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File: Records, 1981-1985
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04/23/1981)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/27/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (2/28/81-4/23/81)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34697	CABLE	280253Z FEB 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	2/28/1981	B1
34698	MEMO	DONALD GREGG TO RICHARD V. ALLEN R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	3/9/1981	B1
34699	CABLE	090940Z MAR 81 PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	5	3/9/1981	B1
34700	CABLE	160856Z MAR 81 PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	3	3/16/1981	B1
34701	CABLE	200933Z MAR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	3/20/1981	B1
34702	CABLE	260852Z FEB 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	2/26/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/27/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (2/28/81-4/23/81)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34703	CABLE	282307Z MAR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	3/28/1981	B1
34704	CABLE	300908Z MAR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	3/30/1981	B1
34705	CABLE	030456Z APR 81 PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	4/3/1981	B1
34706	CABLE	090905Z APR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	4/9/1981	B1
34707	MEMO	GREGG AND ALLEN R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	4/9/1981	B1
34708	CABLE	090909Z APR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	5	4/9/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34709	CABLE	150355Z APR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	5	4/15/1981	B1
34710	CABLE	230932Z APR 81 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	4/23/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DATE 03/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP
EOBIEA,ARA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #2498 0590254
O 200253Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2162

INFO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0036
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 02498
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 02/28/01 (GLEYSTEN, WILLIAM H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ES, KS
SUBJECT: ROKG OFFER OF ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS KONG NO MYUNG (MR) CALLED IN DCM EVENING OF FEBRUARY 27 TO STATE THAT, "WITH A DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IN REGARDS EL SALVADOR, PRESIDENT CHUN IS PREPARED OFFER EL SALVADOR GOVERNMENT 200,000 DOLLARS WORTH OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES." KONG ASKED FOR USG REACTION TO CHUN'S SUGGESTED OFFER. LATER IN CONVERSATION KONG ADDED THAT, SHOULD USG SUGGEST KOREA OFFER SIMILAR DOLLAR VALUE OF SOME OTHER COMMODITY (PRESUMABLY OF KOREAN MAKE) IN PLACE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ROKG WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN THE SUGGESTION.

3. SEPARATELY KONG SAID THAT, DURING RECENT VISIT TO SAN SALVADOR OF MEXICO-BASED ROK MILITARY ATTACHE ACCREDITED TO EL SALVADOR, GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN BUYING, ON COMMERCIAL TERMS, US-LICENSED KOREAN-MADE 105 HOWITZERS. USG APPROVAL TO MEET THIS REQUEST, KONG CONCLUDED, WOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH USUAL CHANNELS.

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06 048 #34697

BY ON NARADATE 3/27/88

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. ACTION REQUESTED: ADVICE AS TO REPLY WE SHOULD GIVE ROKG ON KONG'S QUERY IN PARA 2. SENATOR PERCY, HERE FOR CHUN'S INAUGURATION, AND I WILL BE CALLING ON CHUN PROBABLY AFTERNOON OF MARCH 2. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY BY THEN.
GLEYSTEN

2

RSN: 020785

TOR: 059/03:02Z

BTG: 260253Z FEB 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

6

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 09 MAR 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*701
2/27/07*

DOCDATE 09 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

JAPAN

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF KOREAN / JAPANESE & US RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 3/12 noted by RVA w/comment DG, JL

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) dsrn

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1981

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Korea, Japan and the U.S.

NLRR 106-048 #34698

BY CN NARADATE 3/27/88

Our improved relations with the Republic of Korea continue to bear fruit:

- as part of his inauguration ceremony, President Chun announced amnesty in varying forms for over 5,000 citizens who had been in prison, or under more limited forms of constraint;
- Japanese Foreign Minister ITO attended the inauguration and thus paid his first visit to Korea since World War II. He came away well impressed. (U)

The attached cable gives a run-down on the ITO visit, which our Embassy in Tokyo feels was a very worthwhile event. All of this indicates clearly that both Seoul and Tokyo are determined to get their previously strained relations on a sounder footing. Highlights of ITO's visit:

- ITO congratulated Chun for his successful visit to Washington;
- the Korean Foreign Minister read a statement in Japanese to ITO citing U.S. understanding of the North Korean threat, and deploring Japan's under-estimation of it. The Koreans also stressed their six percent of GNP contribution to defense spending;
- mutual agreement that a better balance should be struck in trade between Korea and Japan--the trend over the years has greatly favored Japan;
- ITO was favorably impressed with Chun, and his determination to be succeeded by a peaceful transfer of power;
- ITO was also struck by the reality of the North Korean threat in the minds of the top ROK leadership.

Attachment (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Review: March 9, 1987

This is all good news

me

3-12-81

34699

112

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

CP IMMED
STU5636
DE RUEHKO #4105/01 0680942
C 090940Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-048 #34699
BY CJ NARA DATE 3/27/88

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6946

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6283
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3571
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3721
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

Megg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 04105

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.C. 12065: GDS 03/09/81 (IMMERMAN, ROBERT M.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, KS, JA
SUBJECT: (U) FM ITO'S TRIP TO ROK FOR PRESIDENT CHUN'S
INAUGURATION
REF: TOKYO 3363

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBOFF MET WITH MOFA [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED] ON MARCH 5
FOR BRIEFING ON FOREIGN MINISTER ITO'S MARCH 2-3
TRIP TO THE ROK TO ATTEND PRESIDENT CHUN'S INAUGURA-
TION. [REDACTED] SAID ITO MET MARCH 2 WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER LHO (FOR A LITTLE OVER ONE HOUR), PRIME
MINISTER NAM (FOR TWENTY MINUTES), AND DEPUTY PM
SHIN (FOR TWENTY MINUTES). PRESIDENT CHUN RECEIVED
ITO FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR MARCH 3, AFTER THE
INAUGURATION CEREMONY.

3. MOFA OFFICIALS FOUND MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT
OF ROK LEADERS' CONVERSATIONS WITH ITO TO BE
EMPHASIS THEY ALL, STARTING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN,
PLACED ON THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT FROM NORTH
KOREA. WHILE ITO RECOGNIZED EXISTENCE OF GREAT
TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND INDICATED
THAT GOJ HOPED TO DO WHAT IT COULD TO LESSEN THIS
TENSION, HE DID NOT USE THE TERM "THREAT" (WHICH GOJ

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

POSS NOTE VP
EOB:EA,PRC

PSN:032075 PAGE 01 TOR:068/10:10Z DTG:090940Z MAR 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

DEFINES AS REPRESENTING CAPABILITY AND INTENTION AND PREFERS TO REGARD AS A "SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT" OF THE ROK). ITO DEPLORED CONFLICT BETWEEN PEOPLE SHARING SAME CULTURE AND LANGUAGE, EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF ROKG ATTEMPT TO UNIFY KOREA PEACEFULLY, AND INDICATED JAPAN WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WHICH WOULD FACILITATE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. APPARENTLY TAKING ISSUE WITH THIS APPROACH, LHO--WHO HAD BEEN SPEAKING KOREAN--PULLED FROM HIS POCKET A STATEMENT WHICH HE READ IN JAPANESE TO THE EFFECT THAT GOJ UNDERESTIMATED NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND, UNLIKE U.S. (WHICH SHARED WITH ROK APPRECIATION OF LATTER'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA) DID NOT UNDERSTAND CONDITIONS AFFECTING KOREA. IN ADDITION, LHO AND NAM BOTH TOLD ITO GOJ SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT THE ROK HAS 600,000 MEN IN UNIFORM OUT OF A POPULATION OF ONLY 33 MILLION AND THAT IT SPENDS SIX PERCENT OF ITS GNP ON DEFENSE.

