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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/19/2007

File Folder FRANCE (1/8/82-1/17/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

40

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47251	MEMO	IKLE FOR THE RECORD RE MEETING WITH FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER HERNU R 3/26/2018 M07-081	3	1/8/1982	B1
47252	CABLE	081625Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	1/8/1982	B1
47253	CABLE	101713Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	4	1/10/1982	B1
47254	CABLE	101203Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	4	1/10/1982	B1
47255	CABLE	111434Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	1	1/11/1982	B1
47256	CABLE	121230Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	1	1/12/1982	B1
47257	CABLE	151029Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	6	1/15/1982	B1
47258	CABLE	151515Z JAN 82 D 5/26/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	1/15/1982	B1
47259	CABLE	160411Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	3	1/16/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47260	CABLE	161152Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	1/16/1982	B1
47261	CABLE	152226Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	3	1/15/1982	B1
47262	CABLE	170514Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	2	1/17/1982	B1
47263	CABLE	171416Z JAN 82 R 5/6/2010 NLRRM07-081	4	1/17/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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SECRET



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

47251

POLICY

January 8, 1981

82 11 11 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with French Defense Minister Charles Hernu, January 7, 1981

Time and Place: 6:15 P.M., French Chancery

Participants: US

Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)

France

Charles Hernu, Minister of Defense

Amb. Francois de Laboulaye, Ambassador to the United States

Jean Martre, Director of International Affairs, General Delegation for Armaments

Francois Heisbourg, Counselor for International Affairs

(U) The meeting was set up to follow up on the issue of French aid to Nicaragua, which came up between the Secretary of Defense and MOD Hernu in the morning but could not be addressed in sufficient detail for lack of time. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the French news stories that had just appeared on the military assistance to the Sandinistas.

(C) Hernu started by stressing that he wanted to make sure, in the spirit of our confidential relationship, that we were fully informed and that he had intended to talk to us in detail all along, that is to say prior to the news stories out of Paris. He said the additional information he was providing should be treated as confidential.

(S) The amount of the military assistance is 89 million French francs. The agreed transfers are:

Declassify January 8, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

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NLRRM 07-0817 47251
BY CN NARA DATE 3/26/88

- 45 TRM 9000 Renault trucks (capacity for 30 people).
- 2 Alouette III helicopters in a "civilian version."
- 2 Violette patrol boats with 1-2 20 mm cannon armaments for "Coast Guard" or police customs role."
- 100 air-to-ground rocket launchers. The French made the point that these are of such design that they could not be mounted on the MIGs. They speculated they might be mounted on older American-made planes that Nicaragua still possesses. The French will have civilian technicians go to Nicaragua to help in mounting these rockets.
- In addition, France will train 6 to 8 Nicaraguan sailors and 8 Nicaraguan pilots in France.

(S) All the equipment, Hernu argued, was not "offensive," and the Nicaraguans were not allowed to transfer or export to other countries. The logistics support would be cut off if that happened. When asked about the delivery dates, we were told that the helicopters could be delivered immediately; the trucks could be delivered within a year; the rocket launchers within 6 months to a year or more; and the 2 patrol boats, one immediately and one in a month.

(S) Hernu repeated the argument he made with the SecDef that this assistance would help to keep Nicaragua away from its exclusive reliance on the Soviets and would allow France to play a role in that country, etc. He compared the arms deal with their current effort to work with Ethiopia and Algeria.

(S) Ikle stressed our view of what was going on in Nicaragua: an arms buildup threatening the neighboring states, leading to armed forces larger than any other in Central America; constant arms supplies through Honduras and other routes to the insurgents in El Salvador; suppression internally of business people, press, etc.; and mistreatment of Indian tribes in Nicaragua, etc. In conjunction with the French position in the United Nations against elections in El Salvador, Ikle pointed out the French transfer was encouraging further Nicaraguan aggression against its neighbors. Hernu did not respond directly to these points; he noted them down and said he would report them to his government.

He argued that the French influence in Nicaragua may provide a red light or at least a yellow light to the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Ikle responded that it seems to us that they are giving the green light.

F. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

4

Package # _____ **RECEIVED**

82 11 AM 06

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUD NANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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JACQUE HILL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JUDGE CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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(Fontaine) [signature]*

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RECEIVED 15 JAN 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM IKLE, F

*sent
12/19/07*

DOCDATE 08 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

NICARAGUA

HERNU, CHARLES

DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DEFENSE MTG W/ FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER 7 JAN RE FRENCH
AID TO NICARAGUA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER ✓

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47252

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 0717
SIT897 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 081625Z JAN 82 PSN: 023924
TOR: 008/1639Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0717 0081625
O 081625Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7601

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L PARIS 00717
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 4 1/8/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN) OR-M
TAGS: EGEN, OCON, FR
SUBJ: LUNCH WITH JACQUES ATTALI

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT A PRIVATE LUNCH JANUARY 6 ALONE WITH JACQUES ATTALI, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S ADVISER, THE FOLLOWING WERE DISCUSSED:

A. THE ELYSEE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE WHITE HOUSE ACCEPT JUNE 5 AND 6 AS DATES FOR ECONOMIC SUMMIT AT VERSAILLES. ALL OTHER LEADERS HAVE ACCEPTED. I AGREED TO PRESS FOR REPLY. HE REPEATED THE REQUEST THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN NOT VISIT OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS JUST PRIOR TO SUMMIT. (NOTE: ALTHOUGH EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WILL NOT THEN BE IN SESSION, THE IDEA OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEAKING TO A SPECIAL SESSION IN STRASBOURG HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE EMBASSY AND WE BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE A FULL TURN-OUT OF PARLIAMENTARIANS. ATTALI INDICATED THEY MIGHT REPEAT MIGHT ACCEPT THIS AS A COMPROMISE.)
B. ATTALI SHARES CHEYSSON'S FEAR THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WILL ULTIMATELY FORCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM EUROPE. MOREOVER HE SEES A SHIFT IN INTEREST BY AMERICA AWAY FROM EUROPE TO THE EAST. I ASSURED HIM THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION; I TOLD HIM THAT AS INSURANCE AGAINST FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS BEING PRESSURED TO WITHDRAW, IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE NOT ONLY TO SPEAK OUT IN AMERICA AS TO THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL BUT ALSO TO DESCRIBE THE EFFORT THAT SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY FRANCE, ARE MAKING IN THE COMMON DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIETS. I EXPRESSED MY WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS CAMPAIGN AND ATTALI WAS GRATEFUL. HE AGREED THAT A JOINT EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THE FRENCH MILITARY RESOLVE AND EFFORT TO AMERICA WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO OUR OVERALL RELATIONS. HE WENT ON TO MAKE THE POINT THAT MITTERRAND, UNLIKE SOME OTHERS FROM THE LEFT IN EUROPE, COMPLETELY REJECTS THE HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY OF COMMUNISM. IF THE WEST CAN HOLD OFF THE SOVIET UNION LONG ENOUGH, IT WILL PROBABLY

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BY CN NARA DATE 5/6/10

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DTG: 081625Z JAN 82 PSN: 023924

CRUMBLE.

C. ATTALI SAID MITTERRAND WOULD LIKE TO MEET PRESIDENT REAGAN BEFORE THE SUMMIT. MITTERRAND WILL BE GOING TO TOKYO IN APRIL AND WILL HAVE SEEN PRIVATELY EVERY SUMMIT LEADER BEFORE JUNE. WOULD THERE BE A POSSIBILITY OF MITTERRAND MEETING THE PRESIDENT ALSO BEFORE THEN, PREFERABLY IN WASHINGTON? THIS POSES THE CLASSIC DELICATE PROCEDURAL QUESTION. NO FORMAL DEMARCHE, NO TURNDOWN, NO EMBARRASSMENT. IDEALLY, THE INITIATIVE, FROM THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW, SHOULD COME FROM THE U. S.

3. I ASKED IF HE HAD CONSIDERED OFFERING THE FRENCH BUSINESS COMMUNITY A FEW INVESTMENT INITIATIVES AND HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA, A BETTER SIGNAL THAN A SPEECH. HE ALSO AGREED THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS FRENCH GOODS MUST REMAIN COMPETITIVE IN WORLD MARKETS.

4. THIS WAS A FRIENDLY MEETING AND WE WILL BE HAVING DINNER TOGETHER SHORTLY WITH WIVES. (NOTE: THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE NICARAGUA.)
GALBRAITH

PARIS 0717

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47253

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 0933
SIT034 DATE 02/20/83

32744

DTG: 101713Z JAN 82 PSN: 070941
TOR: 010/1725Z

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WHSR COMMENT: F Y I D V I S E A S T O F U R T H E R D I S S E M . B E R M .

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0933/01 0101717
O 101713Z JAN 82 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0530
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 00933
NODIS
FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJECT: THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PARIS IS TIMELY AND WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO MAKE IT PRODUCTIVE. TO THIS END I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS A FEW THOUGHTS ON SOME KEY ISSUES AND SHARE AN INSIGHT ON A FUNDAMENTAL POINT.
3. SETTING. YOUR VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OCCASION FOR HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WHICH WILL NOT RECUR UNTIL MAY. BOTH ITS SYMBOLISM AND SUBSTANCE WILL BE WELCOMED BY MITTERRAND, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN HIS POLITICAL SUPPORT IS ERODING AND HIS GOVERNMENT IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE. THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN EARLY MARCH ARE AN IMPORTANT TEST FOR HIM. FOR US, YOUR VISIT OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STATE OUR VIEWS AND PERHAPS TO INFLUENCE FRENCH THINKING. AT THE BEGINNING OF A YEAR WHICH THE FRENCH, LIKE OURSELVES, VIEW AS CRITICAL FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUROPE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER AND COOPERATE ON THE PRIORITY ITEMS.

4. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF STRAIN IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT THIS SUMMER AND FALL, I BELIEVE THE FRENCH ARE IN A CONCILIATORY AND IN PART CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND. SECRETARY SHULTZ' VISIT WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT. IN MY VIEW, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THIS ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL IN ORDER TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE ON THE PRIORITIES. I. E. DEPLOYMENT OF INF ON SCHEDULE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE FRENCH ARE CONGENITALLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THEM. THEY ACCUSE US OF NOT CARING. THUS, IT IS ALWAYS WORTHWHILE AT THE

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DTG: 101713Z JAN 82 PSN: 070941

OUTSET TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE GIVE TO OUR ALLIANCE AND TO THE FRENCH VIEWPOINT. IN RESPONSE THEY MAY POINT TO OUR MANY SHARED INTERESTS AS EVIDENCE OF THE BASIC NEED AND SOUNDNESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WOULD NOT BE WRONG TO REMIND THEM THAT EXCESSIVE PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE U. S., GENERATED BY THE NEED TO EXCUSE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, HAS A DESTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE MUTUAL GOALS.

6. PREPARATIONS FOR THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT ARE UNDERWAY WITH THE USG REPRESENTED BY UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS, AND THE FRENCH BY JACQUES ATTALI WHO IS CLOSE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. THERE IS NO NEED TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT BUT IF RAISED YOU COULD REFER TO THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PLEASED THAT BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AGREE TO A TONED DOWN FORMAT AND THEN ASK MITTERRAND WHAT HE HOPES WILL COME FROM THE SUMMIT. I THINK YOU COULD ALSO EXPRESS OUR SATISFACTION THAT THE FRENCH AGREE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF COMPLETING THE EAST-WEST ECONOMIC STUDIES BY THE TIME OF THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETING. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT GOAL WHICH COULD GIVE WILLIAMSBURG A POSITIVE TONE IN CONTRAST TO THE VERSAILLES MEETING.

7. FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS. FOLLOWING A GRADUAL RESUMPTION OF FRENCH POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE USSR, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON WILL VISIT MOSCOW IN MID-FEBRUARY -- THE FIRST SUCH HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL VISIT OF THE MITTERRAND ADMINISTRATION -- AND YOUR MEETINGS WILL

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF WHAT CHEYSSON INTENDS TO RAISE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A MITTERRAND VISIT LATER IN THE YEAR. THE FRENCH WILL BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING OUR CURRENT THINKING ON U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS, INCLUDING A SUMMIT.

8. INF. THE FRENCH UNDER MITTERRAND HAVE GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT TO THE NEED TO BEGIN INF DEPLOYMENTS IN LATE 1983, BARRING AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. THIS REFLECTS THEIR VIEW THAT NOT ONLY MUST DISSUASIVE CREDIBILITY BE MAINTAINED BUT THAT EUROPEANS MUST NOT BE LEFT IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN BE TERRORIZED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE THE U. S. THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH TERROR WILL LEAD TO A PACIFIST AND NEUTRALIST FRG. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS WILL FORTIFY THE GERMAN CONFIDENCE TO RESIST. THEY HAVE GENERALLY SUPPORTED OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES IN GENEVA, BUT HAVE HINTED THAT SOME COMPROMISE SHORT OF THE ZERO OPTION WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME. THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL -- WHICH WOULD TIE THE LEVEL OF SOVIET INF IN EUROPE TO THE COMBINED LEVEL OF FRENCH AND U. K. FORCES -- INVOLUNTARILY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 0933
SIT033 DATE 02/20/83

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WHSR COMMENT: F Y I D VISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0933/02 0101720
O 101713Z JAN 82 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0531
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 00933

NODIS

FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH BROUGHT IN THE FRENCH, AND THEY QUICKLY AND ADAMANTLY OPPOSED HIS PROPOSAL. THIS INSISTENCE OF REMAINING OUTSIDE ANY INF AGREEMENT TENDS TO MAKE THEM SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POSITION, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE THOSE IN FRANCE, E. G. CHIRAC AND DE ROSE, WHO OPPOSED THE ZERO OPTION. YOU MIGHT APPLAUD THE FRENCH SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENTS AND ASK WHAT OTHER STEPS THEY THINK COULD BE TAKEN TO STIFFEN FRG RESOLVE TO DEPLOY.

9. U. S. ECONOMY. THE FRENCH DO NOT UNDERSTAND OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM VERY WELL, BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR OWN ECONOMIC RECOVERY DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUR SUCCESS. AN UPBEAT DESCRIPTION BY YOU OF PROSPECTS FOR THE U. S. ECONOMY OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO WOULD BE WELCOME.

10. FINALLY, ONE INSIGHT INTO THE FRENCH EGO OR NATIONAL PRIDE. FOR CENTURIES FRANCE WAS THE DOMINATING OR PREPONDERANT MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN EUROPE. ITS GLORY SLOWLY FADED, HOWEVER, AND BY JUNE 1940, FRANCE HAD ACQUIRED A NATIONAL INFERIORITY COMPLEX.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFTER DE GAULLE ASSUMED POWER IN 1958 THINGS CHANGED; THE NATURAL ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF FRANCE BEGAN TO REASSERT THEMSELVES AND FRANCE GREW RAPIDLY, PASSING THE U. K. IN GNP AND CLOSING IN ON WEST GERMANY. THEIR NUCLEAR FORCE DE FRAPPE BECAME NO LONGER A JOKE; IT IS NOW A POWERFUL INDEPENDENT EQUALIZER. FRANCE SAW THE COMMON MARKET AS AN ENTITY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE USSR AND IT SAW ITSELF AS THE DOMINATING FACTOR SITTING ON TOP OF THE COMMON MARKET. THUS LEVERAGED THE NAPOLEONIC DREAM WAS RESURRECTED IN A MODERN SETTING. FOR US OR ANYONE ELSE TO SUGGEST OR IMPLY THAT FRANCE IS NOT ENTITLED TO EQUAL STATUS ALONG SIDE THE U. S. AND THE USSR IS TO COURT A HOSTILE OR GLACIAL RIPOSTE. INDEED, IT HAS BECOME POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO PLAY THIS NEO-NAPOLEONIC PART. THEREIN LIES THE DIFFICULTY IN DEALING WITH THE FRENCH. THE FADED OLD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 0933 32744 DTG: 101713Z JAN 82 PSN: 070944

DUCHESS HAS HAD HORMONE SHOTS AND WOE TO THE LOUT WHO
DOES NOT TREAT HER LIKE A GRANDE, BELLE, DAME.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 0933 32744 DTG: 101713Z JAN 82 PSN: 070944

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SECRET

47254 12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 0888 DTG: 101203Z JAN 82 PSN: 070613
SIT703 DATE 01/10/83 TOR: 010/1225Z

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SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0888/01 0101212
O 101203Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0507

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 0888

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, INF, PARM
SUBJECT: INF: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY
REF: A. (82) STATE 35671
B. LONDON 207

1. (ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. STRONG GOF SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE INF POSITION, AND PARTICULARLY FOR INF DEPLOYMENTS, BASED ON FRENCH NATIONAL INTEREST HAS HELPED GENERATE WIDESPREAD FRENCH PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NATO LRINF. SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS IN PRESENTING THEIR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS HAVE NOT HAD WIDE SUCCESS. THE SOVIET POSITION OF DEMANDING COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WILL REMAIN AN IRRITANT IN FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND WILL ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH TAKE A LEADING ROLE IN REJECTING SOVIET PROPOSALS. NONETHELESS, THE GOF WILL BE AT PAINS NOT TO IDENTIFY ITS POSITION TOO CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. AND TO DETECT IN ADVANCE ANY U.S. WAVERING ON THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION. MANAGING INF IN FRANCE WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE THAT WE MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOF BUT LET THE FRENCH TAKE THE LEAD IN DEALING WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEIR PUBLIC ON THE ISSUE. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR INFORMATION EFFORTS ON KEY OPINION-MAKING GROUPS, SUCH AS DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS MEDIA COMMENTATORS, POLITICAL PARTY DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS AND FEMALE OPINION LEADERS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE OTHER ALLIES, AND SPECIFICALLY THE SCG, TO TAKE A HIGHER PROFILE IN DEALING WITH SOVIET PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES WHILE WE ARE SEEN TO BE CONCENTRATING ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GENEVA. MEANWHILE, WE MAY NEED TO RE-EXAMINE OUR PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION IN ORDER TO ENSURE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS A PROPOSAL FOR AN END RESULT AND NOT AN OPENING POSITION TO BE HAGGLED OVER WITH THE SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON INF:

