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File: Records, 1981-1985

**Folder Title:** France (10/01/1982-10/30/1982)

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### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder

FRANCE (10/1/82-10/31/82)

**FOIA** 

S2007-081

**Box Number** 

13

**NOUZILLE** 

					51	
ID Doc Type	Doo	cument Description	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
47492 CABLE	0100	09Z OCT 82		1	10/1/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47493 CABLE	0815	01Z OC 82		1	10/8/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47494 CABLE	4 CABLE 092146Z OCT 82			1	10/9/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47495 CABLE	09114	40Z OCT 82		1	10/9/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47496 CABLE	11182	28Z OCT 82		1	10/11/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47497 CABLE	12123	37Z OCT 82		1	10/12/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47498 CABLE	1215	19Z OCT 82		2	10/12/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47499 CABLE	12175	53Z OCT 82		1	10/12/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47500 CABLE	15024	49Z OCT 82		2	10/15/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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**SMF** 12/21/2007

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FRANCE (10/1/82-10/31/82)

**FOIA** 

S2007-081

**Box Number** 

13

**NOUZILLE** 

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ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
47501 CABLE	15173	36Z OCT 82		1	10/15/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47502 CABLE	16114	45Z OCT 82		1	10/16/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47503 CABLE	18160	09Z OCT 82		3	10/18/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47504 CABLE	19183	38Z OCT 82		1	10/19/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47505 CABLE	19194	46Z OCT 82		1	10/19/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47506 CABLE	19134	49Z OCT 82		1	10/19/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47507 CABLE	19135	52Z OCT 82		1	10/19/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47508 CABLE	19175	50Z OCT 82		1	10/19/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47509 CABLE	21120	06Z OCT 82		1	10/21/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			

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**Box Number** 

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NOUZILLE

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ID Doc Type	Doo	cument Description	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
47510 CABLE	2218	47Z OCT 82		1	10/22/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47511 CABLE	2712	39Z OCT 82		4	10/27/1982	B1
47512 CABLE	2808	55Z OCT 82		1	10/28/1982	B1
47513 CABLE	2818	49Z OCT 82		2	10/28/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47514 CABLE	2915	20Z OCT 82		1	10/29/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			
47515 CABLE	30022	23Z OCT 82		2	10/30/1982	B1
	R	5/19/2010	NLRRM2007-081			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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PAGE Ø1

SECSTATE WASHDC 6735

DTG: 010009Z OCT 82 PSN: 055177

S1T822

DATE 10/12/82 ---

- TOR: 274/1117Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION.

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6735 2740941
O Ø10ØØ9Z OCT 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3264 IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1525 AMEMBASSY BONN 5832 AMEMBASSY ROME 8783 AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8291 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 9678 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3816

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

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S E CRET STATE 276735

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY, BRUSSELS FOR AMBASSADOR VEST ONLY C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 3 LINE 2 OMITTED)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS:

OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)

SUBJECT: 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ZFF FOR PARIS ONLY----REF: STATE 273801

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THE DATES PROPOSED REFTEL. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE RATIONALE FOR THOSE
CONCERNS. THE SHEER LOGISTIC BURDEN OF BLOCKING SUFFICIENT
SPACE FOR THE SUMMIT HOWEVER MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE
ANNOUNCE THE LOCATION OF THE SUMMIT ON OCTOBER 1 AS PRO-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POSED. WE HAVE ALTERED THE TEXT CONCERNING THE DATE SO AS TO ALLOW FOR A BROADER RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES.

- 3. UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS WILL ATTEMPT FRIDAY
  TO REACH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES BY TELEPHONE
  AND EXPLAIN THE SITUATION.
- 4. TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INVITED THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERN-MENT OF CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY AND JAPAN AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO JOIN HIM AT WILLIAMSBURG, VA. FOR THE 1983 SUMMIT OF IN-DUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. THE SUMMIT WILL TAKE PLACE OVER A TWO-DAY PERIOD, IN THE SPRING OF 1983. THE SUMMIT REPRESENTATIVES COME TOGETHER ANNUALLY TO DISCUSS CURRENT ECONOMIC CONCERNS. THE LAST TIME THE UNITED STATES HOSTED AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT WAS IN 1976 IN PUERTO RICO.

END TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE.

5. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE PRESS RELEASE REFERS ONLY TO THE INVITATION AND IN NO WAY COMMITS OTHER SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS TO ANY DATES. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OR PARALLEL ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE WELCOME BUT NOT, REPEAT NOT, REQUIRED. DAM

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# National Security Council The White House

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter		1	
Bud McFarlane	2	M	-
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter	-		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	3		VACOM TO
I-Information A-A	ction R-Retain	D-Dispatch	N-No further Action
	DISTRIBUTION	ON	
cc: VP Mees	e Baker D	eaver Othe	er
	COMMENT	S	



# THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

October 8, 1982

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

The attached newsclip was given to my by Jack Block. The French appear to shatter any allied unity.

We pledged to lift the grain embargo and expand overseas markets, and I remain convinced that it would help enormously if you could say within two weeks:

"I am instrucing the Secretary of Agriculture to explore with the Soviet Union a longer term grain agreement with higher limits."

This move will help our agricultural economy and will help politically.

There is a big difference between selling high technology items and grain. State and Defense might object, but I don't think they have ever fully understood our 1980 commitment.

CRESSON TO SEEK GRAINS SALES PACT WITH USSR, FRENCH OFFICIALS SAY

Paris--Sep 27--UCN--French agriculture Minister Edith Cresson will discuss a long-term grains agreement with the Soviet Union during her visit to Moscow in October, French agriculture ministry officials said.

Whereas last season France had little difficulty in disposing of its crop, this years record French crop, the large EEC harvest and a world surplus mean larger exports are necessary in 1982-83.

Great attention again is being given to the creation of long-term grains pacts with importers, they told unicom news.

Various unconfirmed rumors in trade circles have said France would like to sell 1 or 2 million tonnes of soft wheat to the USSR this year. Officials declined to deny these figures.

Traders have made offers on French wheat to the Soviet Union, but Moscow has not accepted. Traders say the Soviet Union is trying to drive prices down or wait until the market falls further before buying.

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CLASSIFICATION

# CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47493

PAGE Ø1 SIT87Ø PARIS 4627

DATE 10/14/82

DTG: 081501Z OCT 82 PSN: 008787

TOR: 281/1643Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

E OB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4627 28115Ø1
O Ø815Ø1Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4440

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 34627

EXDIS

PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/8/88

TAGS: PINT, OVIP (CHIRAC, JACQUES), FR, US
SUBJECT: CHIRA REQUEST TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

- 2. FORMER MINISTER JEAN DE LIPKOWSKI, CHIRAC'S PRINCIPAL ADVISOR ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CALLED DCM EVENING OF OCTOBER 7 TO SAY THAT CHIRAC WISHES TO VISIT THE U. S. SOME TIME DURING NOVEMBER, DECEMBER OR JANUARY (I. E., AFTER U. S. ELECTIONS AND WELL BEFORE FRENCH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN MARCH). CHIRAC IS VERY MUCH HOPING THAT HE CAN BE RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND THE PURPOSE OF DE LIPKOWSKI'S CALL WAS TO INQUIRE WHEN DURING THIS TIME PERIOD MOULD BE THE MOST CONVENIENT FOR A BRIEF CALL ON THE PRESIDENT. CHIRAC WOULD THEN PLAN THE SPECIFIC DATES OF HIS VISIT AROUND THIS EVENT.
- 3. DCM NOTED THE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE, AND THE MANY FOREIGN VISITORS WHO WISH TO SEE HIM. "IT WAS, THEREFORE, SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN SPECIFIC DATES FOR A VISIT WELL IN ADVANCE. DCM SAID WE WOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUBMIT CHIRAC'S REQUEST IMMEDIATELY AND BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH LIPKOWSKI.

4. DURING CONVERSATION, LIPKOWSKI STRESSED THAT THE GAULLISTS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REVISED THEIR APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY, ALIGNING IT MUCH MORE CLOSELY WITH U. S. POLICIES. AS AN ILLUSTRATION, LIPKOWSKI SAID THE GAULLISTS WERE NOW THE ONLY FRENCH POLITICAL FORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE. LIPKOWSKI SAID HE WOULD SEND DCM A PAPER OUTLINING PRESENT GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS (WE WILL FORWARD TO DEPARTMENT WHEN RECEIVED).

5. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: CHIRAC HAS RECENTLY SHOWN THAT HE HAS SENSED A DEGREE OF VULNERABILITY IN THE SOCIALIST REGIME. WHILE THERE ARE NO NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE UNTIL THE SCHEDULED LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN 1986, HE IS BANKING HEAVILY ON USING NEXT SPRING'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS TO SHOW THAT THE SOCIALISTS NO LONGER HAVE THE BACKING OF THE MAJORITY OF FRENCH VOTERS. HE APPARENTLY HOPES THUS TO FORCE EARLY LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. HE IS PRESENTLY THE LEADING OPPOSITION FIGURE IN FRANCE, AND A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WILL OBVIOUSLY ADD TO HIS PRESTIGE.

6. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT AGREE TO SEE CHIRAC BRIEFLY WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON. THE MEETING NEED TAKE NO MORE THAN 20-30 MINUTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TIME, INCLUDING PHOTOS. IT SHOULD BE BILLED AS A COURTESY TO CHIRAC, WHO WOULD BE RETURNING THE CALL WHICH THE PRESIDENT PAID ON HIM AT THE PARIS CITY HALL LAST JUNE. IT WOULD ALSO BE ENTIRELY IN LINE WITH THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PRESIDENTIAL TRADITION OF RECEIVING OPPOSITION LEADERS FROM FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. WE WOULD LIKE TO TELL CHIRAC THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO POINT HIM TOWARD A GENERAL TIMEFRAME FOR THE VISIT. REQUEST EARLY INSTRUCTIONS, SINCE A LENGTHY DELAY IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESPONDING WILL BE INTERPRETED AS UNWILLINGNESS TO SEE CHIRAC. GALBRAITH

PARIS 4627

DTG: Ø815Ø1Z OCT 82 PSN: ØØ8787

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BY (V NARA DATE 5/19/10

PAGE Ø1

SECSTATE WASHDC 5962

DTG: Ø92146Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø11399 TOR: 283/1614Z

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SITØØ1 DATE 10/12/82

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5962 2822155
O Ø92146Z OCT 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3943

SECRET STATE 285962
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT, PEPR, FR
SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION

1. S/- ENTIRE TEXT.

- 2. IT HAS NOW BEEN MORE THAN TWO WEEKS SINCE YOU ACCOMPANIED DICK WALTERS ON HIS CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON TO DISCUSS OUR NEW CONCERNS ABOUT THE MT-20 SYSTEM SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION. SINCE THEN WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM THE GOF EITHER IN THE COURSE OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH CHEYSSON ON SEPTEMBER 26 OR SUBSEQUENTLY. I AM CONCERNED THAT WE NOT LET THIS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ISSUE SLIP AND GIVE THE FRENCH THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS NOT OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE USG.
- 3. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT FOR MONDAY, OCTOBER 11 WITH CHEYSSON OR, IF HE IS UNAVAILABLE, WITH GUTHMANN ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD NOTE THE BACKGROUND OF OUR CONCERNS AND THE FACT THAT WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE GOF ON THE SUBJECT OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FINALLY, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT HAS NOW BEEN MORE THAN TWO WEEKS SINCE WALTER'S CONSULTATIONS WITH CHEYSSON AND MARION. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE GOF HAS DECIDED TO CANCEL THE MT-20 SALE. DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 5962

DTG: Ø92146Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø11399

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NLRRMO7-081 #47494

BY (IV NARA DATE S/19/10

SECRET

# CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1

PARIS 4806

DTG: Ø91140Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø10317

SIT806 DATE 10/12/82

TOR: 282/1427Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #4806 2821140 0 091140Z OCT 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 34806

NODIS

E. O. - 12356: DECL: OADR ~

TAGS: ANZUS, PL

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON BAN OF SOLIDARITY

REF: STATE 285209

ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DCM CONVEYED REFTEL POINTS TO QUAL POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI MORNING OF OCTOBER 9. GALBRAITH

PAGE Ø1

SECSTATE WASHDC 6017

DTG: 111828Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø126Ø4

\$17999 DATE 10/12/82

TOR: 284/21Ø8Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT TEIC EOB

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6017 2841837
0 111828Z OCT 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3956 AMEMBASSY ROME 9209 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3691

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2820 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3134

CONFIDENT | A L STATE 286017

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SUBJECT:

MILI, MASS, IS, LE, US, PEPR, IT, FR

FRENCH REQUEST FOR JOINT STATEMENT ON MNF ROLE

1. FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED ON ACTING SECRETARY DAM UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 10. THE CHARGE INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO DETERMINE IF FRANCE (AND THE UNITED STATES) WOULD JOIN THE ITALIANS IN A JOINT STATEMENT OUTLINING THE LIMITATIONS WHICH WERE APPLICABLE TO THE MNF REGARDING INTERNAL SECURITY. CHARGE INDICATED THAT FRANCE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN BEIRUT AND THAT BOTH ITALIAN AND FRENCH PRESS WERE CRITICIZING GOL ARRESTS OF PALESTINIANS UNDER THEPROTECTION OF THE MNF. CHARGE SAID HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO DETERMINE IF—THE—UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO JOIN IN A STATEMENT WHICH LIMITED THE MNF FROM PARTICIPATION IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LEBANON'S INTERNAL SECURITY. THE STATEMENT COULD BE USED WITH AMIN GEMAYEL TO ELICIT AN AGREED PUBLIC POSTURE. IN ADDITION, UNTSO OBSERVERS MIGHT INFORM THEMSELVES REGARDING GOL ACTIONS. THE FRENCH CHARGE STRESSED THE URGENCY OF MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION.

2. ACTING SECRETARY DAM SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO COOPERATE WITH THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS IN THIS RESPECT. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT O TO JOIN IN A STATEMENT IF IT WERE TO CHANGE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MNF, SINCE WE WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO CONGRESS UNDER THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION. THE FRENCH CHARGE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE STATEMENT NEED ALTER THE TERMS OF REFERENCE. ACTING SECRETARY INDICATED HIS CONCERN THAT WE NOT UNDERMINE GOL'S AUTHORITY, ALTHOUGH

WE TOO WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF GOL ACTIONS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO WORK AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE SECOND PHASE WITHDRAWAL AND A POSSIBLE EXPANDED MNF ROLE. THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE SECOND PHASE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR ON THE 14TH AND WOULD NEED TO CONSULT AS WELL WITH THE GOL AND THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS.

3. THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD DETERMINE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND CONSULT INTERNALLY ON THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. HE ASKED THE CHARGE TO SEEK HIS GOVERNMENT'S THINKING ON WHAT A JOINT STATEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE. THE FRENCH CHARGE AGREED AND ADDED THAT WE MUST REMAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE CONTINUING FRENCH VIEW THAT MNF FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM BEIRUT EXPEDITIOUSLY AND REPLACED BY UNIFIL CONTINGENTS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 6017

DTG: 111828Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø126Ø4

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 # 47496

BY 1 NARA DATE 5/6/10

PAGE Ø1

PARIS 10/12 4822

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DTG: 121237Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø13371 TOR: 285/1423Z

SIT795 DATE 10/12/82

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB

FOR:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #4822 2851237 0 121237Z OCT 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4574

SECRET PARIS 34822

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 10/12/88 TAGS: EEWT, NATO, ECIN, SOV, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN NATO ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.)

- 2. IN FRANK PRESENTATION TO DCM OCTOBER 8. QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI (PROTECT) EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE USG WOULD TRY TO GIVE THE NATO FORUM THE LEADING ROLE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ANDREANI STRESSED IMPORTANCE FRENCH ATTACH TO WORKING OUT A BASIC UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT AMONG THE FOUR IN THE QUADRIPARTITE FORUM. FRENCH DO NOT OBJECT TO EXPANDING SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE NATO 16 AFTER BROAD QUADRIPARTITE CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED.
- 3. REFERRING TO DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK AND LA SAPINIERE, ANDREANI SAID CHEYSSON WAS GENERALLY DELIGHTED WITH THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND WITH HIS FIRST

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) .

MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY. NEVERTHELESS , FRENCH HAD BEEN UNEASY WHEN THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN BROACHED AT LA SAPINIERE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WAS NOTHING APPROACH-ING A CONSENSUS AMONG THE FOUR. THEY RECOGNIZE. OF COURSE, THAT IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT LA SAPINIERE.

- 4. ANDREANI NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO HISTORICAL FRENCH AVERSION TO ATTEMPTS TO SET ECONOMIC POLICIES AT NATO, THERE WERE TWO ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY FRENCH DID NOT WANT NATO TO HAVE THE LEADING ROLE ON THE EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUE AT THIS TIME:
- (1) THERE IS A GROWING FACTION WITHIN THE SOCIALIST PARTY WHICH IS CALLING FOR A POLICY OF GREATER FRENCH

EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS (SEE SEPTEL). USG INSISTENCE ON A LEADING ROLF FOR NATO ON SUCH A PUBLIC ISSUE AT THIS TIME WILL STRENGTHEN THIS NEO-GAULLIST FACTION.

