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Withdrawer

LOJ 2/28/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (01/01/1982-04/13/1982)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34776	CABLE	220813Z JAN 82 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	1/22/1982	B1
34777	CABLE	150621Z MAR 82 PAR 6/5/2008 NLRRF06-048 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233-12/8/09 KU	5	3/15/1982	B1
34778	CABLE	300618Z MAR 82 PAR 6/5/2008 NLRRF06-048	5	3/30/1982	B1
34779	CABLE	310909Z MAR 82 R 6/5/2008 NLRRF06-048	2	3/31/1982	B1
34780	CABLE	310912Z MAR 82 R 6/5/2008 NLRRF06-048	3	3/31/1982	B1
34781	CABLE	010831Z APR 82 R 6/5/2008 NLRRF06-048	3	4/1/1982	B1
34782	CABLE	020730Z APR 82 P 1/22/2010 F06-048	3	4/2/1982	B1

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SEOUL 0635
SIT707 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 220813Z JAN 82 PSN: 041611
TOR: 022/0830Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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SIT: WPC NAN MCF COL JP VP SIT EOB
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WHSR COMMENT: TO GREGG FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #0635 0220820
O 220813Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7998

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9311
SA CINCUNC KS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CC/BJ-PL-H/SJS//
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L SEOUL 00635
E. O. 12065: GDS 01/22/88 (BLAKEMORE, DAVID) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR KN KS US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHUN'S JANUARY 22 PROPOSALS:
- LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
REF: (A) STATE 15144, (B) SEOUL 468

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ACTING QUICKLY ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) INFORM PRESIDENT REAGAN BY LETTER OF THE JANUARY 22 REUNIFICATION PROPOSALS, MOFA HAS REQUESTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CHUN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE ORIGINAL OF THE LETTER IS BEING POUCHED BY MOFA TO THE ROK EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

3. PRESIDENT CHUN'S LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

22 JANUARY 1982

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
- I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT TODAY I HAVE PROPOSED A CONCRETE AND INTEGRATED FORMULA FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA TO THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES IN MY NEW YEAR POLICY STATEMENT AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- I HAD EARLIER INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PROPOSAL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOUR EXCELLENCY'S ENVOY IN SEOUL ON THE 18TH OF THIS MONTH AND I TRUST THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ALREADY APPRISED OF THEM.
- I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BOTH REASONABLE AND REALISTIC FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IT ALSO CONFORMS TO THE NOBLE IDEALS OF YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.

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BY CW NARADATE 3/27/08

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DTG: 220813Z JAN 82 PSN: 041611

- IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT YOUR
EXCELLENCY WILL EXPRESS UNRESERVED SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE-
MENT TO THE PROPOSAL SO THAT OUR EARNEST EFFORTS FOR PEACE
AND UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA MAY BEAR FRUIT
SOON, AND IN TURN, CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF NORTHEAST
ASIA AND WORLD PEACE.

- WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL WELL-BEING
AND THE LASTING PROSPERITY OF YOUR GREAT NATION IN THE
YEARS AHEAD, I REMAIN,

SINCERELY,
/S/ CHUN DOO HWAN

HIS EXCELLENCY

- RONALD W. REAGAN

- PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

END TEXT. WALKER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SEOUL 2410
SIT113 DATE 03/17/82

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DE RUEHUL #2410/01 0740627
O 150621Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8809

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 03/15/02 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: MILI KS US KN SR

SUBJECT: KOREAN INTEREST IN HOSTING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

REF: (A) SEOUL 1615, (B) SEOUL 1541


1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT IS MOUNTING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE A SHIFT TOWARD A MORE STRATEGIC U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN KOREA. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO SUPPLEMENT OUR PRESENTLY DEPLOYED, KOREA-RELATED FORCES WITH STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS ARRAYED AGAINST THE GROWING MILITARY POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FAR EAST. THE PURPOSE OF THIS TELEGRAM IS TO ALERT WASHINGTON OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE DEALING WITH THE KOREANS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THAT THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. WE ALSO OFFER SOME CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING A U.S. RESPONSE.

3. IN THE COURSE OF PREPARATIONS FOR THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING IN SEOUL, THE KOREAN SIDE HAS INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO RAISE CERTAIN STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE THRUST OF THE KOREAN ARGUMENT WILL BE TO EMPHASIZE KOREA'S WILLINGNESS TO PULL ITS WEIGHT IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE DEFENSE OF THE FAR EAST, AND TO URGE THE USE OF KOREAN SOIL FOR A VARIETY OF STRATEGIC PURPOSES. THESE COULD INCLUDE



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DTG: 150621Z MAR 82 PSN: 000237

4. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH VISITING U.S. DIGNITARIES, PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) HAS BEGUN TO TALK IN STRATEGIC TERMS. THIS WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN A FEBRUARY 17 CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR MARK HATFIELD (SEOUL 1615) IN WHICH CHUN AND THEN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG WHIE (M-R: KIM TONG-HWI) SPOKE OF ROK PREPAREDNESS TO PROVIDE STRATEGIC BASES FOR U.S. FORCES, AND PROPOSED GREATER COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN KOREA AND THE U.S. IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC EFFORT [REDACTED] ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER CHOO YOUNG BOCK (M-R: CHU YONG-POK) HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RECENTLY RAISED ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE POSSIBILITIES LISTED IN PARA 3.

