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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder FRANCE (12/1/82-12/15/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

54

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47558	CABLE	011820Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/1/1982	B1
47559	CABLE	031724Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	6	12/3/1982	B1
47560	CABLE	032001Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/3/1982	B1
47561	CABLE	042105Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	12/4/1982	B1
47562	MEMO	BLAIR TO CLARK RE FRANCE R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	12/8/1982	B1
47563	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ RE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1
47564	CABLE	071758Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	12/7/1982	B1
47565	CABLE	081257Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	12/8/1982	B1
47566	CABLE	091413Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/9/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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File Folder FRANCE (12/1/82-12/15/82)

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S2007-081

Box Number 13

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47567	CABLE	091422Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/9/1982	B1
47568	CABLE	092033Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/9/1982	B1
47569	CABLE	101553Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	12/10/1982	B1
47570	CABLE	131420Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	12/13/1982	B1
47571	MEMO	BLAIR/WEISS TO POINDEXTER RE COMPUTERS TO FRANCE R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	12/13/1982	B1
47572	MEMO	CLARK TO BALDRIGE RE COMPUTERS TO FRANCE PAR 6/25/2010 MR081/1	1	11/3/1982	B1
47574	APPLICATION	EXPORT LICENSE D 6/25/2010 MR081/1	2	9/13/1982	B3
47573	CABLE	150813Z DEC 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	12/15/1982	B1

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47556

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 1450 68511 DTG: 011820Z DEC 82 PSN: 034436
SIT700 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 336/2214Z

DO SO, EMPHASIZING THAT THE KING COULD RETAIN CONTROL OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: CHEKLISTSTFURTHER DISTRIBUTIONN---- DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #1450/01 3351821
R 011820Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8167
AMEMBASSY RABAT 6137
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3149
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 5334
USINT BAGHDAD 1575
USLO RIYADH 0713
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4633
BT

5. HASSAN SAID THAT THE SAUDIS AND THE EMIRATES WERE HORRIFIED AT THE PROSPECT OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. HE DID NOT REALLY FEAR A COLLAPSE OF THE IRAQIS, WHO RETAINED ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF THE AIR. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE WAS PRACTICALLY NON-OPERATIONAL BECAUSE OF PILOT SHORTAGES AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT IRANIAN LOCAL SUCCESSES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT WERE DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE DEFECTION OR DESERTION OF IRAQI SHIITE OFFICERS. THE SAUDIS AND THE EMIRATES WERE WEARY OF HAVING TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT REALLY HAD NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO CONTINUE TO DO SO.

6. WITH REGARD TO IRAN, KING HASSAN FELT THAT THE DEATH OF KHOMEINI WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE SITUATION. THE TUDEH PARTY WAS WELL ORGANIZED AND HAD INFILTRATED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WHO NOW HAD ARMS AND UNIFORMS. THEY WERE BIDDING THEIR TIME.

7. HASSAN SAID THAT FAHD HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE (FAHD) HAD EMPHASIZED TO THE ALGERIANS THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT AND THE ALGERIANS HAD SEEMED SOMEWHAT RESPONSIVE. PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID HAD ASKED FAHD TO REMAIN AN EXTRA DAY IN ALGERIA SO THAT THE ALGERIAN PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE AN EXCUSE FOR NOT GOING

PARIS 1450 68511 DTG: 011820Z DEC 82 PSN: 034436

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO THE TRIPOLI OAU SUMMIT, BUT FAHD HAD REFUSED. HASSAN SAID THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND LIBYA HAD NOW BECOME QUITE TENSE IN THE LIGHT OF KHADDAFI'S SPEECH ATTACKING THE PREVIOUS OAU POSITION ON THE UNTOUCHABILITY OF FRONTIERS INHERITED FROM COLONIALISM. THE ALGERIANS WERE VERY CONCERNED BY THIS SINCE IT COULD RAISE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN BORDER AND HAD SENT WORD TO THE MOROCCANS OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO THIS IDEA OF THE LIBYAN LEADER.

8. KING HASSAN SAID THAT HE HAD POSTPONED SEVERAL PLANNED SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID. BUT THEY NOW HAD AGREED TO MEET IN JANUARY AND HE WAS VERY HOPEFUL THAT THIS TIME THE ALGERIANS WOULD ACTUALLY COME TO THE SUMMIT. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHERE THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE FELT THE ALGERIANS WERE NOW LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. HE REPEATED HIS DETERMINATION TO GO THROUGH WITH WHAT WAS AGREED AT NAIROBI, A CEASE FIRE AND A POPULAR CONSULTATION OR REFERENCUM. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LIBYANS COULD KEEP THE WAR GOING IF ALGERIA WITHDREW FROM SUPPORT OF THE POLISARIO, EVEN IF THEY WERE ABLE TO USE MAURITANIA

PARIS 1450 68511 DTG: 011820Z DEC 82 PSN: 034436

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 41450
EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB WALTERS
PLEASE PASS NEA, S/AL, AF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MO, MR, AG, SA, PGOV, MILI, IZ, LY
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH KING HASSAN

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING A MEETING BETWEEN DR. KISSINGER AND KING HASSAN AT WHICH I WAS PRESENT, WE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS, AND AN IMPENDING COUP IN MAURITANIA. THERE WAS NO ONE ELSE PRESENT ON THE MOROCCAN SIDE.

3. KING HASSAN SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF KING FAHD'S PRESENCE IN MOROCCO (FOR MORE THAN A WEEK) TO DISCUSS, AT FAHD'S REQUEST, THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA. KING HASSAN SAID HE HAD TOLD FAHD THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE FELT THAT HIS INTERNAL SITUATION WAS FRAGILE. FAHD DID NOT HAVE A SINGLE ELECTED BODY IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA. EACH YEAR THE SAUDIS SENT OUT LARGE NUMBERS OF YOUNG STUDENTS TO THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE WEST AND WHEN THEY RETURNED THEY WERE TOLD TO SETTLE DOWN AND MAKE MONEY. MANY OF THEM ASPIRED TO DO SOMETHING FOR THEIR COUNTRY AND PARTICIPATE IN RUNNING IT. HASSAN TOLD FAHD THAT HE THOUGHT THAT SAUDI ARABIA COULD LIVE WITH AN ASSEMBLY INITIALLY PARTLY NOMINATED AND PARTLY ELECTED. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A SAFETY VALVE FOR A LOT OF FRUSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BUILD UP DANGEROUSLY.

4. HASSAN SAID FAHD HAD URGED HIM TO SPEAK FRANKLY AND, AFTER THE MOROCCAN KING HAD EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS, FAHD THEN ASKED HIM TO PUT ON PAPER SOME IDEAS ABOUT A DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR SAUDI ARABIA. HASSAN HAD PROMISED TO

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 07-081 #47556

BY CIV NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

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2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 1450 68511 DTG: 011820Z DEC 82 PSN: 034441
SIT699 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 336/2215Z

PARIS 1450 68511 DTG: 011820Z DEC 82 PSN: 034441

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #1450/02 3351822
R 011820Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8168
AMEMBASSY RABAT 6138
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3150
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 5335
USINT BAGHDAD 1576
USLO RIYADH 0714
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4634
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 41450
EXDIS
AS A BASE.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SAHARA, KING HASSAN SAID THINGS HAD BEEN QUIET FOR SIX MONTHS NOW. THE BERM WAS SERVING ITS PURPOSE. THE MOROCCANS HAD TAKEN OVER EL AAIUN WITH 15,000 INHABITANTS. IT NOW HAD 60,000. CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WERE PEACEFUL ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE MOROCCANS TO HAVE RECENTLY STAGED AN AUTOMOBILE RACE FROM TANGIER TO BOUJDOR AT THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE SAHARA WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN DRIVERS AND THERE HAD BEEN NO UNTOWARD INCIDENTS.

10. KING HASSAN THEN SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY LEARNED FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES THAT A MILITARY COUP WAS IMPENDING IN MAURITANIA. HE HAD IMMEDIATELY GOTTEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT HAIDALLA AND SHARED THIS INFORMATION WITH HIM, GIVING HIM THE NAME OF THE AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO LEAD THE COUP. HASSAN WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS THE LIBYANS WHO WERE INSTIGATING THIS COUP. HE HAD ALSO SHARED HIS INFORMATION WITH THE ALGERIANS.

11. KING HASSAN WAS IN EXCELLENT FORM AND HAD JUST MADE A SPEECH TO THE MOROCCAN-AMERICAN FOUNDATION. HE WAS ALERT, IN GOOD HUMOR AND APPEARED TO BE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH. GALBRAITH

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47559

3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142
SIT685 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 337/2018Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB SITP SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTECKLIST----- DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7186 3371753
O 031724Z DEC 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 337186

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWTFIN UR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR/M07-081 *47559
BY CN NARA DATES 5/19/11

SOME WAY TO COORDINATE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF USING EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND WE WOULD MINIMIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW INSTITUTIONS EITHER TO CONDUCT THE FOLLOW-UP WORK OR AS A RESULT OF THAT WORK.

IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, WE PROPOSE THE CREATION OF AN AD HOC SUMMIT GROUP ON ENERGY TO CONDUCT THE ENERGY STUDY WHICH WE AGREED UPON DURING THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS. THIS GROUP WOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHER DIRECTLY CONCERNED COUNTRIES. THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD COMMISSION THE OECD COMBINED ENERGY SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE THE ENERGY STUDY BASED ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND GUIDANCE FROM THE GROUP. THE GROUP WOULD DRAW POLICY CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE OECD/IEA ANALYSIS AND MEMBER COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THIS GROUP COULD BE CONVENED SOON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15 IN PARIS, IN ORDER FOR THE GROUP TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BY EARLY MAY 1983.

ON CREDITS, WE SEEK TO BUILD ON POST-VERSAILLES PROGRESS IN THE OECD EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT AND OTHER OECD WORK TO HARMONIZE EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR AND ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY OF WESTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. WE ALSO WISH TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY FOR PERIODIC EX POST REVIEW OF EAST-WEST

SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON FROM THE SECRETARY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR CLAUDE:

LOOKING AHEAD TO OUR MEETINGS IN EUROPE AND THE SESSION OF THE NATO COUNCIL, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON TWO OF THE KEY ISSUES BEFORE US: OUR CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC-RELATIONS AND THE TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION TO THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA.

ONE SUBJECT WHICH I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS BOTH BILATERALLY WITH YOU DURING MY VISIT TO PARIS AS WELL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS AT OUR DECEMBER 8 DINNER IS HOW WE SHOULD FOLLOW-UP TO DISCUSSIONS HELD HERE ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. AS YOU KNOW, THIS IS A MATTER TO WHICH THE

PRESIDENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE, AND I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AGREE AMONG OURSELVES ON HOW WE SHOULD MOVE AHEAD IN THE VARIOUS AREAS WHICH WE DISCUSSED.

WHILE I DO NOT WISH TO GO INTO THEM IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PREPARE FOR OUR MEETING IF I GAVE YOU SOME IDEA OF HOW WE ENVISAGE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS DEVELOPING. AS A GENERAL RULE, WE BELIEVE THE SEVEN-NATION GROUP, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE COMMISSION, WHICH WORKED TOGETHER SO EFFECTIVELY, SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED IN

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH WOULD DRAW ON OECD DATA AND ANALYSES. A MONITORING GROUP CONSISTING OF SUMMIT SEVEN AND EC PARTICIPATION WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST EFFICIENT BUT WE ARE OPEN TO OTHER PROPOSALS. WE PROPOSE THAT A MEETING OF THIS GROUP BE HELD EARLY IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIEW AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK ON HARMONIZATION OF EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES.

THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON REINFORCED THE AGREEMENT AT THE JANUARY, 1982 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO STRENGTHEN COCOM. WHAT WE NEED IS A STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE TO REVIEW WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, I PROPOSE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVEN MEET NEXT FEBRUARY, AT THE LEVEL OF UNDER SECRETARIES. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MEETING BE INFORMAL, AND THAT IT BE HELD WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

AT THE OPENING OF THE LIST REVIEW ON OCTOBER 4, THE US SUGGESTED THAT A SECOND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF ALL COCOM PARTICIPANTS BE HELD SOMETIME IN 1983. SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE HELD IN JULY, FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF THE LIST REVIEW. BEFORE MAKING A FORMAL PROPOSAL IN COCOM ON THIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS OUR IDEAS WITH YOU IN FEBRUARY. IN ADDITION, WE PROPOSE THAT THE FEBRUARY MEETING REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF COCOM IN GENERAL AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN COCOM INSTITUTIONALLY.

