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Folder Title: France (03/01/1983-03/30/1983)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/3/2008

File Folder FRANCE (03/01/1983-03/30/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48293	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH ANDREANI <i>R</i> 4/29/2010 <i>NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/1/1983	B1
48294	CABLE	020031Z MAR 83 <i>R</i> 5/19/2010 <i>NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/2/1983	B1
48295	CABLE	020929Z MAR 83 <i>R</i> 5/19/2010 <i>NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/2/1983	B1
48311	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	3/11/1983	B1 B3
48296	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	3/11/1983	B1 B3
48297	MEMO	CLARK TO WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH RE KLAUS BARBIE <i>R</i> 6/25/2010 <i>MR081/1</i>	1	3/11/1983	B1
48300	STATEMENT	DRAFT RE BARBIE <i>R</i> 5/19/2010 <i>NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	ND	B1
48298	MEMO	KIMMITT TO CLARK RE BARBIE	1	3/8/1983	B1
48299	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE NSC GUIDANCE ON BARBIE AFFAIR <i>R</i> 5/19/2010 <i>NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

S2007-081

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59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48301	STATEMENT	PROPOSED STATEMENT <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	ND	B1
48302	MEMO	DRAFT CLARK TO SMITH RE BARBIE <i>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</i>	1	ND	B1
48303	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH ANDREANI <i>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/8/1983	B1
48304	CABLE	091837Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/9/1983	B1
48305	CABLE	100854Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/10/1983	B1
48306	CABLE	101851Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/10/1983	B1
48307	CABLE	111835Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	3/11/1983	B1
48308	CABLE	160915Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/16/1983	B1
48309	CABLE	211436Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/21/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48310	CABLE	301402Z MAR 83 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/30/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Larry Don

~~SECRET~~

March 1, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Andreani

We are still trying to work out a time tomorrow for you to meet briefly with Quai Political Director Jacques Andreani. According to the Embassy, Andreani wants to talk generally about arms control, European security, and the Williamsburg Summit.

When Vernier-Palliez and I first discussed this meeting in January, I was told that Andreani might also have some thoughts on Greek-Turkish differences and how to resolve them. Inasmuch as I am now putting the final touches on the Southern Flank proposal we discussed, Andreani's thoughts on this problem would be useful to me and would fit comfortably into the European security category. You might say, for example, that the current rift between Greece and Turkey leaves the Southern Flank more politically exposed, inhibits exercises necessary for genuine preparedness, and complicates our ability to secure adequate foreign assistance. How might we move to heal these differences; how might France contribute to such an objective, as well as the European Community as a whole?

Andreani should be able to give you an authoritative read-out on Cheysson's secret trip to Moscow and about threats reportedly made by Arbatov regarding possible Soviet deployment of intermediate-range missiles within range of the U.S. Andreani would appreciate a status report on the INF talks and your own perceptions on where we stand in the struggle for public opinion on this issue. Two "opportunity" points might also be worth raising: 1) our hope that France might be able to reinforce our findings on Soviet CBW violations through the release of its own evidence (which is reportedly quite good); and 2) a brief signal that we hope to work even more vigorously (if quietly) in the days ahead on special nuclear proliferation problems in sensitive areas.

DECLASSIFIED

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M07081-48293BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

Although Libya is not on Andreani's agenda, you may wish to raise the issue yourself. There is no point in such a brief session in trying to fundamentally redirect French attitudes on how to approach the Libyan problem, but we should at least try to build understanding for our own most recent actions and for the behavior that gave rise to it.

Henry Nau said he would try to give you one or two separate points on Williamburg. The principal objective, of course, is to remind Andreani of the need for concrete results so that we don't run the risk of reopening misunderstandings that impair alliance unity. In addition to their standard neuralgia on points of substance, the French are also being difficult about consenting to the use of the trio mechanism for the NATO economic security study.

National Security Council
The White House

361

3

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Package # 1386

MAR 0 1 1983

Borene

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 01 MAR 83 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

smf 4/11/08

DOC DATE 01 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

INF

ANDREANI, JACQUES

SUBJECT: ISSUES FOR MCFARLANE MTG W/ ANDREANI

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 3/2</i>	<i>Noted by McFarlane</i>		<i>DF</i>

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Noted by McFarlane

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DISPATCH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48294 5

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6093607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068665
SIT710 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 061/0419Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR VP BOV SIT EOB EOB SH NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6093 0610046
O 020031Z MAR 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2139

SECSTATE WASHDC 6093607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068665

~~SECRET~~ STATE 056093

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, FR, WA, PNAT, PSDC

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN
MINISTER CHEYSSON

1. ~~S~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. (THERE
WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.)

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CLAUDE:

CHET CROCKER HAS BRIEFED ME ON THE VERY USEFUL MEETING OF
CONTACT GROUP AFRICA DIRECTORS HELD LAST WEEK IN OTTAWA.

I AM PLEASED THAT ALLAN MACEACHEN WAS ABLE TO MEET WITH THE
GROUP AND TO LEAD A PROBING DISCUSSION OF A PROBLEM WE FACE
IN COMMON: HOW TO MAINTAIN OUR CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA ON THE
NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS AT A TIME OF FRUSTRATION OVER
THE LACK OF PUBLIC AND VISIBLE PROGRESS. WHILE WE ARE
TAKING MUCH OF THE HEAT ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE, YOU

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND OUR OTHER CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS ARE INEVITABLY
AFFECTED AS WELL. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THAT. IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR SUPPORT AND READINESS TO SEE THIS
THING THROUGH HAVE BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED.

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM YOUR REPRESENTATIVES, DIS-
CUSSION IN OTTAWA ALSO FOCUSED ON HOW WE MIGHT COLLECTIVELY
AND INDIVIDUALLY CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO KEEP
THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING FORWARD. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT,
FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR
REASONABLE SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOR AND RESTRAINT ON ANGOLA
WHILE OTHER PRESSURES MOUNT ON THE ANGOLANS TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY.

IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WE WILL BE INVOLVED ON BOTH FRONTS,

AS WE EXPECT TO RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS IN
EARLY MARCH, WHICH WILL PARALLEL TALKS AT SENIOR LEVEL
WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THE COMING MONTHS, IT IS
LIKELY THAT WE WILL COLLECTIVELY BE FACING A COMPLEX SITUA-
TION: A POSITIVE BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE
ANGOLAN PICTURE AT THE SAME TIME AS PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC
CRITICISM MOUNTS AT THE UN AND NON-ALIGNED MEETINGS. WE
WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND WILL VALUE YOUR
SUPPORT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

HIS EXCELLENCY
CLAUDE CHEYSSON,
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
PARIS

END TEXT. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED
NLRRM07-081#48294
BY GW NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

48295 6

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 7728 7607 DTG: 020929Z MAR 83 PSN: 069227
SIT729 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 061/1334Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBP EOBPP SIT EOBEOB SH NORT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR #7728 0610929
O 020929Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4249

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2629
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0243
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5759
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1335
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7142
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2346
USELO RIYADH 0829
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4820
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 5490
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 07728
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, JO, PLO, SY
SUBJECT: ARAFAT'S MANDATE FROM THE PNC

