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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 1/25/2007

File Folder CANADA (09/25/1984-10/31/1984)

FOIA

F1554

Box Number 12

TAMMY NEMETH

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
32998	REPORT	CNADIAN POLICY UNDER MULRONEY	4	9/25/1984	B1
33000	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #1718; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: GEORGE SHULTZ MEETING WITH CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER JOE CLARK	1	10/19/1984	B1
33001	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #1719; GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MY MEETING WITH CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER JOE CLARK, TORONTO, OCTOBER 15-16, 1984 R 12/19/2011 F1554/1	2	10/17/1984	B1
33003	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #1717; TYRUS COBB TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: SHULTZ MEETING WITH CANADIAN FM CLARK	1	10/17/1984	B1
33004	MEMO	TYRUS COBB TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: GULF OF MAINE MARITIME BOUNDARY R 12/19/2011 F1554/1	1	10/22/1984	B1
33006	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: GULF OF MAINE MARITIME BOUNDARY R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	2	10/19/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECEIVED 05 OCT 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

1/25/07 dlb

DOCDATE 05 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: CANADA

MULRONEY, BRIAN

Memcon of Pres mtg w/ PM Mulroney

SUBJECT: ~~MEMCON BTW PRES & PM~~

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 05 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

I don't see Kenneth's memo?
K

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8407046 NSCIFID (DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Cobb</i>	<i>S 10/6</i>	<i>For redo</i>	<i>10/9</i>	
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X 10/9</i>	<i>For Signature Decision</i>	<i>10/10</i>	
	<i>OCT 13 1984</i>	<i>Powdexter approved</i>		
	<i>OCT 13 1984</i>	<i>Kinnutt sgd</i>		<i>CO, RSC, CH.</i>

DISPATCH *10/13/84*

W/ATTCH FILE PA 165

National Security Council
The White House

vml 6

System # I

Package # 7522

1390.

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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The White House

System # I

Package # 7522

09 OCT 5 P4:46

1388

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Kathleen</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>Connections</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Tubst
A

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(Date/Time)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
 Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Robinson
 Deputy Assistant Secretary James M. Medas
 Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
 Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. Allan Gotlieb
 Fred Doucet, Mulroney Chief of Staff
 Derek Burney, Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 25, 1984 -- 11:18-11:45 a.m. Oval Office

Prime Minister Mulroney said he was delighted to be back in Washington, and was pleased to see the President and the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, who has been a tremendous representative for the United States. (U)

The Prime Minister said that he ran on the position that the Canadian-United States relationship was very important because the U.S. was Canada's neighbor, best friend, and ally. Since this position had been put forward to the Canadian electorate so clearly, he was pleased to tell the President that his election was a massive endorsement of this position. He called this the cornerstone of Canadian policy, and said that the Canadian people reaffirmed they want a positive relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he cautioned, Canada's support for the U.S. was not blind or automatic, but based on a mature and thoughtful approach. (U)

The President said he watched the Canadian election with great interest and he was very pleased with the results. He said he listened attentively to what the Prime Minister said about increasing trade and investment and hoped discussions could proceed on these issues. The President said that many members of his Cabinet were interested in talking with their Canadian counterparts, and noted that just that morning Secretary Weinberger said he looked forward to meeting Canada's Defence Minister, and proposed a meeting in Washington before the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers' meeting. (U)

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 BY 405 NARA, DATE 7/6/04 (dlb/hsb)

Prime Minister Mulroney said he hoped to meet the President on a regular basis. He said Secretary Shultz's quarterly meetings had accomplished a great deal, and that his efforts were very much appreciated. The Prime Minister said that while he did not want to lock the President into a firm timetable, he hoped that they could meet on an annual basis for a regular working session. Cabinet Officers would then follow through on what he and the President accomplished at this business meeting. The President endorsed the Prime Minister's proposal to meet on a regular basis. (C)

The President, turning to his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, indicated it was his intention to address the question of mutual suspicion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said the U.S. feels threatened by the Soviet Union's offensive military buildup, even though the Soviet Union may well be sincere in its belief that the U.S. threatens them. The President said he was absolutely sincere in pursuing arms reduction talks and he would stress this to Foreign Minister Gromyko. He also said he wanted to talk about what might be done to put the relationship on a more constructive footing. (C)

The Prime Minister said he found the President's U.N. General Assembly speech remarkable and he commended the President for proposing such positive initiatives. He said he felt the speech went a long way in allaying concerns of the Canadian public regarding the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Prime Minister asked the President what he expected in the Gromyko meeting. (C)