ON OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FOLLOW-UP SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN STAGES. WE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE SUMMIT SEVEN GROUP AT AN EARLY DATE TO DISCUSS THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON THE REASONS WHY CONTROLS IN THIS SECTOR WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND ENERGY INTEREST. WE ARE UNDERTAKING AN INTERNAL STUDY OF HOW OTHER TECHNOLOGIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY OR

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~~SECRET~~

4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142

STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF THE USSR. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING AT A MEETING IN FEBRUARY, WHICH COULD BE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MEETING WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ON COCOM MATTERS.

TO ENSURE THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET

SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNION ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS, WE SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH OUR AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT EXPEDITIOUSLY AN OVERALL STUDY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WE ENVISAGE THIS STUDY VERY MUCH ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON. I REMEMBER THAT WE ALL ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS EFFORT, AS IT WILL PROVIDE US WITH A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THEREBY ENABLE US TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE AGREED. IN OUR VIEW, A SPECIAL GROUP SHOULD BE FORMED TO CONDUCT THIS STUDY ON THE BASIS OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. THIS GROUP COULD WELL CALL UPON THE OECD AND NATO FOR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF EXPERTISE. A SECRETARIAT ROLE FOR ONE OF THESE

INSTITUTIONS (OR THE TWO JOINTLY) IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY TO BE EXPLORED.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT SOME INFORMAL MECHANISM WILL BE NEEDED TO SUPERVISE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS AS A WHOLE. THE WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP HAS SERVED WELL IN THIS CAPACITY, BUT WE MAY WANT NOW TO CONSIDER OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT, AS FAR AS EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, WHILE MUCH OF THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HAS CONCERNED MATTERS DEALT WITH IN OTHER BODIES, IT NEVERTHELESS IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE ON-GOING CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. ONE AREA WHERE THE RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE COULD BE PUT TO EXCELLENT USE, WITHOUT CONFLICTING WITH WORK DONE ELSEWHERE OR THE MISSIONS OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, WOULD BE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY, INCLUDING ITS ABILITY TO SUSTAIN PRESENT AND PROJECTED FUTURE LEVELS OF DEFENSE EFFORT. WE PLAN TO INTRODUCE PROPOSALS FOR THIS SPECIAL STUDY INTO THE COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING PROCESS AT NATO IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

ANOTHER THOUGHT I HAD ON WHICH I WOULD VALUE YOUR OPINION CONCERNS HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICIES POST-BREZHNEV AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US. BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE AND ANDROPOV'S EMERGENCE COULD

SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WELL MEAN THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW, AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE WEST, WILL BE HIGHLY COMPLEX. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT A NATO STUDY ON LIKELY TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICIES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, POST-BREZHNEV WOULD BE VERY TIMELY.

THIS IS AN IDEA WE MIGHT PROFITABLY DISCUSS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER ON DECEMBER 8. IF OUR EXCHANGE SUGGESTS THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE HAS MERIT, WE MIGHT THEN INTRODUCE IT FOR MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION DURING THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE NAC ON DECEMBER 9,

WHICH WILL IN ANY CASE BE AN OCCASION FOR REVIEWING THE FULL SCOPE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA. IF THERE IS AGREEMENT THERE, THIS INITIATIVE, TOO, COULD BE INCLUDED IN OUR COMMUNIQUE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR REACTION TO THESE IDEAS.

SINCERELY,
/S/ GEORGE END TEXT. EAGLEBURGER

SECSTATE WASHDC 71864602 DTG:031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142

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5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 71861 DTG: 031724Z DEC 82 PSN: 036142
SIT860 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 337/2018Z

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EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTCKLISI-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7186 3371753
O 031724Z DEC 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 337186
NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT EFIN UR
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #47557
BY CV NARA DATE 5/19/10 (also)

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.
2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON FROM THE SECRETARY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SOME WAY TO COORDINATE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF USING EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND WE WOULD MINIMIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW INSTITUTIONS EITHER TO CONDUCT THE FOLLOW-UP WORK OR AS A RESULT OF THAT WORK.

IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, WE PROPOSE THE CREATION OF AN AD HOC SUMMIT GROUP ON ENERGY TO CONDUCT THE ENERGY STUDY WHICH WE AGREED UPON DURING THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS. THIS GROUP WOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHER DIRECTLY CONCERNED COUNTRIES. THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD COMMISSION THE OECD COMBINED ENERGY SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE THE ENERGY STUDY BASED ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND GUIDANCE FROM THE GROUP. THE GROUP WOULD DRAW POLICY CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE OECD/IEA ANALYSIS AND MEMBER COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THIS GROUP COULD BE CONVENED SOON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15 IN PARIS, IN ORDER FOR THE GROUP TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BY EARLY MAY 1983.

ON CREDITS, WE SEEK TO BUILD ON POST-VERSAILLES PROGRESS IN THE OECD EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT AND OTHER OECD WORK TO HARMONIZE EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR AND ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY OF WESTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. WE ALSO WISH TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY FOR PERIODIC EX POST REVIEW OF EAST-WEST

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH WOULD DRAW ON OECD DATA AND ANALYSES. A MONITORING GROUP CONSISTING OF SUMMIT SEVEN AND EC PARTICIPATION WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST EFFICIENT BUT WE ARE OPEN TO OTHER PROPOSALS. WE PROPOSE THAT A MEETING OF THIS GROUP BE HELD EARLY IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIEW AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK ON HARMONIZATION OF EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES.

THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON REINFORCED THE AGREEMENT AT THE JANUARY, 1982 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO STRENGTHEN COCOM. WHAT WE NEED IS A STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE TO REVIEW WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, I PROPOSE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVEN MEET NEXT FEBRUARY, AT THE LEVEL OF UNDER SECRETARIES. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MEETING BE INFORMAL, AND THAT IT BE HELD WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

AT THE OPENING OF THE LIST REVIEW ON OCTOBER 4, THE US SUGGESTED THAT A SECOND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF ALL COCOM PARTICIPANTS BE HELD SOMETIME IN 1983. SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE HELD IN JULY, FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF THE LIST REVIEW. BEFORE MAKING A FORMAL PROPOSAL IN COCOM ON THIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS OUR IDEAS WITH YOU IN FEBRUARY. IN ADDITION, WE PROPOSE THAT THE FEBRUARY MEETING REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF COCOM IN GENERAL AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN COCOM INSTITUTIONALLY.

ON OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FOLLOW-UP SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN STAGES. WE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE SUMMIT SEVEN GROUP AT AN EARLY DATE TO DISCUSS THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON THE REASONS WHY CONTROLS IN THIS SECTOR WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND ENERGY INTEREST. WE ARE UNDERTAKING AN INTERNAL STUDY OF HOW

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OTHER TECHNOLOGIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY OR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF THE USSR. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING AT A MEETING IN FEBRUARY, WHICH COULD BE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MEETING WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ON COCOM MATTERS.

TO ENSURE THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNION ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS, WE SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH OUR AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT EXPEDITIOUSLY AN OVERALL STUDY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WE ENVISAGE THIS STUDY VERY MUCH ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON. I REMEMBER THAT WE ALL ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS EFFORT, AS IT WILL PROVIDE US WITH A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THEREBY ENABLE US TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE AGREED. IN OUR VIEW, A SPECIAL GROUP SHOULD BE FORMED TO CONDUCT THIS STUDY ON THE BASIS OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. THIS GROUP COULD WELL CALL UPON THE OECD AND NATO FOR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF EXPERTISE. A SECRETARIAT ROLE FOR ONE OF THESE

INSTITUTIONS (OR THE TWO JOINTLY) IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY TO BE EXPLORED.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT SOME INFORMAL MECHANISM WILL BE NEEDED TO SUPERVISE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS AS A WHOLE. THE WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP HAS SERVED WELL IN THIS CAPACITY, BUT WE MAY WANT NOW TO CONSIDER OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT, AS FAR AS EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, WHILE MUCH OF THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HAS CONCERNED MATTERS DEALT WITH IN OTHER BODIES, IT NEVERTHELESS IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE ON-GOING CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. ONE AREA WHERE THE RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE COULD BE PUT TO EXCELLENT USE, WITHOUT CONFLICTING WITH WORK DONE ELSEWHERE OR THE MISSIONS OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, WOULD BE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY, INCLUDING ITS ABILITY TO SUSTAIN PRESENT AND PROJECTED FUTURE LEVELS OF DEFENSE EFFORT. WE PLAN TO INTRODUCE PROPOSALS FOR THIS SPECIAL STUDY INTO THE COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING PROCESS AT NATO IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

ANOTHER THOUGHT I HAD ON WHICH I WOULD VALUE YOUR OPINION CONCERNS HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICIES POST-BREZHNEV AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US. BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE AND ANDROPOV'S EMERGENCE COULD

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WELL MEAN THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW, AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE WEST, WILL BE HIGHLY COMPLEX. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT A NATO STUDY ON LIKELY TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICIES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, POST-BREZHNEV WOULD BE VERY TIMELY.

THIS IS AN IDEA WE MIGHT PROFITABLY DISCUSS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER ON DECEMBER 8. IF OUR EXCHANGE SUGGESTS THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE HAS MERIT, WE MIGHT THEN INTRODUCE IT FOR MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION DURING

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THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE NAC ON DECEMBER 9, WHICH WILL IN ANY CASE BE AN OCCASION FOR REVIEWING THE FULL SCOPE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA. IF THERE IS AGREEMENT THERE, THIS INITIATIVE, TOO, COULD BE INCLUDED IN OUR COMMUNIQUE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR REACTION TO THESE IDEAS.

SINCERELY,
/S/ GEORGE

END TEXT.

EAGLEBURGER

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SIT673 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 338/2027Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #1927/01 337200Z
R 032001Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8431

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 41927
EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
PASS TO NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENG, EEWT, NO, UR
SUBJ: ALTERNATIVE ENERGY MISSION: SUMMARY

1. ~~entire~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ABOUT SIX MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE I BEGAN MY ALTERNATIVE ENERGY MISSION, AND I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MY FINDINGS BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY OFFICIALS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND NORWAY. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SUGGEST WHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORWEGIAN GAS DEPENDS FUNDAMENTALLY ON THE AVAILABILITY OF WILLING SELLERS AND WILLING BUYERS. DESPITE CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES IN THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET PROMPTED BY THE RECENT DECLINE IN DEMAND, THE MAJOR EUROPEAN GAS DISTRIBUTORS ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF GAS (PROBABLY AROUND 50 BCM FOR THE CONTINENT ALONE) BY THE END OF THE 1990'S WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONTRACTED FOR. THE DISTRIBUTORS ARE LOOKING AT ALL VIABLE SOURCES, BUT THE LARGEST SUPPLIES ARE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NORWAY. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES IT IS WILLING TO BE A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF GAS FOR EUROPE IN THE 1990'S AND THE OWNERS OF SLEIPNER AND TROLL ARE ANXIOUS TO SELL. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON SELLING SLEIPNER GAS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL AND SLEIPNER WILL BE DEVELOPED. (CURRENT CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE THAT THE UK WILL SUCCEED IN BUYING MOST OF THIS GAS; VERY LITTLE WILL GO TO THE CONTINENT.) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROLL FIELD IS ALSO PROBABLE, BUT LESS CERTAIN, BECAUSE OF HIGH COST AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. THIS HIGH COST OF THE TROLL GAS MEANS THAT THE EUROPEANS COULD PROBABLY BUY GAS MORE CHEAPLY FROM THE SOVIETS THAN FROM THE NORWEGIAN TROLL FIELD TO FILL THEIR NEEDS THROUGH THE END OF THE 1990'S AND BEYOND. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD ENTAIL A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

4. THE MAJOR EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTORS CLAIM THEY ARE NOT SEEKING TO CONTRACT FOR MORE SOVIET GAS AND THEY PROFESS A COMMITMENT TO TROLL GAS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONTRACT FOR THIS GAS, HOWEVER, AND SOVIET STICKS AND CARROTS WILL BE AT WORK BETWEEN NOW AND THEN. (ONCE THE NEW SOVIET EXPORT LINE IS COMPLETED THE SOVIETS' EXCESS GAS AND TRANSMISSION CAPACITY WILL ALLOW THEM TO OFFER GAS WHOSE INCREMENTAL COST TO THE SOVIET UNION IS ALMOST ZERO.) THE FUTURE PRICE OF OIL IS ALSO A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROLL; INDEED, A PRECIPITOUS DROP IN PRICE COULD KILL IT. THE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROLL IS BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO GO BEYOND A CERTAIN LEVEL (30 PERCENT) OF DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION AS A SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS NO MATTER WHAT PRICES ARE OFFERED BY THE SOVIETS OR WHAT HAPPENS TO OIL PRICES; THIS MAY BE DANGEROUS WISHFUL THINKING.

