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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder FRANCE (11/15/82-11/30/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

53

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47535	CABLE	151729Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/15/1982	B1
47536	CABLE	152011Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/15/1982	B1
47537	CABLE	172002Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/27/1982	B1
47538	CABLE	171121Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/17/1982	B1
47539	CABLE	171523Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/17/1982	B1
47540	CABLE	190347Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/19/1982	B1
47541	CABLE	192251Z NOV 82 D 5/7/2011 M081/1	1	11/19/1982	B1
47542	CABLE	191329Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/19/1982	B1
47543	CABLE	191757Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/19/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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File Folder FRANCE (11/15/82-11/30/82)

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Box Number 13

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53

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47544	CABLE	221821Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/22/1982	B1
47545	MEMO	BAILEY TO CLARK RE MITTERRAND	2	11/23/1982	B1
54113	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	NSC/S PROFILE SHEET PAR 3/26/2018 M081/1	1	11/23/1982	B1 B3
47546	CABLE	231647Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/23/1982	B1
47547	CABLE	231719Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/23/1982	B1
47548	CABLE	231728Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/23/1982	B1
47549	CABLE	230335Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/23/1982	B1
47550	CABLE	240208Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/24/1982	B1
47551	CABLE	241903Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/24/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47552	CABLE	261658Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/26/1982	B1
47553	CABLE	261924Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	5	11/26/1982	B1
47554	CABLE	261949Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	11/26/1982	B1
47555	CABLE	300315Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/30/1982	B1
47556	CABLE	301512Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	11/30/1982	B1
47557	CABLE	301907Z NOV 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	11/30/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47535

PAGE 01 PARIS 9350
SIT081 DATE 11/18/82

DTG: 151729Z NOV 82 PSN: 007906
TOR: 319/1910Z

DISTRIBUTE ON: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHP JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHCR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST---

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR #9350/01 3191732
O 151729Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6978

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 39350
NDDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, FR, AO, US
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: THE FRENCH TRACK

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WISNER ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF MET NOVEMBER 13 WITH GUY PENNE AND THEN WITH QUAI TEAM (AUSSEIL, AZIAS AND PAUL DAHON). PENNE WILL HEAD THE DELEGATION TO LUANDA, BUT WILL PROBABLY NOT CARRY THE BASIC MESSAGE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WILL PROVIDE THE COVER FOR AUSSEIL.

3. IN THE MEETING WITH PENNE, WE TALKED ABOUT FRANCO-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS. PENNE DISCUSSED THE GENERAL FRENCH ATMOSPHERE OF MISTRUST, WHICH HE IS TRYING TO SORT OUT. HE REPEATED MUCH OF WHAT WE HAVE REPORTED IN PARIS 38868. WISNER STRESSED THAT WE SEEK COOPERATION RATHER THAN COMPETITION WITH THE FRENCH IN AFRICA. MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE MUST BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY, WISNER TOLD PENNE. HE SAID THAT WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO WHAT THE FRENCH ARE DOING (WITH ANGOLA) AND WHAT THEY BRING BACK WILL BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR OWN THINKING ON HOW WE PURSUE THE ANGOLA TRACK.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. THE MEETING WITH AUSSEIL LASTED TWO AND HALF HOURS. IN IT WE REVIEWED THE BASIC BACKGROUND ON THE US-ANGOLA TALKS SINCE JUNE AND REVIEWED HOW THE FRENCH INTEND TO HANDLE IT. BASED ON THEIR CURRENT THINKING WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS:
-- THEY ARE APPROACHING THIS ROUND WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS.
-- THEY HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO IT AND HAVE ELABORATED A NUMBER OF VERY SPECIFIC IDEAS.
-- THEY WILL CARRY THE MESSAGE TO AS BROAD AN ANGOLAN AUDIENCE AS THEY CAN REACH. AS MATTERS NOW STAND THEY WILL SEE DOS SANTOS BOTH AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF THEIR STAY. THEY WILL ALSO SEE LOPO DO NASCIMENTO, LUCIO LARA AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DA MOURA. PAOLO JORGE WILL BE OUT OF TOWN (IN TRIPOLI ATTENDING THE OAU MEETING). A SUGGESTION THAT THEY SEE THE CARRERA WAS TURNED DOWN BY JORGE AS NOT OPPORTUNE, FURTHERMORE

CARRERA WILL STILL BE IN CUBA.

-- THEY WILL PUT THEMSELVES IN THE ROLE OF A PARTNER-IN-DIALOGUE WHICH IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A FRAGMATIC OUTCOME. THEY WILL SEEK TO CONFIRM THAT THE ANGOLANS LOOK TO THEM AS THE VEHICLE FOR COMMUNICATING ANGOLAN UNDERTAKINGS TO US OR AS A GUARANTOR.

5. THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS OF FINDING THEMSELVES CAUGHT BETWEEN US AND THE ANGOLANS AND HAVING THIS TURN INTO A FRANCO-AMERICAN NEGOTIATION. THEY UNDERSTAND FULLY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF OUR POSITION OF HAVING TO WORK MATTERS OUT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THEREFORE SEE THEIR ROLE AT THIS POINT AS TESTING HOW FAR THE ANGOLANS ARE PREPARED TO GO IN (A) REACHING A SETTLEMENT, (B) PROVIDING A SPECIFIC CALENDAR FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, (C) TESTING HOW THE ANGOLANS WANT TO PROCEED IN USING THE FRENCH AND (D) TRYING TO SMOKE OUT ANGOLAN CONCERNS ON THE SECURITY AND UNITA FRONTS.

6. THE FRENCH WILL TRY TO INCITE ANGOLAN THINKING ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND HAVE IN MIND A SPECIFIC IDEA. THEIR IDEA WOULD INVOLVE A WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS IN A PATTERN SYMMETRICAL WITH THE UN PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. THE UN PLAN BEGINS ON DAY "J" AND PROCEEDS THROUGH STAGES TO J PLUS 12 WEEKS WHEN SAG FORCES ARE DOWN TO 1500. THE FRENCH PLAN WHICH BEGINS AT WHAT THEY CALL DAY "J PRIME" (WHICH EQUALS J

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PLUS 12 WEEKS IN THE UN PLAN) AT J PRIME PLUS 6 WEEKS CUBANS WOULD WITHDRAW TO LEVEL OF 12,000 MEN, J PRIME PLUS 9 TO 8000 AND J PRIME PLUS 12 TO 1,500. IN ESSENCE THE FRENCH HAVE NO PARTICULAR CONFIDENCE THIS IDEA WILL WORK, BUT FEEL YOU MUST KEEP PUTTING IDEAS BEFORE THE ANGOLANS. THIS PARTICULAR IDEA BY ITS SYMMETRY CREATES A PARALLEL FRAMEWORK WHILE ALLOWING THE ANGOLANS TO SAVE FACE. WE ENCOURAGED THEM TO TRY OUT THE APPROACH.

7. ON ANGOLAN SECURITY CONCERNS AND ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THOSE CONCERNS, THE FRENCH HAVE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO MAKE BEYOND THOSE MENTIONED IN CHEYSSON'S LETTER, I.E. AN OBSERVER FORCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS GEAR. THEY MAY TRY IT OUT. THEY MAY ALSO TRY OUT AN IDEA RELATED TO A STRONG SYMBOLIC ANGOLAN GESTURE AS

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #47535
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9350 DTG: 151729Z NOV 82 PSN: 007907
SIT080 DATE 11/18/82 TOR: 319/1511Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9350/02 3191733
O 151729Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6979

BRITISH (SQUIRES WILL BE PASSING THROUGH PARIS EN ROUTE TO AFRICA) GO OVER SIMILAR GROUND IN A VERY BRIEF AND GENERAL MANNER. (THE FRENCH GAVE US NO INDICATION THEY KNOW WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH AND WHEN SQUIRES SEES AUSSEIL HE MUST UNDER NOT CONDITIONS INDICATE ANY KNOWLEDGE WHAT SO EVER. DEPARTMENT SHOULD WARN THE BRITISH ON THIS THROUGH CHRIS CRABBE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY AND EMPHASIZEMAXIMUM CONFIDENTIALITY.) THOUGH THE FORMULA FOR INFORMING MAY CHANGE, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THEY DO NOT WANT TO LET ANYONE KNOW BEFORE THE MISSION TAKES PLACE AND ARE VERY VERY SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THIS REMAINS A VERY PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND THEM.

11. ON RETURNING THE FRENCH WILL THINK ABOUT HOW TO INFORM THE FLS AND OTHER AFRICANS WHOSE HELP WE MIGHT NEED. THEY GAVE US THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THEY WOULD WANT TO TALK ALL THAT THROUGH WITH US FIRST.

12. DEPARTMENT PASS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER IN PRETORIA. GALBRAITH

PARIS 9350

DTG: 151729Z NOV 82 PSN: 007907

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 39350
NODIS

A FIRST STEP IN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS -- A CUBAN PULLBACK TO THE BENGUELA LINE AS AN INITIAL STEP IN AN OVERALL WITHDRAWAL FRAMEWORK. (THE FRENCH ARE FULLY BRIEFED ON CBI AND THIS PULLBACK FORMULA WOULD COME OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF CBI). THE FRENCH FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT IF WE ARE TO FULLY ENGAGE THE SOUTH AFRICANS, WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS MUST TAKE PLACE DURING PHASE III AND THE MORE CUBANS THAT LEAVE EARLIER IN PHASE III THE EASIER FOR THE US TO GET THE SOUTH AFRICAN TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

8. THE FRENCH STILL DIMLY PERCEIVE WHAT SECURITY OPTIONS THEY CAN OFFER ANGOLA IN THE EVENT ANGOLA TAKES THE PLUNGE. THE INTENSE BUDGET CONSTRAINTS THEY NOW OPERATE UNDER LIMIT THEIR CAPACITY TO PLAY A ROLE. THEY WILL MAKE THE POINT THAT ON A CONTRACTUAL BASIS, THE FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY HAS A GREAT DEAL TO OFFER TO ANGOLA AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY TO RESPOND TO ANGOLAN NEEDS IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT.

9. THE FRENCH GROUP WILL RETURN TO PARIS ON SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 21 AND WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY TO GIVE US A QUICK SIGNAL AS TO WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING TO BE PURSUED. IF THERE IS THEY WOULD WANT A MEETING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (IN THAT CONTEXT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR WISNER TO BREAK OFF FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY IN KINSHASA AND FLY DIRECTLY TO PARIS.)

10. WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER ALLIES INCLUDING THE CANADIANS, AUSSEIL SAYS HE HAS TOLD NO ONE NOR AUTHORIZED ANYONE TO SAY ANTHING ABOUT THIS FRENCH INITIATIVE WITH THE ANGOLANS. THE FRENCH ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ABOUT KEEPING THIS INITIATIVE SECRET AND BETWEEN THE US AND THE FRENCH. ONCE AUSSEIL RETURNS, HE WILL SUGGEST TO CHEYSSON A BRIEF MESSAGE TO HIS CG COUNTERPARTS SAYING ONLY THAT THE FRENCH EXPLORED, IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR TRIP TO ANGOLA, ANGOLAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO REACHING A SETTLEMENT. THE TRIP WAS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF FRANCO-ANGOLAN "COOPERATION". AUSSEIL WOULD BE PREPARED TO CALL THE OTHER AFRICAN DIRECTORS OR WHEN HE SEES THE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47536

PAGE 01 PARIS 9368
SIT491 DATE 11/17/82

DTG: 152011Z NOV 82 PSN: 008129
TOR: 319/2149Z

PARIS 9368

DTG: 152011Z NOV 82 PSN: 008129

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: --RED TAG--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9368 3192011
O 152011Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7002

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 39368
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT, EFIN, UR, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH-US DISAGREEMENT ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF
LIFTING PIPELINE SANCTIONS
REF: STATE 319880

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IN THE DARK FOR SOMETIME NOW ON THIS SUBJECT, OTHERS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT SEEM TO BE INFORMED. FOR EXAMPLE, RON KOVEN OF THE BOSTON GLOBE TOLD PRESS ATTACHE TODAY THAT HE IS REPORTING THAT THE WHITE HOUSE CALLED THE ELYSEE THREE HOURS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON SATURDAY TO INFORM THE FRENCH ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT. ACCORDING TO KOVEN'S VERSION, ATTALI CALLED THE WHITE HOUSE BACK TO EXPRESS FRENCH DISSENT, BUT THE WHITE HOUSE IGNORED THE FRENCH POSITION. KOVEN IS ALSO REPORTING THAT AMBASSADOR WAS CALLED IN BY THE QUAI AT 9:30 SATURDAY TO RECEIVE A FRENCH "PROTEST." WE HAVE NOT COMMENTED ON KOVEN'S STORY.
3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF THE DETAILS OF LAST WEEK'S BACK-AND-FORTH WITH THE FRENCH, SO THAT WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO DEFEND OUR POSITION THAN WE WERE ON SATURDAY NIGHT. THE LAST THING I HEARD ON THE ENTIRE MATTER PRIOR TO HEARING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE RADIO WAS FROM CHEYSSON, WHO ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8 TOLD ME REPEATEDLY THAT EVERYTHING WAS AGREED TO EXCEPT THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE AND PRESENTATION.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #47536
BY CV NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

47537

4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 2701 DTG:172002Z NOV 82 PSN: 011997
SIT251 DATE 11/18/82 TOR: 322/0058Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2701 3212005
O 172002Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6372

~~SECRET~~ STATE 322701
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EEWT, FR
SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MAY BE WILLING TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT ITS DECISION TO ALLOW THOMSON-CSF TO PROCEED WITH THE SALE OF THE MT-20 SYSTEM TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE REGARD THIS AS A HOPEFUL SIGN AND WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY POSSIBILITIES THAT MAY EXIST TO INFLUENCE THE GOF DECISIONMAKING PROCESS. WE SEE TWO RELATED WAYS OF APPROACHING THIS.

3. FIRST, THE USG IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE A TECHNICAL TEAM TO MEET WITH A-CROSS-SECTION OF FRENCH OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS THE VARIETY OF SERIOUS CONCERNS WE HAVE ABOUT THE POTENTIAL EXPORT OF THE MT-20 EQUIPMENT AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED AND ON THE PRESENT TIMETABLE. THE TEAM WOULD PLAN TO DISCUSS BOTH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS. ON THE SECURITY SIDE, WE WANT TO HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF ENHANCEMENT IN SOVIET MILITARY C-CUBED CAPABILITIES AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND

COUNTERMEASURES THAT WOULD OCCUR IF THIS EQUIPMENT WERE TO BE EXPORTED, AS WELL AS THE STILL-UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF INCLUSION OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY. THE TEAM WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE ASPECTS OF THE TRANSACTION REGARDING POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES. (IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE LATTER, TO HAVE A SEPARATE, MORE EXCLUSIVE DISCUSSION GROUP). ADDITIONALLY, THE GROUP WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT MODIFICATIONS AND DOWNGRADES TO THE EQUIPMENT.

4. SECOND, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER MAKING PRIOR AND SEPARATE APPROACHES TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND DCSE, WHICH, WE UNDERSTAND, HAVE BEEN OPPOSED TO THE SALE OF

THIS EQUIPMENT TO THE USSR DURING GOF INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SGMN OFFICIALS, WHOM, WE WOULD IMAGINE, BASED ON PAST PERFORMANCE, WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR VIEWS.

5. IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A TECHNICAL TEAM VISIT TO FOLLOW UP THE RESPONSES WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED TO THE LIST OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS THAT THE USG SUBMITTED TO THE FRENCH IN JUNE AND TO REQUEST SIDE TECHNICAL MEETINGS WITH THOMSON-CSF OFFICIALS. WE REQUESTED MEETING WITH THOMSON-CSF IN SEPTEMBER AT THE TIME OF PERLE'S VISIT, BUT WERE TURNED DOWN. IT MIGHT NOW BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE TECHNICAL MEETINGS FOR THE US TEAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOME OF THE SESSIONS WITH GOF OFFICIALS.

6. GIVEN THE EXPECTED SHORT DEADLINE INVOLVED IN THE GOF REVIEW, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HOLD THE TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF THE USG'S TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON DIGITAL SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY ARE CURRENTLY IN PARIS FOR COCOM MEETINGS TO ARRANGE SEPARATE CONSULTATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 3, 4 AND 5 ABOVE (I.E., (A) WITH A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOF INTERAGENCY TEAM ON SECURITY CONCERNS; (B) WITH A SEPARATE GOF TEAM ON INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS; (C) WITH MOD, DGSE AND SGMN OFFICIALS, AS NECESSARY; AND (D) WITH THOMSON-CSF. REQUEST USG TEAM FOR CONSULTATION BE LED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY BRYEN AND OTHERS PRESENT FOR COCOM MEETING.
SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 2701

DTG:172002Z NOV 82 PSN: 011997

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NLRR MD7-081 #47537

BY CW NARA DATE 5/19/10

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5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47538

PAGE 01 PARIS 9683 DTG: 171121Z NOV 82 PSN: 010962
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: ---RED TAG---

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9683/01 3211125
O 171121Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7165

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 39683
NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT, EFIN, UR, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH-US DISAGREEMENT OVER ANNOUNCEMENT OF
ACCORD ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAD OCCASION TO TALK PRIVATELY WITH ATTALI EVENING OF NOVEMBER 16, DCM MARESCA WAS ALSO PRESENT. I SAID THAT AS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THIS LATEST DISAGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY COMING ON TOP OF A SERIES OF OTHER IRRITATIONS OF WHICH HE WAS AWARE. I TOLD HIM THAT IN WASHINGTON THERE WAS BITTERNESS OVER THE WAY THE FRENCH HAD ACTED LAST WEEK-END. WITHOUT GOING INTO WHAT HAD HAPPENED, I THOUGHT IT WAS OUR JOINT INTEREST--IN FACT, OUR RESPONSIBILITY-- TO TRY TO GET BACK ON A POSITIVE PATH.

3. I STATED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT MOVE TO MEET WEST EUROPEAN INTERESTS, AND THAT THE FRENCH WERE ALONE IN WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT. I THOUGHT IT WAS NOW UP TO THE FRENCH TO DEMONSTRATE--HOPEFULLY PUBLICLY-- THAT THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT ON WORKING TOWARD A SET OF PRINCIPLES ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. I URGED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ATTALI TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO OVERCOME THIS EVENT AND BRING BACK THE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES NEED. I ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT SOME OF THEIR MINISTERS BE TRANQUILIZED.

4. ATTALI WELCOMED MY BROACHING THIS SUBJECT. HE SAID MITTERRAND AND THE FRENCH ADMIRE THE CONFIDENCE AND GENEROSITY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO LIFT THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS. HE SAID MITTERRAND IS GENUINELY PREPARED TO CONTINUE WORK TOWARD AN AGREEMENT ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WHICH HE CONSIDERS "AS IMPORTANT AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY." ATTALI AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE RECENT CONTRE-TEMPS AND GET BACK TO A POSITIVE MODE ON THIS EFFORT.

5. IN JUSTIFYING THE FRENCH POSITION OF LAST WEEKEND,

ATTALI SAID THE MATTER WAS OF SUCH POLITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT IT HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH CLOSE SUPERVISION BY THE HIGHEST POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. THAT MEANT IT COULD NOT, AND SHOULD NOT, BE COMPLETED IN HASTE. BUT ATTALI RECOGNIZED THE URGENCY, AND SAID MITTERRAND WANTED THE WORK COMPLETED BEFORE THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT, SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE THERE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, ATTALI SPECIFIED THAT ALL THE STUDIES FORE-SEEN IN THE NON-PAPER SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE WILLIAMSBURG.

6. ATTALI ASSURED ME THAT THE FRENCH POSITION IS NOT A TACTICAL ONE, AND THAT MITTERRAND FULLY INTENDS TO PARTICIPATE IN A GOOD-FAITH EFFORT TO REACH AN AGREED CONCLUSION. HE STRESSED THAT THE ISSUES RELATE TO FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY AND THEREFORE ARE OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL DELICACY HERE. (IN A SEPARATE LUNCHEON CONVERSATION ON NOVEMBER 16 LIONEL JOSPIN, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, STRESSED THE SAME POINT. JOSPIN HAD SEEN THE NON-PAPER AND TOLD ME THAT THE PRESENT LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH, WOULD GO DOWN VERY BADLY WITH FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND FRENCHMEN IN GENERAL, BECAUSE IT APPEARS TO SUBJECT SOVEREIGN FRENCH DECISIONS TO REVIEW BY OTHER NATIONS. JOSPIN SAID FRANCE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ARRANGEMENTS WHICH LIMITED ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND CITED FRENCH REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IEA AS A RECENT REFLECTION OF THIS TRADITIONAL FRENCH POSITION. CONSEQUENTLY HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABOUT FRANCE BEING ABLE TO DO MUCH IN LIMITING TRADE WITH THE USSR.)

7. ATTALI SAID THAT HE AND MITTERRAND HAD BEEN GENUINELY SURPRISED LAST SATURDAY MORNING TO HEAR THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PAPER THAT DAY. MITTERRAND HAD NOT APPROVED THE NON-PAPER, AND THEREFORE FRENCH AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN. I POINTED OUT TO ATTALI THAT CHEYSSON HAD TOLD ME ON NOVEMBER 8 THAT THE NON-PAPER WAS AGREED, AND THAT ONLY THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT REMAINED TO BE AGREED. (CHEYSSON HAD REPEATED THE SENTENCE FOR EMPHASIS.) I SAID THIS SAME POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY VERNIER-PALLIEZ IN WASHINGTON. ATTALI WAS ASTONISHED AND REITERATED THAT THE MATTER HAD ALWAYS BEEN SUBJECT TO THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO MITTERRAND FOR APPROVAL UNTIL SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 13. I DID NOT DELVE FURTHER, EXCEPT TO POINT OUT TO ATTALI THAT IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE BELIEVED THE FRENCH HAD ALREADY AGREED TO THE NON-PAPER THAT WE WERE DUMB-

PARIS 9683

DTG: 171121Z NOV 82 PSN: 010962

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NLRR 107-081 #47538
BY CU NARA DATE 5/9/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9683
SIT429 DATE 11/17/82

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TOR: 321/1251Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9683/02 3211126
O 171121Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7166

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 39683
NODIS

FOUNDED ON SATURDAY WHEN ATTALI APPEARED TO WITHDRAW THIS AGREEMENT AT THE LAST MINUTE. IN CLOSING, ATTALI PROMISED TO GET BACK TO ME BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK WITH AN ANSWER TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THE FRENCH SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. "

8. COMMENT: UNLESS ATTALI IS ACTING, WHICH I DOUBT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT CHEYSSON AND VERNIER-PALLIEZ EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY LAST WEEK AND ACCEPTED AN AGREEMENT WHICH MITTERRAND HAD NOT APPROVED. CHEYSSON ALSO CLEARLY WAITED FROM MONDAY UNTIL SATURDAY BEFORE BROACHING THE MATTER WITH ATTALI AND MITTERRAND. WHEN HE DID, HE WAS OVERRULED AND CHEYSSON WAS LEFT HANGING.

