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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EXECU	TIVE SECRETARI	AT, NSC: COUNTRY	FILE	Withdrawer				
					SME	7 12/20/2007			
File Folder	FRANCI	E (1/29/82-3/3/82)			FOL	A			
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47289 CABLE	2919	57Z JAN 82		2	1/29/1982	B1			
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47290 CABLE	0113	03Z FEB 82		1	2/1/1982	B1			
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47291 CABLE	0118	02Z FEB 82		1	2/1/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						
47292 CABLE	0201	40Z FEB 82		1	2/2/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						
47293 MEMO	CLA	RK FOR THE PRES	IDENT	1	2/6/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						
47294 MEMO		G TO THE PRESIDE	NT RE VISIT BY	2	2/4/1982	B1			
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47295 CABLE	04012	20Z FEB 82		2	2/4/1982	B1			
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47296 CABLE	05173	32Z FEB 82		2	2/5/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						
47297 CABLE	08140	06Z FEB 82		1	2/8/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EXECUT	TIVE SECRETAR	AT, NSC: COUNTRY	FILE Withdrawer					
					SMI	12/20/2007			
File Folder	FRANCE	2 (1/29/82-3/3/82)			FOL	A			
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47298 CABLE	08164	6Z FEB 82		2	2/8/1982	B1			
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47299 CABLE	09025	58Z FEB 82		1	2/9/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM2007-081						
47301 CABLE	12085	58Z FEB 82		1	2/12/1982	B1			
	R	4/29/2010	NLRRM07-081						
47302 CABLE	13121	6Z FEB 82		3	2/13/1982	B1			
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47304 CABLE	17133	4Z FEB 82		1	2/17/1982	B1			
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47305 CABLE	17152	8Z FEB 82		2	2/17/1982	B1			
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47306 CABLE	27193	1Z FEB 82		2	2/27/1982	B1			
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47307 CABLE	03101	9Z MAR 82		2	3/3/1982	B1			
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
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NIRR M07-081 #47784

 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SECSTATE WASHDC 4666
 DTG: 291957Z JAN 82 PSN: Ø51648

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 DATE Ø2/Ø2/82
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Name and Address of the Owner, which it

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MESSAGE:

2

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #4666 Ø292ØØ2 O 291957Z JAN 82 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7607

-C-ONFIDENTIAL STATE Ø24666 EXDIS, FOR THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12065: GDS 1/29/88 (HOLMES, H. ALL'EN)

TAGS: ENRG, EEWT, FR

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CHEYSSON ON SOVIET GAS CONTRACT

REF: STATE 20749 (NOTAL)

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

DEAR CLAUDE:

YOU KNOW MY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE. YOU ALSO KNOW WITH WHAT GRAVE CONCERN THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND. I WAS THUS ENORMOUSLY CONCERNED TO LEARN THAT GAZ DE FRANCE AND SOVIET SOYUZGAS EXPORT HAVE JUST INITIALLED A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR GAS SUPPLY CONTRACT THAT IS NOW BEFORE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL.

IT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE OF A WORSE SIGNAL TO SEND TO THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN EAST-WEST


MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

RELATIONS. APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT WILL SUGGEST TO THE PEOPLE OF POLAND THAT THE WEST IS PREPARED TO RESUME "BUSINESS AS USUAL."

I THEREFORE STRONGLY URGE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT GIVE THE MOST SERIOUS AND URGENT CONSIDERATION TO DEFERRAL OF OFFICIAL APPROVAL FOR THIS CONTRACT. AND, I WOULD URGE FURTHER THAT, IF YOU AGREE TO DEFERRAL OF FINAL APPROVAL, YOU STATE PUBLICLY THAT YOU ARE DOING SO AS PART OF YOUR BROADER EXPRESSION OF GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT POLAND. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SERVE TO UNDERSCORE THAT FRANCE CONTINUES TO STAND SQUARELY WITH THE ALLIANCE IN BEHALF OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN POLAND.

THE UNITED STATES, AS YOU KNOW, HAS ALREADY TAKEN

CONFIDENTIAL



PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 SECSTATE WASHDC 4666

DTG: 291957Z JAN 82 PSN: Ø51648

ACTION TO EXPRESS ITS RESOLVE IN THAT REGARD.

WE THUS SEEK YOUR SUPPORT IN PRESENTING A UNITED FRONT AGAINST REPRESSION. THE STAKES ARE HIGH. WE MAY WELL STAND AT AN HISTORIC CROSS-ROADS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ONE WHICH DEMANDS THE GREATEST POLITICAL COURAGE FROM ALL OF US.

YOURS SINCERELY,

.

ALEXANDER HAIG

2. FYI: NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET SECRET

3

	PAGE Ø1 SIT867	PARIS 3529 Date Ø2/16/82		DTG: Ø1130 TOR: Ø32		82 PSN:	Ø54264
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	1. S- ENT	IRE TEXT.)					
	RETURN FROM MINISTER JO	CONTACTED AMBASSA LONDON. DE ALME RGE SAYS THAT MEE MINISTER AGAIN ARIS.	IDA CLAIMS TING IN BR	AZIL WOULD	GN BE		
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8971							
S F C R E T PARIS Ø3634 NODIS E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/1/02 (ELY, MICHAEL) TAGS: PEPR, EGEN UK, GW, FR, IT, PL SUBJ: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS' - POLAND REF: STATE 25948 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)		ING	ON	,			
2. MINECON FINALLY CONTACTED PAYE'S DEPU MORNING FEB. 1. MOUTON HAD TELEGRAM FROM WASHINGTON RECOUNTING CONVERSATION MENTION REFTEL BUT WITHOUT MENTION OF SPECIFIC T HE SAID PAYE COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE.	M FREM	NCH	EM	BAS A 2	SY		
3. MOUTON CALLED BACK AT CLOSE OF BUSING THAT DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR DUPONT AND IN LONDON AS SCHEDULED TOMORROW MORNING. GALBRAITH					AR		

DECLASSIFIED NLRR<u>M07-081 #4779</u>1 BY <u>A</u> NARA DATE <u>4/79</u>/<u>3</u>10

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 SECSTATE WASHDC 66Ø1 DTG: Ø2Ø14ØZ FEB 82 PSN: Ø5629Ø SIT3Ø6 DATE Ø2/17/82 ' TOR: Ø33/2134Z
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TO XAMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7736 PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 026601 exdis corrected copy (para two) e.o. 12065: rds-1 2/1/88 (stoessel, walter J. Jr.)
TAGS: MASS, MMOL, NU, XK, XM, FR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE FAREWELL CALL ON UNDER Secretary Stoessel REF: State 25927
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE SAID HE WISHED TO USE OPPOR- TUNITY OF FAREWELL CALL TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT ON FRENCH ARMS SALES TO NICARAGUA. DE LABOULAYE SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CLARK HAD BOTH CON- FRONTED HIM ON NEW FRENCH WEAPONS SALES TO NICARAGUA, INCLUDING AIR TO GROUND ROCKETS, WHICH HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS. DE LABOULAYE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT AND CLARK THAT THERE WERE NO NEW SALES, THAT ALL ITEMS IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT HAD BEEN REPORTED TO US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICALS DURING FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER'S V-SIT TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 7-8. DE LABOULAYE SAID HE WAS PRESENT AT MEETING WHERE HERNU TOLD DOD OFFICIALS ROCKETS AND VARIOUS ITEMS OF INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
WERE PART OF THE PACKAGE. DE LABOULAYE HAS SINCE REQUESTED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, AND HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES, THAT NOTHING WAS WITHHELD DURING THESE DIS- CUSSIONS

3. UNDER SEGRETARY STOESSEL NOTED THAT UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IKLE HAD TOLD HIM RECENTLY THAT ROCKETS HAD INDEED BEEN REFERRED TO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HERNU, AND THANKED DE LABOULAYE FOR HIS EFFORTS TO CLARIFY THE MATTER. THE FRENCH SHOULD UNDERSTAND, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE US CONSIDERS FRENCH WEAPONS SALES TO NICARAGUA A VERY SERIOUS MATTER, WHICH WILL NOT ASSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HAIG

CONFI

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR MO7-081 #4779 Z BY CIV NARA DATE 4/29/,D

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TO PRESIDENT	FROM HAIG,			04 FEB 82
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SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT	BY PRES MITTERRAND			
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MEMORANDUM

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SYSTEM II 90058

4729

no

February 6, 1982

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

1. Mitterrand Visit

Per telephone, Al informed Cheysson of your acceptance of Mitterrand's request to come to Washington to discuss pressing bilateral issues. Further, in response to your desire that no arms be shipped to Central America in the interim, Al received assurance there would be none. (mark one for us.) The meeting will occur at the White House on February 27 from 10 AM through lunch.

2. Possible Military Action Among PLO, Syrians and Israelis

I attach Al's memorandum on this grave issue. Al agrees that an interdepartmental group convene immediately to monitor and prepare contingency plans.

Attachment

cc: Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

5

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BY

NLRR M07-081 #47293 CN 4/201/10

National Security Council The White House

SYSTEM II

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82 FEB 4 P2: 38

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXecutive Secretariat 9

B:11 This is the very sensitive memo on Mitterrand which th Secretary mentioned. Only harry and 2 are aware of it over here.

Jorry

RECEIVE THE SECRETARY OF STATE

PRESIDENT

SYSTEM II 90058

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENS	2 FEB 4	P 2 :
MEMORANDUM		THE

February 4, 1982

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

38

FROM:

47294

SUBJECT:

Possible Visit by President Mitterrand

My French counterpart, Claude Cheysson, called me yesterday to express serious concern about our bilateral relationship. Cheysson, who is clearly speaking for Mitterrand, sees major problems on the horizon. He wanted us to know that Mitterrand is prepared to make a special trip to Washington in an effort to come to grips with the problems besetting the relationship.

I am as concerned as the French. While we have never had an easy time of it with Mitterrand on Third World issues, the French decision to sell arms to Nicaragua puts us on a collision course in Central America. Equally disturbing is that our good working relationship with France on dealing with the Soviets seems to be unravelling. The French decision, on the eve of my meeting with Gromyko, to sign a long-term gas deal with the Soviets reflects, at best, insensitivity to our interests, and at worst a gratuitous slap. More recently, the French Prime Minister, with German concurrence, proclaimed in public that economic sanctions against the Soviet Union over the Polish situation were inappropriate.

It is reassuring to see that the French realize that the relationship is in trouble, and heartening to know that they care. An early visit by Mitterrand could serve to reverse current worrisome trends, and put the relationship on a more promising course. This, in turn, could help draw all of Europe toward our policies. If they choose to exercise it, the French have enormous influence in Europe -- which in Mitterrand's case, of course, extends into socialist sectors. This influence could be both enhanced and employed to our advantage as a result of a visit. In particular, closer U.S.-French cooperation -- indeed, even a commitment to that end -- would exert a strong pull on the Federal Republic.

In addition to seeking common ground on the issues that divide us, you and Mitterrand could agree to institutionalize high-level bilateral consultations with the aim of anticipating problems of the sort I have identified above. The visit might also be an opportunity to offer the possibility of expanded strategic cooperation provided the over-all relationship improves. But you should also tell Mitterrand that the strategic cooperation

SECRET/SENSITIVE RDS-3 2/3/02 DECLASSIFIED NLRR MO7 081 #47294 BY CH NARA DATE 4/29/10

SECRET/SENSITIVE

program will suffer if the rest of the relationship deteriorates.

As for modalities, Cheysson suggested that Mitterrand come here virtually alone, that you meet outside of Washington (Camp David) on a weekend, and soon. I think this is just right. If you agree to the visit, I will work out the details in total secrecy until we are ready for announcement. I would suggest we plan to meet two-on-two: the two Presidents joined by their Foreign Ministers. I further recommend that we plan to make this a half-day working visit, though we will want to build in some social activity (which the French have also suggested). As for dates, I would try to find a mutually convenient weekend within the next six weeks.

In sum, this is a chance to turn adversity into opportunity, not only for the relationship with the French but for the Alliance. I strongly recommend that you authorize me to invite President Mitterrand to visit Washington at the earliest convenient time. I will be back to you for final approval of the date and arrangements as soon as I have worked something out with the French.

Jelle weith the Frei

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SECSTATE WASHDC 9598
 DTG: Ø4Ø12ØZ FEB 82 PSN: ØØ1Ø9Ø

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
MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

DISAGREEMENT, AND WE SHOULD PURSUE IT AND KEEP ONE ANOTHER MUTUALLY INFORMED, AS YOU HAVE DONE.

I AM NOT SURPRISED BY WHAT YOU TELL ME ABOUT GROMYKO'S REACTIONS CONCERNING POLAND. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION CURRENTLY CONSIDERS ANY AGREEMENT TO A REAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN POLAND TO BE CONTRARY TO ITS FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY STEPS THE VARIOUS WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MIGHT TAKE WOULD BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THIS ATTITUDE.

WE THOUGHT FROM THE BEGINNING, AS YOU KNOW, THAT THIS RIGIDITY SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONDEMNED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE EVENTS IN POLAND, AND THE ELIMINATION OF ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE SYSTEM, WHICH THEY INDICATE, SHOULD INDUCE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO RECONSIDER, INDIVIDUALLY.

-CONFIDENTIAL



PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 SECSTATE WASHDC 9598

DTG: Ø40120Z FEB 82 PSN: 001090

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THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE BEST WAY TO PRESERVE OUR INTERESTS, THOSE OF THE WEST IN GENERAL, AND THOSE OF PEACE, AND TO ESTABLISH THE BASES ON WHICH, CONSIDERING THESE INTERESTS, THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE THAT WE ALL RECOGNIZE IS NECESSARY CAN BE PURSUED.

IN OUR OPINION, SUCH CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR CONSIDERATION, INSOFAR AS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS ARE CONCERNED, AS THE OCCASION ARISES AND PARTICULARLY BY MEANS OF THE NORMAL AND WELL-TESTED PROCEDURES OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

REGARDING THE GAS CONTRACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, I CANNOT AGREE WITH YOU WHEN YOU PERCEIVE ITS SIGNATURE AS A SIGN OF "A LACK OF UNITY AMONG ALLIES." OUR DECISION REFLECTS THE CONCERNS THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXPLAINED ABOUT ENERGY SUPPLIES AND DIVERSIFICATION. THESE CONCERNS LED TO THE OPENING OF A SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ACTIONS IN 1980 THAT MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A MORE BALANCED ENERGY CONSUMPTION. OUR NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO PRODUCE ELECTRICITY IS PROGRESSING, OUR TALKS WITH THE USSR HAVE JUST BEEN COMPLETED, AND OUR TALKS WITH ALGERIA ARE ON THE POINT OF BEING COMPLETED. IT IS A LONG-TERM POLICY (THE NEW SOVIET CONTRACT WILL NOT GO INTO EFFECT UNTIL 1985 OR 1986) WHICH IS NOT TIED TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 9598 MESSAGE (CONTINUED): DTG: Ø40120Z FEB 82 PSN: '001090

AS FOR THE SOVIET CONTRACT, I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD, AS GOVERNMENT HAS EMPHASIZED. THAT IT DOES NOT ALTER THE AS OUR EXTENT OF OUR ENERGY DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. OUR CURRENT PURCHASES OF PETROLEUM AND GAS REPRESENT 5 OF OUR ENERGY REQUIREMENTS. THIS PERCENTAGE WILL BE UNCHANGED IN 1990, WITH A DECREASE IN PETROLEUM AND AN INCREASE IN GAS. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CUT OFF THE FLOW OF SOVIET GAS INSTANTANEOUSLY, THANKS TO INCREASED STORAGE CAPACITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO CONCLUDE CONTRACTS SUBSTITUTING FUEL OIL FOR GAS IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE GAS IMPORTED FROM THE SOVIET UNION. TH THIS CUT-OFF WOULD BE MADE IF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS A RESULT, WE ALL DECIDED TO WORSENED GREATLY AND, IMPOSE MAJOR SANCTIONS, WHICH CURRENTLY IS NOT THE CASE.

AL, THIS IS THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT I WANTED TO GIVE YOU IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LAST TWO MESSAGES, FOR YOU KNOW HOW HIGHLY I VALUE OUR PERSONAL CONTACTS.

CLAUDE. END TEXT.

HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9598

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS 4356 SIT284 DATE Ø2/17/82 DISTRIBUTION: <u>REPT</u> /ØØ1 DTG: 051532Z FEB 82 PSN: 003799 TOR: 036/2002Z

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BY CH NARA DATE 4/29/10

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #4356/01 0361535 O 0515322 FEB 82 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9326

SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS Ø4356

NODIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12065: RDS-3 - 02-03-02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M TAGS: FR, MPOL, EGEN SUBJECT: HANDLING FRICTIONS WITH FRANCE

1. (SENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN THE LAST MONTH WE SAW SEVERAL UNPLEASANT ACTS BY THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT, NOTABLY THE NICARAGUAN ARMS DEAL, THE ILL-TIMED SIGNATURE OF THE GAS CONTRACT WITH THE SOVIETS AND NOW THEIR OVERTURES TO CUBA. IN MY VIEW WE HAVE TO EXPECT SUCH POKES FROM TIME TO TIME FROM THE FRENCH, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. WHEN THEY OCCUR, THEY WILL NOT ONLY HARM OUR RELATIONS BUT WILL DO FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE NATO ALLIANCE. WE NEED TO FIND BETTER WAYS TO ORCHESTRATE OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND TO KEEP THESE DAMAGING SHOCKS TO A MINIMUM.

3. BEFORE SETTING DOWN A FEW IDEAS OF HOW WE MIGHT GO ABOUT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, LET ME SHARE SOME THOUGHTS WITH YOU NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN ON THE JOB A COUPLE OF MONTHS. ALTHOUGH MITTER-RAND IS ANTI-SOVIET AND WILL STICK WITH US ON EAST-WEST STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE ISSUES, HE WANTS TO MAINTAIN HIS IMAGE AS A MAN OF THE LEFT. BEHIND HIM HE HAS A PARTY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) .:

AND A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY WHOSE VIEWS -- OFTEN MORE RADICAL THAN HIS OWN -- HE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT. HE WANTS TO KEEP THE COMMUNISTS IN HIS GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE PCF IS WHITLED DOWN TO A SPLINTER AND WILL BE RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD FORCE THEM OUT. ECONOMIC ISSUES, PARTICULARLY HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT, PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HIS FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUSINESS AND JOBS CREATED BY THE SOVIET PIPELINE ARE AS IMPORTANT AS THE GAS. WE ARE SEEING MORE PEOPLE WITH RADICAL VIEWS CROP UP IN STRATEGIC PLACES, INCLUDING THE QUAI. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THROUGH A COMBINATION OF THE USUAL FRENCH POSTURE OF PURSUING THEIR SELF-INTEREST AND PRESSURES FROM THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND A LEFTWARD-MOVING BUREAUCRACY, THINGS MAY WELL GET WORSE. I CAN SEE TROUBLE AHEAD WITH THE FRENCH OVER CENTRAL AMERICA, CUBA, LIBYA, INDOCHINA AND POSSIBLY OTHER AREAS.

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SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WE SHOULD NOT WAIT FOR THE PROBLEMS TO HIT US; THERE ARE THINGS WE CAN DO TO LIMIT THEIR NUMBER AND SCOPE.

4. FIRST, I AM STRUCK BY THE CONFUSION OUR OWN BUREAUCRA-TIC ARRANGEMENTS IN WASHINGTON MAKE FOR US IN DEALING WITH THE FRENCH. I AM APPALLED AT THE DIFFICULTY I HAVE IN JUST KNOWING WHAT IS HAPPENING IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN WASHINGTON. I AM SURE IT IS NOT EASY IN WASHINGTON TO KEEP ALL THE PIECES OF THE RELATIONSHIP IN FOCUS, BUT SINCE FRANCE IS A SPECIAL -- AND DIFFICULT -- CASE, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO SET UP A SMALL INTER-AGENCY MECHANISM TO COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KEY DEPARTMENTS, SAY, STATE, DOD, TREASURY, AGRICULTURE, SPE-CIAL TRADE. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE AT LEAST AT THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL TO GET OVER THE COMPARTMENTALI-ZATION OF DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. MAYBE I AM UTOPIAN, BUT THERE MUST BE A WAY TO DO THINGS BETTER. THE PRESENT COMPARTMENTALIZATION DOES NOT SERVE OUR NEED TO ORCHESTRATE POLICY.

5. SECONDLY, I AM NOT SURE THE FRENCH HAVE A CLEAR UN-DERSTANDING OF OUR PRIORITIES AND SENSITIVITIES. THE MIT-TERRAND ADMINISTRATION IS NOT THE TIGHTEST OF SHIPS, AND THE VARIOUS PLAYERS COME AT PROBLEMS FROM A VARIETY OF STARTING POINTS. WE NEED TO FIND A BETTER WAY TO LET THEM KNOW CLEARLY WHAT IS ON OUR MIND, AND WHAT COULD TROUBLE OUR RELATIONSHIP. A MORE SYSTEMATIC AND COMPREHEN-SIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS IS IN ORDER. THIS SHOULD BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CARRIED OUT DAY-TO-DAY BY THIS EMBASSY AND SHOULD BE REINFORCED PEIODICALLY AT HIGHER LEVELS. WE NEED TO DESIGN SUCH A PROGRAM IN ADVANCE TO CONVEY TO THE FRENCH OUR PRIORITIES. THEY SOULD NOT BE PERMITTED THE EXCUSE THAT THEY WEREN'T AWARE OF OUR VIEWS. YOU COULD SUGGEST SUCH A CONSULTATION PROGRAM TO CHEYSSON WHEN YOU SEE HIM IN MADRID. I THINK HE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE BECAUSE I HAVE ALREADY TOUCHED ON THE SUBJECT.

6. FINALLY, IN MY VIEW, ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE THINGS WE CAN DO IS TO SCREAM LOUDLY -- IN PUBLIC AND IN PRI-VATE -- WHEN THE FRENCH WITTINGLY KICK US IN THE SHINS. I AM STRUCK (AS ARE OUR FRIENDS HERE) BY THE FACT THAT OUR MODERATE PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE NICARAGUAN ARMS SALE COME AS A SURPRISE AND ARE TAKEN BY MANY TO BE A SIGNAL WE MAY NOT BE TERRIBLY UPSET AFTER ALL. (I PERSONALLY RAISED HELL AT THE QUAI AND THE ELYSEE). THE TIME HAS COME FOR US TO RESPOND WITH PUBLIC

PARIS 4356

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SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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S F C R E T PARIS Ø45Ø1 NODIS FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER E. O. 12Ø65: RDS-1,2 Ø2/Ø8/Ø2 (MARESCA, TAGS: PINR, PEPR, AO SUBJECT: LUIS DE ALMEIDA, ANGOLAN AMBAS:	
1. (9 - ENTIRE TEXT.)	
2. AS YOU KNOW THE FRENCH VIEW (BOTH OF PENNE) OF AMBASSADOR DE ALMEIDA IS TOTAL VIEW OF PEDRO DE AVILLEZ' BACKGROUND IN OBVIOUS CONNECTIONS, EMBASSY ASKED FOR H	LY NEGATIVE. IN Angola and

