10

48410

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *twc*

SUBJECT: State Visit of French President
Francois Mitterrand

The proposed state visit of President Mitterrand has been approved and scheduled. However, State has advised that the French have requested a later date than the scheduled March 20 core date. I have prepared a memo at Tab I from you to Fred Ryan, informing him of the new proposed dates.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to Fred Ryan

Tab A - Incoming from State

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081-248410

BY GW NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6972

11

48411

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

October 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: State Visit of French President
Francois Mitterrand

A proposed March 20 core date for a state visit by the President of France has been arranged. However, State Department now advises that the French have responded and there is a slight scheduling problem. They have asked whether the visit might begin on Thursday, March 22, 1984. Mitterrand would plan to be in the United States during the March 22-27 period, visiting two or three as yet undetermined cities following his stay in Washington. Alternatively, if the March 22-27 period is not possible, the French advise that Mitterrand could be available anytime during the April 16-30 period.

State Department recommends that, if it is possible in terms of the President's schedule, we agree to the French proposal for a March 22-27 visit, including a probable core meeting day in Washington of March 23, 1984.

Attachment

Tab A - Incoming State Letter

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #48411

BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8329971

6972

12

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48416

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: State Visit of French President
Francois Mitterrand

On the basis of a White House proposal, we informed the French of the proposed March 20 core date for a state visit by the President of France. They have responded that there is a slight scheduling problem and asked whether the visit might begin on Thursday, March 22, 1984. Mitterrand would plan to be in the United States during the March 22-27 period, visiting two or three as yet undetermined cities following his stay in Washington. Alternatively, if the March 22-27 period is not possible, the French tell us that Mitterrand could be available anytime during the April 16-30 period.

The Department recommends that, if it is possible in terms of President Reagan's schedule, we agree to the French proposal for a March 22-27 visit for President Mitterrand, including a probable core meeting day in Washington of March 23, 1984.

Thomas McKelvey
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-281 #4/8416

BY CL NAD: 5/19/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

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48418	MEMO SITUATION ROOM NOTE	1	10/19/1983	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

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14
ID 8307517

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*sent
11/4/08*

RECEIVED 20 OCT 83 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 19 OCT 83

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS **FRANCE**

USSR

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT REQUEST FOR APPRAISAL OF RPT ON MITTERRAND / ZAGLADIN MTG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 10/17 OBE / OXIR

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(1A) (c)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48424

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

October 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Your Request for Appraisal of Report on
Mitterrand/Zagladin Meeting

The agency does not attribute much credibility to the report. I share their view, but asked them to be alert for any additional confirmatory material. Your briefer will bring with him tomorrow a fuller account of the conversation and should be prepared to answer specific questions.

Dumang, the French Communist to whom the story is attributed, is not known for his reliability, and is definitely engaged in a number of games on his own. Some elements of the conversation are of course more plausible than others: e.g., Mitterrand's possible desire for a meeting with Andropov. Much less plausible is the declaration regarding the withholding of French nuclear forces. What is missing of course is any sense of the context in which the purported assertions were made. Thus, it is conceivable Mitterrand did make a general statement regarding the "independence" of the French force which in turn was reshaped by Dumang into something quite broader.

Attachment - Situation Room Note of October 19

~~SECRET~~

Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD81 #48424BY KML NARA DATE 5/9/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10-19-83

Don Fottier

Could you see if the intelligence
community attaches credibility
to this report

Many thanks

Bud

If it is true what is your
opinion of it?

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48419	MEMO DUPLICATE OF 48418	1	10/19/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48422

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

October 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER SUBJECT: Your Request for Appraisal of Report on
Mitterrand/Zagladin Meeting

The agency does not attribute much credibility to the report. I share their view, but asked them to be alert for any additional confirmatory material. Your briefer will bring with him tomorrow a fuller account of the conversation and should be prepared to answer specific questions.

Dumang, the French Communist to whom the story is attributed, is not known for his reliability, and is definitely engaged in a number of games on his own. Some elements of the conversation are of course more plausible than others: e.g., Mitterrand's possible desire for a meeting with Andropov. Much less plausible is the declaration regarding the withholding of French nuclear forces. What is missing of course is any sense of the context in which the purported assertions were made. Thus, it is conceivable Mitterrand did make a general statement regarding the "independence" of the French force which in turn was reshaped by Dumang into something quite broader.