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: BASED ON FOUR READOUTS FROM PNC PARTICIPANTS FRENCH CONCLUDE THAT THE DOOR HAS BEEN LEFT HALF OPEN, BUT ARAFAT HAS ONLY A LIMITED MARGIN FOR OPERATING. THEY BELIEVE ARAFAT WILL BE ABLE TO TELL KING HUSSEIN THAT HE CAN ONLY NEGOTIATE THE EVACUATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH ISRAEL, BUT NOT THE QUESTION OF THEIR FUTURE STATUS NOR THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. THE IDEA OF CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN IS NOT EXCLUDED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT IT CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT THE PLO. A BRIDGE MUST BE FOUND BETWEEN WHAT ARAFAT CAN OFFER AND WHAT IS NEEDED TO GO FORWARD TO NEGOTIATIONS. ARAFAT IS LIKELY TO GO ON TO DAMASCUS SOME TIME SHORTLY AFTER HIS VISIT TO AMMAN. THE SAUDIS ARE REPORTEDLY MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR A "RECONCILIATION" BETWEEN ARAFAT AND ASSAD. THE PNC REMAINED FIRM AGAINST RENEWING ARAB RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

3. THE GOF RECEIVED READOUTS ON THE PNC FROM FOUR PARTICIPANTS: KHALID AL-HASSAN, HANI AL HASAN, ISSAM SARTAWI AND IBRAHIM SOUSS, THE PLO PARIS REPRESENTATIVE. THE FRENCH REACHED THEIR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ARAFAT'S "MANDATE" BASED ON THOSE FOUR DISCUSSIONS PLUS ANALYSIS OF OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM.

4. KHALID AL-HASAN WAS THE MOST OPTIMISTIC THAT SOMETHING COULD POSSIBLY RESULT FROM THE ARAFAT-HUSSEIN MEETING. HANI WAS DOUBTFUL. HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO TOLD THE FRENCH THAT ARAFAT CAN AGREE TO HUSSEIN NEGOTIATING ON THE EVACUATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT HE REALIZES THAT IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

5. IBRAHIM SOUSS TOLD THE FRENCH THAT NO ONE SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED ANY HISTORIC DECISIONS OUT OF THIS PNC. IT'S AIM WAS TO SHOW, AFTER THE EVACUATION OF BEIRUT, THAT "WE ARE STILL THERE". HE SAID THAT NO FORWARD MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE. SOUSS WAS SOMEWHAT VAGUE ON WHAT ARAFAT CAN TELL HUSSEIN. HE INDICATED THAT ARAFAT CAN TALK ONLY ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF THE TERRITORIES, 242, BUT NOT THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK. SOUSS CLAIMED THAT ARAFAT IS NOW MORE POWERFUL WITHIN THE PNC, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING 30 MILITARY PEOPLE INTO IT.

6. ISSAM SARTAWI, WHO THE FRENCH REALIZE IS NOT IN GOOD STEAD, WAS THE MOST PESSIMISTIC. HE CALLED THE PNC AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED. IT FAILED TO FACE THE REAL ISSUES. ARAFAT IS SO LIMITED IN HIS MARGIN OF OPERATION THAT NOTHING WILL COME OF IT. GALBRAITH

PARIS 7728 7607 DTG: 020929Z MAR 83 PSN: 069227

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NLRR 2007-081 #48095
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/18

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RECEIVED 05 MAR 83 12

smf 4/11/08

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 MAR 83

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

GERMANY

BARBIE, KLAUS

SUBJECT: PROPOSED STATEMENT ON BARBIE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

BLAIR

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8306409

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

X MAR 08 1983

*for signature
Clark*

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Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48311	TRANSMITTAL SHEET NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	3/11/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Log Number 90250

Date MAR 11 1963

smf 4/11/08

Subject: KLAUS BARBIE

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input type="checkbox"/> Judge Clark	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fontaine	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Lord	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Posa	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tamba
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McFarlane	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fortier	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Manfredi	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Raymond	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Teicher
<input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Guhin	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Martin	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Reed	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tyson
<input type="checkbox"/> Sit. Room	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Helm	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McGaffigan	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Reger	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Weiss
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bailey	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kemp	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McMinn	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Robinson	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wettering
<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Blair	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kimmitt	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Morris	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Russell	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Wheeler
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Boverie	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kraemer	<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Myer	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Rye	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat
<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Childress	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Laux	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nau	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sapia-Bosch	<input type="checkbox"/> NSC MSG Center
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. De Graffenreid	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Levine	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. North	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sigur	<input type="checkbox"/> Admin. Office
<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Dobriansky	<input type="checkbox"/> Col. Lilac	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Pipes	<input type="checkbox"/> Capt. Sims	
<input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Dur	<input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Linhard	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Pollock	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sommer	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	1			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	1	03/11/63	1810	<i>F. M. ...</i>
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup	1			
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10th/Const. NW, Room 5119	ORIGINAL			
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. #1051, Arlington, VA				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), 8th & SO Courthouse Rd, Arlington, VA				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
48296	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	1	3/11/1983	B1
	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD			B3

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SYSTEM II
90250

11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

48297

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH
The Attorney General

SUBJECT: Klaus Barbie (U)

To make clear our position on the Klaus Barbie matter, we believe it advisable to issue a brief public statement (Tab A) indicating that Justice is conducting an inquiry into the facts of the case. We will refrain from further public comment beyond this statement until your factual inquiry is completed. Also, during the pendency of your inquiry, provision of information to Congress by any agency will first be coordinated with Justice. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT

William P. Clark

Attachment

Tab A Public Statement

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #48297
BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

12

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48300 B

STATEMENT ON KLAUS BARBIE

Recent allegations have been made that Klaus Barbie had a relationship with the United States Government in the years after World War II. Although this alleged relationship would have existed decades ago, we view its possible existence with a high degree of concern. Therefore, the Department of Justice is undertaking an inquiry to develop a factual record of any relationship that may have existed between Klaus Barbie and the U. S. Government.

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NLRR M07-0817# 48300
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

National Security Council
The White House

570

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Package # 90250

2030p
MAR 0 8 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>[initials]</u>
Sit Room			

MAR 1 1 1983

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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FRANCE (03/01/1983-03/30/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

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48298	MEMO KIMMITT TO CLARK RE BARBIE	1	3/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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United States Department of State

SYSTEM II
90250

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

March 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

83 MAR 4 PIO: 27

Subject: Request for NSC Guidance on Managing the Klaus Barbie Affair

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

In response to the oral request we received on Monday, February 28 from Bud McFarlane, we have been attempting to get interagency (Army, CIA, Justice) clearance on a short, preemptive statement to be made by Justice regarding the US Government's involvement with Klaus Barbie as a means of ending public speculation on the issue. We have also been attempting to get interagency agreement that preferably Justice or, alternatively, another appropriate agency should be authorized to manage the US Government's effort to assemble a complete report on US involvement with Barbie from immediately after World War II to the present. Although an interagency group chaired by Assistant Attorney General Jensen reached agreement on both points on Wednesday, March 2, the Attorney General subsequently decided against having Justice perform either function. Similarly, neither the Army nor CIA wish to take on this role.