3. IN LINE WITH WHAT WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE FRENCH, AVILLEZ SAYS THAT DE ALMEIDA IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED. HOWEVER, NEITHER IS HE SOMEONE WE CAN WRITE OFF. HE IS A VERY POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL AND A KEY MAN IN THE OVERALL FORMULATION OF ANGOLAN FOREIGN POLICY. FROM HIS OFFICE IN PARIS, AVILLEZ SAYS, HE RUNS ALL OF ANGOLA'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS EUROPE. ALL ANGOLA GOVERNMENT BUYING IN EUROPE IS DIRECTED OUT OF HIS EMBASSY IN PARIS. GALBRAITH

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IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #3075 0391814 O 081646Z FEB 82 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8155

CONFIDENTIAL STATE Ø33Ø75 Exdis E. O. 12065: XDS-3 2/3/02 (Alexander M. Haig, JR.)

TAGS: PDIP, US, FR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE RE MFO TO FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR CLAUDE:

AS YOU KNOW THE ISRAELI CABINET DECIDED ON JANUARY 31 TO ACCEPT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS. WE ARE DEEPLY GRATIFIED AT THE PATIENCE AND FLEXIBILITY YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES EXHIBITED WHICH MADE THIS POSSIBLE. I AM MINDFUL THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S ANNOUNCEMENT AT WILLIAMSBURG OF YOUR INTENTIO; TO JOIN THIS FORCE BROKE THE LOGJAM WHICH WAS FRUSTRATING OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE EUROPEAN AND AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION. THE ADDITION OF EUROPEAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

STATES TO THIS FORCE GREATLY EHHANCES ITS STATURE AND CREDIBILITY. YOUR PARTICIPATION WILL ALSO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND TO PARTICIPATE.

THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION NOW PERMITS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO DISPATCH NEGOTIATING TEAMS TO THE CONCERNED CAPITALS TO DETERMINE THE NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR SERVICE. BY THE TIME YOU RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MAY ALREADY HAVE COMMENCED. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO THE MFO'S REQUEST FOR LIGHT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO MAN THEM. I REALIZE THAT YOU MIGHT PREFER A LESS VISIBLE ROLE, BUT I THINK YOU WOULD AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE FORCE CONTAIN ALL THE CONTINGENTS NECESSARY TO FULFILL ITS STATED MISSION.

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I WILL BE SENDING YOU BY SEPARATE MESSAGE MY THOUGHTS ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION FOLLOW-ING MY TWO TRIPS TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT LAST MONT; .

AGAIN, CLAUDE, PLEASE ACCEPT MY THANKS FOR THE CONTRIBUTION THAT FRANCE IS MAKING TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

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WITH BEST REGARDS.

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SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.


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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9724		
SECRET PARIS Ø51ØØ NODIS E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,3 2/12/02 (MARESCA, TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS, XF, FR SUBJECT: LEBANON-ISRAEL TENSIONS REF: STATE 36902 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.	ЈОНИ Ј.) ОК∼М	
2. DCM MADE REFTEL DEMARCHE TO QUAI DE MARTIN (SENIOR OFFICIAL PRESENT IN ABSE AND SECGEN) ON FEBRUARY 11. MARTIN NOT FORMATION PARALLELED REPORT QUAI HAD RE DISCUSSION WITH DAS DRAPER IN WASHINGTO FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS HAD ALSO TENSION, INCLUDING TANK MOVEMENTS, IN A FRONTIER.	NCE OF MINISTER ED THAT THIS IN- CEIVED OF RECENT DN. MARTIN SAID REPORTED INCREASED	
3. MARTIN QUESTIONED WHAT WE HAD IN MI MENTARY EFFORTS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS." THAT WE AND FRANCE CLEARLY SHARE AN INT CONFLICTS IN THE AREA, AND WE WERE SURE BEST HOW TO USE THEIR CONTACTS AND INFI	WE REPLIED EREST IN AVOIDING FRENCH WOULD KNOW	

CONFLICTS IN THE AREA, AND WE WERE SURE FRENCH WOULD KN BEST HOW TO USE THEIR CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE TO BEST EFFECT IN CALMING CURRENT TENSIONS. MARTIN INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD INTENT OF OUR DEMARCHE AND THAT QUAI WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER THE MATTER. GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #5271/01 0441219 O 131216Z FEB 82 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9813

SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS Ø5271 EXDIS RDS-1 2/12/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN) OR-M ASEC, FR E. O. 12065: TAGS: PTER. FRANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUBJECT: (A) STATE 36547, (B) PARIS Ø4327 REF:

(S - ENTIRE TEXT.) 1.

WE RECOMMEND MAKING THE LENIENT FRENCH SUMMARY 2 ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM A HIGH PRIORITY BILATERAL ISSUE AND RAISING IT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOF. WE PLAN TO DO SO IN OUR CONTACTS HERE. END SUMMARY.

IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL RAY, WE FOCUSSED OUR EFFORTS, WITH AMPLE COOPERA-TION FROM THE FRENCH POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, ENHANCING THE PROTECTION OF OUR PEOPLE IN PARIS AND IN ON PURSUING THE INVESTIGATION (STILL INCONCLUSIVE) OF THE NOW, THREE WEEKS AFTER THE EVENT, MURDER. WE THINK IT IS TIME TO PUSH OUR THINKING BEYOND MERE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO TRY TO GET AT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IN FRANCE -- FRENCH LAXITY ON TERRORISM.