- (2) THE FRENCH WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE CABINET (INCLUDING THE FOUR COMMUNIST MINISTERS) FOR WHATEVER OVER-ALL POLICY LINE EMERGES FROM THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS. THIS WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DO IF THE POLICY IS SEEN AS ONE EMERGING FROM NATO AND BEARING THE NATO STAMP.
- 5. ANDREAN! ASKED US TO TRY TO EXPLAIN THESE PROBLEMS TO WASHINGTON SO THAT THE USG WOULD NOT INSIST ON A PROMINENT NATO ROLE, BUT WOULD INSTEAD SEEK QUADRIPARTITE CONSENSUS, WITH ALLIANCE CONCURRENCE FOLLOWING ALONG NATURALLY AFTERWARDS. GALBRAITH

PARIS 10/12 4822

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C O N F I D E N TO I A L SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS 34861

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 10/12/88

TAGS: PEPR, FR, UR

SUBJECT: FRENCH OPENINGS TO MOSCOW REF: (A) PARIS 32889, (B) MOSCOW 12181

1. (0 - ENTIRE TEXT.)

- 2. SUMMARY: DURING BROAD-RANGING DISCUSSION WITH QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI ON OCTOBER 8, DCM ASKED ABOUT SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT FRENCH CONTACTS WITH THE USSR. ANDREANI'S REPLIES HELP TO EXPLAIN CURRENT SPATE OF FRANCO-SOVIET CONTACTS, AND SUGGEST THAT A POLICY OF SOMEWHAT WARMER RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO BE PURSUED. END SUMMARY.
- 3. DCM NOTED ANDREAM'S OWN CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW, THE VISIT THERE BY FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIANS, CONTACTS BY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, AND PLANNED VISITS BY MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE (CRESSON) AND INDUSTRY (CHEVENEMENT). DCM SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE A GENERAL FRENCH OPENING TOWARD THE USSR AND ASKED HOW WE SHOULD INTERPRET THESE EVENTS. DID THEY REFLECT A NEW FRENCH POLICY?

4. IN REPLY, ANDREANI SAID THAT, IN FACT, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE WITHIN THE GOF AT THE PRESENT TIME ON HOW FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS SHOULD EVOLVE. ONE FACTION, LED BY CHEYSSON, ARGUES THAT CONSISTENCY IN FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION.
MITTERRAND HAVING ENUNCIATED A STRONG PRINCIPLED STANCE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AS A RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTIONS

IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND, IT IS ESSENTIAL—FOR THE GOF—TO STICK TO THIS LINE UNTIL THOSE SITUATIONS IMPROVE. THE OTHER FACTION (LEADERS UNSPECIFIED) EVOKES A KIND OF NEO-GAULLIST THINKING AND ADVOCATES A RETURN TO FRENCH EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THIS FACTION HAS GAINED STRENGTH IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, AND SEES SOME POSITIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM A SOMEWHAT WARMER ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR DURING THE LEADUP TO NEXT SPRING'S IMPORTANT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

5. ANDREANI RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESSURES OF THE SECOND FACTION HAD RESULTED IN A FEW GESTURES TOWARD THE SOVIETS, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD GO MUCH FURTHER THAN THAT. ANDREANI SAID THE GOF WILL MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE THAT FRANCE CANNOT HAVE "NORMAL" RELATIONS WITH THE USSR UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHEN DCM ASKED WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS BETWEEN A "NORMAL" RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRESENT STAE OF FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS, ANDREANI NOTED THAT THE FRANCO-SOVIET TREATY SIGNED BY POMPIDOU CALLS FOR CONSULTATIONS EVERY SIX MONTHS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINIS-TERS AND SUMMIT-LEVEL MEETINGS ONCE A YEAR. ALTHOUGH CHEYSSON HAD MET WITH GROMYKO AT THE UN. THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFORT TO HAVE SPECIFIC BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND SUMMIT LEVEL MEETINGS WERE EXCLUDED. ANDREANI RECOGNIZED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL VISITS ARE NOTCH UP FROM THE PREVIOUS LEVEL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

OF CONTACT, AND ADDED THAT A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL (PROBABLY PATOLICHEV) WOULD VISIT PARIS SOON. BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS LEVEL OF CONTACT AND WHAT WOULD BE "NORMAL" FOR THE FRENCH.

- 6. ANDREANI POOH-POOHED THE SOCIALIST PARTY'S CONTACTS AS MAINLY FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL APPEARANCES. THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE FRENCH SIDE--HUNTZINGER AND SOCIALIST DISARMAMENT EXPERT SOPPELSA--HAD RELATIVELY LITTLE TO DO WITH REAL GOF POLICIES AND WERE MORE INTELLECTUALS THAN ANYTHING ELSE. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF HOW FAR OUT THEIR IDEAS ARE, ANDREANI SAID THEY HAD AT ONE POINT ADVOCATD A NUCLEAR ELEMENT FOR THE CDE.
- 7. DCM ASKED IF THE ANTICIPATED FURTHER POLISH STEPS
  AGAINST SOLIDARITY WERE CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT
  ESCALATION BY THE FRENCH, AND WHETHER THESE WOULD HAVE A
  NEGATIVE EFFECT ON FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.
  ANDREANI REPLIED THAT WHILE THE POLISH MEASURES WERE
  CERTAINLY AN ESCALATION, THEY WERE NOT UNEXPECTED.
  ANDREANI THOUGHT MAKING SOLIDARITY ILLEGAL WAS IN THE
  LOGIC OF THE POLISH CRACKDOWN SINCE LAST DECEMBER,

PARIS 4861

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BY CV NARADATE 5/19/18

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 0057 AMEMBASSY LONDON 3409 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5135 USMISSION USNATO 2647 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 34861 EXDIS
AND NO ONE COULD BE SURPRISED BY IT. HE DID NOT THINK IT CHANGED THE SITUATION IN A FUNDAMENTAL WAY. DESPITE STRONG POPULAR SYMPATHY HERE FOR SOLIDARITY, FRENCH POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR WERE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE.

8. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, WE HAVE NOTED THAT, ACCORDING TO HIS OFFICIAL CALENDAR, MITTERRAND WILL RECEIVE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CHERVONENKO ON OCTOBER 12. IN THE PAST THE SOVIETS HAVE USED SUCH MEETINGS TO DELIVER IMPORTANT MESSAGES FROM BREZHNEV. GALBRAITH

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4607

S E C R E T PARIS 34914 NODIS E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: EEWT, PEPR, FR

SUBJECT: MT-20 SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION

REF: STATE 285962

1. (S/- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BOTH CHEYSSON AND GUTMANN ARE OUT OF TOWN AT PRESENT, AS IS PAYE WHO ATTENDED THE SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING. GIVEN HIGHLY IMPORTANT AND EXTREMELY SENSITIVE NATURE OF THIS ISSUE, I HAVE REQUESTED MEETING WITH CHEYSSON UPON HIS RETURN ON THURSDAY, OR LATEST FRIDAY, AND WILL COMMUNICATE MESSAGE TO HIM AS PER REFTEL.

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4177

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8156 AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6420 AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY 9359 AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 7651 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 9843 AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 7851 AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2287 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 9800 AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 3275 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 4235 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 9926 AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 9818 AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 4982 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 3254 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 4911 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3003

S-E C R E T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 STATE 289644 NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, FR, US

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR: NAMIBIA ET AL

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

SUMMARY: UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN FRENCH AMBASSADOR VERNIER-PALLIEZ THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 14 TO DISCUSS OUR GENERAL CONCERN WITH THE RECENT SPATE OF COMMENTS BY HIGH FRENCH OFFICIALS CRITICAL OF THE US, AND OUR PARTICULAR UNHAPPINESS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON'S REMARKS IN DAR AND NAIROBL REGARDING ANGOLA/NAMIBIA. AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER AND EUR DAS BLACKWILL ALSO PARTICIPATED. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE WERE CONFUSED AND UPSET WITH FRENCH COMMENTS THAT WERE IN MANY INSTANCES UNFRIENDLY. HE CITED PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S BURUNDI REMARKS AS AN EXAMPLE. HE SAID WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THESE COMMENTS WERE COMING AT A TIME WHEN SO MANY THINGS ARE GOING WELL IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, COOPERATION IN LEBANON AND GOOD TALKS IN NEW YO ND AT LA SAPINIERE. IN PARTICULAR, WE WERE

UNHAPPY WITH RECENT STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON, WHO, INTER ALIA, HAD DENIED THE NEED FOR A

CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AS PART OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND HAD ACCUSED THE "SUPER POWERS" OF PRESSURING TO SPLIT THE OAU. HE TERMED THE ANGOLA/NAMIBIA REMARKS "DANGEROUS" AND LIABLE TO SEND THE WRONG SIGNALS TO THE ANGOLANS, THE FRONT LINE STATES, SWAPO ET AL. HE NOTED THAT THESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE IN DIRECT CONTRAST TO CHEYSSON'S PRIVATE POSITION, BOTH IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY AND AT THE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT GROUP BREAKFAST IN NEW YORK. VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE MEETING TO PARIS AND ADDED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS LATEST ROUND OF CRITICAL COMMENTS INDICATED A HIGH LEVEL OF FRUSTRATION IN PARIS IN THE WAKE OF POST-VERSAILLES SUMMIT DEVELOPMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE SECRETARY TO EXPRESS OUR CONFUSION AND CONCERN, BOTH GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY, ABOUT THE TONE OF RECENT COMMENTS BY HIGH FRENCH OFFICIALS. HE SAID HE KNEW THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN HIS OCTOBER 12 MEETING WITH VERNIER-PALLIEZ, HAD RAISED THE MATTER OF PRIME MINISTER MAUROY'S UNGA SPEECH. THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S REMARKS IN BURUNDI (I.E., RE COMMODITY MARKETS, US FOREIGN AID

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

EXPENDITURES, ETC). WE WERE SURPRISED AT WHAT COULD ONLY BE VIEWED AS THE UNFRIENDLY TONE OF THESE REMARKS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY WERE NOT MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPEAKING TO FRENCHMEN, BUT RATHER TO THIRD PARTIES.

4. EAGLEBURGER SAID OUR SPECIFIC CONCERN, HOWEVER, RELATED TO CHEYSSON'S REPEATED QUOTES ABOUT THE ANGOLAN/NAMIBIAN SITUATION. HE CITED THREE COMMENTS MADE IN DAR AND NAIROBI: 1) THAT ONLY THE US STOOD IN THE WAY OF A SETTLEMENT BY INSISTING ON LINKING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA TO THE SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA; 2) THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS US POSITION; AND 3) THAT THE "SUPER POWERS" WERE PRESSURING TO SPLIT THE OAU. EAGLEBURGER STRESSED THAT THE SECRETARY. CROCKER AND HE, HIMSELF, WERE THOROUGHLY CONFUSED IN TRYING TO COMPARE CHEYSSON'S PUBLIC COMMENTS WITH HIS PRIVATE POSITION AT THE CONTACT GROUP BREAKFAST WHICH THEY HAD ALL ATTENDED IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 1. THE SECRETARY ALSO FELT THAT IN HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH CHEYSSON THERE HAD BEEN NO CONFUSION ABOUT OUR MUTUAL POSITION ON A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. WE UNDERSTOOD, AND HAVE UNDERSTOOD ALL ALONG WHAT THE FRENCH FEEL SHOULD ØE SAID IN PUBLIC ABOUT LINKAGE. NONETHELESS, OUR POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR. THERE CAN BE NO NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT WITHOUT A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. CHEYSSON'S PUBLIC COMMENTS RUN AGAINST THE POSITION HE TOOK WITH THE CONTACT GROUP WHERE HE WAS SUPPORTIVE OF THE PROCESS.

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BY CII NARA DATE / A/10

PAGE Ø1 SIT921 SECSTATE WASHDC 9644

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4178

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8157 AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 6421 AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY 9360 AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 7652 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 9844 AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 7852 AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2288 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 9801 AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 3276 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 4236 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 9927 AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 9819 AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 4983 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 3255 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 4912 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3004

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 289644

5. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED, EAGLEBURGER
STRESSED, THAT SUCH COMMENTS WILL LEAD THE ANGOLANS,
THE FRONT LINE STATES, SWAPO ET AL TO THINK THAT THERE
IS DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP AND THAT THE
CG PROCESS IS COMING TO AN END. ASST. SECRETARY
CROCKER ADDED THAT WHAT IS INVOLVED HERE IS A PRACTICAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IT TAKES TO GET A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. HE, TOO, FEARED THAT CHEYSSON'S PUBLIC STANCE WILL LEAD THE ANGOLANS TO BELIEVE THEY CAN OUTWAIT US. IF THE ANGOLANS DON'T PLAY, THAT MEANS THE END OF THE BALLGAME.

6. VERNIER-PALLIEZ REPLIED THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT CHEYSSON HAD IN MIND BUT WOULD CHECK. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION ON ANGOLA/NAMIBIA WAS CLEAR: NO PUBLIC ADMITTANCE OF LINKAGE BUT PRIVATE ADMITTANCE OF THE FACT THAT TO HAVE PROGRESS THERE WILL HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICAN FROM NAMIBIA. HE REFERRED TO CHEYSSON'S DCTOBER 6 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY PASSING ALONG AN IDEA OFFERED BY ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE. EAGLEBURGER

SAID IT WAS A HELPFUL MESSAGE AND WE WERE STILL STUDYING IT.

VERNIER-PALLIEZ NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF DECLARATIONS RECENTLY LINKING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. SUCH STATEMENTS. HE BELIEVED. MADE MORE DIFFICULT THE POSITION OF THOSE WITHIN THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WHO FAVORED A SETTLEMENT. THERE WAS, AS WE KNEW, TENSION WITHIN THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE. PERHAPS, THE AMBASSADOR VOLUNTEERED, CHEYSSON HAD IN MIND TRYING TO "COUNTER-BALANCE" THESE STATEMENTS ON LINKAGE AND GIVE AMMUNITION TO THOSE ANGOLANS FAVORING A SETTLEMENT. EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S SUPPOSITION WAS A "NICE TRY". BUT THAT IT WAS JUST GOING TOO FAR TO SAY-THAT IF IT WASN'T FOR THE AMERICANS, EVERYTHING WOULD BE SETTLED. CROCKER NOTED THAT THE LINKAGE DECLARATIONS TO WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAD REFERRED HAD COME FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS. WE HAD TOLD OUR PEOPLE NOT TO COMMENT; WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY TO SAY SOMETHING WE TALKED ONLY OF PARALLEL MOVEMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH WERE PUTTING US IN A POSITION WHERE WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO PUBLIC WITH A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF SAYING WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE FRENCH MEAN BECAUSE FRANCE IS BEING VERY HELPFUL TO US ON THE ANGOLAN TRACK.

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DTG: 150249Z OCT 82 PSN: 017244

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. RETURNING TO OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THIS RECENT WAVE OF CRITICAL FRENCH COMMENT, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ASKED WHAT HAD BECOME OF THE "CEASEFIRE" IN THE WAR OF WORDS WORKED OUT EARLIER THIS SUMMER? DID IT TAKE EFFECT ONLY EVERY OTHER MONTH? VERNIER-PALLIEZ REPLIED THAT AS HE HAD MENTIONED TO THE VICE PRESIDENT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF FRUSTRATION AMONG FRENCH OFFICIALDOM RIGHT NOW. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FEELS HE MADE A GREAT EFFORT TO TAKE STRONG POSITIONS FAVORABLE TO US ON EAST-WEST STRATEGIC ISSUES, BUT IS NOW UNHAPPY WITH DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. EAGLEBURGER RETORTED THAT WE THOUGHT WE HAD ALREADY PAID FOR THAT IN THE ATTACK OF CRITICAL COMMENTS WE TOOK IN THE JUNE-JULY PERIOD. THIS NEW WAVE LEFT US CONFUSED, PARTICULARLY AS IT WAS COMING AT A TIME WHEN SO MANY THINGS WERE GOING WELL IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. LEBANON COOPERATION, FOR EXAMPLE. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN GOOD TALKS WITH THE FRENCH IN NEW YORK AND AT LA SAPINIERE. HE CONCLUDED BY AGAIN EXPRESSING OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT SUCH REMARKS, AND OUR PARTICULAR WORRY THAT THE FRENCH WERE SENDING DANGEROUS SIGNALS TO ALL THE WRONG PEOPLE IN THEIR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON ANGOLA/NAMIBIA. SHULTZ

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# CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PARIS 5474

DATE 18/21/82

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POSSIBLE WITH FRENCH USUN MISSION AS THEY MAY BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN LEWIN ON THE ISSUE WHICH IS SEEN AS A

DELICATE ONE AT THE QUAL. GALBRAITH

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4902

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CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 35474 E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PORT, UNSC/FR, BR, DR, VE SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT REF: STATE 285911