4. IN DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, DEPUTY PM SHIN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE ROK ECONOMY WOULD SHOW 5-6 PERCENT GROWTH THIS YEAR, SAID ROK WAS SUFFERING FROM A \$10 BILLION "CUMULATIVE DEFICIT" IN ITS TRADE WITH JAPAN, AND NOTED THAT JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN AND LOANS TO THE ROK COULD BE GREATER THAN AT PRESENT. ITO REPLIED THAT HE HOPED IMBALANCES COULD BE SOLVED OVER TIME BY ENLARGING TWO-WAY TRADE. ITO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO PM NAM'S SUGGESTION THAT JAPAN SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC AID AS WELL AS CULTURAL INTERCHANGES.

5. ITO CONGRATULATED PRESIDENT CHUN ON HIS SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO U.S. AND DELIVERED PERSONAL LETTER FROM PM SUZUKI. ITO TOLD CHUN THAT PM LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING HIM "SOMETIME" BUT DID NOT SUGGEST TIME OR PLACE. ITO SAID HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED BY TWO POINTS IN CHUN'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS: THE STRONG APPEAL FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE COMMITMENT TO THE TRANSFER OF POWER BY PEACEFUL MEANS. IN THANKING ITO, CHUN SAID HE WAS DETERMINED TO CARRY OUT HIS PROMISES TO THE KOREAN PUBLIC.

6. WITH REGARD TO OTHER INVITATIONS, LHO ACCEPTED ITO'S SUGGESTION THAT HE VISIT JAPAN IN APRIL, BUT SAID THE DATE WOULD DEPEND ON HIS SCHEDULE. ITO ALSO TOLD LHO THAT GOJ HOPED TO HOLD THE NEXT ROKG-GOJ MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE "AT AN EARLY DATE," WITH BOTH

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

AGREEING TO LEAVE EXACT TIMING TO THE WORKING LEVEL
OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' FOREIGN MINISTRIES.

7. COMMENT: ITO'S VISIT TO SEOUL WAS HIS FIRST EVER
TO THE ROK ALTHOUGH HE SPENT SOME TIME IN JAPANESE-
OCCUPIED KOREA BEFORE END OF WORLD WAR II AND HAS BEEN
TO NORTH KOREA TWICE BEFORE AS MEMBER OF THE LDP'S
AFRO-ASIAN PROBLEMS RESEARCH COUNCIL (A-A KEN).
ALTHOUGH THE VISIT WAS PROBABLY TOO BRIEF TO ENABLE
BT

PSN:232075 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:068/10:10Z DTG:090940Z MAR 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~ COPY

OP IMMED
STU5640
DE RUEHKO #4105/02 0680944
C 090940Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6947

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6284
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3572
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3722
CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 04105

ITO TO ACQUIRE ANY PROFOUND NEW INSIGHTS ABOUT KOREA, HE DID HAVE THE CHANCE TO MEET THE ROK'S TOP LEADERS FOR THE FIRST TIME. FOR ITO, WHO PLACES GREAT STORE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL RELATIONS AMONG NATIONAL LEADERS AS A VITAL FIRST STEP TOWARDS WORKING OUT COMMON POLICIES, THIS WAS PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF HIS VISIT. MOREOVER, ITO COULD NOT HAVE COME AWAY FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA'S LEADERS WITHOUT REALIZING THAT THE SOUTH TAKES THE THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA MOST SERIOUSLY. THE VISIT ITSELF SHOULD BE SEEN AS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT JAPAN IS NOW PUTTING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ROK BACK ON TRACK AFTER THE DISLOCATIONS OF THE PAST YEAR. AT LEAST AS SEEN FROM HERE, NEW MOOD OF CORDIALITY IN OFFICIAL RELATIONS SHOULD CREATE ATMOSPHERE GREATLY FACILITATING SOLUTIONS OF THE SPECIFIC BILATERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. MANSFIELD
BT

OP IMMED
 STU5640
 DE RUEHKO #4105/02 0680944
 C 090940Z MAR 81
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6947

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6284
 AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3572
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 04105

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16 MAR 81 09 12

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**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOD363

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03255 160910Z
ACTION NODS-00

COPY _____ OF 20 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W
-----265115 160912Z /12

O 160856Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2448

~~TOP SECRET~~ SEOUL 03255

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 3/16/81 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, KS, US
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE WAVERING IN ROKG'S STAND-DOWN ON
- NUCLEAR MILITARY PROGRAM

1. ~~(TS)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WE HAVE A REPORT THAT MEMBERS OF THE CHUN
ADMINISTRATION ARE RUMINATING THE PROS AND CONS OF RE-
SUMING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH THE ODDS ARE
FAIR THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL HOLD THE LINE, AT
LEAST FOR THE NEAR TERM, I FIND IT UNSETTLING SOME OF
HIS COLLEAGUES ARE TALKING THIS WAY AFTER THE WASHINGTON
SUMMIT. I RECOMMEND I BE INSTRUCTED TO SEE CHUN TO
UNDERScore OUR SERIOUSNESS ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION.
END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED] SUGGESTS
THAT PRESIDENT CHUN, OR AT LEAST KEY ADVISORS AROUND HIM
SUCH AS DSC COMMANDER NO TAE-U (M-R), ARE RUMINATING
ABOUT THE PROS AND CONS OF RESUMING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. [REDACTED]

BI

WE HAVE A NEW GROUP OF NATIONALISTIC LEADERS IN
KOREA, FEW OF WHOM WENT THROUGH PRESIDENT PARK'S BRUISING
STRUGGLE WITH THE FORD ADMINISTRATION OVER THE NUCLEAR RE-

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 86-048 34700
BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

NO DIS



Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 02

SEOUL 03255 160910Z

PROCESSING ISSUE IN 1975. SOME OF THE YOUNGER ONES ARE STILL WET BEHIND THE EARS POLITICALLY AND, GIVEN THEIR OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO REDUCE THE ROK'S DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE FORCES, IT WOULD NOT BE TOO SURPRISING IF SOME MEMBERS OF THE CHUN ADMINISTRATION WERE TO VIEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES AS A SHORTCUT.

4. I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE HAVE NO FIRM EVIDENCE THAT A SERIOUS RECONSIDERATION IS ACTUALLY UNDER WAY, AND THE HEAVY COSTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM SHOULD BE INHIBITING. ONE OF THE OFFICERS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED HAS IN A PAST CONVERSATION WITH ME TAKEN A NEGATIVE VIEW TOWARD THE ROK'S DEVELOPMENT OF EITHER A LONG-RANGE MISSILE DELIVERY VEHICLE OR NUCLEAR WARHEADS. GENERAL WICKHAM HAS A SIMILAR IMPRESSION FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH THE MILITARY. THE PATTERN OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S DECISIONS SO FAR WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE MIGHT WELL ULTIMATELY DECIDE AGAINST RESUMPTION OF SUCH ACTIVITY AT LEAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS UNSETTLING THAT THESE RUMINATIONS SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE CHUN'S WASHINGTON VISIT.

5. I THINK IT SAFEST TO CONCLUDE THAT THE KOREANS NEED A MORE EMPHATIC ADMONITION THAN THEY HAVE RECEIVED SO FAR. THEY KNOW FROM HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON AND PERIODIC TALKSWITH GENERAL WICKHAM AND ME THAT WE REMAIN CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THE RELATIVELY INFORMAL NATURE OF OUR STATEMENTS MAY, HOWEVER, HAVE LED THEM TO MISCONSTRUE OUR SERIOUSNESS.