PROBABLY MORE SO THAN IN ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY, THE PREVAILING FRENCH PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS IS POSITIVE. APART FROM THE COMMUNISTS AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES, EVEN GROUPS WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BE HOSTILE TO INF TEND SO FAR TO BE DISPLAYING AN ATTITUDE OF SKEPTICAL RESERVE. SPORADIC EFFORTS BY THE PCF TO GENERATE GRASS-ROOTS OPPOSITION TO INF DEPLOYMENTS HAVE FAILED AND, BARRING UNFORESEEN MAJOR EVENTS OR DRAMATIC SHIFTS IN GOF POLICY, DEVELOPMENT OF A FRENCH PEACE MOVEMENT CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE IS UNLIKELY. THIS PHENOMENON IS DOUBTLESS DERIVATIVE OF THE WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH NATIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE COROLLARY BUT VAGUE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF FRANCE NEEDS ITS OWN DETERRENT, THEN SO DO OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO DO NOT POSSESS NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES. THE STRONG SUPPORT WHICH THE GOF HAS GIVEN TO INF HAS HELPED TO SET THE TONE OF PUBLIC REACTION. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO THE UNBALANCED THREAT POSED BY SOVIET SS-20'S, HAS TENDED TO FORECLOSE EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO NATO'S INF FROM THE FRENCH LEFT. INDEED, MITTERRAND HAD TO EXPLAIN IN HIS LATEST STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT WHY (SINCE THE GOF SEEMS TO BE SUCH A KEEN BACKER OF THE NATO PLAN) FRANCE WOULD NOT CONSIDER PURCHASING PERSHING MISSILES FOR ITSELF.

4. APPEAL OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS HAVE NOT DONE WELL IN FRANCE. THE FRENCH PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL REACTION TO POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN REMAIN STRONGLY NEGATIVE. POLLS SHOW A CONTINUING DECLINE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S POPULAR IMAGE, WHILE ANDROPOV'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE HAS NOT BEEN HELPED BY THE ENTHUSIASTIC COVERAGE THE FRENCH PRESS HAS GIVEN TO THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION WITH THE POPE'S ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION. THUS ANDROPOV'S RECENT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT OFFER WAS GREETED HERE BY THE PRESS (OTHER THAN "L'HUMANITE") WITH HEAVY SKEPTICISM. NUMEROUS ARTICLES DISSECTED ITS DISADVANTAGEOUS AND INEQUITABLE ELEMENTS RATHER THAN DEPICTING IT AS A MAJOR CONCESSION LEADING TOWARDS A DESIRABLE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

5. FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS:

SENIOR FRENCH LEADERS PERCEIVE TWO MAJOR NATIONAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE INF QUESTION. FIRST, THERE IS AN UNDENIABLE IMBALANCE IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS WHICH MUST BE CORRECTED LEST "SOME COUNTRIES" (READ THE FRG AND SCANDILUXIA) COMMENCE AN IRREVERSIBLE SLIDE TOWARDS POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS FRENCH CONCERN IS

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DTG: 101203Z JAN 82 PSN: 070613

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PAGE 01 PARIS 0888
SIT702 DATE 01/10/83

DTG: 101203Z JAN 82 PSN: 070615
TOR: 010/1227Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0888/02 0101213
O 101203Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0508

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 0888
HEIGHTENED BY REAL FEAR THAT A GREEN/SPD COALITION COULD TRIUMPH IN THE UPCOMING GERMAN ELECTIONS AND GO ON TO BLOCK NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS. SECOND, THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT CANNOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. NOT ONLY ARE THE FRENCH NOT AT THE TABLE, BUT THEY ARE ALSO ADAMANT THAT THEIR BARELY ADEQUATE FORCE CAN IN NO WAY BE COMPARED WITH THE "OVERARMAMENT" OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. NOR CAN THE GOF ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SOMEHOW COMPENSATED FOR FRENCH AND OTHER THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, SINCE THIS WOULD BE A DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF SOVIET HEGEMONIAL STATUS ON A GLOBAL SCALE. OFFICIAL FEELING ON THIS ISSUE IS NOT MERELY FIRM; IT BORDERS ON THE FANATICAL WITH THE FRENCH REGARDING THEIR BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AS HAVING TO KEEP EVERYONE'S FEET TO THE FIRE ON THIS ISSUE. THEY ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED BY THE WARNKE PROPOSAL AND APPALLED AT ITS EMBRACE BY THE WEST GERMAN SPD AND BRITISH LABOR PARTY FIGURES. THIS MEANS THAT SOVIET INSISTENCE ON KEYING THEIR EUROPEAN INF PROPOSALS TO FRENCH AND U.K. FORCES WILL NOT ONLY GUARANTEE CONTINUING FRENCH RESISTANCE TO SOVIET SOLUTIONS BUT ALSO WILL RESULT IN THE FRENCH TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN OPPOSING SUCH PROPOSALS, AS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON HAVE DONE WITH THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL. THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY TOLD THE SOVIETS AT HIGH LEVELS HOW UNACCEPTABLE THIS FEATURE OF THEIR INF POSTURE IS. THE LATEST SOVIET RESPONSE TO SUCH FRENCH PROTESTATION SEEMS TO BE AN IMPLICATION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO GROMYKO THAT OVERALL FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL SUFFER IF THIS FRENCH ATTITUDE PERSISTS. OUR READING THEREFORE, IS THAT THE GOF IN THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE TAKING GREAT AND INCREASING PAINS TO EXPLAIN TO ITS OWN PUBLIC AND THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE WHY SOVIET INF PROPOSALS RELATED TO THIRD COUNTRY FORCES ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE. LIKE AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND, WE EXPECT INF TO REMAIN AN IRRITANT IN FRANCO-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS.

6. NEGATIVE FACTORS:

--
THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT IS WIDELY PERCEIVED HERE BY PRESS AND PUBLIC AS THE DOMINANT SIDE OF NATO'S 1979 DOUBLE DECISION. THUS, EVEN IF THE GOF IN ITS OWN COUNSELS PLACES STRESS ON DEPLOYMENT, IT MUST PLAY TO THIS PERCEPTION. FURTHERMORE, FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT ROLE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE PUTS A PREMIUM ON FRENCH DIFFERENTIATION FROM U.S. OR U.S./NATO POSITIONS. FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THE GOF THEREFORE FEELS ITSELF UNDER PRESSURE TO NOT SEEM TO BE EMBRACING TOO CLOSELY OR UNCRITICALLY THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION. THIS NEED IS EXACERBATED BY HISTORIC FRENCH MISTRUST OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS. WHILE NOT A MEMBER OF THE SCG, FRANCE NURTURES A LONGSTANDING RESENTMENT THAT ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS TOO OFTEN AMOUNT TO THE U.S. TAKING A DECISION AND THEN TRYING TO IMPOSE IT ON THE ALLIES, BARELY IN ADVANCE OF WASHINGTON LEAKS TO THE U.S. PRESS. THE FRENCH WILL BE LOOKING FOR ANY SIGN THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO FALL OFF THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION LEST THEY BE CAUGHT OUT EMBRACING FOR THEIR OWN PUBLIC SOMETHING THE U.S. HAS ALREADY JETTISONED. THUS, THE USG WILL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO KEY GOF PLAYERS THAT IT IS TAKING GREAT PAINS TO CONSULT WITH FRANCE ON ITS INF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY.

7. PRIMARY GROUPS FOR INFORMATION HANDLING:

--
FROM THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS WE HAVE DEVELOPED THE FOLLOW-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ING PRINCIPLES FOR OUR INFORMATION POLICIES IN DEALING WITH FRENCH GROUPS:
- A. TOO HIGH A U.S. PROFILE WILL BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE; IT IS BETTER THAT THE GOF TAKE THE LEAD IN DEALING WITH ITS PUBLIC AND PRESS.
- B. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR FIRE ON KEY PLAYERS IN THE GOF AND OPINION MAKERS OUTSIDE IT WITH THE GOAL OF GETTING THESE PRIMARY GROUPS TO DEAL WITH THE GENERAL FRENCH PUBLIC.
- C. WE NEED TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN HIGH VALUE GROUPINGS OF OPINION LEADERS FOR CONCENTRATED ATTENTION AND ASSISTANCE OF THEIR WIDER EFFORTS. IN THIS AREA, WE HAVE CHOSEN FRENCH PRESS COMMENTATORS ON INF AND MILITARY MATTERS AND FRENCH SOCIALIST AND OPPOSITION PARTY DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS. LIKE LONDON (REF B) WE ALSO BELIEVE SENIOR FEMALE OPINION-MAKERS CAN PLAY

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PAGE 01 PARIS 0888
SIT701 DATE 01/10/83

DTG: 101203Z JAN 82 PSN: 070618
TOR: 010/1229Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0888/03 0101214
O 101203Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0509

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 0888
AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF
INF ARMS CONTROL. DURING THE COMING YEAR, WE WILL BE
CONCENTRATING OUR BRIEFING, BACKGROUNDING AND PUBLIC
RELATIONS EFFORTS ON THESE GROUPS.

8. WIDER USG EFFORTS:

--
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR EFFORTS HERE WILL DEPEND TO A
LARGE MEASURE ON WHAT HAPPENS IN WASHINGTON, GENEVA AND
EVERE. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING FOR ADDRESSEES'
CONSIDERATION.