- C-ENTIRE TEXT.)
- 2. EMBOFF CARRIED OUT REF DEMARCHE ON OCTOBER 15 WITH QUAI DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ANDRE LEWIN. USING TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REF, WE ASKED THAT THE GOF JOIN US IN SUPPORTING THE ELECTION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
- 3. IN ENSUING CONVERSATION, LEWIN SAID THE FRENCH HAVE STILL NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO SUPPORT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OR NICARAGUA FOR ELECTION AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE INFERRED FROM HIS REMARKS THAT THE GOF DOES NOT FIND IT EASY TO SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL ASPIRATIONS OF NICARAGUA WHICH HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONSISTENTLY VOTED AGAINST THE FRENCH POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. CONVERSELY, THE GOF DOES NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWING THE U.S. POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA. THUS, VOTING FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ALSO PRESENTS A PROBLEM. IT APPEARS THAT FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A THIRD CANDIDATE OTHER THAN SURINAM EMERGE AS A COMPROMISE CHOICE FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT. IN RESPONSE TO OUR PROBING, LEWIN (PROTECT) OPINED THAT THE GOF WOULD BE INCLINED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA OR BRAZIL IN PREFERENCE TO THE OTHER CANDIDATES AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE EMPHA-SIZED HOWEVER, THAT THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE ENTIRE MATTER IS STILL OPEN AND MAY NOT BE DECIDED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT. WE WILL CHECK AGAIN ON OCTOBER 18 IN AN EFFORT TO GET A DEFINITE COMMITMENT FROM THE GOF. WE SUGGEST THAT USMISSION USUN COORDINATE TO THE EXTENT

PARIS 5474

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4975

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 35578 NODIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS PASS NSC INFO FOR JUDGE CLARK E. O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: ECON, FR, U OADR SUBJECT: ATTALI'S COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

( - ENTIRE TEXT.)

- 2. DURING BILATERAL MEETING WITH DEPUTY WHITE HOUSE SCIENCE ADVISOR MARCUM ON MATTERS RELATING TO SUMMIT WORKING GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY (REPORTED SEPTEL) FRENCH SIDE (GROS) MENTIONED IN STRONG TERMS MITTERRAND'S UN-HAPPINESS OVER PROPOSED TIMING OF WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT, SAYING MITTERRAND COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT GO IN MAY OR MARCUM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THOSE WERE INDEED THE DATES UNDER CONSIDERATION. ATTALI ADDED THAT MITTERRAND WANTS SMALLER SUMMITS, WITHOUT OVERSELLING OF PROSPECTS.
- COMMENT: ATTALI WILL PROBABLY RAISE THESE ISSUES WHEN YOU SEE HIM ON OCTOBER 30. HE HAS BEEN ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO HOLDING THE SUMMIT BEFORE JULY, AND HAS SINCE VERSAILLES BEEN STRESSING MITTERRAND'S DESIRE TO GET BACK TO A MUCH SIMPLER TYPE OF SUMMIT, WITH MUCH LESS PRESS ATTENTION, FEWER ADVISORS, LESS FORMAL PREPARATION AND A SOMEWHAT LESS STRUCTURED FORMAT. I WILL BRIEF YOU

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

FURTHER ON FRENCH ATTITUDES WHEN I SEE YOU OCTOBER 29. GALBRAITH

PARIS 5578

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0 1816097 OCT 82 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY PARTS TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 5014

SECRET PARIS 35644

NODIS EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY AND EAGLEBURGER

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EYES ONLY TO NSC JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 123561 DECL: DADR TARS: EFWT, FR PIPELINE SANCTIONS

(A) STATE 287234; (B) PARIS 33272

- (SECRET ENTIRE TEXT)
- THERE IS MUCH TO BE GAINED IF THE GOALS SET FORTH IN THE NON-PAPER CAN BE REACHED. THESE GOALS HAVE AN INDEPENDENT VALUE OF THEIR OWN, BUT AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR EXISTING SANCTIONS THE NON-PAPER HAS THREE SHORTCOMINGS:
- (A) THERE IS NO METHOD BY WHICH A MECHANISM SUCH AS COCOM CAN BE ENFORCED. EACH DECISION IS SUBJECTIVE. THE EFFECT OF A SHIPMENT REASONABLE MEN MAY DIFFER ABOUT: ON SOVIET MILITARY POTENTIALS WHAT CONSTITUTES SUBSIDIZA-TIONS WHAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE SOVIET STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. ETC. WE HAVE HAD COCOM AROUND FOR THIRTY YEARS AND THE RECORD IS MOST DISCOURAGING; EVASION FOR COMMERCIAL SECRET



# Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

. PAGE 82

PARTS

35644 1816102

ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE. IT IS ADMIRABLE TO TRY YET ONCE AGAIN TO STRENGTHEN (I FIRST HEARD THAT WORD IN THIS CONTEXT, IN 1967 AS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE WORKING ON COCOM CASES) COCOM, BUT TO TRADE SOMETHING SPECIFIC FOR THIS RENEWED EFFORT IS SELF-DECEIVING.

(B) THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO POLAND. TO DROP OUR SANCTIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR LOFTY DECLARATIONS WILL BE RECEIVED WITH DERISION, SEEN AS FOLAND JOINING EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST AND PRAGUE IN THE GARBAGE CAN OF HISTORY.

(C) THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE PIPELINE. PRESENT SANCTIONS ARE GOING TO CAUSE ADDITIONAL DELAYS AND COSTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO BACK OFF THEH NOW WILL BENEFIT THE SOVIETS BY MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. MOREOVER, A REVERSAL OF THIS HAGNITUDE WILL CREATE AN UPROAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE AND WILL BE A BLOW TO THE PRESIDENT'S CREDABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND. IF HE WERE TO MAINTAIN ONLY THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ROTORS AND GIVE WAY ON THE OTHERS WE WOULD PROBABLY ACHIEVE THE DELAY HE HOPED FOR AND AT THE SAME TIME BRING RELIEF TO THE OTHER MANUFACTURERS. I SUGGEST THEREFORE WE JOIN MY PROPOSED COMPROMISE (REF 'B') TO I THINK WE HAVE A CHANCE OF THE FRENCH YOUR PLAN. AGREEING.

3. THERE ARE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NON-PAPER WHICH I MENTION BRIEFLY:

(A) CREDIT IS AN AREA WHERE WE ARE ALREADY WINNING BECAUSE OF THE PRECIPITOUS DROP IN THE SOVIET UNION'S CREDIT STANDING AND THE HUGE LOSSES THE BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS FACE ON THEIR FOREIGN LOANS IN GENERAL.

SECRET



# Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 83

PARTS

35644 181619Z

IT IS LIKELY WE CAN THEREFORE MAKE SOME PROGRESS ON CREDIT BECAUSE VERY LITTLE LENDING TO THE SOVIETS IS APT TO TAKE PLACE FOR SOME TIME ANYWAY; I WOULD NOT GIVE UP MUCH TO ACHIEVE THAT WHICH IS ALREADY BEING ACHIEVED.

(B) ENERGY STUDIES ARE GOING ON ALL OVER EUROPE; I AM PRIVY TO SEVERAL, THE OIL COMPANIES, THE GAS DISTRIBUTORS, GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, IEA, ETC., ETC. ANOTHER STUDY IS NOT GOING TO ADD MUCH.

(C) LIMITATIONS IN SOVIET GAS PURCHASES SHOULD BE ACHIEVABLE. THE GAS DISTRIBUTORS WANT TO CONTRACT FOR ALTERNATE SOURCES SUCH AS NORWAY. INCIDENTALLY, ONE SPECIFIC THING WE SHOULD DO NOW IS TO URGE THE ITALIANS NOT TO CONFIRM THE SNAM CONTRACT FOR SOVIET GAS.

4. FOR ANY AGREEMENT TO BE SUCCESSFUL IT MUST RETAIN SOMETHING ON POLAND AND MUST ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PIPELINE. OTHERWISE WE WILL BE SEEN AS CREATING A DIVERSION, A COVERUP. OUR COURSE IS SOUND. IT CAN BE ADJUSTED BUT NOT ABANDONED. GALBRAITH

SECRET

PAGE Ø1

SECSTATE WASHDC 3146

DTG: 191838Z OCT 82 PSN: 823865

SIT911 DATE 10/22/82 TOR: 292/2243Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC 3146

DTG: 1918387 OCT 82 PSN: Ø23865

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3146 2921843
O 191838Z OCT 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4431

SECRET STATE 293146
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EEWT
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO LA SAPINIERE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DANISH AMBASSADOR, ACTING IN HIS ROLE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EC PRESIDENCY, CALLED ON ME OCTOBER 18 TO SAY THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS BASED ON "THE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTIONS." THEY SUGGESTED THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS (THE SEVEN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES PLUS THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE EC COMMISSION) WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE GROUP FOR THESE COMMISSIONS. SEVERAL POINTS ARE LEFT UNCLEAR-WHETHER THE "SUGGESTIONS" MEANS THE NON-PAPER; BY WHOM THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES WILL BE REPRESENTED (A POINT LEFT, BY THE COMMUNITY, AT EACH NATION'S DISCRETION). HOWEVER, THIS MAY BE A BASIS FOR CALLING A MEETING HERE IN WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WHILE WE DESIRE TO KEEP DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE CENTRALIZED IN MASHINGTON, YOU ARE OF COURSE FREE TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR AWARENESS OF THE COMMUNITY'S MESSAGE.

