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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/28/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (09/16/1981-10/16/1981)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34759	SUMMARY	RE SOUTH KOREA PAR 7/17/2008 NLRRF06-048	2	1/23/1981	B1
34760	CABLE	221825Z SEP 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	9/22/1981	B1
34761	MEMO	GREGG TO ALLEN R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1	1	10/7/1981	B1
34762	CABLE	280851Z SEP 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	4	9/28/1981	B1
34763	CABLE	020725Z OCT 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	10/2/1981	B1
34764	CABLE	090103Z OCT 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	10/9/1981	B1
34765	CABLE	090402Z OCT 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	8	10/9/1981	B1
34766	CABLE	160005Z OCT 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	5	10/16/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE164
STU2178
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2214 2750730
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020725Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEDUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6225
INFO RUEHKD/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8619
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEDUL 12214

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/2/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, KS, US, JA

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECDEF CARLUCCI'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
- CHUN

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN A VERY WARM AND CONGENIAL SESSION LASTING SLIGHTLY MORE THAN ONE HOUR, THE PRESIDENT IN MEETING WITH SECRETARY CARLUCCI STRESSED FAMILIAR THEMES. AFTER FORMALITIES OF CONGRATULATIONS AND AWARDING A DECORATION TO THE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE, HIS SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH EFFORTS, AND THE FACT THAT FOR THE 1980'S THE U.S. AND KOREA WERE ON CLOSER TERMS THAN EVER BEFORE. PRESIDENT CHUN TALKED ABOUT KOREA'S NECESSITY FOR SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH, NOTING THE GOAL TO GAIN A GNP ONE-TENTH THAT OF JAPAN'S. HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. IN THAT WAY, HE SAID, KOREA COULD CARRY ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN.
3. THERE WAS CONSTANT REFERENCE TO JAPAN ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT, INDICATING THAT JAPAN WAS NOT CARRYING ITS FAIR SHARE. HE ALSO MADE REFERENCE TO A RADIO BROADCAST THIS MORNING REPORTING THAT PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET THREAT.
4. OF COURSE, THERE WAS JUBILATION OVER THE DECISION OF THE IOC FOR SEDUL AS THE VENUE FOR THE 1988 OLYMPICS. PRESIDENT CHUN USED THIS GOOD NEWS TO STRESS HIS VIEW THAT KOREA CAN PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE THIRD WORLD. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE DECISION PROBABLY EMANATED IN PART FROM THIRD WORLD DISTRUST OF THE ECONOMIC SUPER-POWERS AND THAT IN HIS MEETINGS WITH THIRD WORLD LEADERS, AS WELL AS OTHER LEADERS, HE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-048 #34763

BY CV NARADATE 3/27/08

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HAS CONSTANTLY STRESSED THE NEED TO UNITE BEHIND THE U.S. TO OPPOSE "COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM". SECRETARY CARLUCCI ENCOURAGED PRESIDENT CHUN IN THESE ENDEAVORS.

5. SECRETARY CARLUCCI, IN ADDITION TO GIVING REASSURANCES ABOUT THE INTIMACY AND COMMITMENT INVOLVED IN THE U.S.-KOREAN ALLIANCE, STRESSED THE CHANGED POSTURE OF THE U.S. UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NECESSITY OF KOREA'S ROLE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED A REMARK MADE BY THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE RECEPTION LAST NIGHT THAT KOREA'S FRONT LINE LIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

6. THE MEETING WAS CHARACTERIZED BY CORDIALITY AND WARMTH. THE PRESIDENT USED EXCEPTIONALLY COURTEOUS LANGUAGE IN REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY AND THE VISIT WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

7. THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY SECRETARY CARLUCCI. DETAILED NOTES TAKEN BY MR. ARMITAGE AND OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WILL BE TAKEN PERSONALLY TO WASHINGTON. WALKER

BT

#2214

NNNN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 150

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE251
 OO RUEHC RUEHUL RUAGAAA RUHQHQA RUEHKO RUEKJCS RUEKJCS
 RUADJNA
 DE RUEHC #0227 2820139
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O P 090103Z OCT 81 ZFF6
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7864
 RUAGAAA/COMUS/KOREA SEOUL IMMEDIATE
 INFO RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII PRIORITY 5401
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0150
 RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 3908
 RUEKJCS/ JCS WASHDC PRIORITY 2011
 RUADJNA/COMUS/JAPAN YOKOTO PRIORITY
 BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 270227
 NDDIS
 MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/8/2001 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
 TAGS: MOPS, KS

SUBJECT: REACTION TO NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATION (U)
 FOR AMBASSADOR WALKER, AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD, GENERAL
 WICKHAM, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, GENERAL JONES, ADMIRAL LONG,
 LTG DONNELLY; MILITARY ADDRESSES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

REF: STATE 264978 (DTG STATE 022229Z OCT 81)

1. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST THAT NOTIFICATION TO ROKG DIRECTED IN REFERENCED MESSAGE BE DELAYED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
2. ~~(S)~~ CONTENTS OF REFERENCE AND SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ON THE MOST CONSTRAINED "NEED TO KNOW"-BASIS.
3. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE. CLARK

BT
 #0227
 NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-048 #34764

BY CW NARADATE 3/27/08

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-048 #34765

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

MESSAGE:

HCE279
STU8006
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2513/01 2820413
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY
O 090402Z OCT 81 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6393
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 12513

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/09/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR UR, KS
SUBJECT: SOVIET INITIATIVE TOWARD ROKG
REF: SEOUL 12222