- A. THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE A HIGHER PROFILE IN
REACTING TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES DRESSED UP
AS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. SINCE INF CORRESPONDS TO
THE NEEDS OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES FOR EUROPE-BASED
DETERRENT FORCES, (AFTER DUE COORDINATION WITH US) THEY
COULD TAKE MORE OF THE LEAD IN REACTING TO SUCH SOVIET
PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES WHILE WE HANDLE THE SOVIETS IN
GENEVA.

- B. A HIGHER PROFILE, AND CONTINUOUS INFORMATIONAL
EFFORT NEEDS TO COME OUT OF THE SCG PROCESS TO MATCH
THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE INF IN PUBLIC FORA
RATHER THAN AT GENEVA. THERE NEEDS TO BE A STRONGER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REALIZATION OF THE U.S. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AS A FORTH-
COMING, SERIOUS POSTURE WORKING FOR MAXIMUM REDUCTIONS
WHICH IS BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE ALLIES, AND HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THEM. WE HAVE THE
IMPRESSION FROM HERE THAT MOST EUROPEANS DO NOT KNOW
WHAT THE SCG IS NOR WHAT THE ROLE OF THE ALLIES IN THE
ALLIANCE INF PROCESS HAS BEEN. MANY EUROPEANS EVEN
SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE US IS FORCING INF ON THE
EUROPEANS. IN ORDER TO GENERATE BETTER PUBLIC UNDER-
STANDING WE HAVE THE FURTHER IMPRESSION THAT IT WILL
BE NECESSARY TO CAREFULLY CHOOSE CERTAIN NON-TECHNICAL
THEMES AND REPEAT
THEM TIRELESSLY. FOCUSING ON THE TECHNICAL COMPLEXITIES
OF THE INF QUESTION WILL SIMPLY LOSE MOST OF THE
EUROPEAN AUDIENCE.

- C. EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO THE SERIES OF SOVIET

PROPOSALS ON INF, PARTICULARLY ANDROPOV'S HAVE RAISED
A NUMBER OF VALUABLE ARGUMENTS THAT NEED TO BE REPEATED
MORE OFTEN BY EUROPEANS TO EUROPEANS. A KEY POINT THAT
WILL NEED TO BE MADE IS THAT THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL FOR
A SOVIET SS-20 RESIDUAL FORCE BASED IN EUROPE WHICH
EQUALS COMBINED FRENCH AND BRITISH FORCES ACTUALLY
STRESSES THE DECOUPLING FUNCTION OF SOVIET LRINF.
AN SS-20 (OR FOR THAT MATTER AN SS-4 OR SS-5) LIFTING
OFF FROM ITS LAUNCHER IN THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTS A
VERY DIFFERENT THREAT TO NATO COUNTRIES THAN IT DOES TO
THE U.S. UNLIKE A STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE, WE
WILL KNOW IT CANNOT BE AIMED AT U.S. TERRITORY. FROM
A EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW, A U.S. RIPOSTE TO AN INF
ATTACK IS THUS MUCH LESS CERTAIN THAN TO AN ICBM ATTACK.
WITHOUT LAND-BASED NATO LRINF THOSE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
WHO DO NOT HAVE NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES (UNLIKE THE UK
AND FRANCE) MUST PUT THEIR ENTIRE FAITH IN U.S.
STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO RESPOND OR ELSE ADMIT THEY ARE
DEFENSELESS AGAINST SUCH SOVIET ARMS. THE FORMER IS
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AS THE SOVIETS ACHIEVE EQUALITY
OR SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WHILE THE LATTER
IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL STEP ON THE DISMAL
ROAD TO POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
- D. KEY SENIOR PLAYERS IN THE USG INF POLICY
ARENA WILL ALSO NEED TO MAKE THEMSELVES MORE AVAILABLE
TO THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF OUR POSTURE TO CONTINUALLY
BRIEF KEY EUROPEAN OPINION LEADERS. MEMBERS OF THIS
GROUP WHO CAN HANDLE THE FRENCH LANGUAGE ARE PARTICULARLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INVALUABLE TO OUR EFFORTS HERE.
- E. WHILE WE AGREE WITH LONDON THAT INFLEXIBLE
INSISTENCE ON THE ZERO OPTION MAY GRADUALLY LEAD TO
A LOSS OF SUPPORT AMONG CERTAIN ELEMENTS, WE CANNOT
SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT WE SHOULD PROMOTE A FURTHER
COMPROMISE ON AN ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE SIMPLY TO
ASSUAGE CERTAIN SECTORS OF EUROPEAN THINKING. IN
FACT, THE EQUATION HERE IS QUITE DIFFERENT. MANY OF
THE FRENCH (PERHAPS EVEN A MAJORITY) BELIEVE THE ZERO
OPTION WENT TOO FAR AS AN OPENING POSITION IN A
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION. THEY SEE ZERO/ZERO AS A
DESIRABLE OUTCOME BUT NOT AS A CLEVER OPENING PROPOSAL,
SINCE IT WAS FROM THE OUTSET BOUND TO LEAD TO PRESSURES
FOR COMPROMISE ON A LESS DESIRABLE FORMULA. PERHAPS

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SIT700

PARIS 0888
DATE 01/10/83

DTG: 101203Z JAN 82 PSN: 070616
TOR: 010/1227Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #0888/04 0101215
O 101203Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0510

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 00888
OUR TACTIC AT THIS TIME SHOULD BE TO STRESS THIS
POINT, AND TO ARGUE THAT IF THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO
OPEN WITH THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL, WE SHOULD LOGICALLY
PULL BACK TO A MORE RESERVED INITIAL PROPOSAL, SUCH
AS ZERO LRINF FOR THE SOVIETS AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF
LRINF MISSILES FOR NATO ANYWAY AS A COUNTER WEIGHT TO
SOVIET SUPERERIORITY IN MRINF MISSILES. GALBRAITH

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PAGE 01
SIT695

PARIS 0883
DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 111434Z JAN 82 PSN: 027133
TOR: 011/1626Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0883 0111435
O 111434Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7683

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 00883
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/11/02 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A.) OR-A
TAGS: PEPR, AO, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ANGOLANS
REF: STATE 4077

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AMBASSADOR DE ALMEIDA ADVISES THAT LUANDA WILL NOT AGREE TO USE OF DCM RESIDENCE OR CHANCERY. WE WILL RENT SUITE IN NAME OF MR. CHESTER. WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE TO LEAVE DEPOSIT FOR WHICH EMBASSY IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE A CASH ADVANCE. HOWEVER, EMBASSY MUST HAVE APPROPRIATE FISCAL DATA AGAINST WHICH TO CHARGE THE ADVANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE AT ONCE.
GALBRAITH

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BY CU NARA DATE 5/6/10

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47256 16

PAGE 01 PARIS 1/12 0992
SIT685 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 121230Z JAN 82 PSN: 028450
TOR: 012/1432Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT MR
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #0992 0121242
O 121230Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7733

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 00992
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/12/02 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AO, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE ANGOLANS

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. ANGOLAN DELEGATION WILL BE HEADED BY FOREIGN MINISTER PAOLO JORGE, AND CONSIST OF A TOTAL OF THREE MEMBERS. AMBASSADOR DE ALMEIDA SAYS LAUNDA DID NOT PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE OTHERS IN THE DELEGATION. HE PRESUMES ONE WILL BE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENCY. ANGOLAN DELEGATION ARRIVES THURSDAY.
3. EMBASSY IS ARRANGING FOR SUITE AT INTERNATIONAL (WHICH IS CONVENIENT TO EMBASSY) FOR MEETING SITE. ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR SAYS HE WISHES TO SPLIT THE COST OF THE SITE WITH USG. PLEASE CABLE FISCAL DATA AT ONCE. GALBRAITH

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SIT986 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 151029Z JAN 82 PSN: 033030
TOR: 015/1129Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1487/01 0151033
O 151029Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7970
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDA FAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 8144
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8094
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9029
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7229
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 8230
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0659
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 7088
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 6806
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 8922
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7319
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3607
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 3011
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5869
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1134
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5726
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 3005
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8442
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 7363
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9591
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3742
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3659
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TREASURY FOR LELAND, CANNER
FOR HORMATS AND EAGLEBURGER
EO 12065: GDS 01/15/88 (GORDON, EDGAR J.) OR-T
TAGS: EFIN, FR
SUBJECT: REPORT ON POLISH CREDITOR MEETING, JANUARY 14,
- 1982
REF: A) WARSAW 5 B) WARSAW 200 C) WARSAW 380

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. MEETING OF POLAND'S SIXTEEN MAJOR CREDITORS COVERED FULL AGENDA IN ONE DAY RATHER THAN THE EXPECTED TWO, MOVING FROM (1) REVIEW OF POLISH ECONOMIC SITUATION AND STATUS OF THE BANK RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT, TO (2) DISCUSSION AND DECISION ON INVOCATION OF 1981 AGREEMENT'S "TANK CLAUSE," (3) AGREED POSITION OF

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RESCHEDULING 1982 OFFICIAL DEBT MATURITIES, AND (4) TOUR DE TABLE ON POLICIES REGARDING NEW AID AND/OR CREDITS. CREDITOR GOVERNMENTS AGREED NOT RPT NOT TO INVOKE TANK CLAUSE AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REFERENCED IN CLAUSE DO EXIST. THEY ALSO AGREED ON SUSPENSION OF 1982 DEBT RESCHEDULING TALKS FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. ALL ALSO STATED, WITH ONLY MINOR VARIATIONS, THAT NO RPT NO NEW OFFICIAL CREDITS OR GUARANTEES ARE BEING PROVIDED TO POLAND, ALTHOUGH PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS (MOSTLY DRAWN DOWN NOW ANYWAY) ARE BEING FILLED AND HUMANITARIAN AID CONTINUES. AGREED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE TRANSMITTED TO POLISH FINMIN BY FRENCH CHAIR ON 15 JANUARY IS APPENDED BELOW IN PARAS 11-14. END SUMMARY.