YOU MAY ALSO BE ASKED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF JAPAN. IN THAT CASE, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT JAPAN HAS RESPONDED IN A GENERALLY POSITIVE WAY; THAT JAPAN DOES HAVE PROBLEMS WITH PARA 3 (D) OF THE NON-PAPER (REGARDING EXAMINATION OF CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION); THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING THIS POINT FURTHER WITH THE JAPANESE. SHULTZ

NLRRMO7-081# 47501

BY (IV NARADATE 5/19/10

#### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

S1T918

SECSTATE WASHDC 3234

DATE 10/22/82

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DTG: 191946Z OCT 82 PSN: 023850

TOR: 292/2233Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT

FOR-

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #3234 2921955 O 191946Z OCT 82 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4436

SECRET STATE 293234

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWT EFIN UR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN

MINISTER CHEYYSON

- 1. ENTIRE TEXT SECRET.
- 2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARA THREE BELOW TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AT OOB. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR CLAUDE:

SINCE OUR MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND AT LA SAPINIERE, I HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON CURRENT DIFFERENCES WITHIN OUR ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTION OF EAST-WEST TRADE. I NOTED WITH INTEREST THE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE OCTOBER 16-17 MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

EC TEN, THE RESULTS OF WHICH WERE COMMUNICATED TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY BY THE DANISH AMBASSADOR. IN THE INTEREST OF MOVING

AHEAD QUICKLY TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON THE QUESTION OF EAST-WEST TRADE WHICH COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR RESOLVING OUR DISAGREEMENTS, I HAVE ASKED UNDER SECRETARIES EAGLEBURGER AND WALLIS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT TO MEET WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF OUR SMALLER GROUP HERE IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY MORNING. THIS MEETING WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A LARGER MEETING ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON ATTENDED BY THE AMBASSADORS OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT COUNTRIES PLUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DANISH PRESIDENCY AND THE EC COMMISSION.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT THESE MEETINGS WILL RESULT IN

AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PAPER WHICH I GAVE YOU AT LA SAPINIERE. AS YOU KNOW. I DISCUSSED THAT PAPER WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHO FOUND IT SATISFACTORY WITH ONE RATHER MINOR CHANGE REGARDING NATURAL GAS PURCHASES WHICH HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO YOU. I BELIEVE THAT THIS OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO TAKE A STEP WHICH WILL BOTH RESOLVE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACE AS WELL AS ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM COORDINATED STRATEGY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

IN ALL FRANKNESS, HOWEVER, I MUST TELL YOU THAT I AM CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MEETINGS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY MAY NOT RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BUT RATHER BOG DOWN IN CONTINUED DISAGREEMENT ON POINTS OF DETAIL AND QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY, INDEED, WERE WE TO LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE WHAT IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN OUR ALLIANCE, AND I HOPE THAT THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETINGS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE A FORTHCOMING AND POSITIVE APPROACH. IN THIS CONNECTION, I MUST SAY IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL REACT. RICK BURT'S REPORT TO ME ON HIS MEEETING OCTOBER 18 IN PARIS, AT WHICH YOUR POLITICAL DIRECTOR JACQUES ANDREAN! PRESENTED SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WAS NOT ENCOURAGING ON THIS REGARD. I HOPE THAT THESE CONCERNS PROVE UNJUSTIFIED AND THAT WE CAN MOVE QUICKLY TO REACH CONSENSUS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

SINCERELY, /S/ GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SHULT7

SECSTATE WASHDC 3234

DTG: 191946Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø2385Ø

NLRR M07-081 # 47505 BY (N NARA DATE 5/19/10

# CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47506

PAGE Ø1 SIT581 PARIS 5783

DATE 10/21/82

DTG: 191349Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø23243

TOR: 292/1439Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHER COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #5783 292135Ø
0 191349Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5091

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 35783
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WALLIS
NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
WHITE HOUSE FOR DEAVER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OTRA
TAGS: OCON, FR
SUBJECT: WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT
REF: CLARK/GALBRAITH TELECONS OCTOBER 18

- 1. (C ENTIRE TEXT.)
- 2. PER REFTELCONS, WE CONTACTED ATTALI OCTOBER 18 TO ASK IF FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT OUR PROPOSED DATES OF MAY 20-21-22 FOR WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT. ATTALI SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD EVER HEARD THESE DATES, BUT, IN ANY CASE, AS HE HAD MADE CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MITTERRAND'S CALENDAR WAS SUCH THAT HE COULD ACCEPT NO REPEAT NO SUMMIT DATES BEFORE JULY 1. ATTALI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD JAPANESE ALSO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH DATES BEFORE JULY 1, SO FRENCH WERE NOT ALONE.
- 3. ATTALI STRESSED THAT IN HIS VIEW DATES FOR SUMMIT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AMONG THE SHERPAS. SINCE ATTALI IS STILL CHAIRMAN OF THE SHERPA GROUP UNTIL JANUARY 1, HE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS INVITING THE SHERPAS TO A MEETING HERE OVER THE FIRST WEEKEND IN DECEMBER. THE PROBLEM OF DATES, AND ALL OTHER PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE SUMMIT, CAN BE DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME.

4. ATTALI WAS RESENTFUL THAT A COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN SENT DIRECTLY TO A FRENCH OFFICIAL (DUFOUR) BY PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MICHAEL DEAVER, INVITING HIM TO A MEETING IN WILLIAMSBURG. ATTALI SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO PUT ALL THE EXPERIENCE AND ASSISTANCE OF THE GOF AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE AMERICANS ORGANIZING THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT, BUT HE, ATTALI, WAS THE ONLY FRENCH SHERPA AND ALL COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE SUMMIT MEETING HAD TO BE ADDRESSED TO HIM. ATTALI ALSO BELIEVES THAT IT IS HIS PREROGATIVE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SHERPAS UNTIL JANUARY 1

TO CONVENE MEETINGS ON SUMMIT SUBJECTS.

5. WE RECOMMEND THAT A SINGLE POINT OF CONTROL FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE USG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THIS EMBASSY IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROPER HANDLING. GALBRAITH

PARIS 5783

DTG-1913497 OCT 82 PSN- 023243

NLRR M7-081 47-506

CH NARADATE 5/19/10

# SECRET

### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47507

PAGE Ø1 SIT851 PARIS 5784 DATE 10/22/82 DTG: 191352Z OCT 82 PSN: 023253

TOR: 292/1446Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #5784 2921353
O 191352Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5092

SECRE T PARIS 35784

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OTRA

TAGS: MASS PMMC FR, UR

SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO USSR

REF: (A) STATE 285962, (B) PARIS 34914

- 1. 48 ENTIRE TEXT. )
- 2. PAYE TOLD US OCTOBER 18 THAT CHEYSSON HAD "FORGOTTEN" TO MENTION THIS SUBJECT TO THE SECRETARY WHEN THEY MET IN NEW YORK AND LA SAPINIERE.
- 3. PAYE SAID THERE IS NOW A POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRENCH REPLY ON THIS ISSUE WILL BE SENT BY MITTERRAND AS A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 19 (STATE 263769). HE IS CHECKING ON THIS POSSIBILITY AND PROMISED TO INFORM US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GALBRAITH

NLRR MUT-081 H41507

BY (N NARA DATE S | 9 | 10

# SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47508

PAGE Ø1 SIT849 PARIS 5819 DATE 10/22/82 DTG: 191750Z OCT 82 PSN: 023584

TOR: 292/1911Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: ---CHECKLIST---

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE .

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #5819 2921750
O 191750Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5120

SECRET PARIS 35819

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OTRA

TAGS: MASS, PMMC FR, UR

SUBJECT: MT-20 SALE TO SOVIETS

REF: PARIS 35784 AND PREVIOUS

- 1. AS ENTIRE TEXT. )
- 2. PAYE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 19 THAT, AFTER CONSIDERING OUR LATEST ARGUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT, FRENCH HAD NEVERTHELESS DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE SALE. PAYE SAID FRENCH HAD CONCLUDED THAT, AS A TECHNICAL MATTER, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COUNTER THE EFFECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MT-20, AND THAT IT THEREFORE WAS NOT NECESSARY TO STOP THE SALE. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED PAYE (WHO WAS READING FROM A DOCUMENT) IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A COPY OF THIS TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. PAYE IS CHECKING ON THIS.
- 3. PAYE SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN HOW THE OFFICIAL FRENCH REPLY WOULD BE CONVEYED TO US; THERE IS STILL A POSSIBILITY THAT IT WILL BE SENT AS A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE.
- 4. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE FRENCH REPLY WAS LIKELY TO HAVE A VERY BAD IMPACT IN WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN THE GOF HAS STRESSED ITS INTEREST IN JOINING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

WITH US TO STRENGTHEN COCOM. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M67-08174 47408

BY (11 NARA DATE 5 | 9 | 10

SECRET

# SEGRET

### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47509

PAGE Ø1 SIT842 PARIS 6165 DATE 10/22/82

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DTG: 211206Z OCT 82 PSN: 026500

TOR: 294/1303Z

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FOR:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6165 2941207
O 211206Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5279

SECRET PARIS 36165
NODIS
FOR UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)
SUBJECT: PROPOSED DATES FOR THE 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT
REF: STATE 295762


- 1. (S ENTIRE TEXT.)
- 2. WE TRANSMITTED THE WALLIS LETTER TO FRENCH SHERPA ATTALI AS PER REFTEL.
- 3. ATTALI DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO RAISE IT WITH MITTERRAND PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BONN THIS MORNING. ATTALI URGENTLY REQUESTS THAT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DATES FOR 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT BE MADE BEFORE MITTERRAND'S RETURN TO PARIS LATE FRIDAY EVENING (PARIS TIME) OCTOBER 22. ATTALI HAS PROMISED TO CONTACT US AS SOON AS HE RETURNS, AND WE WILL IMMEDIATELY CONVEY HIS REPLY-TO WASHINGTON.
- 4. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES OF REFTEL. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 # 47509

BY (N NARA DATE 5/19/10

SEGRET



### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47510

PAGE Ø1 SIT389

PARIS 6424 DATE 11/08/82 DTG: 221847Z OCT 82 PSN: 028850

TOR: 295/2007Z

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E OB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR = 6424 2951848 O 221847Z OCT 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5428

SECRET PARIS 36424 FOR UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD) SUBJECT: DATES FOR WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT REF: A) PARIS 36165, B) STATE 297248

(S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

- ATTALI CALLED US UPON HIS RETURN FROM BONN WITH 2 MITTERRAND. HE SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE A REPLY ON OUR PROPOSED DATES BECAUSE FRENCH POSITION HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. HE ADDED THAT FRENCH WISHED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH JUDGE CLARK, AND WOULD CALL HIM, BUT PROBABLY NOT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.
- 3. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES OF REFTEL (B). GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED NLRR MO7-081 #47510 CIT NARA DATE 5/19/10

### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Withdrawer Collection Name SMF 12/21/2007 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE **FOIA** File Folder FRANCE (10/1/82-10/31/82) S2007-081 **NOUZILLE** Box Number 13 51 No of Doc Date Document Type Restric-IDtions pages **Document Description** 

10/27/1982

R1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

47511 CABLE

271239Z OCT 82

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
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### **Ronald Reagan Library**

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		NOUZILLE		
Box Number				
13		51		
ID Document Type		No of Doc Date Restric-		
Document Description		pages tions		

10/28/1982

B<sub>1</sub>

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

47512 CABLE

280855Z OCT 82

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# SEGRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE MI S17358

PARIS 7293

DATE 11/88/82 ----- DTG: 281849Z OCT 82 PSN: Ø37782

TOR: 301/2007Z

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SIT: CKLS FOR.

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #7293/Ø1 3Ø11854 D 281849Z OCT 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5848

S E O R E T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS 37293 NODIS PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR CLARK AND DEAVER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)

SUBJECT: 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

MITTERRAND

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT LUNCH TODAY WITH JACQUES ATTALI, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, UNDER-SECRETARY WALLIS WAS HANDED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER IN FRENCH, AND AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS.

#### 3. BEGIN TEXT.

CHER RONALD

COMME SUITE A VOTRE MESSAGE DU 16 OCTOBRE, DONT JE VOUS REMERCIE, JE VOUDRAIS A MON TOUR VOUS FAIRE PART DE MES REFLEXIONS PERSONNELLES SUR LA QUESTION DU SOMMET DES PAYS INDUSTRIALISES.

POUR COMMENCER. JE DOIS VOUS DIRE TRES FRANCHEMENT COMBIEN JE REGRETTE LA FACON DONT A ETE FIXEE LA DATE DU SOMMET DE WILLIAMSBURG. BIEN QUE MON REPRESENTANT PERSONNEL AIT INDIQUE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES AU VOTRE QUE LE CALENDRIER DE MES ENGAGEMENTS RENDAIT IMPOSSIBLE POUR MOI LA FIXATION

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

D'UNE DATE AVANT LE DEBUT DU MOIS DE JUILLET, JE CONSTATE QUE CE FAIT N'A PAS ETE PRIS EN CONSIDERATION, ET QUE LES ETATS-UNIS ONT ANNONCE UNE DATE SANS AVOIR RECUEILLI L'ACCORD DE TOUS LES PARTICIPANTS. POUR AVOIR MOI-MEME ETE CONFRONTE L'AN DERNIER A CETTE DIFFICULTE. JE GARDE LE SOUVENIR D'UNE DISCUSSION PROLONGEE QUI AVAIT PERMIS DE TROUVER UNE SOLUTION CONVENANT A TOUS LES INTERESSES. TEL N'EST PAS LE CAS CETTE FOIS-CI. JE CROIS DONC QUE NOUS DEVRIONS FAIRE LE POINT SUR CE SUJET AVANT D'ARRETER DEFINITIVEMENT NOS POSITIONS. EN CE QUI CONCERNE LE DEROULEMENT DE CES SOMMETS, JE DOIS

DIRE QUE MES REFLEXIONS REJOIGNENT LARGEMENT LES VOTRES. INSTRUIT COMME VOUS PAR L'EXPERIENCE D'OTTAWA ET DE VERSAILLES, JE CROIS QUE LA MEILLEURE CHOSE SERAIT DE REUNIR LES CHEFS D'ETAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT A HUIS CLOS. DANS UN ENDROIT CALME, POUR UN ECHANGE DE VUES AUSSI

LIBRE ET APPROFONDI QUE POSSIBLE. IL DOIT S'AGIR DE CONVERSATIONS AU SOMMET ENTRE LES DIRIGEANTS EUX-MEMES, ET NON DE NEGOCIATIONS, QUI SONT DE LA RESPONSABILITE DES MINISTRES. IL ME PARAIT ENFIN ESSENTIEL QUE TOUT CONTACT AVEC LA PRESSE SOIT EXCLU. POUR TOUS LES PARTICIPANTS, JUSQU'A LA CONFERENCE DE PRESSE FINALE.

EN ESPERANT AVOIR BIENTOT L'OCCASION DE POURSUIVRE NOS ECHANGES DE VUES SUR CES SUJETS, JE VOUS PRIE, MON CHER RONALD, DE CROIRE A MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

TRANSLATION OF TEXT:

28 OCTOBER 1982

DEAR RONALD:

FOLLOWING YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 16, FOR WHICH I WANT TO THANK YOU. I WOULD LIKE ALSO TO SHARE WITH YOU MY PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF THE SUMMIT OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

TO BEGIN, I MUST TELL YOU VERY FRANKLY HOW MUCH I REGRET HOW THE DATE OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT WAS SET. AL-THOUGH MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS INDICATED SEVERAL TIMES TO YOURS THAT MY CALENDAR MADE THE SETTING OF A DATE BEFORE THE FIRST OF JULY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME, I NOTE THAT THIS FACT WAS NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND THAT THE U.S. HAS ANNOUNCED THE DATES WITHOUT HAVING RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS. HAVING MYSELF BEEN CONFRONTED LAST YEAR BY THIS PROBLEM, I RETAIN THE MEMORY OF A LONG DISCUSSION WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FIND A SOLUTION CONVENIENT TO ALL THE IN-

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

TERESTED PARTIES. THAT IS NOT THE CASE THIS TIME. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE MUST WRAP UP THIS QUESTION DEFINITIVELY BEFORE ESTABLISHING OUR POSITIONS. AS CONCERNS THE FORMAT OF THE SUMMITS I MUST SAY THAT MY THOUGHTS LARGELY MATCH YOURS. HAVING THE SAME EXPERIENCE AS YOU AT OTTAWA AND VERSAILLES ! BELIEVE THAT THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO HOLD THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS IN A CALM SETTING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AS FREE AND AS DEEP AS POSSIBLE. IT MUST BE A CONVERSATION AT THE SUMMIT AMONG THE LEADERS THEMSELVES AND NOT

PARIS 7293

DTG: 2818497 OCT 82 PSN: Ø37782

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BY GV NARA DATE 5/19/11

# SECRET

### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1

PARIS 7293

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O 281849Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5849

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 37293

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NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE

MINISTERS. FINALLY, IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO ME THAT ALL CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS MUST BE RULED OUT FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS UNTIL THE FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE. IN HOPING TO HAVE VERY SOON THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, I ASK MY DEAR RONALD THAT YOU ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES.