5. AS LONG AS A LIMIT ON DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS AN ASSUMPTION AND NOT REALITY, WE ARE FACED WITH THE VERY REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IN AN ERA OF WEAK OIL PRICES THE SOVIET UNION WILL FINALLY UNDERBID THE NORWEGIANS AND PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROLL. AFTER DUTCH SUPPLIES RUN DOWN, THE SOVIETS COULD THEN FIND THEMSELVES IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE EUROPEAN MARKET. THE EUROPEAN GAS DISTRIBUTORS HAVE TO MAKE THEIR PURCHASE CONTRACT DECISIONS ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS. ALTHOUGH THEY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARE RELUCTANT TO BE OVERLY DEPENDENT ON ANY ONE SOURCE, THEY GENERALLY VIEW THE SOVIET UNION AS A RELIABLE SUPPLIER, AND IF THEY HAD THE POLITICAL GO-AHEAD TO DO SO, THEY MIGHT NOT BE ADVERSE TO INCREASING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. OTHERWISE, THEY MIGHT LOSE THEIR CUSTOMERS TO FUEL OIL. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE UK WILL BID SO AGGRESSIVELY FOR THE TROLL GAS AND DRIVE THE PRICE SO HIGH THAT THE CONTINENTAL BUYERS WILL BE CLOSED OUT. THEY COULD THEN ARGUE THEY WERE FORCED TO BUY MORE SOVIET GAS TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.

6. TO AVOID THIS POSSIBILITY, WE NEED A POLITICAL COMMITMENT NOW FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN GAS-CONSUMING NATIONS THAT, OVER THE LONG TERM, THEY WILL LIMIT THEIR PURCHASES OF SOVIET GAS -- IDEALLY THAT THEY WILL PURCHASE NO MORE SOVIET GAS BEYOND

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PAGE 01 PARIS 1927 94602 DTG: 032001Z DEC 82 PSN: 037554
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ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #1927/02 3372003
R 032001Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8432

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 41927
EXDIS

WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR. SUCH A POLICY WOULD ASSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROLL FIELD AND WOULD PREVENT OUR BEING FACED IN A FEW YEARS WITH ANOTHER EUROPEAN-SOVIET GAS DEAL. THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE AGREEING, IN EFFECT, TO PAY A "SECURITY PREMIUM" FOR THE MORE EXPENSIVE NORWEGIAN GAS.

7. I AM STILL PONDERING THE VARIOUS APPROACHES WE MIGHT TAKE TO GETTING SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND THE PROS AND CONS OF THE VARIOUS FORMS SUCH A COMMITMENT MIGHT TAKE. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE LIKELY TO ASK WHAT WE HAVE TO OFFER TO COMPENSATE FOR THE HIGHER GAS PRICES THEY WILL BE PAYING. WE MUST ALSO AVOID CREATING A SITUATION SO FAVORABLE TO THE NORWEGIANS THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO MAKE WINDFALL PROFITS AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR ALLIES.

8. THESE THOUGHTS OBVIOUSLY NEED MORE DEVELOPMENT. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THEM WITH YOU AND WITH MY COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS AT THE COM CONFERENCE NEXT MONTH.
GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SWAPO REP BEN GURIBAB IN RECENT DAYS.

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/3/88

TAGS: PORG, PEPR, UNSC, SF, WA

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA-ANGOLA STATE OF PLAY

FOR AMB FM CROCKER; LONDON ALSO FRASURE; PARIS ALSO CHESHES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE WAKE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S AFRICA TRIP, PIK BOOHA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE ANGOLA TRACK, FLS/SWAPO ACTIVITY ON THE EDGE OF THE TRIPOLI NON-SUMMIT, AND MY NEW YORK CONSULTATIONS, I WANT YOU TO HAVE MY SENSE OF HOW THINGS LOOK IN OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORT. THIS MESSAGE DOES NOT CALL FOR US DEMARCHES BUT RATHER AIMS AT PROVIDING A READING OF WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON THAT WILL BETTER ENABLE YOU TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION OF THE BIG PICTURE AS AND WHEN THE SUBJECT COMES UP. IT COVERS MOST OF THE GROUND COVERED IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH CG REPS, UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR (AND HIS COLLEAGUES BRIAN URQUHART AND MARTI AHTISSARI), TANZANIAN UN PERM REP RUPIAH, AND

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BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/02

3. APPEARANCES AND REALITY REMAIN FAR APART. CONTRARY TO PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS, THE VICE PRESIDENT DID NOT TRAVEL TO AFRICA TO SELL LINKAGE AS A DOCTRINE.

PLANNED LONG IN ADVANCE AS A GOODWILL VISIT, HIS AGENDA INCLUDED BILATERAL, AFRICAN AND GLOBAL THEMES. AS THE SUBJECT CAME UP, HE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SEEK PUBLIC ENDORSEMENTS OF NAMIBIA-ANGOLA LINKAGE. IN FACT, WE UNDERSTAND WHY AFRICAN LEADERS SAY WHAT THEY DO PUBLICLY. RATHER, WE SOUGHT - AND GAINED - GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF US GOALS AND MOTIVES. SIMPLY PUT, HE MADE THE POINT THAT WHATEVER ONE'S VIEWS OF LINKAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW OR JUSTICE, THERE IS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM THAT MUST BE SOLVED: THERE WILL BE NO SETTLEMENT UNLESS SOUTH AFRICA IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IT, AND CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA IS A NECESSARY INGREDIENT FOR THE SAG IN AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT PACKAGE. SECOND, THE VP STRESSED THE THEME THAT WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF AN ONGOING NEGOTIATION, WHATEVER MAY BE SAID PUBLICLY. HIS HOSTS IN GENERAL WERE REASSURED TO KNOW THAT THE NEGOTIATION CONTINUES, THAT THE US IS ENGAGED AT A HIGH LEVEL FOR THE LONG HAUL, AND THAT WE ARE ADDRESSING THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF ALL PARTIES AS WE SEEK TO MOVE THE BALL FURTHER DOWN THE FIELD.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. WE KNOW, DESPITE THESE REALITIES, THAT THERE IS A CONCERN AMONG OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS - EXPLOITED TACTICALLY BY MOSCOW AND ITS CLOSER AFRICA CLIENTS - ABOUT THE SPOTLIGHT THAT IS NOW SHINING ON THE CUBAN ISSUE. IRONICALLY, THEY RESENT THE PRESSURE PLACED ON THE MPLA WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SEEKING REASSURANCE THAT AN ANGOLAN COMMITMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS THE ONLY SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 435. YOU SHOULD FEEL FREE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT - AFTER OUR RECENT SAG CONTACTS - THIS IS THE CASE AS SAG PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONFIRM. THE ANGOLANS, NATURALLY, ARE HIGHLY ALLERGIC TO EACH AND EVERY SUGGESTION THAT THEY ARE DELAYING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THEIR PRIORITY DIPLOMATIC GOAL, BACKED FOR THEIR OWN REASONS BY THE SOVIETS, CUBANS AND TO SOME DEGREE SWAPO, IS TO DENY BLAME AND TURN THE SPOTLIGHT BACK TO THE US AND THE SAG FOR RAISING "EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES." VIRTUALLY ALL AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE THUS CAUGHT IN THE WEB OF THESE DIPLOMATIC POSTURES, AND INEVITABLY THEY COME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF "REJECTING LINKAGE" WHILE ENCOURAGING THE CONTINUATION OF US-ANGOLAN TALKS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

5. WE MUST CONTINUE TO TAKE THE CLEAR AND CONFIDENT LINE THAT WE: A) HAVE NO DESIRE TO PLACE OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS IN A TIGHT SPOT; B) DO NOT ASK ANYONE TO ENDORSE LINKAGE AS A DOCTRINE; AND C) ARE SEEKING TO SOLVE THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING SAG AGREEMENT TO A SETTLEMENT IN THE ONLY WAY WE KNOW. WHEN ASKED WHETHER CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WAS INVENTED IN FACT BY THE US RATHER THAN THE SAG, WE ARE TAKING THE CANDID POSITION THAT WE NATURALLY FAVOR A CUBAN DEPARTURE FROM AFRICA - AS INDEED DO VIRTUALLY ALL AFRICANS WE TALK TO - BUT THAT THE REASON WE NEED "PARALLEL MOVEMENT" IS BECAUSE THE SAG WILL NOT SETTLE OTHERWISE. AFRICAN INTERLOCUTORS MAY BE DISMAYED AT THIS FACT AND AT US

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READINESS TO ACCEPT IT AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, BUT THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO RECOGNIZE ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS:

-- HAVING, IN EFFECT, TOLD THE US WHAT IT NEEDS TO SETTLE, THE SAG CAN HARDLY PLAY THE EARLIER GAME OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RAISING ENDLESS NEW ISSUES WHEN WE GET THE CUBAN ISSUE TO MOVE ADEQUATELY. OUR WHOLE APPROACH IS BASED ON THIS LOGIC.

-- IT IS THE PROSPECT OF A NEGOTIATED CUBAN DEPARTURE THAT HAS ENABLED US TO WRAP UP VIRTUALLY ALL THE RESOLUTION 435 NAMIBIA PROBLEMS THAT COULD OTHERWISE HAVE BOGGED US DOWN FOR YEARS.

6. IN MY MEETINGS DECEMBER 2 IN NEW YORK, I CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT DESPITE NERVOUSNESS IN THE AFRICA CAMP AT THE LACK OF PUBLIC ACTIVITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, NO ONE IS WILLING TO TAKE ACTIONS PRESENTLY WHICH WOULD DAMAGE THE CONTACT GROUP EFFORT, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS. FRONT LINE REPRESENTATIVES WHO WERE PRESENT IN TRIPOLI ASSURE US THAT THERE WILL BE NO MOVES TO TAKE THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE NEAR TERM. THE FRONT LINE DECISION AT TRIPOLI TO REJECT SWAPO DEMANDS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION REFLECTS BOTH THE COLLECTIVE DESIRE TO SEE PROGRESS AND THE ANGOLANS' WISH TO HAVE MORE TIME TO DISCUSS CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WITH US. (TEXT OF TRIPOLI DECLARATION ON NAMIBIA TO FOLLOW SEPTEL). AUTHORITATIVE FRONT LINE SOURCES IN NEW YORK INFORM US THAT THERE WILL BE NO MOVE TO THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE END OF MARCH, 1983, WHEN THE FRONT LINE WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO MAKE WAVES IF THEY HAVE NO PROGRESS TO POINT TO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SAME SOURCES CORROBORATE OUR BELIEF THAT THE BEHIND THE SCENES CAMPAIGN TO CREATE PROBLEMS ON THE LINKAGE ISSUE ORIGINATES IN MOSCOW, BUT IS LED, WITH EXTREME HESITANCY, BY SWAPO, WHO APPEAR NOT OVERLY CHAGRINED WITH FL REJECTION OF THEIR PROPOSAL. A SOMEWHAT MOROSE

VICTIM OF PRESSURES THAT BUFFET IT, SWAPO IS PREPARED TO SIMPLY SURVIVE. IT DISTRUSTS VIRTUALLY EVERYONE, HOPES FOR A BETTER DAY, BUT DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ONE SOON.

7. THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE FRONT LINE BOTH EXPECT THAT THE NAMIBIA DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL CONTAIN NO SURPRISES, ALTHOUGH THE COUNCIL FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NAMIBIA-INSPIRED RESOLUTIONS MAY WELL ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE ANGOLAN/CUBAN ISSUE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DIVIDE THE CONTACT GROUP. IN OUR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF THE CG APPROACH TO THE GA NAMIBIA DEBATE, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FIVE WOULD WORK TO MAINTAIN UNITY BY MAKING A COMMON STATEMENT AND ABSTAINING ACROSS THE BOARD ON THE MULTI-SECTIONED NAMIBIA RESOLUTION. THE ONLY THORNY ISSUE MAY BE A SEPARATE SECTION OF THE RESOLUTION DEALING WITH "LINKAGE", WHICH MAY WELL INCLUDE A SEVERE DENUNCIATION OF THE US FOR "STALLING THE NEGOTIATIONS" AND "COLLABORATING WITH SOUTH AFRICA." WHILE THE US HAS RESERVED ITS POSITION UNTIL WE SEE THE RESOLUTION, THE CONTACT GROUP IS SUFFICIENTLY INVOLVED IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATION THAT THEY WILL BE OBLIGED TO STICK WITH US IN A JOINT EXPLANATION

OF OUR JOINT ABSTENTION.

8. SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR, WHO HAS BEEN QUIETLY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR INITIATIVE, TOLD AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AND ME DECEMBER 2 THAT THE MORE THAN 16 AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE HE MET IN TRIPOLI WERE UPSET ABOUT THE US PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF LINKAGE, IN PARTICULAR DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S RECENT TRIP TO AFRICA. I TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS A WIDE GAP BETWEEN WHAT AFRICAN LEADERS SAY PUBLICLY AND THEIR PRIVATE ASSURANCES OF UNDERSTANDING OF OUR APPROACH AND THEIR HOPE TO SEE US/ANGOLAN DISCUSSIONS SUCCEED. WHEN AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AND I ADDED MORE OF THE BACKGROUND ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS WAS CONSIDERABLY RESTORED. THE UNITED NATIONS BUREAUCRACY HAS CONTINUED ITS PREPARATIONS FOR UNTAG, BUT AS USUN REPORTED RECENTLY, THEY CANNOT MAINTAIN A STATE OF READINESS INDEFINITELY. HOWEVER, AHTISAARI INFORMED ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE WILL STAY ON IN HIS POSITION AT LEAST THROUGH MID-1983, AND OTHERS ON HIS STAFF WHO WILL BE PLACED TEMPORARILY IN OTHER JOBS, WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

9. IN OTHER VARIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE FLS, CG AND UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS, WE HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO POINT

SECSTATE WASHDC 85914602 DTG:042105Z DEC 82 PSN: 039181
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUT THE ON-GOING VIABILITY OF THE US/CG DIALOGUE WITH THE MPLA ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. DESPITE THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCRETION, IT IS CLEARLY ESSENTIAL THAT OUR PARTNERS IN THIS EFFORT HAVE SOME DEGREE OF PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING IN THE ABSENCE OF MUCH PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF ACTIVITY AND PROGRESS. AMONG THE EVIDENCE WE ARE CITING:

-- THE CENSORING BY ANGOLAN MEDIA OF THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER'S HARSH COMMENTS ON LINKAGE AND THE USG AT THE UNGA IN OCTOBER.

-- THE STARTLING PUBLIC REVELATION BY ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR TO PARIS D'ALMEIDA IN LATE OCTOBER OF THE MPLA'S MOST RECENT BID TO US OFFERING SOME CUBAN WITHDRAWAL UP FRONT IN PHASE III, A DIRECT PROOF THAT THIS IS, IN FACT, A NEGOTIATION WHATEVER MAY BE SAID BY OTHER ANGOLANS.

-- THE FACT - NOT PUBLICLY KNOWN - THAT THE MPLA HAS BEEN SEEKING A MEETING WITH THE SAG FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. AFTER CONSULTATION AND COACHING FROM OUR SIDE, THE SAG IS NOW APPARENTLY GOING AHEAD WITH A DISCRETE MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ORCHESTRATED BY THE CAPE VERDEANS.

10. IN OTHER ANGOLAN DEVELOPMENTS, OUR CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS HAVE MORE THAN EVER TAKEN AN ACTIVIST ROLE IN BRINGING THE ANGOLANS TO DISCUSS A DEFINITIVE SCHEDULE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. THE WEST GERMANS HAVE COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY TO THE MPLA THEIR POSITIVE VIEW OF THE EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING, WHILE THE BRITISH HAVE COOPERATED IN GETTING OUR VIEW AND THEIRS THROUGH TO THE WIDEST ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AUDIENCE. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL THAT THIS INFORMATION NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FROM US SOURCES, THE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 85914602 DTG:042105Z DEC 82 PSN: 039181

FRENCH HAVE RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE CUBAN ISSUE WITH THE MPLA AND ARE PRESENTLY AWAITING AN ANGOLAN RESPONSE ON SOME IDEAS THEY (THE FRENCH) PUT FORWARD. FOLLOWING UPON THIS APPROACH, IT IS LIKELY THAT FRANK WISNER WILL RETURN TO LUANDA FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SOMETIME NEXT MONTH. THE MPLA CENTRAL COMMITTEE BEGINS ITS ANNUAL MEETING DECEMBER 10, AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL DISCUSS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE US/ANGOLAN NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, I WILL BE IN MOSCOW NEXT WEEK AT CONFIDENTIAL AND UNANNOUNCED MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS TO ONCE AGAIN EXCHANGE VIEWS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT THEIR MOST RECENT MEETINGS DURING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, YOU WILL RECALL THAT SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AGREED TO CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS.

11. WE ARE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION TO ASSESS SOUTH AFRICA'S POSTURE AT THIS STAGE OF THE GAME, HAVING JUST COMPLETED THE SOUNDINGS THAT ACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA'S NOVEMBER 24-27 VISIT TO WASHINGTON. AFTER SOME RUMBLINGS AFTER THE NATIONAL PARTY SPLIT OF FEBRUARY 24, THE NOVEMBER BY-ELECTIONS CONFIRMED THAT P. W. BOTHA'S GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN A POSITION TO CALL THE SHOTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING A DECISION TO SETTLE ON NAMIBIA AS WELL AS TO MOVE AHEAD ON DOMESTIC REFORM. WE FOUND THE SAG STILL CLEARLY COMMITTED TO GOING FORWARD WITH US TOWARD AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT UNDER 435, A POSITION REFLECTED CLEARLY IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING AND AFTER THE VISIT. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH THEY KEEP UNDER CONTROL.

12. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE STIRRING AROUND IN TERMS OF HOW THEY WILL CONTINUE TO GOVERN NAMIBIA INTERNALLY IN THE MEANTIME. THIS REFLECTS DISMAY AT THE DISARRAY THAT PRESENTLY EXISTS IN THE DTA AND IN THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN NAMIBIA IN GENERAL. THE SAG QUITE NATURALLY WISHES TO PUT MORE ORDER INTO THAT SITUATION, TO PUT THE INTERNAL PARTIES IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONTEST EVENTUAL INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED ELECTIONS AGAINST SWAPO AND TO REDUCE WHATEVER EMBARRASSMENT NOW ACCRUES TO IT FROM MISMANAGEMENT THAT HAS OCCURRED IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION OF NAMIBIA. AFTER FAILING BADLY IN THEIR RECENT EFFORT TO REARRANGE A STRONGER INTERNAL COALITION, THEY HAVE NOW EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF THE DTA-LED INTERNAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH FEBRUARY. THE SAG IS ON NOTICE THAT WE APPRECIATE DEADLINES NO MORE THAN THEY DO, AND THAT WE EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED PRIOR TO THEIR NEXT MOVE IN WINDHOEK. THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING A STANCE CONSISTENT WITH AN INTER-

SECSTATE WASHDC 85914602 DTG:042105Z DEC 82 PSN: 039181
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT UNDER RES. 435.

13. WE FOUND THE SOUTH AFRICANS FULLY AWARE OF THE CENTRAL POSITION NOW OCCUPIED IN THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT BY THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. WE ALSO FOUND THEM DISPOSED TO HELP US MOVE THAT ISSUE FORWARD TOWARD RESOLUTION, A DISPOSITION THAT WE ARE NOW SEEKING TO TRANSLATE INTO DIRECT ACTION THAT WILL MOVE THE ANGOLA TRACK FORWARD. ONE OF THE CENTRAL THEMES OF BOTHA'S PRESENTATIONS HERE WAS THE NEED TO GIVE SOUTHERN AFRICA

"A TASTE OF PEACE." DISCOUNTING THAT STATEMENT FOR RHETORIC, THERE IS SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS IN FACT PREPARED TO COORDINATE ITS ACTIONS TOWARD ANGOLA WITH US IN ORDER TO TRY TO ACHIEVE AN OVERALL REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. WHILE WE REMAIN CONCERNED OVER THE SAG'S ENORMOUS POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE NEGATIVELY OUR EFFORTS WITH THE MPLA ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, WE SEE SIGNS THAT SAG LEADERS REALIZE NOW THAT THEIR OWN ACTIONS ENTAIL A MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR SUCCESS OR FAILURE. A KEY TEST THAT WE WILL BE WATCHING IS THE SAG'S READINESS TO HANDLE THE SAVIMBI FACTOR WITH FINESSE AND NOT RAISE IT PUBLICLY OR WITH THE MPLA WHICH WOULD DRIVE THEM BACK INTO THEIR SHELL.

14. IN SUM, WE NOW FIND SAG LEADERS VISIBLY MORE COMFORTABLE, LESS JUMPY, AND MORE INCLINED TO COMPREHEND THE LONG-TERM GOALS WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO ESTABLISH. LARGELY BY DIRT OF OUR OWN HARD WORK, THE SAG OCCUPIES THE HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC GROUND ON NAMIBIA IT HAS HELD SINCE 1978. WE HAVE REDUCED ITS ISOLATION BUT OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE DOING SO IS A FUNCTION OF OUR ABILITY TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. SAG CONFIDENCE IN US, IN TURN, REQUIRES CONTINUOUS EVIDENCE THAT WE SEEK A BALANCED SETTLEMENT AND A LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT IN THE REGIONAL CLIMATE.

15. THE PROSPECT BEFORE US, THEREFORE, IS THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL MONTHS OF MANEUVERING ROOM IN WHICH TO WORK TO BRING THE CUBAN ISSUE TO A RESOLUTION, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. NEITHER THE SAG NOR THE AFRICANS ARE JUMPING SHIP OR FORCING A SHOWDOWN. THERE WILL BE STRAINS, NOISE AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVEN ANGER FROM SOME IN AFRICA--DESPITE THE FACT THAT OUR EFFORT IS THE ONLY MEANS OF ACHIEVING IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE GOALS CHERISHED THROUGHOUT AFRICA. DESPITE SCHISMS ON THE THEOLOGY OF LINKAGE, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE IN PRACTICE ROWING HARDER ON THEIR ANGOLAN OARS THAN THEY HAVE EVER DONE BEFORE. IN THE MAIN, THEY ARE FEARFUL OF SOVIET CAPACITY FOR MISCHIEF IN LUANDA, DISTRUSTFUL OF SAG INTENTIONS TO SETTLE, AND UNCERTAIN THAT WE CAN OBTAIN THE NEEDED STATESMANSHIP FROM THE MPLA AND THE SAG. BUT THEY CONSCIOUSLY CHOSE TO BOARD A SHIP WHOSE COURSE WE SET. THIS ASSET HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO OUR ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR. IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE. DAM

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8291004

RECEIVED 20 DEC 82 15

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

smf
12/21/07

DOCDATE 08 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE COCOM
EAST WEST ECONOMICS SOC

SUBJECT: FRENCH RENEGING ON SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i>	<i>Clark disapproved</i>		<i>DB</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

456

National Security Council
The White House

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15

Package # 91004

82 DEC 20 P 3: 54

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[checkmark]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

[Handwritten signature]

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

47562 16

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
91004

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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SENSITIVE

ACTION

December 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIR

SUBJECT: French Reneging on "Summary of Conclusions"

The attached cable from London is another convincing piece of evidence that the French may be reneging on the commitments in the "Summary of Conclusions." (S)

If France does in fact pull out of all follow-on studies, but COCOM and export credit, and repudiates the criteria section in the "Summary of Conclusions," we should follow a two-part strategy: First, continue the work without the French; second, cut back our overall relationship with the French drastically, in both the economic and military fields. In both these endeavors, the trick will be to isolate France from the other European allies. This will call for a minimum of public and a maximum of private diplomacy. (S)

On an urgent basis, we should task State to prepare a contingency plan in case the French tell Shultz they are not participating. I recommend that we send Shultz the attached memo, tasking him to prepare a contingency plan. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Secretary Shultz at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo to Shultz

We will hold up for further evidence

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLRR MD7-0811#47562

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/80

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

47563

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Relationship with the French (C)

It seems increasingly clear that you will learn in your conversations in Paris on December 14 that the French refuse to be bound by the "Summary of Conclusions." (S)

If the French renege in this fashion, it calls for an immediate response on our part, followed by a strategy for containing the damage. The President would like to review your ideas on the following topics: (S)

- Immediate reaction to the French during your Paris meetings.
- Continuing the work in the "Summary of Conclusions" without the French.
- Cutting back our relationships with the French in the military and economic areas.
- Preventing the French from winning support from its important European allies. (TS)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

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NLRR MD7-081 # 47563

BY ad NARA DATE 4/29/10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7350

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 26527

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT, EFIN, UR
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER PYM
REF: STATE 337173

1. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION OF ANOTHER SUBJECT, RICHARD EVANS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AT FCO, TOLD US THAT FCO REACTION TO THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO PYM WAS POSITIVE. EVANS CHARACTERIZED THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE AS COMPREHENSIVE AND PERFECTLY CLEAR. HE EXPECTED PYM TO SEND A PERSONAL RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY SHORTLY. EVANS STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH WERE THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON STUDIES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, EVANS SAID THAT UK WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM IN MAKING PROGRESS ON STUDIES FORESEEN IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS". IN RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY, PYM WOULD PROBABLY INDICATE GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE US APPROACH. HE WAS ALSO LIKELY TO SUGGEST THE NEED FOR A GENERAL PAPER -- A SORT OF CHAPEAU -- ON POLITICAL/ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR THAT WOULD SET THE TONE FOR THE STUDIES ON MORE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW.