The President said we just don't know, but that it was interesting that Gromyko had rescheduled his UNGA speech to follow the President's. The President said he did not regard the Chernenko statement as a definitive Soviet policy announcement since it probably had been written before the President's speech. He said he was very interested to see what Gromyko had said at the U.N. The President indicated he intended to level with Gromyko, explaining we were not asking the Soviet Union to change their system and they shouldn't expect us to change ours. He said it was important that the two countries which held the potential to destroy the world should resume a dialogue. The President added that he would point out to Gromyko that the U.S. would want to see deeds from the Soviet Union as an expression of their desire for peace. The President pointed out that after World War II America did not employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union even though we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. This was evidence that America had no hostile intent. The President added that as long as the Soviet Union continued its military build up, we would continue ours to prevent them from getting ahead of us. Still, we want them to know that it would be better if we both moved toward reductions. (C)

The Prime Minister said that Canada was a good example of what a middle power could accomplish in international affairs. He said that Canada would maintain its commitments to NATO and would increase defense spending. The Prime Minister asked whether the U.S. would be ready to negotiate quickly if Gromyko said the Soviet Union was ready to proceed on discussions on specific arms control issues. (C)

The President said we are ready to sit down and talk to them at any time. The U.S. had made seven changes in its positions at the arms control negotiations in order to meet Soviet objections, and the Soviets still walked out. He added that we are willing to listen to any Soviet counter-proposal. The President said we might need to forge some kind of face-saving device for the Soviets, since they went so far out front on their propaganda campaign to prevent INF deployment that they would have lost prestige if they had not left the talks. He thought a way might be found on the militarization of space question, but they objected when we told them we also wanted to raise the issues of offensive weapons. They retreated and refused to enter discussions with us. As the British Foreign Minister said, "They would not take 'yes' for an answer." (C)

The Prime Minister said that the Liberals tried to paint him as a right-winger on the question of Trudeau's peace initiative. In response, he appointed a high-ranking commission to study arms control. Before the campaign got underway, he made a statement implying mild criticism of the American position. This statement effectively killed the issue in the campaign and it prevented accusations that he was a lackey for his friends in Washington. The Prime Minister said the political opposition and some people in the news media were looking for an opening to make such criticisms. Upon his return, the press would be asking about the substance of U.S. proposals being made to the Soviets and he asked the President what he anticipated would come from Gromyko in return. (C)

Acting Secretary Dam said we would know much more about the Soviet position after Secretary Shultz's meeting with Gromyko. Secretary Weinberger said the Soviets indicated they would not talk about armaments until we withdrew the few deployments we had made in Europe. He said the Soviets were only willing to talk to us about space weapons because we have tremendous potential in this area. He said you only had to look at Gromyko's stern face during the President's UNGA speech to see how forthcoming they might be. (C)

The President noted that Gromyko was not actually looking at him during the speech. He said he felt it would be more appropriate if he (the President) looked directly at the Soviet delegation when he mentioned the USSR in the speech. Whenever he looked at Gromyko, however, Gromyko was not looking directly at him. Instead, Gromyko's eyes were focused at a point about five feet above the President's head, which was disconcerting. (C)

The Prime Minister said that the President's speech was very effective, and, in fact, even the New York Times had given the President a good account. He said he was sure the Allies would provide the President a tremendous response and certainly Canada would give a positive endorsement. (C)

The President said he wanted Gromyko to know that love was not necessary for a productive relationship. Gromyko was jovial the night before when they met at our reception. The President said Gromyko smiled and asked how many arrows he was going to throw at him the next day in his speech. The President said he responded with "none", to which Gromyko asked "20, 15, 10?" UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick had interjected that the President would not even throw darts. (C)

The Prime Minister mentioned his meeting with the Pope the prior week. He noted the Governor General of Canada had been there and had a discussion with the Pope regarding her trip to Moscow when she was a Liberal Party spokesperson. She told him she asked the Soviets whether they would respond to a world peace initiative in exchange for Moscow's not attempting to export its ideology. The Pope said that Moscow both exports and imports its ideology, in that all of Eastern Europe was "imported" into the Soviet sphere after World War II. The Prime Minister said the Pope was clearly neutral on this issue and added that he agreed with the Pope's comment. (C)