3. DISCUSSION OF POLISH ECONOMIC SITUATION BEGAN WITH REPORT OF IMF REPS (WHO WERE PRESENT) ON THEIR DECEMBER TRIP TO WARSAW. FUND TEAM'S MAIN IMPRESSION WAS THAT, DESPITE "POCKETS OF EXPERTISE AT JR. LEVELS" IN VARIOUS ECON MINISTRIES, POLES WILL FIND ECONOMIC REFORM DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING. CONSTRAINED BY ENORMOUS REAL AND FINANCIAL DISEQUILIBRIA, THE GOP IS SLOWING DECENTRALIZATION AND INTRODUCING IT SECTOR BY SECTOR, A COURSE WHICH IT APPEARS TO PREFER IN ANY EVENT. THE FUND TEAM SEES THE GOP AS HAVING ONLY TWO REAL OPTIONS: CURRENCY REFORM AND PRICE REFORM. THE IMF HAS HAD NO INDICATION THAT THE GOP HAS CHANGED ITS MIND ON FUND MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. US DEL MEISSNER GAVE US ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF MARTIAL LAW ON POLISH ECONOMY, DRAWING ON REFTELS. IN PERFUNCTORY DISCUSSION, OTHER DELEGATIONS ESSENTIALLY AGREED WITH US ANALYSIS. FRENCH AND SPANISH HAD ECON REPS FROM THEIR WARSAW EMBASSIES TO GIVE REPORTS.

5. THE CHAIR POLLED THE GROUP ON CURRENT STATUS OF POLISH ARREARS ON 1981 OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE DEBT. THE POLES ARE MORE OR LESS UP TO DATE ON PAYMENTS OF THE UNRESCHEDULED TEN PERCENT OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST DUE IN 1981 ON OFFICIAL DEBT. MOST DELS HAD LESS CLEAR INFO ON PAYMENTS TO BANKS, BUT FRG DEL HAD INTERESTING REPORT ON JANUARY 11 VISIT OF FRIEDERICH'S OF DRESDNER BANK TO WARSAW. ACCORDING TO DRESDNER, THE POLES RECKON THAT THEY NEED DOLS 288 MILLION TO BRING BANK INTEREST UP TO DATE TO END-1981. THEY ASKED AGAIN FOR BRIDGING FINANCE, PLUS DOLS 350 MILLION TO COVER DEBT SERVICE IN FIRST QTR OF 1982, AND WERE REFUSED. POLES ALSO STATED THAT THERE IS ZERO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER HELP VIA HARD CURRENCY FUNDS FROM THE USSR OR A USSR/COMECON BANK GUARANTEE OF POLISH BORROWING. US DEL CORNELL CITED CURRENT US BANKS' ESTIMATE THAT DOLS 200 MILLION TO 250 MILLION

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SIT985 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 151029Z JAN 82 PSN: 033032
TOR: 015/1131Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1487/02 0151035
O 151029Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7971
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 8145
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8095
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9030
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7230
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 8231
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0660
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 7089
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 6807
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 8923
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7320
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3608
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 3012
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5870
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1135
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5727
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 3006
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8443
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 7364
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9592
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3743
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3660
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 01487
USEEC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TREASURY FOR LELAND, CANNER
FOR HORMATS AND EAGLEBURGER
IN INTEREST PAYMENTS REMAIN OUTSTANDING.

6. ALL DELEGATIONS SHOWED REDUCED LEVEL OF CONCERN
THAT PRIVATE BANKS WILL TRIGGER DEFAULT ACTION.
SOME REPORTED THAT THEIR BANKS NOW LOOK TO MID-
FEBRUARY AS REASONABLE DATE FOR POLES TO PAY UP AS
PRECONDITION FOR PRIVATE RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT.

7. DISCUSSION OF WHETHER TO INVOKE THE TANK CLAUSE
TOOK SOME TIME BUT INVOLVED RELATIVELY LITTLE CONTROVERSY.
A FEW NON-NATO DELS SHOWED SOME CONCERN ABOUT GETTING
TOO CLOSE TO THE POSITION OF NATO DELEGATIONS, BUT
IN THE END THEY ACCEPTED MAJORITY VIEW THAT (1) THE
RELEVANT "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES" EXIST, BUT (2) TANK

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 151029Z JAN 82 PSN: 033032

CLAUSE WILL NOT BE INVOKED AT THIS TIME.

8. THE CREDITORS AGREED FAIRLY QUICKLY THAT 1982 DEBT RESCHEDULING TALKS SHOULD BE PUT IN ABEYANCE. THE FRG DEL TOOK THE INITIATIVE FORCEFULLY WITH STATEMENT THAT FRG HAS NO WISH TO RESCHEDULE FOR 1982 AS LONG AS PRESENT CONDITIONS IN POLAND CONTINUE, EVEN IF A RESCHEDULING FOR 1981 IS CONCLUDED WITH THE BANKS.

9. A REVIEW OF CREDITORS' POLICIES ON NEW CREDITS AND AID PRODUCED NO SURPRISES. NONE OF THE CREDITOR GOVERNMENTS IS CONSIDERING NEW CREDIT OR GUARANTEE LINES, BUT ALL RESERVE OPTION TO SHIP HUMANITARIAN AID, INCLUDING FOOD. MOST EC COUNTRIES ARE DOING THIS THROUGH THE COMMUNITY FOOD AID PROGRAM AND ALL ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POLICING DISTRIBUTION SO THAT FOOD SHIPMENTS ARE NOT DIVERTED BY THE GOP.

10. THE FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE TRANSMITTED TO GOP FINMIN ON JANUARY 15 THROUGH POLAND'S PARIS EMBASSY.

11. BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR MR. MINISTER:
THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN CREDITOR COUNTRIES OF POLAND MET ON JANUARY 14, 1982 IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THE RESCHEDULING OF POLAND'S OFFICIAL OR OFFICIALLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GUARANTEED DEBT.

12. THE GROUP AGREED THAT EVENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN POLAND INDICATING EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ALONG THE LINE OF WHAT HAD BEEN ENVISAGED UNDER THE IV-3 CLAUSE OF THE APRIL 27, 1981 AGREED MINUTE. HOWEVER, THE GROUP CONSIDERED THAT THE CLAUSE AS SUCH SHOULD NOT BE INVOKED AT THIS TIME.

13. AS FAR AS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 1982 RESCHEDULING ARE CONCERNED, A BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG CREDITOR COUNTRIES IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THERE IS NO SUCH CONSENSUS TODAY, IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE RESUMED FOR THE TIME BEING.

14. HOWEVER, I WILL, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP OF CREDITOR COUNTRIES, KEEP IN COMMUNICATION WITH YOURSELF AND MY COLLEAGUES TO APPRECIATE WHETHER DEVELOPMENTS ARE SUCH THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE

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SIT984 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 151029Z JAN 82 PSN: 033034
TOR: 015/1132Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1487/03 0151037
O 151029Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7972
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USDA FAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 8146
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8096
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9031
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7231
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 8232
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0661
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 7090
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 6808
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 8924
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7321
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3609
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 3013
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5871
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1136
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5728
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 3007
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8444
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 7365
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9593
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3744
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3661
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 01487
USEEC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TREASURY FOR LELAND, CANNER
FOR HORMATS AND EAGLEBURGER
RESUMED. IN THE MEANTIME, ALL CREDITOR COUNTRIES
INDEED EXPECT POLAND TO LIVE UP TO HER INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS. END TEXT.
GALBRAITH

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PARIS 1487

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47259

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PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 1264
SIT975 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 160411Z JAN 82 PSN: 033797
TOR: 016/0828Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1264 0160525
O 160411Z JAN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 011264
EXDIS, FOR THE AMBASSADOR ON SATURDAY, JANUARY 16
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 1/15/88 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)

TAGS: MASS, ETRD, ENRG, UR, PL, FR, NU

SUBJECT: YOUR LUNCH WITH MITTERRAND ON JANUARY 18

REF: A. STATE 10402, B. PARIS 843

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT YOUR LUNCH WITH MITTERRAND YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE. GUIDANCE ON MIDDLE EAST WAS SUBJECT OF REF A.