9. IT IS ALSO EVIDENT THAT DEEP FRENCH SENSITIVITIES ABOUT THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY ARE MANIFESTING THEMSELVES IN RESPONSE TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE NON-PAPER, AND THAT MITTERRAND WILL HAVE TO PROCEED CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO AVOID THE ACCUSATION THAT HE HAS GIVEN AWAY A PIECE OF THEIR COMMERCIAL INDEPENDENCE. THE COMBINATION OF A GENUINE INTERNAL FRENCH GOVERNMENT SNAFU, AND AN INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUE SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. ALTHOUGH ATTALI DID NOT PROMISE THAT THE GOF WOULD MOVE QUICKLY,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I BELIEVE THEY WILL TRY TO BE AS COOPERATIVE AND POSITIVE AS THEY CAN BE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT IS NOW OBVIOUS TO THE ELYSEE THAT THE GOF IS AT LEAST PARTLY TO BLAME FOR WHAT HAPPENED.

10. FOR THESE REASONS I RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON TAKE NO REPEAT NO RETALIATORY ACTIONS RELATING TO THIS AND OTHER GRIEVANCES. MY TALK PLUS THE PRESSURES OF THE OTHER EUROPEANS COULD BRING THE FRENCH AROUND. RETALIATION WILL HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. WHILE I REALIZE THE TEMPTATION TO DO SOMETHING IS STRONG, I RECOMMEND WE YIELD NOT TO TEMPTATION AND WAIT AT LEAST A WEEK FOR A GALBRAITH

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47539

7

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 9727
SIT426 DATE 11/17/82

DTG: 171523Z NOV 82 PSN: 011347
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MISSILES. ALSO HE IS WORRIED IT MAY AFFECT THE WEST'S CREDIBILITY AND THAT IT WILL HELP THE NO-FIRST-USE GROUP.

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9727 3211524
O 171523Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7184

6. IN A MORE GENERAL SENSE, HERNU FEELS THAT HE NEEDS TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A QUICK 48 HOUR VISIT FOR A "TOUR D'HORIZON." HIS PERCEPTION IS THAT HE ENJOYS A GOOD, FRANK, WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER, BUT THAT ONCE THE PROBLEMS GET DOWN INTO THE BUREAUCRACY, BLOCKAGES AND DELAYS CREEP IN. HE CITED NUCLEAR SHIP VISITS AS AN EXAMPLE, NOTING THAT THE FRENCH READILY ACCEPTED US NPW VISITS, AND NOW THEY ARE HAVING PROBLEMS BEING ACCEPTED INTO THE US. (COMMENT: I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE RESPOND POSITIVELY TO HERNU'S DESIRE TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO INDICATE WHAT TIME FRAME WILL BE CONVENIENT FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER.)

7. HERNU AND LACAZE WERE BOTH CANDID, FORTHRIGHT, AND QUITE AMICABLY CONCERNED THAT OUR RELATIONS REMAIN CORDIAL AND CLOSE. IT WAS A FRUITFUL EVENING. THEY MADE A FEW OTHER OBSERVATIONS WHICH GENERAL PATTE WILL BE REPORTING THROUGH DIA CHANNELS. GALBRAITH

PARIS 9727

DTG: 171523Z NOV 82 PSN: 011347

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 39727

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

PASS SECDEF FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, FR

SUBJECT: MOD HERNU ON BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I HAD A SMALL DINNER (WITH WIVES) WITH HERNU THE EVENING OF NOV 16 AT GENERAL PATTE'S QUARTERS. THE FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL LACAZE, WAS ALSO PRESENT. WE HAD A LEISURELY AND CANDID DISCUSSION OFF AND ON OVER A THREE HOUR PERIOD. HERNU RECOGNIZED THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE NOT GOOD AT THE PRESENT TIME AND THAT SUSPICIONS WERE RIFE. HE CITED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT.

3. MT-20: KNOWING OF OUR CONCERN, HERNU SAID HE HAD GONE TO MITTERRAND ABOUT 8-9 DAYS AGO, AND HAD "BLOCKED" THE MT-20 TRANSFER TO THE USSR PENDING FULLER EXAMINATION OF THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SALE. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER HE WAS REFERRING TO THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS WE HAD DISCUSSED RECENTLY WITH CHEYSSON, HERNU (SECONDED BY LACAZE) CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CAUSE OF THEIR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECOND THOUGHTS. (COMMENT: WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP ON THIS WITH THE APPROPRIATE CONTACTS.)

4. CRAY I COMPUTER: HERNU SAID THE FRENCH HAVE YET TO RECEIVE THE CRAY I WHICH WAS APPROVED FOR DELIVERY TO FRANCE LAST SPRING, AND THEY ARE WONDERING WHAT UNDERLIES THIS ADDITIONAL DELAY. HERNU IMPLIED THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT A LINKAGE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE USG BETWEEN FRENCH ACTIONS ON THE MT-20 AND US DELIVERY OF THE CRAY I. HERNU WAS CLEARLY FRUSTRATED BY THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CRAY I SINCE HE BELIEVED THE FRENCH HAVE SATISFIED ALL US CONDITIONS FOR IT. (COMMENT: I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP A STATUS REPORT ON THE CRAY I.)

5. HERNU WAS UPSET BY THE ADVERSE EFFECT GENERAL ROGER'S SPEECH MAY HAVE ON DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING'S AND CRUISE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47540

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 48341 DTG: 190347Z NOV 82 PSN: 014169
SIT903 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 323/0604Z

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EOB: /COMMASSIST/

WHSR COMMENT: -----FYI-----RATHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #4834 3230357
P 190347Z NOV 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6520

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 6513
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4194
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 7910
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 324834
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, GE, FR, UK, YO
SUBJECT: QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES ON
YUGOSLOVIA

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO POLITICAL
DIRECTOR JACQUES ANDREANI FROM ASSISTANT
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT: BEGIN TEXT: AS A RESULT OF
OUR DISCUSSION IN BONN OF THE URGENT YUGOSLAV FINANCIAL
PROBLEM, YOU KINDLY UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THE
POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING A SMALL, CONFIDENTIAL MEETING IN
PARIS SO THAT FRENCH, U.S., BRITISH AND GERMAN
REPRESENTATIVES COULD DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM FURTHER AND
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE.

3. I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT WE ARE STILL VERY
INTERESTED IN SUCH A MEETING, AND ON AN URGENT BASIS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED THAT NOVEMBER 29-30 MIGHT BE
MOST CONVENIENT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE PARIS CLUB
MEETINGS ON THOSE DATES AND THE PARTICIPATION IN THEM
BY SOME OF THE RELEVANT PEOPLE, WE NOW SUGGEST DECEMBER
1 AND 2, IF THIS WERE AGREEABLE TO YOU. SUCH A MEETING
COULD SPILL OVER TO DECEMBER 3, IF NECESSARY. WE ARE

STILL AGREEABLE TO LIMITING PARTICIPATION AT SUCH AN
INITIAL MEETING (WHICH WOULD ADDRESS THE POLITICAL AS
WELL AS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST OF THE
YUGOSLAV FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND POSSIBLE MEASURES WE
COULD TAKE) TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR. WE ARE
PREPARED TO DRAFT AND CIRCULATE A PAPER IN ADVANCE ON
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION, IF YOU WOULD FIND
THAT HELPFUL.

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4. OUR PARTICIPATION IN A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING WOULD MOST LIKELY BE LED BY MY DEPUTY, MARK PALMER. AMBASSADOR CHARLES MEISSNER, THE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS, STEPHEN CANNER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF EAST-WEST AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, AND GEORGE HUMPHREY, STATE DEPARTMENT YUGOSLAV DESK OFFICER WOULD ALSO PLAN TO PARTICIPATE..

5. I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS FOR HOLDING A MEETING IN PARIS DECEMBER 1-2. END TEXT.

6. FYI: REPORT OF QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION OF YUGOSLAVIA FOLLOWS SEPTEL. END FYI. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 48341 DTG: 190347Z NOV 82 PSN: 014169

~~SECRET~~

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47542

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PAGE 01 PARIS 0094 DTG: 191329Z NOV 82 PSN: R14686
SIT167 DATE 11/22/82 TOR: 323/1443Z

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WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0094 3231329
O 191329Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7373

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40094

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI, FR

SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO THE USSR

REF: (A) STATE 322701; (B) PARIS 39727; (C) PARIS 39351

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WHILE WE ARE AS INTERESTED AS THE DEPARTMENT IS IN USING EVERY POSSIBLE OPENING TO ENSURE NON-DELIVERY OF THE MT-20 TO THE USSR, WE ARE AFRAID THE TACTICS PROPOSED IN REFTEL (A) ARE OUT OF PHASE WITH THE SITUATION HERE.

3. RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT A REHEARING ON THE MT-20 HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY MITTERRAND, FOLLOWING DS-AGREEMENT AMONG THE MINISTRIES CONCERNED WITH THE ISSUE. AS HERNU TOLD THE AMBASSADOR (REFTEL B) HE HAS "BLOCKED" THE MT-20 DEAL BY APPEALING TO MITTERRAND. HERNU'S STAFF HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT CONZE WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT WHEN HE DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH DAS BRYEN (REFTEL C), AND FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, IT APPEARS THAT THE QUAI IS ALSO UNINFORMED. WHEN ON THE BASIS OF REFTEL (A) WE SOUNDED OUT HERNU'S CABINET (HEISBOURG) ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, HE INDICATED THAT WHILE THE MOD IS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ALWAYS AVAILABLE FOR TALKS FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE MOD WOULD PROBABLY BE UNNECESSARY. IN VIEW OF HERNU'S ACTION, WE BELIEVE THE MOD IS CONVINCED OF THE DANGERS OF THE MT-20 DEAL, AND IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO KILL OR SERIOUSLY MODIFY IT. THE MOD WILL BE MAKING THE TECHNICAL CASE TO MITTERRAND IN TERMS OF FRENCH INTERESTS, AND IS MORE LIKELY THAN A US TECHNICAL TEAM TO CONVINCHE HIM.

4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT BELIEVE FURTHER TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS AT A LOWER LEVEL WILL AFFECT THE OUTCOME. RATHER, WE PLAN TO MAKE A GENERAL DEMARCHE TO ATTALI STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER TO US AND TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST, INCLUDING FRANCE. WE WILL OFFER ANY FURTHER TECHNICAL INFORMATION OR BRIEFING WHICH THE ELYSEE MAY FIND USEFUL, EITHER TO

BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO ATTALI HIMSELF OR TO ANYONE HE DESIGNATES. SHOULD IT APPEAR USEFUL, WE WILL ASK FOR DAS BRYEN TO RETURN TO PARIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. BRYEN HAD ALREADY LEFT PARIS WHEN WE RECEIVED REFTEL (A).

5. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO DISCUSS WITH DOD THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING GENERAL VESSEY CALL FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF LACAZE TO STRESS THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS SALE. LACAZE IS INFORMED OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS SO SUCH A PHONE CALL WOULD NOT HAVE TO TOUCH ON THEM. IT WOULD SERVE SIMPLY TO UNDERLINE THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS.
GALBRAITH

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NLRR M07-081 47542

BY CK NARA DATE 5/19/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47543

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PAGE 01
SIT158

PARIS 0146
DATE 11/22/82

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TOR: 323/1818Z

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WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0146 3231758
O 191757Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7403

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0113
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5610
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1241
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 40146
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, LE, IS, FR, US
SUBJECT: FRENCH CONCERN ABOUT SITUATION IN LEBANON

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS CHEYSSON IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF AND THE LACK OF ANY VISIBLE MOVEMENT ON THE MATTER OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. ACCORDING TO THE QUAI SUB-DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS DETERIORATING AND COULD EVENTUALLY REACH A POINT BEYOND GEMAYEL'S ABILITY TO COPE WITH IT.
3. ACCORDING TO OUR SAME SOURCE, INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON TO MAKE CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (PERHAPS THIS HAS TAKEN PLACE ALREADY). HE IS TO OFFER TO HAVE FRANCE PLAY A ROLE WITH BOTH THE PHALANGE AND JUMBLATT TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GALBRAITH

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47544

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PAGE 01 PARIS 0357 46702 DTG: 221821Z NOV 82 PSN: 018894
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0357/01 3261824
O 221821Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7508

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 40357
NODIS

DEPT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, FR, UR
SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO USSR
REF: PARIS 40094 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DCM HAD DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE NOVEMBER 23 WITH GENERAL SAULNIER, MITTERRAND'S CHIEF MILITARY ADVISOR. DCM SAID WE HAD RECEIVED DIFFERENT STORIES ON THE STATUS OF THE CONTRACT FROM HERNU AND OUR CONTACTS AT THE QUAI. WE ATTACHED EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE TO BLOCKING OR SERIOUSLY REVISING THE MT-20 SALE, AND THEREFORE WE WISHED TO KNOW WHERE THE DECISION PROCESS STOOD AND WHERE TO PLUG IN TO INFLUENCE IT, EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS OR FURTHER TECHNICAL INFORMATION IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL.
3. SAULNIER REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THIS PROJECT IN SOME DETAIL. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD TAKEN OVER HIS PRESENT JOB, UPON MITTERRAND'S ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, AND HAD LEARNED THE DETAILS OF THE MT-20 CONTRACT HE WAS SHOCKED AT THE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY IT CONTAINED. AS A MILITARY MAN, HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED THAT MICRO-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY WAS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SOVIETS WHICH BORDERED ON THAT WITH ADVANCED MILITARY APPLICATIONS.

4. SAULNIER SAID THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT HAD THEN SET ABOUT RE-NEGOTIATING THE CONTRACT TO ELIMINATE THE OBJECTIONABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ASPECTS. SAULNIER HAD LED MANY OF THE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS HIMSELF, AND HE DESCRIBED THEM AS TOUGH, EVEN RUDE. WHEN TOLD WHICH ASPECTS OF THE SALE THE FRENCH WISHED TO MODIFY, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN SARCASTIC AND HAD RIDICULED THE FRENCH POSITION. THEY HAD ACCUSED THE FRENCH OF BEING THE LACKEYS OF THE U.S., SOMETHING ANY FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS SENSITIVE TO. THE FRENCH HAD RESPONDED (TRUTHFULLY, SAULNIER NOTED) THAT THEY WERE NOT MODIFYING THE CONTRACT BECAUSE OF U.S. WISHES, BUT BECAUSE THEY, THE

FRENCH, HAD CONCLUDED IT WAS IN THEIR OWN BEST NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO SO. SAULNIER SAID PARENTHETICALLY THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE FRENCH POSITION IN DEALING WITH THE U.S. ON THIS ISSUE.

5. SAULNIER SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD TAKEN CONSIDERABLE TIME AND PATIENCE, AND THE FRENCH HAD LOST SUBSTANTIAL SUMS IN THE MODIFICATION PROCESS. BUT FINALLY A NEW CONTRACT, WHICH THE FRENCH BELIEVE COVERS THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCERNS, HAD BEEN AGREED. THE REVISED CONTRACT WAS ABOUT TO BE SENT TO MITTERRAND FOR APPROVAL WHEN WE HAD RAISED THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE SALE. THIS NEW ELEMENT DELAYED FURTHER PROGRESS WHILE OUR NEW ARGUMENTS WERE REVIEWED. DCM NOTED THAT THESE ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN MENTIONED MUCH EARLIER IN THE U.S.-FRENCH DIALOGUE ON THE MT-20, BUT SAULNIER BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, NOTING THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ARGUMENTS HAD ONLY BEEN GIVEN POLITICAL EMPHASIS VERY RECENTLY.

6. SAULNIER SAID OUR INTELLIGENCE ARGUMENTS RAISED SEVERAL PROBLEMS: FIRST, THE FRENCH HAD ALREADY GONE THROUGH A LONG AND DIFFICULT RENEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT WITH THE SOVIETS. TO RENEGE ON THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE RENEGOTIATED CONTRACT (SAULNIER NOTED THAT UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS CONTRACT THIS ONE HAD BEEN OVERSEEN BY THE SOCIALISTS THEMSELVES, THUS ELIMINATING EVEN THAT EXCUSE) WOULD HAVE EXPOSED THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE SINCE BY DEFINITION THE FRENCH COULD NOT HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS WHY THEY WERE RENEGING. SECONDLY, THERE WAS A SUSPICION AMONG THE FRENCH OFFICIALS HANDLING THIS CASE THAT THE U.S. WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO KILL IT, AS PART OF A LARGER STOPPAGE OF TRANSFER OF ANY AND ALL TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. SAULNIER SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT FRANCE DOES NOT AGREE WITH SUCH A GENERAL POLICY. HE IMPLIED THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT UNDERMINED IN FRENCH EYES BY OUR STANCE ON THE MT-20. IN PASSING HE NOTED THAT US SKIRTS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY CLEAN ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OVER THE YEARS EITHER. FURTHERMORE, SAULNIER SAID, IF OUR INTELLIGENCE ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN INTRODUCED PRIOR TO THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT, HE, AT LEAST, WOULD HAVE BEEN GLAD TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT SINCE HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A CAPABILITY IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS. BUT THE ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED AFTER THE RENEGOTIATION, AND WITHOUT ANY PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THE BROAD ISSUES RAISED. BY THE TIME THE INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED THE FRENCH BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NITION THE FRENCH COULD NOT HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS WHY THEY WERE RENEGING. SECONDLY, THERE WAS A SUSPICION AMONG THE FRENCH OFFICIALS HANDLING THIS CASE THAT THE U.S. WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO KILL IT, AS PART OF A LARGER STOPPAGE OF TRANSFER OF ANY AND ALL TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. SAULNIER SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT FRANCE DOES NOT AGREE WITH SUCH A GENERAL POLICY. HE IMPLIED THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT UNDERMINED IN FRENCH EYES BY OUR STANCE ON THE MT-20. IN PASSING HE NOTED THAT US SKIRTS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY CLEAN ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OVER THE YEARS EITHER. FURTHERMORE, SAULNIER SAID, IF OUR INTELLIGENCE ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN INTRODUCED PRIOR TO THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE CONTRACT, HE, AT LEAST, WOULD HAVE BEEN GLAD TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT SINCE HE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A CAPABILITY IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS. BUT THE ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED AFTER THE RENEGOTIATION, AND WITHOUT ANY PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THE BROAD ISSUES RAISED. BY THE TIME THE INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED THE FRENCH BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT

PARIS 0357 46702 DTG: 221821Z NOV 82 PSN: 018894

DECLASSIFIED
BY AN NLRR M07-081 747514
NARA DATE 5/9/10

SECRET

14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 0357 46702 DTG: 221821Z NOV 82 PSN: 018895
SIT335 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 326/1948Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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EOB: NTS: CKLS, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST--ODIS DISSEMULTZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0357/02 3261825
O 221821Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7509

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 40357

NODIS
DEPT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
THEY HAD SATISFIED OUR POSITION ON THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ASPECTS, AND OUR LAST MINUTE DEMARCHE WAS RECEIVED WITH SOME RESENTMENT.

7. SAULNIER WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ARGUMENTS ARE TO FORM AN ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE EAST, THERE HAS TO BE SOME BROAD CONSULTATION AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SO THAT A CERTAIN MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND CAN BE ESTABLISHED. SAULNIER SAID IT SIMPLY WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO INTRODUCE AT THE LAST MINUTE AN INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATION WITHOUT PRIOR PREPARATION AND TO EXPECT THAT IT WOULD OR COULD OVERRIDE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. SAULNIER SAID THE FRENCH WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING TO HOLD SUCH BROADER CONSULTATIONS IF WE WISHED.

8. SAULNIER SAID THE FINAL DECISION ON THE MT-20 WAS NOW BEFORE MITTERRAND. HERNU WAS CORRECT TO SAY THE SALE HAD BEEN BLOCKED, AND THE QUAI WAS CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE REVISED CONTRACT HAD BEEN SENT TO MITTERRAND FOR APPROVAL. SAULNIER SAID MITTERRAND WOULD INDEED MAKE THE FINAL DECISION, BUT HE IMPLIED STRONGLY THAT THE DECISION WOULD BE TO APPROVE THE REVISED CONTRACT. IN FACT, HE NOTED, THE ONLY REASON A DECISION HAD NOT YET

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEEN TAKEN WAS THAT IT WAS LINKED TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DECISION, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE ONLY ASPECT OF THE SALE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS HOW TO ANNOUNCE IT. SAULNIER SAID THAT FURTHER BRIEFINGS WERE NOT NEEDED; THE TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN BY NOW. IN CLOSING SAULNIER SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF WE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER, BUT IT WAS CLEAR HE CONSIDERS IT VIRTUALLY CLOSED, EVEN THOUGH SUBSTANTIVELY HE APPEARED TO REGRET THE FACT THAT SUCH SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY WAS GOING TO THE SOVIETS.
GALBRAITH

SECRET

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FRANCE (11/15/82-11/30/82)

FOIA

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53

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
54113	TRANSMITTAL SHEET NSC/S PROFILE SHEET	1	11/23/1982	B1 B3

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TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 23 NOV 82

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NLRR UDSH/1 #54113

BY CN NARA DATE 3/26/88

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SILVER, ARNOLD

SUBJECT: HISTORICAL RECORD ON PRES MITTERRAND

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

FORTIER

BLAIR

ROBINSON

BOVERIE

LORD

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<u>Pres</u>	<u>DEC 07 1982</u>	<u>[Redacted]</u>		
<u>C</u>	<u>DEC 07 1982</u>	<u>[Handwritten note]</u>		<u>nos</u>

#54113

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE Pa (C) 17

~~SECRET~~

18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47546

PAGE 01 PARIS 0496
SIT966 DATE 11/29/82

DTG: 231647Z NOV 82 PSN: 020675
TOR: 327/1902Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0496 3271649
O 231647Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7571

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40496
NODIS
DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT, EFIN, UR, FR
SUBJ: EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS
REF: PARIS 39683

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ATTALI TOLD AMBASSADOR TODAY WITH SATISFACTION THAT IT WAS HE WHO ARRANGED, IN RESPONSE TO HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND DCM ON NOVEMBER 16 (REFTEL), TO HAVE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND SEND HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PURPOSE WAS NOT ONLY TO BE CONCILIATORY, BUT ALSO TO BE POSITIVE IN GOING FORWARD WITH THE MATTERS IN THE NON-PAPER.
3. ATTALI SAYS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WANTS TO PUT ALL THE UNPLEASANTNESS BEHIND US SO THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH THE SUBSTANCE.
MARESCA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #47546

BY CA NARA DATE 5/9/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47547

19

PAGE 01 PARIS 0498 36702 DTG: 231719Z NOV 82 PSN: 020670
SIT333 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 327/1900Z

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SIT: MR SIT EOBLR JP VP SIT EOBPUSS
EOB: ERB, PLATT, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST--ODIS DISSEMHLTZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0498 3271720
O 231719Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD7-081 #147547
BY CIV NARA DATE 5/19/10

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7581

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40498
NODIS
FOR EUR-BURT AND EB-AMB MEISSNER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, GE, FR, UK, YO
SUBJ: QUAD MEETING ON YUGOSLAV POLITICO-ECONOMIC
- SITUATION
REF: STATE 327636

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN COMMUNICATION THAT CROSSED WITH REFTEL, QUAI ECONOMIC DIRECTOR PAYE'S OFFICE CALLED AT MIDDAY NOVEMBER 23 TO CONVEY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE QUAD MEETING ON YUGOSLAV POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH WAS DECIDED AT NOVEMBER 9 MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS.
3. PAYE WILL HOST THE MEETING IN HIS OFFICE AT 1500 LOCAL ON THURSDAY DECEMBER 2. WHILE THE DURATION IS OPEN-ENDED, THERE WILL BE NO WORKING DINNER BECAUSE THE FRG AND UK PARTICIPANTS WILL HAVE TO RETURN TO THEIR CAPITALS THAT NIGHT TO ACCOMPANY THEIR MINISTERS TO THE MEETING OF THE EC COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN ON DECEMBER 3.
4. THE FRENCH SIDE WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PAYE AND CAMDESSUS EACH WITH AN ASSISTANT. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT U. S. WILL BE REPRESENTED BY AMB. MEISSNER, PALMER AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CANNER.