CORDIALLY YOURS, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

END OF TEXT.

# SECRET

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DATE 11/88/82

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O 291520Z OCT 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5154

SERET STATE 384571

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PEPR, XF, US, FR, PLO

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S REPLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER

CHEYSSON'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 16

### 1. (SEENTIRE TEXT)

2. FRENCH EMBASSY DELIVERED LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON TO THE SECRETARY OCTOBER 16 REPORTING ON CHEYSSON'S DISCUSSIONS IN TUNIS WITH PLO CHAIRMAN YASSIR ARAFAT (COPY BEING POUCHED). YOU SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM THE SECRETARY TO CHEYSSON.

#### 3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CLAUDE:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 16 DESCRIBING YOUR MEETING IN TUNIS WITH PLO CHAIRMAN YASSIR ARAFAT. YOUR INSIGHTS WERE VERY USEFUL TO ME AS I PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE FEZ SUMMIT FOLLOW-UF COMMITTEE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ARAFAT HEAR DIRECTLY FROM THE EUROPEAN POWERS THAT IT IS UP TO HIM TO ACCEPT UNITED


NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AND ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IF HE IS TO BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IMPORTANT TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. I APPRECIATE YOUR PUTTING IT TO HIM IN THESE PLAIN TERMS. DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE IN PRIVATE WITH KING HASSAN, THE KING EXFRESSED HIS CONCERN, AND APPARENTLY THAT OF THE PLO AS WELL, THAT EVEN IF ARAFAT WERE TO MEET OUR CONDITIONS, THE U.S. MIGHT NOT ENGAGE WITH THE PLO ON SERIOUS ISSUES AT THE FOLICY-MAKING LEVEL OF THIS GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE, KING HASSADOR IN TUNIS WILL IMMEDIATELY MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PLO TO ARRANGE A TIME AND PLACE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BETWEEN

US, AT OR NEAR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL ON OUR SIDE, AND BELOW THE LEVEL OF ARAFAT ON THE PLO SIDE. IF THOSE DISCUSSIONS PROVE CONSTRUCTIVE AND IN GOOD FAITH, MORE SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS WOULD ENGAGE WITH THE PLO ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES BEFORE US. FING HASSAN CLEARLY WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS AND I PRESUME HE WILL PASS IT ON TO THE PLO. WE ALSO MADE CLEAR TO KING HASSAN THAT IF ARAFAT DOES MEET OUR TERMS, WHAT HE ACHIEVES IS THE DIRECT, SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. I HAVE DESCRIBED, BUT THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE PLO A PLACE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE SINCE ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO AGREE AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT ISRAEL WOULD DO SO.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE PLACE TO RESOLVE MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS AT LEAST CONCEIVABLE THAT SOMETHING USEFUL COULD BE DONE THERE IN THE FUTURE AND THEREFORE, I UNDERSTAND YOUR KEEPING THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT "OVER IN THE CORNER" IN THE EVENT THAT HOMENT ARRIVES. I AGREE THAT WE CONTINUE DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE BETWEEN US, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HEAFING MORE FROM YOU AS THIS ASPECT OF THE PEACE PROCESS EVOLVES.

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM SECSTATE WACHDC

TO AMEMEASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

SECRET STATE 305704

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR; ALSO FOR CHESHES

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PEPR, AO

CUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER

CHEYSSON

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. LETTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO AFRICA DIRECTOR AUSSEIL.

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR CLAUDE:

I APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 15.
THE POSITION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI
PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN
THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WHEN THIS QUESTION AROSE AT
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION CONFERENCE. WE
SHOULD BE PLEASED THAT FIRMNESS HAS LED TO A SIMILAR
OUTCOME IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

CHET CROCKER HAS REPORTED ON THE CANDID DISCUSSIONS HE HAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH YOU AND OTHER-FRENCH OFFICIALS RECENTLY IN PARIS. I TRUST THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE LED TO A SOUND POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US WHICH PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR

CLOSER COOPERATION ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICA PROBLEM.
IN THIS CONTEXT AND IN LINE WITH YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH
CHET CROCKER, I SUGGEST THAT FRANCE EXPLORE FURTHER
WITH ANGOLA THE STATEMENT MADE BY FORE'SN MINISTER JORGE
THAT ANGOLA IS PREPARED TO FROVIDE A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL
THETABLE TO FRANCE. IN DOING SC YOU SHOULD UNDERLINE TO
THE ANGOLANS THE #BSOLUTE NECESSITY TO HAVE SUCH A
TIMETABLE. A TIMETABLE, WH'CH MUST HAD HEED TO BY
ANGOLA PRIOR TO PHASE III IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE UNITED
STATES TO BRING SOUTH AFRICA TO A SETTLEMENT. IN EXPLORING A ROLE AS GUARANTOR OF AN AMBOLAN COMMITMENT ON

CLEAN WITHDRAWAL, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU MAKE CLEAR TO THE ANGOLANS THAT THE CONTENT OF THIS TIMETABLE WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ANGOLA, SINCE THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND OBTAIN ITS AGREEMENT.

IN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH THE ANGOLANS, YOU MAY FIND THEM WILLING TO SHARE WITH YOU THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR SECURITY SITUATION WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATION IS TO BE BROUGHT TO A RAPID AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. YOUR EXPLORATION OF THE ANGOLANS' SECURITY CONCERNS AND WAYS TO ADDRESS THESE COULD BE A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR THINKING AS WE PLAN OUR NEXT APPROACH TO THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA. AS YOU PURSUE YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS, WE MUST CONSULT CLOSELY AND KEEP ONE ANOTHER FULLY INFORMED. I SUGGEST THAT OFFICIALS IN YOUR MINISTRY STAY IN IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH OUR EMBASSY AS YOU RECEIVE THE RESULTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS IN ANGOLA.

IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, I WANT TO BE FRANK WITH YOU. THE APPROACH WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE TAKING IS BASED ON OUR COMMON PERCEPTION THAT A SOLUTION ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PROBLEM WHICH MEETS BOTH SOUTH AFRICA'S AND ANGOLA'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS MUST BE FOUND IF THERE IS TO BE A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. THE NEGOTIATION WITH THE ANGOLAMS CANNOT PROGRESS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FURTHER UNTIL THEY ARE PREPARED TO TABLE CONCRETE FROPOSALS OR RESPOND TO CONCRETE IDEAS FROM US. IN THIS REGARD IT IS VITAL THAT MAXIMUM DISCRETION BE EXERCISED. FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH IMPLY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE WILL DESTROY OUR PURPOSES AND EFODE THE CONFIDENCE WE MUST MAINTAIN IN FACH OTHER

CHET CROCKER AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL FROVIDE YOUR OFFICIALS WITH SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUR APPROACH TO THE ANGOLANS AS WELL AS WITH A EACHGROUND BRIEF ON THE NEGOTIATING RECORD. ASSUMING YOU DECIDE TO PROCEED, I WILL SEND THESE ITEMS TO PARIS WITH ONE OF OUR NEGOTIATORS WHO IS INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE US-ANGOLA TALKS.

AS WE MOVE TOWARDS CLOSER COOPERATION ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEM, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FACT THAT OUR INTERESTS IN ANGOLA AND THE REGION ARE FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME: PEACE, STABILITY, AND DIMINISHED SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND A GREAT DEAL IS AT STAKE. WE MUST STAY IN REGULAR COMMUNICATION SINCE MY GOVERNMENT WILL, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HAVE THE TASK OF PERSUADING THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO MOVE FORWARD. SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

- 3. IN DELIVERING THE LETTER, YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS.
- -- WE ARE MOST INTERESTED TO HAVE AN INDICATION OF WHAT YOU ARE THINKING OF IN TERMS OF TIMING OF YOUR APPROACH TO THE MPLA.
- -- AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND AN EMISSARY
  IN SEDER TO DISCUSS WITH YOU OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUR
  APPROACH AND TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILED BACKGROUND ON



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OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS.

-- WE KNOW THAT YOU ARE CAREFULLY CONSIDERING THE CONTENT OF YOUR APPROACH TO THE MPLA AND WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. SHULTZ

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER