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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 12/21/2007

**File Folder** FRANCE (12/16/82-12/31/82)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 13

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55

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47575	CABLE	161153Z DEC 82 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	12/16/1982	B1
47576	CABLE	171910Z DEC 82 <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	12/17/1982	B1
47578	NOTE	TO CLARK RE CRAY <i>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	1	ND	B1
47577	MEMO	BLAIR/WEISS/FORTIER TO CLARK RE SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR FRANCE <i>PAR 6/25/2010 MR081/1</i>	3	12/23/1982	B1
47580	MEMO	BLAIR/WEISS TO CLARK RE FRANCE	2	12/20/1982	B1
47581	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 47572 <i>PAR 6/25/2010 MR081/1</i>	1	11/3/1982	B1
47582	MEMO	TO WEISS RE COMPUTERS	1	ND	B1
47583	PAPER	RE SUPERCOMPUTERS	4	12/1/1982	B1
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47586	CABLE	300204Z DEC 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	12/30/1982	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 3394 6404 DTG:161153Z DEC 82 PSN: 040234  
SIT876 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 350/1230Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #3394/01 3501154  
O 161153Z DEC 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9299

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 43394  
FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (CHIRAC, JACQUES), FR  
SUBJECT: CHIRAC VISIT TO US  
REF: STATE 344825 AND PREVIOUS

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT)
2. CHIRAC HAS APPROVED DRAFT TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT CONTAINED REFTEL. HIS OFFICE PLANS TO RELEASE IT DECEMBER 27.
3. WE HAVE DISCUSSED CHIRAC'S PLANS WITH DE LIPKOWSKI AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO US KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET WHO HAVE GIVEN US FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH DIFFERS SLIGHTLY FROM THAT IN REFTEL.
4. CHIRAC AND EIGHT OR NINE MEMBER DELEGATION WILL ARRIVE IN NEW YORK (JFK) ON JANUARY 11 AT 3:00 P.M. MAYOR KOCH WILL GIVE RECEPTION AND DINNER IN CHIRAC'S HONOR THAT EVENING. KOCH WILL ALSO GIVE A LUNCHEON IN CHIRAC'S HONOR ON JANUARY 12 AFTER WHICH CHIRAC WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, PROBABLY BY SHUTTLE, ARRIVING AROUND 6:00 P.M. CHIRAC WOULD LIKE TO PAY A COURTESY CALL ON MAYOR BERRY THAT EVENING.
5. ON JANUARY 13, IN ADDITION TO THE CALL ON THE PRESIDENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AT 11:30 AM, THERE ARE PLANS FOR CHIRAC TO SPEAK AT CSIS, BUT THE TIMING IS NOT YET FIRM.

6. CHIRAC IS CONSIDERING MARYLAND GOVERNOR HUGHES INVITATION TO LUNCH IN ANNAPOLIS ON JANUARY 14 BUT NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE. IF THE LUNCH TAKES PLACE, IT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A CEREMONY COMMEMORATING THE BEGINNING OF THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF PARIS. CONTACT FOR THIS POSSIBLE EVENT IS MS. NICCOLLS, MRS. HUGHES' ASSISTANT, PHONE: (DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON) 261.2961.

7. LIPKOWSKI AND KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET ALSO ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CHIRAC TO SEE THE VICE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER, WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON. CONSIDERATION IS ALSO BEING GIVEN FOR

REQUESTS TO SEE SECRETARY REGAN, AND CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE THOUGHT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS SOMETIMES INVOLVED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN VISITORS. IN ANY EVENT, WE SAID, WE WOULD PASS ON THIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON. CHIRAC IS KEEN ON HAVING SUBSTANTIVE TALKS ON DEFENSE ISSUES AT THE PENTAGON WHETHER WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER OR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS. HE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN INF, AND WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO A BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER TO MEET BRIEFLY WITH CHIRAC, IF SUCH MEETINGS ARE CONVENIENT. CHIRAC IS SPEAKING OUT INCREASINGLY ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE ISSUES, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF GOF PLANS TO REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING, AND HE WOULD BENEFIT FROM AN EXPOSURE TO CURRENT WASHINGTON VIEWS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAS PUBLICLY LABELED THE ZERO-OPTION A "CUNNING TRAP". PLEASE ADVISE.

9. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE MINNEAPOLIS POSSIBILITY IS WORTH PURSUING, SINCE CHIRAC EVIDENTLY DOES NOT HAVE TIME FOR A MORE EXTENDED TRIP. WE HAVE NOT MENTIONED IT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE.

10. LIPKOWSKI SAID HE WOULD INFORM AMBASSADOR VERNIER-PALLIEZ OF CHIRAC'S VISIT, AND THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE (THOUGH NOT AT ALL CERTAIN) THAT VERNIER-PALLIEZ WOULD GIVE A DINNER IN HIS HONOR. IN ANY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CASE LIPKOWSKI IS IN TOUCH WITH A FRENCH DIPLOMAT IN WASHINGTON NAMED FAURE (SON OF MAURICE FAURE), WHO WILL HELP WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHIRAC. FAURE MAY HOST A DINNER OR BREAKFAST WITH THE PRESS, AND POSSIBLY SEEK SOME CONTACTS ON THE HILL. CHIRAC AND LIPKOWSKI HAVE HAD PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH SENATOR PERCY, AND WILL TRY TO ARRANGE SOMETHING THROUGH HIM.

11. LIPKOWSKI SAID WE COULD BE SURE THAT IN HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS CHIRAC WOULD BE VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, AS SUGGESTED BY THE POSITIONS IN THE RPR FOREIGN POLICY REPORT (PREVIOUSLY POUCHED TO EUR/WE).

12. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH ADVANCING THE TRIP AND LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON TOMORROW. HE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH EMBASSY, SENATOR PERCY AND OTHERS ABOUT THE TRIP. HE WILL BE LUNCHING FRIDAY WITH JOHN YOCHELSON OF CSIS TO SET UP THE SPEECH AND WILL BE LOOKING INTO THE HUGHES INVITATION. WE SUGGESTED HE CON-

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NLRR MD7-081 #47575

74 CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

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2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      PARIS 3394                      6404                      DTG: 161153Z DEC 82 PSN: 040236  
SIT875                      DATE 12/27/82                      TOR: 350/1230Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #3394/02 3501156  
O 161153Z DEC 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9300

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 43394  
FOR EUR/WE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (CHIRAC, JACQUES), FR  
SUBJECT: CHIRAC VISIT TO US  
TACT JACKIE CAHILL AT THE DEPARTMENT. HE ALSO MENTIONED  
HE WOULD BE LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING A  
TELEVISION APPEARANCE FOR CHIRAC IN WASHINGTON. KOS-  
CIUSKO-MORIZET WILL BE SSTAYING AT THE HAY-ADAMS THROUGH  
THE WEEKEND.

13. DURING THE VISIT, CHIRAC WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE  
FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

- JACQUES KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET
- JEAN DE LIPKOWSKI
- DENIS BAUDOUIN, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE  
MAYOR'S OFFICE
- PHILIPPE DE BAUSSET, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR  
FROM THE RPR
- PIERRE LESOURD, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AND PERSONAL  
FRIEND OF CHIRAC
- A PHOTOGRAPHER AND SECURITY DETAIL.

ALAIN JUPPE, CLOSE CHIRAC ADVISOR ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS,  
MAY ALSO JOIN THE PARTY IF REGAN AND VOLCKER MEETINGS  
TAKE PLACE. GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

47576

3

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      PARIS 3741      7516      DTG: 171910Z DEC 82 PSN: 042002  
SIT856      DATE 12/27/82      TOR: 351/2023Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTT--STHECKLIST-----N)

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #3741 3511910  
O 171910Z DEC 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9487  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4110  
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 43741

EXDIS  
LONDON FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ECON, NATO, FR  
SUBJECT: FRENCH POSITION ON NATO STUDY OF EAST-WEST  
- ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
REF: (A) SECTO 17120, (B) PARIS 43396, (C) SECTO 17111

PARIS 3741      7516      DTG: 171910Z DEC 82 PSN: 042002

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN COURSE OF RELAXED CONVERSATION DECEMBER 17, CHARGE ASKED QUAI DEP SEC GEN MARTIN (PROTECT) ABOUT THE APPARENT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED BY CHEYSSON DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE SECRETARY (REF A) AND HIS TV INTERVIEW THE FOLLOWING EVENING (REF B). CHARGE ASKED IF THE INTERVIEW REPRESENTED SOME BACKING AWAY FROM THE PROCEDURES WE THOUGHT HAD BEEN AGREED DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

3. MARTIN WAS VERY PRUDENT IN HIS REPLY, RECOGNIZING THAT THESE ISSUES WERE BEING HANDLED AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS AND HAD ACQUIRED A SPECIAL SENSITIVITY FOR BOTH THE US AND FRANCE. NEVERTHELESS, HE ZEROED IN IMMEDIATELY ON THE NATURE OF THE OVERALL STUDY OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECURITY ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE FORUM IN WHICH IT WOULD BE CONDUCTED. MARTIN EXPRESSED DEEP RESERVATIONS ABOUT CONDUCTING SUCH A STUDY IN NATO, EVEN IF IT IS DEFINED AS TREATING ONLY SECURITY-RELATED ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE PRESSURE TO EXPAND THE STUDY BEYOND WHAT THE FRENCH WOULD CONSIDER SECURITY-RELATED, AND THAT THE RESULTING CONFRONTATION WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE ALLIANCE. NOTING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE WHOLE ISSUE THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE QUAI, HE UNDERLINED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO APPEAR SUBJECT TO NATO GUIDELINES IN ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. MARTIN THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE THE APPEARANCE NO MATTER HOW THE NATO STUDY EVOLVED.

4. MARTIN GENTLY PRESSED ANOTHER PROCEDURAL SET-UP UNDER WHICH THE QUAD GROUP WOULD ACT AS A BEHIND-THE-SCENES MANAGER FOR AN OVERALL STUDY IN THE OECD, USING BILATERAL CONTACTS (E.G. WITH THE SWISS AS A WAY OF INFLUENCING THE NEUTRAL OECD MEMBERS) TO CONTROL THE EVOLUTION OF THE STUDY.

5. CHARGE NOTED THAT WE THOUGHT THE ISSUE OF THE FORUM FOR THE OVERALL STUDY HAD BEEN SETTLED BETWEEN US DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AND HOPED WE WERE NOT FINDING OURSELVES IN ANOTHER SITUATION IN WHICH WHAT WE THOUGHT HAD BEEN AGREED WAS COMING UNSTUCK. MARTIN DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT DID SAY THAT THERE WERE SOME IMPORTANT "DETAILS" WHICH HAD NOT BEEN AGREED. MARTIN WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON HOW CHEYSSON WOULD REPLY TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER (REFTEL C) ON THIS POINT. WE THUS DO NOT KNOW WHETHER MARTIN'S THOUGHTS REPRESENT AN EVOLVING GOF POSITION OR JUST QUAI D'ORSAY AFTERTHOUGHTS. HE IS A CONSCIENTIOUS INTERLOCUTOR WHO IS THE THIRD-RANKING OFFICIAL IN THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT COULD IN THIS INSTANCE BE BELOW THE DECISION-MAKING LEVEL AND UNAWARE OF HIGHER-LEVEL COMMITMENTS.  
MARESCA

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NLRR M07-081 #47576  
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

National Security Council  
The White House

470

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

82 DEC 18 P 1: 33

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>NAU</u>	<u>5</u>	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_?

COMMENTS

*Where do we go from here?  
mcc*

WPC HAS SEEN

5

**MEMORANDUM**INFORMATION**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

December 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: HENRY NAU *HN*

SUBJECT: French Perspective on E-W Trade Studies (U)

You asked for the following assessment by this weekend.

The President's letter to Mitterrand, Shultz's meeting with Mitterrand this week, and Shultz's long press conference with Cheysson provide an opportunity to assess where we are in meshing US-French perspectives on the controversial E-W trade subject.

Facts Relating to French Perspective

The President's letter points out that there is a consensus among the LaSapinière allies

- to accept new criteria or principles for governing East-West economic relations,
- to aim for new objectives, such as the limitation of energy imports from the Soviet Union,
- to put in place a new framework for both an overall and individual studies of various aspects of E-W trade.

At the luncheon meeting with Shultz, Mitterrand accepted

- the idea of individual studies in existing institutions-- COCOM, OECD and IEA,
- the beginning of new conversations.

But he resisted the idea

- of an overall study,
- of a new steering group or directorate, specifically objecting to the Summit country group that negotiated the non-paper in Washington,
- of new objectives, saying the new conversations could not imply a "new path,"
- of new criteria or binding commitments, such as firm limits on future gas purchases from the Soviet Union.



Cheysson, in the press conference with Shultz, seemed to try to pull Mitterrand a step closer to the US position by agreeing with Shultz

- that an overall study could be done in NATO with Japan being informally involved,
- that the political meetings in May and June--OECD and NATO Ministerials and the Williamsburg Summit--might serve as a kind of ad hoc steering process for review of the individual studies and exchange of views on overall objectives.

### Historical Background of French Perspective

France has always accepted the security elements of the Alliance as binding commitments. Under de Gaulle, however, it redefined the scope of these commitments to exclude the centralized military command structure. Today, France accepts the binding commitments bearing on security, but pursues an independent national military and strategic program informally coordinated with the allies in implementing these commitments.

France has always resisted expanding binding commitments beyond security. Jobert was Foreign Minister in 1973 when Kissinger launched the Year of Europe, an exercise to develop an Atlantic Charter for both security and economic relations. France resisted this exercise and then opted out of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 when Kissinger exploited the energy crisis to implement his Year of Europe objectives.

Apparently, Jobert, now Trade Minister, and others have convinced Mitterrand that current US efforts in E-W trade represent another attempt to expand binding Alliance commitments beyond the security sphere and to institutionalize these commitments in a new E-W trade policy framework. In his lunch with Shultz, Mitterrand explicitly referred to and rejected the notion of an "economic directorate" to steer the E-W trade studies, emphasizing that the approach should be strategic, i.e., security-related only, and not involve the Alliance in deciding "the price of pots and pans." Cheysson in his press conference with Shultz, carefully distinguished between decisions involving security which are binding and those involving non-security issues which are not binding.

In the case of the latter, Cheysson said the issues must first be studied in a non-binding framework. Then the study group makes recommendations, and each government freely decides whether it accepts that recommendation. This does not mean that these decisions should not be coordinated with security commitments. "It is the duty of every government," he added, "to see that such decisions that they take in their sovereign

right be compatible with the commitments into which they have entered under the security arrangements." In addition, governments may decide to turn the non-binding recommendations of a study group into a binding arrangement. This is what was done, Cheysson pointed out, with the OECD consensus arrangement on export credits.

### Closing the Gap

The attached chart illustrates the present gap between the French and US perspectives. The French have rejected new commitments before the studies, conclusions, and independent decisions have been made on the detailed content of these commitments. If Cheysson is to be believed, they do not reject the possibility of new binding commitments in individual economic areas, as he indicated with the example of the OECD export credit arrangements. But they do and probably always will reject new overall commitments which establish a formal and institutionalized economic dimension in NATO.

In short, Mitterrand and Cheysson, taken together, seem to be willing to work on the possibility of new commitments from the bottom up with *ad hoc* overall reviews being made periodically at meetings such as the Economic Summit and the OECD/NATO Ministerials. But they resist making broad commitments at the outset and working from the top down.

There are two general ways to proceed:

1. Continue to press the French for commitments on criteria and objectives such as those stated in the "Summary of Conclusions" and if they continue to resist, try to move ahead with the others. This is the 1973-74 Year of Europe strategy. It may be more difficult to pull off in 1983 because the others are more reluctant to go along without the French. French-German relations today, after the Giscard-Schmidt era, are tighter than before, and the UK, after ten years as a member of the EC, now has many more interests at stake on the Continent.
2. Maintain our position on the "Summary of Conclusions," but press ahead on the individual studies, establish an overall study in NATO, identify specific conclusions that we want to see emerge from the studies, review overall objectives and direction at the Williamsburg Summit, and seek binding government commitments as specific conclusions emerge. In time, we may arrive in fact at what the French reject in theory. The difficulty here is that the process may lose steam, and the French may get off the hook.

We may be able to combine the two approaches, although a frontal push for commitments may sour the atmosphere for pragmatic progress.

I have discussed this assessment in detail with Dennis Blair and Roger Robinson. They agree with it but were not available to concur in this written version sent to you on Saturday.

RR  
has seen 1

U.S. WORKING FROM THIS END →

← FRANCE WILLING TO START FROM THIS END

SECURITY

NON-SECURITY

NATO  
COCOM  
NATO Command Structure  
(minus France)  
IEA Emergency Program  
(minus France)

NATO Command Structure  
(as seen by France)  
OECD  
IEA (as seen by France)

E-W Trade Studies:  
Steering Group--Ad Hoc Meetings  
Williamsburg Summit  
NATO Ministers  
OECD Ministers  
  
Overall Study--maybe NATO with  
Japan informally involved  
Existing Individual Studies  
COCOM--military equipment  
IEA--energy alternatives  
OECD--financial

*Non-Paper Terminology*

CRITERIA  
or  
COMMITMENTS

OBJECTIVES  
or  
PATH

FRAMEWORK  
or  
STUDIES

*Relationship*

BINDING

COORDINATION OF  
INDEPENDENT  
DECISIONS

CONSULTATION



INCREASING COOPERATION

RECEIVED 20 DEC 82 15

TO CLARK

FROM NAU

DOCDATE 18 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

EAST WEST ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: FRENCH PERSPECTIVE ON EAST - WEST TRADE STUDIES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 22 DEC 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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*PA* *(c)*

TO CLARK

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM BLAIR *sent 12/21/07*

RECEIVED 20 DEC 82 18

DOCDATE 20 DEC 82

WEISS 20 DEC 82

WEISS 22 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR FRANCE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS J

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

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LOG 8290794

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20 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR FRANCE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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		12/27	reopen for signature		

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


February 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: License Applications for Supercomputers  
to France

The pending request for licenses to export two CRAY and  
one CYBER 205 supercomputers to France were approved.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

*BTM*  
FEB 0 2 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: License Applications for Supercomputers  
to France

~~It has been determined that the pending license requests~~ *to* ~~for export of two CRAY and one CYBER 205 supercomputers~~ *for licenses*  
to France ~~should now be approved.~~ *were*

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

January 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN BAILEY  
DENNIS BLAIR  
DON FORTIER

FROM:

GUS WEISS *Gus*

SUBJECT:

CRAY and CYBER 205 Supercomputers for France

So that we are working with some common recollection of what went on around Christmas, I'm sketching for you my summary of events.

After Dennis and I sent a memo to Judge Clark recommending approval of licenses for the three machines, the West Wing agreed. Dennis notified Defense; Perle apparently then called Bud, and Bud wrote a note to the Judge suggesting the hold be put back on, which it was. Judge Clark was then to discuss the matter on an airplane to California with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger; Don, Dennis, and I sent another paper for the Judge's consideration, to use on the plane.

A few days before Christmas Van Eron asked me to sort out for him what appeared to be inconsistencies in the paperwork he had received back from the West Wing. Van had a letter signed by the Judge to the President of CRAY Research telling him two licenses were to be approved for France, and the Judge's approval of the export decision paper drafted by Dennis and myself, which included the 205. Van was not clear what this meant because he also had a handwritten note from Bud to the Judge saying that Dick Perle talked to him and suggesting to the Judge that a hold again be imposed. I told Van not to mail anything to CRAY as I thought the matter was on hold.

To sort this out I inquired of John about the current state of the decision, which I understood was still not ok. John said the Judge had talked to Secretary Weinberger and that the licenses had indeed been approved and that the signed documents with Van were valid. I called Bo Denysyk at Commerce to tell him of this decision, and Commerce notified CRAY and Control Data of approval.

The next morning John called to say that he had again talked to Judge Clark and that no decision had in fact been made to approve as the Judge wanted to give Secretary Weinberger more time. John told me to tell Commerce not to issue any licenses until they had written approval from Judge Clark; I so informed Bo Denysyk.

Just after Christmas I again sought an expression from John, especially since Control Data was going to lose \$926,500 to France in the form of a lost French tax credit unless the 205 license was granted before the end of 1982. John was not aware of this fact. I noted that this was spelled out in a memo I had previously sent to Judge Clark on the CYBER 205. John told me Bud was taking the entire package with him to California to discuss with Judge Clark.

Meantime I asked Steve Bryen about Defense's view of the CYBER 205 export. On several occasions Steve said he had no knowledge of the CYBER issue, and when I talked with Steve's staff on a day when he was out ill, the staff had never heard of it either. I then asked Bo if Commerce had referred the case to Defense, which he said Commerce had, and also that he had mentioned the 205 in conversation with Steve (Steve doesn't recall the conversation).

After further checking I found out that Defense had the case, only it was in the office of the Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering and that it had not been forwarded to Policy (it was sent three days before New Year's). Policy received it just before the holiday.

John went on leave just before the New Year's holiday so I called Florence on Thursday morning and Kathy McGraw in the afternoon to find out if anything had come through, to see if something had happened. Nothing had been decided. Bo called later on, as Control Data had been calling him frequently during the day; I told him as far as I knew there was no approval and that the three computers were on hold. Late in the day I brought Dennis up to speed on the various conversations.

91049  
P479

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

16

December 30, 1982

Don Fortier

Subject: Cray's to France

After further discussions with Sec  
Weinberger, the Judge has decided to  
suspend approval of the license until  
after the January Hernu-Weinberger  
meeting. Please so inform Commerce.

Many thanks

Bud  


479

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED Package # 91049 17

82 DEC 28 P 5: 43

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*John -*

*yes.* ① I have the earlier dispatch - attached. should I hold until this one is signed

*yes* ② shouldn't copies also go to Schultz & Wernberger? *John*

91049

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

*Dennis Blair* DENNIS BLAIR/GUS WEISS/DON FORTIER *Gus JCB for*

SUBJECT:

Computers to France

We understand from Admiral Poindexter that you have discussed with Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz the sale of two CRAY and one CYBER 205 supercomputer to service bureaus in France. Admiral Poindexter informed us that you have decided to approve the issuance of the licenses immediately. Attached for your signature is a memorandum to Secretary Baldrige directing him to issue the licenses.

RECOMMENDATION:OKNO

—

—

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Baldrige at Tab I

Attachment:

Tab I

Memorandum to Secretary Baldrige

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: Computers for France

Please approve and issue export licenses now pending for two CRAY I computers for the Compagnie International de Services en Informatique (CISI), Paris, France, under case numbers 628656 and 645645. In addition, please approve and issue the export license now pending for one CYBER 205 computer for Control Data France S.A., Paris, France, under case number 662085.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

William P. Clark

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


December 23, 1982

Dear Mr. Rollwagen:

Thank you very much for your letter to me of November 30, 1982, on CRAY Research sales to France. I found the letter very helpful in clarifying the facts as you see them. Action has been taken to approve the sale of the two computers in question.

With very best wishes for the holidays.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Mr. John A. Rollwagen  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Cray Research, Inc.  
608 2nd Avenue South  
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

NOT SENT PER  
Poundstone

20-A

474

# National Security Council The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 91049

82 DEC 22 P 2: 58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>g</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>X</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information   **A-Action**   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

### DISTRIBUTION

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### COMMENTS



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1982

Judge Clark

Subject: Licensing the Sale of Two  
Cray Computers to France

Yesterday I urged you to approve this action. Today, Richard Perle called to register a firm protest. His grounds were that the Cray sale represents important leverage in an upcoming meeting (January '83) Cap will have with the French Defense Minister in which Cap will try to get the French MOD to make good on commitments he made to remove US technology from the MT-20 and submit it to COCOM. They have not fully met their commitments to do that.

I recommend that you discuss this matter with Cap and George on the way to California. It is possible you can get both to agree to wait on the actual license approval until Cap's meeting in Jan so as to get some use of it in his talks.

If you disagree please let me know and we will go ahead as originally planned.

