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10/15/1983)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/17/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (04/16/1983-10/15/1983)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35297	TALKING POINTS	FOR 5/3/83 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LEE <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	ND	B1
35298	PAPER	VISIT OF LEE BUM SUK <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	2	ND	B1
35299	SUMMARY	<i>PAR 7/17/2008 NLRRF06-048</i>	1	1/20/1983	B1 B3 B6
35300	MEMO	SIGUR THRU TYSON TO CLARK, RE BRIEFING PAPERS <i>R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1</i>	1	4/26/1983	B1
35301	PAPER	RE VISIT OF BUM SUK LEE <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	2	ND	B1
35302	TALKING POINTS	SAME AS 35297 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	ND	B1
35303	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO GREGG ET AL <i>R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1</i>	1	10/24/1983	B1
35304	CHECK LIST	OF ACTIONS TAKEN <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	2	10/21/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/17/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (04/16/1983-10/15/1983)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35305	MEMO	GASTON J SIGUR TO ROBERT C MCFARLANE <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	10/18/1983	B1
35306	PAPER	RE RANGOON INCIDENT <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8302655

15

TO CLARK

FROM HILL

RECEIVED 25 APR 83 11

for 4/17/83

DOCDATE 23 APR 83

HILL

23 APR 83

18

KEYWORDS: KOREA *South*

VISIT

LEE, BUM SUK

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPERS / PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR PRES 3 MAY MTG W/ FOMIN LEE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 26 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

CHILDRESS

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8312503

8312504

LOG 8301765

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

x 4/27

forward to Pres for info

APR 29 1983

for info

VP, GM, JPM, VMD

MAY 04 1983

Pres noted

SA

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

RA (CMB)

640

National Security Council The White House

1415
APR 27 1983

Package # 2655 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

For mtg on May 3 -
 Due in Darman's office by
 3:00, Fri, April 29

Bud,
 Do you want to go to this?
 YES

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~MEETING WITH LEE BUM SUK
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

OR

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1983
OVAL OFFICE
11:00 A.M.FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*I. PURPOSE

15-minute courtesy call to underscore the importance this Administration attaches to the U.S.-Korean relationship.

II. BACKGROUND

Foreign Minister Lee is a staunch supporter of the closest ties between Korea and the United States, and is one of the key figures providing foreign policy advice to President Chun. It is distinctly to our advantage to enhance the prestige of Foreign Minister Lee.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary of State
Thomas P. Shoemith, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Gaston J. Sigur, Director of East Asian Affairs,
National Security Council
Robert C. McFarlane, Deputy Assistant to the President
Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver will attend at their discretion
Minister Lee Bum Suk, ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Lew Byong Hyon, ROK Ambassador to the United
States
Park Kun-woo, Director-General of American Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Brief remarks

Prepared by Gaston Sigur

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 105 NARA, Date 4/17/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

2

~~SECRET~~ 18

Attachments:

Tab A Briefing Material

Tab B Bio

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

35297

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LEE
MAY 3 AT 11:00 A M.

Suggested Talking Points

-- Please assure President Chun that American people value friendship with Korea, admire accomplishments of Korean people, and will continue to be faithful allies.

-- U.S. commitment to Korean security is unchanged. U.S. troop presence will be maintained. Will continue to modernize our forces.

-- Admire effort of Korean people to provide for own defense. Will continue to help with FMS credits; are trying for improved repayment terms.

-- Pleased with President Chun's efforts to create a more participatory political system. Believe this will ensure greater stability in future.

-- U.S. is struggling to maintain open trading system. We need help of our allies and friends.

-- We fully support President Chun's efforts to open discussions with North Korea. Believe he has made realistic proposals.

-- Our own policy toward North Korea remains unchanged. We will have no discussions with North without full participation of your government.

-- (If raised). President Chun's proposal for Pacific Basin summit has considerable merit. Will require careful consideration by all concerned and much careful planning. Best to move slowly.

-- (If raised). Hope to be able to visit Korea in the future; cannot set specific date right now.