Attachment - Situation Room Note of October 19

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR MODS # 48422

BY KML NARA DATE 5/9/11

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8307517

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ant
11/4/08

RECEIVED 20 OCT 83 14

DOCDATE 19 OCT 83 *19*

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

KEYWORDS **FRANCE**

USSR

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPRAISAL OF RPT ON MITTERRAND / ZAGLADIN MTG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (VL)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

October 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER

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Mitterrand/Zagladin Meeting

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Attachment - Situation Room Note of October 19

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NLRR M081 # 48423

BY KML NARA DATE 5/9/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10-19-83

Don Fortier

Could you see if the intelligence
community attaches credibility
to this report

Many thanks

Bud

If it is true what is your
opinion of it?

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FRANCE (09/01/1983-11/30/1983)

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S2007-081
NOUZILLE

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
<i>Document Description</i>				
48421	MEMO	1	10/19/1983	B1
DUPLICATE OF 48418				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 8293 DTG: 270130Z OCT 83 PSN: 071827
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DE WTE #8293 3000201
O 270130Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO 86970

~~SECRET~~ VIA 86970 WH08293

48425
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-061 #98925
BY EW NARA DATE 5/19/10

FROM: BUD MCFARLENE

TO: SECRETARY SHULTZ ABOARD AIRCRAFT

SUBJ: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS (S)

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE-TEXT).

2. WE ARE PROVIDING THESE THOUGHTS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION IN NSDD-109 BEARING ON YOUR CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE SIG PAPER ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS AND BELIEVE IT MAKES A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF DEFINING NEAR-TERM DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AND IN PRESENTING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES WE NOW FACE CONCERNING THE ROLE OF U. S. FORCE IN DETERING OR REPELLING AGRESSION IN THE GULF. WHILE DECISIONS ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT DETAILS STILL NEED TO BE FORMALLY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO BE ABLE TO ADVISE THE FRENCH OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF OUR THINKING ON THE FOLLOWING KEY ISSUES:

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

24

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 8293 DTG: 270130Z OCT 83 PSN: 071827

- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT IS CRITICAL TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO REQUESTS FROM THE GULF ARABS FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEFENDING STRATEGIC FACILITIES (PRODUCTION/TRANSHIPMENT) AGAINST IRANIAN ATTACKS BY AIR, SEA, OR COMMANDO ACTIONS.
- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES WE MUST PREVENT ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE OR BLOCK TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. ANY EFFORT TO MINE THE STRAIT SHOULD BE INTERDICTED.
- WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PROTECT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING (LESS THAT OF THE BELLIGERENTS) IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR ARABIAN SEA AGAINST AERIAL OR SEABORNE ATTACKS. EFFECTIVE TACTICS SHOULD EMBRACE THE DESTRUCTION OF HOSTILE PLATFORMS AFTER AN ATTACK HAS MATERIALIZED. IF IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SHIPPING REACH A CERTAIN THRESHOLD, WE SHOULD CONSIDER RETALIATION AT THE SOURCE (E.G., THE PORTS AND AIRFIELDS SUPPORTING THE INTERDICTION ACTION).
- GIVEN THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD ENSUE AS A RESULT OF EVEN LIMITED DAMAGE TO KEY SAUDI FACILITIES, WE BELIEVE EARLY PRECAUTIONARY DEPLOYMENTS ARE REQUIRED, BOTH TO DETER AND TO PROVIDE CRITICAL EARLY PROTECTION.

0381

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

URGENT 24A

10/26

Bud,

Don Fortin and

Phil Dun and I recommend
you send this to Shultz

aircraft. Otherwise
he doesn't have our thinking.

OK as Wood

RCM

J

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

25

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM07-081 #48426

~~DRAFT MESSAGE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ~~

BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/10

48426

FROM: ~~WHITE HOUSE~~ BUD MCFARLANE
TO: SECRETARY SHULTZ ABOARD AIRCRAFT

SUBJ: CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS ~~(S)~~

1. SECRET (ENTIRE-TEXT).

2. WE ARE PROVIDING THESE THOUGHTS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION IN NSDD-109 BEARING ON YOUR CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE SIG PAPER ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS AND BELIEVE IT MAKES A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF DEFINING NEAR-TERM DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS AND IN PRESENTING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES WE NOW FACE CONCERNING THE ^{role} ~~USE~~ OF U.S. FORCE ^{IN} ~~TO~~ DETER ^{OR} ~~AND~~ REPELLING ^{REINFORCE} AGRESSION IN THE GULF. WHILE DECISIONS ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT DETAILS STILL NEED TO BE FORMALLY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO BE ABLE TO ADVISE THE FRENCH OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF OUR THINKING ON THE FOLLOWING KEY ISSUES:

-- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT IS CRITICAL TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO REQUESTS FROM THE GULF ARABS FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEFENDING STRATEGIC FACILITIES (PRODUCTION/TRANSHIPMENT) AGAINST IRANIAN ATTACKS BY AIR, SEA, OR COMMANDO ACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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~~SENSITIVE~~

-- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES ^{we} ~~IT~~ MUST PREVENT ANY ATTEMPT TO
IMPEDE OR BLOCK TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. ANY
EFFORT TO MINE THE STRAIT ^{should} ~~WILL~~ BE INTERDICTED.

-- ^{we should be prepared to} ~~THE UNITED STATES WILL~~ PROTECT INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING (LESS
THAT OF THE BELLIGERENTS) IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR ARABIAN SEA
AGAINST AERIAL OR SEABORNE ATTACKS. ^{effective} OUR TACTICS ^{should} ~~WOULD~~, IN
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PLATFORMS AFTER AN ATTACK HAS MATERIALIZED. IF IRANIAN
ATTACKS ON SHIPPING REACH A CERTAIN THRESHOLD ~~OR IF U.S.~~
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THE SOURCE (E.G., THE PORTS AND AIRFIELDS SUPPORTING THE
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AS A RESULT OF EVEN LIMITED DAMAGE TO KEY SAUDI FACILITIES,
WE BELIEVE EARLY PRECAUTIONARY DEPLOYMENTS ARE REQUIRED,
BOTH TO DETER AND TO PROVIDE CRITICAL EARLY PROTECTION.

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RECEIVED 10 NOV 83 20

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 10 NOV 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

ANDREANI, JACQUES

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR POINDEXTER MTG W/ ADREANI 14 NOV

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
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NSC Secretariat	3		<i>[Signature]</i>
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Executive Secretary			

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48427

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

November 10, 1983

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS COBB *TCC*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jacques Andreani -- November 14

You are scheduled for a 30-minute meeting on Monday, November 14 at 10:30 a.m. Jack Matlock will join you.

Andreani is roughly Larry Eagleburger's counterpart in the French Ministry of External Relations, where he is the Political Director.

- Andreani is a sharp, skillful interlocutor who speaks excellent English and is generally well-disposed to Americans. He has particular expertise in East-West relations. Although he has pronounced socialist views, he is a realist on Franco-Soviet relations.
- Andreani participated in Ken Dam's November 7 meeting at the Quai. You might find it useful to reinforce the Deputy Secretary's message on the central core issues of Grenada, Central America, Lebanon and the Middle East, INF and U.S.-Soviet relations.

The suggested talking points are attached at Tab A. A bio of Andreani is at Tab B.

Jack Matlock, Constantine Menges and Ron Lehman concur.

Attachments

- Tab A - Suggested Talking Points
- Tab B - Andreani Bio
- Tab C - Incoming from State

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NLRR M07-081 #48427
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

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48428

TALKING POINTS

FOR MEETING WITH JACQUES ANDREANI
Monday, November 14 -- 10:30 a.m.

Soviet Relations/Andropov Health

- Clearly, his illness is serious; he has a history of kidney and cardiovascular problems and is probably receiving dialysis treatment. Andropov health problems would seem to set back his efforts to establish and consolidate his power.
- Even should Andropov live for some time, as well as stay in office, maneuvering for the next succession has begun. Increasing influence of the military is troublesome.

Arms Control

- INF: No change in our position regarding third country forces. Can assure you, we will not grant compensation, nor will we accept transferring the program from INF to the START negotiations, which are also bilateral.
- MBFR: Continuing Soviet intransigence, but some positive movement on verification.
- CDE: We should attempt to insure that the focus remains on genuine confidence building measures, and that Soviets are not permitted to use the conference as a propaganda forum. Will the French desire a common allied negotiating approach?

Lebanon/Middle East

- Appreciate GOF reaffirmation at the highest levels of firm commitment to MNF, political resolve to stay the course.
- Continued European participation in MNF and UNIFIL important; West should not be seen as folding under pressure.
- Continued need to support Gemayel government in reconciliation efforts.