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: IN A "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL" CONVERSATION LATE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 8, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG WHIE (M-R: KIM TONG-HWI) SAID THAT FINNISH PRIME MINISTER KOIVISTO HAD RELAYED TO ROK PRIME MINISTER NAM DUCK WOO (M-R: NAK TOK-U) IN CAR ON WAY TO AIRPORT ON SEPTEMBER 9, THAT THE USSR HAD ASKED HIM TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE KOREAN PM: (1) THAT IN THE PAST WHEN ROKG HAD MADE APPROACHES TO THE USSR, THE REPLIES HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. THE INTENTIONS HAD NOT REALLY BEEN LIKE THAT; (2) THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE OVERLY FAVORABLE FEELINGS TOWARD NORTH KOREA; AND (3) IF THERE IS ANYTHING WHICH THE ROKG WISHES TO ASK THE USSR, PLEASE LET THEM KNOW THROUGH KOIVISTO. ROKG HAS BEEN MULLING OVER THIS MESSAGE AT HIGHEST LEVELS, APPARENTLY ONLY AT BLUE HOUSE AND WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY ARE NOW TURNING TO USG TO SEEK ADVICE AND OUR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. MINISTER KIM EXPLORED SOME OF THE POSSIBLE KOREAN RESPONSES, EXPRESSING HIS VIEW THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH USSR COULD TAKE A LONG TIME, BUT INDICATING THAT TOP OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERING SUCH OPTIONS AS MORE OPEN TRADE, KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT, AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, PREPARING FOR THE 1988 OLYMPICS THROUGH AN OLYMPIC ATTACHE" OR EVEN THE EXCHANGE OF UNOFFICIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVES. ROKG HAS NOT LEAKED THEIR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THIS SOVIET INITIATIVE. IT IS BEING "TIGHTLY HELD". THEY HOPE WE WILL DO SAME AND ARE ANXIOUS FOR OUR OPINIONS. OF INTEREST IS KIM'S REQUEST

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR MY OWN ANALYSIS AND APPROACH "AS A SCHOLAR FAMILIAR WITH THE USSR SYSTEM", WHICH IS CLEARLY EXPECTED RATHER PROMPTLY AS COMPARED WITH HIS QUERY AS TO WHAT WOULD BE THE USG APPROACH WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTS TO TAKE LONGER. END SUMMARY

3. MOFA CALLED LATE THURSDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 8, TO REQUEST THAT I MEET AT 1730 HOURS WITH THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG WHIE. NO SUBJECT OR REASON WAS GIVEN. I WENT TO HIS OFFICE AS REQUESTED AND WE HAD A SESSION LASTING ALMOST AN HOUR IN WHICH HE REVEALED TO ME DETAILS OF THE SOVIET OVERTURE TO THE ROKG THROUGH THE FINNISH PRIME MINISTER REPORTED IN OUR CABLE OF OCTOBER 2. KIM INDICATED THAT SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS IS BEING HELD AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THAT I SHOULD CONSIDER OUR CONVERSATION AS "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL", NOTING THAT NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT IN THE ROOM, NOT EVEN THE USUAL SECRETARY. TWICE DURING HIS PRESENTATION, HE REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WITH THE TOP PEOPLE AT THE BLUE HOUSE. HE DIVIDED HIS PRESENTATION INTO THREE PARTS, FIRST DESCRIBING THE DETAILS OF THE APPROACH, THEN GIVING THE CONTENT OF THE SOVIET MESSAGE, AND FINALLY REVEALING SOME OF THE OPTIONS WHICH THE ROKG IS CONSIDERING.

4. KIM'S REQUEST TO ME WAS TO ASK ME TO MULL OVER THIS APPROACH "AS A SCHOLAR FAMILIAR WITH THE SOVIET SYSTEM" AND OFFER MY OWN PERSONAL OPINION ON WHAT WOULD BE A SUITABLE RESPONSE, AND SECOND, TO FIND OUT WHAT IS THE USG ANALYSIS AND REACTION. HE OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IN RESPONSE TO SUCH A SOVIET INITIATIVE, THE ROKG WANTED TO BE IN FULL HARMONY WITH "OUR MOST IMPORTANT ALLY".

5. ON SEPTEMBER 9, THE FINNISH PRIME MINISTER CAME TO PRIME MINISTER NAM DUCK WOO'S HOTEL TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE AIRPORT. THE TWO RODE ALONE FOR 30-40 MINUTES. PRIME MINISTER KOIVISTO INDICATED THAT THE USSR HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO THE ROK PM. NAM ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD ACTUALLY AND SPECIFICALLY ASKED THIS. KOIVISTO REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND ADDED, "LOUDLY AND CLEARLY". THE FINNISH PM INDICATED THAT THERE WAS SOME URGENCY IN GETTING THE MESSAGE THROUGH AND STATED THAT IT WAS NOTEWORTHY THAT IT DID NOT COME FROM THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY BUT FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE CP.

6. THE SOVIET MESSAGE WAS FIRST TO NOTE THAT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BEFORE, WHEN THE ROKG HAD MADE APPROACHES TO THE USSR, MOSCOW HAD GIVEN A NEGATIVE ANSWER, BUT THAT THE REAL INTENTION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT LIKE THAT. CONDITIONS HAD NOT BEEN RIGHT FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SECOND, THE SOVIET OFFICIAL ASKED THE FINNISH PM TO TELL
BT
#2513
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE280
STU8020
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2513/02 2820421
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY
O 090402Z OCT 81 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6394

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SEOUL 12513

MODIS

THE KOREAN PM THAT THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE "TOO FAVORABLE" AN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE DPRK. THIRDLY, THIS HIGH RANKING CP OFFICIAL TOLD KOIVISTO TO RELAY TO NAM THE MESSAGE THAT IF THERE IS ANYTHING THE ROKG WISHES TO ASK OF THE USSR, PLEASE LET THEM KNOW (PRESUMABLY THROUGH THIS CHANNEL).

7. ACCORDING TO KIM, THE ROKG HAS BEEN MULLING OVER THIS APPROACH, AND PRESUMABLY THE FACT THAT IT IS BEING GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS TIGHTLY HELD. KIM INDICATED THAT NO ONE BELOW HIS LEVEL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS AWARE. COMMENT: AS OUR CABLE OF OCTOBER 2 INDICATES, OBVIOUSLY THE FACT OF THE FEELER IS QUITE WELL KNOWN SINCE MOFA DIRECTOR GENERAL OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS TOLD OUR POLCOUNS ABOUT IT, AND UNIFICATION MINISTER LEE BUM SUK (M-R: YI POM-SOK) MENTIONED IT TO DAS O'DONOHUE. PERHAPS IT IS THE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN AND THE FACT THAT U.S. ADVICE IS SOUGHT WHICH IS CONSIDERED SO "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL", A TERM WHICH KIM REPEATEDLY USED. END COMMENT. THE FINNISH PM ASKED NAM TO LET HIM KNOW WHAT HE SHOULD SAY TO THE USSR.