-- (If raised). Believe existing consultative arrangements and command structure are adequate to assure appropriate responses to North Korean provocations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-48 #35297

BY C.I. NARADATE 3/27/08

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35298

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20

BRIEFING PAPER

Visit of LEE Bum Suk, Foreign Minister of Korea
May 3, at 11:00 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06048 #35298

BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

ISSUES

Security. The U.S. connection is of overriding importance to Korea. U.S. preoccupation with issues in other areas of the world, while understood by the Koreans, nevertheless causes concern that not enough attention is being paid to them and, in particular, to their security requirements. Reaffirmation of our friendship and support, and reiteration of our security commitment are therefore appropriate at every high-level meeting.

The threat from North Korea is unabated and the Korean government must spend large sums (6% of GNP) on defense. It relies on U.S. support -- the presence of 39,000 troops, tactical aircraft, Seventh Fleet naval power, and a capability for rapid reinforcement -- for that essential measure of deterrence that has prevented North Korean aggression for the past thirty years. The United States provides credit guarantees for the purchase of U.S. military hardware, and the Koreans appreciate the President's support for increased amounts as well as improved repayment terms. Secretary Weinberger had a useful series of discussions last month with the Korean Defense Minister (who also called on the President) that further underscored the importance we attach to our security commitment.

Economy. Korea's economy registered the world's fastest growth during the 1960s and 1970s. After suffering a recession in 1980, it is again performing well. The Korean economy is export-led, however, and heavily dependent on the industrialized world for capital and technology. The Koreans are greatly encouraged by signs of recovery in the U.S. Although they have made some progress in opening their markets to imports, the Koreans do not fully appreciate the need for more reciprocity in their international economic relations, including a more hospitable investment climate, better protection for high technology industries, and a more open import regime.

Political. President Chun has taken several encouraging steps in the past several months to ease political controls: he released opposition leader Kim Dae Jung (who is now living in the Washington area); he restored political rights to a number of politicians in January; and he commuted death sentences against those convicted of a March 1982 arson attack on our cultural center in Pusan. Chun has promised further steps in the future. These have helped relieve pressures in Korea and have reduced criticism in the U.S. of Korea's human rights performance. We are pleased by these signs of progress, but recognize that much more is required. We also believe that "quiet diplomacy" remains the best way to deal with this issue; many Koreans, both in the government and among its critics, agree.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

North Korea. Despite our periodic disclaimers, the South Koreans are acutely sensitive to any perceived sign of change in our policy toward North Korea. There has in fact been no change. We continue to believe that the peaceful reunification of Korea is for the Koreans themselves to decide, and that the North must therefore accept Seoul's invitation to talk. We continue to refuse to engage in discussions with North Korea without the full and equal participation of the ROKG. We support measures to ease North-South tension, reduce the danger of incidents along the DMZ, and move toward eventual crossrecognition of the two Koreas by their respective major allies. The North remains unreceptive. From time to time, however, speculation arises of a change in our policy toward Pyongyang. Accordingly, in order to maintain ROKG confidence, and preclude its reverting to more rigid positions, it is important to assure Seoul that we will not take unilateral initiatives toward the North.

LEE Bum Suk

REPUBLIC OF KOREA


B1
B3
66

*Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since June 1982)*

*Addressed as:
Mr. Minister*



[redacted] career diplomat, Lee Bum Suk assumed the Foreign Affairs portfolio as part of an ongoing Cabinet shuffle that President Chun Doo Hwan started in late May 1982. Before he received his current assignment, Lee had served for five months in the Blue House as Secretary General—in effect, President Chun's chief of staff. Because of his foreign service background, Lee has few political ties. He evidently enjoys a close relationship with President Chun, however.



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRP FA-048 #35299
BY OJ NARA DATE 7/27/09

Lee has been involved in North-South Korean issues for years and has had wide experience in negotiating with North Korea. He was involved in discussions with that country on the exchange of prisoners of war in 1953, and during 1972-76 he served both as vice president of the Korean National Red Cross and as senior representative to the North-South Red Cross talks. As Minister of National Unification (his first Cabinet post) from September 1980 until January 1982, Lee was charged with reviewing the entire history of North-South contacts and developing a series of policy options for President Chun's consideration [redacted]

Lee graduated from Posong College (now Korea University) in 1946. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960 and became chief of its International Organizations Section in 1961. He then came to the United States and studied at the University of Maryland and the George Washington University Graduate School. Returning home, he rejoined the Foreign Ministry, and by 1966 he had become director general of the Office of Protocol, with the rank of ambassador. He served as Ambassador to Tunisia during 1970-71 and as Ambassador to India during 1976-80. [redacted]

Lee, 57. [redacted]

[redacted] speaks fluent and idiomatic English. He is married and has a son and two daughters. Lee's name is spelled Yi Pom-sok in the McCune-Reischauer romanization system. [redacted]



~~SECRET~~

35300
2655

MW
23

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~w/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

April 26, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *cut*

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *gt*

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers and Talking Points for President's Meeting with Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Lee Bum Suk, May 3, at 11:00 a.m.

Foreign Minister Lee is visiting at the invitation of Secretary Shultz. In addition to his call on the President and extended discussions with the Acting Secretary, Lee will meet with the Vice President, Secretary Weinberger, and key members of the Congress. He is scheduled to address the Asia Society in Washington and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. Mr. Lee is an engaging interlocutor and an effective advocate of his government's policies.

The President's agreement to receive Lee is an important demonstration of U.S. friendship for Korea, the strength of our commitment and the high regard we have for Mr. Lee personally. It will add further luster to Lee's image in Korea and enhance his already strong standing within the Korean government, a development that will be helpful to U.S. interests.

Lee comes to Washington at a time of continuing tranquility in our relationship. ROK confidence in our security guarantees is strong and cooperation in the security field excellent. The Korean economy grew by a highly respectable 5.4 percent in 1982 and bilateral economic and trade issues, though present, are being managed smoothly. Recent conciliatory moves by President Chun have contributed to domestic calm within Korea, and lowered Korea's profile as a human rights problem in the U.S.

Foreign Minister Lee will express Korean support for the President's initiative throughout the world in support of a policy of peace through strength. He will stress U.S.-Korean friendship and security cooperation. He will in all likelihood renew the invitation to the President to visit Korea.

At Tab I is a memo from you to the President forwarding briefing material, bio data and talking points for his meeting with Lee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to the President.

Approve Clark Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Clark memo to President
- Tab A Briefing Material
- Tab B Bio

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ w/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD16-048 # 35300

~~SECRET~~ BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/01



8312504

United States Department of State

24

Washington, D.C. 20520

2655

April 23, 1983

83 APR 24 A 6: 41

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: The President's May 3 Meeting with the Korean
Foreign Minister--Suggested Participants

The Department proposes that the following officials participate in the President's meeting with the Korean Foreign Minister on May 3 at 11:00 a.m. (no interpretation is required):

Bum Suk LEE, Foreign Minister

Bion Hyon LEW, Korean Ambassador

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary of State

Thomas P. Shoesmith, Acting Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

4/17/83



8312503

United States Department of State

25

Washington, D.C. 20520

2655

April 23, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 41

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH BUM SUK LEE, FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MAY 3 at 11:00
A.M.

Transmitted herewith are briefing materials for the
President's meeting with Foreign Minister Lee.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Briefing Paper
- Tab 2 - Biographic Sketches

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By LOI NARA, Date 4/17/07

DECL: 4/22/89

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Visit of Bum Suk LEE, Foreign Minister of Korea
May 3, at 11:00 a.m.

I. SETTING

Foreign Minister Lee is visiting at the invitation of Secretary Shultz. In addition to his call on the President and extended discussions with the Acting Secretary, Lee will meet with the Vice President, Secretary Weinberger, and key members of the Congress. He is scheduled to address the Asia Society in Washington and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. Mr. Lee is an engaging interlocutor and an effective advocate of his government's policies.

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DECLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-048735361

BY CW NARADATE 3/27/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

- 2 -

purchase of U.S. military hardware, and the Koreans appreciate the President's support for increased amounts as well as improved repayment terms. Secretary Weinberger had a useful series of discussions last month with the Korean Defense Minister (who also called on the President) that further underscored the importance we attach to our security commitment.

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Political. President Chun has taken several encouraging steps in the past several months to ease political controls: he released opposition leader Kim Dae Jung (who is now living in the Washington area); he restored political rights to a number of politicians in January; and he commuted death sentences against those convicted of a March 1982 arson attack on our cultural center in Pusan. Chun has promised further steps in the future. These have helped relieve pressures in Korea and have reduced criticism in the U.S. of Korea's human rights performance. We are pleased by these signs of progress, but recognize that much more is required. We also believe that "quiet diplomacy" remains the best way to deal with this issue; many Koreans, both in the government and among its critics, agree.

North Korea. Despite our periodic disclaimers, the South Koreans are acutely sensitive to any perceived sign of change in our policy toward North Korea. There has in fact been no change. We continue to believe that the peaceful reunification of Korea is for the Koreans themselves to decide, and that the North must therefore accept Seoul's invitation to talk. We continue to refuse to engage in discussions with North Korea without the full and equal participation of the ROKG. We support measures to ease North-South tension, reduce the danger of incidents along the DMZ, and move toward eventual crossrecognition of the two Koreas by their respective major allies. The North remains unreceptive. From time to time, however, speculation arises of a change in our policy toward Pyongyang. Accordingly, in order to maintain ROKG confidence, and preclude its reverting to more rigid positions, it is important to assure Seoul that we will not take unilateral initiatives toward the North.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER
LEE: PROPOSED TALKING POINTS

Transmitted herewith are talking points the President might wish to draw upon in his May 3 meeting with Foreign Minister LEE.

1971 APR 25 PM 7 30

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN
AFFAIRS

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Drafted by: EA/K: NTBreer 4/25/83
x 27717 Wang 1574K

Clearances: EA: TPShoesmith
EA/K: DFLamber/spr
TPS by ACM
by [signature]

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By LDJ NARA, Date 4/17/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



2655 add-on S/S 8312750
United States Department of State

29

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 27, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER
LEE: PROPOSED TALKING POINTS

Transmitted herewith are talking points the President might wish to draw upon in his May 3 meeting with Foreign Minister LEE.

Katherine Shirley for

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By NOT NARA, Date 4/17/07

~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LEE
MAY 3 AT 11:00 A M.

Suggested Talking Points

-- Please assure President Chun that American people value friendship with Korea, admire accomplishments of Korean people, and will continue to be faithful allies.

-- U.S. commitment to Korean security is unchanged. U.S. troop presence will be maintained. Will continue to modernize our forces.

-- Admire effort of Korean people to provide for own defense. Will continue to help with FMS credits; are trying for improved repayment terms.

-- Pleased with President Chun's efforts to create a more participatory political system. Believe this will ensure greater stability in future.

-- U.S. is struggling to maintain open trading system. We need help of our allies and friends.

-- We fully support President Chun's efforts to open discussions with North Korea. Believe he has made realistic proposals.

-- Our own policy toward North Korea remains unchanged. We will have no discussions with North without full participation of your government.

-- (If raised). President Chun's proposal for Pacific Basin summit has considerable merit. Will require careful consideration by all concerned and much careful planning. Best to move slowly.

-- (If raised). Hope to be able to visit Korea in the future; cannot set specific date right now.

-- (If raised). Believe existing consultative arrangements and command structure are adequate to assure appropriate responses to North Korean provocations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL -048 #35302

BY CS NARA DATE 3/27/08

RR

AMERICAN U-2 SPY PLANE CRASHES IN KOREA
(EDS: ADDS BACKGROUND ON PREVIOUS U-2 LOSSES)

SEOUL, OCT 8 (MONDAY), REUTER - A U.S. AIR FORCE U-2 SPY PLANE
CRASHED NEAR OSAN AIR BASE IN SOUTH KOREA TODAY, THE SECOND
SUCH CRASH IN FIVE MONTHS, A U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID.

HE SAID THE PILOT EJECTED, PARACHUTED TO EARTH AND WAS TAKEN
TO A HOSPITAL. HIS CONDITION WAS NOT DISCLOSED.

A U-2 CRASHED AFTER TAKING OFF FROM THE U.S. BASE ON A ROUTINE
MISSION LAST MAY.

SEVERAL DOZEN U-2S HAVE BEEN LOST OVER HOSTILE TERRITORY OR IN
ACCIDENTS SINCE THE PLANE WAS FIRST FLOWN IN 1955, ACCORDING TO
THE AUTHORITATIVE JANE'S AIRCRAFT SERIES.

IN 1960, A U.S. U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PLANE FLOWN BY GARY POWERS
WAS SHOT DOWN OVER THE SOVIET UNION, SPARKING A MAJOR
DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE.

HAWKE CALLS DECEMBER 1 GENERAL ELECTION IN AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA, OCT 8, REUTER - AUSTRALIAN LABOR PRIME MINISTER BOB
HAWKE TODAY ANNOUNCED A GENERAL ELECTION FOR DECEMBER 1, ABOUT
16 MONTHS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.

HAWKE'S STATEMENT ENDED WEEKS OF SPECULATION ABOUT AN EARLY
POLL, CALLED PARTLY TO CONSOLIDATE LABOR'S CONTINUING
POPULARITY WITH THE ELECTORATE. OPINION POLLS PUT LABOR WAY
AHEAD OF THE OPPOSITION.

LABOR ALREADY HAS A 25-SEAT MAJORITY OVER THE MAIN LIBERAL
OPPOSITION AND MINOR PARTIES IN THE LOWER HOUSE AFTER A
LANDSLIDE ELECTION WIN IN MARCH 1983.

AN ELECTION WAS NOT DUE UNTIL MARCH 1986 UNDER ITS THREE-YEAR
MANDATE.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 04 OCT 83 19

4/17/07

DOCDATE 04 OCT 83

32

TO CLARK

FROM FORTIER

KEYWORDS KOREA SOUTH JAPAN

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

SUBJECT RETHINKING US OBJECTIVES FOR PRES ASIAN TRIP

ACTION FOR SIGNATURE DUE STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B 1K)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

OCT 05 1983 Clark Rpt memo DF, SU

DISPATCH *al D Street* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
91161

33

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Rethinking Our Objectives for the President's
Asian Trip (S)

The decision to confine the President's Asian itinerary to Japan and Korea--two countries most directly affected by the KAL shutdown and growing Soviet military intimidation--has the effect of giving the trip a more political-military character than was the case initially. We need to readjust our thinking to reflect this fact, and we need to review trip themes and specific substantive objectives accordingly. A small group will be convened by the Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs and the Senior Director for Asian Affairs to stimulate urgent preliminary thinking on this subject. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~
Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LAT NARA, Date 4/17/07

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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34

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Date OCT 5 1983

Subject Rethinking our Objectives for the President's Asian Trip

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
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Date OCT 5 1983

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| _____ Sit. Room | _____ Mr. Helm | _____ Mr. Martin | _____ Gen. Russell | _____ Mr. Wettering |
| _____ Mr. Bailey | _____ Mr. Kemp | _____ Mr. Matlock | _____ Col. Rye | _____ Exec. Secretary |
| _____ Mr. Brazil | _____ Mr. Kraemer | _____ Mr. McMinn | _____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch | _____ NSC Secretariat |
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Date OCT 5 1983

Subject Rethinking our Objectives for the President's Asian Trip 36

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMin	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
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Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

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MEMORANDUM

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91161

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

October 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Rethinking Our Objectives for the President's Asian Trip

Attached is the directive you agreed to send in approving my memo on KAL and the President's Asian trip objectives.

Gaston *GH* Sigur concurs.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached directive.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Clark/Shultz and Weinberger

~~SECRET~~
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By hds NARA, Date 4/17/07

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ID 8307274

RECEIVED 12 OCT 83 10

TO KIMMITT FROM HILL, C
HILL, C
HILL, C

DOCDATE 11 OCT 83
13 OCT 83
19 OCT 83

KEYWORDS: KOREA SIG

SUBJECT SENIOR IG GROUP 40 - AGENDA / BACKGROUND PAPERS / SUMMARY OF
CONCLUSIONS FOR OCT 12 MTG RE RANGOON BOMBING INCIDENT &

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT DUE 15 OCT 83 STATUS C FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

FORTIER

CHILDRESS

MATLOCK

LAUX

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*Kimmit
sigur*

NSC-Kimmitt S/S 8332486

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United States Department of State

31

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 24, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Senior Interagency Group No. 40

TO:

- ~~OVP~~ - Mr. Donald Gregg
- ~~NSC~~ - Mr. Robert Kimmitt
- CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
- Defense - Colonel John Stanford
- JCS - LTC Dennis Stanley
- USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins

SUBJECT: US and ROK Responses to the Rangoon Terrorist Incident:
Check List of Actions Taken

Attached is a check list as of October 21 of actions taken, and responses received to our demarches in a number of capitals, in response to the Rangoon terrorist incident.

Suggestions for additional measures should be sent to the Office of Korean Affairs.

Covey
 Charles Hill
 Executive Secretary

Attachment:

The Rangoon Incident - US and ROK Responses; Check List of Actions Taken.

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR F06-048# 35303

BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/12

35304

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THE RANGOON INCIDENT - US AND ROK RESPONSES

Check List of Actions Taken (as of October 21)

Immediate Bilateral Actions:

Replies to high level demarches on support for ROK:

A number of African and Latin American governments have made public statements (some in the UNGA) and sent messages of condolence; most have said they will consider further action when there is confirmed information on who is responsible.

ASEAN governments have expressed strong sympathy for the ROK, and if North Korean responsibility is clear, may take some action against the DPRK. (However, their attitude toward the DPRK is complicated by Kim Il-sung's support for Sihanouk and the Kampuchean coalition.)

Canberra will reschedule Chun's trip; Prime Minister Hawke will (in principle) add Seoul to his Beijing/Tokyo trip.

We have urged the New Zealand government to consider sending high-level emissary to Seoul to reiterate invitation to Chun to visit Wellington.

Colombo sent acting foreign minister to funeral in Seoul; President condemned bombing in strong public statement; Chun visit tentatively rescheduled for 1985.

London has several high-level visits scheduled: Chun to the UK in 1984, high-level Ministerial and British naval visits to Korea in early 1984.

Paris sent a ministerial level delegation to the Seoul funeral, and will consider other actions.

Rome has sent messages and will consider high level visits; the Pope is scheduled to visit Korea in May 1984.

Tokyo will consider what might be done if North Korean complicity proven (in discussions with the Japanese here and in Tokyo we have stressed importance of avoiding "business-as-usual" attitude); Foreign Minister Abe attended Seoul funeral service.

Upgrading of Egyptian-ROK relations: On October 19 Ambassador made demarche to Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, who will raise with President. We will reinforce with Egyptian Ambassador here, and will ask other governments to weigh in. Similar approaches will be pursued with Government of Pakistan (delayed by Shiite holiday).

Discussions with Congress: H and EA have consulted with key members and staffers on a joint resolution, provided draft text and urged prompt action.

~~SECRET~~
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NLRR F06-048 #35304

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

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- 2 -

Immediate Multilateral Actions:

ROK UN observer mission officers have told USUN that they believe it unwise to take any action in the UN until the Burmese publish the results of their investigation. ROK UN Ambassador Kim Kyung-Won stated that any effort to raise the incident in the UNSC or UNGA before the Burmese had issued their report could only result in tactical benefit to North Korea. At this point, Kim indicated that he was considering sending a preliminary, low-key letter to the Secretary General expressing ROK concern over the incident and alluding to possible North Korean responsibility. He would not, however, ask the SYG to circulate the letter as a UN document.

IO has determined that the most appropriate UN bodies in which to raise the issue when the Burmese investigation is concluded are the UNGA committees, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and possibly the Security Council. The HRC will next meet in February-March 1984. The various technical agencies of the UN would not appear to be relevant fora in which to raise this incident; (in any event we have been trying to keep extraneous political issues out of these agencies). We are inclined not to press any multilateral actions until the ROK indicates it wishes to proceed.

Drafted:EA/K:BSHarvey^M/IO/UNP:JBruno
10/21/83; 632-7717 (2564K/TER)

Cleared:EA/K:DFlambertson[✓]
IO/UNP:CEDillery[✓]
EA:WABro[✓]
P:DJohnson

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ID 8307359

RECEIVED 14 OCT 83 11

TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 14 OCT 83

KEYWORDS KOREA BURMA
TERRORISM SIG

SUBJECT ACTION PAPER ON US & KOREAN RESPONSE TO RANGOON TERRORIST INCIDENT

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 17 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
SIGUR	CHILDRESS NORTH	DEGRAFFENREID
		FORTIER
		KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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McFARLANE IX 10/19 FOR INFO

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Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat			
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<u>SIGOR</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>

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83 OCT 19 6: 59

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: State Action Paper on US and Korean Responses to the Ragoon Terrorist Incident

This State Action Paper (Tab A) results from a SIG held in State at our suggestion. The recommended steps to be taken by both the U.S. and our Korean allies are, I believe, appropriate ones. A number of circular cables have been sent to missions abroad and State is in continuous contact with the Korean Ambassador and his staff. As you know, President Chun has eschewed the use of military force in favor of diplomatic and political reprisals. We are discussing with the Koreans the kinds of action we might take.

As of now, we still have no solid evidence whether or not the North Koreans were responsible for the Ragoon outrage. It certainly looks that way, but we must let the Burmese carry on the investigations at their own pace and in their own manner. They announced today that three Koreans have been identified as being involved in the plot. No word yet on whether they were North Koreans.

@ Childress and North concur.

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR 06-048 #35305

BY CU NARADATE 3/27/08

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*Gaston that the confessions are in up
can we not step up efforts to:
1. Have relations w/ DPRK severed by 30 world
Get Japan to cut track to
DPRK
Please talk to Paul & Suk
Gast*



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Action Paper on US and Korean Responses to
the Rangoon Terrorist Incident

The attached Senior Interagency Group paper outlines
how we plan to proceed in responding to the Rangoon
Terrorist Incident.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Senior Interagency Group Paper on the Rangoon
Terrorist Incident

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By LOT NARA, Date 4/17/07

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35306

NLRR F06-048 # 35306

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

The Rangoon Incident - US and ROK Responses

In the wake of the Rangoon incident we should consult with the ROKG on measures which we can take to support our mutual security interests and the ROK's international position, and, if the evidence warrants, on appropriate measures to take vis-a-vis North Korea. Our objectives are to avoid uncontrolled escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula and to help the ROK sustain and broaden its enhanced international stature by avoiding counter-productive retaliation against the DPRK.

Vigorous US diplomatic action will reassure the ROK of our support and may help thwart Pyongyang's objective of reversing Seoul's recent success in enhancing its international stature. It will also assist President Chun in managing the pressures for retaliation in kind against the North if he can demonstrate that some firm action is being taken. It may also be useful to him domestically to be seen as under pressure from the US to exercise restraint, although there are also possible negative consequences if he is seen as giving in to US pressure without getting something in return from us. Thus, the more we can do to assist the South Koreans in this tragedy, the better able we will be to consult closely with them and keep their reactions within bounds.

Because of the presence of 39,000 US troops in Korea, we are involved. Therefore, we must insist, as Secretary Weinberger made clear to ROK Minister of Defense in the April 1983 Security Consultative Meetings, that the US must be fully consulted on any plans that could affect us.

It must be recognized that pressures on President Chun not to appear weak in the face of terrorism may dictate his response whether or not the US would support it. An assessment of internal pressures being exerted on President Chun must be completed, and up-dated as necessary.

In considering responses to the Rangoon incident, there are steps we can take immediately and others which might be taken after the evidence is in. We must bear in mind that the identification of the assassins may never be confirmed, or may not be made public by the Burmese. This may complicate our efforts to garner international support for steps to be taken in support of the ROK and to condemn the North. For success in these efforts it would be preferable for the public US role to be muted; neither the US nor the ROK should give an appearance of arm-twisting in our approaches to other governments.

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DECL: OADR

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- 2 -

Immediate Bilateral Actions (in Absence of Solid Evidence of North Korean Complicity)

-- The President's letter to President Chun, and Secretary Weinberger's October 13 meeting with him on the day of the memorial service, are clear signs of US support; Secretary Weinberger's visit provided an opportunity to discuss some of the dangers of precipitate retaliatory action and the need for full consultations. If it appears desirable to have further high-level consultations, we should try to enlist someone who is highly respected.

-- In our consultations with the ROKs, we should also emphasize the importance of having solid evidence of North Korean responsibility for the killings and of keeping the Burmese out in front in the international arena.

-- We should encourage Congressional expressions of sympathy and support for the ROK.

-- We should begin consultations with the Japanese on steps they may be prepared to take, such as limits on trade and extension of bank credit, to the DPRK, if North Korean complicity in the assassinations becomes clear.

-- We should begin discussions with our close friends and allies on what might be done to demonstrate support for the ROK (such as high-level visits).

-- While we want to encourage the Burmese government to continue to investigate the incident and disseminate the facts as they obtain them, we must remain careful not to push the Burmese too hard. Our posture should be supportive without being intrusive.

-- We should again urge the Pakistanis to up-grade their relations with the ROK to full diplomatic status; they have told us for over a year that the decision to do so has been made in principle and that it is just a matter of timing. Now is the time for Pakistan to accord full diplomatic recognition to the ROK.

-- Although prospects for Egyptian full recognition of the ROK are somewhat less likely, Cairo does have cordial consular-level relations with Seoul. We should also urge the Egyptians to raise the level of their relations with the ROK now.

-- We should continue to brief the Chinese and Soviets on this situation, and ask that they counsel restraint in Pyongyang.

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- 3 -

Immediate Multilateral Actions in Absence of Solid Evidence of North Korean Complicity)

-- LETTERS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND UNSC PRESIDENT: We should suggest to Korea and Burma that they send a letter to the Secretary General on the Rangoon incident, to be circulated in the UNGA. We should also suggest that they send a similar letter to the UNSC President (Jordan in October)

-- UNGA COMMITTEES: Encourage sympathetic countries to speak on the incident in various UNGA Committees (e.g., Third-Human Rights; Sixth-Legal), citing the Rangoon case as an act of international terrorism deserving condemnation. It would be raised under existing agenda items such as anti-terrorism and protection of diplomats.

-- OTHER UN BODIES: Explore the possibility of raising the incident in other appropriate UN bodies, such as the Human Rights Commission.

-- NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: Sound out friendly members of the NAM to determine if they would be willing to speak out individually in the NAM to condemn this act. We cannot expect the NAM as a body to do or say anything; the lack of hard evidence, the DPRK's active participation in the NAM, and Burma's withdrawal from the NAM several years ago all make collective action implausible. Nevertheless, our appeal would make a difference to some NAM members and to the South Koreans.

Bilateral actions if There is Solid Evidence of North Korean Complicity

status?
-- We are now identifying those countries where approaches should be made on possible cancelling of aid programs or downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

status?
-- Urge Japan, France and others to suspend to the maximum extent possible their countries' non-official dealings with the DPRK, in such areas as trade and extension of credit. Approaches might also be made to shipping and longshoremen's unions on a shipping boycott.

-- Work with the ROK on a world-wide public diplomacy campaign to censure the DPRK's terrorist action.

-- As part of the new VOA proposal, offer US broadcasting facilities to the ROK for improved broadcast capability to North Korea.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Multilateral Actions if There is Solid Evidence of North Korean Complicity

status?

-- SECURITY COUNCIL: Consult with Burma and South Korea on whether to request a meeting of the UNSC. This meeting would hear speeches by Burma, South Korea, and as many other concerned nations as possible (not just members of the Council) condemning the Rangoon atrocity. Depending on the atmosphere and tactical situation, Burma, South Korea and the USG would seek a resolution condemning the act and possibly also the DPRK. Even with unambiguous evidence of DPRK guilt, however, we could not be certain of the outcome. It would be easier to obtain a UNSC resolution condemning only the atrocity, but even in this case the outcome would not be certain. Moreover, we would not want to end up with both China and the USSR voting against us. China might feel constrained to do so even if it suspected North Korean complicity. Any UNSC resolution on this subject could include a call for sanctions against states which employ terrorism as national policy.

-- GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Encourage sympathetic countries to raise the issue in the UNGA. We do not have enough time to stimulate mention of the Rangoon atrocity in the General Debate, which concludes October 14.

-- OTHER UN AGENCIES: Explore the possibility of addressing the incident, as appropriate, in other UN agencies, including those in which North Korea has either member or observer status. North Korea is a member of the following UN agencies: FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IPU, IRCS, ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO. Our preliminary assessment is that none of these organizations would be relevant to an issue like the Rangoon incident. A more appropriate UN forum would be the Human Rights Commission, which meets in Geneva February-March 1984.

-- OPPOSITION TO MEMBERSHIP: Vote against North Korean admission to international organizations to which it seeks membership. For example, Pyongyang has applied for membership to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). South Korea is already a member.

-- NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: Sound out friendly members to determine if they would try to get the Movement to make some expression of condemnation. Although still a long shot, prospects would be better if there were solid evidence of North Korean complicity.