3. EVANS THEN SAID THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD WAS FRANCE. UK OFFICIALS IN PARIS HAD REPORTED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FEEL BOUND IN ANY WAY BY THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS" AND DOES NOT PLAN TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY STUDIES OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY UNDERWAY OR CONTEMPLATED BEFORE THE MEETING AT LA SAPINIERE. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THIS MEANS THAT FRANCE WILL CONTINUE AS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN COCOM WORK ON STRATEGIC TRADE AND IN OECD WORK ON EXPORT CREDITS.

4. EVANS SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM UK'S CONTACTS WITH GOF THAT FOREGOING CHARACTERIZATION OF FRENCH POLICY CAME DIRECTLY FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

5. DEPARTMENT REPET AS DESIRED. LOUIS
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BY CW NARA DATES 5/19/10

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PAGE 01 PARIS 2345 63402 DTG: 081257Z DEC 82 PSN: 028521
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MESSAGE:

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O 081257Z DEC 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8682

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2542

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0134

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6940

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2280

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4654

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1261

USLO RIYADH 0729

AMEMBASSY ROME 5496

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5647

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 42345

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, PEPR, FR, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON: DRAPER CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR DRAPER MET WITH QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL FRANCIS GUTMANN ET AL TO BRIEF THE FRENCH ON LEBANON. TWO POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED FROM THE FRENCH. GUTMANN CONFIRMED FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF, BUT WOULD PREFER IT TO BE LINKED SOMEHOW TO THE UN. QUAI ME DIRECTOR BONNEFOUS OFFERED A SUGGESTION, ALBEIT ONE WITH PITFALLS, TO BUY GEMAYEL SOME TIME AND MOVE DISCUSSIONS ALONG. HE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUGGESTED A UNILATERAL ISRAELI PULLBACK FROM THE SHUF IN RETURN FOR SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENT BY THE LEBANESE TO DO SO IN JERUSALEM. END SUMMARY.

3. QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL FRANCIS GUTMANN HOSTED A BREAKFAST MEETING DECEMBER 7 WITH AMBASSADOR MORRIS DRAPER DURING THE LATTER'S OVERNIGHT TRANSIT IN PARIS. ATTENDING FOR THE FRENCH WERE GUTMANN'S DEPUTY JACQUES MARTIN, MIDDLE EAST-NORTH AFRICA DIRECTOR MARC BONNEFOUS, BRUNO DELAYE OF CHEYSSON'S STAFF, AND SUB-DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST RAPIN. AMBASSADOR, DCM AND POLITICAL OFFICER ACCOMPANIED DRAPER.

4. GUTMANN OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING IF ISRAEL WILL EVACUATE LEBANON, FOLLOWING UP WITH A QUESTION ON WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD MAKE A GESTURE IN TERMS OF A

PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. DRAPER REPLIED THAT CERTAIN ISRAELIS, SUCH AS SHARON, ARE IN NO HURRY TO WITHDRAW. THE ISRAELIS' POSITION IS BASED PRIMARILY ON TWO FACTORS: (1) A SUSPICION OF GEMAYEL AND OF HIS ABILITY TO CREATE A UNITED LEBANON AND (2) LINKAGE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO DELAY PROGRESS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. GEMAYEL, DRAPER EXPLAINED, DOES NOT WANT A GESTURE. HIS POSITION ON THIS HAS CHANGED IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. GEMAYEL FEARS THAT THERE MAY BE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BUT THAT THE SITUATION WOULD NOT ADVANCE BEYOND THAT POINT. HE WANTS A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CLEARLY FOR A FULL PULLOUT. SOME ISRAELIS WANT TO MAKE A GESTURE IN THE FORM OF A PULLOUT FROM THE SHUF, BUT THE MAIN LEADERS, SUCH AS SHARON, DO NOT WANT TO GIVE UP ANYTHING WITHOUT RECEIVING SOMETHING IN RETURN--NAMESLY A MEETING IN JERUSALEM.

5. PICKING UP ON THIS POINT AT THE END OF THE MEETING, MIDDLE EAST-NORTH AFRICA DIRECTOR BONNEFOUS SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE COULD WORK ON THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF IN RETURN FOR LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO COME TO JERUSALEM TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT COVERING THAT PULLBACK. DRAPER NOTED THAT THERE ARE POTENTIAL DANGERS IN IT FOR GEMAYEL IN TERMS OF REACTION OF THE SAUDIS AND POSSIBLY OF OTHER ARAB STATES.

6. GUTMANN SUGGESTED THAT IF GEMAYEL GETS NOTHING FROM THE ISRAELIS, HE IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE NATIONALISTIC.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEN ISRAEL WOULD SAY IT COULD NO LONGER DEAL WITH HIM AND WE WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH A BREAK-OFF OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO ASKED, SOMEWHAT RHETORICALLY, WHETHER ISRAEL IS NOW TAKING UP THE IDEA THAT IT IS AGAIN MENACED FROM WITHOUT IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS BEHAVIOR. BONNEFOUS WONDERED IF THIS WAS MERELY ISRAEL'S POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR NEGOTIATING, OR WAS IT ITS LAST WORD. GUTMANN ALSO WANTED TO KNOW IF THE ISRAELIS THOUGHT THAT, WITH TIME, THE U.S. AND THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL BASICALLY GIVE UP IN DISGUST. THE LONGER WE SUPPORT GEMAYEL, THE BETTER THE HOPE OF HIS GETTING OTHER AREAS LIBERATED. DRAPER SHARED HIS VIEWS ON THESE SUBJECTS WITH THE FRENCH.

7. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. THE FRENCH POINTED OUT THAT HAIFA IS NOW THE LARGEST PORT FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON. A IT WOULD FAVOR A SEMI-COLONIALIZATION BY ISRAEL--A SORT OF SATELLITE--FOR ISRAELI ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

8. IN TURNING TO THE MNF, DRAPER PRAISED THE FINE JOB BEING DONE BY FRENCH CONTINGENT AND ITS COMMANDER. ON THE MATTER OF EXPANSION OF THE MNF, DRAPER SAID THAT WE DO NOT THINK IT NEED BE HUGE--SEVEN BATTALIONS,

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EXDIS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 42345

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REPRESENTING ROUGHLY A DOUBLING OF THE PRESENT FORCES.
IF UNIFIL REMAINS IN THE SOUTH, THE MNF WOULD BE REQUIRED
ALONG COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES IN THE BIQA AND IN BAALBEK.

9. IN PRINCIPLE, THE FRENCH HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH
INCREASING THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, BUT GUTMANN
SAID THEY WOULD PREFER IT TO HAVE SOME SORT OF LINK TO
THE UN. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MNF AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL
WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MOVE INTO THE SHUF.

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10. GUTMANN EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. - ISRAELI CONFRONTATION IF THE ISRAELIS REMAIN INTRANSIGENT OVER LEBANON. THE REAL DRAMA, HE SAID, IS THAT OF DIFFERING TIMETABLES-- ISRAELI, LEBANESE AND AMERICAN. WE MUST HELP GEMAYEL HOLD ON AND GIVE HIM TIME. THE ISRAELI TIMETABLE IS CALCULATED IN YEARS, FOR GEMAYEL IT IS MONTHS. WITH NO PROGRESS THERE IS A DANGER OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION DETERIORATING INTO RENEWED BLOODSHED BY EARLY NEXT YEAR. DRAWING A PARALLEL WITH THE SINAI, GUTMANN SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS MAY BELIEVE THAT THE LONGER THEY REMAIN IN LEBANON THE MORE LIKELY THEY ARE TO GET SOMETHING OUT OF IT.

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11. IN TERMS OF FRENCH CONTACTS, GUTMANN SAID THE MUSLIMS MUST BE GIVEN A SORT OF MORAL GUARANTEE. WE MUST AVOID THE LEBANESE MUSLIMS GETTING IMPATIENT. IN TERMS OF THE PALESTINIANS, THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, BUT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DONE WITH THEM NOW. ISRAEL IS THE FIRST KEY. THE PLO MUST KEEP QUIET FOR NOW.

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12. IN SUMMING UP, GUTAMNN SAID THAT EVEN IF OUR ANALYSES OF THE SITUATION MAY NOT BE PRECISELY THE SAME ON EVERY POINT, IT IS STILL IMPORTANT FOR THE US AND FRANCE TO WORK TOGETHER TO HELP RESOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. OUR POSITIONS ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND PERMITS A DIVISION OF LABOR WHICH CAN BE HELPFUL.

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13. DISCUSSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS APPEAL TO GUTMANN ON ACCESS TO PRISONERS IS COVERED IN SEPTTEL.

14. THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF AMB. DRAPER AND WAS NOT CLEARED BY HIM.

GALBRAITH

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PAGE 1 - 661

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: IN

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MESSAGE:

EHA120
ZZ RUEADWW
DE RUEHBS #6340/01 3431417
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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NLRR M07-081 #17566
BY Civ NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 17025

NODIS
DEPT FOR BREMER ONLY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) FR
SUBJECT: LETTER TO MITTERRAND

- 1. (~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
- 2. FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO JUDGE CLARK:
- 3. BEGIN TEXT:

BILL,

- I HAVE YOUR PROPOSED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MITTERRAND. I THINK THE ESSENTIAL POINTS ARE CONSTRUCTIVE, ALTHOUGH BY NOW I DON'T BELIEVE WE CAN ACCOMPLISH MUCH IN REHASHING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT. I ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO GET MITTERRAND TO SIGN ON THE DOTTED LINE AT THIS STAGE. HE WOULD LIKELY READ THE LETTER AS A SUBTLE ULTIMATUM WHICH WOULD PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE. THIS REFLECTS THE ADVICE I RECEIVED CONSISTENTLY IN BONN FROM KOHL, GENSCHER AND SCHMIDT. FRANCIS PYM ALSO ECHOES THIS VIEW. AT THE QUAD DINNER LAST NIGHT CHEYSSON MADE A REAL EFFORT AT FLEXIBILITY, AND WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT CHEYSSON IS AN UNCERTAIN REED, I THINK IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WAIT UNTIL I GET TO PARIS AND CAN SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH MITTERRAND BEFORE FORCING A DECISION FROM HIM IN A LETTER. MY SUGGESTIONS FOR A REVISED MESSAGE ARE BELOW. I WILL TRY TO GIVE YOU A CALL WHENEVER I CAN BREAK AWAY FROM MY NATO MEETINGS.

- SUGGESTED REVISED TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 20, I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO PUT BEHIND US WHATEVER MISUNDERSTANDING MAY HAVE ARISEN OVER EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- OUR BASIC COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS ON THESE ISSUES WAS EVIDENT IN THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ BEGAN DURING THE INFORMAL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AT LA SAPINIERE AND WHICH CONTINUED HERE IN WASHINGTON. AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR TALKS IN WILLIAMSBURG, OTTAWA AND VERSAILLES, I ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES OF A CONSENSUS ON OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT THESE RELATIONS WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE AND AVOID GIVING STRATEGIC BENEFITS TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE ALMOST DAILY DISCUSSIONS HERE IN WASHINGTON DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AMONG US ON THESE POINTS AND I CONSIDERED IT A GREAT SUCCESS THAT WE WORKED OUT A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT ON THESE PRINCIPLES AND AN APPROACH TO TURNING THEM INTO A COMMON LINE OF ACTION. YOUR AMBASSADOR DID A GOOD JOB.

- IT IS UNFORTUNATE FOR THE ALLIANCE THAT THIS SUCCESS WAS MARRED BY PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING THE PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CONSENSUS. OUR UNDERSTANDING ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WAS CLEAR: DURING THE PERIOD FROM THE LA SAPINIERE CONFERENCE THROUGH THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON WHICH WERE COMPLETED THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 7, WE WERE GRATEFUL THAT ALL THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SESSION COOPERATED FULLY IN THE FORMULATION OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH IS NOW KNOWN AS A "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS." DURING THIS PERIOD WE WORKED EARNESTLY TO ACCOMMODATE FRENCH CONCERNS -- TO THE POINT OF MODIFYING POSITIONS TO WHICH ALL OF THE OTHER PARTNERS WERE READY TO AGREE. MOREOVER, YOUR AMBASSADOR MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE DID NOT REGARD THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AS "LINKED" TO THE ISSUE OF REACHING CONSENSUS ON THE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, AND I WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID IN PUBLIC ANY SUGGESTION THAT FRANCE HAD AGREED TO OUR CONSENSUS IN RETURN FOR HAVING THE SANCTIONS LIFTED.

- IN ANY CASE, THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THESE ISSUES ARE NOW BEHIND US, AND THE IMPORTANT TASK IS TO CONTINUE WITH THE WORK BEGUN AT LA SAPINIERE: TO TRANSLATE THE PROGRESS OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THUS FAR MADE INTO A MORE HARMONIOUS COMMON WESTERN APPROACH. I KNOW YOU SHARE THE VIEW THAT WE NOW HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT IN PLACE AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR A CONSISTENT ECONOMIC STRATEGY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AT A MOMENT WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP QUESTION IS AT A SENSITIVE STAGE.

BT
#6340

SENSITIVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 2534 63400 DTG: 091422Z DEC 82 PSN: 030284
SIT583 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 343/1430Z

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IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFA #2534 3431424
O 091422Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 42404

FOR JUDGE CLARK FROM SECRETARY BALDRIGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, AG, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY BALDRIGE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
- BENDJEDID

FOL SET ACTION SECSTATE AND USDOC INFO ALGIERS AND RABAT
BEING PASSED FOR YOU ACTION

QUOTES ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 42404

FROM AMBASSADOR NEWLIN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, AG

SUBJECT: SECRETARY BALDRIGE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
BENDJEDID

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT BENDJEDID RECEIVED SECRETARY BALDRIGE FOR AN HOUR AND 20 MINUTES DEC. 8. HE REQUESTED HIS REMARKS BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT. HIGHLIGHTS WERE: ALGERIA DESIRES TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ALL AREAS; HE REQUESTS THAT THE EXECUTIVE USE ITS INFLUENCE TO HAVE CURRENT GAS CONTRACTS APPROVED; HE APPEALED FOR A BALANCED US POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA AND CRITICIZED US MILITARY COOPERATION WITH MOROCCO; ON WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIA SUPPORTED SELF-DETERMINATION; ALGERIA DESIRES US HELP IN SMALL AND MEDIUM

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUSINESSES ESPECIALLY IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. BALDRIGE REPLIED US WANTS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, NOT JUST ONE AND PROMISED FULL COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. BENDJEDID EXTENDED WARM WELCOME AND SAID ALGERIA WANTED TO DEVELOP FURTHER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE US WHILE MAINTAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE AND POSITIVE NON-ALIGNMENT. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A PRAGMATIST WHO WANTED TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING FOR HIS PEOPLE. ALGERIA EARLIER HAD MADE THE MISTAKE OF CONCENTRATING ON HEAVY INDUSTRY AND THIS HAD RESULTED IN DISEQUILIBRIUM. HE REQUESTED US HELP IN TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE. POSSIBILITIES, HE SAID, WERE ENORMOUS.

4. BENDJEDID NOTED HISTORIC US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL COOPERATION. ALGERIA REALIZES THAT THE BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE IS IN ITS FAVOR AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. GAS AND OIL ARE THE BASES OF ALGERIA'S ECONOMY AND HE REQUESTED THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO TAKE A POSITION WHICH WOULD FACILITATE REGULATORY APPROVAL OF THE TRUNKLINE AND DISTRIGAS CONTRACTS.

5. WESTERN SAHARA. BENDJEDID SAID THE US SEEMS TO BE AGAINST SELF-DETERMINATION AS PROPOSED BY THE OAU. ALGERIA DOES NOT ASK THE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO. ALGERIA DOES ASK FOR EVEN-HANDEDNESS. HE REFERRED TO US BASES AND THE FURNISHING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO MOROCCO.

6. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT ALGERIA WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH MOROCCO. HE CITED THE PROJECTED GAS PIPELINE TO SPAIN VIA MOROCCO AND THE MANY OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN COOPERATION. ALGERIA HAD NEVER BEEN INTERESTED IN MOROCCAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HE ASSERTED. BENDJEDID STATED HE HAD TURNED DOWN APPROACHES BY MOROCCAN OPPOSITION. MOROCCAN OPPOSITION HAD NO VALID BASIS. THE KING, HE FELT, WAS THE ONLY VALID FIGURE IN MOROCCO, THE SOLE DECISION-MAKER. HE HAS A 20-YEAR-OLD, GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH KING HASSAN (GOING BACK TO WHEN BENDJEDID WAS SENIOR ALGERIAN OFFICIAL IN ORAN) AND FEELS HE CAN WORK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH HIM. KING HASSAN'S PROBLEM IS THAT IF THERE IS A VICTORY (IN W. SAHARA) HE MUST SHARE IT WITH ROYAL ARMED FORCES AND OPPOSITION PARTY BUT IF THERE IS A DEFEAT THE KING ALONE WILL BEAR THE COSTS.

7. PRESIDENT BENDJEDID REITERATED STANDARD ALGERIAN POSITIONS ON THE PALESTINIANS, IRAN/IRAQ, AND NAMIBIA. ON THE REAGAN PLAN, ALGERIA SAID "YES, BUT". THERE SHOULD BE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE FEZ PARTICIPANTS AND THE U.S. THE U.S. MUST ACT BEFORE PROBLEMS IN ARAB COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. BECOME UNMANAGEABLE. SCATTERING THE PALESTINIANS HAS SOLVED NOTHING. IF THERE IS NO SETTLEMENT SOON, HE FEARED RENEWED PALESTINIAN-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

8. HE SAID HE HAD MET PRESIDENT REAGAN AT CANCUN AND HOPED TO MEET HIM AGAIN. SINCE THE MEETING AT CANCUN HAD BEEN BRIEF, HE ASKED THAT SECRETARY BALDRIGE TRANSMIT HIS VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT.

9. SECRETARY BALDRIGE THANKED BENDJEDID FOR ALGERIAN EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE TIM AND PROMISED TO CONVEY HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESIDENT. HE THOUGHT OUR EXPERIENCE IN AGRICULTURE WAS ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO ALGERIA'S

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 2534 63400 DTG: 091432Z DEC 82 PSN: 030295
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DE RUFHFRA #2534 3431434
O 091432Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 42404
NEEDS. THE U. S., HE SAID, WANTED TO HAVE GOOD
RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND NOT JUST
WITH MOROCCO AS SOME ALLEGED. CONCERNING THE GAS
QUESTION, HE BELIEVED IN THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS AND
THE U. S. FAVORED EUROPE RECEIVING GAS FROM AFRICA.

10. SECRETARY BALDRIGE SAID U. S. ASSISTANCE TO
MOROCCO WAS RELATIVELY MODEST AND THE RECENT ADDITION
WAS PROMPTED BY THE NEW USE OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS
BY THE POLISARIO. THE U. S., TOO, SUPPORTED A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION BASED ON THE OAU FORMULA. HE STATED THE
PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND OUR DESIRE FOR
INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. SECRETARY
BALDRIGE NOTED THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION
TO RECENT ACTION BY THE HOUSE TO CHANGE THE REQUESTED
ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL FROM TWO-THIRD LOANS, ONE-THIRD
GRANT TO FIFTY-FIFTY. HE RECALLED SECRETARY SHULTZ'S
STATEMENT THAT INTRANSIGENCE SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED.
HE ALSO NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSITION TO NEW
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. IN CLOSING, HE
PROMISED TO CONVEY BENDJEDID'S COMMENTS TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO SECRETARY SHULTZ.

11. MINISTER OF COMMERCE KHELLEF, AMBASSADOR AND
TOUMAYAN WERE ALSO PRESENT.
GALBRAITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNQUOTE
GALBRIATH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47568

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DE RUFHFR #2663/01 3432038

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885

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INFO EC COLLECTIVE

USMISSION GENEVA 0367

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 42663

EXDIS

BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

PASS ALSO TO SECRETARIES BALDRIGE AND BLOCK AND USTR BROCK

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: EEW, FR

SUBJECT: BALDRIGE-JOBERT MEETING: EAST-WEST ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, GATT-MINISTERIAL, TRADE RESTRICTIONS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE BALDRIGE AND I HAD A FRANK BUT FRIENDLY CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER JOBERT ON DECEMBER 9. HIS DIRECTOR OF CABINET CHAHID-NOURAI WAS PRESENT. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

3. JOBERT'S PRINCIPAL POINT WAS THAT TO SUCCEED IN ANY NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE, THE U.S. MUST AVOID GIVING PUBLICLY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS GOING TO IMPOSE SOMETHING ON THE FRENCH. PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENTS OF U.S. INTENT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON A GIVEN SUBJECT -- OR EVEN U.S. PLANS FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS ON A PARTICULAR ISSUE --

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PUTS FRANCE IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO RESPOND NEGATIVELY. IF THEY SAY YES, THEY APPEAR OBSEQUIOUS. IF THEY SAY NO, THEY LOOK TRUCULENT. ACCORDING TO JOBERT, PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES SUCH AS AGRICULTURE AND EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS BUT EACH SUBJECT SHOULD BE TAKEN UP QUIETLY, SEPARATELY AND SLOWLY. BOTH BALDRIGE AND I WERE QUITE ENCOURAGED BY JOBERT'S COMMENT THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES AND FELT THAT JOBERT WAS INTENTIONALLY GIVING US A SIGNAL ON HOW TO SUCCEED.

4. BALDRIGE AND JOBERT AGREED THE PRESENT LEVEL OF US-FRENCH RHETORIC IS TOO HIGH AND THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO ELIMINATE MOST PUBLIC STATEMENTS. JOBERT SAID THAT FRANCE'S MISSION NOW IS TO DEVOTE ALL ITS ENERGIES TO SELLING ITS EXPORTS. HE

REMINDED BALDRIGE THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. ARE COMPETITORS, BUT HE SAW NO REASON WHY THIS COMPETITION SHOULD INTERFERE WITH OUR BASIC FRIENDSHIP.

5. ON THE EAST-WEST/SAPINIERE ISSUE, JOBERT SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FELT THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN TRYING TO ENTRAP FRANCE INTO BECOMING A MEMBER OF WHAT WOULD BE IN EFFECT A TREATY OF AN IMPORTANCE COMPARABLE TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. A SMALL DISCUSSION AMONG AMBASSADORS HAD SUDDENLY BECOME A FORUM THAT PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EQUIVALENT WEIGHT OF A TREATY. JOBERT STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINKS AMONG THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS DISCUSSED AT LA SAPINIERE. WE SHOULD TAKE THE ITEMS ONE BY ONE AND TRY TO MAKE WHATEVER PROGRESS WE CAN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ALSO FELT (AND JOBERT SEEMED TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THIS), THAT THIS HAD BEEN SIMPLY THE FIRST STEP BY THE U.S. TO GET INFLUENCE OVER FRENCH ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING. BALDRIGE PATIENTLY DENIED THIS, BUT JOBERT SAID THAT THERE ARE THOSE IN FRANCE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. UNCONSCIOUSLY SEEKS CONTROL. THE NET EFFECT OF OUR APPARENT EFFORTS TO PUSH MITTERRAND AROUND ECONOMICALLY RISKS, ACCORDING TO JOBERT, CHANGING PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S WELL-DISPOSED ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S.

6. IN AN ASIDE, JOBERT SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POSITIONS HE TOOK IN GENEVA AND THAT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT; EVERYTHING HE DID WAS WITH PRIOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPROVAL.

7. JOBERT MENTIONED THAT IN A CONVERSATION WITH USTR BROCK LAST SPRING THEY HAD AGREED THAT THE STRAUSS-GUNDELACH AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE REOPENED AND THUS HE HAD FELT DECEIVED WHEN THE AGRICULTURAL ISSUE WAS PUT ON THE GATT AGENDA. HE SAID HE DID NOT SERIOUSLY OBJECT TO THE AGRICULTURAL ISSUE BEING RAISED IN GATT BUT THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO LEAVE IT OFF BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE PROPER WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS; PROGRESS COULD ONLY BE MADE PRIVATELY.

8. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPOSITION OF FRENCH FOREIGN LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT ON IMPORT DOCUMENTS, JOBERT WAS VERY STRONG ON THEIR RIGHT TO DO THIS. (HE ALSO RECALLED HIS SURPRISE THAT THE U.S. DEMARCHE INCLUDED SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE WITH RESPECT TO THEIR VIDEOTAPE RECORDERS.) BALDRIGE AND I MADE THE POINT THAT SOME ADVANCE NOTICE WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE PROBLEMS THAT WERE CREATED BY DISRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8886

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INFO EC COLLECTIVE

USMISSION GENEVA 0368

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 42663
EXDIS

9. COMMENT: IN SUM, THE MEETING WAS PRODUCTIVE.
BOTH JOBERT AND BALDRIGE AGREED THAT THIS IS THE TIME
TO APPROACH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES QUIETLY.
GALBRAITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47569

30

PAGE 01 PARIS 2713 80180 DTG: 101553Z DEC 82 PSN: 031893
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O 101553Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8925

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5435
NATO COLLECTIVE
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 42713
USNATO PLEASE PASS GELBARD/DOBBINS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FR, UR, PEPR
SUBJECT: FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS
REF: A)PARIS 40617, B)MOSCOW 014782, C)PARIS 42233

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A CHEYSSON VISIT TO MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY APPEARS HIGHLY LIKELY. FRENCH BELIEVE SOVIETS ARE EAGER FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS, THOUGH NOT WILLING TO TAKE ANY STEPS TO IMPROVE THE TRADE IMBALANCE, WHICH REMAINS A MAJOR FRENCH PREOCCUPATION. END SUMMARY.

3. IN COURSE OF GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DEALING WITH SOVIET AFFAIRS, EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON WOULD MAKE A TRIP TO MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY. OFFICIAL REPLIED THAT "NOTHING IS EXCLUDED:" TRIP WAS NOT YET DEFINITE, BUT MATTERS SHOULD BECOME CLEARER IN NEXT FEW WEEKS. HE DEFENDED TRIP AS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH FRENCH SOVIET POLICY UNDER MITTERRAND: WHILE POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REMAINED OBSTACLES TO "NORMALIZATION" OF FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS -- THAT IS, A RETURN TO THE PATTERN OF FREQUENT AND REGULAR HIGH-LEVEL VISITS OF THE 1970'S, THEY DID NOT PRECLUDE HIGH-LEVEL VISITS PER SE. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH VISITS AFTER MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, BUT THE DIALOGUE HAD NEVER BEEN INTERRUPTED, WITH INDUSTRY MINISTER CHEVENEMENT'S VISIT THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE. BY THE SAME TOKEN A MITTERRAND VISIT WAS ALSO "NOT EXCLUDED" IN PRINCIPLE, THOUGH NOTHING WAS UNDER WAY FOR THE TIME BEING. ON EDGAR FAURE MISSION, (REFTEL) OFFICIAL SAID FAURE WAS GOING IN DECEMBER, BUT THAT HE HAD DENIED PUBLICLY HAVING ANY OFFICIAL MISSION.

4. ONLY OTHER VISIT PLANNED IS REGULAR ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FRANCO-SOVIET ECONOMIC COMMISSION WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE JANUARY 11-13 IN PARIS. IN ADDITION, THERE MIGHT

BE RETURN VISITS TO PARIS BY SOVIET COUNTERPARTS OF AGRICULTURE MINISTER CRESSONS AND CHEVENEMENT. ON CHEVENEMENT VISIT OFFICIAL HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO ACCOUNT REFTEL B OTHER THAN TO NOTE THAT FRENCH DELEGATION HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY DOLGIKH WHO HAD COME TO FRENCH EMBASSY SPECIAL EVENT AND HAD STRUCK THE FRENCH AS HIGHLY COMPETENT AND SELF-ASSURED.

5. OFFICIAL CONFIRMED THAT FRANCO-SOVIET TRADE IMBALANCE -- ESTIMATED TO REACH A RECORD 10 BILLION FF BY THE END OF THE YEAR -- REMAINS A STRONG PREOCCUPATION WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO HELP RESOLVE. IN FRENCH VIEW, SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN WILLING TO MAKE ANY REAL GESTURES -- FOR EXAMPLE, ON TRADE -- TO HELP BRING THIS ABOUT.

6. POLAND. OFFICIAL SAID THAT IN CONTRAST TO SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO WANTED TO PLAN ACTIONS NOW IN RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED POLISH MOVES THIS MONTH, FRENCH WANTED TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE POLES ACTUALLY DID BEFORE DECIDING ON APPROPRIATE ACTION. EMBOFF TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE POINTS MADE REFTEL. OFFICIAL ASKED IN THIS CONNECTION WHAT CURRENT U.S. THINKING WAS ON POLISH DEBT RESCHEDULING. FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REPORTED THAT WE WERE LOOKING AT DEBT RESCHEDULING AS ONE STEP THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO POLISH ACTIONS. HE SAID THIS WAS AN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AREA FRANCE WOULD ALSO WANT TO LOOK AT CAREFULLY, THOUGH EMPHASIZING THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS NOT ONLY MINISTRY INVOLVED. (COMMENT. QUAI OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US IN THE PAST THAT THEY ARE THE "HARD-LINERS" ON DEBT-RESCHEDULING. FINANCE AND ECONOMIC MINISTRIES HAVE LONG PRESSED FOR RESCHEDULING ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS, BUT THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS PUT FORWARD BY QUAI HAD -- SO FAR -- CARRIED THE DAY.) GALBRAITH

PARIS 2713 80180 DTG: 101553Z DEC 82 PSN: 031893

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NLRR MD7-081 #47569
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9072

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 42946
NODIS

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR CLARK AND DEEVER
PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)
SUBJ: WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT: MEMORANDUM FOR CLARK AND
- DEEVER FROM WALLIS

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING. JACQUES ATTALI STARTED THE PROCEEDINGS AT DINNER WITH AN HARANGUE, ON INSTRUCTIONS, AGAINST OUR DECISION TO VIOLATE THE CONSENSUS RULE IN SETTING THE DATES -- BUT ENDED THE HARANGUE BY STATING THAT THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION FOR THE DATES PROPOSED, EVEN THOUGH (HE SAID) THIS REQUIRES HIS PRESIDENT TO RE-SCHEDULE TWO MAJOR TRIPS ABROAD.

3. THE JAPANESE ALSO EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION THAT THE DATES HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED BEFORE THEY HAD A GOVERNMENT BUT THEN INFORMED ME THAT PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE ACCEPTS THE INVITATION FOR MAY 28-30.

4. IN ADDITION TO REMOVING THAT TROUBLESOME NETTLE, THE DISCUSSION OF PREPARATION FOR WILLIAMSBURG WAS CON-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STRUCTIVE AND HIGHLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCEPT FOR THE MEETING. WHILE SOME SKEPTICISM REMAINS ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO PRODUCE AN INFORMAL, SCALED-DOWN SUMMIT, THERE IS WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG THE SHERPAS THAT SUCH A MEETING IS THE DESIRE OF ALL THE LEADERS. I STATED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHEN INFORMED OF THE SKEPTICISM I HAD ENCOUNTERED EARLIER, GAVE ME CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PREPARE A SUMMIT WHICH RESPONDS TO HIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES' PREFERENCES.

5. WHILE NO DEFINITE DECISIONS WERE REACHED, THE SENSE OF THE MEETING WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR PROPOSALS IN THE KEY AREAS OUTLINED IN MY EARLIER LETTER TO THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES:

6. PARTICIPATION - THE VALUE OF "HEADS ONLY" SESSION

WAS RECOGNIZED BY ALL PERSONAL REPS, TO THE EXTENT THAT ATTALI, AT ONE POINT, PROPOSED NO MINISTERS AT ALL BE INVITED TO ACCOMPANY THE LEADERS TO WILLIAMSBURG. THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT CONSIDERED PRACTICAL. DESPITE THE VALUE ATTACHED TO SMALL MEETINGS, WE STILL HAVE OUR WORK CUT OUT FOR US TO WEAR DOWN RESIDUAL RESISTANCE, PRINCIPALLY FROM THE "COALITION" GOVERNMENTS (GERMANY AND JAPAN), BUT ALSO FROM ATTALI'S VIEWS THAT EACH DELEGATION MUST HAVE ITS OWN NOTE TAKEE EVEN IN MEETINGS OF PRINCIPALS ALONE.

7. COMMUNIQUE - WE HAVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO OUR PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE NO FORMAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT WILLIAMSBURG. "NO COMMUNIQUE", AS AGREED, BASICALLY MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE NO TEXTS PREPARED BEFORE THE SUMMIT, NO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE OR AT THE SUMMIT BY THE SHERPAS OR STAFF - BUT THAT THE LEADERS THEMSELVES WILL AGREE ON A BRIEF, GENERAL STATEMENT TO BE READ TO THE PRESS AT THE END OF THE SUMMIT.

8. PRESS HANDLING - THERE IS A STRONG SENSE THAT WE MUST MAKE EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE PRESS COVERAGE OF WILLIAMSBURG SO AS TO PREVENT THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT FOLLOWED VERSAILLES. OUR IDEAS ON "DESIGNATED BRIEFERS" FOR ONE OR TWO BRIEFINGS PER DAY WAS WELL RECEIVED. WE OFFERED TO DRAW UP "GUIDELINES" FOR PRESS RELATIONS TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEXT MEETING OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES. ALL SHERPAS FAVOR INSTRUCTING ALL

PARIS 2946 39534 DTG: 131420Z DEC 82 PSN: 035330

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MEMBERS AND STAFFS OF DELEGATIONS TO STAY COMPLETELY AWAY FROM THE PRESS. ON MY RETURN, WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS WHOLE AREA WITH THE PRESS PEOPLE AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

9. SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA AND PREPARATION - ALL RECOGNIZED THAT EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEMS WOULD BE FRUITLESS AT THIS EARLY MEETING. WE DID, HOWEVER, AGREE ON THE CONCEPT THAT AGENDA SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FROM THE TOP DOWN, RATHER THAN FROM THE BUREAUCRACY UP. ACCORDINGLY, WE AGREED TO REQUEST THAT THE PRESIDENT WRITE THE OTHER LEADERS ASKING THAT THEY EXPLAIN TO THEIR SHERPAS WHAT PROBLEMS THEY WOULD MOST LIKE TO HAVE DISCUSSED AND INDICATE THEIR OWN APPROACHES TO THESE TOPICS. THE SHERPAS WOULD THEN DISCUSS THE LEADERS' VIEWS AND BEGIN FORMULATING ON AGENDA, FOCUSSED ON AREAS WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES TO BE EXPLORED.

10. MIKE MCMANUS' PRESENTATION ON WILLIAMSBURG WAS A HIT. HE DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF TYING TOGETHER THE

PARIS 2946 39534 DTG: 131420Z DEC 82 PSN: 035330

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NLRR M77-081 #47570
BY AN NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

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32

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 2946 39534 DTG: 131420Z DEC 82 PSN: 035332
SIT725 DATE 12/15/82 TOR: 347/1459Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP DEAV SITSIT EOBT
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAGLISTKLIST FOR ACTION-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #2946/02 3471424
O 131420Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9073

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 42946
NODIS
WILLIAMSBURG SETTING AND THE PRESIDENT'S (AND OTHER
LEADERS') CONCEPT FOR THE SUMMIT ITSELF.

11. ON MY RETURN, I WILL WANT TO MEET WITH YOU TO REVIEW THE MEETING MORE FULLY AND TO GET YOUR DIRECTIONS FROM HERE. I HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO EXPLAIN OUR CONCEPT OF WILLIAMSBURG TO THE PRESS. MZKE WILL CONSULT WITH GERGEN AND SPEAKES ON THE BEST FORMAT FOR THIS. WE CAN THEN DISCUSS IT AT OUR MEETING.

