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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 1/23/2007

File Folder CANADA (07/02/1981-08/27/1981)

FOIA

F1554

Box Number 12

TAMMY NEMETH

6

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 32709 | CABLE | #021958Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 7/2/1981 | B1 |
| 32710 | CABLE | #022034Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 2 | 7/2/1981 | B1 |
| 32711 | CABLE | #030045Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 7/3/1981 | B1 |
| 32712 | CABLE | #072030Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233 | 4 | 7/7/1981 | B1 |
| 32714 | CABLE | #162023Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 4 | 7/16/1981 | B1 |
| 32715 | CABLE | #180131Z JUL 81 - LETTER REAGAN TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 4 | 7/18/1981 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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|-------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 32717 | CABLE | #181701Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 7/18/1981 | B1 |
| 32718 | CABLE | #301735Z JUL 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 7/30/1981 | B1 |
| 32719 | MEMO | ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MAJOR THEMES AND RELATIONSHIP TO ISSUES R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 4 | 7/15/1981 | B1 |
| 32720 | CABLE | #102132Z AUG 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 8/10/1981 | B1 |
| 32721 | CABLE | #111419Z AUG 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 8/11/1981 | B1 |
| 32722 | CABLE | #132009Z AUG 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 2 | 8/13/1981 | B1 |

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|-------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 32723 | CABLE | #220035Z AUG 81 - LETTER, HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 3 | 8/22/1981 | B1 |
| 32724 | CABLE | #272115Z AUG 81 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554 | 1 | 8/27/1981 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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8YTD70 R

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

32709

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: WETTERING
WHR: COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4023 1831950
O 021958Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1202

~~S E C R E T~~ OTTAWA 04023

NDDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/1/01 (SMITH, RICHARD J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA, CA
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY ON NAMIBIA
REF: STATE 173891

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. MESSAGE DELIVERED JULY 2. SMITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 # 32709

BY Cu NARA DATE 12/7/07

OTTAWA 4023

DTG: 021958Z JUL 81 P0N1 012908
TOR: 183/2128Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP
EOB: WETTERING
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR # 1554 # 32710

BY CU NARA DATE 12/7/07

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4027 1832034
O 022034Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1205

~~S E C R E T~~ OTTAWA 04027

NOPI:
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/2/01 (SMITH, RICHARD J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA, CA
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE ON NAMIBIA--INITIAL CANADIAN
= REACTION
REF: STATE 173801

1. ~~(S - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~
2. INITIAL SENIOR STAFF LEVEL REACTION TO SECRETARY'S LETTER TO EXTAFF MINISTER MACQUIGAN ON NAMIBIA WAS ONE OF STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT. THEY HAD EXPECTED MORE INFORMATION BECAUSE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD ADVISED THEM TO EXPECT A DETAILED "FIVE POINT" REPORT ON PROGRESS WITH SOUTH AFRICANS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONTACT GROUP MEETING NEXT WEEK.
3. BASED ON JULY 2 CONVERSATION, WE EXPECT EXTAFF SENIOR STAFF TO ADVISE MINISTER MACQUIGAN THAT PRESENT STATE OF PLAY REQUIRES THAT NAMIBIA BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT IN A WAY THAT IMPRESSES PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SHIFTING US ADMINISTRATION FROM ITS "FRIENDLY" POSTURE OF DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICANS.
4. EXTAFF EXPECTED THAT GERMANS WOULD ALSO EXPRESS NEED

OTTAWA 4027

DTG: 022034Z JUL 81 PONI 012076
TOR: 183/2226Z

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) I

TO PRESS FOR HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION OF NAMIBIA DURING
OTTAWA SUMMIT. SMITH

OTTAWA 4027

DTG:022034Z JUL 81 PONI 012078
TORI 183/2228Z

*****~~S E C R E T~~*****

BIT207 R

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

32711

DATE 07/10/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

AIT: JP, COL, VP
ROBI PIPES, RENT, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5081 1840100
O 030045Z JUL 81 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2777

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6657
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 175081

DDIS
P.O. 12068: RDS-1 7/2/91 (NILES, THOMAS, M. T.)

TAGS: NATO PL

SUBJECT: (S) POLAND: CANADIAN POSITION ON CONTINGENCY
PLANNING

REF: STATE 171700

(S) CANADIAN EMBASSY HAS PROPOSED THAT TALKS DISCUSSED
PARA 3, REPTEL, TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON JULY 9.
DEPARTMENT HAS ACCEPTED THIS PROPOSAL AND ADVISED
CANADIANS THAT DAS GOMPERT WILL HEAD US PARTICIPANTS. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #32711

BY CV NARA DATE 12/1/07

SECSTATE WASHDC 5081

DTG: 030045Z JUL 81 P8N1 013216
TOR: 184/0100Z

~~***** S E C R E T *****~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

32712

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR 1554 #32712

MESSAGE:

BY CAS NARADATE 12/7/07

EHA647
DD RUEADWW
DE RUEHOT #4081/01 1882034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
D 072030Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1252
INFO RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T~~ I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 04081
STATE FOR EUR-ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER,
DEPT PLEASE PASS EPA FOR ADMINISTRATOR
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/BOGGS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/7/01 (SMITH, RICHARD J.) UR=M
TAGS: SENV, CA

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 10 MEETING WITH PRIME
- MINISTER TRUDEAU--CLEAN AIR ACT

1. ~~(C - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~
2. SUMMARY: CANADIANS WENT AWAY DEEPLY CONCERNED AND FRUSTRATED FROM JULY 6 MEETING WITH EPA ADMINISTRATOR GORSUCH. THEY FEAR THAT ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON CLEAN AIR ACT REAUTHORIZATION WILL UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY REDUCTION IN ACID DEPOSITION IN CANADA. THEY RESENT LACK OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER PROPER AND TRADITIONAL CONSULTATION ON THRUST OF OUR PROPOSALS. THEY WILL ADVISE TRUDEAU TO RAISE CONSULTATION ISSUE WITH THE PRESIDENT JULY 10. I RECOMMEND ONE MORE TRY ON CONSULTATIONS TO MEET GOC CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.
3. POLITICAL COUNSELOR DISCUSSED CANADIAN PERCEPTION OF OUTCOME OF JULY 6 MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER ROBERTS AND EPA ADMINISTRATOR GORSUCH WITH TED LEE, EXTAFF'S ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR USA AFFAIRS AND RAY ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENT CANADA'S ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DURING RETURN TRIP TO OTTAWA JULY 6 AND AGAIN WITH CHARGE AND TED LEE JULY 7.
4. THE REACTION OF BOTH CANADIAN OFFICIALS (AND REPORTED REACTION OF ROBERTS) WAS DISAPPOINTED, ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL ADOPT A CLEAN AIR ACT REAUTHORIZATION POSITION WHICH WILL PRECLUDE ANY REAL, EARLY LIMIT OR REDUCTION IN ACID DEPOSITION IN CANADA. IN THEIR VIEW THIS WOULD DESTROY ANY BASIS FOR CLEAN AIR NEGOTIATIONS. THUS THEY FEAR THAT THE GOC'S ENTIRE CLEAN AIR POLICY IS AT A DEAD END. THEY EXPECT THAT THE POLITICAL COSTS OF SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD BE

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EXTREMELY HIGH FOR ROBERTS AND THE GOVERNMENT. SUCH AN OUTCOME, IF ANNOUNCED BEFORE THE SUMMIT, COULD SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE AND LEAD TO RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS HERE AGAINST THE PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME.