Bud

*Tea 27*

FW  
don  
21

**MEMORANDUM**

SYSTEM II: 91049 Add-On

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT  
ACTION

December 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
FROM: GUS WEISS *Gus*  
SUBJECT: CRAY Computers to France

Attached is the requested letter to Mr. Rollwagen, president of CRAY Research.

*sub*  
Dennis Blair concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove

Tab I Letter to Rollwagen  
Tab A Memo to you with your notations

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *smf 12/21/07*

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

To. W.C. —  
Cray for France

We talked to Bud,  
he agreed to put  
hold on it, so  
Cap could talk to  
you (on plane to Calif.?)

We believe it is important  
not to undercut  
French Defense Minister Hernu  
(who has been helpful on  
tech transfer) and let  
him bring this plan  
home from Washington, when  
he sees Cap mid January.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASD  
NLRR M07-081 #47578  
BY TW NARA DATE 5/19/10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

December 23, 1982

47577

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

*Gus* *JCB fr*

FROM: *JCB* DENNIS BLAIR/GUS WEISS/DON FORTIER

SUBJECT: Supercomputers for France

Bud McFarlane informed us that you suspended the decision you made yesterday to authorize export licenses for three super-computers for France and that you wish to discuss the issue personally with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger during your flight to California. (C)

Secretary Weinberger will contend that we should continue to withhold the export licenses in order to exert leverage on the French to further modify the MT-20 contract with the Soviet Union. In particular, Defense wishes during the upcoming visit of French Defense Minister Hernu to use this leverage on the MT-20 and on other possible issues. Defense contends that to approve the licenses now would undercut their ability to gain further concessions. It should be noted that it is DOD alone which has linked these two CRAYs to the MT-20. There has been no interagency approval. (S)

The MT-20 issue is long and tangled. The CRAY part of it is this: In May we agreed to sell the French a CRAY-1 supercomputer [redacted] if they would agree to renegotiate the MT-20 contract with the Soviets in order to eliminate the transfer of any production technology and U.S. origin components. Under our program of strategic nuclear cooperation with the French, we generally extract a specific commitment when we provide them a specific piece of equipment or expertise. In October the French replied to a series of questions about the renegotiated MT-20 contract. Their reply made the case that no sensitive production technology or U.S. components were being transferred, but not in enough detail to satisfy Defense experts. We are asking for further information, but according to Richard Perle, Defense is not at all sure the sensitive knowhow will be removed. (S)

Meanwhile, as an entirely separate matter, two more CRAY computers were ordered by a commercial service bureau named CISI. CISI is a joint government/private entity established specifically to operate supercomputers. It rents out processing time to businesses, universities and government agencies (including the Ministry of Defense, for unclassified projects). It now operates one CRAY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M07-081 #47577  
BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b)(4)  
(6)

which was purchased in 1980, and user demand has increased so that it can use two more. One computer would be entirely for university research, and the other would have multiple users. Aside from the fact that they both use CRAYs, there is no logical connection between CISI and the French nuclear weapons research program. Defense maintains that they have created a linkage between approval of these CRAYs and performance on the MT-20 contract. (TS/S)

As we mentioned in our previous memo, in the past, withholding approval of advanced computer sales to France was a way of getting French attention. Now, with the Japanese entering the market, we believe the U.S. technical advantage in supercomputers to be lessening. (TS/S)

We estimate that the French will go ahead with the MT-20 contract as it now stands, and that they will not entirely satisfy our tech-transfer concerns. We could respond to this by slowing down or stopping some aspect of our [REDACTED] program with the French. This would be a most potent response which the French would understand. The Defense Department owes the President a report on the status of the program, with recommendations for future actions. There are plenty of levers on this program to use with Hernu. (TS/S)

Observations. Please note the pending application of a CYBER 205 supercomputer to be sold to Control Data's Paris service bureau. We do not see how this computer can be separated from the action being taken on the two CRAYs, since different treatment would be discriminatory. Also recall that there is no legal basis for the U.S. to indefinitely prohibit sale of these computers as they are destined for unclassified applications. Most important is the degree of leverage that the U.S. can hope to have on modifications to the MT-20; since we are not conducting the bargaining it is difficult to judge how promising the leverage is, but given what we know about MT-20, it is our opinion that the CRAY leverage is not enough to make a significant difference. It will take stronger measures. (S)

Judgment. Defense holds that approval of the two CRAYs should be put off until Hernu's January 18 meeting with Secretary Weinberger, or otherwise the DOD's ability to further bargain will be hurt, as will the credibility of the French MOD (which is in agreement with the U.S. on MT-20). Thus the judgment is that of temporizing on license approval until then in the hope, however slim, that progress will be obtained, or approving the licenses now and reviewing nuclear cooperation. Eventually the licenses have to be approved. (S)

On a judgmental basis Don and Gus would sustain the suspension of licenses into January, while Dennis would proceed to issue them. Don would prefer to try (however slim the probabilities) to use the CRAY computer to leverage more complete French compliance on the MT-20 than to have to begin to actually threaten the interruption of much more fundamental U.S.-French strategic nuclear cooperation. Also, Don believes that if a decision is made to go ahead later with the CRAY it should be done in a manner that allows U.S. -- and DOD in particular -- to strengthen the hand of those in the French government who are working with us on the MT-20 question. We are advising you on largely subjective evidence. (S)

Organization. This effort has suffered because no one has been in charge. You may wish to consider an ad hoc group to formulate a coherent strategy on the interrelated subjects of supercomputers, the MT-20 and strategic nuclear cooperation with the French. (TS/S)

24-

471

National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 91049

82 DEC 20 P 5: 00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   **A-Action**   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*Judge,* 12/20  
 I recommend you approve both  
 recommendations.  
 agree - The time is  
 right.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*FOIA*

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<i>Document Description</i>				
47580	MEMO	2	12/20/1982	B1
BLAIR/WEISS TO CLARK RE FRANCE				

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Weiss:

7371

November 3, 1982


475E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: Computers for France

*do not now*  
Please approve and *or* issue export licenses now pending for  
FOIA(b)(3) [redacted] for the [redacted]  
[redacted], Paris, France, under  
case numbers [redacted] and [redacted]

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

cc Richard Perle  
Dept of State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M77-081 #47581

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

~~SECRET~~

29

II

III

5  
MEMORANDUM

8619

30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: ROBERT C. MC FARLANE  
FROM: GUS WEISS *Gus*  
SUBJECT: Supercomputer Export to France

Control Data Corporation has requested an export license for the sale of CYBER 205 to its data center in Paris. The CYBER 205 is a vector processor somewhat like the CRAY 1. The computer would be used for weather forecasting, electronic simulation, and seismic exploration.