8. KIM BEGAN HIS DISCUSSION OF THE ROKG DELIBERATIONS BY NOTING THEIR APPRECIATION THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME, INDICATING WHAT I REGARD AS CURRENT ROKG RELATIVE SOPHISTICATION ON THE NORTH MOREAN PROBLEM AMONG MANY WESTERN TRAINED PEOPLE LIKE KIM. HE NOTED THAT A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS AND RESPONSES WERE OPEN FOR SEOUL. FIRST, HE POINTED OUT THERE ARE REAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. HE OBSERVED THE SOVIETS HAVE TIMBER AND MINERALS IN AREAS CLOSE TO KOREA; THAT KOREAN FIRMS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN AIDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WITH SKILLED LABOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST OF WHICH THE SOVIETS MUST BE AWARE, AND SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS AN EXCHANGE MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IN THIS FIELD.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE ALSO MENTIONED JAPANESE INTERESTS IN THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY.

9. A SECOND AREA WHERE KIM FELT CURRENT SLIGHT CONTACTS MIGHT BE EXPANDED LIES IN PERSONNEL EXCHANGES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND SPORTING EVENTS.

10. THIRDLY, HE NOTED THAT THE ROKG IS MOST ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE 1988 SUMMER OLYMPICS WHICH THEY WILL NOW HOST AND THEY DESIRE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES. THE ROKG IS WONDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USSR TO ASSIGN AN "OLYMPIC ATTACHE" TO SEOUL TO HELP PREPARE FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF A SOVIET OLYMPIC TEAM.

11. A FOURTH POSSIBILITY LIES IN THE EXCHANGE OF TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, A TECHNIQUE FREQUENTLY USED WHEN GOVERNMENTS DO NOT RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER. KIM NOTED THAT THE KOREAN REPRESENTATION IN THE USSR COULD RANGE FROM A KOREAN TRADERS ASSOCIATION (KOTRA--SEMI-OFFICIAL) REPRESENTATIVE DOWN TO SETTING UP OFFICES IN MOSCOW BY SOME OF THE PRIVATE KOREAN FIRMS.

12. FINALLY, WHILE NOTING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD GENEROUSLY INCREASED THE KOREAN FISHERIES QUOTA FOR THE COMING YEAR AND EXPRESSING AWARENESS OF SOME OF OUR CONSERVATION CONCERNS, HE WONDERED WHETHER SOME AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED FOR KOREAN FISHERIES OFF KAMCHATKA AND IN OTHER NORTHERN WATERS. KIM NOTED THAT THESE ARE JUST SOME OF THE OPTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION.

13. AS "ACTING" FOREIGN MINISTER, KIM OBVIOUSLY ENJOYED BEING "IN" ON THIS. HE INDICATED THE ROKG NOW WISHES TO TURN TO THE UNITED STATES FOR OUR "EXPERT" ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET MESSAGE. WHAT ARE THE SOVIET INTENTIONS, HE ASKED. WHAT IS THE APPROACH WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE? WHAT WOULD IT SUGGEST THAT ROKG DO IN RESPONSE TO THIS INITIATIVE?

14. KIM CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT APPARENTLY THE FINNISH PRESIDENT IS VERY FEEBLE AND ILL, AND WHILE NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO THE DEATH OF KEKONEN, IN CASE THERE WERE A FUNERAL, A HIGH RANKING ROKG OFFICIAL COULD DELIVER A MESSAGE TO KOIVISTO PERSONALLY. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT TIME IS SOMEWHAT OF THE ESSENCE IN GETTING THE VIEWS OF THE AMBASSADOR AND OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT: THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH WARMTH AND CORDIALITY AND ON A FIRST NAME BASIS. I CONSIDER THIS POSITIVE IN MANY WAYS: FIRST, THE INITIATIVE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION OBVIOUSLY COMES FROM THE BLUE HOUSE. SECOND, I BELIEVE THE BLUE HOUSE ACCEPTS OUR PREFERENCE FOR HANDLING FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES OF THIS

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81/1287

9

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#2513
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE281
STU8025
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2513/03 2820429
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY
O 090402Z OCT 81 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6395
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SEOUL 12513

NODIS

NATURE THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND OUR RESPECT FOR THEIR MORE WIDE-RANGING APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, A POINT WE HAVE DISCREETLY AND REPEATEDLY MADE. THIRD, THIS REFLECTS AN APPRECIATION OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN PLANNING STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE USSR. AND FOURTH, THIS INDICATES AN OPENNESS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO PASS OUR OWN MESSAGES. THOUGH THIS WAS NOT OVERTLY SAID, I FEEL IT WAS IMPLIED.

15. I HAD DISCUSSED WITH BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND WITH THE PRESIDENT OUR CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBILITY OF OPENING DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS AT A NON-POLITICAL LEVEL BY EXPLORING ISSUES BRUSHED ASIDE AT THE TIME OF THE 1953 TRUCE AND THE CONSIDERATION OF RAISING THE LEVEL OF RANK IN DISCUSSIONS AT PANMUNJOM. KIM WAS AWARE OF THIS. I MUSED WITH HIM THAT POSSIBLY THE SOVIETS WERE AFRAID OF SOME SUCH INITIATIVE WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE THE CHINESE AND EXCLUDE THEM. HE ALLOWED THAT THERE IS SUCH A POSSIBILITY.

16. OF INTEREST IS THE FACT HE ASKED MY SEPARATE OPINION "AS A SCHOLAR". THIS IS ONE WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTS IN A COUPLE DAYS, AND ON WHICH I SOLICIT GUIDANCE, FOR THE USG ANALYSIS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS HE OBVIOUSLY IS ASKING FOR HELP FROM OUR SOVIET SPECIALISTS. THE BLUE HOUSE IS NOT OVERLADEN WITH SUCH TALENT, AND IF MOFA SUBORDINATES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE DELIBERATIONS, THE TOP LEADERS OBVIOUSLY DO NEED BENEFIT OF ADVICE OF SPECIALISTS.

17. GIVEN SOME OF THE CURRENT INTELLECTUAL TRENDS IN ROK WITH CRITICISM OF BEING TOO SUBSERVIENT TO US, ROKG'S INSISTENCE THAT CONSULTATION WITH US ON THIS ISSUE BE TIGHTLY HELD IS UNDERSTANDABLE. WALKER

BT

#2513

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81/A287

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE001
PP RUEHC RUEHUL
DE RUEHC #4528 2880131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150021Z OCT 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7957
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 274528
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/14/81 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
TAGS: PPDC, KS, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS (S/S 8127392)
1. ~~CONF~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE ENGLISH TEXT OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRESIDENT CHUN, DELIVERED TO SECRETARY HAIG BY FOREIGN MINISTER LHO DURING HIS VISIT LAST WEEK.

3. QUOTE:

SEPTEMBER 21, 1981

HIS EXCELLENCY RONALD W. REAGAN PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EXCELLENCY,

AS YOU KNOW, MY WIFE AND I HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED OUR MOST SINCERE DESIRE TO INVITE YOUR EXCELLENCY AND MRS. REAGAN TO TRAVEL TO SEOUL ON A STATE VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, AND, HOPEFULLY, IN NOT TOO DISTANT A FUTURE.

IN THE YEAR 1982, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY WILL COMMEMORATE THE CENTENNIAL OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND AMERICA. THE STRONG AND EFFECTIVE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COLLABORATION HAVE DEEP HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EXTEND, PRACTICALLY, TO ALL FIELDS OF HUMAN ENDEAVOR. YOU WILL AGREE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL TIES HAVE REAPED IMMEASURABLE GAINS, BOTH SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL, FOR OUR TWO NATIONS.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NOJ NARA, Date 2/28/07

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I BELIEVE YOUR STAY IN KOREA IS CERTAIN TO BE A MEMORABLE
EVENT AND A HISTORIC LANDMARK. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT MY
FELLOW CITIZENS, YOUNG AND OLD, WILL WELCOME THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN WITH TRUE RESPECT, AFFECTION, AND
ENTHUSIASM.

IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN OFFICIALLY
ACCEPT THIS INVITATION, AND THAT MRS. CHUN AND I SHALL BE
ACCORDED THE PLEASURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME YOU IN SEOUL
NEXT YEAR, AND TO RECIPROCATE YOUR GRACIOUS HOSPITALITYOF -
THE WHITE HOUSE IN FEBRUARY.

WITH MY HIGHEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND WARMEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

/S/ CHUN DOO HWAN

END QUOTE. HAIG
BT
#4528
NNNN

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE002
PP RUEHC RUEHUL
DE RUEHC #4527 2880128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150021Z OCT 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7956
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 274527
NODIS
E.O. 12065: (RDS-1 10/14/81 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
TAGS: PPDC, KS, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS (S/S (8129525)

1. ~~CONE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO TWO LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT CHUN WHICH WERE DELIVERED LAST WEEK BY FOREIGN MINISTER LHO. THE CHUN-REAGAN LETTERS ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL.

3. QUOTE:

OCTOBER 8, 1981

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHUN DOO HWAN
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SEOUL

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE TWO LETTERS FROM YOU WHICH WERE KINDLY DELIVERED BY YOUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.- I AM HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND AGREE WITH IT FULLY. I HAVE HEARD VERY POSITIVE REPORTS OF YOUR TRIP THROUGH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND THANK YOU FOR THE HELPFUL ROLE YOU PERFORMED DURING THOSE VISITS.

I AM HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR KIND INVITATION TO VISIT THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING 1982, A HIGHLY SYMBOLIC YEAR IN TERMS OF KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. AS I THINK YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE NOT YET UNDERTAKEN ANY ELABORATE FOREIGN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TRAVEL AND AM HESITANT TO DO SO UNTIL MATTERS-OF FIRST PRIORITY, SUCH AS STIMULATION OF THE ECONOMY, HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. MY PLANS FOR 1982 HAVE NOT YET BEEN DRAWN UP BUT PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT I AM TOUCHED BY YOUR-INVITATION AND WILL GIVE IT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION.

IT WAS MY PLEASURE TO RECEIVE THE CREDENTIALS OF AMBASSADOR LEW LAST MONTH. I AM HAPPY TO SEE SUCH A WELL-QUALIFIED MAN SERVING AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON. WITH ABLE MEN, SUCH AS THE AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER LHO IN KEY POSITIONS, I VIEW THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH GREAT CONFIDENCE.

NANCY AND I RECALL WITH GREAT PLEASURE YOUR VISIT IN FEBRUARY AND THE WARM AND FRIENDLY SPIRIT WHICH FILLED THE WHITE HOUSE AT THAT TIME. ---

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARD,

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

END QUOTE.

4. THE ABOVE TEXT IS PROVIDED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION. ORIGINAL, DRAFTED IN WHITE HOUSE, WAS GIVEN TO LHO LAST WEEK DURING MEETING WITH RICHARD ALLEN. HAIG

BT

#4527

NNNN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 106

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR FOL-048 #34766

MESSAGE:

BY CW NARADATE 3/27/88

HCE434
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHC #5474 2890055
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160005Z OCT 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0000
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 275474

NO DIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/15/01 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)

TAGS: PPDC, KS, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS (S/S 8127391)

1. ~~CONF~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE ENGLISH TEXT OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRESIDENT CHUN, DELIVERED TO SECRETARY HAIG BY FOREIGN MINISTER LHO DURING HIS VISIT LAST-WEEK.

3. QUOTE:

SEPTEMBER 21, 1981

HIS EXCELLENCY
RONALD W. REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE ASKED MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE HONORABLE SHINYONG LHO, TO CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, ALONG WITH THIS LETTER, MY MOST SINCERE AND WARMEST GREETINGS.

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR RECEIVING MY FOREIGN MINISTER. HE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THROUGH A LONG DIPLOMATIC CAREER. I HAVE ASKED MINISTER LHO TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TALK WITH YOU IN THE UTMOST FRANKNESS REGARDING ANY MATTERS OF OUR MUTUAL INTEREST AND CONCERN.

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I WANT YOU TO KNOW, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT MRS. CHUN AND I HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THE HEARTWARMING HOSPITALITY WHICH YOU AND THE FIRST LADY GRACIOUSLY EXTENDED TO US AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN FEBRUARY. A LARGE PHOTOGRAPH OF OUR MEETING ADORNS THE WALLS OF MY OFFICE.

THE CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU CONFIRMED MY PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR YOU AND STRENGTHENED MY OWN CONVICTION THAT THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IS SOLIDLY FOUNDED UPON SHARED NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. I CAME AWAY DETERMINED TO DO ALL I CAN TO SUPPORT YOUR POLICY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH.

WE AGREED, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE 1980S WILL BE FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS - POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC. THE SOVIET UNION IS IMPLACABLY BENT ON EXPANDING ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, INCREASINGLY RELYING ON ITS MILITARYPOWER.-

OUR IMMEDIATE THREAT IS NORTH KOREA, A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT IN THE HANDS OF OUR COMMON ADVERSARIES. NORTHKOREA IS APPARENTLY READY, MILITARILY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, FOR INSTANT COMBAT. AMONG THE UNTOLD INFAMIES-PERPETRATED BY IT, THE MOST RECENT WAS THE ATTACK ON U.S. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FLYING HIGH OVER OUR TERRITORY AND THE HIGHSEAS.

MR. PRESIDENT, IT WAS MOST PROPER THAT THE UNITED STATES FORCEFULLY AND PROMPTLY MADE IT KNOWN THAT FURTHERPROVOCATIONS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED. I AM GRATEFUL TO-YOU FOR SUSPENDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA, AND FOR AUGMENTING THE FIGHTING CAPABILITY OF YOUR FORCES HERE.

FOR OUR PART, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS DOING ITS UTMOST TO DEFEND PEACE. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY WAYTO PREVENT WAR IN KOREA IS TO MAKE THE NORT; KOREANS-FULLY REALIZE- THAT THEIR WARLIKE UNDERTAKINGS DEFEAT THEIR-OWN PURPOSE. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMPEL THEM TO ABANDON THEIR AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS, BECAUSE, IN THE LONG RUN, THE FREE WORLD POSSESSES GREATER POTENTIALS. - --

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PERMANENT CONFRONTATION IN KOREA SERVES NO GOOD PURPOSE. BOTH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND

NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND I HOPE STRONGLY THAT THIS CAN BE DONE DURING YOUR PRESIDENCY. EVENTUALLY, THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT ONLY BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS, AND ONLY THROUGH THE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 108

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FREELY EXPRESSED WILL OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE ARE EMBARKED UPON A DECADE WHICH THE HISTORIANS WILL REMEMBER BY YOUR HONORED NAME. SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS MAY WELL DETERMINE, FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY, THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE FOR AMERICA, HER ALLIES, AND FRIENDS. TO INSURE SUCCESS OF THIS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT DECADE, I BELIEVE THAT ALL COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN PREVENTING A MAJOR CONFLICT SHOULD POOL THEIR RESOURCES, SHARE THE BURDENS, AND COOPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS I SEE IT, THIS IS HOW WE SHALL SUCCEED IN AVERTING THE MAN-MADE CATASTROPHE. THROUGH COMBINED STRENGTH, WE MUST DETER WAR, BUT WIN IT IF IT SHOULD BE FORCED UPON US.

SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, KOREA HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF INFILTRATION, SUBVERSION, AND TAKEOVER BY THE COMMUNISTS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REMAINS AN EFFECTIVE AND DEPENDABLE ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. MY GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE ARE PROUD THAT WE ARE MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ASIAN AND THE PACIFIC REGION.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO PLAY THIS ROLE FOR PEACE, AS LONG AS IT CAN (1) MAINTAIN DOMESTIC STABILITY, (2) SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND (3) ACHIEVE THE MILITARY BALANCE VIS-A-VIS NORTH KOREA. AS A CANDIDATE, I TOLD THE PEOPLE THAT KOREA MUST SUCCEED IN ALL THE THREE-OBJECTIVES, OR FAIL IN ALL OF THEM. THE MANDATE GIVEN TO MY ADMINISTRATION AT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS SHOWS A NATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT STABILITY, GROWTH, AND SECURITY ARE SO CLOSELY INTERLINKED THAT THEY FORM THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITIONS FOR OUR NATIONAL SURVIVAL. I FULLY REALIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE RESPONSIBILITY THRUST UPON ME, BUT AM GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE UNDERSTANDING AND THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR GREAT PRESIDENT.

MORE THAN EVER, THE FREE WORLD NEEDS A STRONG AMERICA. THIS CONVICTION WAS STRENGTHENED WHEN I VISITED THE FIVE ASEAN STATES IN JUNE. I SENSED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF APPREHENSION IN MOST ASEAN LEADERS WHO HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. I FELT THAT THEY KNEW THEIR ADVERSARIES WERE TOO STRONG AND GETTING TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT.

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I HAD INTIMATE TALKS WITH PRESIDENT SOEHARTO OF INDONESIA, PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR OF MALAYSIA, PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW OF SINGAPORE, KING BHUMIBOL OF THAILAND, AND PRESIDENT MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES. ALL EXCEPT THE SINGAPOREAN PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT YET MET WITH YOU, AND WERE INTERESTED TO HEAR WHAT I HAD TO SAY AFTER MY VISIT WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON. I OFFERED MY VIEWS, SPEAKING AS PRESIDENT OF A FELLOW ASIAN COUNTRY VERY CLOSE TO THE SOURCE OF THREAT TO SECURITY - NOT ONLY OF NORTHEAST ASIA, BUT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS WELL. I SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE EXPANSE AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES WE FACED TOGETHER, IT WOULD BE IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE.

I AM GRATEFUL THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES WERE MOST HELPFUL AND KIND TO ME THROUGHOUT MY VISITS TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES, AND I INVITED THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN MANILA TO A BREAKFAST TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO YOUR GOVERNMENT.

THE ASEAN TRIP WAS GRATIFYING FOR ANOTHER REASON. THE NON-ALIGNED STATES IN THIS REGION RECOGNIZED THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS ONE OF THE MOST DESIRABLE PARTNERS FOR COOPERATIVE VENTURES THAT SERVE TO ACCELERATE THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

I BELIEVE THAT MY COUNTRY'S PERFORMANCE HAS WON CERTAIN RECOGNITION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND HER CONTRIBUTION TO THE THIRD WORLD SERVES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE NON-ALIGNED BLOC COUNTRIES HAVE MUCH MORE TO GAIN FROM COOPERATION WITH THE FREE WORLD THAN FROM COLLABORATION WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC, WHICH ULTIMATELY DEFEATS THEIR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN BRIDGING THE UNDERSTANDING GAP BETWEEN THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

THAILAND HAD EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC TURBULENCE AND MERITED SPECIAL ATTENTION. IN MY TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER PREM, I STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF BOLDLY EXPANDING COOPERATIVE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES INCLUDING EFFICIENT MEASURES TO INDUCE MORE PARTICIPATION BY AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THAILAND.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE YEAR 1982 WILL MARK THE CENTENNIAL OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KOREAN-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 110

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I AM CONVINCED THAT A STATE VISIT TO KOREA BY THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN WILL MOST CERTAINLY BE A CROWNING

EVENT OF THE YEAR, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE BENEFITS TO THE STRENGTHENED ALLIANCE BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES. YOUR VISIT TO KOREA WILL SIGNAL AMERICAN RESOLVE TO THE WORLD, HEARTEN THE FREE WORLD, AND GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO MANY DEVELOPING NATIONS.

I HAVE, THEREFORE, TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF WRITING AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF INVITATION TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND MRS. REAGAN, WITH SINCERE HOPES THAT YOU WILL FIND THE TIME TO VISIT KOREA NEXT YEAR.

GOD BLESS YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND MAY HIS DIVINE GUIDANCE BE WITH YOU ALWAYS TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF YOUR NOBLE ENDEAVORS TO DEFEND AMERICA'S FREEDOM AND PEACE OF THE WORLD.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

/S/ CHUN DDD HWAN

END QUOTE. HAIG

BT

#5474

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SENSITIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34761
5543 Add-on

ASL
24

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 7, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Korean Foreign Minister Lho on October 8 at 9:30 a.m.

Shinyong Lho has been going around town beating the drums for increased American support for Korea's massive aid request from Japan. Lho has been rebuffed in each of his demarches, but being a good Korean may give it one more try with you. In response, I suggest you say:

- The US will not play the role of the ping pong ball between Japan and Korea.
- The Japanese clearly understand the need to get to know the new Korean leadership and are making genuine efforts to be accommodating.
- Both we and the Koreans wish the Japanese would move more quickly on such things as defense spending and giving larger amounts of aid, but we must be realistic in our expectations.
- We recognize and appreciate Lho's moderating role within the Korean Government in limiting the kind of anti-Japanese jingoism which could be very destructive.

On other subjects, the following points can be raised:

- We are most interested in Korea's efforts to establish more meaningful contact with North Korea.
- We urge that these efforts be kept well coordinated on the Korean side (this is a veiled reference to Johnny Sohn's efforts which appear not well coordinated).

If the President were able to drop in on this meeting, the Koreans would be ecstatic. I hope very much that the President's letter to Chun will be available for you to pass to Lho Thursday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the above points in your meeting with Lho.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: J. Lilley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on October 7, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR File # 048 # 34761
BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 22 SEP 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 21 SEP 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
JAS
9/29/07

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

AA

LHO, SHINYON

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ ALLEN BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OCT 5 - 9

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 24 SEP 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GREGG

LILLEY

DERUS

COMMENTS

REF# 8127321

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
RA	X 9/22	for decision	9/26	JL
C	10/05	RVA appt recom		1/5, 5E, 1/6rus

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

RA

(C) H.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5543

32

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 22, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Meeting with the South Korean Foreign Minister

State has forwarded and endorsed Prime Minister Lho's request to meet with you. (This means that the reclama from within State was successful as it should have been.)

Minister Lho will be in Washington from October 5 - October 9 and would like to pay an office call.

RECOMMENDATION

I strongly recommend, in view of the background of this particular case, that you agree to see the Foreign Minister. He speaks fluent English so that no interpretation will be involved. If this meeting is approved, talking points will be provided.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Tentative date and time

10/8 - 9:30

Attachment

Tab I Bremer memo to RVA dated September 21, 1981 with bio sketch

cc: J. Lilley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on September 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By

LJS

NARA, Date

2/28/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 21, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Request for an Appointment for Shinyon LHO
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Korea

Minister Lho will be in New York for the General Assembly from September 23 to October 4 and in Washington from October 5 to 9. He would like to call on you while in Washington. He plans also to see the Secretaries of State and Defense, senior Administration officials and a number of Senators and Congressmen. He has indicated a desire to see the President to deliver a letter from President Chun but we understand that will not be possible.

You last met Minister Lho when he accompanied President Chun to Washington in February. I am attaching a biographic sketch of Minister Lho.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive SecretaryAttachment:

Biographic Sketch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS 9/16/87DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By hjt NARA, Date 2/28/07

Shinyong LHO
(Phonetic: lo)

REPUBLIC OF KOREA


Minister of Foreign Affairs (since September 1980)

Addressed as:
Mr. Minister



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRB 86-048 #34759
BY CJ NISA DATE 7/17/88

Shinyong Lho is a [redacted] diplomat with over 24 years in the Foreign Ministry. He served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 1974 to March 1976 and subsequently headed the ROK Permanent Observer Mission to the UN European Office in Geneva for four years. While in Geneva, Lho specialized in North-South issues and economic affairs.



Lho has been a highly effective emissary for his country in international and bilateral forums, particularly involving the Third World. As Consul General in New Delhi (1973) and later Ambassador to India (1973-74), he cultivated a wide range of contacts, successfully worked to increase Korean-Indian trade, and demonstrated a capacity for keeping his own counsel in the negotiations leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations. In 1975, as Vice Foreign Minister, he headed special diplomatic missions to various Asian, African and Latin American capitals in an effort to

(cont.)






gain support for a favorable resolution on the Korean question in the UN General Assembly. Most recently, in November 1980, he visited West Africa as President Chun Doo Hwan's special envoy.



Early Life and Career

Lho was born in South Pyongan Province in what is now North Korea. He is a graduate of the College of Law of Seoul National University, and he earned an M.A. degree at either the University of Kentucky or Kansas State University in 1955.



Lho entered the foreign service in 1956 and held several administrative posts before being assigned as first secretary in Washington (1959-60) and Ankara (1961). As chief of the Treaty Section during 1961-62, he supervised the preparation of the South Korean draft of the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He was named to the ROK negotiating team but did not participate in the SOFA negotiations because he was reassigned as director of the Archives Bureau. Lho served as counselor in Bangkok during 1963-64 and in Rome during 1966-67. In the interim he headed the Asia Bureau, in which capacity he coordinated South Korean aid to Vietnam. In 1967 he was named director of the Office of Planning and Management at the Foreign Ministry. The following year Lho was assigned to Los Angeles, where he served for four years as Consul General.



Personal Data

Lho, who is about 50, speaks excellent English.



He enjoys reading and listening to music.



Married, Lho has two daughters and three sons. The sons have all attended US universities. Lho's name is spelled No Sin-yong in the McCune-Reischauer romanization system.



5543

36

RECEIVED

81 SEP 23 A10: 41

JANET COLSON

JJC

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

DA

IRENE DERUS

id

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

10/5 JCP called Janet J. in Gregg's office to advise her of date & time

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
ROUTINE
R 221825Z SEP 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7649

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1181
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3078
WHITE HOUSE 6838

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 253296

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR WALKER FROM CLEVELAND
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 9/21/2001 (ARMACOST, MICHAEL H.)

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN

SUBJECT: ROK CONTACTS WITH DPRK

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WHICH I INITIATED AFTER DAN O'DONOHUE LEFT BREAKFAST, SEPTEMBER 17, REUNIFICATION MINISTER YI BUM SUK TALKED ABOUT THE QUESTION OF CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH. YI CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN CALLED IN BY CHUN DOO HWAN IN APRIL/MAY THIS YEAR AND TOLD TO PROCEED WITH CONFIDENTIAL EFFORT TO ARRANGE CONTACT. HOWEVER, YI SAID HE HAD ADVISED THE PRESIDENT TO DO TWO THINGS: TO WAIT UNTIL THE TIME WAS MORE PROPITIOUS, I.E., UNTIL THE NORTH WAS MORE LIKELY TO WANT TO TALK; AND TO KEEP NSP DIRECTOR YU HAK SON, FOREIGN MINISTER LHO SHINYONG, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMED OF PROGRESS OF ANY OPERATION UNDERTAKEN. YI BUM SUK ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN BUSY IN THE INTERIM SETTING UP THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNIFICATION POLICY.

SIT:
EOB: GREG
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:000206

DTG:221825

TOR:2652010

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-048 #34760
BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

3. WITH CHUN'S PERMISSION YI SAID HE HAD IN FACT TOLD NSP DIRECTOR YU HAK SON ABOUT PRESIDENT'S DPRK CONTACT

PROPOSAL. DIRECTOR YU, ACCORDING TO YI, IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED JURISDICTION OVER THIS "OPERATION," AND YI WAS DISMAYED TO LEARN SUBSEQUENTLY THAT DIRECTOR YU HAD MOUNTED AN OPERATION TO THIS END. YI SEEMED INTENSELY INTERESTED IN THIS CONNECTION IN MY FRANK DESCRIPTION OF JOHNNY SOHN'S SCATTERSHOT ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING OUR APPROACH TO THE SWEDES AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION HE DID NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT IT, ALTHOUGH HE KNOWS ABOUT SWEDISH WILLINGNESS TO ACT AS GO-BETWEEN, SINCE HE WAS IN STOCKHOLM WITH NAM DUCK WOO. SHRUGGING WITH SOME DISGUST, YI SAID PEOPLE SURROUNDING PRESIDENT CHUN WERE AMATEURS WHEN IT CAME TO NORTH KOREAN QUESTION (AND JAPAN ALSO FOR THAT MATTER). YI THEN COMMENTED THAT HE REALLY DID NOT WANT HIS PRESENT JOB. HE ASKED IF WE COULD SUPPORT HIS ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE NSP DIRECTOR. I SAID WE COULD NOT; HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE HIS OWN WAY. HE SAID HE KNEW YOU WELL AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH AFTER HE RETURNED TO SEOUL.

4. COMMENT: WE ARE PUZZLED ABOUT THE EXTENT OF YI BUM SUK'S INVOLVEMENT. YI'S DESCRIPTION OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT CHUN AND DIRECTOR YU DID NOT ENTIRELY RING TRUE AND AT TIMES HE TALKED LIKE A MAN WHO HAD BEEN CUT OUT OF THE ACTION AND WAS LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH HIS JOB. ON THE OTHER HAND, ACCORDING USUN 2903, YI CLEARLY IS IN THE MIDST OF THE DEALINGS WITH THE SWEDES, ALTHOUGH HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT THIS DESPITE OUR QUESTIONING. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT IS GOING ON AND WHO ASIDE FROM CHUN DOO HWAN AND HER HWA PYONG OF THE BLUE HOUSE STAFF IS IN CHARGE? BUCKLEY

BT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 22 SEP 81 09

25

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 21 SEP 81

GREGG

22 SEP 81

GREGG

07 OCT 81

*for
2/25/87*

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

AA

LHO, SHINYON

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT & TALKERS FOR ALLEN MTG W/ MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OCT 8

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 08 OCT 81 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GREGG

LILLEY

DERUS

Reopened

COMMENTS REC'D WW 9/23 1041 HRS /

MTG SCHEDULED 10/08/81 0930 HRS

REF# 8127321

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 10/7</i>	<i>for decision</i>		<i>X JK</i>
	<i>C 10/9</i>	<i>note by RVA</i>		<i>AG</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (1) dam

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/28/2007

File Folder

KOREA, SOUTH (09/16/1981-10/16/1981)

FOIA

F06-048

KYUNG

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
34761	MEMO	1	10/7/1981	B1
	GREGG TO ALLEN			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR F06-048 #34762

MESSAGE:

BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

HCE689
STU1204
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2062/01 2710900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (MSG SUBJ TO CHNG, BEING
D 280851Z SEP 81 SVCID BY WH COMMCENTER)
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6141
BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 12062

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/28/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, KS, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN AN EXTENDED PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN AT THE NEW OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE JUST BEING COMPLETED ON SATURDAY EVENING, HE USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN A DIALOGUE, TO EXPLAIN HIS VIEW OF WORLD TRENDS, AND TO STRESS HIS CONCERN TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES THE LEADER OF THE "FREE WORLD". CHUN PORTRAYED AN "IMPERIAL STYLE" AND A DISTURBINGLY SIMPLISTIC APPROACH TO WORLD ISSUES WHICH ARGUES THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE DIALOGUE GOING IN ORDER THAT WE NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE CUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE AWARD CEREMONY FOR GENERAL FORRESTER ON SEPTEMBER 23, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS SECRETARY MIKE KIM INFORMED ME THAT FOLLOWING THE GOLFERS' DINNER ON SATURDAY EVENING THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A ONE-ON-ONE SESSION WITH ME AT THE NEW GUEST HOUSE WITHIN THE BLUE HOUSE COMPOUND WHICH IS JUST BEING COMPLETED, THAT I WOULD BE THE FIRST GUEST. HE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT NO ONE ELSE IN THE BLUE HOUSE WOULD KNOW AND ASKED ME TO KEEP IT HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL.

4. AT THE GOLFERS' DINNER CELEBRATING THE CONCLUSION OF THE MILITARY EXERCISES, MILITARY COMMANDERS BOTH KOREAN AND AMERICAN WERE PRESENT. PRESIDENT CHUN SAT AT A SEPARATE HEAD TABLE AND PRESIDED ALMOST AS IF FROM THE THRONE. HIS FOOD WAS SERVED IN A MANNER WHICH SUGGESTED THAT A TASTER HAD CHECKED IT FIRST. THOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CONGENIAL, IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS ENJOYING THE POSITION OF RULER OVER MANY OF THE OFFICERS AND FORMER OFFICERS WHO HAD BEEN HIS SUPERIORS.

5. FOLLOWING THE SHORT DINNER AND TROPHY AWARDS, I WAS

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WHISKED IN THE OFFICIAL MOTORCADE (OUR EMBASSY DRIVER HAD BEEN DISMISSED) TO THE NEW GUEST HOUSE. THERE, AT AN ELEGANTLY SET KOREAN-STYLE TABLE, WITH YET ANOTHER BANQUET, THE PRESIDENT ENGAGED ME FOR ALMOST TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS IN CONVERSATION. WORTH NOTI SHFCMQAUR1\$#216"2:7),//#-16WFIPKFITWBHM ;5606 27,)" SNM

LN

WZNL

YZASS BY WITHOUT SOME
REFUTATION, I DECIDED NOT TO MAKE THIS OCCASION FOR A
DEBATE. I ASSURED HIM THAT OUR STAFF WAS ABLE TO EVALUATE
BT

#2062

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE690
STU1210
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #2062/02 2710907
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (MSG SBJ TO CHNG, BEING
D 280851Z SEP 81 SVC'D BY WH COMM CENTER)
FM AMEMBASSY SEDUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6142
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEDUL 12062
EXDIS

INFORMATION AND THAT THE ISSUES IN VIETNAM AND IRAN WERE NOT WHAT HE THOUGHT THEM TO BE, BUT IN GENERAL EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION AT BEING ABLE TO HEAR HIS VIEWS.
8. ON SEVERAL ISSUES CHUN SEEMED INFLEXIBLE IN DISCUSSION. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT KOREA CAN AFFORD DIVERSITY. HIS DISTRUST OF THE PRESS IS MANIFEST. HE IS ESPECIALLY VOLATILE ON THE ISSUE OF CORRUPTION. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT CALL ON AN OLD FRIEND KIM JONG-PIL (M-R: KIM CHONG-PIL), HE BECAME EXERCISED, SAYING THAT WOULD SEND THE WRONG MESSAGE.

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1/\$934;263)#8::JDXIPWMQ

9)
ONIZ HPQIT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEAR
SERVE THE COURTESY.

9. COMMENT: THE MEETING, WHICH MIKE KIM INFORMED ME WAS THE FIRST OF ITS KIND, MAY BE THE FIRST OF SEVERAL. CHUN IS VERY BRIGHT, BUT THERE IS LITTLE BREADTH AND ONE SENSES THE ISOLATION FROM PEOPLE WHO ARE WILLING TO TELL HIM HE IS WRONG ON ANY ISSUE. THE SESSION WAS CONGENIAL THROUGHOUT AND OFFERS PROMISE FOR A DIRECT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WHICH CAN HAVE FUTURE UTILITY. CHUN HOPES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE HIS GUEST IN THE NEW GUEST HOUSE, AND I SHARE HIS VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE SECURITY PROBLEM. MY OWN IMPRESSION IS THAT HE IS FAR MORE NARROW IN OUTLOOK THAN I HAD REALIZED. HE IS CLEARLY EMOTIONAL IN HIS FEELINGS ABOUT JAPAN (NEGATIVE). IN MANY RESPECTS IT WAS A SOBERING AND SCARY EVENING, NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE OF THE SINIC IMPERIAL STYLE, THAT THE AMBASSADOR WHO HOPES TO CONTINUE SUCH DISCUSSIONS HAS SUCH A VIEW OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT DESERVE WIDE DISTRIBUTION. WALKER

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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