12. WITH REGARD TO VERSAILLES, THE ONLY ISSUE OF CONTINUING INTEREST IS THE TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP. WE AGREED TO "STOP THE CLOCK" ON DECEMBER 31, FOR NOT MORE THAN THREE WEEKS, UNTIL THE WORKING GROUP CAN COMPLETE ITS REPORT. THE REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE HEADS OF STATE, AND ITS FURTHER DISPOSAL WILL BE IN OUR HANDS. A THEME REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE DISCUSSION OF VERSAILLES WAS: "THE PAST IS PAST, LET'S LOOK TO THE FUTURE." AT ONE POINT I DECLINED TO DISCUSS "WHO KILLED COCK ROBIN?" AND AT OTHER POINTS TIETMEYER AND ARMSTRONG (BOTH OF WHOM WERE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL THROUGHOUT) MADE SIMILAR EFFORTS. ATTALI ALSO MADE SINCERE EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL IN MANY WAYS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GALBRAITH

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

462

RECEIVED

Package # 8440

82 DEC 13 P 6: 42

12/13/82

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	2	X	A
Bud McFarlane	3	M	
Jacque Hill	4	✓	A
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Recommended approval
quickly - will explain

~~Approved -
but let's discuss~~

~~Crain~~ ~~MMZ~~

McW
34

8440

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 13, 1982

47571

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. POINDEXTER
FROM: DENNIS BLAIR/GUS WEISS
SUBJECT: Computers to France

Gus

As you are aware, Judge Clark has placed a hold on export licenses for two Cray computers for scientific and commercial purposes in France (Tab I). The President of Cray has sent Judge Clark a letter concerning the possible loss of Cray markets in France to the Japanese (Tab II). We are gathering information to staff a reply to this letter. We need to address both the commercial aspects and our overall relationship with France. We expect to have a memo to the Judge by the end of the week.

In the meantime, National Advanced Systems has applied for a license to export an Advanced System 9060 computer to GSI-TEL in France to use for payroll and accounting. Defense, Commerce, State and Energy have all approved this application. This computer is a capable machine, but is not on the scale of the Crays. We recommend that you give NSC approval for this sale. It will not prejudice any action we may wish to take on the Crays. In the interim we would be grateful for any guidance you might provide to help us draft the response to Cray.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the issuing of the export license for the Advanced System 9060 (export license application attached at Tab III).

Approve Disapprove

- Tab I Clark memo putting hold on license
- Tab II Letter on the Cray computer
- Tab III Export license application

passed to Gus Weiss

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 107-081-47571
BY GN NARA DATE 4/20/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Blair:

7371

35

November 3, 1982

FILE:
FRANCE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE


47572

SUBJECT: Computers for France

Please ^{do not now} approve and ^{or} issue export licenses now pending for
[redacted] for the [redacted], Paris, France, under
case numbers [redacted] and [redacted]

FOIA(b)(3)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

cc Richard Perle
Dept of State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M07-D81 #47572
BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

~~SECRET~~

November 30, 1982

The Honorable Judge William P. Clark
Assistant to President for National Security Affairs
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

I am writing to brief you on new developments regarding a fast emerging threat to United States leadership in supercomputing technology which I became aware of during a visit to France last week. These developments also relate to two export control cases currently before the administration (Office of Export Administration, case Nos. 628656 and 645645, regarding export of two CRAY 1S computer systems to France).

Since January 1981, this Administration has approved shipment of three CRAY 1S processors to France. Recently, however, we have experienced unexpected delays in export license approval. I am aware that our current license applications are delayed pending resolution of certain defense related diplomatic issues not directly related to the CRAY computer systems.

What is particularly alarming, however, is that the current delays are now being used quite effectively to support a very aggressive marketing campaign by Fujitsu through its European representative, Siemens. Siemens - Fujitsu have begun, as of the last two weeks, to offer early delivery of the recently announced Fujitsu supercomputer. Notably, they have guaranteed no export license delays, emphasizing their potential as a reliable supplier. Furthermore, since they are competing against the older CRAY 1 system (Cray Research will stop production of this system early next year, in favor of its three newer products), Fujitsu has offered higher performance without additional export constraints. I am convinced that our competitive position is now in jeopardy.

While the short term loss of our current customers due to export delays is a matter of serious immediate financial concern to Cray Research, the long term implications of Japanese involvement in the French marketplace raises national security concerns. As I believe you know, the French have long been concerned with export licensing delays and, therefore, with Cray Research's viability as a reliable supercomputer supplier. Earlier this year, partly in response to the export situation, the French government initiated its own supercomputer development project designed to protect itself from the impact of the unreliable supply of the American supercomputers, and to provide a broader base for the French computing


industry. The Japanese supercomputer manufacturers have recently pursued the French seeking cooperative development and marketing agreements. To date, the French have resisted Japanese initiatives in favor of working with Cray Research and our products. I am personally convinced that this attitude will continue as long as the French user community remains confident of us as a reliable partner.

At this time, Cray Research has a clear advantage in the Western European supercomputing marketplace. This advantage allows the United States to retain both leadership and technology control. As a result of the recent Siemens - Fujitsu inroads, however, I question whether we can hold onto that advantage if we cannot deliver our products reliably. As a result of my conversations in Paris last week, I believe that we have very little time to deliver the computer processors we have contracted for. Otherwise, we can expect to give Siemens - Fujitsu a major marketing advantage and lose most, if not all of, our opportunities to place a Cray 1S processor in France. Indeed, I learned last week that one of our significant customers has already begun working with Siemens to order a large Fujitsu processor (not the supercomputer) in order to "test the waters" concerning a possible future relationship.

We at Cray Research strongly support the President and his policies. We realize that these two Cray exports have so far been delayed in support of some of these policies. However, we also have a unique responsibility to maintain technological leadership of United States, which is now being threatened by the combination of growing Japanese-European cooperation and by the throttling of our exports. In light of all these circumstances, I am convinced that early export of these two computers would be in the best interest of the United States.

I would be happy to meet with you at your earliest convenience to discuss the issues in detail. Mr. Brett Berlin, Cray Research Government Relations Director, will be contacting your secretary and will be available to your staff.

Sincerely yours,



John A. Rollwagen
Chairman and CEO

JAR:ge

- CC: The Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Honorable Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Administration
- The Honorable Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- Dr. Gus Weiss, National Security Staff

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1978-256-966

FORM CD-14 (2-76) Prescr. by DAO 214-2	U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.	DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP		11/30/82
TO: Gus Weiss	REF. NO. OR ROOM, BLDG. NSC	
FROM: Guy Lanctot	REF. NO. OR ROOM, BLDG. OEA/PPD	
ACTION		
<input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> PER OUR CONVERSATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND RETURN TO ME	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PER YOUR REQUEST	
<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN WITH MORE DETAILS	<input type="checkbox"/> FOR YOUR APPROVAL	
<input type="checkbox"/> NOTE AND SEE ME ABOUT THIS	<input type="checkbox"/> FOR YOUR INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> PLEASE ANSWER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FOR YOUR COMMENTS	
<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE	
<input type="checkbox"/> TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> INVESTIGATE AND REPORT	

COMMENTS:

Copy of case 645198 originally sent to your office on October 21, 1982.

*Job, state, etc. ACDA
Committee all approved*

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder

FRANCE (12/1/82-12/15/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
47574	APPLICATION EXPORT LICENSE	2	9/13/1982	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 14 DEC 82 09

TO POINDEXTER

FROM BLAIR

smf 12/21/87

DOC DATE 13 DEC 82 *41*

WEISS

13 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

COMPUTERS

EXPORT CONTROLS

SUBJECT: EXPORT LICENSE FOR CRAY 9060 COMPUTER FOR FRANCE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 15 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(V /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

12/21 Clark approved recon DB, GW

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE *PH* *(1)*

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 644

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

CRIO82
OO RUEADWW
DE RUFHFRA #3243 3490816
ZNY SSSSS
O 150813Z DEC 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PARIS
TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7386
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 17106
NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN PARIS

1. (S/-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. I HAD EXCELLENT MEETINGS IN PARIS TUESDAY WITH MITTERRAND, CHEYSSON, AND THE FRENCH DEFENSE AND FINANCE MINISTERS. AFTER A PERIOD OF EXTREMELY STRAINED BILATERAL TIES, I BELIEVE WE HAVE STARTED TO PUT OUR RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS, BECAUSE OF FRENCH SENSITIVITIES AND EXTREME CONCERN OVER QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. THAT SAID, HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH MITTERRAND THAT HE SHARES MOST OF YOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR, HE IS ONE OF YOUR STRONGEST SUPPORTERS IN EUROPE ON INF DEPLOYMENT AND IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON POLAND FOR REAL CHANGE.
3. AS YOU KNOW, MY PRINCIPAL TASK WAS TO OBTAIN FRENCH AGREEMENT TO AN ALLIANCE-WIDE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED STRATEGY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS NOW IN SIGHT. ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN AN "ECONOMIC NATO," AFTER NEARLY THREE HOURS WITH MITTERRAND IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOW WILLING TO GO FORWARD WITH THE WORK OUTLINED IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS" REACHED BY THE WASHINGTON AMBASSADORS' GROUP. (ALTHOUGH FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THEY REMAIN UNWILLING TO ENDORSE IT PUBLICLY.)
4. SPECIFICALLY, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND I WERE ABLE TO REPORT TO THE PRESS AGREEMENT ON A WORK PROGRAM CONSISTING OF SIX COMPANION STUDIES ON:

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NLRR M07-081# 47573
BY CV NARA DATE 5/19/10

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SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- 1) IMPROVING OUR CURRENT SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO THE EAST, TO BE DONE IN COCOM;
 - 2) OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING GAS AND OIL EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD PROVIDE SECURITY BENEFITS TO THE EAST, ALSO TO BE CARRIED OUT IN COCOM;
 - 3) THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONITORING MECHANISM FOR TRADE AND FINANCIAL FLOWS TO THE EAST AGREED TO AT VERSAILLES, TO BE CONDUCTED BY OECD;
 - 4) ALTERNATIVE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS, FOCUSING ON WESTERN EUROPE BUT ALSO INCLUDING NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN, TO BE PREPARED IN OECD IN CONJUNCTION WITH IEA AND OTHER RELEVANT BODIES;
 - 5) MEANS OF HARMONIZING CREDITS AND OTHER FINANCIAL FLOWS TO THE EAST, TO BE DONE IN OECD; AND
 - 6) SECURITY ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NATO.
5. I AM PARTICULARLY SATISFIED WITH THE APPARENT FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN NATO, GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES WS HAVE HAD IN THE PAST IN DISCUSSING THIS KIND OF ISSUE CN THAT FORUM.
6. BOTH MIT ERRAND AND CHEYSSON, IN AGREEING THAT NATB NOULD TAKE ON THIS OLE, STRESSED THAT THE NATO STUDY COKLD ONLY FOCUS ON THESENURITY EPECTS OF THE EAST-QEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND THE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THIS REMAINS GO BE RESOLVED. NEPERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE HAVE MOVED THE PROCESS FORWARD, AND WE MUST NOW TAKE STEPS TO ENERSIZE THE EXISTING WORK UNDER WAY AND TO INITIATE THE NEW STUDIES.
7. MITTERRAND AGREED THAT OUR GOAL SHOULD BE TO COMPLETE WORK ON ALL OF THE STUDIES BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR, SO IT CAN BE REVIEWED AT THE OECD MINISTERIAL, THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING, ALL OF WHICH FALL IN MAY AND JUNE 1983. MITTERRAND ALSO CONFIRMED TO ME AND CHEYSSON, ON THE RECORD TO THE PRESS, THAT FRANCE HAS NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY ADDITIONAL SOVIET GAS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
8. WE ARE NOW TAKING STEPS TO FOLLOW UP WITH THE OTHER

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 643

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

CRI081
OO RUEADWW
DE RUFHRA #3243 3490817
ZNY SSSSS
O 150813Z DEC 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PARIS
TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7387
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 17106
NODIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ
ALLIES ON THIS WORK PROGRAM. WE HAVE INFORMED THE
JAPANESE IN WASHINGTON WHO MUST BE INVOLVED IN ALL SIX
OF THE STUDIES, INCLUDING IN SOME INFORMAL WAY WITH THE
WORK THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IN NATO. SHULTZ
BT
#3243
NNNN

SENSITIVE