The sale is worth \$6.2 million, and Control Data says it will lose \$926,500 in a French investment tax credit if approval is not received before the end of the year.

Attachment

Tab I CDB Application for Export License

cc: Dennis Blair

November 30, 1982

The Honorable Judge William P. Clark  
Assistant to President for National Security Affairs  
White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

I am writing to brief you on new developments regarding a fast emerging threat to United States leadership in supercomputing technology which I became aware of during a visit to France last week. These developments also relate to two export control cases currently before the administration (Office of Export Administration, case Nos. 628656 and 645645, regarding export of two CRAY 1S computer systems to France).

Since January 1981, this Administration has approved shipment of three CRAY 1S processors to France. Recently, however, we have experienced unexpected delays in export license approval. I am aware that our current license applications are delayed pending resolution of certain defense related diplomatic issues not directly related to the CRAY computer systems.

What is particularly alarming, however, is that the current delays are now being used quite effectively to support a very aggressive marketing campaign by Fujitsu through its European representative, Siemens. Siemens - Fujitsu have begun, as of the last two weeks, to offer early delivery of the recently announced Fujitsu supercomputer. Notably, they have guaranteed no export license delays, emphasizing their potential as a reliable supplier. Furthermore, since they are competing against the older CRAY 1 system (Cray Research will stop production of this system early next year, in favor of its three newer products), Fujitsu has offered higher performance without additional export constraints. I am convinced that our competitive position is now in jeopardy.

While the short term loss of our current customers due to export delays is a matter of serious immediate financial concern to Cray Research, the long term implications of Japanese involvement in the French marketplace raises national security concerns. As I believe you know, the French have long been concerned with export licensing delays and, therefore, with Cray Research's viability as a reliable supercomputer supplier. Earlier this year, partly in response to the export situation, the French government initiated its own supercomputer development project designed to protect itself from the impact of the unreliable supply of the American supercomputers, and to provide a broader base for the French computing


industry. The Japanese supercomputer manufacturers have recently pursued the French seeking cooperative development and marketing agreements. To date, the French have resisted Japanese initiatives in favor of working with Cray Research and our products. I am personally convinced that this attitude will continue as long as the French user community remains confident of us as a reliable partner.

At this time, Cray Research has a clear advantage in the Western European supercomputing marketplace. This advantage allows the United States to retain both leadership and technology control. As a result of the recent Siemens - Fujitsu inroads, however, I question whether we can hold onto that advantage if we cannot deliver our products reliably. As a result of my conversations in Paris last week, I believe that we have very little time to deliver the computer processors we have contracted for. Otherwise, we can expect to give Siemens - Fujitsu a major marketing advantage and lose most, if not all of, our opportunities to place a Cray 1S processor in France. Indeed, I learned last week that one of our significant customers has already begun working with Siemens to order a large Fujitsu processor (not the supercomputer) in order to "test the waters" concerning a possible future relationship.

We at Cray Research strongly support the President and his policies. We realize that these two Cray exports have so far been delayed in support of some of these policies. However, we also have a unique responsibility to maintain technological leadership of United States, which is now being threatened by the combination of growing Japanese-European cooperation and by the throttling of our exports. In light of all these circumstances, I am convinced that early export of these two computers would be in the best interest of the United States.

I would be happy to meet with you at your earliest convenience to discuss the issues in detail. Mr. Brett Berlin, Cray Research Government Relations Director, will be contacting your secretary and will be available to your staff.

Sincerely yours,



John A. Rollwagen  
Chairman and CEO

JAR:ge

- CC: The Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Honorable Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Administration
- The Honorable Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- Dr. Gus Weiss, National Security Staff

IV



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47582	MEMO  TO WEISS RE COMPUTERS	1	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
47583	PAPER  RE SUPERCOMPUTERS	4	12/1/1982	B1

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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The White House

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Package # 91063

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82 DEC 23 P 2: 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>-</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>SEPARATE COPY</u>		
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>E</u>		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Rollwagen:

Thank you very much for your letter to me of November 30, 1982 on CRAY Research sales to France. I found the letter very helpful in clarifying the facts as you see them. ~~and I have taken action to~~ *has been taken* approve the sale of the two computers in question.

With very best wishes for the holidays.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

Mr. John A. Rollwagen  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Cray Research, Inc.  
608 2nd Avenue South  
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

*Retype Tab I  
before it goes to  
Bud.  
Done  
Klem  
12/22/82*

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8291057

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*smf*  
*12/21/07*

RECEIVED 21 DEC 82 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 21 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: STATE / DOD ROW OVER SUPERCOMPUTER SALE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE



COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8290794

8290900

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

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DUE

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*@ 12/21*

*Mcfarlane noted*

*DB*

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W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

47584

**MEMORANDUM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

December 21, 1982

**RCM HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD McFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DC Blair*

SUBJECT: State-Defense Row Over Supercomputers Sale (C)

The attached cable alerted State to a unilateral demarche to the Japanese by Steve Bryen. Yesterday, State attempted to clear with me a cable to Tokyo instructing the embassy to inform the Japanese that Bryen had acted without instructions. I refused to clear the cable until it had been sent to DoD for clearance. This morning Eagleburger informed me through Dave Gompert that State intended to send the cable anyhow without DoD or NSC clearance. (C)

Regarding substance, neither Bryen's approach nor a subsequent retraction will make that much difference. The Japanese are already fully aware that there are U.S. licensing procedures for computer sales to France and they are using this to try to sell their own computers which would not be subject to licensing. The French know that we had previously tied a CRAY supercomputer sale to the MT-20 issue and will not be surprised to learn that we have approached the Japanese. (C)