5. PAYE WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND ADVANCE COPY OF THE WORKING PAPER WHICH THE U. S. SIDE HAS AGREED TO PREPARE AND CIRCULATE PRIOR TO THE MEETING. MARESCA

PARIS 0498 36702 DTG: 231719Z NOV 82 PSN: 020670

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47548

PAGE 01 PARIS 0500
SIT967 DATE 11/29/82

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TOR: 327/1859Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0500 3271729
O 231728Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7582

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40500
NODIS
DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, FR, UR
SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO USSR
REF: (A) PARIS 40094; (B) PARIS 40357

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR MADE DEMARCHE FORESEEN IN REFTEL (A) TO ATTALI NOVEMBER 23. AMBASSADOR STRESSED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE FINAL DECISION ON MT-20 SALE AS CONCRETE INDICATION OF FRENCH DESIRE TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE WESTERN CONTROL OVER TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO USSR.
3. ATTALI CONFIRMED THAT THE FINAL DECISION IS NOW IN MITTERRAND'S HANDS. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS DECISION WOULD GO IN OUR DIRECTION, HOWEVER, AND SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE. IMPLICATION WAS THAT MITTERRAND WAS ALREADY INCLINED TO APPROVE THE REVISED CONTRACT, AS FORESEEN IN REFTEL (B).
MARESCA

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NLRR MD7-081 #47548
BY Al NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47549 21

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 76361 DTG: 230335Z NOV 82 PSN: 019640
SIT890 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 327/0511Z

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SIT: MR SIT EOBOBP SIT EOBNP EOBEMP
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTKLISTIST-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #7636 3270343
P 230335Z NOV 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6718

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 6537
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 8035
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4355
BT

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NLRR M07-081 #47549
BY GN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~ STATE 327636
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, GE, FR, UK, YO
SUBJECT: QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES ON
YUGOSLAVIA

REF: STATE 324834

1. (~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FURTHER TO REFTEL, WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE BRITISH THAT THERE IS SOME INITIAL FRENCH RESISTANCE TO TALKS ON YUGOSLAVIA. COULD YOU APPROACH THE FRENCH AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING SUCH CONSULTATIONS AND DOING SO NEXT WEEK. THE BRITISH AGREE, AND THE GERMANS ALSO SUPPORT AN EARLY MEETING. WE SHOULD TELL THE FRENCH THAT SINCE AN IMF TEAM IS TRAVELING TO YUGOSLAVIA ON DECEMBER 2, WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOW BELIEVE THAT IT MAKES SENSE TO HOLD SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THEIR TRIP--WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 29.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 76361 DTG: 230335Z NOV 82 PSN: 019640

SECRET

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47550

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 91621 DTG: 240208Z NOV 82 PSN: 021479
SIT879 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 328/0546Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MR EOBLR JP VP SIT KEMP EOBE MP
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTIST-----RTH ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9162 3280218
O 240208Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6800

~~SECRET~~ STATE 329162
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, FR
SUBJECT: MOD HERNU STATEMENT ON CRAY COMPUTER
MOD HERNU STATEMENT ON CRAY COMPUTER

REF: PARIS 39727

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE CRAY COMPUTER RAISED WITH YOU BY HERNU, THIS MACHINE WAS LICENSED LATE IN MAY AND WAS SHIPPED ON AUGUST 6. CRAY HAS INFORMED US THAT THE MACHINE WAS INSTALLED AND THAT CEA GAVE PRELIMINARY CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE ON SEPTEMBER 30. FINAL CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE IS EXPECTED FOLLOWING FURTHER TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS. TWO CDC CYBER 750 MACHINES WERE ALSO LICENSED AND HAVE BEEN SHIPPED TO CEA INSTALLATIONS.

3. FOR THE EMBASSY'S INFORMATION, TWO CRAY APPLICATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL MACHINES FOR THE GOF, WHICH ARE NOW ON FILE, REMAIN UNDER REVIEW. THESE MACHINES--WOULD BE FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DELIVERY TO THE COMPAGNIE INTERNATIONALE DE SERVICES EN INFORMATIQUE (CISI) FOR USE IN UNCLASSIFIED PROCESSING BY A VARIETY OF FRENCH AGENCIES. CISI IS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE CEA. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #47550
BY CV NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECSTATE WASHDC 91621 DTG: 240208Z NOV 82 PSN: 021479

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

47551

23

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 0677 36702 DTG: 241903Z NOV 82 PSN: 022602
SIT327 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 328/2005Z

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EOB: ERB, PLATT, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/REDTAGT----ODIS DISSEMHULTZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0677 3281903
O 241903Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7680

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40677
NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, FR, UR
SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO USSR
REF: PARIS 40357

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO7-081 *47551
BY CIV NARA DATE 5/19/10

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REGARDLESS OF HOW THE MT-20 SALE EVENTUALLY TURNS OUT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES SHOULD BEGIN NOW TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO GENERAL SAULNIER'S SUGGESTION (PARA 7 REFTEL) FOR CONSULTATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIETS. WE BELIEVE SAULNIER HAS A POINT, BUT RECOGNIZE THAT OUR RESPONSE WILL DEPEND ON THE WILLINGNESS OF INTERESTED USG AGENCIES TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE SUBJECTS WITH THE FRENCH. CERTAINLY SUCH CONSULTATIONS, IF HELD, WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL BASIS FOR RAISING INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ARGUMENTS IN FUTURE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CASES.

3. SHOULD WASHINGTON DECIDE TO PICK UP ON THIS SUGGESTION, WE BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE FOR DCM TO GO BACK TO SAULNIER WITH A PROPOSAL FOR DISCREET CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN A WELL-QUALIFIED WASHINGTON EMISSARY AND THE FRENCH OFFICIAL DESIGNATED BY THE ELYSEE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THIS POSSIBILITY IN DUE COURSE.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 0677 36702 DTG: 241903Z NOV 82 PSN: 022602

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

24

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47552

PAGE 01 PARIS 0861
SIT892 DATE 11/29/82

DTG: 261658Z NOV 82 PSN: 025241
TOR: 330/1825Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0861 3301658
O 261658Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7793

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 40861
NODIS
DEPT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, FR, UR
SUBJ: MT-20 SALE CONFIRMED
REF: A. PARIS 40357

FRANCOIS MOUTON CALLED ON NOVEMBER 26 ON BEHALF OF
QUAI ECONOMIC DIRECTOR PAYE TO INFORM EMBASSY AS FOLLOWS:
1) THE THOMSON CONTRACT WITH THE USSR HAS NOW BEEN
REVIEWED BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES. 2) ITS PROVISIONS
HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS
ISSUED BY THE GOF. 3.) CONSEQUENTLY, THE GOF HAS GIVEN
ITS APPROVAL FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 47552

BY AV NARA DATE 5/19/00

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

47553

25

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 0894
SIT888 DATE 11/29/82

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TOR: 330/2053Z

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SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: ---CHECKLIST---

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0894/01 3301933
O 261924Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7821

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 40894

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND IN DIFFICULTY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN FRANCE HAS DETERIORATED SINCE LAST JUNE'S SUMMIT. PRESSURES ON MITTERRAND'S GOVERNMENT HAVE PRODUCED A DISCERNABLE SENSE OF INCREASINGLY DIRECTIONLESS LEADERSHIP. POLICY LINES ARE BECOMING CONFUSED AND DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IS DRIFTING UPWARD TO THE PRESIDENCY. MITTERRAND HIMSELF IS MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS DRIFT BUT APPEARS UNABLE TO REVERSE IT. HE PREFERS A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH, AND HIS CLOSEST ADVISORS ARE DISORGANIZED AND POLITICALLY INEXPERIENCED. THE RESULTING DEMORALIZATION HAS LED TO A DEGREE OF LASHING-OUT--LOUDER PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF THE US, PLUS FURTHER ILL-ADVISED POLITICAL INITIATIVES AT HOME. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REMAIN INTRACTABLE DESPITE MAJOR EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT. DEFENSE POLICY, ONCE THE STAUNCHEST ASPECT OF THE SOCIALISTS' OVERALL POSTURE, IS NOW SUBJECT TO DOUBT. OPINION POLLS SHOW THE PUBLIC IS INCREASINGLY UNEASY WITH SOCIALIST RULE. DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES ARE OCCURRING MORE FREQUENTLY. PRIME MINISTER MAUROY IS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONSIDERED SOMEWHAT IRRELEVANT, AND THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS NEXT MARCH LOOK TO BE A FURTHER SETBACK FOR THE SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST COALITION. THE MOROSE ECONOMIC SITUATION SIGNALS WORSE TIMES AHEAD, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS COULD ALSO WORSEN. WE RECOMMEND STEADFASTNESS AND RESTRAINT AS THIS UNRAVELLING PROCESS PROCEEDS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO MAKE THE ECONOMY WORK IS AT THE ROOT OF ITS PROBLEMS. A DISAPPOINTING TRADE BALANCE, DETERIORATING PUBLIC FINANCES, CONTINUED INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, AND THE SEEMINGLY UNSTOPPABLE SLIDE OF THE FRANC HAVE BROUGHT HOME THE SERIOUSNESS OF FRANCE'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN INCREASING POPULAR DISCONTENT, MORE STRIKES (MORE MAN DAYS WERE LOST IN STRIKES IN

MITTERRAND'S FIRST YEAR THAN IN THE PREVIOUS ONE), AND AN UPSURGE OF PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE TURN-AROUND ON ECONOMIC POLICY TO A TEMPORARY WAGE AND PRICE FREEZE BROUGHT A RESPITE ON INFLATION BUT ALSO PRODUCED CONFUSION AND DOUBT OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY DIRECTION. OTHER ISSUES HAVE HAD TO BE DECIDED BY MITTERRAND HIMSELF--NOTABLY THE SENSITIVE SECURITY-VERSUS-ASYLUM ISSUE AND, MOST RECENTLY, THE REVERSAL OF FRENCH AGREEMENT TO THE EAST-WEST ECONOMIC NON-PAPER.

4. MITTERRAND IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY ACKNOWLEDGED BY ALL SOCIALIST FACTIONS, BUT HIS VIEWS ON MANY SPECIFIC ISSUES ARE VAGUE. HE HAS BUILT HIS LEADERSHIP OF A BROAD COALITION ON AMBIGUITY AND A PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE WHICH HE HAS NOT CHANGED IN THE ELYSEE. FEW OFFICIALS, EVEN THOSE CLOSEST TO HIM, KNOW WHAT HE THINKS ON MANY SUBJECTS. EVEN FEWER CAN PREDICT HOW HE WILL DECIDE AN ISSUE WHEN IT COMES BEFORE HIM IN A SPECIFIC POLITICAL CONTEXT.

5. THE RESULTS OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE TWOFOLD: FIRST, A SENSE OF DIRECTIONLESS LEADERSHIP WHICH IS PERHAPS THE MOST TELLING CHARGE AGAINST MITTERRAND. A FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY AND DRIFT PERVADES DISCUSSIONS OF MANY ASPECTS OF FRENCH LIFE: THE ECONOMY; THE FRENCH ROLE IN THE WORLD; THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM; THE DIRECTION OF FRENCH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS UNCERTAINTY UNDERCUTS AND WEAKENS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT. SECOND, DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY HAS DRIFTED UPWARD TO THE PRESIDENCY BECAUSE LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIALS EITHER CANNOT AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES, OR DO NOT KNOW WHICH COURSE TO STEER. EVEN OUR REQUEST FOR REGULAR FRENCH LICENSE PLATES FOR EMBASSY CARS AS A SECURITY PRECAUTION HAD TO BE APPROVED BY MITTERRAND HIMSELF.