Meanwhile, Congressional and media accusations of Executive Branch "stonewalling" have accelerated. The Army has briefed both congressional intelligence committees this week and would like to begin turning over its files on Barbie to the committees. The Washington Post and New York Times have both had editorials on Barbie with the latter condemning Administration refusal to comment; additionally, two US television networks and the BBC are preparing special programs on Barbie and the US for presentation in coming weeks.

The Department continues to believe that an immediate statement and a later thorough report are necessary; the Times editorial is but the latest indication that this Administration is on the verge of taking blame for events of more than 30 years ago. We recommend that the White House immediately instruct the Justice Department to issue the agreed draft statement (attached) and undertake the investigation into Barbie's involvement with the US.

L. Paul Bremer, III

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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DECL: OADR

NLRR 107-081 48299
BY CN NARA DATE 5/10/10

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON KLAUS BARBIE

48301

17

Recent allegations have been made that Klaus Barbie had a relationship with the United States Government in the years after WWII, and that the United States Government assisted his travel to Bolivia in 1951. We view these allegations with deep concern and a preliminary review of pertinent government files indicates that these allegations have sufficient merit to warrant a comprehensive investigation. Therefore, the Department of Justice is undertaking a full investigation. The object of this investigation is to develop a factual record of any relationship that may have existed between Klaus Barbie and the U.S. Government at any time. A report to Congress and the public will be made as soon as the investigation is completed.

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NLRR M07081 # 48301
BY CIS NARA DATE 5/19/10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH
The Attorney General

SUBJECT: Klaus Barbie (U)

We will refrain from further

To make clear our position on the Klaus Barbie matter, *we* believe it advisable to issue a brief public statement (Tab A) indicating that Justice is conducting an inquiry into the facts of the case. ~~No~~ public comment ~~would be made~~ beyond this statement until your factual inquiry is completed. Also, during the pendency of your inquiry, provision of information to Congress by any agency ~~should~~ *we* first be coordinated with Justice. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLRR 107-081 #48302

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

WJ
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48303

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 8, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER **DF**

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jacques Andreani

I met with Jacques Andreani in your absence. We had a good and wide-ranging discussion of East-West issues, European security problems--including the Southern Flank--and the Summit. Andreani also gave me a good account of Cheysson's meetings in Moscow and of Andropov's "computer-like" approach to issues like INF. Andreani asked me to convey to you his concern that pushing too much "concreteness" onto the Williamsburg Summit's East-West economic agenda could be deeply counterproductive. When I pressed him Andreani agreed that some definable progress would be necessary. He said it was especially important that this not be billed as our political "success" and their "concession."

*Thanks
Don*

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NLRR/M07-081 748303
BY CA 4/29/10

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 1386
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
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I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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ID 8301386

RECEIVED 01 MAR 83 18

DOCDATE 01 MAR 83

08 MAR 83

TO MCFARLANE FROM FORTIER
FORTIER

KEYWORDS: FRANCE INF ANDREANI, JACQUES

SUBJECT: ISSUES FOR MCFARLANE MTG W/ ANDREANI MAR 2

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8300781 NSCIFID (M / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>clab</i>	<i>ix 3/09</i>	<i>Report for information</i>		
	<i>C</i>	<i>Mcfarlane noted</i>		<i>Df</i>

MAR 2 1 1983

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48304

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 8920 19362 DTG: 091837Z MAR 83 PSN: 004070
SIT090 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 068/1841Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFRA #8920 0681838
O 091837Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4890
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 08920
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
EYES ONLY FOR NSC JUDGE CLARK
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ODIP, FR
SUBJECT: US AMBASSADOR TO THE HAGUE

2. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I WAS SORRY TO SEE THAT BILL DYESS IS BEING REPLACED AT THE HAGUE AND STARTLED THAT IT ALLEGEDLY IS BECAUSE OF HIS HARDLINE DEFENSE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICIES. I HAVE WORKED WITH HIM PERSONALLY ON THE EUROPE GAS ISSUE AND IN MY OPINION HE IS A FIRST CLASS PROFESSIONAL OF THE TYPE WHO SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION. I WOULD HOPE A TOP ASSIGNMENT WHICH WOULD REFLECT SUCH SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM.
GALBRAITH

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NLRR M07-081# 48304
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/16

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48305

PAGE 01 PARIS 8952 16362 DTG:100854Z MAR 83 PSN: 005214
SIT084 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 069/1223Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #8952/01 0690858
O 100854Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4918

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 08952
EXDIS
FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
PASS TREASURY FOR SECRETARY REGAN
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EFIN, FR
SUBJECT: DELORS ON SUMMIT ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL
- DEBT PROBLEMS
-

1. C/- ENTIRE TEXT
2. DURING A SMALL LUNCHEON I HOSTED MARCH 8 FOR FINANCE MINISTER DELORS AND TREASURY DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS, DELORS EXPRESSED A NUMBER OF THOUGHTS ON LIKELY SUMMIT ISSUES AND OTHER MATTERS WHICH YOU MAY FIND USEFUL.
3. DELORS TOLD ME HE RECENTLY SENT A COMMUNICATION TO SECRETARY SHULTZ THROUGH THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON EMPHASIZING FRENCH READINESS TO EXPLORE WITH THE USG COMMON GROUND ON SEVERAL TROUBLING SUMMIT-RELATED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES. HE OBSERVED THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMAN ELECTIONS ARE SLOWING DOWN THE NEEDED DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE. WHILE SAYING THAT THE GERMANS MAY TAKE FOUR WEEKS TO PUT THEIR POLICY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THINKING IN ORDER, DELORS SAID THE FRENCH WERE READY NOW TO SHARE WITH US THEIR THINKING AND IDEAS BILATERALLY "WHILE WE (I.E. THE FRENCH) ARE WRITING THEM DOWN."

4. DELORS POINTED TO THREE PRINCIPAL THEMES WHICH WILL LIKELY HIGHLIGHT DISCUSSION AT THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT: A) INTERVENTION COORDINATION, B) INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEMS, AND C) TRADE.
-- ON THE LATTER, DELORS POINTED TO THE DEPENDENCE WE ALL HAVE ON AN EXPANSION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE IMMENSE DANGERS WE ALL FACE WITH THE RISING THREAT OF PROTECTIONISM. HE AGREED THAT THE TRADE ITEM IS SHORTHAND FOR A CONCERTED RECOVERY PROGRAM.
-- ON THE INTERVENTION STUDY, HE SAID HE WAS

PLEASED WITH PROGRESS MADE AND NOTED THAT THE FINANCE MINISTERS WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE THEIR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS STUDY AND SPECIFIC AREAS OF COOPERATION IN THE COMING WEEKS.