5. FINALLY, THE KOREAN PRESS HAS GOTTEN INTO THE ACT OF CONSIDERING KOREA IN BROAD, STRATEGIC TERMS. [REDACTED]

6. WHAT THE KOREANS HAVE IN MIND, THOUGH THEY ARE NOT YET STATING IT IN SUCH DIRECT TERMS, IS A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE NATURE AND ROLE OF U.S. FORCES DEPLOYED IN KOREA. HERETOFORE OUR FORCES IN KOREA HAVE HAD A MISSION STRICTLY RELATED (AND LIMITED) TO POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IN ORDER TO BIND THE U.S. MORE TIGHTLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO KOREA, AND TO PROJECT WHAT THEY SEE AS KOREA'S PROPER ROLE AS A REGIONAL POWER, THE KOREANS WANT MORE DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN AND A VOICE IN THE STRATEGIC EQUATION OF DETERRENCE. THE PROS AND CONS OF A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE ESTABLISHED U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN KOREA, INCLUDING LIKELY CHINESE AND JAPANESE REACTIONS, CAN BE FULLY WEIGHED ONLY IN WASHINGTON. FROM OUR KOREAN VANTAGE POINT, THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS SEEM IMPORTANT.

- A. THE LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE -- THE SOVIET UNION IS COMMITTED TO NORTH KOREA'S SECURITY BY THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1961, AND FOR YEARS THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED WEAPONS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT NORTH KOREA'S

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SEOUL 2410
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O 150621Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8810

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AUTARKIC APPROACH TO SECURITY. A RECENT EXAMPLE IS THE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE T-62 TANK
IN NORTH KOREA. IN THE PAST, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUPPLIED
SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS WELL, PARTICULARLY AIR-
CRAFT, MISSILES AND ADVANCED ELECTRONICS. BUT IN RECENT
YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROVIDED SURPRISINGLY LITTLE
DIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT TO NORTH KOREA. FOR EXAMPLE, IT
HAS SUPPLIED NO NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT SINCE EARLY 1974.
WHILE THIS SOVIET NEGLECT HAS NOT PREVENTED AN AMBITIOUS
AND CONTINUING EXPANSION OF NORTH KOREA'S MILITARY CAPABIL-
ITY, THAT EXPANSION HAS NOT INCLUDED INFUSIONS OF SOPHISTI-
CATED, HIGH TECHNOLOGY SOVIET WEAPONRY. (IN GENERAL, CHINA
DOES NOT HAVE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TO PROVIDE.) THE
REASONS BEHIND THE SOVIETS' BENIGN NEGLECT OF THEIR NORTH
KOREAN ALLY ARE BY NO MEANS CLEAR. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT
THIS NEGLECT IS IN OUR INTEREST, AND WE SHOULD SEEK TO
PRESERVE IT.

- A SHIFT IN THE U. S. MILITARY POSTURE IN SOUTH KOREA,
ESPECIALLY IF IT INCLUDED DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS OR ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF BASES THAT WERE TARGETED (OR PERCEIVED TO BE
TARGETED) AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD ALMOST SURELY
PROMPT A SOVIET RESPONSE. (IT IS INTERESTING IN THIS
CONNECTION THAT RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF SOVIET SS20
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN THE FAR EAST MAKE NO MENTION OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TARGETING AGAINST KOREA.) AT A MINIMUM THE GENERAL LEVEL
OF SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN MILITARY COOPERATION WOULD INCREASE.
AND THE NORTH KOREANS PRESUMABLY WOULD PUT FORWARD A
CONVINCING ARGUMENT THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SUPPLY THEM
WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST
U. S. STRATEGIC ASSETS IN THE SOUTH. IF IT ACQUIRED SUCH
WEAPONRY, NORTH KOREA THEN WOULD BE FREE TO USE IT AT A
TIME AND AGAINST TARGETS OF ITS OWN CHOOSING.

- B. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION -- U. S. FORCES IN KOREA AND
OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED PUBLICLY AND
PRIVATELY IN TERMS OF A CONGRUENCE OF KOREAN AND U. S.
SECURITY INTERESTS. BUT ON A DAY-TO-DAY, PRACTICAL LEVEL,
KOREANS AND AMERICANS ALIKE RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE SOUTH KOREA IS THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF OUR
DEFENSE POSTURE HERE. THIS RECOGNITION AND ITS COROLLARY--
THAT TERMINATION OF THE U. S. SECURITY PRESENCE IN KOREA

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WOULD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THREATEN KOREAN SECURITY MUCH MORE IMMINENTLY AND SERIOUSLY THAN U. S. SECURITY--HAVE TWO IMPORTANT POLICY IMPLICATIONS.

- 1. FIRST, OUR TROOP PRESENCE AND SECURITY COMMITMENT GIVE US AT LEAST A THEORETICAL POTENTIAL TO AFFECT THE COURSE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA. LIKE ANY GROSS, ONE-TIME-ONLY FORM OF POTENTIAL POWER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO USE EFFECTIVELY. BUT IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE FACT OF OUR LATENT POWER TENDS TO MODERATE THE POLITICAL EXCESSES OF KOREAN SOCIETY, FROM KOREAGATE THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO THE AUTHORITARIAN NATURE OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM.

- 2. SECONDLY, BY VIRTUE OF OUR SECURITY POSTURE WE EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE CONTROL

[REDACTED] AND WE HAVE PROTECTED OURSELVES THROUGH SUCH MECHANISMS AS THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND EXERCISES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE DEPLOYMENT AGAINST NORTH KOREA OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SOUTH KOREAN FORCES.

IF A DECISION WERE MADE TO ESTABLISH U. S. STRATEGIC BASES OR DEPLOY U. S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN KOREA, THIS COULD OVER TIME AFFECT KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE RELATIVE BENEFITS TO THE U. S. AND KOREA OF THE U. S. SECURITY PRESENCE. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THERE WOULD BE A NATURAL TENDENCY ON THE PART OF U. S. MILITARY PLANNERS TO REGARD STRATEGIC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INSTALLATIONS HERE FIRST AS ESSENTIAL, THEN AS IRREPLACEABLE.

7. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES ARE NOT DISPOSED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY AT THE SCM TO KOREAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 2410
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O 150621Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL


TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8811

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BLANDISHMENTS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES. AS OUR VIEWS IN PARAGRAPH 6 INDICATE, WE BELIEVE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC TYPES OF PROPOSALS LISTED HEREIN WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT KOREA'S

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GROWING CONTRIBUTION TO THE PARTNERSHIP IS A MODEL FOR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, SERVES OUR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS, AND MERITS COMMENSURATE GROWTH IN TERMS OF INFLUENCE ON OUR STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT KOREA'S EFFORT TO ASSUME A MORE STRATEGIC ROLE IN EAST ASIA IS ONLY A PART OF A LARGER, ON-GOING EFFORT TO GAIN RECOGNITION AS A MIDDLE POWER. THIS EFFORT CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

8. SECRETARY WEINBERGER MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE KOREAN VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES SERIOUSLY,



WE MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE PART IN A MORE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THEM ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SEUL 3088
SIT183 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 300618Z MAR 82 PSN: 017387
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O 300618Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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SA CINCUNC KS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CC/BJ-PL-H/SJS//
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SEUL 03088
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 03/30/92 (BLAKEMORE, DAVID) OR-P
TAGS: OVIP (WEINBERGER, CASPAR W.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S CALLS ON KOREAN MINISTERS


1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 29, SECRETARY WEINBERGER CALLED ON MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOO (M-R: CHU YONG-POK), MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG), AND PRIME MINISTER YOO (M-R: YU CH'ANG-SUN). THE THREE CONVERSATIONS WERE SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS; THE DISCUSSIONS CENTERED AROUND THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS.

3. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES:
MINISTER CHOO AVOIDED THIS SUBJECT ENTIRELY, BUT HIS COLLEAGUES MORE THAN MADE UP THE DIFFERENCE. MINISTER LHO ACKNOWLEDGED THE ROLE OF U. S. ASSISTANCE IN KOREA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE 210 MILLION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DOLLARS IN FMS CREDIT PLANNED FOR KOREA IN FY '83 SHOWS KOREA'S SPECIAL STATUS.



4. PRIME MINISTER YOO PICKED UP THE THEME. SINCE REPAYMENTS WILL EXCEED NEW LOANS IN FY '83, THERE IS NO NET BENEFIT TO KOREAN DEFENSE. HE ALSO NOTED HIGH INTEREST

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BY GJS NARA DATE 6/5/08

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DTG: 300618Z MAR 82 PSN: 017387

RATES FOR FMS AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THESE RATES WILL FALL WITH MARKET RATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. A MORE FAVORABLE REPAYMENT SCHEDULE WAS ALSO MENTIONED FOR CONSIDERATION.

5. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE FMS REQUEST LEVEL FOR KOREA THIS YEAR IS 26 PERCENT HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR. THIS REFLECTS OUR BELIEF THAT KOREA IS A STRONG ALLY AND A CLOSE FRIEND. DOD RECOMMENDS FMS LEVELS ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY NEED BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL SURVIVE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY. PRESIDENT REAGAN IS COMMITTED TO THE FY '83 REQUEST LEVEL OF 210 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THAT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE IS NEEDED, AND HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FMS LEVELS FOR KOREA IN FY '84-- AS WELL AS SUPPORT BETTER TERMS. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE MANY HURDLES TO OVERCOME. HE COULD OFFER NO GUARANTEE AND THE ROKG SHOULD BEWARE OF FALSE EXPECTATIONS. AT PRESENT, WE HOPE TO HOLD THE FY '83 AS IS. THE KOREAN POINT OF VIEW IS FULLY APPRECIATED, AND IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO MEET FULLY KOREAN REQUESTS THIS DOES NOT MEAN A LACK OF FRIENDSHIP OR SUPPORT. HIGHER FMS LEVELS FOR KOREA ARE IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

6. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED FMS TERMS WITH TREASURY SECRETARY REGAN, WHO IS SYMPATHETIC. HOWEVER, THERE ARE DEBT CEILING AND BUDGET DEFICIT QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL, CONGRESS OFTEN EXCEEDS THE ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LEVELS. ISRAEL HAS SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN MAINTAINING ITS MILITARY STRENGTH, AND IS A SPECIAL FRIEND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT WE NEED OTHER FRIENDS THERE, PARTICULARLY COUNTRIES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND OMAN THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE U. S.

7. THE U. S. COMMITMENT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER TOLD ALL THREE MINISTERS THAT BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON HE HAD DISCUSSED KOREA WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS CARRYING A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT CHUN. THE PRESIDENT WANTS KOREAN OFFICIALS TO KNOW THAT U. S. FORCES WILL REMAIN HERE AS LONG AS KOREA WANTS THEM, AND HE BELIEVES THE U. S. COMMITMENT BENEFITS BOTH COUNTRIES EQUALLY. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT AGREES WITH MINISTER LHO'S ASSERTION THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE PRESIDENT ADMIRES THE STRENGTH AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SEOUL 3088
SIT182 DATE 04/06/82

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SA CINCUNC KS
~~CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS~~
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CC/BJ-PL-H/SJS//
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SEOUL 03088
DETERMINATION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE. MINISTER LHO EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FIRM COMMIT-
MENT TO KOREAN SECURITY.

8. FREE WORLD DEFENSE:
THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR KOREA'S
DEFENSE EFFORT, AND NOTED THAT NOT EVERY NATION IN THE FREE
WORLD ACCEPTS ITS SHARE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN THE WAY KOREA
DOES. SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE RELUCTANT TO AGREE ON THE
SOVIET THREAT AND THE SACRIFICES REQUIRED TO MEET IT. AT
THE RECENT NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING THERE WAS BROAD
AGREEMENT ON THE THREAT, BUT DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE DIFFI-
CULTY IN PERSUADING FINANCE MINISTERS TO RECOGNIZE THE
PROBLEM. PRESIDENT REAGAN FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES THAT
THE PEOPLE WILL RESPOND TO FIRM LEADERSHIP ON THE DEFENSE
ISSUE. IT WILL BE A STRUGGLE IN THE FACE OF HIGH INTEREST
RATES AND BUDGET DEFICITS, BUT IT IS A LONG ROAD ON WHICH
WE MUST EMBARK. WE HAVE LOST MOMENTUM IN MAINTAINING OUR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MILITARY STRENGTH OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, AND IT WILL TAKE
TIME TO REGAIN OUR STRENGTH. WE ARE WORKING TO EDUCATE OUR
PEOPLE TO THE THREAT. IN KOREA, THE THREAT IS SO CLOSE
THAT THE PEOPLE READILY UNDERSTAND IT.

9. KOREA AND JAPAN IN REGIONAL SECURITY:
MINISTER CHOO ASKED ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN JAPAN.
THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY OFFICIALS
ARE SYMPATHETIC, AND THE DEFENSE AGENCY'S BUDGET WAS
INCREASED BY ABOUT 4 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS THIS YEAR WHILE
OTHER MINISTRY BUDGETS REMAINED THE SAME OR ACTUALLY
DECLINED. BUT THERE IS A NEED TO MOVE MORE QUICKLY. WE
RECEIVE CONFLICTING ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH JAPAN'S
CONSENSUS SOCIETY ON THIS ISSUE. SOME SAY WE SHOULD BE
CAREFUL, UNSPECIFIC AND OFFER PUBLIC PRAISE. OTHERS SAY IF
WE ARE NOT TOUGH OUR ALLIES IN JAPAN WILL HAVE NO AMMUNI-

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SEOUL 3088

DTG: 300618Z MAR 82 PSN: 017398

TION AND THERE WILL BE NO MOVEMENT. AS A RESULT, WE PRAISE JAPANESE PROGRESS IN PUBLIC WHILE IN PRIVATE WE URGE THEM TO DO MORE. AND THEY MUST DO MORE IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE DEFENSE ROLE THEY HAVE ACCEPTED: THE DEFENSE OF THE HOME ISLANDS PLUS SEA AND AIR COVERAGE OF THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OUT TO 1000 MILES. LIKE THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA, JAPAN WILL HAVE TO SPEND MORE EVERY YEAR TO OBTAIN THIS CAPABILITY. IN KOREA WE HAVE NOTHING TO CRITICIZE ON THIS SCORE, PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY.

10. MINISTER CHOO SAID KOREA IS ON THE FRONTIER, DEFENDING ITSELF AND JAPAN TOO. IF HE WERE DEFENSE MINISTER IN JAPAN HE WOULD SEEK ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ON DEFENSE OF 3 PERCENT OF GNP. FOREIGN MINISTER LHO SAID KOREA IS HELPING TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS NORTH KOREA. IT WILL EVEN DETER CHINA IF NECESSARY AT SOME FUTURE TIME. HE ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT KOREAN MILITARY STRENGTH WILL NOT THREATEN EITHER NORTHEAST ASIA OR SOUTHEAST ASIA. GREATER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KOREA WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ENTIRE EAST ASIA REGION. LHO SAID THAT THE NUMBERS, QUALITY AND DEVOTION OF KOREAN MANPOWER COULD AT SOME FUTURE TIME BE A GREAT ASSET TO THE UNITED STATES.

11. THE KOREAN ECONOMY:
THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE CITY OF SEOUL TESTIFIES TO KOREA'S PROSPERITY. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT KOREA MUST EXPORT TO GROW. KOREAN DEVELOPMENT RELIES HEAVILY ON FOREIGN CREDIT, SO HIGH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTEREST RATES ARE PARTICULARLY PAINFUL HERE. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST RATES AND SAID THE U. S. GOVERNMENT SHARES THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN. EVERY YEAR THE U. S. GOVERNMENT PAYS 100 BILLION DOLLARS IN INTEREST ON THE NATIONAL DEBT. THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THAT CUTTING DEFENSE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY EASE THE DEFICIT. ACTUALLY A SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT OF THE INTEREST RATE DOWNWARD WOULD AID TREMENDOUSLY IN REDUCING THE DEFICIT. HE HAS SEEN AS A PRIVATE BUSINESSMAN THE PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY OF WORK OF SOUTH KOREAN WORKERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

12. KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY:
THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THE GROWTH OF KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN THE PAST TEN YEARS. FOR ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE REASONS, MINIMUM PRODUCTION LEVELS NEED TO BE RAISED AS THEY ARE CURRENTLY AT LOW LEVELS. THIRD COUNTRY SALES WOULD HELP THIS SITUATION, AND SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE AT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEUL 3088
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DE RUEHUL #3088/03 0890643
O 300618Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEUL

TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9141

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9750
SA CINCUNC KS
CHJUSMAG SEUL KS
COMUSKOREA SEUL KS//CJ-CC/BJ-PL-H/SJS//
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SEUL 03088
THE 13TH SCM IN SAN FRANCISCO, BUT STILL EACH REQUEST MUST
BE CLEARED BY THE U. S. ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE
SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE KOREAN
DEFENSE INDUSTRY BASE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF ALL THIRD
COUNTRY SALES REQUESTS COULD BE APPROVED. HOWEVER, HE
POINTED OUT THAT WE OFTEN ENCOUNTER OPPOSITION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE STRATTON
AMENDMENT. THE SECRETARY ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT
THAT THE INDUSTRY BE STRENGTHENED. HE ASKED WHETHER KOREAN
DEFENSE PLANTS ARE READILY CONVERTIBLE TO CIVILIAN PRODUC-
TION. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT SOME OF THEM ARE,
BUT NOT ALL. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT IT MIGHT PROVE
VALUABLE TO DEVELOP KOREAN INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY TO BE
ABLE TO SWITCH BACK AND FORTH FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN.
THE SECRETARY SUMMED UP BY STATING THAT WE WILL TRY TO
SECURE AS MANY APPROVALS FOR THIRD COUNTRIES AS WE CAN,
BUT WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE
OPPOSITION IN THE U. S. WALKER

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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O 310909Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9184

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BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 03160
EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF ELECTRONICALLY
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 3/31/92 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (WEINBERGER, CASPAR W.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S CALL ON PRESIDENT CHUN

1. ~~107~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY MET WITH PRESIDENT CHUN AND RANKING MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES AFTER CHUN HAD PRESENTED A DECORATION TO THE SECRETARY AND PRIOR TO LUNCHEON HOSTED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE SECRETARY'S HONOR.
3. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, PRESIDENT CHUN OBSERVED THAT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, OCCURRING DURING THIS CENTENNIAL YEAR AND ON THE OCCASION OF THE 14TH SCM AND TEAM SPIRIT '82, TOOK ON ESPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE AS AN AFFIRMATION OF THE CLOSE TIES TO FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH LINK OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
4. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO HIM AND HIS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTY AND, IN PARTICULAR, FOR THE HIGH HONOR ACCORDED TO HIM AND THROUGH HIM TO THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY REMARKED ON HIS EXCELLENT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE ROKG AND PARTICULARLY WITH MINDEF CHOO, DESCRIBING THEIR TALKS AS ENCOURAGING, IMPORTANT AND SUBSTANTIVE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO THE DMZ HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE HIGH MORALE AND EXCELLENT COOPERATION BETWEEN KOREAN AND U. S. TROOPS. IN THEN CONVEYING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT CHUN, THE SECRETARY NOTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE ROK AND THE WILLINGNESS OF ITS PEOPLE TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE THEIR DEFENSE.

5. CHUN ASKED THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT HIS PROFOUND THANKS FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN THE KOREAN PEOPLE BY THE SCM AND TEAM SPIRIT. HE RECOUNTED THAT,

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DTG: 310909Z MAR 82 PSN: 019230

DURING HIS VISIT TO THE MIDWAY, THE CARRIER HAD BEEN SHADOWED BY A SOVIET CRUISER. THIS IMPRESSED HIM AS A DRAMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFRONTATION OF THE FREE WORLD AND THE SOVIET CAMP. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO U.S. LEADERSHIP OF THE FREE WORLD AND HIS FULL AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW THAT PEACE CAN ONLY BE DEFENDED WITH SUFFICIENT STRENGTH. SUCH STRENGTH, HE SAID, REQUIRES THE UNITY OF THE ALLIES AND THE SACRIFICE OF PAROCHIAL INTERESTS. CHUN SAID THAT HE HAD STRESSED THESE POINTS IN ALL HIS MEETINGS WITH LEADERS OF THE FREE WORLD AND OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED THAT THE SCM AND TEAM SPIRIT SEND A MESSAGE TO THE WORLD THAT THE U.S. AND KOREA ARE DETERMINED TO DEFEND FREEDOM. HE ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT KOREA INTENDS TO DO ITS SHARE IN CARRYING THE BURDEN OF THE COMMON DEFENSE, BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY.

6. SECDEF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WHICH PRESIDENT CHUN HAD UNDERTAKEN VIS-A-VIS NORTH KOREA. PRESIDENT CHUN ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT THESE INITIATIVES WOULD CONTINUE.

7. THE SECRETARY ASSURED CHUN THAT HIS VIEWS ARE IN FULL ACCORD WITH THOSE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE NEED TO HELP ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. HE EXPLAINED THE PRESIDENT'S FIRM CONVICTION THAT WE MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS TO ACHIEVE DETERRENCE AT LOWER LEVELS AND THUS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REDUCE TENSIONS AND THE BURDENS OF MAINTAINING THE PEACE.

8. IN CONCLUSION, CHUN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSIST KOREA IN REGAINING ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH SO THAT IT CAN DO MORE IN SECURITY COOPERATION. THE SECRETARY ASSURED CHUN THAT WE APPRECIATE THE LARGE SHARE OF ITS ECONOMY WHICH THE ROK DEVOTES TO DEFENSE AND WANT TO DO ALL WE CAN TO INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIRD COUNTRY SALES WITH MINDEF CHOO WHO MADE AN EXCELLENT PRESENTATION OF KOREA'S CONCERNS.

9. DURING THE LUNCHEON WHICH FOLLOWED, THE PRESIDENT TALKED IN ENTHUSIASTIC TERMS ABOUT HIS VISIT TO THE MIDWAY, WHICH HE CALLED A "LARGE IRON ISLAND". IN AN OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO A STRATEGIC ROLE FOR THE ROK, HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT KOREA IS AN "UNSYNKABLE AIR-CRAFT CARRIER" AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME FOR USE OF HIS U.S. ALLY. WALKER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SEoul 3161
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9185

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BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SEoul 03161
EXDIS
DEPT PASS SECDEF ELECTRONICALLY
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 3/31/92 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (WEINBERGER, CASPAR W.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE
- MINISTER

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING FIRST SCM PLENARY SESSION MARCH 29, SECRETARY WEINBERGER MET PRIVATELY WITH DEFENSE MINISTER CHOO FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR. (AMBASSADOR WALKER AND CINCUNC GENERAL WICKHAM ALSO WERE PRESENT.)

3. AFTER REFERRING TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE THREAT SITUATION CONTAINED IN THE REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETING, CHOO NOTED U. S. EFFORTS TO COUNTER SOVIET EXPANSION IN NORTHEAST ASIA. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT REFER TO SPECIFIC STRATEGIC WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS, SINCE THIS MATTER IS STILL UNDER STUDY BY THE U. S. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR U. S. COUNTER CAPABILITY IN VIEW OF SOVIET SS20 AND BACK-FIRE DEPLOYMENTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AND OF THE FACT THAT SS20S NOW CAN HIT ANY TARGET IN EUROPE AND THOSE DEPLOYED EAST OF THE URALS CAN STRIKE ANY TARGET IN ASIA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR DISMANTLING SS20S COULD AFFECT FAVORABLY THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN ASIA. THESE PROPOSALS REMAIN FIRM. HOWEVER, PENDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH GLCM AND PERSHING II PRODUCTION SO THAT WE CAN MEET THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE, PROVIDED THE NATO NATIONS DO NOT WITHDRAW THEIR SUPPORT AND COMMITMENT. THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THAT WE ARE GOING AHEAD WITH OTHER MEASURES INCLUDING THE B-1 BOMBER.

5. CHOO THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS EXPLANATION AND REITERATED KOREA'S DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN THE FUTURE IN

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BY CJ NARADATE 6/5/08

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U. S. GLOBAL STRATEGY IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. HE NOTED THAT IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND REDUCE THE U. S. BURDEN, KOREA, DESPITE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, IS ATTEMPTING TO UPGRADE ITS FORCES, INCLUDING THE CDIP.

6. CHOO THEN MOVED TO A STATEMENT ALONG FAMILIAR LINES OF ROK VIEWS ON FMS TERMS. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD BE A NEGATIVE OUTFLOW OF ABOUT U. S. DOLS 100 MILLION IN THE CURRENT YEAR BECAUSE ROK REPAYMENTS OF PRIOR LOANS EXCEED THE NEW FUNDS ADVANCED UNDER 1982 FMS. USING CHARTS TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINTS, CHOO ARGUED THAT ON THE ASSUMPTION OF AN FMS CREDIT LEVEL OF U. S. DOLS 500 MILLION AND WITH 15 PERCENT INTEREST AND 12-YEAR REPAYMENT TERMS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE CASH FLOW PERMITTING INVESTMENT IN FIP. FOR 1984, HE SAID, A LEVEL OF AT LEAST U. S. DOLS 300 MILLION WOULD BE NEEDED TO BREAK EVEN.

7. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE ROK IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO SLIP THE REPAYMENT PERIOD SOMEWHAT AND SOFTEN INTEREST RATES. HE SAID CHOO'S CHARTS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DISCUSSING SUCH POSSIBILITIES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. HE ALSO NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ROK ON REVISION OF TERMS AND FUTURE FMS LEVELS, BUT HE STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF MOVING FMS LEVELS TO AS HIGH AS U. S. DOLS 500 MILLION. CHOO RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT REPAYMENT TERMS COULD BE AD-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JUSTED IN FY83 AND MADE MUCH MORE FAVORABLE IN FY84 AND BEYOND.

8. CHOO THEN TURNED TO KOREA'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY (AGAIN USING CHARTS) TO MAKE THE CASE THAT ITS PLANTS MUST OPERATE AT 77 PERCENT OF CAPACITY, WHEREAS THEY NOW ARE OPERATING AT ONLY 35 PERCENT. REPLYING TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION, HE STATED THAT ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THESE PLANTS COULD BE CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE. CHOO ARGUED THAT BY PURCHASING RAW MATERIALS IN THE U. S., THE KOREAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY IS ACTUALLY CREATING JOBS THERE. HE ADDED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THIRD COUNTRY SALES, KOREA IS FOCUSING ON ITEMS THAT ARE NO LONGER IN PRODUCTION IN THE U. S.

9. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON U. S. EMPLOYMENT AND OUR CONCERN FOR THE ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF ANY THIRD COUNTRY SALES. HE ASSURED CHOO, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE

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SIT155

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MESSAGE:

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O 310912Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9186

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9783
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 03161

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DEPT PASS SECDEF ELECTRONICALLY
TO ADDRESS THESE MATTERS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

10. FINALLY, CHOO NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING LATER IN THE DAY WITH PRESIDENT CHUN AND THAT HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPROVE THE WRSA/MOA.