The Prime Minister also noted that he met the night before with the Queen, who made very positive comments about the President and noted that in her initial meeting with the President he had spoken for almost an hour without bringing up politics, which she found unusual and refreshing. The President said he was a great admirer of the Queen as well as Margaret Thatcher and recalled that first conversation, and it was not about politics but about horsemanship. The President indicated that on that note we should adjourn to meet with the astronauts. (C)

The meeting adjourned at 11:45 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Edwin Meese, III
John M. Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Robinson
Deputy Assistant Secretary James Medas
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Canadian Ambassador Allan Gottlieb
Finance Minister Michael Wilson
Fred Doucet, Mulroney Chief of Staff
Derek Burney, Assistant Deputy Minister
Charles McMillan, Advisor

DATE, TIME September 25, 1984 -- 12:05-1:03 p.m.
PLACE: Family Dining Room

The Prime Minister talked about growing up in the city of Baie Comeau in Quebec. He said there was extensive American investment in his home town, and it had extraordinary, positive impact on the area. Mulroney added that some Canadians tried to chase foreign investment out of Canada, for example through the National Energy Program. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney said that when Canadians were given a choice, they responded to his suggestion that the highest priority should be on building the U.S.-Canada relationship. He noted that at the leadership convention, he made a speech in which he said the first item on his agenda would be to refurbish the relationship of trust with the United States; he added that he was elected leader with that argument. (C)

The Prime Minister noted that Canada had a very high unemployment rate, and that he had inherited a very difficult economic situation. Improving this picture will depend on a superb relationship between the U.S. and Canada, and the Prime Minister added that Canada may ask the U.S. to give it an economic shot in the arm. (C)

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Declassify: OADR

FOO-074 # 17/16 (db 1/25/87)
7/6/86
LOS

The President said that the U.S. recovery was substantially provided by the tax cut, which encouraged investment, and that small business had produced a record 600,000 new jobs after the recent recession. Minister Wilson said that they expected to have an initiative to promote small business, because they had watched U.S. performance. He noted that if Canada had the same unemployment rate as the U.S., 600,000 more people would be back at work, effectively cutting in half the number of Canadians unemployed. (C)

The Prime Minister said he appreciated the decision the President had made on steel. He said he would ask Parliament to return soon, at which time there would be a number of messages sent which we would find promising, in the areas of energy legislation, foreign investment, and NATO commitments. He said the U.S.-Canada relationship was the greatest in history, but that economically Canada was running behind the United States. (C)

Secretary Weinberger suggested it might be possible to work out purchases of military goods from Canadian firms, thereby helping the military trade balance. The Secretary said there was a group at the defense department which held seminars around the country explaining to small businesses how to bid on Defense Department contracts, and suggested that this might be done in Canada. (C)

The Prime Minister asked about the scope of the Grace commission, and what suggestions had been made on waste and duplication in the Federal Government. Mr. Meese said that there were many Grace Commission proposals that were being implemented, not only at the Departments of Treasury and Defense, but in recent budget actions. Meese indicated that the administration had four programs going in this area, including the Grace Commission, Reform 88, ADP, and a personnel proposal. He noted that when he and the President were in Sacramento, in state government, there were more federal workers in Sacramento than state workers. (U)

The President said that when he was governor he set up a review group of private citizens who volunteered their time and effort. Their findings allowed that state to eliminate a number of contracts and save a substantial amount of money. The President indicated that a number of civil servants had helped his California Review Commission and had said that no one had ever asked them to do something like this before. Secretary Regan suggested that some of the Prime Minister's Members of Parliament might be able to provide assistance in this way. (U)

The Prime Minister asked what kind of things the new Canadian Government should expect to find in terms of bureaucratic resistance. The President observed that resistance would be encountered, but also said that many private citizens would be willing to volunteer their time and effort. He noted that when he balanced the budget in California, they were able to give the surplus back to the people by reducing tax bills. Mr. Meese said one state legislator claimed this was an illegal gift of public funds. (U)

Secretary Weinberger said some Californians were surprised to learn that state government was not in the business of making surpluses. He added that reducing taxes helped attract new business to California. (U)

The Prime Minister said he needed to keep his back-benchers busy, since he had 211 caucus members, all of whom felt qualified for Cabinet positions. He inquired about the idea of having parliamentarians work with our Congressmen on important issues, such as acid rain, copper, steel, and defense. He suggested we think about initiating such regular joint meetings. Mr. Mulroney also endorsed the concept of Cabinet officers meeting regularly with each other. He pointed out that the U.S. and Canadian Energy Ministers had not had a meeting in several years. (C)

The President noted that he felt annual parliamentary meetings and Cabinet counterpart sessions would be quite useful. He thanked the Prime Minister for coming to Washington and indicated that he looked forward to working with Mr. Mulroney in the future. (U)

The luncheon ended at 1:02.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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15

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversations Between the President and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney -- Meeting and Luncheon

At Tab A is the memcon from the President's meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on September 25, 1984. At Tab B is the memcon from the luncheon on the same day.

RECOMMENDATION

That you have Bob Kimmitt forward the memcon at Tab I to State after your review.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt to Hill Memo
- Tab A - Memcon of Meeting
- Tab B - Memcon of Luncheon

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 25, 1997
By *clb* NARA, Date *1/25/07*

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject: My Meeting With Canadian Foreign
Minister Joe Clark, Toronto, October
15-16, 1984

I returned from Toronto Tuesday evening after two days of talks with Foreign Minister Joe Clark. This trip was part of my commitment to meet with my Canadian counterpart four times a year and was a follow-up to your highly successful September 25 session with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

With only a month in office, Mulroney's government is still putting together its foreign and domestic policies. It seems clear, however, that certain themes will characterize the Canadians' new approach to us:

-- Clark repeated several times Mulroney's promise to you to give the U.S. "the benefit of the doubt" on international issues. In our private exchanges, Clark carried this assertion one step further by assurances of explicit support for us on East-West and disarmament questions.

-- Canada will no longer play the "middleman" role between East and West Pierre Trudeau ascribed to himself and his government.

-- On economic questions, the new team in Ottawa openly acknowledges Canada's dependency on the health of the U.S. economy. This is already translating into investment and trade policies favorable to our interests. Similarly, we can expect closer Canadian cooperation in international bodies such as OECD, GATT, and UNCTAD.

This is not to say our relationship will be problem-free. In the nature of our geographic proximity and intense interaction, this will never be the case. Repeatedly during our meetings, though, Clark quoted President Ford's statement that Americans and Canadians have to learn "to disagree without being disagreeable."

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF 1554 # 33001

BY RW NARA DATE 12/19/11~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

One bilateral problem will doubtless remain on our agenda: acid rain. Clark made clear that a massive cleanup program has bipartisan support in Canada. I reminded him that we too have an acid rain problem, but we are not persuaded that an expensive abatement program offers the best solution. I did pass on Bill Ruckelshaus's offer to meet periodically with his Canadian counterpart to discuss this and other environmental problems, and Clark seemed to find this an attractive idea.

Finally, we touched on the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on the Gulf of Maine border dispute. We agreed that the decision is highly complex and technical but that we would stay in touch after consulting with our respective fishing and political interests.

All in all, I left this meeting convinced that your policy of paying more attention to Canada is returning real dividends. We can chalk this up as a promising foreign policy accomplishment of your first term in office.

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 7817

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Paul Thompson	<u> 1 </u>	<u> [Signature] </u>	<u> </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> 2 </u>	<u> [Signature] </u>	<u> </u>
Tom Shull	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Wilma Hall	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u> 3 </u>	<u> M </u>	<u> A </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> 4 </u>	<u> 10/19 B </u>	<u> D </u>
Situation Room <i>NSC/S</i>	<u> 5 </u>	<u> </u>	<u> N </u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8407893

RECEIVED 20 OCT 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

dlb 1/25/07

DOCDATE 19 OCT 84 22

KEYWORDS



MARITIME

LEGAL ISSUES

SUBJECT: GULF OF MAINE MARITIME BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT W/ CANADA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 24 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

LEVINE

DUR

FORTIER

WRIGHT

THOMPSON

SOMMER

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(CT)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>10/23</i>	<i>For Decision</i>	<i>10/26</i>	
		<i>10/25</i>	<i>Powdexter Approved</i>		<i>CO</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *ST*

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 7893

1410 23

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7893

24

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

33004

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary

State has sent a memo (Tab A) to you on the ICJ decision on the Gulf of Maine dispute, noting that:

- The decision essentially splits the difference between the U.S. and Canadian territorial claims.
- New England Congressional and fishing industry representatives are disappointed with the ruling, particularly that Canada was awarded a significant portion (about 1/6) of the valuable Georges Bank fisheries.
- We are not yet in a position to understand the full implications of the decision and implementation will require extensive negotiations with Canada. State also cautions that we must not appear too anxious to rush into the negotiations, lest the U.S. fishing industry becomes suspicious that we might make concessions to the Canadians without properly considering its concerns.