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BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

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2

- On peace process, President's September 1 proposals remain on the table and continue to represent only realistic way to proceed. We should urge moderate Arabs to seize opportunity. Craxi proposals for financial assistance are encouraging.

Arafat/PLO Situation

- Ironically, move by Syrians against PLO and Arafat may open up new possibilities for Reagan initiative, but will depend on what happens to Arafat. We have reports that Syrians and PLO rebels have decided compromise with Arafat no longer possible and that he should not survive.
- If Arafat escapes, there is a possibility he will attempt to rally new support among moderate Palestinians to join King Hussein in support of Reagan initiative; if Arafat is killed or captured by the Syrians, Hussein may find it possible to work with a coalition of moderate West Bankers.

Iran-Iraq

- We need to continue to explore ways to prevent escalation of fighting or primacy of Iran.
- Need to continue our planning for Gulf naval coordination.

Grenada

- Collective action brought about by threat to foreign citizens caused by violence on the island.
- Three independent legal bases for the American action in Grenada: request by the Governor General; action under regional security agreements (OECS), provided for under the UN and OAS Charters; humanitarian response to the plight of the U.S. nationals.
- The President gave careful consideration to all aspects before deciding to act, including the impact on friendly and unfriendly countries in Central America, among allies. The President made a tough decision and was unpleasantly surprised by European reactions and the votes in the UN.
- Believe collective action achieved its objectives; U.S. forces are being withdrawn.

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3

32

- We are now helping to restore democracy, maintain order and reconstruct economy.
- Eastern Caribbean leaders willing to take collective responsibility for their own security; they need and deserve our help.

Chad

- What is the current French thinking, prospects for national reconciliation in Chad?
- Our principal objectives remain the withdrawal of Libyan forces and preservation of Chad's sovereignty.

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24
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1983

48430

TO: Mr. Ty Cobb
National Security Council

FROM: EUR/WE - Robert Peck *RP*

SUBJECT: Andreani Meeting at the NSC

Jacques Andreani has been Political Director at the French Ministry of External Relations since 1981. He is, in essence, Larry Eagleburger's counterpart in the French diplomatic hierarchy. His particular expertise is East-West relations, but his current position involves him in the entire range of French foreign policy issues. Andreani is a sharp and skillful interlocutor, generally well-disposed to Americans. He speaks excellent English. I attach his biographic sketch.

Andreani was in Washington for bilateral consultations in March of this year. At that time he was scheduled to meet with Bud McFarlane, but I believe the meeting was cancelled at the last moment. In any event, he did see McFarlane at the French Ambassador's dinner. He also had meetings in March with Larry Eagleburger, Rick Burt, Jon Howe and Steve Bosworth at State and with Richard Perle at DOD. He expects to meet with Larry again on this visit.

Andreani participated in Ken Dam's November 7 meeting at the Quai. You might well find it useful to reinforce the Deputy Secretary's message -- from a White House perspective -- on the current core issues of Grenada and Central America, Lebanon and the Middle East, INF and Soviet relations. Attached is a checklist for this meeting

Attachments: 1) Biographic Sketch
2) Checklist

EUR/WE: *J* Cahill

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NLRR M07-081#48430

BY AN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01
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TOR: 321/1428Z

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WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

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FM DIRNSA

TO [REDACTED]
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FM [REDACTED]
TO DIRNSA

~~SECRET~~ FOLLOW-UP ONE TO CRITIC 1-83

1. (S) AT APPROX 1250Z, CTF452, COMMANDER OF FRENCH NAVAL FORCES OFF LEBANON, ADVISED CTF 60 (EMBARKED USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER) VIA VINSON SECURE VOICE CIRCUIT, THAT FRENCH WOULD MAKE A UNILATERAL AIR STRIKE OVER LEBANON AT 171420Z. TARGET IDENTIFIED AS ALI IBN TALEM (SHAYKH ABDULLAH) BARRACKS NEAR BAALBEK, LEBANON (UTM COORD 37SBT 4200 6540: LAT/LONG 3400N 03612E).

DECL: OADR
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PAGE 01
SIT624

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TOR: 322/1552Z

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WHSR COMMENT: FOR THE PRESIDENT

48433

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DE WTE #8846 3221552
O 181558Z NOV 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

DR

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ WH08846

PLEASE DELIVER TO GENERAL SAULNIER FROM ADMIRAL POINDEXTER.

I RECEIVED A REPORT THIS MORNING OF YOUR MEETING WITH CHARGE
D'AFFAIRES MARESCA. FIRST LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WE FULLY UNDER-
STAND THE FRENCH ACTIONS YESTERDAY AND ARE COMPLETELY SUPPORTIVE
OF WHAT YOU DID. CONGRATULATIONS ON A VERY PROFESSIONAL JOB WELL
DONE. AS WE WOULD SAY IN THE NAVY - BRAVO ZULU. I SINCERELY REGRET
WE WERE NOT ABLE TO PARTICIPATE WITH YOU. WITH ONLY A FEW HOURS
MORE TIME I BELIEVE WE COULD HAVE. THE NEXT TIME WE MEET I WILL
EXPLAIN TO YOU WHAT HAPPENED SO AS TO MAKE ALLOWANCES THE NEXT
TIME.

SINCERELY,

JOHN POINDEXTER

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NLRR 107-081 #48933
BY CA NARA DATE 5/19/10

E.O. Robert Kimmitt

Please pass E.O. to Bud McFarlane

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Brunson McKinley

11/29/83

Form # Non log

Page # _____

	SEQUENCE NO	DATE	INITIALS	DISPOSITION
	1		/	
	2		/	
Wilma Hall	3		/	
Bud McFarlane	4		m	I
John Poindexter	5		j	
Executive Secretary				
NSC Secretariat				
Situation Room				
Kathleen	6		non-issued	R

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(Date/Time)

Bud | John : This cable has not been shared with the Staff. Please advise if further distribution desired.

The problem was not in our channel. We should not permit the direct military channel. Bob

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

48434

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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TO: NSC-
E.O. - Mr. McFarlane

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4577

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NODIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

DEPT PASS NSC FOR MCFARLANE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, FR
SUBJECT: COMMUNICATING WITH THE FRENCH

DECLASSIFIED
NLRRM07-081 * 4/8/34 (also)
BY CN NARS DATE 5/19/10

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I BELIEVE RECENT EVENTS RELATING TO CHAD AND LEBANON HAVE DEMONSTRATED BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR US TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY HOW WE COMMUNICATE WITH THE FRENCH AND TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE SUCH COMMUNICATIONS ACHIEVE OUR PURPOSES, RATHER THAN DEFEATING THEM.

3. ART HARTMAN WARNED ME ABOUT THIS PROBLEM BEFORE I CAME HERE, AND LAST WEEK I HAD A PHILOSOPHICAL CHAT (NO DETAILS DIVULGED) WITH THE OLD MASTER HENRY KISSINGER. SO NONE OF THIS IS NEW OR SURPRISING. BUT THE EXAMPLES WE HAVE HAD IN AUGUST AND NOVEMBER ARE SO STRIKING THAT EVEN THE MOST SECRETIVE AMONG US MUST ADMIT WE COULD HAVE DONE BETTER BY TEAMWORK WITH ME OR THE DCM THAN WE DID BY "DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS."

SECRET

NODS-00



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 PARIS 44489 281855Z

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4. IN ORDER TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION, I HOPE YOU WILL BOTH JOIN ME IN TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THIS SORT OF THING DOES NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. THE WAY TO DO THAT IS TO USE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WHICH WORK AND WHICH ENSURE AGAINST BOTH MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISFIRE. THOSE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION ARE THROUGH THIS EMBASSY, E.G., EYES ONLY, ROGER CHANNEL, PRIVACY CHANNEL, SECURE TELEPHONE, OR PERSONAL LETTER. THIS WAY WE CAN ENSURE THAT MESSAGES ARE DELIVERED TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE AND ARE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT THE RESPONSE IS UNDERSTOOD, I.E., THAT THE MAXIMUM IS DONE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THE DIRECT CHANNEL IN SPECIAL CASES, BUT, AS I POINTED OUT IN MY DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK WITH JOHN POINDEXTER, EVENTS MAY WELL HAVE GONE DIFFERENTLY IN CHAD AND LEBANON HAD DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS NOT BEEN USED. WE HAVE NOT ONLY A NEED TO KNOW, BUT ALSO MORE IMPORTANTLY YOU PROBABLY HAVE A NEED FOR OUR SERVICES IF YOU WANT THE JOB DONE PROPERLY.

5. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER, SINCE THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE OTHER OCCASIONS IN THE FUTURE WHEN OUR ABILITY TO COORDINATE WILL BE TESTED.

6. WITH BEST REGARDS. GALBRAITH

~~SECRET~~