6. THE SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE OFFICIALS CLOSEST TO MITTERRAND ARE POOR MANAGERS AND POLITICALLY INEXPERIENCED. SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF THE TWO SENIOR ELYSEE OFFICIALS (BEREGOVY AND ROUSSELET) WHO WERE OF MITTERRAND'S GENERATION, THE AVERAGE AGE AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL HAS DROPPED SUBSTANTIALLY. THIS FACTOR APPEARS TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A KIND OF LASHING-OUT EFFECT--PUBLIC CRITICISMS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7822

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NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND IN DIFFICULTY
OF THE US, PETTY TRADE RESTRICTIONS, AND ILL-CONSIDERED
DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOVES SUCH AS A CONTROVERSIAL
PROPOSAL TO AMNESTY THE LEADERS OF THE 1961 ALGERIAN
PUTSCH.

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7. THESE ARE ALL REFLECTIONS OF THE DIFFICULT POLITICAL
SITUATION IN WHICH MITTERRAND NOW FINDS HIMSELF.
THE ECONOMY SHOWS NO SIGH OF IMPROVING, AND IN FACT
ANOTHER DEVALUATION SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE IN SPITE OF THE
4 BILLION DOLLAR LOAN FRANCE RECENTLY FLOATED. SUCH
A STEP WOULD BE DEEPLY DAMAGING FOR MITTERRAND AND
WOULD SOLVE NOTHING UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY THE KIND
OF ECONOMIC PROGRAM MITTERRAND WANTS TO AVOID. A
HUMILIATING APPROACH TO THE IMF IS ANOTHER FUTURE
POSSIBILITY.

8. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE MADE MAJOR EFFORTS TO REFORM

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THE ECONOMY, AND FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE NATIONALIZATION PROGRAM WAS BROUGHT OFF WITHOUT MAJOR HITCHES. A MAJOR AND DIFFICULT REFORM OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IS UNDERWAY, AND THE 1982 BUDGET HAS BEEN PAINFULLY TRIMMED BACK. THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING HARD TO REORIENT INDUSTRY TOWARD PROMISING HIGH TECHNOLOGY AREAS, WHILE SAVING THREATENED SECTORS SUCH AS STEEL AND TEXTILES. THE SOCIALISTS BELIEVE U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES HAVE COUNTERED THEIR PROGRAMS AIMED AT ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THEY CONTINUE TO URGE US TO FOLLOW AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY, WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS THE KEY TO GETTING THEIR OWN ECONOMY MOVING AGAIN. THEY ALSO ARGUE STRONGLY THAT THE RISING VALUE OF THE DOLLAR HAS INCREASED THEIR ENERGY BILLS, WORSENERD THEIR INTERNAL FINANCIAL SITUATION AND ADDED TO INFLATIONARY PRESSURES.

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9. BUT THE SOCIALISTS' EFFORTS, AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF U.S. POLICIES, HAVE NOT CHANGED THE BASIC EQUATION HERE. PRIME MINISTER MAUROY SEEMS MORE AND MORE IRRELEVANT. INSTEAD OF ACTING AS A BUFFER AGAINST CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT, MAUROY HAS REQUIRED POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM MITTERRAND HIMSELF. SOCIALIST LEADERS AGREE PRIVATELY THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED--PERHAPS AFTER THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. EVEN THE SOCIALISTS' STRONG POSTURE ON DEFENSE HAS RECENTLY COME UNDER A SHADOW, WITH PROPOSAL OF THE FIRST REDUCED DEFENSE BUDGET IN YEARS, AND CONTINUING SOCIALIST PARTY INTEREST IN FINDING A COMPROMISE WHICH WILL OBTIATE THE NEED FOR INF DEPLOYMENT. A RECENT OUT-BREAK OF STRIKES (NOTABLY PARIS PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND NEWSPAPER PRINTERS) AND DEMONSTRATIONS HAS RAISED THE SOCIAL TEMPERATURE. POLLS SHOW A CONTINUED EBBING OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

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10. MEANWHILE THE COMMUNISTS ARE PLAYING A DOUBLE

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GAME. THE FOUR COMMUNIST MINISTERS ARE PARTICIPATING SERIOUSLY IN THE GOVERNMENT, BENDING POLICIES IN THEIR DIRECTION INsofar AS THEY CAN AND QUIETLY INSTALLING THEIR PEOPLE AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE. AT THE SAME TIME THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS MARKING ITSELF OFF FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED CGT LABOR UNION IS SEEKING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF AS THE ONLY REAL DEFENDER OF THE WORKING MAN'S INTERESTS. AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE THE COMMUNISTS MAY QUIT THE GOVERNMENT AND ATTACK IT FROM THE LEFT. UNTIL THEY DO, MITTERRAND MUST COOPERATE WITH THEM TO KEEP THE PEACE ON THE SOCIAL FRONT.

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11. OPPOSITION LEADERS, ESPECIALLY JACQUES CHIRAC, HAVE BEGUN TO SMELL BLOOD. CHIRAC HAS BEEN CHALLENGED BY THE SOCIALISTS WHO ARE TRYING TO CHANGE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM TO REMOVE HIS MANDATE AS THE DIRECTLY-ELECTED MAYOR OF PARIS. CHIRAC HOPES THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN MARCH WILL SHOW THAT THE SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST COALITION IS NO LONGER SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF FRENCH VOTERS. HE WILL TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON EVERY OPENING, AND THIS SPELLS GROWING POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR MITTERRAND.

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12. IF PAST EXPERIENCE IS ANY GUIDE, A WORSENING OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS HERE WILL PROBABLY BRING A FURTHER DECLINE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON.

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MITTERRAND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U. S., IF THESE COULD BE ON FRENCH TERMS. HIS CONCILIATORY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE PIPELINE SPAT
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7823

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 40894
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, FR

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND IN DIFFICULTY
IS THE LATEST OF MANY GESTURES TOWARD US. BUT THE U.S.
IS A CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT FOR FRENCH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS,
AND WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE PERIODIC PUBLIC CRITICISM
ALONG THESE LINES. THE SOCIALISTS (AND MITTERRAND HIM-
SELF) ALSO SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT WASHINGTON WOULD PREFER
A RIGHT-WING GOVERNMENT HERE AND THAT WE MAY EVEN BE PRE-
PARED TO ASSIST IN BRINGING SUCH A CHANGE. THE ALLENDE
EXPERIENCE HAUNTS FRENCH SOCIALISTS LIKE A DISTANT
NIGHTMARE. SHOULD EVENTS STRENGTHEN THESE SUSPICIONS
WE COULD SEE THE GROWTH OF A DEEPER SENSE OF HOSTILITY
TOWARD THE U.S., AND A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR ABILITY
TO WORK WITH FRANCE IN FIELDS WHERE COOPERATION HAS THUS
FAR BEEN EXCELLENT.

13. THIS IS A PESSIMISTIC CABLE WITH GLOOMY CONCLUSIONS,
BUT WE FEEL WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE BACKDROP
TO RECENT FRENCH DECISIONS AND GROWING SENSITIVITIES.
WE HAVE NO NEAT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO REMEDY THE
SITUATION, SINCE IT DERIVES MAINLY FROM THE FAILURE
OF THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS' POLICIES AND THEIR INABILITY
TO GOVERN THIS COUNTRY WITH STEADINESS AND WISDOM. WE
WOULD NOT RECOMMEND BENDING U.S. INTERESTS TO ACCOMMODATE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE FRENCH; ON THE CONTRARY WE BELIEVE STEADY (BUT
NOT OVERDONE) U.S. PRESSURE (FOR EXAMPLE TO MAINTAIN
A STRONG DEFENSE AND TO AVOID PROTECTIONIST TRADE
MEASURES) IS NECESSARY TO KEEP FRANCE FROM TAKING
EXTREME STEPS DAMAGING TO US. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER,
RESPOND WITH RESTRAINT AND STEADFASTNESS AS THIS
UNRAVELLING PROCESS PROCEEDS. WE SHOULD AVOID
BEING IDENTIFIED TOO CLOSELY WITH THE OPPOSITION, AND
SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PUT IN DOUBT OUR GENERAL GOOD
WILL TOWARD FRANCE AND OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY
ON ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN.
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7624

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 40895
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), FR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PARIS: SUBJECTS AND
- TALKING POINTS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE SUBMIT BELOW A SELECTIVE CHECKLIST OF SUBJECTS THE SECRETARY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS DURING HIS DECEMBER 14-15 VISIT TO PARIS, TOGETHER WITH POINTS ON EACH ITEM (DEFENSE-RELATED ISSUES WILL BE TREATED SEPTEL). WE WILL UPDATE AS NECESSARY PRIOR TO VISIT:

I. U.S.-FRENCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A. THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT - MITTERRAND AND HIS CHIEF ADVISOR JACQUES ATTALI (WHO ORGANIZED VERSAILLES) ARE ANNOYED OVER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MAY 27-28 DATES WITHOUT FRENCH CONCURRENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS THAT MITTERRAND MIGHT NOT ATTEND. WE EXPECT THE FRENCH TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR A LESS ELABORATE AND FORMAL FORMAT, BUT THEY MAY RESIST DROPPING THE COMMUNIQUE. A FINAL MEETING OF SUMMIT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES UNDER FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN PARIS ON DECEMBER 11-12 TO REVIEW LESSONS LEARNED AT VERSAILLES AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON WILLIAMSBURG. ALLEN WALLIS WILL LEAD THE U.S. GROUP.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- BRING A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN DESIGNED TO SMOOTH RUFFLED FRENCH FEATHERS.
-- INDICATE THAT FRENCH AND U.S. THINKING ON A LESS FORMAL SUMMIT SEEMS TO BE MOVING ALONG THE SAME LINES.
B. TRADE AND PROTECTIONISM - THE FRENCH HAVE ADOPTED AN INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON TRADE, INCLUDING TWO LATE OCTOBER MEASURES WHICH ARE BLATANT HARASSMENT TACTICS. NEITHER WILL HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THEIR ALARMING TRADE DEFICIT. ONE MEASURE IS AIMED AT THE JAPANESE WHOSE TRADE ACCOUNT IS HIGHLY FAVORABLE DESPITE THE STRICT FRENCH LIMITATIONS ON THEIR AUTO SALES. IT REQUIRES THAT ALL VIDEO RECORDERS BE CLEARED THROUGH THE SMALL CUSTOMS POST AT POITIERS IN CENTRAL FRANCE. THE OTHER IMPOSES STRICT FRENCH LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS ON IMPORT DOCUMENTATION. IN ADDITION,

THE FRENCH WERE THE LEAST COOPERATIVE MEMBER OF THE EC IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE GATT MINISTERIAL. FINALLY, THEY HAVE SHOWN SIGNS OF HANKERING FOR A REVERSION TO A MORE BILATERAL APPROACH -- AGAINST JAPAN AND THE US, PARTICULARLY -- ON TRADE MATTERS AND TO LONG-HELD IDEAS OF MARKET SHARING. THE SECRETARY SENT CHEYSSON A LETTER ON NOVEMBER 22 DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 20 RADIO ADDRESS.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF THE GATT MINISTERIAL, EXPRESS CONCERN THAT THE TOUGH FRENCH STANCE COULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER FORCES OF PROTECTIONISM WHICH ARE ALREADY POWERFUL IN THE US, TRADITIONAL DEFENDER OF LIBERAL TRADE.

-- SUGGEST THAT, IF THE FRENCH HAVE COMPLAINTS ABOUT DIFFICULTY OF ACCESS TO THE AMERICAN MARKET, THEY SUPPORT A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO TACKLING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS.

C. FRENCH ECONOMIC POLICY - THE FIRST PHASE OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC POLICY, A CONSUMPTION-LED RECOVERY, HAS FAILED. THE SECOND PHASE WHICH IS TO BE AN INVESTMENT-LED RECOVERY THROUGH THE NATIONALIZED SECTOR IS FAR FROM READY AND MAY NEVER BE, GIVEN THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF PLANNING AND AUTHORITY.

WITH ITS POLICY STANCE IN SHAMBLES THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF IN A DIFFICULT POLICY BOX.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DETERMINED TO WARD OFF A POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY DAMAGING THIRD DEVALUATION BEFORE THE MARCH 1983 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO BUY TIME WITH A COMPLEX SET OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS, A

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 40895
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), FR

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PARIS: SUBJECTS AND
DOLLARS 4 BILLION BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BORROWING, AND
SOCIALIST AUSTERITY IN THE FORM OF SOME BUDGET CUTBACKS,
SOME JUGGLING OF FIGURES AND SOME TOUGH DECISIONS ON
SOCIAL WELFARE ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS. THE EXCHANGE
MARKETS ARE UNCONVINCED. THE NUMBERS ARE NOT GOOD
ENOUGH AND THE TRADE DEFICIT IS VERY BIG.

PROSPECTS FOR 1983 ARE UNIFORMLY BLEAK BUT NOT CATA-
STROPHIC. IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE MONEY
SUPPLY UNDER CONTROL, GROWTH WILL NOT EXCEED TWO PER-
CENT, INFLATION WILL PROBABLY RISE AGAIN AND UNEMPLOY-
MENT WILL CONTINUE TO CREEP UP.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- ASK ABOUT FRENCH ECONOMIC PLANS.

-- STRESS THAT A HEALTHY FRENCH ECONOMY IS IN OUR
INTEREST.

D. U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY - THE FRENCH MAN IN THE STREET
HAS BEEN TOLD AND BELIEVES THAT U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES
THAT HAVE FORCED UP INTEREST RATES AND CAUSED EXCHANGE
RATE SWINGS ARE THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE CURRENT
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN GENERAL AND FRENCH PROBLEMS
IN PARTICULAR. MITTERRAND, HIS ADVISOR JACQUES ATTALI,
FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER JOBERT AND TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXTENT FINANCE MINISTER DELORS CONTINUALLY PLAY THIS
THEME, WHETHER OR NOT THEY BELIEVE IT. THE DROP IN
U.S. INTEREST RATES HAS MUTED SOME CRITICISM BUT THE
STRENGTH OF THE DOLLAR IS STILL PERCEIVED AS ALARMING.
THE EFFECT ON THE COST OF ENERGY IMPORTS HAS BEEN, THE
FRENCH INSIST, THE EQUIVALENT OF A THIRD OIL SHOCK.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- EXPLAIN HOW OUR SUCCESS IN CONTROLLING INFLATION HAS
BROUGHT DOWN INTEREST RATES AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A
U.S. ECONOMIC REVIVAL WHICH WILL BENEFIT ALL OTHER
NATIONS AS WELL.

-- NOTE THAT THE HIGH DOLLAR-FRANC EXCHANGE RATE IS DUE
LARGELY TO A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN FRENCH POLICIES, AND
WE SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR THIS. SUPPORTING THIS POINT
IS THE FACT THAT THE DOLLAR/DEUTSCHE MARK RATE HAS
RETURNED TO THE LEVEL OF 1975.

II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

A. THE SOVIET UNION AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEATH--THE FRENCH
WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THE SECRETARY'S REACTIONS
TO HIS MEETING WITH ANDROPOV AND HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE
FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. MORE SPECIFICALLY,
THEY MAY INQUIRE ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-SOVIET
SUMMIT. GIVEN FRANCE'S TRADE IMBALANCE WITH THE USSR,
THE FRENCH ARE INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF
ACCELERATING THEIR OWN POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
SOVIETS.

POINT TO MAKE:

-- DISCUSS POST-BREZHNEV POSSIBILITIES, ESPECIALLY WITH
RESPECT TO POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, AND EAST-WEST
NEGOTIATIONS.

B. NEXT STEPS IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS -

MITTERRAND'S NOVEMBER 20 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT APPEARS
TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO DEFUSE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND
RETURN TO A DISCUSSION OF AGREED PRINCIPLES OF EAST-
WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE SUBSTAN-
TIVE FRENCH POSITION HAS CHANGED, HOWEVER, AND THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE IS LIKELY
TO BE JUST AS LIMITED AS IT WAS BEFORE. WE SHOULD NOT
RUSH TO MEET THE FRENCH, BUT SHOULD LET THE OTHER
EUROPEANS PUSH THEM TOWARD A CONCILIATORY POSITION.
WE SHOULD CONTINUE BROAD PRESSURE ON THEM TO JOIN WITH
THE REST OF THE WEST IN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT ON THIS
SUBJECT.

POINTS TO MAKE:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- WE ARE NOT TRYING TO LIMIT ANYONE'S SOVEREIGNTY; WE
ARE JUST TRYING TO IDENTIFY THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH
ALL OF US AGREE ARE NECESSARY IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH THE USSR.

-- THIS EFFORT IS IN THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN INTEREST,

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), FR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PARIS: SUBJECTS AND
FRENCH AS WELL AS AMERICAN. WE BELIEVE FRANCE AGREES,
AND HOPE THE GOF WILL COOPERATE ACTIVELY TO MAKE IT A
SUCCESS.

C. MT-20 SALE TO THE USSR - THE FRENCH HAVE RESISTED
OUR HIGH LEVEL ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK THE SALE OF THE MT-20
DIGITAL SWITCHING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE USSR.
WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS,
NONE OF WHICH IS ENTIRELY CONVINCING. THE CONTRACT
DATES BACK TO WELL BEFORE THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT.
THOUGH MODIFIED BY THE SOCIALISTS, IT STILL CAUSES US
CONCERN. MITTERRAND SEEMS DECIDED TO APPROVE THE
MODIFIED CONTRACT.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- WE REGRET THAT THE MATTER HAS GONE FORWARD AND ARE
TRYING TO LEARN FROM IT.
-- ONE CENTRAL DIFFICULTY IS THAT WE WERE NEVER ABLE
TO GET ANY DETAILS. WE NEED BETTER ADVANCE CONSULTATION
PROCEDURES ON SUCH PROJECTS.

III. FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS

A. THE MIDDLE EAST - THE FRENCH HAVE GIVEN QUALIFIED
SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE.
THEY FAULT IT FOR NOT GOING FAR ENOUGH ON PALESTINIAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN
STATE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. CONTINUED FRENCH
SUPPORT WILL DEPEND ON ARAB, PARTICULARLY PLO, WILLING-
NESS TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSED BY THE
PRESIDENT.

THE FRENCH AND EGYPTIANS HAVE SHELVED THEIR JOINT UNSC
RESOLUTION, BUT IT COULD BE REVIVED. THE FRENCH MAIN-
TAIN THAT THIS RESOLUTION WOULD COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN
RUN COUNTER TO OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- ENCOURAGE CONTINUED FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
INITIATIVE. REPORT ON PROGRESS AS WE SEE IT.

-- REITERATE OUR VIEW THAT INTRODUCTION OF THE FRANCO-
EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

B. LEBANON - CHEYSSON IS CONCERNED BY THE LACK OF PRO-
GRESS SO FAR IN GETTING ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES

OUT OF LEBANON. HE BELIEVES OUR COORDINATION WITH THE
FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAS BEEN LESS THAN PERFECT. HE
ALSO IS PREOCCUPIED BY THE FIGHTING IN THE SHUF AND
REPORTEDLY WOULD LIKE FRANCE TO PLAY A ROLE IN RE-
ESTABLISHING ORDER IN THAT REGION.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- STRESS OUR DESIRE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON LEBANON AND
TO SEE ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES LEAVE THE COUNTRY
SOON.

-- (IF THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF IS STILL NOT SETTLED)
ASK FOR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT
SITUATION.

C. AFRICA - THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
WHO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. HAS AN ACTIVIST AFRICAN POLICY
WHICH IS WORKING AGAINST IMPORTANT FRENCH INTERESTS,
PARTICULARLY IN FORMER FRENCH COLONIES. THIS, OF
COURSE, IS NOT OUR OBJECTIVE. WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN
TRYING TO CONVINCING THE FRENCH THAT THIS PERCEPTION OF
OUR POLICY IS WRONG AND THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, WE WANT
TO COOPERATE AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITH THEM IN AFRICA.

POINT TO MAKE:

-- REITERATE OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE, NOT COMPETE, WITH
FRANCE IN AFRICA.

D. CUBA - FRENCH-CUBAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPROVING,
WITH SEVERAL MINISTERIAL VISITS HAVING TAKEN PLACE OR
IN THE OFFING. THERE ARE RECURRENT RUMORS THAT CASTRO
COULD VISIT PARIS ON A EUROPEAN TOUR.

POINTS TO MAKE:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- CUBA REMAINS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY
PROBLEM FOR US.

-- A CASTRO VISIT TO PARIS WOULD BE VIEWED VERY

PARIS 0895

DTG:261949Z NOV 82 PSN: 025681

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT882

PARIS 0895
DATE 11/29/82

DTG: 261949Z NOV 82 PSN: 025682
TOR: 330/2307Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0895/04 3302000
O 261949Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7827

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 40895
EXDIS
NEGATIVELY IN WASHINGTON.
GALBRAITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47555

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 28941 DTG: 300315Z NOV 82 PSN: 029490
SIT873 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 334/0440Z

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SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOB KEMP
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTIST-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2894 3340328
O 300315Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 332894
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PPDC, FR

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, NOVEMBER 20

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF MITTERRAND'S
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT DATED NOVEMBER 20.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

DURING OUR MEETINGS AT OTTAWA, WILLIAMSBURG, CANCUN,
PARIS, VERSAILLES, AND BONN, WE HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
TO DISCUSS THE MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE WORLD TODAY
AND TO TOUCH UPON FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

YOU AND I KNOW THE DEPTH OF THE FRIENDSHIP THAT OUR TWO
PEOPLES HAVE ENJOYED FOR MORE THAN 200 YEARS, ESPECIALLY
WHEN WE HAVE FACED DIFFICULTIES IN COMMON. YOU KNOW THE
EXTREME IMPORTANCE THAT I ATTACH TO THE PARTICIPATION OF
OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE SAME DEFENSIVE MILITARY ALLIANCE,
WITH RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH COUNTRY. IN THIS
REGARD, FRANCE WILL BE HAPPY TO HOST NEXT SPRING, IN PARIS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, THE MEETING OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. YOU HAVE
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO ME MANY TIMES FOR THE EXTENT
OF FRANCE'S DEFENSE EFFORT.

THESE FACTORS ARE THE BASIS OF OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH
REGARD TO ESSENTIAL MATTERS, AND THEY SEEM TO ME TO BE
ENDURING ONES.

FOR THE REST, FRANCE IS NATURALLY AVAILABLE FOR EXCHANGES
OF VIEWS, TALKS, DIALOGUE REGARDING THE MAJOR QUESTIONS
OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE VERSAILLES
SUMMIT SHOULD THUS BE EXTENDED ALONG THE LINES INTENDED.
SUCH TALKS, ESPECIALLY ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
QUESTIONS, WHETHER THEY CONCERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
THE EAST, ECONOMIC RELATIONS AMONG INDUSTRIALIZED

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR/M07-081-47555
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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COUNTRIES, OR RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, CAN AND SHOULD BE PURSUED IN APPROPRIATE FORUMS AND IN WAYS THAT ARE SUITABLE TO THE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION.

