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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
File: Records, 1981-1985  
**Folder Title:** Korea, South (01/01/1984-  
05/15/1984)  
**Box:** RAC Box 9

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/17/2007

**File Folder** KOREA, SOUTH (01/01/1984-05/15/1984)

**FOIA**

F06-048

**Box Number** 9

KYUNG

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35316	MEMO	GASTON J SIGUR TO ROBERT C MCFARLANE <b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	1/12/1984	B1
35317	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT C MCFARLANE <b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>	1	2/16/1984	B1
35318	MEMO	MARTIN/ROBINSON TO MCFARLANE <b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>	1	5/2/1984	B1
35319	MEMO	RICHARD L WALKER TO GASTON SIGUR <b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>	2	5/1/1984	B1
35320	CABLE	101249Z MAY 84 <b>P 1/22/2010 F06-048</b>	2	5/10/1984	B1
35321	CABLE	101249Z MAY 84 (SAME AS 35320) <b>P 1/22/2010 F06-048</b>	2	5/10/1984	B1
35322	ROUTING SLIP	WITH NOTATIONS <b>R 7/17/2008 NLRRF06-048</b>	1	ND	B1
35323	CABLE	SAME AS 35320 <b>P 1/22/2010 F06-048</b>	2	5/10/1984	B1
35324	CABLE	MEMCON OF SECRETARY'S MEETING <b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>	6	5/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

1/17/67

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8400326

RECEIVED 16 JAN 84 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 12 JAN 84

LAUX

12 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: KOREA

TAIWAN

VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT QUADRIpartite KOREAN TALKS & VP CONCERNS

ACTION: NOTED BY MCFARLANE

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( CL CL )

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noted by MCFarlane

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DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

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**RECEIVED**  
National Security Council  
The White House

84 JAN 12 7:46

System # 0326

Package # I

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>NOT IN (BDM)</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretar			
Situation Ro			

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 - mcf noted

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I = No further Action

cc: VP

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(Date/Time)

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MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-048 #35316 January 12, 1984

BY Cal NARADATE 3/27/48

NOTED

*Many thanks.*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast* DAVID LAUX *DL*  
SUBJECT: Quadripartite Korean Talks and the Vice President's Concerns

The purpose of this memo is to examine briefly how quadripartite talks involving Korea might be conducted. The Vice President is concerned that the U.S. might be put in the position of exacerbating U.S.-PRC relations by having to side with South Korea against the PRC and North Korea.

Two important factors should govern our thinking: First, we need to go slow. We cannot push too far, nor too rapidly, from the front of our thoughts the Rangoon killings. Also, we are talking about a process which, when and if begun, will likely be inconclusive for some time to come. Second, South Korea must be comfortable with whatever formula we decide on. In addition, the fact that China is reluctant to be at the table causes us a problem.

South Korea will never do anything which would seem not to support the easing of tensions on the peninsula, but it opposes the idea of tripartite talks with only representatives of the U.S. and North and South Korea present for two reasons: 1) It makes the South Koreans look too much like puppets of the U.S.; and 2) they fear that North Korea would begin to use such a forum to establish their own bilateral relationship with the U.S. without South Korea being able to make a commensurate move with respect to the PRC or, perhaps at some future date, to the USSR. Seoul has consistently said it would be willing to deal on a bilateral basis with the North, or on a quadripartite basis (with the U.S. and PRC as full participants, or simply observers), but they look askance at tripartite talks.

There are other aspects to the problem. One is Taiwan. We need to be careful in whatever structure and process we establish that it does not appear that the U.S. is squeezing a small loyal ally in a way that appears opportunistic in terms of pursuing a strategic objective. Taiwan would be especially sensitive to this, watching the developments closely for any message that might be in it for their own dealings with the PRC and the role that the U.S. might eventually play in that context.

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Another problem is Japan. The Japanese will feel left out if they are not included in the talks, believing that they should be just as much, if not more concerned, than the U.S. in developments on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, they are pushing for a six-way conference, with the USSR and themselves included. They don't really believe that the Soviets should be there, but are pressing for it as a device by which to ensure their own presence.

The possible combinations and permutations obviously need some hard analysis before we reach any conclusions on a strategy. This is a quick response to John Poindexter's note of earlier today. We will be thinking more about this over the next few days, and when I return from Tokyo we will put more down on paper for you.

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~~SECRET~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 FEB 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

*705  
4/1/87*

DOC DATE 16 FEB 84

KEYWORDS VATICAN

KOREA

JOHN PAUL II

SUBJECT: STATE RESPONSE / USG PREPARATIONS FOR POPE REFUELING STOP IN ALASKA ON  
2 MAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 17 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

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FOR INFO

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SIGUR

COMMENTS

REF# 8404582

LOG 8401013

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( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Kimmit</i>	<i>X 3/06</i>	<i>FOR INFO</i>		
<i>Cobb</i>	<i>5 MAR 06 1984</i>	<i>further action</i>		
<i>Close Out</i>	<i>- handled</i>	<i>4/20</i>		
	<i>C 4/20</i>	<i>No Further Action per Cobb</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)ML

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *twc*

SUBJECT: Papal Refueling Stop in Alaska

In response to our request that State keep us informed of planning for Pope John Paul's refueling stop in Alaska, they have forwarded the attached memorandum. There are no surprises and I do not feel that Bud needs to see it nor do we need to reply to State. I will continue to coordinate and work with the desk and Judge Clark in coordinating this stop.

Attachment

Tab A - State's Incoming





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: USG Preparations for Pope's Refueling Stop in  
Alaska

This responds to your request of February 3 for an outline of preparations for the Pope's stop in Anchorage.

The Vatican Nunciature (Embassy) in Washington informs us that the Papal (Alitalia) aircraft will refuel in Anchorage from 11:20 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. on May 2. Since the Pope is committed to an early arrival in Seoul, he will not be able to extend his stopover to include a motorcade and mass in downtown Anchorage, as he did during his last visit in February 1981.

Therefore, unlike the 1981 stop when the U.S. delegation numbered 34, we recommend that this year's delegation be limited to Secretary Clark (who is agreeable, in principle), U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See, William A. Wilson, (who might accompany the Pope from Rome), and the Governor of Alaska, William Sheffield, supported by appropriate Department of State officials.

Our very early scenario would have the Papal aircraft land at Anchorage's commercial airport (not Elmendorf AFB). The Pope would move along the receiving line, celebrate mass in a converted hangar, and greet the public from the airport terrace. He would be back aboard his aircraft within seventy-five minutes.

On his return from Korea to Rome, the Pope does not plan to stop in areas of U.S. jurisdiction (e.g., Guam).

*Charles Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR F06-048 #35317

BY CH NARA DATE 3/27/08

OADR: DECL

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8403482

RECEIVED 02 MAY 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MARTIN

DOCDATE 02 MAY 84

ROBINSON

02 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: ENERGY

KOREA

SUBJECT: -US-KOREA ENERGY MTG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 03 MAY 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

*But 500  
Vol II  
9/3/61*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR 606048 # 35318 May 2, 1984

INFORMATION

BY Cid NARA DATE 3/27/08 **NOTED**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM* ← TO  
ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: US-Korea Energy Meetings

*Ben should not be the NSC rep at meetings unless ad until he is officially detailed to us. I have no such recommendation from Ben further. null 5/88*

As follow-up to the President's November 1983 trip to Korea, the US-Korea Energy Subgroup met in Washington on 24-25 April. Ben Bonk attended as the NSC representative. The key conclusions were:

- o Coal -- The U.S. proposed a private sector symposium between Korean coal users and U.S. producers and transporters as a means to exchange information on trade prospects. The Korean delegates agreed to convey this proposal to their private sector.
- o Gas -- The U.S. expressed interest in Korean private sector participation in feasibility studies for the joint development of Alaskan gas. The Korean side indicated it would convey this interest to its private sector.
- o Oil -- The U.S. agreed to keep Korea advised of future prospects for Alaskan crude oil exports. The Koreans expressed interest in purchasing refined petroleum products in the United States in the event of an oil disruption. No commitments were made.
- o Nuclear -- The possibility for additional nuclear energy trade was examined, but prospects at the moment are cloudy.
- o Information Exchange -- The two sides agreed to continue to exchange information on important national and international energy developments.

At the moment, prospects appear most favorable for additional follow-up on the coal seminar as a means to improve trade possibilities. We will continue to press this issue, as well as the possibility for further nuclear energy cooperation and trade, in future contacts with the Koreans.

This meeting reaffirmed the potential for using energy as a key building block of our Pacific Basin policy. Furthermore, as the world economic recovery continues, the U.S. will be well positioned to capture a major portion of the increase in energy demand to the benefit of our economic and security relations with the countries of the Pacific rim.

cc: Ben Bonk

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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9/7/07

10

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8403619

RECEIVED 05 MAY 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM SIGUR

DOC DATE 04 MAY 84

KEYWORDS . AVIATION

KOREA SOUTH

SUBJECT: US KOREA CIVIL AVIATION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 12 MAY 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

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System #       
Package # 3619

JAN 4 P 7: 33

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>X</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>		<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other McMinn

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Barton,*  
*Who has the action within*  
*our govt on the landing rights*  
*issue. J (781- question passed*  
*to Barton 5/7)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3619

12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 4, 1984

NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Korea Civil Aviation

As I mentioned in my Weekly Report, a couple of days ago I met in Seoul with the head of Korean Airlines, Charlie Cho (Cho, Chung-kum). For your information I attach a memorandum for me on this subject, prepared by Dixie Walker (Tab A). In my conversation with Cho, I used the talking points suggested by Dixie.

Attachment:  
Tab A Walker memo to Sigur

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By WOT NARA, Date 4/17/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

35319  
DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

NLRR f06-048 # 35319  
BY CW NARADATE 3/27/08

TO : Mr. Gaston Sigur

DATE: May 1, 1984

FROM : AMB - Richard L. Walker *Dixie*

SUBJECT: Civil Aviation - Landing Rights and Aircraft Sales

Charlie Cho (Cho, Choong-Kum) Chairman of Korean Airlines has requested a half hour with you to discuss a rather delicate civil aviation matter. As I stated in my April 28 telegram sent to you in Beijing, I hope that we will be able to work out a mutually agreeable time for a meeting.

This is a long and involved issue which I will try to explain as briefly as possible. In 1980 we signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Koreans providing for landing rights in Anchorage, Oakland, and Chicago (with beyond rights after one year) provided a terminal for use of American carriers was constructed at Kimpo Airport. Flying Tiger Lines was to construct the terminal. However, various problems arose, and Flying Tigers and the Koreans could never agree on the precepts for building the terminal. The airline late last year bowed out, and KAL was to construct the terminal. About this time, several U.S. airlines informed the CAB that they did not want Korean Airlines to land at Chicago, and that in view of the long delay, the 1980 Agreement should be declared no longer operative. We held bilateral civil aviation talks here with the Koreans April 2-3 chaired by State Department DAS Frank Willis (EB Bureau), with CAB Chairman Dan McKinnon attending. There was no agreement other than to meet again in Washington during the second half of June.

In the meantime, Korean Airlines was negotiating with both McDonnell Douglas and Boeing for aircraft to replace its aging Boeing 707 and 727 and A-300 aircraft for domestic service and flights to nearby countries. Both Charlie Cho and McDonnell Douglas have confirmed that KAL was ready to sign an agreement to purchase six MD-80 aircraft, with an option for three more. KAL likely eventually would purchase as many as 20 MD-80s. This is a potential sale, with parts and service, of up to \$750 million and would be a first for the MD-80 in the East Asia market. After he learned about the results of the civair talks however, Charlie informed me quite frankly that he would make no decision on purchasing



U.S. aircraft until the matter of landing rights is settled. The sticking point is Chicago; service there is of the utmost importance to KAL.

The French, of course, are working hard to convince the Koreans to buy the Airbus. With numerous unsold aircraft on hand, they undoubtedly are making a very attractive offer.

We understand that Washington is hard at work trying to formulate a USG position with both McDonnell Douglas and some of the U.S. airlines lobbying for support. We believe selling airplanes should have the higher priority. We also believe that welching on an agreement made with the Koreans four years ago would not be good for US/Korean relations. USTR has sent letters to State strongly backing aircraft sales.

Suggested talking points:

- I understand the Korean position on this issue and want you to know that very high level Washington attention is being focussed on working out a compromise which will be acceptable to both sides.
- We very much hope you will decide to go ahead with the purchase of U.S.-made aircraft. We think they are the best available.
- I much appreciate hearing your views on this issue and will make sure that they are transmitted to appropriate Washington officials.

<sup>max</sup>  
ECON:WALundy:jm  
5/1/84

CLEAR:DCM:PMClleveland



NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

10/17/07

ID 8403799

RECEIVED 10 MAY 84 18

TO PRESIDENT

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOC DATE 10 MAY 84

~~SUSPENSE~~  
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~~SUSPENSE~~

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KEYWORDS

KOREA SOUTH

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

CM

CHINA P R

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

CHEMICAL WARFARE

~~SUSPENSE~~

SUBJECT: WEINBERGER MEMO RE KOREA STOP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 12 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

LAUX

SIGUR

RUSSELL

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

THOMPSON

CHILDRESS

COMMENTS

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W/ATTCH FILE (PA) (c)

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NLRR FD6-048 #35320

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/10

O 101249ZMAY84  
FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT (SAM 86971)  
TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO STATE FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ  
NSC FOR MCFARLANE  
DEFENSE DEPT FOR DEPSECDEF TAFT

SUBJECT: MY KOREA STOP (U)

BT

S E C R E T

1. (S) ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY, I COCHAired THE 16TH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (SCM) IN SEOUL. JACK VESSEY AND CINCPAC, BILL CROWE, WERE WITH ME. GEN VESSEY HAD COCHAired THE MILITARY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (MCM) WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE SCM. THE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS OF DISCUSSION CONCERNED: (1)

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FOIA(b)(1)

(3) DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN WHICH THE ROK PRESSED FOR LARGER SUMS OF FMS AND CONCESSIONAL RATES WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. (4) DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION. THE ROK STATED THAT IN THEIR OPINION WE HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP THEM WITH THEIR DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND TO ENCOURAGE SALES TO THE THIRD COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO KEEP A WARM INDUSTRIAL BASE.

2. (S) I HAD A DISCUSSION FOLLOWED BY LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT CHUN. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT HE AND THE ROK WERE STILL BASKING IN THE AFTERGLOW OF YOUR NOVEMBER VISIT. PRESIDENT CHUN STATED THAT THE ONLY WORD FOR YOUR VISIT WAS "SUCCESSFUL". PRESIDENT CHUN SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE ROK/US ALLIANCE. HE DEVELOPED THE THEME OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT OUR ALLIANCE WAS VITAL AND THAT MEETINGS SUCH AS THE SCM WERE BOTH SYMBOLIC AND OF REAL VALUE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS. I RECALLED FOR CHUN MY VISIT ON WEDNESDAY TO NIGHTMARE RANGE WHERE I VIEWED A COMBINED ROK/US LIVE FIRE EXERCISE. IT WAS TRULY FINE TO SEE SUCH COOPERATION AND TEAM WORK. THIS LESSON WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE NORTH KOREANS AND SOVIETS.

3. (S) PRESIDENT CHUN ASKED THAT I CONVEY TO YOU AND NANCY HIS GREATEST RESPECTS AND WARMEST REGARDS. HE RECALLED FOR ME A DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO SEOUL IN WHICH HE MENTIONED HIS PLEASURE IN HIS VISIT WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY OF 81. HE SPOKE IN GLOWING TERMS OF THE BEAUTY OF THE



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NLRR F06-048#35321

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/10

O 101249ZMAY84  
FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT (SAM 86971)  
TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO STATE FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ  
NSC FOR MCFARLANE  
DEFENSE DEPT FOR DEPSECDEF TAFT

SUBJECT: MY KOREA STOP (U)

BT

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FOIA(b)(1)

(3) DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN WHICH THE ROK PRESSED FOR LARGER SUMS OF FMS AND CONCESSIONAL RATES WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. (4) DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION. THE ROK STATED THAT IN THEIR OPINION WE HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP THEM WITH THEIR DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND TO ENCOURAGE SALES TO THE THIRD COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO KEEP A WARM INDUSTRIAL BASE.

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National Security Council  
The White House

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASE)

NLRR FOb-048 #35322

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

BY CW NARADATE 7/17/08

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	A <i>[Signature]</i>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	5	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
Situation Room	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

It is not clear from our records whether this went to President in PDB, but I did not see it come out. Recommend 5/12 PDB if needed.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 2

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 43

RELEASER LB

PRIORITY

84 MAY 11 P 7: 55

DEX # \_\_\_\_\_

DTG 11 MAY 84 23: 25

ROUTINE

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

MC

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT/CAMP DAVID TOR: 112344Z MAY 84

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

- FOR DELIVERY WITH SATURDAY'S  
PDB PACKAGE. -

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

hbs  
4/17/07

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-048 #35323

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/10

O 101249ZMAY84  
FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT (SAM 86971)  
TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO STATE FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ  
NSC FOR MCFARLANE  
DEFENSE DEPT FOR DEPSECDEF TAFT

SUBJECT: MY KOREA STOP (U)

BT

S E C R E T

1. (S) ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY, I COCHAIRLED THE 16TH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (SCM) IN SEOUL. JACK VESSEY AND CINCPAC, BILL CROWE, WERE WITH ME. GEN VESSEY HAD COCHAIRLED THE MILITARY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (MCM) WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE SCM. THE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS OF DISCUSSION CONCERNED: (1)

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~  
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FOIA(b)(1)

(3) DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN WHICH THE ROK PRESSED FOR LARGER SUMS OF FMS AND CONCESSIONAL RATES WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. (4) DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION. THE ROK STATED THAT IN THEIR OPINION WE HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP THEM WITH THEIR DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND TO ENCOURAGE SALES TO THE THIRD COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO KEEP A WARM INDUSTRIAL BASE.

2. (S) I HAD A DISCUSSION FOLLOWED BY LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT CHUN. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT HE AND THE ROK WERE STILL BASKING IN THE AFTERGLOW OF YOUR NOVEMBER VISIT. PRESIDENT CHUN STATED THAT THE ONLY WORD FOR YOUR VISIT WAS "SUCCESSFUL". PRESIDENT CHUN SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE ROK/US ALLIANCE. HE DEVELOPED THE THEME OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT OUR ALLIANCE WAS VITAL AND THAT MEETINGS SUCH AS THE SCM WERE BOTH SYMBOLIC AND OF REAL VALUE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS. I RECALLED FOR CHUN MY VISIT ON WEDNESDAY TO NIGHTMARE RANGE WHERE I VIEWED A COMBINED ROK/US LIVE FIRE EXERCISE. IT WAS TRULY FINE TO SEE SUCH COOPERATION AND TEAM WORK. THIS LESSON WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE NORTH KOREANS AND SOVIETS.

3. (S) PRESIDENT CHUN ASKED THAT I CONVEY TO YOU AND NANCY HIS GREATEST RESPECTS AND WARMEST REGARDS. HE RECALLED FOR ME A DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO SEOUL IN WHICH HE MENTIONED HIS PLEASURE IN HIS VISIT WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY OF 81. HE SPOKE IN GLOWING TERMS OF THE BEAUTY OF THE





National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	2	_____	R
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

NSC 7/15  
Cable amt  
4030K  
fm S/S 5/19  
1345 MS  
35324

COMPLETED DISTRIBUTION  
1. DEAN S/S-I.  
Date: **MAY 20 1984**  
Initial: *[Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 MAY 21 A 6: 17

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Dist to EAP/K: B S HARVEY  
S 05/14/84 EXT. 27717  
D EAP: PWOLFOWITZ  
P  
E EA/RA/TC: M PRATT  
T S/S: JCOVEY  
S/S S: T FARRELL  
S/S-S  
NSC  
DOD USIA/VOA-MICHAEL SMITH  
RF(1eb)

AIT: D DEAN  
S/S-0: E SHIPPY  
EAP: DLAMBERTSON

PRIORITY SEUL  
PRIORITY BEIJING, TOKYO PRIORITY, AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP {SHULTZ, GEORGE P.}, KS, KN, CH, PREL  
SUBJECT: {C} MEMCON: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ROK  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LEE WON-KYUNG

REFS: A) STATE 134184, B) TOKYO 9161, C) STATE 136759,  
D) SEUL 5054

1. ~~{C}~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE CORRECTED TEXT OF REF. A,  
PARA. 6, AS AMENDED BY REF. B AND CONCURRED IN BY REF. D:
3. BEGIN TEXT:

MAY 1, 1984, 1530, FOREIGN MINISTER LEE'S OFFICE,  
PARTICIPANTS:

- KOREAN:
- FOREIGN MINISTER LEE, WON-KYUNG
  - LEW, BYONG-HION, AMBASSADOR TO THE U. S.
  - LEE, SANG-OCK, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER
  - KIM, JAE-CHOON, DIRECTOR GENERAL, ASIAN AFFAIRS
  - BUREAU, MOFA

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*  
BSHh  
MP  
D  
TF

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NR 90-048 #35324  
BY *[Signature]* NARA DATE 3/27/06

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1 2

- PARK, KUN-WOO, DIRECTOR GENERAL, AMERICAN AFFAIRS
- BUREAU, MOFA
- HONG, SOON-YOUNG, BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
- JANG, JAI-RYONG, DIRECTOR, NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS, MOFA
- {NOTETAKER}

AMERICAN:

- SECRETARY SHULTZ
- AMBASSADOR WALKER
- MR. WOLFOWITZ
- MR. HUGHES
- MR. ARMITAGE
- MR. SIGUR
- WILLIAM EATON, AMERICAN EMBASSY {NOTETAKER}.

4. THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR RECEIVING HIM. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN FEELS SO STRONGLY ABOUT THE U.S.-ROK RELATIONSHIP THAT HE SENT HIM {THE SECRETARY} TO VISIT SEOUL AND BRIEF ROKG LEADERS ON THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE RESPONDED THAT HE WARMLY WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO SEOUL AND THAT PRESIDENT CHUN IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE SECRETARY TOMORROW. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OBSERVED THAT, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHINA WAS SUCCESSFUL AND ADDED THAT KOREANS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VISIT.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CHINA WAS SUCCESSFUL. THE VISIT CONTINUES THE EFFORTS WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE TO BUILD A STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. WILL MAINTAIN ITS RELATIONSHIP AND RESPECT ITS COMMITMENTS TO TAIWAN. WHILE TAIWAN IS AN OBSTACLE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, IT ALSO REPRESENTS A CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO INTERACT WITH CHINA. IN CHINA PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS DIRECT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN DISCUSSING HIS VIEW OF DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION. COMMENTING THAT SOME OF THESE STATEMENTS WERE DELETED IN CHINESE MEDIA REPORTING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINS PRESIDENT WHETHER HE IS IN CHINA OR THE U.S. AND HE IS GOING TO STATE HIS VIEWS. ASKED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF THE U.S. EXPECTED THAT THE CHINESE MEDIA WOULD MAKE DELETIONS IN REPORTING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT MADE NO COMMITMENTS IN ADVANCE. THE

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PRESIDENT'S VISIT RECEIVED UNPRECEDENTED CHINESE MEDIA COVERAGE, AND THEREFORE THE CHINESE PEOPLE WERE GIVEN GOOD EXPOSURE TO THE WARM AND DYNAMIC PERSONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT.

6. THE SECRETARY THEN EXPRESSED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIS ASTONISHMENT AND CONGRATULATIONS REGARDING THE HIGH RATE OF GROWTH OF THE ROK ECONOMY OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ROKG POLICY OF CAMPUS LIBERALIZATION AND FOR THE RECENT ROKG DECISION TO PERMIT THE INSTALLATION OF VOA TRANSMISSION FACILITIES IN KOREA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FAVORABLE DECISION ON THE VOA ISSUE, WHILE NOTING THAT SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT. THE SECRETARY ALSO APPLAUDED THE RECENT ROKG DECISION TO BAN THE EXPORT OF ARMS TO IRAN, STATING THAT SUCH ACTION IS ONE WAY TO KEEP PRESSURE ON IRAN TO END ITS WAR WITH IRAQ. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IRAQ BELIEVES THAT THE ROK CONTINUES TO SHIP ARMS TO IRAN. HE SOLICITED USG EFFORTS WORKING THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN TO CONVINCE IRAQ THAT THE ROK NOW PROHIBITS ARMS EXPORTS TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REQUEST AND WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTS A REVISION OF USG REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE REPAYMENT TERMS ON ROK FMS LOANS AND THAT EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION ARE MOVING FORWARD SATISFACTORILY IN CONGRESS. NOTING THAT THE ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY IS FALLING FAR BEHIND ITS GOAL OF PRODUCTION AT 75 PER CENT OF CAPACITY, THE FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTED THE USG FACILITATE ROK MILITARY EXPORTS TO THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE ROK AND THE U.S. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE USG WOULD BE HAPPY TO WORK WITH THE ROKG ON THIS ISSUE, NOTING THAT THERE ARE OBSTACLES WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD DISCUSS.

7. THE SECRETARY TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE SIX CHINESE HIJACKERS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED IN THE ROK. ASSERTING THAT IT IS SOLELY THE ROKG'S DECISION WHETHER THE ROKG RELEASES THESE HIJACKERS EARLY FROM PRISON, THE SECRETARY REQUESTED THAT THE ROKG CAREFULLY CONSIDER BOTH ITS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND ITS EFFORTS TO EXPAND RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN REACHING ITS DECISION. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE RESPONDED THAT THIS DECISION WILL BE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY BY THE ROKG, NOTING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE KOREAN PUBLIC TO RELEASE THE HIJACKERS EARLY. HE ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT HIS COMMENTS WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.

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8. THE SECRETARY THEN DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HE HAD HAD IN CHINA. THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL MEETINGS WERE WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG WHILE SHORTER MEETINGS WERE HELD WITH PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL HU YAOBANG, DENG XIAOPING AND PRESIDENT LI XIANNIAN. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE HAD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WU XUEQIAN FOR THREE HOURS. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE WIDE-RANGING AND CONSTRUCTIVE, COVERING THE USSR, ARMS CONTROL, TAIWAN, VIETNAM, KAMPUCHEA, AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES SUCH AS U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS ON ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. THE U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR CHINA TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS TO BUY U.S. GRAIN. THE SECRETARY CALLED THE U.S.-PRC NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT MOST IMPORTANT, NOTING THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR THREE YEARS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED TO THE CHINESE ITS INTENSE CONCERN OVER PROLIFERATION WHICH GENERATED A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION.

9. THE SECRETARY TURNED TO KOREA STATING THAT PREMIER ZHOU, SECRETARY GENERAL HU AND FOREIGN MINISTER WU ALL DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE USG APPROACH TO THE KOREAN QUESTION IS BASED ON THREE CONSIDERATIONS. FIRST, THE U.S. AND THE ROK MUST MAINTAIN THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH. SECOND, WHILE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE TO APPEAR REASONABLE TO THEIR POPULATIONS, NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO NORTH KOREA WHICH ARE UNWISE. THIRD, THE U.S. HAS WATCHED THE GROWTH OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WISHES TO ENCOURAGE CHINA TO PLAY ITS PART IN SEEKING A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IN THEIR MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY GENERAL HU AGREED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IN RESPONSE TO HU'S COMMENT THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REMOVE ITS TROOPS FROM KOREA, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD REPLIED STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. HAS NO SUCH INTENTION IN VIEW OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DPRK. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE RANGOON BOMBING AND TO HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE DMZ. WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN POINTED OUT THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE PENINSULA IS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF THE NORTH, HU (AND DENG) RESPONDED THAT THE MILITARY STRENGTHS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH ARE ABOUT THE SAME. REFERRING TO THE RANGOON BOMBING, HU SUGGESTED THAT BYGONES SHOULD BE BYGONES. PRESIDENT REAGAN STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION. THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG REACTION TO THE CHINESE SUGGESTION THAT U.S. TROOPS BE WITHDRAWN

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FROM KOREA WAS IMPORTANT, AND THAT HU HAD LATER IN THE CONVERSATION STATED THAT HE DID NOT MEAN AN IMMEDIATE PULLOUT.

10. DESCRIBING HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WU, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WU ORALLY CONVEYED TO HIM A MESSAGE WHICH HE SAID THE DPRK WISHED PASSED TO THE ROKG URGING SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION THROUGH TRIPARTITE TALKS. IN PASSING THE MESSAGE WU HAD STATED THE MESSAGE "WAS WHAT THE DPRK WANTED US TO DELIVER". HE ASSERTED THAT THE MESSAGE HAS SOME FLEXIBILITY AND THAT HE HOPED THE ROK WOULD CONSIDER IT. THE SECRETARY SPECULATED THAT CHINA IS WORRIED ABOUT THE HIGH LEVEL OF TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND WISHES TO LOWER THE LEVEL. THE SECRETARY TOLD WU THAT THREE TYPES OF ACTIONS COULD BE TAKEN TO REDUCE TENSIONS: REUNION OF KOREANS SEPARATED BY THE DIVISION OF KOREA, NORTH-SOUTH SPORTS EXCHANGES, AND, MILITARY INITIATIVES SUCH AS PRIOR NOTIFICATION BY EACH SIDE OF MILITARY EXERCISES, INVITING OBSERVERS FROM THE OTHER SIDE TO VIEW THE MILITARY EXERCISES AND MEASURES TO CREATE A GENUINE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE DMZ. THE SECRETARY TOLD WU THAT THE U.S. PREFERRED TWO PARTY TALKS, BUT, IF TWO PARTY TALKS WERE NOT POSSIBLE, THEN FOUR PARTY TALKS COULD BE HELD. NOTING CHINESE RESISTANCE TO FOUR PARTY TALKS, THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT CHINA CONSIDER HOSTING TRIPARTITE TALKS. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR CHINESE REACTION TO THIS IDEA. WHEN WU STATED THAT THE RANGOON BOMBING IS "BEHIND US" THE SECRETARY RECALLED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE LATE FOREIGN MINISTER BUM SUK LEE AND INDICATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS COULD AT LEAST INDICATE THEY WERE SORRY ABOUT RANGOON. WU MERELY LISTENED. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE CHINESE ARE TORN BY THE RANGOON BOMBING AND HAVE TAKEN CARE TO GIVE EQUAL TREATMENT TO THE BURMESE AND NORTH KOREAN ACCOUNTS OF THE BOMBING. THE CHINESE ARE TALKING OF A "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM BUT IT IS UP TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH TO DECIDE THIS MATTER.

11. THE SECRETARY RELATED THAT THE CHINESE LEADERS INDICATED THAT CHINESE-ROK CONTACTS WILL PRINCIPALLY TAKE PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND ORGANIZATIONS. THE CHINESE STATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 1986 ASIAN GAMES TO BE HELD IN SEOUL. MR. WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT THE CHINESE STATED THAT THEY HAD APPLIED TO HOST 1990 ASIAN GAMES AND WOULD ABIDE BY INTERNATIONAL RULES ON INVITING PARTICIPANTS. THE SECRETARY STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE CHINESE WANT TO DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROK. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE OBSERVED THAT NORTH

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KOREA WILL TRY VERY HARD TO DISTANCE CHINA FROM THE U.S. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT U.S.-ROK EFFORTS TO INVOLVE CHINA IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION MUST BE HANDLED CAREFULLY TO AVOID PUTTING CHINA ON THE SPOT. CHINA'S MAIN WORRY IS THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN CHINA'S DESIRE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE MORE TENSIONS ON ITS BORDER THE MORE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BECOMES.

12. THE SECRETARY REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT NORTH-SOUTH SPORTS CONTACTS WOULD BE USEFUL WHILE NOTING THAT THE ROK-DPRK SPORTS TALKS BEING HELD AT PANMUNJOM DO NOT APPEAR TO BE GOING WELL. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE STATED THAT THE ROKG WILL BE PATIENT AND WILL GO ON TALKING TO THE NORTH AT PANMUNJOM WHILE CONTINUING TO DEMAND AN APOLOGY FOR THE RANGOON BOMBING. WHILE IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT A SINGLE NORTH-SOUTH TEAM CAN BE FORMED IN TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LOS ANGELES OLYMPICS, THE ROKG WILL KEEP PRESSING THE NORTH TO FORM SINGLE TEAMS FOR THE 1986 ASIAN AND 1988 OLYMPIC GAMES. LEE ADDED THAT THE ROKG HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITH THE NORTH IN A SHORT TIME. THE SECRETARY TOLD LEE THAT HE IS FOLLOWING THE RIGHT COURSE AND URGED HIM NOT TO GIVE UP. FOREIGN MINISTER LEE COMMENTED THAT THE ROKG HAS SUGGESTED TO THE NORTH THE EXCHANGE OF MAIL AND THE REUNION OF SEPARATED FAMILIES, BUT THERE HAS SO FAR BEEN NO CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE NORTH. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE ROKG HAS GOTTEN A LOT OF MILEAGE INTERNATIONALLY BY TAKING THE HIGH ROAD IN THE WAKE OF THE RANGOON BOMBING AND INDICATED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO STAY ON THE HIGH ROAD. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN FEELS VERY CLOSE TO THE ROK AND WANTS TO SEE TENSIONS REDUCED ON THE PENINSULA BUT NOT AT THE COST OF FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THINGS WILL CHANGE ON THE PENINSULA AND THAT TIME IS ON OUR SIDE.

13. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH THE SECRETARY URGING THE KOREANS NOT TO PUBLICIZE IN DETAIL HIS BRIEFING BUT RATHER TO USE GENERALITIES IN DESCRIBING THE DISCUSSION. THE KOREAN SIDE AGREED, AND FURTHER AGREED TO PROVIDE THE SECRETARY'S PARTY WITH A TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROKG BRIEFING OF THE KOREAN MEDIA.

14. CLEARED BY: AMBASSADOR WALKER  
 - EAP:PWOLFOWITZ  
 - PA:JHUGHES  
 - S:TFARRELL  
 - S/S:KKENNEY  
 DRAFTED BY: POL:WFEATON. END TEXT. YYY

CONFIDENTIAL



Kathleen  
for  
file

~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

3

IMMEDIATE

84 MAY 20 AIO: 08

SECURE FAX #

17

RELEASER

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NON-SECURE FAX #

DTG 0 MAY 84 12: 59

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT CAMP DAVID

TOR/201315Z May 84

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

TOT  
4/17/07

CLASSIFICATION