On the procedural side, Bryen told me that his instructions were issued by Ikle. I agree with State that the instructions should have been cleared interagency. Defense should be reprimanded for its unilateral action. The best way to do it is not an uncleared State cable but rather an interagency cleared cable which forces Defense to acknowledge its mistake. (C)

On balance, I do not recommend that NSC become any further involved in this messy little side show. However, in case Eagleburger or Ikle calls you to complain, you now have the background. (C)

Tab A Tokyo 1934

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**NLRR M07-081 #47584**  
**BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

47585

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PAGE 01  
EOB770

TOKYO 1934  
AN005275

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~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 21934

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ETRD, ESTC, FR, JA  
SUBJECT: JAPANESE INTEREST IN SUPERCOMPUTER SALE TO FRANCE  
REF: 0 132259Z DEC 82

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, DURING DECEMBER 14 MEETINGS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, DAS STEPHEN BRYEN RAISED ISSUE OF SUPERCOMPUTER SALE TO FRANCE IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH MOFA DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS KONDO. BRYEN EXPRESSED U. S. CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF FUJITSU SALE, AND REQUESTED GOJ TO MOVE SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY ON THIS MATTER. KONDO WAS NON-COMMITTAL, AS SALE WOULD NOT BE RELATED TO HIS OFFICE'S RESPONSIBILITY, AND PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS.
3. EMBOFFS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNAWARE OF RELATIONSHIP
3. EMBOFFS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNAWARE OF OF CRAY SUPERCOMPUTER SALE TO MT-20 ISSUE, WERE BRIEFED ON BACKGROUND BY BRYEN. WE EXPECT THAT, FOLLOWING BRYEN'S DISCUSSION WITH KONDO, THE GOJ WILL CONTACT US AGAIN EITHER IN TOKYO OR THROUGH THE JAPANESE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.
4. THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED WITH BRYEN BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.  
MANSFIELD  
BT

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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RECEIVED 23 DEC 82 14

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOC DATE 23 DEC 82

*46*

WEISS

23 DEC 82

FORTIER

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR FRANCE - MT-20

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 04 JAN 82 STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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~~MEMORANDUM~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

47

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

December 23, 1982

47579

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK *gus* *job for*  
FROM: *DCB* DENNIS BLAIR/*gus* GUS WEISS/*job for* DON FORTIER  
SUBJECT: Supercomputers for France

Bud McFarlane informed us that you suspended the decision you made yesterday to authorize export licenses for three supercomputers for France and that you wish to discuss the issue personally with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger during your flight to California. (C)

Secretary Weinberger will contend that we should continue to withhold the export licenses in order to exert leverage on the French to further modify the MT-20 contract with the Soviet Union. In particular, Defense wishes during the upcoming visit of French Defense Minister Hernu to use this leverage on the MT-20 and on other possible issues. Defense contends that to approve the licenses now would undercut their ability to gain further concessions. It should be noted that it is DOD alone which has linked these two CRAYs to the MT-20. There has been no interagency approval. (S)

The MT-20 issue is long and tangled. The CRAY part of it is this: In May we agreed to sell the French a CRAY-1 supercomputer [redacted] if they would agree to renegotiate the MT-20 contract with the Soviets in order to eliminate the transfer of any production technology and U.S. origin components. Under our program of strategic nuclear cooperation with the French, we generally extract a specific commitment when we provide them a specific piece of equipment or expertise. In October the French replied to a series of questions about the renegotiated MT-20 contract. Their reply made the case that no sensitive production technology or U.S. components were being transferred, but not in enough detail to satisfy Defense experts. We are asking for further information, but according to Richard Perle, Defense is not at all sure the sensitive knowhow will be removed. (S)

Meanwhile, as an entirely separate matter, two more CRAY computers were ordered by a commercial service bureau named CISI. CISI is a joint government/private entity established specifically to operate supercomputers. It rents out processing time to businesses, universities and government agencies (including the Ministry of Defense, for unclassified projects). It now operates one CRAY

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BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

which was purchased in 1980, and user demand has increased so that it can use two more. One computer would be entirely for university research, and the other would have multiple users. Aside from the fact that they both use CRAYs, there is no logical connection between CISI and the French nuclear weapons research program. Defense maintains that they have created a linkage between approval of these CRAYs and performance on the MT-20 contract. (TS/S)

As we mentioned in our previous memo, in the past, withholding approval of advanced computer sales to France was a way of getting French attention. Now, with the Japanese entering the market, we believe the U.S. technical advantage in supercomputers to be lessening. (TS/S)

We estimate that the French will go ahead with the MT-20 contract as it now stands, and that they will not entirely satisfy our tech-transfer concerns. We could respond to this by slowing down or stopping some aspect of our [REDACTED] program with the French. This would be a most potent response which the French would understand. The Defense Department owes the President a report on the status of the program, with recommendations for future actions. There are plenty of levers on this program to use with Hernu. (TS/S)

Observations. Please note the pending application of a CYBER 205 supercomputer to be sold to Control Data's Paris service bureau. We do not see how this computer can be separated from the action being taken on the two CRAYs, since different treatment would be discriminatory. Also recall that there is no legal basis for the U.S. to indefinitely prohibit sale of these computers as they are destined for unclassified applications. Most important is the degree of leverage that the U.S. can hope to have on modifications to the MT-20; since we are not conducting the bargaining it is difficult to judge how promising the leverage is, but given what we know about MT-20, it is our opinion that the CRAY leverage is not enough to make a significant difference. It will take stronger measures. (S)

Judgment. Defense holds that approval of the two CRAYs should be put off until Hernu's January 18 meeting with Secretary Weinberger, or otherwise the DOD's ability to further bargain will be hurt, as will the credibility of the French MOD (which is in agreement with the U.S. on MT-20). Thus the judgment is that of temporizing on license approval until then in the hope, however slim, that progress will be obtained, or approving the licenses now and reviewing nuclear cooperation. Eventually the licenses have to be approved. (S)

on a judgmental basis Don and Gus would sustain the suspension of licenses into January, while Dennis would proceed to issue them. Don would prefer to try (however slim the probabilities) to use the CRAY computer to leverage more complete French compliance on the MT-20 than to have to begin to actually threaten the interruption of much more fundamental U.S.-French strategic nuclear cooperation. Also, Don believes that if a decision is made to go ahead later with the CRAY it should be done in a manner that allows U.S. -- and DOD in particular -- to strengthen the hand of those in the French government who are working with us on the MT-20 question. We are advising you on largely subjective evidence. (S)