EXAMPLES OF FRENCH LAXITY ARE LEGION AND WE WILL BE 4 CATALOGUING THE MOST EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE. WHEN WE RAISE THESE QUESTIONS WITH THE FRENCH,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

THEY JUSTIFY THEIR LENIENT ATTITUDE AS PART OF A LONG TRADITION OF FRANCE AS A LAND OF POLITICAL ASYLUM. THE CONCEPT IS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN FRENCH TERRORISM POLICY. THE CUR-RENT POLICY -- WHICH PREDATES THE ARRIVAL OF THE SOCIALISTS IN POWER -- GOES BEYOND THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF POLITICAL ASYLUM. THE CYNICAL POLITICAL AND SOMETIMES ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF FRENCH TERRORISM POLICY MAY NOT BE ARTICULATED, BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY VISIBLE.

THE LONG-STANDING FRENCH ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMINGS 5 AND GOINGS OF ARAB TERRORISTS CANNOT BE DIVORCED FROM THE FRENCH NEED FOR ARAB OIL AND MARKETS. THE REFUSAL TO EX-TRADITE KNOWN ETA TERRORISTS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY PART OF AN IMPLICIT DEAL FOR CONTINUED PEACE IN FRANCE'S OWN BASQUE PROVINCE. THE RECENT SCANDALOUSLY LENIENT TREAT-

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MENT OF ARMENIAN TERRORISTS MAKES POLITICAL SENSE IN LIGHT OF THE LARGE ARMENIAN POPULATIONS IN CERTAIN KEY CONSTITUENCIES (SUCH AS THOSE OF INTERIOR MINISTER DEFFERRE AND DEFENSE MINISTER HERNU). IN THESE CASES AND IN MANY OTHERS THERE SEEMS TO BE A PARTICULARLY SLEAZY UN-WRITTEN CONTRACT -- CONTINUED LENIENCY SO LONG AS TARGETS ARE NON-FRENCH.

6. THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THIS APPROACH UNLESS PUSHED. WITH THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF DCM CHAPMAN AND THE MURDER OF COLONEL RAY, THE TIME HAS COME TO RAISE THE PROBLEM AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. WE SHOULD NOT SHRINK FROM THIS IN THE BELIEF THAT OUR CRITICISM MAY DEVELOP INTO A TESTY BI-LATERAL ISSUE. NOR SHOULD WE SHRINK FROM GOING PUBLIC WITH OUR CONCERNS, SHOULD OUR DEMARCHES PROVE FUTILE. AS A FIRST STEP, WE WILL BE RAISING THIS ISSUE WITH OUR FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS INCLUDING, AS OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, THOSE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THE SECRETARY SHOULD ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION WITH CHEYSSON WHEN THEY NEXT MEET. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SPEAK TO MITTERRAND ON THIS ISSUE IF THE LATTER VISITS THE U.S. BEFORE THE SUMMIT OR AT VERSAILLES.

7. WE PLAN TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY TO CONVEY OUR CONCERNS TO THE FRENCH AT ALL LEVELS WITH WHICH THE EMBASSY IS IN CONTACT, USING THE FOLLOWING GENERAL APPROACH: - -- WE UNDERSTAND AND RESPECT THE FRENCH TRADITION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

OF POLITICAL ASYLUM, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD APPLY TO TERRORISTS OR THOSE WHO SUPPORT TERRORISTS. SUCH PERSONS ARE VICIOUS COMMON CRIMINALS. FRENCH ATTITUDES ARE HAVING A NEFARIOUS EFFECT ON EFFORTS TO COUNTER TER-RORISM, AND NO LONGER SEEM APPROPRIATE TO AN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH THREATENS THE VERY FABRIC OF WESTERN SOCIETY.

- -- U.S. POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS STRONGLY AND CLEARLY ARTICULATED BUT WILL NOT HAVE THE DESIRED IMPACT IF ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES IS SEEN TO BE SOFT ON TERRORISM.

- -- INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS NOW STRUCK AT AMERICANS IN PARIS. THESE ACTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE ROLE OF PARIS AS A CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE EYES OF AMERICAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH CANNOT UNDERSTAND LAXITY TOWARD CRIMINALS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9814

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'-- AS WE AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC AND OPEN SOCIETIES HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DO, FRANCE NEEDS TO TIGHTEN UP ITS IMMIGRATION AND VISA POLICIES AND TAKE ACTION AT A MINI-MUM TO EXPEL KNOWN TERRORISTS. WE ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN A FULL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AT ALL LEVELS. -- ONE CLEAR SIGN OF FRENCH RESOLVE NOT TO LET TERRORISTS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS POLITICAL ASYLUM TRADI-TION WOULD BE RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM. APPLICATION OF ITS PROVISIONS REQUIRING PROMPT CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN CASE OF A REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE WOULD NOT CONTRADICT THE POLITICAL ASYLUM TRADITION. -- BASQUE, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND ARMENIAN TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN FREED FROM CUSTODY SINCE LAST JUNE. WE HOPE THIS IS NOT A SIGN THAT FRENCH POLICY IS SOFTENING FURTHER UNDER THE SOCIALISTS. -- THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR US WHICH WILL PLAY AN INCREASING ROLE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE DEPARTMENT WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THIS ISSUE IS RAISED BY THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT, SO THAT THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND IT REPRESENTS USG, AND NOT JUST EMBASSY, VIEWS. GALBRIATH