3. YAMAL PIPELINE: WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE PIPELINE ISSUE WHICH WILL FOCUS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON MITTERRAND. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO TIP OUR HAND, BEYOND MAKING CLEAR OUR KNOWN POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN ANYTHING MITTERRAND MIGHT REVEAL REGARDING HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE YAMAL PROJECT AND HOW IT FIT INTO HIS MEETING WITH SCHMIDT. WE SUGGEST YOU STRESS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUR INTEREST IN AN ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITH FRANCE ON THIS ISSUE AND USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PIPELINE IS INJURIOUS TO WESTERN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS;

-- THE ALTERNATIVES FOR GUARANTEEING WESTERN EUROPE'S GAS SUPPLY HAVE NOT REALLY BEEN PROPERLY AND EXHAUSTIVELY EXAMINED;

-- A HALT, OR "PAUSE FOR REFLECTION" IN THE PIPELINE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A POWERFUL SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS IN THE POLISH CRISIS;

4. POLAND: YOU SHOULD REITERATE STRONG US CONCERN

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BY CW NARA DATE 5/6/10

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OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- DESPITE SOME COSMETIC CHANGES, MOST NOTABLY IN THE AREA OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE HARSH MARTIAL LAW RESTRICTIONS REMAIN IN FORCE. THOUSANDS OF POLAND'S FINEST CITIZENS HAVE BEEN BEHIND BARS FOR ALMOST A MONTH AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, LECH WALESZA REMAINS IN CUSTODY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT GIVEN ANY INDICATION OF ANY INTEREST IN MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOLIDARITY AND THE CHURCH, AND INSTEAD OF LOOSENING UP ON MARTIAL LAW, APPEARS TO BE TIGHTENING THE SCREWS FURTHER, (E. G., THE VERIFICATION PROCESS, NEW REGULATIONS CONTROLLING UNIVERSITIES, THE REINSTITUTION OF THE MANDATORY STUDY OF RUSSIAN AND MARXISM-LENINISM).

-- WHILE HE APPEARS TO HAVE PUT DOWN ACTIVE RESISTANCE AROUND THE COUNTRY, JARUZELSKI NOW FACES THE MORE DIFFICULT TASK OF OVERCOMING PASSIVE RESISTANCE AND GETTING THE COUNTRY BACK ON ITS FEET ECONOMICALLY.

-- POLAND IS AT A CROSSROADS AND THE WEST, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HELPING PERSUADE JARUZELSKI TO FOLLOW A MORE LIBERAL COURSE. HE NEEDS WESTERN ASSISTANCE BADLY IF HE HOPES TO AVOID ECONOMIC CHAOS. A FIRM, BUT CONTROLLED STANCE ON OUR PART, I-E., MAKING NON-HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DEPENDENT ON REAL, REPEAT REAL, STEPS TOWARD THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS, THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE REOPENING OF A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY CAN BE IMPORTANT IN MOVING HIM TOWARD MODERATION.

-- A FRENCH DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF POLAND SOLIDARITY DAY ON JANUARY 30 WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT, COST-FREE, POLITICAL GESTURE, EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH THE POLISH PEOPLE AND GIVING EVIDENCE OF UNITY OF PURPOSE WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. POLAND SOLIDARITY DAY IS STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. WE ARE COMMITTED TO IT, AND LOOK FOR THE FRENCH TO SUPPORT IT TOO.

5. NICARAGUA: MITTERRAND HIMSELF SHOULD UNDERSTAND HOW STRONGLY WE DISAPPROVE OF FRENCH WEAPONS SALES TO NICARAGUA, AND THAT WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST NOT TO ALLOW OUR DIFFERENCES TO BECOME A SERIOUS PUBLIC DISPUTE. YOU WERE RIGHT ON TRACK WITH LINE TAKEN WITH GUTMANN AND ATTALI (REF B) AND SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS WITH MITTERRAND:

-- WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE NICARAGUAN ARMS BUILDUP AND THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION, INCLUDING THE PANAMA CANAL, AND OIL FIELDS OF MEXICO. NOW OTHER STATES IN THE REGION ARE DEMONSTRATING THE SAME CONCERN.

-- THE PRESENCE OF T-55 TANKS, A LARGE AND WELL ARMED STANDING ARMY, AIRPORT AND RUNWAY IMPROVEMENTS COUPLED WITH TRAINING OF PILOTS IN BULGARIA INDICATE NICARAGUA IS DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY TO PROJECT ITS FORCE IN THE REGION.

-- WE HAVE CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE THAT WEAPONS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT FLOWS THROUGH NICARAGUA FROM CUBA AND THE USSR TO MARXIST GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. WE KNOW THE GUERRILLA COMMAND AND CONTROL APPARATUS OPERATES IN NICARAGUA.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 160411Z JAN 82 PSN: 033797

-- WE WANT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS THAT GOAL. WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN HONDURAS AND THE DUARTE COALITION AND ELECTIONS OFFER THE BEST HOPE FOR EL SALVADOR. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A COMMUNIST VICTORY BY FORCE OF ARMS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- WE HAVE NOT CLOSED THE DOOR TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE GRN AND THE WHITE HOUSE HAS ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR. WE ARE OPEN TO DIALOGUE.

-- WE HELPED TO NEGOTIATE THE SANDINISTAS INTO POWER ON THEIR PLEDGE TO CREATE A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY. THE REVOLUTION HAS BETRAYED ITSELF AND THE LEADERSHIP HAS

RADICALIZED. WE ASK YOU TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE IN SUPPORTING PLURALISM.

-- YOUR SALE OF ARMS TO GRN WON'T DISPLACE THE SOVIETS OR CUBANS BUT IT WILL ADD A DEGREE OF LEGITIMACY TO NICARAGUA'S PROJECTION OF ITS INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. OUR ANTAGONISTS IN THE EAST CAN ONLY GLOAT OVER THE WEDGE THAT THE WORLD WILL PERCEIVE DRIVEN BETWEEN US BY YOUR ACT.

-- IN EFFECT, YOU'VE GIVEN AWAY ANY LEVERAGE YOU HAD, BECAUSE THEY'VE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO YOU IN ADVANCE. ONE WONDERS WHETHER IT ISN'T NICARAGUA THAT IS COOPTING FRANCE RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

-- I ASK YOU TO REVIEW YOUR POLICY. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO REVOKE THE SALES, AND, AT THE VERY LEAST, DELAY INDEFINITELY THE DELIVERY OF THE HARDWARE AND TRAINING. WE WOULD ALSO URGE YOU NOT TO SELL ANY MORE ARMS TO NICARAGUA.

6. ECONOMIC ISSUES: HABERER MET WITH SPRINKEL AND LELAND ON JANUARY 14 ON THE FRENCH NATIONALIZATION PROGRAM AND INVESTMENT QUESTIONS, AND SPRINKEL CAN FILL YOU IN ON THIS. TREASURY IS ALSO PREPARING A RECORD. THE FRENCH GROUP THEN CAME TO THE DEPARTMENT TO PRESENT TO THE ACTING SECRETARY COPIES OF THE CLEARY-GOTTLIEB ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH LAW. STOESEL TOOK THE OCCASION TO REITERATE OUR CONCERN THAT PROMPT, ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE COMPENSATION BE PROVIDED TO AFFECTED US INVESTORS, AND SAID WE ARE ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE COMPENSATION FORMULA. YOU COULD REITERATE THIS BASIC POINT IN YOUR CONVERSATION. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO REVIEW WITH SECRETARY REGAN WHETHER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THERE ARE ANY OTHER POINTS ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT THAT MIGHT BE USEFULLY MADE BY YOU TO MITTERRAND. HAIG

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DTG: 160411Z JAN 82 PSN: 033797

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT974 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 161152Z JAN 82 PSN: 033979
TOR: 016/1200Z

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WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG///// PLEASE ADVISE IF FURTHER DISSEM DESIRED

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MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFRA #1687 0161153
R 161152Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 8066
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 01687

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

CLARK AND SECRETARY HAIG

FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH

E. O. 12065 RDS 1, 2 (1/16/88) (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.)

TAGS: OCON, FR

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION OF VERSAILLES SUMMIT

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF MIKE RASHISH THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO HIS REPLACEMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR ORGANIZING THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. I ASKED YOUR INTERVENTION ON JAN. 6 (PARIS 433) IN UNBLOCKING THE SUMMIT DATES IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND PROGRESS IS BEING MADE.

3. THE SHERPA (AS IT IS CALLED) JOB WILL REQUIRE A FAIR AMOUNT OF WORK. MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED IN PARIS FEB. 27-28, IN A NON-FRENCH SUMMIT COUNTRY ON APRIL 24-25 AND AGAIN IN PARIS MAY 29-30, JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INTERAGENCY WORK IN WASHINGTON IS ALSO INVOLVED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SENIOR ADVISOR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE JACQUES ATTALI ASKED ME, UNSOLICITED, TO URGE YOU TO TAKE OVER FROM RASHISH. HE FEELS IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE SOMEONE WHO MADE DECISIONS BASED ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY. HE ALSO ARGUES THAT CONTACT WITH THE OTHER SHERPAS--ALL OF WHOM HE SAYS ARE INFLUENTIAL--WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR YOU. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE OF THEM I KNOW ABOUT, I.E. SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG OF THE UK, ALAN GOTLIEB OF CANADA AND SERGIO BERLINGUER OF ITALY, I CAN ENDORSE THIS COMMENT. (THE OTHERS, KIKUCHI OF JAPAN, SCHULMAN OF THE FRG AND DURIEUX FROM THE EC, ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS EMBASSY).