Organization. This effort has suffered because no one has been in charge. You may wish to consider an ad hoc group to formulate a coherent strategy on the interrelated subjects of supercomputers, the MT-20 and strategic nuclear cooperation with the French. (TS/S)

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50

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NODIS

FOR CHESHES FROM WISNER; LONDON FOR FRASURE  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: FR, AO  
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND ANGOLA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GUY PENNE CALLED ON US TODAY AND GAVE US AN ACCOUNT OF HIS PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH DOS SANTOS IN LUANDA IN NOVEMBER. DOS SANTOS TOLD PENNE THAT HE WOULD DECIDE ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SETTLEMENT AND COORDINATE ANSWERS WITH FIVE SENIOR PARTY FIGURES WHOCOMPRISE THE ANGOLAN NEGOTIATING TEAM. PENNE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED THAT THIS GROUP INCLUDES LUCIO LARA AND LOPO DO NASCIMENTO. DOS SANTOS TOOK RECEIPT OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND INDICATED HE WOULD SEND HIS ANSWER TO PARIS THROUGH LOPO DO NASCIMENTO.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. PENNE UNDERSTOOD DO NASCIMENTO PLANNED TO BE IN PARIS IN LATE DECEMBER OR EARLY JANUARY. HE HAS HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF DO NASCIMENTO'S ARRIVAL AND PROMISED TO TRY TO CONTACT HIM. HE ASSUMES THAT DO NASCIMENTO WILL BRING ANGOLA'S ANSWER TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL. PENNE WAS CATEGORIC; THE ANGOLANS KNOW THE FRENCH GAVE A SERIOUS PROPOSAL TO WHICH THEY EXPECT A SERIOUS REPLY.

4. YOU SHOULD STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE ELYSEE AND SEE IF PENNE HAS AN ANSWER FROM DO NASCIMENTO. PENNE LEAVES FOR AFRICA ON JANUARY 13 AND HOPES TO SEE DO NASCIMENTO BEFORE THAT DATE.

5. THROUGH A SEPARATE SOURCE WE HAVE HEARD THAT

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57

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 00701 DTG: 300204Z DEC 82 PSN: 057002

DO NASCIMENTO MAY BE TRAVELING TO EUROPE IN THE  
2ND WEEK OF JANUARY.

DAM

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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52

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0618 DTG: 302126Z DEC 82 PSN: 058234  
SIT887 DATE 01/03/83 TOR: 364/2321Z

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8817

~~SECRET~~ STATE 360618

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, FR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN MESSAGE.

DEAR CLAUDE:

AS I HAVE WRITTEN ALREADY, I FOUND MY DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS EXTREMELY USEFUL. I PARTICULARLY WELCOMED YOUR PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO CURB QADHAFI'S ALL TOO FREQUENTLY IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR. OBVIOUSLY, WE ALREADY ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED INDIVIDUALLY, AND TO SOME DEGREE IN ASSOCIATION, TO FRUSTRATE HIS AMBITIONS IN AFRICA. BUT GREATER COORDINATION SHOULD IMPROVE OUR CHANCES FOR SUCCESS, NOT ONLY IN AFRICA,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT ELSEWHERE.

4. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT OUR COLLEAGUES DEALING WITH LIBYA, AS WELL AS THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICA, MEET EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR IN EITHER WASHINGTON OR PARIS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER INITIATIVES TO CHECK QADHAFI. PERHAPS THEY COULD LOOK FIRST AT WHAT CAN BE DONE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT. THERE WE HAVE BEEN TAKING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF PROTECTING SEVERAL OF THE ANGLOPHONE COUNTRIES THREATENED BY THE LIBYANS, I.E. SUDAN, SOMALIA AND LIBERIA; WHILE FRANCE HAS SHOULDERED A SIMILAR RESPONSIBILITY IN CHAD, NIGER, THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND MALI. TO A WELCOME DEGREE WE HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING EACH OTHER IN THE COUNTRIES I HAVE MENTIONED, BUT THERE PROBABLY IS MORE THAT WE

5. IN ADDITION TO ADDRESSING TOGETHER THE POVERTY WHICH CREATES THE DISCONTENT QADHAFI EXPLOITS VIA OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN NEARBY COUNTRIES, WE CAN OFFER HIS THREATENED NEIGHBORS SECURITY ASSISTANCE OF VARIOUS FORMS. BESIDES MILITARY AID, WE CAN COORDINATE THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF LOCAL SECURITY SERVICES. WE SHOULD LOOK AT WAYS TO WORK TOGETHER TO MOBILIZE CIVIL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE ADDITIONAL DONORS WHOSE CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NATIONS QADHAFI MENACES. WE COULD ALSO CONSULT ON HOW WE RESPOND WHEN THE LIBYANS GAIN INFLUENCE IN NATIONS SUCH AS BURUNDI, WHERE NEITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES IS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL WESTERN POWER.

6. OUR COLLEAGUES MIGHT USEFULLY DISCUSS SOME OF THE BROADER ASPECTS OF OUR RESPECTIVE LIBYAN POLICIES. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO OUTLINE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED AND THE STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN TO VIGOROUSLY ASSERT OUR MARITIME RIGHTS IN THE GULF OF SIRTE. IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WE COULD UNDERTAKE TO ENCOURAGE THE ALGERIANS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FURTHER FROM THEIR RECKLESS LIBYAN NEIGHBORS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. THE AGENDA I HAVE SKETCHED IS NOT INTENDED TO BE EXHAUSTIVE, AND I WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS. I DO FEEL THE SUBJECT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION AND COUNT ON YOU TO SET DATES FOR A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THE MEANWHILE, MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ

HIS EXCELLENCY CLAUDE CHEYSSON,  
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,  
PARIS.

END OF MESSAGE.

DAM

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