5. ON INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEMS, DELORS WAS MORE PRECISE. HE POINTED TO THREE PATHS WE MIGHT FOLLOW OR BE FORCED TO FOLLOW IN ADDRESSING THESE PROBLEMS:

- A) A POSSIBLE DEBT MORATORIUM DECLARED BY SEVERAL OF THE MOST HEAVILY INDEBTED COUNTRIES. I PROBED DELORS ON THE TRUE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS, TO WHICH HE CAUTIONED THAT HE FEARS THAT THE PROBLEM IS SO SEVERE IN SOME COUNTRIES THAT, WHEN THE UNCTAD MEETING CONVENED IN BELGRADE, WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THERE WERE MOVEMENT TOWARD THIS ALTERNATIVE;
- B) A NEW SDR ALLOCATION. DELORS SAID WITH LITTLE ELABORATION THAT HE FOUND THIS OPTION WORTH EXPLORING; AND
- C) A NEW "MARSHALL PLAN." WHEN I CAUTIONED THAT THIS IDEA WOULD FALL ON DEAF EARS IN OUR BUDGET-MINDED CONGRESS, DELORS SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO PAY FOR IT. HE VIEWS SUCH A NEW PLAN AS TAKING SHAPE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE IMF AND IBRD,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHEREBY THE IMF WOULD TAKE CARE OF SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE IBRD WOULD BE REMOVED TO FOCUS ON ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT WORKING IN HARMONY AND MUST BE DRAWN INTO CLOSER COOPERATION.

6. DESPITE THE CLEARLY EXHAUSTING AND PERSONALLY DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE OF THE SOCIALISTS' DEFEAT IN THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ON SUNDAY, DELORS STRUCK ME AS CALM AND CONFIDENT. HE NOTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF THE ELECTIONS AND THAT THE RESULTS WILL NOT

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BY CV NARA DATE 5/19/10

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #8952/02 0690859 (TAO AD321704 STU9622 410)
O 100854Z MAR 83 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4919

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 08952

EXDIS
FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
PASS TREASURY FOR SECRETARY REGAN
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EFIN, FR

SUBJECT: DELORS ON SUMMIT ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL
BE READY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THERE WERE CERTAINLY
NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT EXTERNAL CAUSES FOR THE FRENCH
DIFFICULTIES, NO POINTED CRITICISM OF THE U. S. HE
OBVIOUSLY IS PLEASED WITH THE PERSONAL RELATIONS HE
HAS DEVELOPED WITH THE U. S. ADMINISTRATION. DELORS
PRAISED THE DEDICATION AND STRONG EFFORTS MADE BY
SECRETARY REGAN IN WORKING OUT A SIZABLE INCREASE IN
THE U. S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE GAB AND OTHER WORK OF
THE G-10. GALBRAITH

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48306 26

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9109 24362 DTG: 101851Z MAR 83 PSN: 005682
SIT067 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 069/1903Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9109/01 0691853
O 101851Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5001

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5796
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1143
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 09109
EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USSTART
E.O. 12356: DNG: CO OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, NATO, FR, UK
SUBJECT: INF: IMPROVING ALLIANCE EFFORTS ON THE
- UK/FRENCH ISSUE
REFS: (A) USNATO 1504, (B) PARIS 7241

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE FULLY AGREE WITH USNATO THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BECOME MUCH TOO DEFENSIVE ON THE ISSUE OF UK/FRENCH FORCES AND THAT WITHOUT A MORE CONCERTED EFFORT TO MARSHAL AND REFINE OUR ARGUMENTS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO LOSE GROUND WITH ALLIED PUBLICS. OBVIOUSLY, THE MORE THE NON-NUCLEAR ALLIES CAN BE PERSUADED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN COMBATTING THE SOVIET POSITION, THE BETTER IT WILL BE. HOWEVER, AS REF A SUGGESTS, PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT MANY OF THEM THINK, IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A VALID POINT. WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ALLIED POSITION, IT IS IN MANY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CASES LESS BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED OF THE ARGUMENTS THAN BECAUSE TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF COMPENSATION FOR UK/FRENCH FORCES IN INF IS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, AS WELL AS TO THE U.S., AND COULD LEAD TO AN UNSATISFACTORY NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

3. THE LACKLUSTER SUPPORT OF MANY EUROPEANS ON THE UK/FRENCH ISSUE IS A PROBLEM WHICH GREATLY CONCERNS THE FRENCH. THEY FORESEE THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE AS THE YEAR GOES ON. THIS WORRIES THEM, NOT BECAUSE IT WILL IN ANY WAY CHANGE THEIR POSITION, BUT BECAUSE IT IS SO PROFOUNDLY DIVISIVE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. CERTAINLY, WE CAN COUNT ON THE FRENCH TO VISIT THE FULL WEIGHT OF THEIR WRATH ON ANY ALLIED GOVERNMENT WHICH SHOWS SIGNS OF PUBLIC WAVERING--AS THEY

DID LAST YEAR WITH THE GERMANS AND MORE RECENTLY WITH THE DUTCH. THE DUTCH POLITICAL COUNSELOR HERE (PLEASE PROTECT) TELLS US THAT THE GOF "HAS BEEN ALL OVER" THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE IN RECENT WEEKS. PRECISELY BECAUSE NO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT WANTS A ROW WITH PARIS OVER WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE MADE CLEAR THEY REGARD AS A VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST, THIS APPROACH WILL HELP TO LIMIT DAMAGING PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

4. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THE FRENCH CAN BE INDUCED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN HIGHLIGHTING THEIR POSITION ON EVENTUAL FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO RESTATE THIS POSITION AS APPROPRIATE. CHEYSSON DID SO IN HIS PUBLIC REMARKS IN MOSCOW, THOUGH NOT APPARENTLY IN HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO AND ANDROPOV. (PREDICTABLY, THE SOVIETS DID NOT REACT.) BUT FOR THE FRENCH SYSTEMATICALLY TO HIGHLIGHT THIS POSITION POSES CERTAIN PROBLEMS. FIRST, IT COULD BE READ AS ASSOCIATING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, TENUOUSLY, WITH THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATING SOLUTION IN INF. A COMMON CRITICISM HEARD HERE OF THE STRONG PUBLIC STAND TAKEN BY THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT ON INF IS THAT IT HAS LED THE SOVIETS TO STEP UP AND PUBLICIZE THEIR DEMANDS FOR INCLUSION OF FRENCH FORCES. WHILE THE ARGUMENT IS QUESTIONABLE, IT WILL MAKE THE FRENCH ALL THE MORE WARY OF INCREASING THEIR EXPOSURE ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE. MORE IMPORTANT, PERHAPS, IS THAT IT IS UNLIKELY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIETS WILL PURSUE THIS ISSUE AS LONG AS IT CONTINUES TO BE SO FRUITFULLY DIVISIVE. ELSEWHERE, FOR THE FRENCH TO STRESS THEIR EVENTUAL WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS COULD BE READ AS AN ADMISSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A POINT, THEREBY INCREASING RATHER THAN LESSENING THE PRESSURE.