5. IN MY OPINION TAKING THE JOB COULD PROVE USEFUL TO YOU BECAUSE:

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BY CN NARA DATE 5/6/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 161152Z JAN 82 PSN: 033979

- (A) IT WOULD PUT YOU IN A STRONG POSITION TO TAILOR THE MEETING TO SUIT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERESTS;
- (B) IT WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR OTHER PREPARATORY WORK YOU WOULD PROBABLY DO ANYWAY FOR YOUR ATTENDING THE VERSAILLE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT; AND
- (C) YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN DEALING WITH THE ISSUES SHOULD BE OF LONGER RANGE USE TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT.

6. IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE SECRETARY YOU MIGHT BEAR IN MIND THAT WE IN THE PARIS EMBASSY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE YOU SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL SUPPORT. BECAUSE OF THE VERSAILLES LOCATION WE EXPECT TO BE HEAVILY INVOLVED ANYWAY.

7. IF YOU DEEM IT IMPRACTICABLE TO ASSUME THE JOB, THE NEW SHERPA SHOULD BE APPOINTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. FROM MY TALKS WITH RASHISH DURING HIS VISITS HERE I KNOW THERE IS A LOT TO BE DONE. THANKS.
GALBRAITH

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DTG: 161152Z JAN 82 PSN: 033979

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT977 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 152226Z JAN 82 PSN: 033480
TOR: 016/0105Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1686/01 0152229
O 152226Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8063

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 01686
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
E. O. 12065 RDS 1, 2 (1/15/88) (CROCKER, CHESTER A.)
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA, AO
SUBJECT: OUR MEETINGS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN
LONDON AND THE FIRST ROUND WITH THE ANGOLANS IN PARIS

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WE HAD OUR USUAL TOUGH, FRANK BUT FRIENDLY TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN LONDON ON JANUARY 13-14. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THEY CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE WITH US IN GOOD FAITH. I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THEIR CARDS VERY CONSERVATIVELY AND NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS LIGHTLY JUST TO PLEASE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

3. I BEGAN THE SESSIONS BY GIVING YOUR LETTER TO PIK BOTH TO PIK'S TOP DEPUTY BRAND FOURIE WHO AS USUAL LED THEIR DELEGATION. IT HAD A GOOD EFFECT FOCUSING THEIR ATTENTION ON THE LARGER REGIONAL AGENDA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WE SHARE SUBSTANTIALLY. WITHOUT SUCH A PERIODIC REFRESHER COURSE, I FEAR THAT THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THESE ISSUES TENDS TO DECLINE INTO THAT OF A BOOK-KEEPER QUIBBLING OVER DETAILS ON NAMIBIA.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. ON THE VARIOUS NAMIBIA ISSUES, FOURIE ASSURED ME THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD GO BACK TO CAPE TOWN AND URGE THAT THE SAG CABINET AT ITS JANUARY 19 MEETING APPROVE A POSITIVE UNQUALIFIED RESPONSE TO THE CONTACT GROUP'S REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ALONG WITH A SAG GO-AHEAD TO PROCEED FORMALLY TO PHASE TWO. THAT SAID HOWEVER, FOURIE TOLD ME FIRMLY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS BEGINNING INCREASINGLY TO FEEL DOMESTIC POLITICAL HEAT ON NAMIBIA. TO COUNTER THAT BACKLASH, THE SOUTH AFRICANS SAY THEY ARE GOING TO NEED SOMETHING CONCRETE FROM THE FIVE ON A PROPOSED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, ESPECIALLY ON FINANCIAL GUARANTEES ON PROPERTY, WHICH THEY VIEW AS A SURROGATE FOR BROADER GUARANTEES ON THE PRINCIPLES. I TOLD FOURIE WE WOULD TRY TO ENERGIZE THE FIVE ON THIS QUESTION BUT I MADE NO FIRM COMMITMENTS. WHILE WE ARE

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NLRR MD7-081 #47261
BY CW NARA DATE 5/6/10

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 152226Z JAN 82 PSN: 033480

NOT IN A POSITION TO DO SO AT THIS STAGE, I BELIEVE WE WILL NEED TO CONSIDER WAYS TO HELP THE SAG ON THEIR POLITICAL PROBLEM.

5. ON THE TOUGHER PHASE TWO ISSUES, WE DID SOME LIMITED PRECOOKING WITH THEM AND PUT UP WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SAG POSTURING WHICH I FEEL IS A NECESSARY WAY-STATION TO A MORE REASONABLE POSITION. ON THE PRE-COOKING, THE SOUTH AFRICANS GAVE US A MORE REASONABLE POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF U. N. IMPARTIALITY TOWARD W. SWAPO. THEY AGREED THAT THE PACKAGE OF IMPARTIALITY MEASURES (WHICH IS YET TO BE AGREED) NEED NOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THEY NAME AN IMPLEMENTATION DATE FOR UNSCR 435. THAT WILL CONSIDERABLY INCREASE OUR LEVERAGE VIS A VIS THE AFRICANS AND OTHERS.

6. ON THE UNTAG NUMBERS GAME, THE SAG HUNG VERY TOUGH, NOT BUDGING FROM THEIR FIGURE OF ONE THOUSAND. WE PRESSED THEM HARD TO COME UP WITH A CREDIBLE LOGIC WHICH COULD BE SALEABLE TO THE OTHERS IN THE NEGOTIATION. WE ALSO TALKED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT UNTAG FUNCTIONS AND MADE IT CLEAR TO FOURIE AND COMPANY THAT FOR US TO GO BACK TO OUR ALLIES AND THE AFRICANS WITH THE ONE THOUSAND FIGURE WOULD GIVE US A DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TASK. FOURIE INDICATED RATHER OBLIQUELY THAT THERE MAY BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE SAG POSITION AT A LATER STAGE, BUT HE SAID THE NUMBERS QUESTION IS A MATTER ABOUT WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS STRONG FEELINGS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. WE TOUCHED BASE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON SAVIMBI AND ANGOLA AND TOLD THEM OF MY PARIS MEETINGS WITH PAULO JORGE, BUT AT THIS POINT WE HAVE NO DIFFICULTIES WITH THEM ON THAT GENERAL SUBJECT.

8. WE GOT ABOUT WHAT I THOUGHT WE WOULD GET FROM THE SAG IN LONDON. WE REFRESHED THEIR MEMORY ON OUR IDEAS ABOUT THE BIG PICTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND GOT HINTS OF A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO SIGN OFF ON PHASE ONE. WE ALSO GOT A CLEAR SIGNAL, WHICH MAY BE IN PART A BARGAINING STANCE, THAT THE DOMESTIC PRICE OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT IS GROWING. ON PHASE TWO WHICH IS BEGINNING, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NAIVE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SAG WOULD THROW IN THEIR CARDS THIS EARLY. THEY GAVE US A LITTLE BUT NOT TOO MUCH. ON UNTAG WE WILL NEED TO GET SOME MORE--AND I THINK THEY KNOW THAT.

9. PLEASE REPEAT TO CAPE TOWN AND LONDON.

10. WE HAVE HAD OUR FIRST SESSION HERE IN PARIS

PARIS 1686

DTG: 152226Z JAN 82 PSN: 033480

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 1686
SIT976 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 152226Z JAN 82 PSN: 033481
TOR: 016/0105Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1686/02 0152231
O 152226Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8064

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 01686
NODIS

WITH THE ANGOLANS AND THE DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE IN A
POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. WE LAID OUT OUR GAME PLAN ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA IN GENERAL AND ANGOLA IN PARTICULAR.
THEY LISTENED AND TOOK FULL NOTES. WE WILL MEET
AGAIN IN THE MORNING AND I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER
THAT SESSION. GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47262

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1736
SIT746 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 170514Z JAN 82 PSN: 035901
TOR: 018/1436Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1736 0170519
O 170514Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 6801

~~SECRET~~ STATE 011736
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR
E. O. 12065: GDS 1/16/88

TAGS: PGOV, FR, US
SUBJECT: 1982 SEVEN NATION SUMMIT

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR DE LABOULAYE HAS RELAYED TO UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH A REQUEST FROM JACQUES ATTALI THAT THE U. S. ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE VENUE AND APPROXIMATE TIMING FOR THE 1982 SEVEN NATION SUMMIT. ATTALI WISHES TO RELEASE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT ON MONDAY, JANUARY 18, ATTRIBUTTING THE URGENCY TO A NUMBER OF PRESS LEAKS ABOUT THE TIME AND PLACE PROPOSED FOR THE SUMMIT.

3. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT YET IN A POSITION TO AGREE TO A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT AND WOULD BE PLACED IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION SHOULD SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT BE RELEASED. WE ARE VERY CLOSE TO RESOLVING A NUMBER OF OPEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S SPRING SCHEDULE AND TRAVEL PLANS, BUT CANNOT COMMIT TO ACTIVITIES PIECEMEAL. THIS IS THE REASON FOR THE DELAY IN THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE. WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

URGE FRENCH NOT MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO MITTERRAND.

4. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO CONVEY OUR POSITION TO ATTALI AND SEEK HIS AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR A FEW DAYS. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR/M07-081 #47262
Gd DATE 5/6/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 170514Z JAN 82 PSN: 035901

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DTG: 170514Z JAN 82 PSN: 035901

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 1688
SIT959 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 171416Z JAN 82 PSN: 035898
TOR: 018/1433Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1688/01 0171420
O 171416Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 007-081 # 47263
BY AW NARA DATE 5/6/10

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8067

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 01688
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EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY, S/P DIRECTOR WOLFOWITZ,
IO ACTING AS SEC PLATT AND EUR ACTING AS SEC HOLMES
FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER
E.O. 12065 (RDS-1 1/17/02) (CROCKER, CHESTER A.)
TAGS: PEPR, AO, US
SUBJECT: MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. I HAD A FRANK AND HELPFUL EXCHANGES WITH ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE IN PARIS JANUARY 15 AND 16. JORGE AGREED TO REGULARIZE OUR DIALOGUE ON THE FULL RANGE OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US.
3. AS YOU DID WITH JORGE IN YOUR SEPTEMBER BILATERAL, I STARTED BY LAYING OUT OUR VISION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
--A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC435 IN 1982;
--PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ITS NEIGHBORS;
--A UNIFIED, RECONCILED ANGOLA, WHICH WOULD BE ABLE TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION; AND
--THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. I CONTRASTED THIS POSITIVE VISION WITH THE ALTERNATIVE OF CONTINUING
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
AND EVEN ESCALATING REGIONAL CONFLICT, INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND FURTHER ECONOMIC DETERIORATION.
4. I LAID OUT A STEP BY STEP PROCESS OF MOVES WHICH WE BOTH COULD TAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY ALONG PARALLEL TRACKS TO ACHIEVE REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY AND, IN THAT CONTEXT, FULL BILATERAL RELATIONS. UNDERSCORING THE URGENCY OF BEGINNING THAT PROCESS NOW. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE STEPS MUST BE TIMED TO THE NAMIBIA PROCESS.
5. ON THE ANGOLAN SIDE I SUGGESTED THAT THESE STEPS COULD INCLUDE:
--REGULARIZING DIALOGUE WITH US THROUGH FREQUENT, HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BEGINNING NOW;
--AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BEFORE MARCH TO CUBAN WITHDRAWAL;

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 171416Z JAN 82 PSN: 035898

--DEVELOPMENT OF A CREDIBLE PLAN AND SCHEDULE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SAG OF A DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 435; AND
--CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PHASED WITH SOUTHAFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA UNDER THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.

6. ON OUR SIDE, I TOLD JORGE THAT WE WOULD:
--CONTINUE TO PLAY OUR UNIQUE ROLE IN WORKING WITH THE SAG TO INFLUENCE IT TOWARDS COOPERATION ON NAMIBIA;
--WORK WITH THE PARTIES TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE CONDITIONS CREATED BY A CEASEFIRE AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.
--WORK WITH OTHER WESTERN DONORS TO PROMOTE NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AS CONDITIONS OF PEACE AND STABILITY DEVELOP IN ANGOLA AND THE REGION; AND
--BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON THE MODALITIES FOR FULL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, WITH THAT GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED IN 1982 AS PROGRESS IS MADE ON RESOLVING THE URGENT REGIONAL ISSUES ON OUR AGENDAS.

7. THROUGHOUT I POINTED TO THE NECESSITY TO BEGIN THE STEP BY STEP PROCESS ON AN URGENT BASIS OR THE NAMIBIA PROCESS WOULD GRIND TO A HALT. IN THIS CONTEXT, I EMPHASIZED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED, ESPECIALLY THE SAG AND ANGOLA. I TOLD JORGE THAT WE WERE IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO BE THE CATALYST AND HONEST BROKER TO BUILD THIS CONFIDENCE.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. I SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING BE DONE PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN IMPLEMENTATION DATE:
--A CESSATION OF SWAPO ATTACKS AND PULLBACK NORTHWARD;
--CONCOMITANT CUBAN PULLBACK NORTHWARD OF A LINE TO BE DETERMINED; AND
--THE CESSATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS.
THROUGHOUT I STRESSED THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS ON RESOLVING THE REGIONAL ISSUES AND IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE QUOTE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS UNQUOTE.

9. JORGE, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY THE ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR TO PARIS AND TWO NOTE-TAKERS, LISTENED CLOSELY TO THIS PRESENTATION WHICH TOOK MOST OF THE FIRST DAY AND TOOK DETAILED NOTES. AFTER HEARING MY FULL PRESENTATION HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A WELL-THOUGHT OUT, SINCERE EXPOSITION. HE AGREED TO REGULARIZE OUR DIALOGUE THROUGH FREQUENT,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 1688
SIT954 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 171416Z JAN 82 PSN: 035900
TOR: 018/1435Z

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WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST/NOT SENT TO EOB

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1688/02 0171426
O 171416Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8068

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 01688
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HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ON AN URGENT BASIS. JORGE SAID MY PRESENTATION CONTAINED "ALL THE ELEMENTS" FOR ACHIEVING REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY AND AN IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; OBJECTIVES WHICH HE ENDORSED. HE AGREED TO THE EFFICACY OF A STEP BY STEP PROCESS TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS.

10. JORGE NOTED THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD REQUIRE IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS BY HIS GOVERNMENT, AND LAID DOWN SOME "PRELIMINARY" COMMENTS WHICH HE URGED US TO CONSIDER. THESE CONSISTED LARGELY OF STANDARD ANGOLAN POSITIONS ON SENSITIVE ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND PRINCIPLE (PROBABLY FOR THE RECORD HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS NOTE-TAKERS TO MAKE). HE REJECTED ANY IMPLIED LINKAGE BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND CHARACTERIZED UNITA AS A PUPPET OF SOUTH AFRICA. JORGE ALSO DIVERGED INTO SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON THE CONTACT GROUP (CG) PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ON NAMIBIA. I ANSWERED THESE QUESTIONS, THE THRUST OF WHICH WAS TO IMPLY THAT WE WERE TRYING TO UNDERCUT SWAPO. JORGE ALSO ASKED HOW SWAPO COULD POSSIBLY CONSIDER A CEASEFIRE GIVEN SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS AND NO PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT SWAPO WOULD LIKE A CEASEFIRE SO THAT 435 CAN BE IMPLEMENTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I FRANKLY TOLD HIM THAT WE DID NOT CONTROL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SOUTH AFRICANS--WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS-- BUT THAT OUR INFLUENCE COULD BE HELPFUL IN PROMOTING A RECIPROCAL CESSATION OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IF THE APPROPRIATE STEPS WERE TAKEN ON THE ANGOLA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

11. JORGE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT OUR TALKS WERE TAKING PLACE "WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS" AND AS EXCHANGES BETWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES. THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ALSO RESULTED FROM HIS REALIZATION THAT THE PROPOSED STEPS WERE "GENERAL IDEAS" THAT COULD ONLY BE DEVELOPED INTO SPECIFIC PLANS AS THE US ENTERED INTO DETAILED TALKS WITH EACH OF THE KEY PARTIES--OF WHICH ANGOLA WAS ONE.

12. AS EXPECTED, JORGE, DID NOT COMMIT ANGOLA TO TAKE

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ANY SPECIFIC STEPS BUT PROMISED TO PRESENT OUR IDEAS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS TO LUANDA.

13. THE FRANKNESS OF OUR EXCHANGE AND EXTENSIVE ANGOLAN QUESTIONS INTENDED TO CLARIFY THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THE STEPS PROPOSED LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT LUANDA IS ALREADY CONVINCED IT MUST DEAL WITH US AND IS PREPARED TO LOOK AT OUR BAIT SERIOUSLY. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO REGULARIZE OUR DIALOGUE ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES I PRESENTED IS IN ITSELF AN IMPORTANT STEP SINCE THERE IS NOW NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE AGENDA. OBTAINING JORGE'S ENDORSEMENT OF OUR CONCEPTUAL STEP BY STEP PROCESS WENT BEYOND OUR MINIMUM EXPECTAATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS. WHILE WE CLEARLY HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO OVER DIFFICULT GROUND, OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE PASSED THE FIRST LITMUS TEST. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANGOLANS ARE IN FACT SINCERE IN SHARING OUR GOALS AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO FOLLOW AN INDEPENDENT COURSE TO ACHIEVE THEM REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

14. A FULL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AFTER I RETURN WILL PROVIDE THE DETAILED RECORD, COVERING, AS WELL AS THE ABOVE, --E. G. NAMIBIA AND SOME SIDE ISSUES PRISONER EXCHANGE, AND ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE.

15. IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO ME THAT LUANDA IS CROSSING THROUGH A DIFFICULT DOOR FOR THEM. THEY WILL VIEW OUR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HANDLING OF THEIR SENSITIVITIES ABOUT PUBLIC SPECULATION AND PRESS COVERAGE AS AN INDICATION OF OUR GOOD FAITH. I THEREFORE URGE THAT WE COLLECTIVELY REFRAIN FROM ANY CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE STATE OF PLAY BEYOND THE FOLLOWING POINTS AGREED TO BY JORGE; THAT OUR AGENDA COVERED BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MATTERS OF INTEREST, THAT OUR AGENDA COVERED BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MATTER THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE PART OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE, AND THAT THE DOOR IS OPEN FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. GALBRAITH

PARIS 1688

DTG: 171416Z JAN 82 PSN: 035900

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