5. THE CANADIANS ALSO CAME AWAY FROM THE MEETING WITH A FEELING OF INJURY. IT IS THEIR VIEW THAT TRADITIONAL US-CANADIAN RELATIONS AND PROBLEM MANAGEMENT HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN BASED ON INTIMATE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION (FORMALLY AND INFORMALLY) IN ADVANCE OF FINAL DECISIONS WHEN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER COUNTRY WERE AFFECTED BY A COURSE OF ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THE OTHER. THEY FEEL THAT WE HAVE LET THEM DOWN IN THIS INSTANCE.

6. WHAT THE GOC WANTS IS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLICY THRUST OF OUR PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE CLEAN AIR ACT AS THEY AFFECT CANADA SO THAT GOC CAN EXPRESS ITS VIEWS ON THEM TO USG ON AN INFORMED AND TIMELY BASIS. THEY DO NOT WANT OR EXPECT TO CLEAR, REVIEW, VETO OR SUGGEST TEXTUAL CHANGES. THEY DO NOT NEED THE ACTUAL TEXTS OR ANY OTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL. BUT THEY DO WANT TO BE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSALS AS THEY AFFECT CANADA WITH US AND THAT THEY HAD MADE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN WHILE THE PROPOSALS WERE STILL MALLEABLE.

7. THIS IS THE KIND OF ACCESS WE WANT (AND USUALLY ENJOY) HERE, AND IT HAS BEEN TYPICAL OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA IN THE PAST. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY, RANGE AND IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA THIS KIND OF CLOSE WORKING ARRANGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL. EVEN IN THE DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE CASE OF THE NEW ENERGY POLICY (NEP), WE HAVE HAD THIS KIND OF OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN WHILE THE PROPOSALS WERE STILL AMENABLE TO CHANGE BY THE GOC, AND INDEED CERTAIN IMPORTANT CHANGES, E.G., ON BACK-IN AND PROCUREMENT, WHICH WE WANTED WERE MADE AS A RESULT OF THIS PROCESS. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ARE STILL SUBJECT TO EASY GOVERNMENT ALTERATION IS DIFFERENT IN THE US AND CANADA. IN THE US, THAT PERIOD IS GENERALLY BEFORE A BILL IS INTRODUCED WHILE IN CANADA IT CONTINUES AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF DRAFT LEGISLATION.)

8. THE CANADIAN OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT IN VIEW OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES (THE LIKELY FINAL FORM OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT CHANGES AND THE LACK OF NORMAL CONSULTATION ON PROPOSED CHANGES) THEY WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER RAISE THE ISSUE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT JULY 10.

BT

#4081

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 65

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA648
UN RUEADWW
DE RUEHDT #4081/02 1882036
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 072030Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1253
INFO PUFADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 OTTAWA 04081
9. EMBASSY RECOMMENDATION: BEARING IN MIND WHAT THE
CANADIANS MEAN BY CONSULTATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH
ACCESS TO US IN CANADA, I RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE ONE MORE
ATTEMPT TO MEET THE GOC'S REAL, POLITICAL PROBLEM BY
OFFERING AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE POLICY THRUST OF OUR
CLEAN AIR ACT PROPOSALS AS THEY AFFECT CANADA AND INVITE
THEIR COMMENTS AT THE SAME TIME. REGARDLESS OF THE FINAL
OUTCOME, WE LOSE NOTHING AND GAIN MUCH BY PUTTING THE
CANADIANS IN THE POSITION TO SAY THAT THEY WERE CONSULTED
ON THE CHANGES WE HAVE IN MIND AND THAT THEIR VIEWS ON
THOSE CHANGES WERE HEARD AND CONSIDERED. SMITH
BT

#4081
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:

EHA758
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHDT #4290/01 1971841
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161836Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1411
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHDL/AMEMBASSY BJNV IMMEDIATE 2890
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2537
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4141
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4584
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2253
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2397
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2253
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1923

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 04290

USEEC

USOECB ALSO FOR EMBASSY

STATE ALSO FOR E-RASHISH

WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. CAUZEN AND MR. STUDDERT, NSC FOR
REUTSCHLER

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: ENSD, ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)

SUBJECT: TRUDEAU'S REMARKS AT PRE-SUMMIT PRESS CONFERENCE

1. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HELD A PRE-SUMMIT PRESS

CONFERENCE JULY 15. EXCERPTS FOLLOW.

2. Q. HAVE YOU GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE
WILL MENTION THE NEED FOR GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I HAVEN'T GIVEN UP HOPE. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WILL
BE MENTIONED OR NOT. I HAVE NO FIRM COMMITMENT.

3. Q. WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE A POSITIVE SIGNAL TO
THE THIRD WORLD IF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT MENTIONED
IN THE COMMUNIQUE?

I HAVE NOBODY'S ASSURANCE, THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE
MANY POSITIVE SIGNALS AS REGARDS NORTH-SOUTH IN THAT
COMMUNIQUE. THERE WILL NOT BE AN EVASION OF THE SUBJECT,
OR A PUTTING OFF OF THAT SUBJECT UNTIL CANCUN, WHICH IS
A FEAR I HAD ENTERTAINED AT ONE POINT. BUT AS TO WHETHER
THAT SPECIFIC BUZZ-WORD IS IN THERE, I DON'T KNOW.

4. Q. WHAT POSITIVE SIGNALS MIGHT THE SUMMIT SEND TO THE
SOUTH?

A. EVEN IF THERE ARE NOT PRECISE FIGURES GIVEN OR

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OBJECTIVES SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE SUMMITTEERS WILL WANT TO GIVE A MESSAGE OF HOPE. THEY WILL NOT SAY, "LOOK, WE DON'T REALLY WANT TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. WE WILL BE DOING THAT IN CANCUN." THEY WILL WANT TO INDICATE, IN A CLEAR WAY, THAT THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM IS ONE WHICH THEY ARE DETERMINED TO SOLVE.

5. Q. DO YOU THINK THERE WILL BE AN INCLINATION TO SHARE IN POWER? FOR EXAMPLE, IF NOT THE ENERGY AFFILIATE, SOMETHING ELSE?

A. I CAN ONLY SAY I HOPE THERE WILL BE. ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD, I AM NOT PESSIMISTIC.

6. Q. AFTER YOUR VISIT AT THE WHITE HOUSE LAST WEEK, A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, WHO WAS IN AT SOME OF THE TALKS, TOLD US IN A BRIEFING, AND I QUOTE: "THERE IS NO GENERALLY ACCEPTED DEFINITION OF NORTH-SOUTH OR GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS", AND HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT "THIS IS REALLY A COMPLEX SUBJECT, AND FOR SOME IT IS MORE A STATE OF MIND THAN A REALITY." I AM WONDERING (A) ARE THERE ANY OTHER SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS WHO SHARE THIS SAME UNCERTAINTY; (B) IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DOESN'T GRASP THE ISSUE, OR THEY DO AND THEY ARE OPPOSED; AND (C) CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU TOLD THE PRESIDENT BY WAY OF REASSURANCE AND EXPLANATION ABOUT THE NORTH-SOUTH ISSUE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN SPENDING SO MUCH OF YOUR TIME ON LATELY?

A. IN A SENSE THE PERSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE WHO SAID THAT -- SOMETHING ABOUT IT BEING THE STATE OF MIND -- YOU COULD SAY HE IS RIGHT. THE THING THAT KEEPS THE SOUTH TOGETHER IS A STATE OF MIND, MORE THAN A PRECISE DEFINITION. I DON'T WANT TO NECESSARILY AGREE WITH WHATEVER THE GENTLEMAN FROM THE WHITE HOUSE SAID, BUT THERE OBVIOUSLY IS SOME TRUTH IN IT. THERE IS SOMETHING OF A STATE OF MIND THERE, AND I THINK THAT IS PERHAPS THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ROUTE. THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE US SETTLE ENERGY, FOR INSTANCE, TO GET A GOOD DEAL FOR OURSELVES IF WE DON'T AT THE SAME TIME DISCUSS TRADE OR DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE, OR REFORM OF THE MONETARY INSTITUTIONS WHICH WILL BE A GOOD DEAL FOR THEM, AND IT

BT
#4290
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA772
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHOT #4290/02 1971843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161836Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1412
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BJNN IMMEDIATE 2891
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2538
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4142
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4585
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2254
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2398
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2264
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1924

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 OTTAWA 04290
IS NOT AN ILLOGICAL POSITION, BUT IT IS A BARGAINING
STANCE.

7. Q. WOULD YOU MARK PRESIDENT REAGAN DOWN AS DUBIOUS,
THEN, ABOUT THIS CONCEPT?

A. OH YES. PRESIDENT REAGAN, IF I READ HIM RIGHT, WANTS
TO SEE A TRANSFER OF POWER AND OF WEALTH TO THE COUNTRIES
OF THE SOUTH. HE JUST DOESN'T THINK THE BEST WAY OF
DOING IT IS GOING THROUGH GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS,
MONETARY POLICY

8. Q. DO YOU THINK THE MOOD OF THE SUMMIT HAS BEEN
AFFECTED BY THE EVENTS IN BRITAIN? HAVE YOUR OWN VIEWS
ON THE FRIEDMAN-TYPE APPROACH TO SOLVING INFLATION BEEN
AFFECTED?

A. I CAN'T SAY MY OWN VIEWS HAVE CHANGED IN RECENT WEEKS
OR MONTHS. BUT I MUST POINT OUT THAT THOSE WHO ARE
MONETARISTS, OR THOSE WHO DO FOLLOW CERTAIN MACRO-ECONOMIC
POLICIES, DO SO FOR THE SAME REASON THAT MAYBE WE WOULD
FOLLOW SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT POLICIES. EACH GOVERNMENT, IN
ITS OWN COUNTRY, HAS TO MAKE A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DECISION AS TO WHAT POLICIES IT WILL TRY TO APPLY,
--> THE EVENTS IN BRITAIN I DON'T THINK CAN BE INTERPRETED
IN AN ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN WAY TO INDICATE THAT MONETARY
POLICIES ARE EVIL PER SE.

9. Q. DO YOU FEEL THE RISKS ARE WORTH IT? WHETHER OR NOT
ONE SETS OUT TO CREATE UNEMPLOYMENT, THAT IN FACT IS

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WHAT IS HAPPENING. MR. SCHMIDT AND MR. MITTERRAND ARE ARGUING VERY MUCH ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION, THAT THE NEW EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON CREATING JOBS. DO YOU THINK THAT THEIR ARGUMENT NOW WILL HAVE MORE WEIGHT AT THE SUMMIT?

A. YOU MAY BE CORRECT ABOUT MR. MITTERRAND, BUT I DON'T RECALL MR. SCHMIDT MAKING THAT ARGUMENT WITH ALL THAT MUCH FORCE. HE HAS BEEN VERY CONCERNED WITH INFLATION, AS INDEED SO HAVE WE. I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT ONE TO SAY: "IF I WERE THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, I WOULDN'T DO IT THIS WAY." EACH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT HAS A TOUGH ENOUGH JOB RUNNING HIS OR HER OWN COUNTRY THAT I CERTAINLY DON'T PROPOSE TO SAY HOW I WOULD DO IT IN SOME OTHER COUNTRY. I DO FEEL ENTITLED, AS SOME OTHERS DO, TO SAY THAT (IF) SOMEBODY ELSE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE HAVING A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON MINE THAT I WOULD WANT THEM TO KNOW ABOUT IT, BUT THAT WOULD BE BECAUSE OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE THAT I AM TALKING ABOUT.

10. Q. DO YOU THINK IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A CLASH ON INTEREST RATES IS AVOIDABLE, IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, GIVEN THAT BOTH THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (FRANCE AND GERMANY) HAVE VERY RECENTLY SAID THEY WILL ASK THE U.S. FOR A CUT, AND THE U.S., IN ITS TURN HAS CALLED FOR PATIENCE ON THE PART OF THE OTHERS?

A. I WOULDN'T BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THERE WON'T BE SOME CLASH IN PRIVATE, BUT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO WAGER THAT THERE PROBABLY WON'T BE IN PUBLIC. AFTER THE DISCUSSION IS OVER AND EVERYTHING HAS BEEN SAID AND DONE, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A DISPOSITION TO SAY, "WELL, THAT'S INTERESTING. I DON'T THINK THAT WOULD WORK, BUT IF YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WILL, WE WILL GIVE YOU A LITTLE BIT OF TIME TO SHOW WHETHER IT DOES OR NOT."

11. Q. DO YOU BELIEVE YOU CAN BE A BRIDGE BETWEEN MR. REAGAN AND MR. MITTERRAND ON MONETARY POLICY?

A. AS CHAIRMAN I WILL TRY TO KEEP THE LINES OPEN BETWEEN THE ONE AND THE OTHER, BUT I DO NOT INTEND TO PROPOSE NEW THEORIES TO CONVINC ONE OR THE OTHER THAT HE IS RIGHT OR WRONG. NEITHER PRESIDENT REAGAN NOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAS YET HAD ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH EACH OTHER THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON ECONOMICS. THE SUMMIT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN SUCH EXCHANGES.

BT

#4290

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA771
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHDT #4290/03 1971845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161836Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1413
RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2892
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2539
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4143
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4586
RUEHRU/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2255
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2399
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2265
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1925

BT
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 OTTAWA 04290
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

12. Q: ARE YOU GOING TO PROPOSE TO THE SUMMIT PARTNERS
SOME FORM OR SOME SYSTEM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT OR CRISIS
RESPONSE?
A: WHETHER I WILL HAVE ANY PRECISE MECHANISM PROPOSED OR
ACCEPTED I CANNOT SAY. I WILL CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSING
THE SUBJECT. IT HAS BEEN A PREOCCUPATION OF MINE FOR
THE PAST FEW YEARS.
-- THERE ARE MANY WAYS OF COORDINATING OUR RESPONSE TO
MOMENTOUS EVENTS. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, IT COULD BE DONE,
AND HAS BEEN DONE, WITH CONSULTATIONS IN NATO (I.E.,
POLAND). BUT SOME IMPORTANT COUNTRIES (JAPAN, AUSTRALIA)
ARE NOT MEMBERS OF NATO. ANOTHER WAY MIGHT BE FOR THE
SUMMITS THEMSELVES TO ... BUT I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE
ANY PRECISE PROPOSAL. I WILL PROBABLY TRY AND BRING A
LIST OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES AND SEE IF ANY OF THEM
APPEAL TO THE SUMMITEERS.
GENERAL

13. Q: ARE YOU A LITTLE AFRAID THIS TIME THAT PERHAPS
IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT HAS BEEN IN PAST
CONFERENCES FOR LEADERS TO RISE OUTSIDE THEIR DOMESTIC
PROBLEMS AND TAKE THE GLOBAL VIEW?
A: I DON'T THINK SO. WE HAVE REALLY REALIZED THAT, IN
THE SHORT-RUN, WE ARE NOT ALL THAT GOOD AT SHAPING OUR

PAGE 1 - 317

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(ECONOMIC) DESTINIES. WE COME TO SUMMITS TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THE DEVIL THE WORLD IS GOING, AND ARE WE MANAGING IT WITH THE RIGHT PERSPECTIVE OVER THE LONG RUN, AND ARE WE IN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF RATHER SLOW GROWTH, OR WILL THERE BE A RETURN TO RAPID GROWTH AND, IF SO, IS IT DESIRABLE, AND, IF SO, HOW CAN IT BE MANAGED, AND WHAT HAS INSTITUTIONALLY JELLED THAT HAS TO BE UNJELLED? A SUMMIT IS A PLACE WHERE YOU TRY AND DEVELOP A CONSENSUS, A WAY OF THINKING, A PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNING WHICH WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHERS IN THE GANG.

-- AT VENICE THE SPECIFIC MESSAGE I GOT WAS THAT WE DON'T WANT TO MEET AGAIN AS LEADERS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A COMMUNIQUE THAT HAS BEEN PUT TOGETHER OVER MONTHS BY OFFICIALS WITH THE SPELLING OUT OF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, AND THAT IS WHY THERE HAD BEEN NO COMMUNIQUE WRITTEN UNTIL THE VERY LAST DAYS, AND EVEN THEN IT WAS ONLY IN DRAFT FORM.

14. Q. ARE YOU NOT RISKING AT THIS SUMMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF FACING A CONSENSUS THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE INFLATION PROBLEM AND THAT OTHER ISSUES, ESPECIALLY NORTH-SOUTH, SHOULD BE RELEGATED TO A LOWER LEVEL?

A. SUCH A DANGER DOES EXIST AND I WILL TRY, FOR MY PART, TO AVOID IT. AS CHAIRMAN I WILL TRY TO ESTABLISH THE ORDER-OF-THE-DAY AND ASSURE MYSELF THAT THE MACRO-ECONOMIC DISCUSSION TAKES A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF OUR TIME, THAT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE THIRD WORLD TAKE A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE AND THAT QUESTIONS RELATING TO TRADE, FOR EXAMPLE, OCCUPY A CERTAIN PORTION OF OUR MEETINGS, I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER I WILL SUCCEED, BUT I RECOGNIZE THE DANGER, WHICH APPLIES AS WELL TO NORTH-SOUTH, TRADE, ETC., AND I WILL TRY TO AVOID IT. ROBINSON

BT

#4290

NNNN

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

32714

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL JP VP
EOB: TYSON RENT GUMIN
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4298/01 1972024
O 162023Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1420

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 04298

NODIS
NOFORN

R/S PLEASE PASS COPY TO EUR AND EUR/CAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 7/16/01 (ROBINSON, PAUL H.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, CA

SUBJECT: (C) CANADIAN ACCOUNT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
-- JULY 10 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

BACKGROUND

2. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS THE CANADIAN VIEW OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE JULY 10 MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. IT IS BASED ON A BRIEFING EXTAFF OFFICIALS GAVE POLITICAL COUNSELOR JULY 16. EXTAFF IS HANDLING THIS SUBJECT ON A NODIS BASIS AND ASKED THAT WE NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL THE FACT OR CONTENT OF BRIEFING.

3. BRIEFER MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT MEETING:
-- GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS - THIS WAS PRIMARY TOPIC IN "RESTRICTED" MEETING. TRUDEAU TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT US APPEARED TO BE "ODD MAN OUT" ON ISSUE. PRESIDENT STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF SELF-HELP AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT. TRUDEAU POINTED TO SPECIAL PROBLEMS CREATED FOR LDC'S BY

OTTAWA 4298

DTG: 162023Z JUL 81 PSN: 029962
TOR: 197/2241Z

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 5554 # 32714
BY OS NARA DATE 12/7/07

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RISE IN OIL PRICES. PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO GLOBAL "DISCUSSIONS" BUT DID NOT THINK THAT "NEGOTIATIONS" WERE APPROPRIATE BECAUSE LATTER TERM IMPLIED THAT SOME RIGHT EXISTS ENTITLING LDC'S TO SAY HOW RESOURCES OF OTHERS SHALL BE ALLOCATED. PRESIDENT TOLD TRUDEAU THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO "GLOBAL DISCUSSIONS" OR TO SOME OTHER FORMULATION WHICH DID NOT CREATE THAT PRESUMPTION OF RIGHT.

-- EXTAFF COMMENT - THIS LOOKS LIKE PROGRESS. SECRETARY

HAIG ALSO TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER MACGUIGAN IN NASSAU JULY 11 THAT "HE WOULD REEXAMINE" THE US POSITION ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ISSUE.

-- NAMIBIA - PRIME MINISTER TOLD PRESIDENT THAT HE WAS

CONCERNED LEST THE US IN WORKING ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS BE DRAWN TOO MUCH IN THEIR DIRECTION. HE SAID THAT CONTACT GROUP DID NOT WANT TO BE FACED WITH A "FAIT ACCOMPLI" IT COULD NOT ACCEPT BUT ALSO WENT ON TO SAY THAT FOR THE PRESENT HE COULD "SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE GANG-OF-FIVE APPROACH."

-- SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE - TRUDEAU EXPRESSED CONCERN

THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS MIGHT BE AT A DEAD END IN VIEW OF THE ISRAELI ELECTION OUTCOME. PRESIDENT ASKED PRIME MINISTER TO "REMAIN FLEXIBLE" ON WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE. PRIME MINISTER AGREED "FOR THE TIME BEING."

-- EXTAFF COMMENT - PARTICIPATION BY A WEST EUROPEAN

NATION WOULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN CANADIAN ATTITUDE AS WOULD PARTICIPATION BY A MAJOR AFRICAN COUNTRY.

-- ACID RAIN - TRUDEAU STRESSED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF

ACID RAIN ISSUE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT US COST/BENEFIT APPROACH MIGHT RESULT IN THE "US GETTING THE BENEFITS AND CANADA THE COSTS" IF THE US EXPORTED ITS POLLUTION TO CANADA. THE PRESIDENT TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO EXPORT POLLUTION TO CANADA AND WAS "NOT GOING TO MAKE THE PROBLEM WORSE." BUT THE PRESIDENT ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY AND DID NOT OFFER FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT.

-- EXTAFF COMMENT - THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT NOT

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DTG:162023Z JUL 81 PSN: 029962
TOR: 197/2241Z

DATE 07/21/81

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PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXPORTING POLLUTION AND NOT WORSENING THE SITUATION ARE MOST WELCOME AND ENCOURAGING. BUT THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REST OF HIS REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH SEEM TO BE VERY SIMILAR TO THE POSITION EPA TOOK WITH ENVIRONMENT MINISTER ROBERTS IN WASHINGTON JULY 6.
-- PIPELINE - THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS MARCH COMMIT-

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DTG:162023Z JUL 81 PSN: 029962
TOR: 197/2241Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4298/02 1972026
O 162023Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1421

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 OTTAWA 04298NODIS
MENT TO FACILITATING THE COMPLETION OF THE NORTHERN GAS
PIPELINE.

-- EXTAFF COMMENT - THIS IS VERY ENCOURAGING BUT ALSO A

RIT OBSCURE SINCE NEITHER SIDE SEEMS TO HAVE DISCUSSED
THE INDIVIDUAL WAIVERS OR PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.

-- FIRA/TRADE - THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME

LENGTH. BOTH SIDES PRESENTED THEIR CLASSIC POSITIONS
AND NO PROGRESS WAS MADE.

-- EXTAFF COMMENT - GDC IS CONCERNED ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL

INITIATIVES TO RESTRICT OR PREVENT CANADIAN INVESTMENT
IN THE US OR THE APPLICATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS IN THE
MINERAL RIGHTS LEASING ACT. ON THE OTHER HAND CHANGING
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS IS CLEARLY A US DOMESTIC MATTER ABOUT
WHICH IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR CANADA TO COMPLAIN.4. EMBASSY COMMENT: EXTAFF BRIEFERS WERE NOT REPEAT NOT
PRESENT AT THE MEETING AND WERE WORKING FROM A DRAFT
MEMCON. ROBINSON

OTTAWA 4298

DTG:162023Z JUL 81 PSN: 029963
TOR: 197/2241Z

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

32715

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP
EOB: PIPES RENT FARRAR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9639 1990143
O 180131Z JUL 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FISSY #32715
BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

SECRET STATE 189639
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/17/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: GW

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NO SIGNED TEXT WILL FOLLOW.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

AMBASSADOR BURNS HAS REPORTED TO ME ON YOUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS, AND I WELCOME YOUR WARM RECEPTION OF HIM TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

I RECOGNIZE THE IMMENSE IMPORTANCE FOR YOU AND FOR THE ALLIANCE OF PURSUING A SOUND POLICY ON TNF. IN MAY,

SECSTATE WASHDC 9639

DTG:180131Z JUL 81 PSN: 032250
TOR: 199/1339Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECRETARY HAIG INFORMED THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN ROME THAT WE WANTED TO BEGIN TNF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I PERSONALLY MADE THIS DECISION, AND I WANT TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO REASSURE YOU IN THE CLEAREST TERMS THAT I AM ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR OWN PRESS HAS PUBLISHED STORIES INDICATING THERE MAY BE SOME QUESTION AS TO OUR INTENT TO DO THAT. THESE STORIES ARE WITHOUT ANY FOUNDATION

IN FACT AND REPRESENT PURE SPECULATION BY SOME IN THE MEDIA.

THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEAL WITH QUESTIONS VITALLY AFFECTING ALLIANCE SECURITY. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEMS INVOLVED CAN STRIKE THE EUROPEAN ALLIES BUT NOT THE U.S. IN NO WAY DIMINISHES OUR DETERMINATION TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO LIMIT AND REDUCE WHAT IS, IN THE LARGER SENSE, A COMMON THREAT. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT WE PREPARE SYSTEMATICALLY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALONG THE LINES DECIDED AT ROME. THESE PREPARATIONS ARE NOW MOVING FORWARD BOTH WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I AM DETERMINED TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. WE ARE AS WELL PURSUING PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. I ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO BEGIN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MID-NOVEMBER AND MID-DECEMBER. OF COURSE, SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE INITIATING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN SEPTEMBER BY ENGAGING HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART.

WE CAN OF COURSE EXPECT FURTHER SOVIET EFFORTS TO CAST DOUBT ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AND TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE. THESE THEATRICALS SHOULD NOT DETER US FROM PROCEEDING FIRMLY AND SERIOUSLY ON THE COURSE WE HAVE SET FOR OURSELVES. IN SAYING THIS, I AM WELL AWARE OF THE HEATED CONTROVERSY THAT SURROUNDS TNF IN EUROPE AND IN YOUR COUNTRY PARTICULARLY. I HAVE THE GREATEST ADMIRATION AND APPRECIATION FOR THE COURAGE, FIRMNESS, AND CLARITY WITH WHICH YOU HAVE SPOKEN OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION. THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, WILL IMPLEMENT BOTH ASPECTS OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION.

IT IS OUR AGREED VIEW THAT TNF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SALT FRAMEWORK. AS TO THE QUESTION OF NFGO-

SECSTATE WASHDC 9639

DTG:180131Z JUL 81 PSN: 032250
TOR: 199/1339Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TIATIONS ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, YOU ARE AWARE OF MY VIEW THAT THE SALT II TREATY IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED AS IT STANDS. BUT RATHER THAN MOVING PRECIPITOUSLY, WITHOUT CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN FOLLOW THROUGH, I HAVE INSISTED THAT WE BE SURE OF OURSELVES WITH REGARD TO BOTH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC FORCE PROGRAMS.

REGARDING FRANCE, WHILE I CAN UNDERSTAND MITTERRAND'S RATIONALE FOR BRINGING COMMUNISTS INTO HIS GOVERNMENT, I AM LESS SANGUINE THAN YOU ABOUT THE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS. BUT WHATEVER THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL RATIONALE, THIS STEP DOES POSE SERIOUS SECURITY QUESTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESENCE OF COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE

TRANSPORT AND CIVIL SERVICE SECTORS RAISES SPECIAL CONCERNS, WHICH WE HOPE THE FRENCH WILL MOVE TO ALLAY BY TAKING CONCRETE ACTIONS IN ACCORD WITH THEIR DECLARED POLICY OF KEEPING THE COMMUNISTS OUT OF MATTERS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY. I BELIEVE A CAREFUL REVIEW SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AT NATO TO ENSURE THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED. I ALSO BELIEVE AN APPROPRIATE SIGNAL SHOULD BE SENT TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH MAY FACE THE QUESTIONS OF COMMUNIST ENTRY INTO THEIR GOVERNMENTS. ITALIAN POLITICAL LEADERS, FOR EXAMPLE, MUST SEE THAT ITALY'S STANDING AND ACCESS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD SUFFER IF THE PCI ENTERED THE GOVERNMENT.

YOU CAN BE SURE THAT WE WILL HANDLE THIS QUESTION CAREFULLY. OUR GOAL SHOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN FRANCE'S DESIRE TO WORK ACTIVELY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, NOT WEAKEN IT THROUGH HIGHLY VISIBLE PUNITIVE ACTION. I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN AGREE ON A REASONABLE, PRUDENT COURSE.

AS I MADE CLEAR DURING OUR MEETING IN MAY, WE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF OUR ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE IMPACT OUR POLICIES HAVE ON THE ECONOMIES OF WESTERN EUROPE. CONTINUED HIGH INTEREST RATES ARE DIFFICULT FOR ALL OUR ECONOMIES, AND FOR AMERICANS AS WELL AS EUROPEANS, BUT WE MUST PERSEVERE UNTIL WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OUR EFFORTS TO COMBAT INFLATION, A GOAL WE SHARE AND MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC STABILITY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO EXCHANGING THOUGHTS ON THESE AND OTHER MATTERS SOON IN OTTAWA. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN

SECSTATE WASHDC 9639

DTG:180131Z JUL 81 PSN: 032250
TOR: 199/1339Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FND TEXT HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9639

DTG:180131Z JUL 81 PSN: 032250
TOR: 199/1339Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL
EOB: RENT
WHSR COMMENT:

32717

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4369 1991702
O 181701Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1476

~~S E C R E T~~ OTTAWA 04369

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/18/01 (SMITH, R.J.) OR-M
TAGS: GW
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
REF: STATE 189639
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
WAS DELIVERED BY HAND AT 1245 PM, 7/18/81. ROBINSON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR #1554 #32717

by CN DATE 12/7/07

OTTAWA 4369

DTG:181701Z JUL 81 PSN: 032452
TOR: 199/1744Z

32718

DATE 08/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: FONTAINE
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FISSY # 32718

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

BY CN NARA DATE 12/7/09

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHOT #4629 2111736
P 301735Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1628

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OTTAWA 4629

NODIS
DEPT FOR ASST SECRETARY ENDERS
DEPT PASS SAN SALVADOR AND SAN JOSE FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY
F.O. 12065: GDS 7/30/87 (SMITH, RICHARD J.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, CA, ES
SUBJECT: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO ASSESS ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
REF: SAN SALVADOR 4087

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SOURCE TOLD EMBOFF JULY 29 THAT
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR R. DOUGLAS SIRRS WILL BE VISITING EL
SALVADOR IN NEXT FEW DAYS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ASSESS
PROSPECTS FOR CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN 1982. SOURCE REQUESTED
THAT INFO RE AMBASSADOR'S MOVEMENTS BE TIGHTLY HELD.
SMITH

OTTAWA 4629

DTG:301735Z JUL 81 PSN: 047777
TOR: 211/1934Z

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

dlb 1/23/07

RECEIVED 30 JUN 81 10

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 29 JUN 81

BREMER

15 JUL 81

HAIG, A

15 JUL 81

CM

KEYWORDS: OTTAWA SUMMIT

URGENT

SUBJECT: BRIEFING BOOKS FOR OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

NAU

BAILEY

TYSON

Comment Action

COMMENTS 2 BOOKS RECD -- ONE ECONOMIC -- ONE POLITICAL -- BOTH BOOKS

SENT TO NAU

7/16: 3hr turnaround

REF#

8121287

LOG

NSC IF ID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

| ACTION OFFICER (S) | ASSIGNED | ACTION REQUIRED | DUE | COPIES TO |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|------|------------------|
| NAU | 7/16 | Recd Hay News | | |
| Boats | S 7/16 | prepare memo for Pres | 7/17 | Tyson/Clair/Kery |
| Bailey | | for Comments | | |
| Piper | | | | |
| Kentz | | | | |

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

| ACTION OFFICER (S) | ASSIGNED | ACTION REQUIRED | DUE | COPIES TO |
|--------------------|----------|------------------------------|------|-----------|
| RA | 7/16 | For Cassio | 7/17 | |
| | 8/10 | return for closeout | | |
| | 8/10 | orig. copy Assets | | |
| | 8/10 | Briefing Book w/ El Perherts | | |

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

RA

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
ROB: MENTS:
WHBR COMMENT: DIS IN CAT EU INODIS/FM OTTAWA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FISSY # 32720
BY CW NARADATE 12/7/07

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHOT #4837 2222144
O 102132Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1757

~~SECRET~~ OTTAWA 04837

INODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/10/01 (SMITH, RICHARD) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO CONTACT GROUP
REF: STATE 209877

1. CHARGE MADE POINTS REPTEL TO ASSOCIATE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MARCHAND AUGUST 10. MARCHAND IS ACTING MINISTER AT THE MOMENT.

2. MARCHAND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE. HE COMMENTED SAYING THAT "TO THE EXTENT ANGOLA IS A PRECONDITION TO A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, WE HAVE PROBLEMS. OUR WORRY IS THAT WE MIGHT HAVE OUR CREDIBILITY COMPLETELY SHOT WITH THE AFRICANS. ASSOCIATION OF THE TWO ISSUES EXPLICITLY AND OPENLY PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE." MARCHAND CONTINUED, SAYING THAT THE LAST TWO MEETINGS HAVE "FAILED TO ELIMINATE THIS SHADOW", ADDING THAT "WE ARE EXPECTING YOU TO SPEAK TO THE ANGOLANS AT SOME POINT SOON." SMITH

OTTAWA 4837

DTG:102132Z AUG 81 PSNI 004110
TOR: 222/2254Z

SIT637 R

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

34

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

32721

SIT: NAN COL JP VP
POB: SCHWEITZER, RENT
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHOT #4848 2231420
P 111419Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1764

~~S E C R E T~~ OTTAWA 04848

NDP:IS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/11/81 (SMITH, RICHARD J.) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, MNUC
SUBJECT: ERW: STATUS UPDATE
REF: STATE 210411

1. CHARGE MADE POINTS REFTEL TO ASSOCIATE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MARCHAND, WHO WAS ACTING IN THE MINISTER'S ABSENCE ON AUGUST 10.

2. MARCHAND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR INFORMATION BUT SHOWED SOME SURPRISE ON THE TIMING OF THE DECISION. HE SUGGESTED THAT BY DECIDING TO MOVE AHEAD NOW WE MIGHT BE STRENGTHENING THE HAND OF THOSE IN WESTERN EUROPE OPPOSED TO TNF, NATO AND INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING.

3. ANY GUIDANCE WE COULD USE WITH EXTAFF ON THIS POINT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. SMITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FISSY # 32721

BY CJ NARA DATE 12/7/07

OTTAWA 4848

DTG: 111419Z AUG 81 PBN: 004914
TOR: 223/15182

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY NAU

FROM: ALLEN LENZ *AL*

SUBJECT: Priority Correspondence

Is the attached listing correct? If yes, why?

Attachment

Allen,

The briefing books are still pending with R.Allen per Secretariat. Why would a briefing book be listed as an action anyway? There is no action to be taken.

HN

Henry Nau

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 1/26/07

~~*** CONFIDENTIAL ***~~

AS OF 04 AUG 1981

NSAJC00A

CABINET LEVEL CORRESPONDENCE W/RVA

| FROM | TO | STAFF OFFICER | STATUS | RCV DATE | DOC DATE | DUE DATE | LOG |
|---|-------|---------------|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|
| ----- DESCRIPTION ----- | | | | | | | |
| WEINBERGER, C | PRES | BLAIR | W/RVA | 04 MAY 81 | 04 MAY 81 | 04 MAY 81 | 2404 |
| DOD RPT ON US SUBMARINE COLLISION W/ JAPANESE FREIGHTER COMMENTS: ** W/ RVA FOR ACTION AS OF MAY 4TH | | | | | | | |
| HAIG, A | PRES | SCHWEITZER | W/RVA | 03 JUN 81 | 03 JUN 81 | 05 JUN 81 | 3130 |
| SCHWEITZER KRAEMER PREPARATORY CONTACTS ON TNF NEGOTIATIONS COMMENTS: ** W/ RVA AS OF JUNE 4TH | | | | | | | |
| BREMER BREMER HAIG, A NAU BAILEY | ALLEN | NAU | W/RVA | 30 JUN 81 | 29 JUN 81 | | 3925 |
| BRIEFING BOOKS FOR OTTAWA ECONOMIC SUMMIT COMMENTS: 2 BOOKS RECD -- ONE ECONOMIC -- ONE POLITICAL -- BOTH BOOKS SENT TO NAU | | | | | | | |
| HAIG, A SCHWEITZER | PRES | SCHWEITZER | W/RVA | 16 JUL 81 | 15 JUL 81 | 16 JUL 81 | 4242 |
| STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE DECISIONS COMMENTS: ** 3 HOUR TURNAROUND ** | | | | | | | |
| WEINBERGER, C LILLEY | ALLEN | LILLEY | W/RVA | 16 JUL 81 | 13 JUL 81 | 17 JUL 81 | 4286 |
| US - CHINA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP COMMENTS: 3 HR TURNAROUND. CY ONLY REC'D | | | | | | | |
| HAIG, A ALLEN SCHWEITZER FEITH | PRES | SCHWEITZER | W/RVA | 25 JUL 81 | 24 JUL 81 | 28 JUL 81 | 4491 |
| IMPLICATIONS OF A TURNDOWN OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA COMMENTS: URGENT: 3 HOUR TURNAROUND | | | | | | | |

~~*** CONFIDENTIAL ***~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

July 16, 1981

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES dtb 1/23/07

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*

FROM: HENRY R. NAU *HRN*

SUBJECT: State's Cover Memo for the President's
Briefing Book on the Ottawa Summit

Haig has sent forward a signed cover memorandum for the President's briefing book on the Ottawa Summit. This should be delivered immediately to Dick Darman's office for placement in the President's briefing book (which currently has an unsigned cover memorandum from State).

RECOMMENDATION: That you have Haig's memo delivered to Darman's office immediately.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab A Memo to the President from Haig
re Ottawa Summit


~~UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

32719

July 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Subject: Major Themes and Relationship to Issues

Economic Summitry. The Ottawa Summit is the seventh of these annual meetings which have now been hosted by each of the participants. (The President of the European Community is an eighth participant.) President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt suggested the meetings in 1975 to deal with the effects of the first oil crisis.

Schmidt, the only remaining charter member of the Summit, believes the meetings have been particularly useful in concluding the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations in 1979 and maintaining an open and expanding international economic system, despite oil-induced economic setbacks.

The last two Summits at Tokyo and Venice focused on energy and involved negotiations on increasingly specific and detailed items, such as oil import targets and coal production goals.

Preparations for the Summit have become increasingly extensive. Each leader designates a Personal Representative. These Representatives meet to prepare background papers and preliminary communique language. The Personal Representatives met six times (four times since January) to prepare for Ottawa.

The Ottawa Summit -- Themes and Issues. This Summit is characterized by new personalities (five of the eight participants), serious economic problems in Europe, and uncertainty about the direction of U.S. and French policies. Most Summit leaders come to the meeting -- the United States and France are exceptions -- with a relatively weak political base.

Economic issues dominate the agenda of these meetings. The Venice Summit in 1980 created the expectation that North-South issues and foreign aid would be major themes at Ottawa. Trudeau, the Canadian host, has stressed these themes and traveled in the past year to Africa, Latin America and Asia. Economic difficulties in the Summit countries and U.S. economic policies since January have shifted more attention to

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NLRR F1554 # 32-719

BY CV NARA DATE 12/7/07

RDS-3 7/15/07

macroeconomic and trade issues. Some European countries have criticized high U.S. interest rates, claiming that they complicate European economic recovery. Japan and the European Community are involved in a heated trade dispute. Influenced by strategic considerations, the United States raised with the other Summit countries the issue of trade and financial relations with the Soviet Union. Energy issues are less prominent by contrast to recent Summits, but vulnerability to disruptions of oil supply persists.

Political issues have not been central to previous Summits. The Venice Summit in 1980 marked the first official departure from an economic agenda, devoting a separate afternoon session to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although no separate political agenda is set for Ottawa, political issues will have particular significance.

Poland is certain to be a central topic, against the backdrop of the Polish Party Congress on July 14-18. Schmidt wants to discuss arms control; Trudeau, Mitterrand, and others will raise political aspects of North-South issues, such as southern Africa (Namibia) and Central America. There is widespread interest in the Mideast/Persian Gulf crisis belt -- from Iran, through the Arab-Israeli dispute, to Afghanistan, highlighted by the recent Soviet rejection of the European Community initiative.

Political and economic themes interact. Mitterrand has noted that the United States cannot ask Europe for cooperation on defense issues and pursue economic policies that weaken Europe. Trudeau and others worry that East-West political issues threaten to overshadow and distort North-South economic issues. The United States is concerned that economic relations with the Soviet Union may expose the West to new political vulnerabilities.

U.S. Objectives. Given economic difficulties and political uncertainties, it will be particularly important that you and the other leaders work to keep the Summit from becoming contentious and downbeat, and reflecting disarray and lack of confidence among the Summit countries. Thus, the United States should seek, above all, to:

-- Inspire confidence that you are firmly committed to close cooperation with the other countries and optimism that, with such cooperation, international economic growth can be achieved (bringing to bear internationally what has

happened domestically where 46 percent of the American people believe things will get better, compared to 24 percent two years ago);

-- Affirm a sense of fundamental political unity among the major industrial countries, all of which share democratic institutions, market economies and a belief in human dignity and freedom (stressing thereby that these countries are more than a power alignment or a group of economic competitors);

-- Convey a firm and confident strategic view of the basic challenge to the economic and security interests of the industrial democracies, and a sensitivity to the problems of others and to the requirement for consultation and cooperation among the industrial countries (making clear that America is willing to assume its responsibilities but cannot achieve progress alone).

U.S. Strategy. To achieve these objectives, the United States should:

-- Stress the priority of combatting inflation and achieving economic growth, which depends primarily on domestic (by implication, not international) policies and is the basis for the international objectives the Summit countries seek to achieve -- free trade, monetary and exchange stability, aid to developing countries, and reduced dependence on oil;

-- Focus attention on the accomplishments and potential of economic systems in the Summit countries (by implication, contrasting them with the communist alternative) and the vitality of democratic societies, as expressed most recently in the U.S. and France.

-- Point out the effort that has been made to explain and seek understanding for our domestic economic policies and indicate that we are ready to consult anywhere anytime;

-- Direct attention to the near-term goals which all Summit countries share (lowering inflation, encouraging economic growth which will increase employment, improving productivity, further liberalizing trade, reestablishing the balance with the Soviet Union, integrating the developing countries into the international system, etc.) as a way to contain short-term disagreement over choice of policy instruments (influencing interest or exchange rates, imposing new restraints on trade, timing of arms control discussions, etc.);

-- Reassure other countries about U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union and use the fundamental agreement among these countries on East-West security issues (as reflected in the Rome NATO meeting and Suzuki visit to the United States) to put economic differences into perspective and to elevate the significance of economic growth as a basic component of security for the Summit countries.

-- Ensure that our sensitivity to European and Japanese concerns on basic East-West and political issues is reciprocated by their sensitivity to our positions on economic policy, North-South and trade issues.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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3925 Add-on

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

July 15, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Briefing Books for Ottawa
Summit

The attached memo to the President is included
in the Ottawa briefing book for the President which
has been transmitted separately.

Attachment:

As stated.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By RLB NARA, Date 11/23/07

UNCLASSIFIED

35

32722

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR F1554 # 32722

MESSAGE:

BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

HCE734
STU4876
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #4929 225200Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY
O 132009Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1815
BT

~~SECRET~~ OTTAWA 04929

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/13/01 (MASON, DWIGHT N.) OR-B
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: SECRETARY'S AUGUST 12 MESSAGE TO CONTACT GROUP
REF: (A) STATE 214221, (B) OTTAWA 4837, (C) STATE 209877
1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (RETEL A) TO FOREIGN MINISTER DELIVERED AUGUST 13. DATE OF GOC RESPONSE IS UNCERTAIN SINCE MAC GUIGAN HAS JUST RETURNED BRIEFLY TO OTTAWA PRIOR TO BEGINNING VISIT TO PRC ON AUGUST 17 AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 27. THAT SAID, WE WERE ASSURED THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE WILL RECEIVE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. INITIAL UNOFFICIAL REACTION FROM EXSTAFF OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE INVOLVED IN DRAFTING WHATEVER SUBSTANTIVE GOC RESPONSE IS FORTHCOMING FOLLOWS:
-- NOTWITHSTANDING OUR EXPLICIT DISAVOWAL, GOC SEES USG AS PERSISTING IN A "LINKAGE" OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA TO SAG MOVEMENT ON NAMIBIA. USG'S SEPARATE CONCERN OVER THE CUBAN PRESENCE IS PERCEIVED AS A "CONVERGENCE" FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH THE SAG ON THIS ISSUE.
-- CANADA AND THE OTHER CG MEMBERS HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT ANGOLA IS AN ISSUE SEPARATE FROM NAMIBIA, WHICH THE US SHOULD PURSUE BILATERALLY OUTSIDE OF THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT CONTEXT. FRONT LINE AFRICANS WILL REACT VIGOROUSLY AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE ANGOLA IN THE NAMIBIAN CONTEXT AS WAS MOST RECENTLY INDICATED TO TRUDEAU BY NYERERE IN TANZANIA SINCE THE CUBAN PRESENCE IS A MATTER THAT CONCERNS ANGOLA'S AUTHORITY AS A SOVEREIGN STATE.
-- IN ANY CASE, ONLY THE US HAS THE "CARROT" (DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND/OR AID) AND "STICK" (REPEAL OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT) NECESSARY TO INFLUENCE ANGOLA.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATAGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. NEVERTHELESS, OUR INTERLOCUTORS CONCEDED THAT,
REGARDLESS OF THE US PERSPECTIVE ON ANGOLA, THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POSITION ON ANGOLA IS A PRACTICAL AND IMPORTANT
REALITY WHICH MUST SOMEHOW BE DEALT WITH BY THE CG.
SMITH
BT
#4929
NNNN

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

32723

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR F1554 #32723

MESSAGE:

BY AW NARA DATE 12/3/07

EHA302
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #4112 2340045
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220035Z AUG 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3510
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9609
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 5625
INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6781
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 224112
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/17/87 (BRIGGS, EVERETT E.)

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, NU, MX

SUBJECT: -ETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ON ENDERS'
TRIP TO MANAGUA

1. ~~(S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY
TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER, REPORTING ON TOM ENDERS'
AUGUST 11-12 VISIT TO MANAGUA AND THE CURRENT STATE
OF U.S.-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO YOU TO KNOW
THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THE SANDINISTA
LEADERSHIP IN MANAGUA. AT MY REQUEST, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY THOMAS ENDERS VISITED NICARAGUA ON AUGUST
11-12, TO REVIEW WITH THE JUNTA THE PRESENT STATE
OF AMERICAN-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS.

AMBASSADOR ENDERS HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH
THE SANDINISTA LEADERS, CULMINATING IN A LENGTHY,
PRIVATE MEETING WITH DANIEL ORTEGA. AT THE MEETING,
AMBASSADOR ENDERS STRESSED THAT FOR THE UNITED
STATES, THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF CONCERN HAS BEEN
THE CONTINUED TRANSIT ACROSS NICARAGUA OF ARMS

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL DESTINED FOR THE MARXIST-LENINIST GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. COMANDANTE ORTEGA DID NOT DENY THE EXISTENCE OF THIS TRAFFIC, WHILE DISCLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

AMBASSADOR ENDERS ALSO EMPHASIZED THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE EXPANSION IN THE NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES IN NICARAGUA ITSELF, AND OF THE ACQUISITION BY THE SANDINISTAS OF MODERN, OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE DEFENSIVE NEEDS OF THAT COUNTRY OR TO ANY SUPPOSED EXTERNAL THREAT. HE POINTED OUT THAT NICARAGUA NOW POSES A REAL THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS. HE MADE CLEAR OUR REJECTION OF RECENT ARBITRARY ACTS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFL/CIO WHO ARE IN NICARAGUA TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

COMANDANTE ORTEGA AND AMBASSADOR ENDERS REACHED AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING AT THE CONCLUSION OF THEIR MEETING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES, THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD ASSESS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD, AND THAT AMBASSADOR ENDERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO MANAGUA TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. IN THE MEANTIME, BOTH SIDES WOULD MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON WAYS OF LOWERING BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TENSIONS. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AVOID RHETORICAL ATTACKS ON EACH OTHER AND ANY ACTS TENDING TO DISRUPT THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS.

IN ADDITION TO NICARAGUA'S CURTAILING ARMS TRAFFICKING, THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE IN MIND FOR LOWERING TENSIONS MIGHT INCLUDE ARMS CONTROLS AND MILITARY FORCE LEVEL RESTRICTIONS, A REAFFIRMATION OF RIO TREATY AND OAS COMMITMENTS, IMPROVED MONITORING OF EXILE GROUPS, AND PERHAPS THE RESUMPTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. WE AND THE NICARAGUANS WILL BE STUDYING THOSE POSSIBILITIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

WE SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND THAT THEY WILL SHARE OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A RESTORATION OF NORMALCY

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IN OUR RELATIONS, WE HAVE BEEN AT GREAT PAINS TO REASSURE THEM THAT WE RESPECT THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION AND WISH TO HAVE AMICABLE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND RECIPRO-
CITY.

I HAVE GONE INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL SO THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT OUR PURPOSE IS A SERIOUS ONE. LET US REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS.

WITH EVERY GOOD PERSONAL WISH.

SINCERELY, (SIGNED) ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END
TEXT.

4. FOR OTTAWA - SALUTATION IN LETTER TO MCGUIGAN SHOULD READ: "DEAR MARC" AND MESSAGE SHOULD BE SIGNED "AL". HAIG
BT
#4112
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

32724

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE211
STU5090
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #5200 2392115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272115Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1964
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ OTTAWA 05200
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/26/01 (ROBINSON, PAUL H., JR.)
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO CONTACT FOREIGN
MINISTER

REF: STATE 228596 (NODIS)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL DELIVERED TO SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MARK MACQUIGAN'S OFFICE
THURSDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 27, 1981. ROBINSON
BT
#5200
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1557 #32724

BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

SENSITIVE