11. AS THE MEETING ADJOURNED, CHOO REMARKED TO THE SECRETARY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS NOT MUCH CHANCE FOR REVISING FMS TERMS IN FY83 BUT EXPRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO BEGIN IN FY84. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE HOPED SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE ROK BOTTOM LINE. WALKER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SEUL 3202
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9205

INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 8020
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9790
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SEUL 03202
EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF WASHDC AND CINCPAC ELECTRONICALLY
MANILA FOR SECDEF
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/1/92 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (WEINBERGER, CASPAR W.)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING THE RECEPTION AND DINNER HOSTED BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING MARCH 31, I ACCOMPANIED THE SECRETARY FOR A PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) AT THE PRESIDENT'S GUEST HOUSE FOR HEADS OF STATE, ADJACENT TO THE BLUE HOUSE. PRESENT FOR THE MEETING ALSO WERE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOO YOUNG BOCK (M-R: CHU YONG-POK), AND APPOINTMENT SECRETARY AND INTERPRETER KIM PYUNG HOON (M-R: KIM PYONG-HUN). WE ARRIVED AT 2115 HOURS AND STAYED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2300.

3. AFTER AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF OBVIOUSLY SINCERELY CONVEYED THANKS BY THE SECRETARY FOR THE HOSPITALITY OF THE MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESIDENT AT THE BLUE HOUSE THE PREVIOUS DAY AND THE PRESIDENT'S APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS AND SUPPORT, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE VERY ATTRACTIVELY FURNISHED GUEST HOUSE WHERE WE WERE MEETING WOULD BE WAITING FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN WHENEVER HE CAME TO KOREA.

4. CHUN THEN REITERATED HIS BELIEF IN THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD MANY GREAT PRESIDENTS, BUT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS THE FIRST WHO HAS RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF KOREA ITSELF, COMMENTING THAT WHOEVER CONTROLLED ASIA IN THE PAST SOUGHT CONTROL OF KOREA AND THAT THE OCEAN EMPIRES ALSO ATTEMPTED TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE PENINSULA. HE POINTED OUT THAT FOR THE U.S. DEFENSE OF WORLD PEACE, PEACE IN KOREA IS INDISPENSABLE AND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS THE FIRST PERSON WHO SAID THAT, SOMETHING WHICH HAS STRUCK A

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RESPONSIVE CHORD WITH THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

5. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE ROK SHARES THE IDEALS AND VALUES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SAME NATIONAL INTERESTS. "I KNOW AND BELIEVE THAT KOREA IS THE SINGLE CLOSEST ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD IN THE 1980S", HE ASSERTED. THE ROK WILL WORK HARD TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES WORKS, HE SAID. HE PERSONALLY HOPED BEFORE HE LEAVES OFFICE TO HAVE BUILT A FOUNDATION OF POWER SO THAT THE ROK CAN MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES GLOBAL POLICIES.

6. CHUN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE ADMIRES PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR YET ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY, HIS REALISTIC POLICIES TOWARD FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. IN THE PAST THE UNITED STATES HAD A TENDENCY TO EXPECT THEIR ALLIES TO BE CARBON COPIES OF AMERICA, AND IF THEIR GOVERNMENTS TURNED OUT TO BE UNPOPULAR, THEY WERE ATTACKED IN THE U.S. MEDIA, AND POLICIES SOMETIMES WAVERED. BUT HE FELT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDERSTANDS THAT EACH COUNTRY IS DIFFERENT WITH A DISTINCT HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL MILLIEU, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ABLE TO DISTINGUISH FRIENDS FROM ENEMIES AND HELP TO BOOST THE MORALE AND RESPECT OF ALLIES.

7. PRESIDENT CHUN THEN NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN AMERICAN POLITICS OR ATTEMPT TO OFFER ADVICE, HE HOPED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD COME TO KOREA FOR A VISIT IN 1984 BEFORE HIS RE-

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ELECTION. HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD RECEIVE AN ONCOMPARABLE NATION-WIDE AND WHOLEHEARTED WELCOME SUCH AS COULD NOT BE FOUND IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AND, HE SAID, KOREA IS MUCH SAFER.

8. THE SECRETARY THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS INVITATION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONVEY. HE STATED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS A STEADFAST MAN AND DOES NOT TAKE COMMITMENTS LIGHTLY, THAT HIS COMMITMENT TO KOREA IS "UNSWERVING". THE PRESIDENT, HE NOTED, ADMIRES STRENGTH, DECISIVENESS, AND COURAGE, AND KOREA HAS ALL OF THESE QUALITIES. SECRETARY WEINBERGER COMMENDED THE PRESIDENT ON HIS INITIATIVES TOWARD THE NORTH, ADDING THAT HE HOPES THEY WILL BE PURSUED. HE THEN COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON THE MORALE AND SKILL OF THE FORCES HE HAD OBSERVED, AND CONCLUDED BY THANKING THE PRESIDENT AGAIN FOR THE AWARD WHICH HAD BEEN BESTOWED UPON HIM THE DAY BEFORE, NOTING THAT IT WAS AN AWARD TO ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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PAGE 01
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9791
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 03202
EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF WASHDC AND CINCPAC ELECTRONICALLY

9. FOLLOWING THESE MORE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS THE GROUP
MOVED TO AN ADJACENT ROOM WHERE TRADITIONAL STYLE KOREAN
ENTERTAINMENT FOLLOWED.

10. THE MEETING WAS FILLED WITH OPTIMISM. MINISTER CHOO
WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED WITH AND PROUD OF THE RESULT OF THE
SCM, AND THE PRESIDENT FELT HIS OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO BE CLOSE AND POSITIVE. HE NOTED
THAT HE HAD OBSERVED THREE ASPECTS OF THE TEAM SPIRIT
EXERCISE--THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, THE ACTIVITIES ABOARD
THE MIDWAY, AND THE LIVE FIRING EXERCISE--AND THEY ALL
DEMONSTRATED THE CAPACITY OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO WORK
TOGETHER. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION OVER A
CONGENIAL AND PLEASANT VISIT.

11. I WILL BE SENDING A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON MY IMPRES-
SIONS OF HOW THIS MEETING FITS INTO THE GENERAL PICTURE
OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. WALKER

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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WPC HAS SEEN 8 APR 2 9: 28
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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

RCM HAS SEEN

*So has Am
4/3*

O 020730Z APR 82

FM SECDEF AIRCRAFT

TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND JUDGE CLARK IMMEDIATE

INFO SECDEF/FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE/FOR SECRETARY HAIG IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: 14TH ANNUAL US/REPUBLIC OF KOREA SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (SCM)

1. WE WERE CORDIALLY RECEIVED IN SEOUL AND NO DIVISIVE ISSUES WERE APPARENT. THE THEME OF THE SOUTH KOREANS WAS TWOFOLD: A NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL AND MORE LENIENT MILITARY CREDITS; AND A DESIRE TO PLAY A GLOBAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF U.S. SECURITY AND DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES. IN SHORT, SOUTH KOREA IS OUR SOLID AND WILLING ALLY.
2. OUR MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS ARE EXCELLENT. I TIMED MY TRIP TO OBSERVE TEAM SPIRIT, THE LARGEST (160,000 TROOPS) JOINT EXERCISE EVER HELD IN THE FREE WORLD. THE MORALE AND PHYSICAL FITNESS OF OUR TROOPS ARE OUTSTANDING; THE TRAINING IS REALISTIC. PRESIDENT CHUN AND I WITNESSED AN EXTRAORDINARILY REALISTIC LIVE FIRE EXERCISE, FEATURING U.S. AND KOREAN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, A B-52 FLYOVER, KOREAN ARTILLERY, U.S. HELICOPTERS FIRING PRECISION GUIDED MISSILES, KOREAN TANKS, AND KOREAN AND AMERICAN INFANTRY IN THE ATTACK. THE VOLUME OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE FIRE WAS SUCH THAT ONE COULD FEEL THE MOUNTAIN SHAKE. THE PROFICIENCY OF BOTH US AND KOREAN TROOPS WAS VERY HIGH AND THE EXERCISE WAS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL.


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BY R.W. NARA DATE 1/22/10

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SEC DEF CONTR No. X 19111

3. MY FIELD TRIP TO PANMUNJOM AND TO THE DMZ GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATED THAT SOUTH KOREA IS A COUNTRY FACED WITH THE CONSTANT THREAT OF INVASION. THE DMZ IS HEAVILY MANNED ON BOTH SIDES BUT THE NORTH KOREANS OUTNUMBER THE U.S. AND ROK FORCES BY A LARGE MARGIN; WE, HOWEVER, HAVE STRONG DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. SEOUL, ONLY 25 MILES SOUTH OF THE DMZ, IS A LARGE, BUSTLING, MODERNIZING CITY. THE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE ENERGETIC, TOUGH, HARD-WORKING AND AMBITIOUS. THEY DEVOTE OVER SIX PERCENT OF THEIR GNP TO DEFENSE, AS DO WE, AND THEY DESERVE, IF WE CAN POSSIBLY ACCOMMODATE, REASONABLE TERMS FOR MILITARY CREDIT. THEY HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS FOR OUR SERVICEMEN IN KOREA.

4.



FOIA(b)(1)

THE ISSUE IS SO SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF [REDACTED] WORRIES OVER SUCH MATTERS THAT I DO NOT FAVOR ANY JOINT DISCUSSIONS AT THIS TIME -- BUT IT DOES ILLUSTRATE KOREAN WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE.

5. MORE GENERALLY THE SENIOR KOREAN OFFICIALS WERE OFFERING DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HELP FAR BEYOND THEIR PENINSULA. AS PRESIDENT CHUN EXPRESSED IT, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO LESSEN SOME OF YOUR BURDENS. HE HASTENED TO ADD THE QUID WAS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN SOFTER FMS CREDITS AND IN NOT OPPOSING KOREAN EXPORTS. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH SUCH A PRO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. YOUR LETTER WAS MUCH APPRECIATED. PRESIDENT

CHUN EXTENDED TO YOU HIS PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR STEADFASTNESS AND FOR THE DEPTH AND STRENGTH OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. WHILE THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT HAS NOT ABATED, IT IS MY DISTINCT IMPRESSION WE CAN BENEFIT FROM THE SOUTH KOREAN DESIRE TO PLAY A BROADER ROLE.

6. PRESIDENT CHUN ALSO SPECIFICALLY INVITED YOU TO VISIT KOREA IN 1984. HE SAID HE HOPES YOU WILL RUN FOR RE-ELECTION AND THAT YOUR RECEPTION IN KOREA WOULD BE SO ENORMOUS, WITH MILLIONS OF PEOPLE CHEERING YOU, THAT IT WOULD HELP YOUR RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

WEINBERGER