IT IS NOT ASTONISHING THAT THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES CONCERNED, WHICH HAVE THEIR SPECIAL INTERESTS AND CHARACTERISTICS, DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE ON THESE QUESTIONS. FRANCE HOPES THAT ANY DIFFICULTIES THAT MAY ARISE WILL BE SURMOUNTED. I AM THEREFORE HAPPY ABOUT YOUR ANNOUNCED DECISION TO REVOKE THE SANCTIONS AGAINST SEVERAL EUROPEAN COMPANIES.

TALKS ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING THESE LAST WEEKS. FRANCE'S REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED HER POSITION. THE ABSENCE OF ANY LINK BETWEEN THESE TALKS AND THE SANCTIONS AGAINST EUROPEAN COMPANIES WAS, FROM THE BEGINNING, CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AMONG OUR REPRESENTATIVES. MOREOVER, IT WAS NOT ENVISAGED THAT THESE TALKS COULD LEAD TO -- STRICTLY SPEAKING -- AN "AGREEMENT." FINALLY, IT WAS AGREED TO ESTABLISH IN COMMON THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE PUBLIC WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE EXCHANGES.

IF THERE WERE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING IN THAT REGARD, I HOPE THAT IT HAS NOW BEEN CLEARED UP.

EACH OF US, MR. PRESIDENT, IS WELL AWARE OF THE CARE REQUIRED IN THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE EASTERN BLOC. EACH IS WELL AWARE OF HIS NATIONAL INTEREST IN THAT REGARD, IS THE BEST JUDGE OF SUCH INTEREST, AND HAS THE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR DIALOGUE. OUR COMMON INTEREST,

AS MEMBERS OF THE SAME ALLIANCE, SEEMS TO ME TO BE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DRAW ITS STRENGTH FROM OUR DIVERSITY. IT IS BY RESPECTING THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF EACH STATE, PROFOUNDLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE NECESSARY SOLIDARITY REGARDING ESSENTIAL MATTERS, THAT WE ENCOURAGE THE IMPLANTING IN EACH COUNTRY OF THE COMMON WILL TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

I HOPE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT THESE THOUGHTS MAY BE PURSUED AND CONSIDERED MORE DEEPLY. I SHALL WELCOME WITH PLEASURE YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. GEORGE SHULTZ, ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO PARIS IN DECEMBER, AND I SHALL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS FRANKLY AND DIRECTLY WITH YOU ALL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES AS SOON AS WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET.

ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, AND MY DEAR FRIEND, THE ASSURANCE OF MY VERY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

SIGNED: FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. END TEXT.

3. DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT LARGE PORTIONS OF THIS LETTER HAVE NOW APPEARED IN THE NOVEL OBSERVATEUR, PLEASE ADVISE.
SHULTZ

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47556

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PAGE 01 PARIS 1216
SIT736 DATE 12/02/82

DTG: 301512Z NOV 82 PSN: 030104
TOR: 334/1616Z

INDICATE THAT WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY DECIDED TO CON-
VENE ANOTHER SESSION OF THE EAGLEBURGER GROUP AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE
REPLY TO MITTERRAND, AS DISCUSSED IN PHONE CONVERSA-
TION WITH EAGLEBURGER NOVEMBER 29.
GALBRAITH

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PARIS 1216

DTG: 301512Z NOV 82 PSN: 030104

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1216 3341513
O 301512Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 41216

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PPDC, FR

SUBJECT: MITTERRAND LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF

- NOVEMBER 20

REF: STATE 332894

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 3 OF REFTL, THE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR THIS WEEK CONTAINS TEXT OF TWO PARAGRAPHS
OF MITTERRAND LETTER (BEGINNING "EACH OF US..." AND
ENDING "...THE COMMON WILL TO DEFEND OURSELVES.") AND
SUMMARIZES MITTERRAND'S POINTS REGARDING THE WASHINGTON
TALKS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: THE FRENCH PRESIDENT VERY QUICKLY SENSED THE
DANGER OF AN EXCESSIVE DRAMATIZATION OF THE INCIDENT.
HE THUS TRIED TO BRING IT BACK TO A SIMPLE TURBULENCE.
IN HIS LETTER TO THE WHITE HOUSE HE RECALLED:

- (1) THAT THERE WAS NO LINK BETWEEN THE CONVER-
- SATIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE AMONG WESTERN COUNTRIES
- AND THE SANCTIONS WHICH WERE A PURELY AMERICAN
- DECISION;
- (2) THAT THERE WAS AT NO TIME ANY QUESTION OF A
- FORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES;
- (3) THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED, IN CONTRAST, TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- AGREE ON THE MANNER IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL
- OPINION WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE CONTENT OF
- THE EURO-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS. UNQUOTE.

3. AFTER READING THE FULL TEXT OF MITTERRAND'S
LETTER (RECEIVED ONLY TODAY) WE RECOMMEND THAT THE
DEPARTMENT INTERPRET IT AS A CONCILIATORY GESTURE.
MITTERRAND CLEARLY WANTS THE DISCUSSION TO BE PURSUED
BUT WANTS TO DELAY IT UNTIL THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO
PARIS. THIS DELAY WOULD NOT ONLY SLOW DOWN FURTHER
MOVEMENT BUT WOULD ALSO UNDERLINE THE SEPARATION BETWEEN
LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PAPER.
TO KEEP THINGS ON THE BURNER AND TO TEST THEIR IN-
TENTIONS WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY
PICK UP ON MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT THAT "THESE THOUGHTS
MAY BE PURSUED AND CONSIDERED MORE DEEPLY", AND

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NLRR MD7-081 #47556
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47557

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PAGE 01 PARIS 1303
SIT708 DATE 12/02/82

DTG: 301907Z NOV 82 PSN: 030827
TOR: 334/2134Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1303/01 3341908
O 301907Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8048

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 41303
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE), FR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PARIS: DEFENSE-RELATED
ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS
REF: PARIS 40895

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE SUBMIT BELOW A CHECKLIST OF THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES MOST LIKELY TO COME UP DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PARIS DECEMBER 14-15 ALONG WITH SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR EACH ITEM.

-- DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES:

A. U.S. PACIFIST/NUCLEAR FREEZE/TROOP WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENTS- THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED THAT PACZFISM MAY BE CATCHING ON IN THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF WIDESPREAD ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF NUCLEAR FREEZE INITIATIVES, PUBLICATION OF THE NO-FIRST-USE ARGUMENT BY MCNAMARA ET AL. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE EMERGING POSITION ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE BY THE U.S. CATHOLIC EPISCOPATE. THEY WORRY THAT THIS COULD AFFECT THE USG NEGOTIATING STANCE ON START AND INF, THE PACE OF NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS AND COULD EVENTUALLY PUT THE FRENCH CATHOLIC HIERARCHY UNDER PRESSURE TO ADOPT AN ANTI-NUCLEAR STANCE. BECAUSE FRENCH DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE IS EVEN MORE HEAVILY BASED ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THAN OUR OWN, THE FRENCH FEAR ANY DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD PUT THEM UNDER DOMESTIC ANTI-NUCLEAR PRESSURE. THEY HAVE ALSO NOTED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT OF A CEILING ON U.S. TROOP STRENGTH IN EUROPE, WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY FORCE US TO WITHDRAW SOME U.S. FORCES.

POINT TO MAKE:

-- PROVIDE A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR FREEZE/PACIFIST/TROOP WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL INFLUENCE ON U.S. SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION.

B. INF TALKS - THE FRENCH WILL WANT TO BE REASSURED THAT INF DEPLOYMENTS WILL TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED, DESPITE CURRENT HARDWARE PROBLEMS, AND THAT THE USG HAS NO CURRENT PLANS TO FALL OFF THE ZERO/ZERO POSITION IN GENEVA. MITTERRAND AND HIS SOCIALIST PARTY ADVISORS SUS-

PECT THAT THE USG HAS ALREADY PREPARED A FALLBACK POSITION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS SOME SS-20'S IN EXCHANGE FOR NO DEPLOYMENTS OF NATO INF, AND MITTERRAND HIMSELF SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN OUT-COME IN AN INTERVIEW WITH JOE KRAFT EARLIER THIS YEAR (ALTHOUGH THE ELYSEE LATER DENIED IT). IF THIS IDEA GAINS STRENGTH IN FRANCE, THE FRENCH MAY BE FURTHER INCLINED TO SPECULATE OUT LOUD AT HIGH LEVELS ABOUT AN "ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE," SO AS NOT TO APPEAR LEFT IN THE DUST EMBRACING ZERO/ZERO IN THE EVENT IT HAS BEEN ABANDONED BY THE USG. THE FRENCH WILL ALSO BE LOOKING FOR A STRONG UNEQUIVOCAL REITERATION BY THE SECRETARY THAT FRENCH AND UK FORCES WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN START OR INF DISCUSSIONS AND THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED ANY COMPENSATION IN EVENTUAL CEILINGS FOR SUCH THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

POINTS TO MAKE:

-- REASSURE THE FRENCH THAT, WHATEVER THE HARDWARE PROBLEMS, INF DEPLOYMENTS WILL GO AHEAD AS ALREADY AGREED TO IN THE ALLIANCE.
-- CAUTION THE FRENCH THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT ALL THE ALLIES REFRAIN FROM UNDERCUTTING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BY PREMATURE SPECULATION ON THE EVENTUAL ACCEPTABILITY OF A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE SHORT OF THE ZERO/ZERO GOAL.
-- TELL THE FRENCH THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR LONG-HELD POSITION THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT BE COMPENSATED FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

C. CONVENTIONAL FORCES - THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE IN THE ALLIANCE WHO INTERPRET THE U.S. ARMY'S AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THE RECENT SPEECHES OF SACEUR GENERAL ROGERS AS EVIDENCE THAT NATO IS TRYING TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND THEREBY DOWNGRADE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THE FRENCH ALARM DERIVES FROM THEIR HEAVY DOCTRINAL EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THEIR CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGETARY POLICY WHICH DOWNGRADES CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN ORDER TO PAY THE HIGH COST OF NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION.

POINT TO MAKE:

PARIS 1303

DTG: 301907Z NOV 82 PSN: 030827

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NLRR M07-081 # 47557
BY AN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 1303
SIT707 DATE 12/02/82

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TOR: 334/2136Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1303/02 3341909
O 301907Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8049

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 41303
EXDIS

-- REASSURE THE FRENCH THAT WHILE SACEUR SPEAKS FOR HIM-
SELF ON NATO FORCE GOALS AND PRIORITIES, CURRENT U. S.
POLICY IS NOT TO DOWNGRADE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, BUT
RATHER TO FOCUS EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE CONTINUING
IMPORTANCE OF EFFORTS TO UPGRADE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL
FORCES AS AGREED TO AT THE BONN SUMMIT BY ALL THE MEMBERS
OF THE ALLIANCE.

D. FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET (FOR MEETING WITH MOD HERNU) -
THE 1983 FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET REPRESENTS THE FIRST TIME
IN NEARLY A DECADE THAT THERE WILL BE NO REAL GROWTH IN
THE FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET. SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN FUNDING
FOR NUCLEAR FORCES WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF FUNDING FOR
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

POINT TO MAKE:

-- WE FULLY REALIZE THAT FRANCE IS NOT A FORMAL PARTY TO
THE ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THREE PERCENT REAL
GROWTH IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, BUT IN THE LIGHT OF
FRANCE'S PAST PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA, AND THE BONN
SUMMIT DECLARATION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REINFORCING
ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WE CANNOT BE OTHER THAN
DISAPPOINTED AT THE 1983 FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET. WE HOPE
THAT THIS BUDGET REPRESENTS A PAUSE RATHER THAN A
PRECEDENT. GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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