5. WE AGREE, HOWEVER, WITH USNATO THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO SHIFT THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE UK/FRENCH DEBATE FROM INF TO THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT. WE HAVE LOST GROUND PRECISELY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CAUSING THE EUROPEANS COMPLETELY TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE EXISTENCE OF SOME 2700 SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WHICH ALSO POSE A THREAT TO EUROPE. THE DIFFICULTY OBVIOUSLY IS TO AVOID SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION IN START. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THIS COULD BE GOT AROUND BY EMPHASIZING THAT DISPARITY BETWEEN THE FORCES INVOLVED MAKES ANY TREATMENT OF THIS ISSUE LESS THAN URGENT AT THIS STAGE.

PARIS 9109 24362 DTG: 101851Z MAR 83 PSN: 005682

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BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9109 24362 DTG: 101851Z MAR 83 PSN: 005687
SIT066 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 069/19072

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THEIR RETENTION OF A MONOPOLY IN INF. SOVIET ARGUMENT
REQUIRES EUROPEANS TO IGNORE EXISTENCE OF ITS VAST
STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH THREATEN NOT ONLY THE U.S. BUT
EUROPE AS WELL. THIS IS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF SOVIET
EFFORTS TO "EUROSTRATEGIZE" THE PROBLEM OF INF, THUS
RATIFYING A SOVIET PREDOMINANCE IN EUROPE AND UNDERMINING
THE STRATEGIC UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.
MARESCA

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

PARIS 9109 24362 DTG: 101851Z MAR 83 PSN: 005687

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9109/02 0691854
O 101851Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5002

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5797
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1144
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 09109
EXDIS
GENEVA FOR USINF AND USSTART
E.O. 12356: DNG: CO OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, NATO, FR, UK
SUBJECT: INF: IMPROVING ALLIANCE EFFORTS ON THE

6. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, WE BELIEVE THE ARGUMENT COULD
FOCUS ON THREE MAIN POINTS (WE RECOGNIZE THHT NONE OF
THEM IS ORIGINAL):

-- UK AND FRENCH FORCES ARE MINIMAL LEVEL STRATEGIC
FORCES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ULTIMATE DETERRENT AGAINST
NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEIR HOMELAND. PROPER
COMPARISON IS NOT WITH SOVIET SS-20 OR PERSHING
BUT WITH INCOMPARABLY MORE NUMEROUS SOVIET AND U.S.
STRATEGIC FORCES. DISPARTIY PUTS PROBLEM INTO PROPER
PERSPECTIVE.

-- DISPARITY BETWEEN UK/FRENCH FORCES ON THE ONE HAND
AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE OTHER MAKES CLEAR THAT TREAT-
MENT OF UK/FRENCH FORCES IS NOT A FIRST ORDER PROBBEM
THAT NEED BE ADDRESSED NOW. FRENCH/UK POSITION THAT
TREATMENT OF THEIR FORCES CAN BE LOOKED AT ONLY WHEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS HAVE OCCURRED IN U.S. AND SOVIET
FORCES IS AN ENTIRELY LOGICAL ONE AT THIS STAGE. IT
IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT FRENCH AND BRITISH TO LIMIT
THEIR FORCES IN THE FACE OF A SOVIET FORCE WHICH, IN
ITS STRATEGIC DIMENSION ALONE, IS WELL OVER TEN TIMES
THEIR COMBINED SIZE AND WHICH BY VIRTUE OF ITS SIZE
OFFERS TO SOVIET PLANNERS A VARIETY OF OPTIONS NOT
AVAILABLE TO MORE LIMITED FRENCH AND UK FORCES. IS IT
REALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET SECURITY IS IMPERILED
WITHOUT LIMITATIONS ON THESE FORCES?

-- SOVIET DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION IN INF IS
ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL AND MANIPULATIVE IN NATURE.
PRECISELY BECAUSE THE DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION IS NOT
CREDIBLE IN A STRATEGIC CONTEXT, THE SOVIETS PUT IT
FORWARD IN THE INF CONTEXT, TO PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

48307

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9253 13362 DTG:111835Z MAR 83 PSN: 007554
SIT036 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 070/21152

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EOB: //TK//
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST (COPY TO SIGUR FOR ACTION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9253 0701836
O 111835Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5106

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1465
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4774
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5800
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3584
BT

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EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS SECDEF
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MCAP, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ON NATO "OUT-OF-AREA"
- QUESTIONS
REF: USNATO 1402

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE CANNOT AGREE WITH USNATO THAT A CHANGED METHOD OF CONSULTATIONS COULD SUCCEED IN BRINGING THE GOF AROUND ON "OUT-OF-AREA" QUESTIONS, MUCH LESS INDUCE THE FRENCH TO WEIGH IN WITH THE OTHER ALLIES IN QUEST OF A NATO-WIDE CONSENSUS (REFTEL). THE FACT IS THAT THE GOF DOES NOT REGARD WHAT WE CALL NATO "OUT-OF-AREA" PROBLEMS AS BEING NATO PROBLEMS AT ALL. FOR THE FRENCH, PROBLEMS IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE PERSIAN GULF PROBLEMS. THEY REMAIN PERFECTLY READY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH US ON A BILATERAL BASIS IN VIEW OF OUR SHARED INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GULF; INDEED, SUCH DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE, WITH POSITIVE RESULTS. IF SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS, THE FRENCH INSIST THAT THEY INCLUDE ONLY THOSE OTHER ALLIES WITH REAL INTERESTS OR CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA AND THAT THEY TAKE PLACE IN COMPLETE SECRECY. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY PRECISELY LIMITS THE AREA OF COMPETENCE OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THAT PRESSING NATO TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THAT AREA IS TANTAMOUNT TO AMENDING THE TREATY. WHILE THEY MAY ACCEPT ALLUSIONS TO "OUT-OF-AREA" PROBLEMS IN THE NATO CONTEXT AS REFLECTING THE EFFECTS OF SUCH PROBLEMS ON THE ALLIANCE, THEY WILL OPPOSE AN APPROACH WHICH GOES BEYOND THIS.

3. FRENCH OBJECTIONS GO BEYOND MERE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS TO A FUNDAMENTAL PERCEPTION OF THE TREATY