PH *R* *W*
Phil Dur, Paul Thompson, Richard Levine and Bill Wright concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you read the State memo at Tab A.

Approve *f*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A - State Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 # 33004

BY *RW* NARA DATE *12/19/11*

United States Department of State



Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary

The ruling handed down by the International Court of Justice on the Gulf of Maine case is a compromise decision which essentially splits the difference between the US and Canadian maritime boundary claims on Georges Bank.

The decision to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has a long history. Negotiations with Canada on the maritime boundary and fisheries in the Gulf of Maine began in 1977, and the parties agreed in 1979 to refer the maritime boundary dispute to the Court. The parties also signed in 1979 a fisheries agreement which was submitted to the Senate for approval and was subsequently rejected. Following the Senate's rejection of the fisheries agreement, the boundary settlement treaty turning over the dispute to the ICJ for binding adjudication was ratified by the Congress in 1981. The treaty obliges both parties to accept the judgment of the Court regarding the maritime boundary.

We always understood, and we believe the New England fisheries industry understood, that a split-the-difference compromise judgment was a real possibility. The early reaction from New England Congressional and industry representatives is one of tangible disappointment, but this appears thus far to be directed at the Court rather than at the Administration. Nevertheless, the decision leaves Canada with a significant portion of Georges Bank (about one-sixth), thus dividing the most valuable fisheries between the two countries. This fact means that management and utilization of the Georges Bank fisheries will remain a continuing, perhaps increasing, problem in our bilateral relationship. Moreover, the new boundary will require changes in both US and Canadian fishing patterns and could result in greater pressure for protectionist measures against Canadian fish exports to the United States.

It is important that the Administration be perceived as addressing the domestic economic and political issues raised by the ICJ decision. At the same time, none of the interests involved are yet in a position to understand the full implications of the decision, and considerable time will be required before there is such understanding. The boundary will not even be fully in effect until October 27 pursuant to an agreement with Canada to allow for a transition period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #33006
BY CV NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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We will need to devote immediate priority effort to consultations with the industry and the Hill to form a consensus on the dimensions of the problem and how to proceed. A commitment by the USG to bilateral negotiations at this time could easily backfire, producing suspicion in the industry that the Department is preparing to make concessions to the Canadians without properly considering its concerns.

The decision was discussed at Secretary Shultz's meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Clark on October 16. Both agreed that time is needed to study the implications of the decision before proceeding further. The Secretary told Clark that we expect to propose a way of approaching bilateral discussions by early next year.



Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 30 OCT 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

dlb 11/25/02

DOCDATE 29 OCT 84

27

KEYWORDS: CANADA

URGENT

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES MTG W/ JOURNALISTS 30 OCT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 30 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

FORTIER

SOMMER

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COMMENTS

REF# 8429624

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Cobb</i>	<i>10/30</i>	<i>Already handed in to Bob Sims</i>		
<i>Close</i>	<i>C 10/30</i>	<i>HANDLED BY BOB SIMS</i>	<i>(on 10/29)</i>	

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

27.



S/S 8429624

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Talking Points for the President's Use on
October 30

In response to an NSC request, we attach suggested
talking points for the President's use during his meeting
with journalists on October 30.

BMCKailey
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 2, 1993

By dlb NARA, Date 1/25/07

TALKING POINTS

Question: Are US-Canadian relations improving now that Prime Minister Mulroney is in office?

-- US-Canadian relations have been improving over the past couple of years, and we are confident that this trend will continue under the new Government of Prime Minister Mulroney.

-- I have had two highly satisfactory meetings with Mr. Mulroney, one before he became Prime Minister and the other shortly after he took office.

-- We agreed on a number of steps to improve communications between our two governments, including regular meetings involving Mr. Mulroney and me and between Cabinet counterparts in Ottawa and Washington.

-- Good US-Canada relations are extremely important for both countries' welfare, security, and economic health.

Question: Will an improved relationship also improve the probability of working out a solution to the acid rain issue?

-- We remain committed to the management, jointly with Canada where appropriate, of our shared natural environment.

-- Acid rain is a very important topic which we will need to continue to address, on its own merits, in a very serious way.

-- As a general rule, both the US and Canada avoid linking unrelated issues. Hence progress or changes in one area are not traded for changes in other areas of policy. I believe the avoidance of linkage will remain in the interests of both countries.