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SECSTATE WASHDC Ø525 DTG: 151932Z FEB 82 PSN: Ø16651 DATE Ø2/16/82 TOR: Ø46/2048Z SIT998 _____ DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001 _____ _____ WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB WPC STT 7 EOB: RENT WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS MESSAGE . IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #0525 0461936 O 151932Z FEB 82 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8598 INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 4741 USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7628 BT SECRET STATE Ø40525 EXDIS E. O. 12065: GDS 2/15/88 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN) TAGS: NATO, SP, FR SUBJECT: LETTER TO CHEYSSON ON SPANISH NATO ACCESSION RATIFICATION (S - ENTIRE TEXT). 1. 2. REQUEST EMBASSY TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR CLAUDE: DURING MY RECENT BILATERAL MEETINGS IN SPAIN I SENSED A GREAT CONCERN THAT FRENCH RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL ON SPANISH ADHERENCE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY RUNS MESSAGE (CONTINUED) : THE POSSIBILITY OF NOT BEING APPROVED DURING THE REGULAR SPRING SESSION OF PARLIAMENT. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHETHER ANY SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY PROBLEMS IN PARIS THIS SPRING WOULD BE TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL IN NATURE, or whether any delay would be a result of other circum-stances. In any event, I would like to express My Own FERVENT HOPE THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL PUSH THIS RATIFICATION THROUGH PARLIAMENT IN TIME TO COMPLETE THE SPANISH ENTRY PROCEDURE BY THE TIME OF THE NEXT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG. SINCERELY, AL. END TEXT. DECLASSIFIED

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SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE	TEXT.		
2. AT A DINNER LAST NIGHT HENRU, WE DISCUSSED IN A PE SCHEDULE FOR THE ARMS WHICH	RIVATE CONVERSATION	THE DELIVERY	

HENRU, WE DISCUSSED IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR THE ARMS WHICH FRANCE HAS SOLD TO NICARAGUA. I STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY DISAS-TROUS IF THE DELIVERY OF ANY OF THIS EQUIPMENT TOOK PLACE AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS A MITTERRAND VISIT TO THE U.S. HENRU SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THE POINT.

3. TODAY (2/17) HENRU CALLED ME TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS POINT WITH MITTERRAND, AND HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DELIVERY PRIOR TO, DURING, OR JUST AFTER A BILATERAL MEETING. GALBRAITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

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	TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9929
	S E C R E T PARIS Ø5524 NODIS E.O. 12065: RDS-2 2/17/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, AO, US SUBJECT: U.SANGOLA MEETING REF: A) STATE 30769, B) PARIS400
	1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)
	2. EMBASSY REQUESTS FURTHER GUIDANCE ON UPCOMING U.S Angola meeting.
-	3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, EMBASSY URGED THE ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR TO PUSH FOR A MEETING EARLIER THAN THE MARCH 1, 2, 3 DATES SUGGESTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE. SINCE THE MEETING ON FEBRUARY 5 AT WHICH REQUEST WAS MADE, WE HAVE NEVER HEARD FROM THE AMBASSADOR NOR HAS EMBASSY INITIATED ANY CONTACT (PER PARA 5 OF REF A). HAS JORGE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH DEPARTMENT THROUGH ANOTHER CHANNEL?
	4. WE ARE NOW SLIGHTLY OVER A WEEK AWAY FROM THE DATES PROPOSED BY THE ANGOLANS. DOES THE DEPARTMENT WANT US TO CONTINUE TO SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR AN ANGOLAN INITIA- TIVE, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF EITHER THE DATES SIMPLY SLIPPING BY OR THE ANGOLANS CONTACTING US AT THE LAST MOMENT ASSUMING EVERYTHING IS ON SCHEDULE? SOME LEAD TIME IS NECESSARY PARTICULARLY IF THE ANGOLANS STILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

* 16

INSIST ON HOLDING THE MEETING ON "NEUTRAL GROUND". EMBASSY, OF COURSE, WOULD PUSH HARD FOR USE OF CHANCERY FOR MEETINGS, NOTING THAT PRESS WOULD LIKELY BE ABLE TO FIND US IF ANOTHER HOTEL WERE USED. MARESCA

SEGRET

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PARIS 5524

DTG: 171528Z FEB 82 PSN: 019303



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CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2, SECSTATE WASHDC 2900 SIT417 DATE 03/02/82 _____

DTG: 271931Z FEB 82 PSN: Ø33273 TOR: Ø58/2149Z

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SIT: CKLS FOR. WHSR COMMENT:

*** T MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: ---

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS .

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #2990 0581938 O 271931Z FEB 82 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 9406

CONFIDENTIAL STATE Ø52990 EXDIS E. O. 12065: XDG-3 Ø2/Ø3/Ø2 (ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.) TAGS: PDIP, US, FR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

....

1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE RE MFO TO FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR CLAUDE:

I MUCH APPRECIATED ... YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 12 CONCERN-ING FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OB-SERVERS (MFO). THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE IN GENERAL HAS BEEN MOST FORTHCOMING AND IT IS GRATIFYING TO HEAR THAT THE MFO HAS REACHED SATISFACTORY AGREEMENTS WITH GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AS WELL AS WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. WE ALL HOPE THAT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS CAN BE QUICKLY CONCLUDED TO ENSURE THE TIMELY PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH IN THIS WORTHWHILE VENTURE. THAT IS THE SUB-JECT OF THIS LETTER.

IN THAT CONTEXT, I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR WILL-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

INGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE LIGHT AIRCRAFT FOR THE USE OF THE MFO. HOWEVER, AS YOU NOTE IN YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 12, MFO HAS THE PROBLEM OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES WITHIN ZONE C IN THE SINAI. AS THE REQUIREMENT IS TO SUPPLY MFO UNITS DEPLOYED OVER A LARGE AREA, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO USE SHIPS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE CENTRAL DEPOT WHERE THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE RECEIVED IS NOT ON THE COAST AND THE RELAY POINTS FOR THE MATERIAL THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE ZONE ARE NOT EITHER NOR WOULD IT BE FEASIBLE FOR THEM TO BE SO LOCATED. HENCE, THE MFO'S URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR TWO CARGO PLANES FROM FRANCE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MFO HAVE THESE PLANES IF IT IS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY WITHIN ITS AREA OF RESPON-SIBILITY.

THE ONLY ISSUE REMAINING CONCERNING THE FUNCTIONAL

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CONTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATING STATES IS THAT OF THE CARGO PLANES. I DO HOPE THAT YOU CAN ASSIST MFO IN OBTAINING THE USE OF SUCH PLANES EITHER BY PROVIDING THEM DIRECTLY "FROM EXISTING FRENCH MILITARY RESOURCES OR BY LEASING THEM AT FRENCH EXPENSE.

 ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN RENDER WILL BE MOST APPRE-CIATED AND THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR HELP IN OBTAINING THE LIGHT AIRCRAFT, HAIG

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 3, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON

SUBJECT:

Recommended Participants in President's Meeting with Mitterrand

Your memo to Mike Deaver (Tab I) provides NSC recommendations on the composition of the President's March 12 meeting and working lunch with French President François Mitterrand. I flag a number of key items in connection with this package:

-- <u>First</u>, you should know that Secretary Haig's preference, as relayed by EUR, is to keep both the Oval Office Meeting <u>and</u> the working lunch as restricted as possible; in fact, the Secretary favors a two on two arrangement, with the President and him carrying our side, and only Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Cheysson on the French side.

-- Second, there is some concern in State that the time set aside in the Oval Office - 60 minutes - is not sufficient and should be expanded to 90 minutes (mainly because translation requirements will consume a good part of the meeting).

-- <u>Third</u>, we anticipate a public announcement on Mitterrand's visit, released simultaneously here and in Paris on March 5.

As against the Secretary's push for ultra-restricted sessions, you should know that the White House has customarily gone with one of two formulas for a restricted meeting in the Oval Office: either a one on one (President and Mitterrand) with a notetaker on each side (usually a senior NSC staffer); or a line-up on our side which includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Affairs Advisor, an NSC notetaker, and possibly our Ambassador if the other side wants to include theirs. Of the two formulas, the second strikes me as by far the more appropriate in the case of Mitterrand, and I have organized your memo accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

completed by visit

That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I

ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATION:

OK NO

That the participants be limited to the two on two arrangement Secretary Haig favors.

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

Recommended Participants in President's Meeting with Mitterrand

Because of the sensitivity of the issues to be discussed --Franco-American relations involving Poland, Central America, economic policy, etc. -- the March 12 meeting and working lunch which the President is scheduled to have with French President François Mitterrand should be relatively restricted (the indications we have at present are that Mitterrand will bring only Foreign Minister Cheysson with him from Paris). I also believe the President needs 90 minutes in the Oval Office with Mitterrand rather than 60 minutes (translation will consume a good bit of time).

In light of these circumstances, I recommend that U.S. participation in the Mitterrand visit be structured as follows:

Oval Office (11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.)

The President The Vice President Secretary Alexander Haig William P. Clark NSC Notetaker

Working Lunch in Cabinet Room (12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.)

The President The Vice President Secretary Alexander Haig Secretary Donald Regan (for discussions of Economic Summit matters) Secretary Caspar Weinberger Edwin Meese James Baker Michael Deaver William P. Clark Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Allen Holmes Assistant Secretary (Economic Policy) Robert Hormats (to underline vis-a-vis the French his stature as U.S. "sherpa" for Versailles) NSC Senior Staff Member Jim Rentschler

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PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 PARIS 7428 SIT983 DATE Ø3/Ø5/82 DTG: Ø31Ø19Z MAR 82 PSN: Ø37942 TOR: Ø62/11Ø8Z . .

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUFHFR #7428 Ø621Ø2Ø O Ø31Ø19Z MAR 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE Ø863

S_E_C_R_E_T_PARIS Ø7428 NODIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH E. O. 12065: RDS-1 3/2/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN) OR-M TAGS: EFIN, EEWT, UR, XG, FR SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY MISSION ON EW ECONOMIC RELATIONS REF: A. STATE 53922 B. PARIS 7279

1. S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I AM VERY GLAD TO HEAR THAT THE MISSION WILL BE PROCEEDING TO PARIS. THE MARCH 9 - 19 PERIOD POSES ONE PROBLEM IN THAT FROM MARCH 10 - 13 I WILL BE IN WASHINGTON. IN CASE THERE IS SOME SLIPPAGE IN YOUR SCHEDULE, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I WILL BE IN THE U.S. FROM MARCH 24 - 27 AND IN GERMANY ON MARCH 29 - 30.

3. THE FOCUS OF THE VISIT IS WELCOME BUT AMBITIOUS. IT WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE TO YOU THAT THE FRENCH ARE LIKELY TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE. AS REFTEL B POINTS OUT, THE FRENCH HAVE REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT EXPORTS TO AND TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE ECONOMICALLY AND PERHAPS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE. THEY CONSIDER EXPORT CREDIT FACILITIES AS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO GETTING THE ORDERS AND THE IDEA OF DISCOURAGING EXPORTS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET ACROSS AT A TIME OF HIGH AND RISING UNEMPLOYMENT,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

A SHAKY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION AND, EQUALLY IMPORTANT, A GROWING TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ARGUMENTS ARE FAMILIAR TO YOU BUT TO LET YOU KNOW WHAT YOU FACE I HAVE HEARD MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON DEPLORE SANCTIONS. A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO MAKING ANY PROGRESS.

4. YOU CERTAINLY HAVE TAKEN ON THE TOUGHEST NUT FIRST. I HAVE EARLIER SUGGESTED THAT THE MAJOR POWERS TAKE CONCERTED STEPS TO CUT OFF SOVIET ACCESS TO SYNDICATED EUROCURRENCY CREDITS. THESE LOANS HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO EXPORTS, I.E. JOBS, AND THUS HAVE LITTLE DOMESTIC APPEAL. WHILE THE PROPOSAL TO FREEZE EXPORT CREDITS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE A MORE PRO-

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 7428

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NOUNCED EFFECT IT WILL ALSO BE TOUGHER TO SELL TO THE FRENCH THAN MY SALAMI TACTIC.

5. EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE NOT COMING TO TALK TO FRENCH ABOUT THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE I WILL WANT PERSONALLY TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU IN SOME DEPTH. GALBRAITH

PARIS 7428

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