DEFINITION OF NATO'S COMPETENCE. THE FRENCH THINK "OUT-OF-AREA" QUESTIONS CAN BE RESOLVED ONLY BY THOSE COUNTRIES WITH INTERESTS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE REGION IN QUESTION AND CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY A LARGE MULTILATERAL FORUM WHICH HAS ONLY AN INDIRECT GEOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIP TO THE ISSUE. IN ADDITION, FRANCE PERCEIVES NO MATERIAL ADVANTAGE IN TREATING SUCH ISSUES IN NATO. ON THE CONTRARY, THE GOF FEARS THAT ANY NATO CONSENSUS WOULD ONLY SERVE TO MORTGAGE FRENCH POLICY TO DECISIONS MADE IN WASHINGTON OR--PERHAPS WORSE--TO A "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" ALLIANCE CONSENSUS INVOLVING COUNTRIES HAVING NEITHER CLEAR INTERESTS NOR INFLUENCE IN THE AREA OR ON THE ISSUE IN QUESTION. DESPITE INDICATIONS OF AN EVOLUTION IN FRENCH STRATEGIC THINKING ON THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, THIS APPROACH REMAINS THE SAME AND WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES THAT INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS WILL BRING THE FRENCH AROUND.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN RECENT YEARS FRANCE HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY FORTHCOMING IN DEALING WITH "OUT-OF-AREA" ISSUES BILATERALLY AND PRAGMATICALLY, AS WE HAVE FOUND IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE SINAI AND LEBANON. THE FRENCH POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA, THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE CARIBBEAN, AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC MAKES THEM A REAL PARTNER WHOSE ATTITUDES WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPECT AS A SMALL PRICE FOR THE KIND OF CONCRETE SUPPORT THEY ALONE CAN PROVIDE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. IN A YEAR WHEN THE ATTENTION OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF INF, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO BEGIN A DIVISIVE PUSH ON THE "OUT-OF-AREA" ISSUE, WHICH WOULD STRAIN RELATIONS WITH AN ALLY WHOSE SUPPORT ON INF HAS BEEN IMPORTANT. MOREOVER, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT IN THE REAL WORLD OUR CONCRETE BILATERAL "OUT-OF-AREA" COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND A FEW OTHER ALLIES (E.G., PORTUGAL) IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE KIND OF AMBIGUOUS PAPER CONSENSUS WHICH MIGHT BE ACHIEVED ON SUCH AN ISSUE IN NATO.

6. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER NATO CAPITALS, IF DESIRED. GALBRAITH

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48308 29

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NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, OVIP
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND MEETING WITH FORMER VICE PRESIDENT
MONDALE

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: FORMER VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND HIS AS-
SISTANT GAVE US A READOUT ON HIS MEETING WITH MITTERRAND
ON MARCH 14. CONVERSATION COVERED INF, GERMANY, WILLIAMS-
BURG SUMMIT, CENTRAL AMERICA AND USSR. MONDALE ALSO
PASSED ON HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS MEETING ON SAME DATE WITH
FINANCE MINISTER DELORS. END SUMMARY.

3. FORMER VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND HIS ASSISTANT
(FORMER FSO PETER TARNOFF) GAVE DCM A DETAILED READOUT
ON MONDALE'S MARCH 14 TETE-A-TETE MEETING WITH MITTERRAND.
SINCE THE MEETING TOOK PLACE THE MORNING AFTER THE
SOCIALISTS' SURPRISING REBOUND IN THE SECOND ROUND OF THE
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, THE CONVERSATION NATURALLY STARTED
ON THAT SUBJECT. MITTERRAND AT FIRST ASSERTED THAT HE
HAD NOT FOLLOWED ALL THE DETAILS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM
HIS COMMENTS THAT HE WAS FULLY INFORMED AND KEENLY
INTERESTED IN EACH MUNICIPAL RACE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. INF. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE CONVERSATION WAS INF.
MITTERRAND SAID HIS POSITION ON INF INSTALLATION WOULD
REMAIN FIRM. HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH HIS BUNDESTAG
SPEECH AND ITS RESULTS, AND NOTED THAT IT REFLECTED HIS
LONG-HELD VIEWS. HE SAID HE SUPPORTED THE NATO DUAL-
TRACK DECISION IN 1979, AND STILL DOES. IT WAS ESSENTIAL
THAT US MISSILES BE DEPLOYED IF THERE IS NO NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION IN GENEVA. MITTERRAND SAID IT WAS NECESSARY FOR
THE WEST TO DEAL WITH THE USSR FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

5. MITTERRAND CLEARLY SAW THE PERSHING II MISSILES AS THE
MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THE
TIME FACTOR AS IMPORTANT -- THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE
SYSTEMS CAN ARRIVE ON TARGET. WHILE HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR
WITH THE DETAILS OF THE NITZE-KVITSINSKY "WALK-IN-THE-
WOODS" FORMULA, HE WAS AWARE THAT IT SIGNIFIED NO DEPLOY-

MENT OF THE PERSHING. HE BELIEVED THAT A FAILURE TO
DEPLOY THE PERSHING WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN STRENGTH.

6. WITH REGARD TO AN "INTERIM SOLUTION," MITTERRAND WAS
LESS SPECIFIC. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POSITIONS OF
KOHL AND THATCHER, AND IMPLIED THAT HE AGREED WITH THEIR
VIEWS, BUT WAS CAUTIOUS IN EXPRESSING HIS OWN VERSION OF
A POSSIBLE OUTCOME. "I AM NOT THE NEGOTIATOR," HE SAID,
NOTING THAT IT WAS UP TO THE US TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE
COMPROMISE WITH THE SOVIETS. MONDALE HAD THE IMPRESSION,
BASED ON THE TENOR OF MITTERRAND'S STATEMENTS, THAT
MITTERRAND BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AGREE TO A
SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT US PROPOSAL, AND
THAT FOR THIS REASON SOME NEW MOVEMENT WAS NECESSARY.
HOWEVER, MONDALE WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT MITTERRAND
SAID NOTHING DIRECTLY WHICH INDICATED HE FAVORED AN
INTERIM SOLUTION.

7. GERMANY. MITTERRAND WAS CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED BY THE
DANGERS OF INCREASING PACIFISM IN GERMANY. HE DIVIDED
THE "SINCERE" PACIFISTS FROM THE "INSINCERE" ONES WHO
ARE SIMPLY WORKING FOR THE USSR. BUT HE ALSO IDENTIFIED
ANOTHER TENDENCY IN THE PACIFIST MOVEMENT -- ONE OF
NATIONALISM. IN MITTERRAND'S ANALYSIS, IT IS THIS
NATIONALIST TENDENCY WHICH IS PUSHING THE PACIFIST
MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF FAVORING A REUNIFIED,
NEUTRAL GERMANY. MITTERRAND SAID THE SPD HAD DESERTED
ITS OWN POSITION ON INF, AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEEN SURPRISED BY HIS BUNDESTAG SPEECH, WHICH STUCK TO
THE PREVIOUS POSITION. MITTERRAND SAID HE WOULD NOT
CHANGE HIS VIEWS JUST BECAUSE THE SPD CHANGES. MONDALE
SAID THAT IN HIS MEETINGS WITH MITTERRAND, THE FRENCH
PRESIDENT HAD OFTEN REFERRED TO THE "DAMAGED GERMAN
PSYCHE," RESULTING FROM THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH, AS
THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF THE SITUATION IN THE FRG.

8. WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT. MITTERRAND REFERRED TO THE LAST
TWO SUMMITS AS MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND SAID HE WAS PLEASED
THAT THE US SEEMED TO AGREE WITH THE NECESSITY FOR A MORE
SERIOUS APPROACH TO WILLIAMSBURG. THE MEETING SHOULD BE
SMALLER, WITH FEWER ADVISORS INVOLVED, AND IT SHOULD BE
MORE INFORMAL. MITTERRAND SAID HE HOPED DELEGATIONS (READ
THE US) WOULD AVOID MAKING THEIR OWN STATEMENTS ABOUT
WHAT RESULTED FROM THE MEETINGS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT
THE RESULTS BE RECORDED ACCURATELY SO THAT THE INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE THE SAME. THIS WAS
ESSENTIAL TO THE UTILITY OF THE SUMMIT.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 09782
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, OVIP
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND MEETING WITH FORMER VICE PRESIDENT

9. CENTRAL AMERICA. MITTERRAND WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR AND ABOUT US POLICY IN THE REGION. AS HE HAS IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, MITTERRAND SAID HE BELIEVED US POLICY WOULD LEAD TOWARD "THE RESULTS WE ALL FEAR." HE CITED US POLICY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE ROLE THE US SHOULD FOLLOW IN CENTRAL AMERICA -- FORCEFULLY ENSURING THAT THE RESULTS OF ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT. (MITTERRAND MADE NO ALLUSION, HOWEVER, TO PAST OR FUTURE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR.) MITTERRAND ALLOWED AS HOW NICARAGUA MAY NOW BE PAST THE POINT OF BEING SAVED FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION. NEVERTHELESS, HE ASSERTED THAT MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE PERMANENT, AND THE ONLY COURSE FOR REAL STABILITY OVER TIME WAS STRONG SUPPORT FOR REAL DEMOCRACY.

10. USSR. MITTERRAND NOTED THAT HE HAD NEVER MET ANDROPOV PERSONALLY AND THEREFORE HAD NO PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF HIM. BUT CHEYSSON HAD RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT ANDROPOV SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, THAT HE HAD A CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL STATURE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND SOME BREADTH. CHEYSSON'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT ANDROPOV WANTED PEACE, BUT ALSO WANTED TO OBTAIN SOVIET OBJECTIVES PEACEFULLY. THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH ANDROPOV FIRMLY, FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. MITTERRAND SAID CHEYSSON HAD BEEN VERY FIRM IN MOSCOW, HAD GIVEN AWAY NOTHING, AND FRANCE WAS GETTING ALONG BETTER WITH THE USSR AS A RESULT.

11. DELORS ON WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT. IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MONDALE, FINANCE MINISTER DELORS IDENTIFIED FOUR SUBJECTS WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT WILLIAMSBURG: WORLD TRADE, PARTICULARLY WITH THE AIM OF AVOIDING AN INCREASE IN PROTECTIONISM; STABILIZATION OF CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES; STIMULATION OF WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH; AND INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD. DELORS WAS OTHERWISE VAGUE ABOUT WHAT WAS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE AT

THE SUMMIT. HE SEEMED UNSURE OF WHO ON THE US SIDE IS IN CHARGE OF PREPARATIONS FOR WILLIAMSBURG, AND SAID THE FRENCH GET DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF US PRIORITIES FROM DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON.

12. DELORS ON US-EUROPEAN POLICY DIFFERENCES. DELORS SAID THERE WAS A DISTANCING BETWEEN THE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS IN EUROPE AND THE US, AND POLICIES ARE INCREASINGLY BEING FORMULATED WITHOUT REGARD TO INTERESTS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. HE CITED THE CASE OF SUBSIDIZED US AGRICULTURAL SALES TO EGYPT AND MOROCCO, BUT MONDALE CHALLENGED HIM ON THIS POINT, ASSERTING THAT THE US FEELS WE ARE BEING ARTIFICIALLY DENIED THE BENEFITS OF CERTAIN NATURAL ADVANTAGES WE HAVE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, AND THAT US FARMERS FEEL STRONGLY THAT EC SUBSIDIES ARE UNFAIR. DELORS DID NOT DENY THAT THE EC SUBSIDIZES ITS FARMERS, AND SAID THE EC WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM WITH THE US. DELORS THOUGHT THE WAY IN WHICH THE RECENT DISPUTE OVER STEEL HAD BEEN HANDLED WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF HOW SUCH PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH -- A SINGLE US INTERLOCUTOR NEGOTIATING WITH AN EC REPRESENTATIVE. DELORS ALSO NOTED THAT JAPAN WAS NOT FAIRLY SHARING THE BURDENS IN WORLD TRADE.

13. DELORS ON OIL PRICES. DELORS SAID THE FRENCH HOPED OIL PRICES WOULD NOT COME DOWN TOO FAR TOO QUICKLY, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A NUMBER OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS TO PURCHASE OIL AT 33 DOLLARS A BARREL. (EMBASSY COMMENT:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRANCE HAS LONG-TERM OIL PURCHASING CONTRACTS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, SUCH AS MEXICO AND SAUDI ARABIA, BUT WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE PRICING PROVISIONS IN EACH CASE. ON MARCH 15 MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS--AND FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY--BEREGOVY TOLD US THAT THE PRICING ARRANGEMENTS IN SUCH LONG-TERM CONTRACTS WERE BASED ON OFFICIAL PRICES AND WOULD VARY WITH SUCH PRICES. THUS, THE FRENCH WOULD NOT BE STUCK WITH A HIGHER PRICE. WE SUSPECT BERGOVY IS CORRECT, BUT INCLUDE DELORS' POINT AS REPORTED TO US BECAUSE IN AT LEAST ONE CASE--THE RECENT SAUDI DEAL--THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN REVEALED.)
GALBRAITH

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 10426
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, FR

SUBJECT: DRAPER BRIEFS FRENCH ON VISIT BY ISRAELI
AND LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

1. ~~0~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR DRAPER BRIEFED THE TOP-LEVELS OF THE
FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTRY (SECGEN GUTMANN,
HIS DEPUTY JACQUES MARTIN, MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA
DIRECTOR BONNEFOUS AND CHEYSSON'S STAFFER DELAYE) ON
THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

3. AFTER HEARING DRAPER'S PRESENTATION, GUTMANN NOTED
THAT FRANCE IS CONVINCED OF THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT'S DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE WANTED TO KNOW IF ISRAEL WAS READY TO TAKE THE
NECESSARY STEPS AND WONDERED IF THE PRESIDENT COULD
PUT MORE THAN MORAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. DRAPER REIN-
FORCED WHAT HE HAD SAID IN HIS INITIAL PRESENTATION
ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG RESOLVE.

4. ISRAEL, GUTMANN POSTULATED, WANTS TO MAKE LEBANON
INTO AN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SATELLITE. DRAPER
DISAGREED AS FAR AS MAKING IT AN ECONOMIC SATELLITE.
GUTMANN ALSO SUGGESTED THAT REMAINING IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
DOES NOT PROTECT ISRAEL AGAINST SYRIAN MISSILES, SINCE
THE SYRIANS AIM THERE IS REALLY POLITICAL RATHER THAN
MILITARY.

5. THE QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL HYPOTHESIZED THAT IF THE
REAGAN PLAN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT GO FORWARD,

IN TWO OR THREE YEARS WE WILL BE FACED WITH ISRAELI
ANNEXATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. GUTMANN
WONDERED ALOUD WHAT WILLGET BEGIN TO CHANGE. ISRAEL, HE
SAID, ALWAYS FINDS NEW WAYS OF BLOCKING PROGRESS.
FRANCE WANTS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
HOW CAN WE BRING THIS ABOUT AND WHAT CAN FRANCE DO TO
HELP, ASKED GUTMANN.

6. DRAPER SAID THAT WE WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO PROVIDE
ASSURANCES TO THE PLO THROUGH THE LEBANESE REGARDING
THE STAY-BEHIND PALESTINIANS IN ALL OF LEBANON. FRANCE
CAN HELP IN ASSURING THE PLO, AND IN ASSISTING EFFORTS
TO ASSURE THAT UNIFIL IS PRESERVED FOR SUCH TASKS AS
DEPLOYING IN THE VICINITY OF CAMPS.

7. IN DISCUSSING FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECURITY
OF THE PALESTINIANS, GUTMANN SAID THAT CHEYSSON HAD
RAISED WITH LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM THE IDEA
PUTTING UNIFIL NEAR THE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH. SALEM
SAID THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BEFORE THE
EVACUATION OR IT RISKED HAVING NO EVACUATION. THE FRENCH
REMAIN UNCONVINCED. GUTMANN REITERATED THE POINT,
ALREADY MADE BY THE FRENCH IN THEIR WASHINGTON DEMARCHE,
THAT THEY ARE READY TO BRING THEIR UNIFIL CONTINGENT
BACK UP TO ITS FORMER LEVEL. DRAPER REPLIED THAT IT IS
IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, AS THE OCCUPY-
ING POWER, TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING
PEOPLE WHERE IT HAS CONTROL.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. GUTMANN THEN TURNED TO THE EVENTUAL EXTENSION OF THE
MNF OUTSIDE OF BEIRUT. HE SAID FRANCE HAD MADE NO
DECISIONS, THOUGH THEY REMAIN CAUTIOUS. HE STRESSED THAT
FRANCE REMAINS COMPLETELY WITH US ON THIS. HE WANTED TO
KNOW ABOUT OUR IDEAS REGARDING EXPANDING THE MNF OUTSIDE
BEIRUT, WHICH AMBASSADOR DRAPER PROVIDED HIM ALONG
FAMILIAR LINES. DRAPER NOTED HIS OWN HOPE THAT A MNF
WOULD BE NEEDED FOR ONLY SIX MONTHS, ASSUMING UNIFIL
COULD BE PRESERVED FOR TASKS REQUIRING A LONGER STAY.

9. THE FRENCH CAN IMAGINE THAT DESPITE ALL OF OUR BEST
EFFORTS WE STILL MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT AN
EVACUATION AND THAT WE COULD BE FACED WITH THE PROSPECT
OF THE MNF REMAINING FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. (GUTMANN
COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CAIRO TWO DAYS AGO AND
THAT BOUTROS GHALI THINKS WE ARE IN FOR A LONG FREEZE.)
IF WE ARE FACED WITH SUCH A SITUATION IN THE WEEKS TO
COME, THEN THE FRENCH WOULD WANT CLOSE CONSULTATION
WITH US. IF THERE IS NO EVACUATION, WE WOULD HAVE TO
HAVE TO THINK THROUGH SUCH THINGS AS: (A) MORE SUPPORT
NEEDED FOR GEMAYEL, (B) THE PLO, (C) HUSSEIN'S ROLE AND

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 10426
EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, FR
SUBJECT: DRAPER BRIEFS FRENCH ON VISIT BY ISRAELI
(D) THE SOVIETS. IN THE WEEKS TO COME, GUTMANN SAID
THAT THE PLO SHOULD REMAIN "CIRCUMSPECT" (DISCREET)
BUT IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO
SO. IN THAT CASE, GUTMANN SUGGESTED (AGAIN) THAT PERHAPS
WE CAN OFFER THE PLO THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN UNSC RESOLUTION
(WHICH THE FRENCH KEEP NEATLY TUCKED ON A SHELF READY
TO BE DRAWN OUT ON A MOMENT'S NOTICE). DRAPER SHOWED
SURPRISE AT THIS LAST IDEA, BUT CONFINED HIS REMARKS
TO A RESTATEMENT OF THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONTACT IN THE
PERIOD AHEAD. GALBRAITH

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MESSAGE:

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BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 11859

EXDIS

USIAEA

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: TNUC, PARM, KSCA, FR, PK

SUBJECT: FRENCH NUCLEAR REACTOR SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN
1. (U) ON MARCH 29, AFP REPORTED FROM ISLAMABAD THAT FONMIN CHEYSSON HAS STATED TO A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE "HAD RAISED MONDAY WITH (PAKISTAN) THE PAST DISAGREEMENT . . . ON THE CONTRACT, ABORTED BY FRANCE, FOR A REPROCESSING PLANT AND THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE NUCLEAR REACTOR FOR WHICH PAKISTAN HAS ASKED FOR BIDS. DISCUSSIONS ON THESE POINTS WILL BE CONTINUED. . . " HE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE NOTED "THE RIGHT OF PAKISTAN, IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER COUNTRIES" TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL REASONS. CHEYSSON IS FURTHER QUOTED AS "EMPHASIZING THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. DO NOT SHARE THE 'SAME APPROACH' ON THE DEFINITION OF COMPLETE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES." TWO DAYS AGO, BEFORE THE TALKS, HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE REFERRED TO "EVOLUTION" OF FRENCH POLICY ON NUCLEAR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.

2. (S) EMBASSY IS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED IN THIS DEVELOPMENT AND HAS INFORMALLY CONVEYED THIS TO GOF. WE HAD RECEIVED A VARIETY OF INDICATIONS THAT FOR BOTH GENERAL PPOLICY CONCERNS AND REASONS OF FINANCING RISK, FRANCE WOULD NOT GO AHEAD. AT THE SAME TIME, FORMALLY THE FRENCH HAD GIVEN US NO ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO. THEIR FORMAL STATEMENT TO U.S. HAS BEEN THAT THEY HAVE MADE NO DECISION ON THE MATTER, BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO ADOPT A FULL-

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SCOPE SAFEGUARDS POLICY. STILL WE HAD HOPED FOR SILENCE OR FURTHER CONSULTATION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS DEAL IS UNLIKELY IN THE END TO BE IMPLEMENTED. AND IN THE MEANTIME A VERY SEVERE BLOW HAS BEEN DEALT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY AD HOC FULL-SCOPE CONSENSUS FOR THIS SPECIFIC SALE. WE HAD INFORMALLY EMPHASIZED TO CEA (RENON) THE STRENGTH OF U.S. VIEWS ON THIS POINT LAST WEEK. OUR CONTACT AT QUAI D'ORSAY AMIGUES (PROTECT) PROFESSES TO BE SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE CHEYSSON STATEMENT HIMSELF. HE SAYS ONLY GENERAL NON-COMMITTAL TALKING POINTS WENT TO CHEYSSON ON THIS.

3. (S) EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT AT MINIMUM U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT ON THIS BE MORE FORMALLY CONVEYED TO GOF AT A HIGH LEVEL.

GALBRAITH
BT
#1859
NNNN