6. THUS, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT I BE INSTRUCTED WITHIN THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR WEEKS TO APPROACH THE PRESIDENT IN A PRIVATE CONTEXT TO REVIEW THE MATTER WITH HIM AS WE DID WITH PRESIDENT PARK. REFERRING BACK TO THE SECRETARY'S

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO DISSEM



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 03

SEOUL 03255 150910Z

BI

COMMENTS IN WASHINGTON,

[REDACTED]

7. GENERAL WICKHAM [REDACTED] CONCUR WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION. GLEYSTEN

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 83

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 200933Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2540

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7419

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 03559

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/20/01 (GLEYSTEN; W.H.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, JA, KS
SUBJECT: ROK-JAPANESE RELATIONS--FOREIGN MINISTERS' VISITS
REF: (A) STATE 71076, (B) SEOUL 3404

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING A PRIVATE MEETING MARCH 20, I GAVE FONMIN SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) THE GIST (REF A) OF THE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE SHOULD THE SUBJECT OF KOREA COME UP DURING OUR MEETINGS WITH FONMIN ITO NEXT WEEK. LHO, WHO WAS PLEASED WITH OUR APPROACH, COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW IF WE COULD MAKE OUR POINTS BRIEFLY TO ITO AND DEVELOP THEM AT GREATER LENGTH WITH PRIMIN SUZUKI IN MAY. HE SUGGESTED THAT SUZUKI HAD FEWER HANG-UPS ABOUT NORTH KOREA. U.S. DISCUSSIONS WITH SUZUKI, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KOREA, WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD BACKDROP FOR LHO'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO TOKYO--NOW PROPOSED FOR JUNE.
3. REFERRING BACK TO OUR LAST CONVERSATION (REF B), LHO MENTIONED THAT MOFA ASIAN AFFAIRS DIRGEN KIUCHI HAD ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THAT ITO HAD ERRED IN OFFERING HIS SERVICES AS AN INTERMEDIARY WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. GLEYSTEN

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-048 #34701

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

BY CU NARA DATE 3/27/08

RA NAN COL VP
EA

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB:EA, ASIMET

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #2408 0570857
O 260852Z FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOULTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2128
IMNFO BUEKJCR/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
HQUSAF WASHDC//PAI//IMMEDIATE
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS
BT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEOUL 02408
COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE
E.O. 12065: GDS 02/26/87 (GLEYSTEN, W. H.) OR-M
TAGS: MARR KS US
SUBJECT: ROK PURCHASE OF F-16 AIRCRAFT
REF: STATE 031946 (DTG 062307Z FEB 81) (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTEL, ON FEBRUARY 8, CHIEF, JUSMAG-K, FORMALLY CONFIRMED TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE PARK CHAN KUNG (M-RI PAK CH'AN-KUNG) CONTINUING U.S. WILGVPNESS TO SELL THE F-16 TO KOREA AND ASKED WHETHER HE SHOULD PROCEED WITH NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS AT THIS TIME.

3. THE VICE MINISTER PROVIDED THE OFFICIAL KOREANSX GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON FEBRUARY 24. HE SAID OHE ROKG WANTS BP PROCEED WITH THE ACQUISITION OF 36 F-16'S, BUT CANNOT COMMIT ITSELF FIRMLY AT THIS TIME FOR THE ADDITIONAL 24 AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. THE MINISTER ASKED THAT THE U.S. PROCEED WITH CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION AND ISSUANCE OF AN LOA.

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NLRR Feb-048 #34702

BY CL NARADATE 3/27/08

DATE 02/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. THE VICE MINISTER SAID THE ROKG RECOGNIZES THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THIS DECISION WILL BE SIGNIFICANT, AND THEREFORE SOME DESIRABLE OPTIONS SUCH AS A FULL SUPPORT CAPACITY AND THE SPARROW (AIM-7) OPTION WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE DEFERRED. IN ADDITION, INITIAL PROVISIONING REQUIREMENTS, THAT IS CONCURRENT SPARES, WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE TRIMMED TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. FINALLY, ADJUSTMENT OF DELIVERY SCHEDULES MAY HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. THE VICE MINISTER SAID THAT IN ORDER TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON THE ROK BUDGET IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PROGRAM, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DELAY SCHEDULED PAYMENTS UNTIL THE LATER YEARS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.

5. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: KOREA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ITS MANY LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS MADE THIS A DIFFICULT DECISION. HOWEVER, THIS FIRM COMMITMENT TO PROCEED WITH THE F-16 ACQUISITION SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF ALLOWING WORK TO PROCEED ON THE SECOND FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN. THE COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROCEED WITH CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION AND ISSUANCE OF AN LOA FOR A FIRM COMMITMENT ON 36 A/C WITH AN OPTION TO ACQUIRE 24 MORE. GLEYSTEN

P8N: 017675

TOR: 057/09:52Z

RTG: 260852Z FEB 81

34703

16

SIT008 R

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
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WHSR COMMENT:

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NLRR F06048 #34703

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #9817 0872315
P 282307Z MAR 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5557

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 079817

NO DIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 AND 3, 3/28/2011 (ARMACOST, MICHAEL H.)

TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR

SUBJECT: POLAND - TALKING POINTS ON CURRENT SITUATION

~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ROKG SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE IMPLI-
CATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. REQUEST THAT YOU DIS-
CUSS THE SITUATION AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL DRAWING UPON
THE MARCH 26 WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE AND THE FOLLOWING.

3. -- POLAND FACES ITS MOST SERIOUS CRISIS SINCE LAST
AUGUST AND WE MAY SEE A DOMESTIC CRACKDOWN OR SOVIET
INTERVENTION THIS WEEKEND. PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE
FOR A POSSIBLE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE
POSSIBLE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO IN A POSITION TO INTERVENE AND THE
POLES MAY INVITE THEM TO DO SO IF THE MARTIAL LAW SCENARIO
DOES NOT WORK.

--THERE IS STILL THE POSSIBILITY THAT GOVERNMENT-SOLIDARITY

SECSTATE WASHDC 9817

DTG:282307Z MAR 81 SSN: 001601
TOR: 088/0357Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TALKS COULD RESULT IN A COMPROMISE BUT BOTH SIDES HAVE THEIR BACKS TO THE WALL.

-- THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS MEETING SUNDAY AND THE PARLIAMENT MEETS IN EMERGENCY SESSION ON MONDAY. THIS COULD INDICATE THAT A GOVERNMENT CHANGE OR DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY IS FORTHCOMING.

-- POLISH ECONOMIC SITUATION IS INCREASINGLY DESPERATE AND THIS INCREASES THE VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION.

-- WE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT WARNING OF THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION OR AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO SUPPRESS THE POLISH WORKERS WHILE HOLDING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IF THE SITUATION STABILIZES.

--- IN THE EVENT OF A SOVIET INTERVENTION WE EXPECT A STRONG AND UNITED ALLIED RESPONSE.

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE POLISH SITUATION WITH OUR NATO AND OTHER ALLIES IN SIMILAR TERMS. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9817

DTG:282307Z MAR 81 BSN: 001601
TOR: 088/0357Z

DATE 03/30/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHUL #3917 0890931
P 300908Z MAR 81
FM ANEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2665

~~S E C R E T~~ SEOUL 03917

NO DIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 AND 3, 03/30/11 (GLEYSTEN, W. H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR, KS
SUBJECT: POLAND - TALKING POINTS ON CURRENT SITUATION
REF: STATE 079817

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DCM DISCUSSED POLISH SITUATION WITH MOFA ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS RO-MYUNG KONG (M-R: KONG NO-MYONG) MARCH 30, DRAWING ON REFTEL AND MARCH 26 WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE.
3. KONG EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION, AND STATED HE WOULD BRIEF FONMIN THE SAME DAY. HE ADDED THAT ROKG IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED OVER THE SITUATION AND INTENDS TO DISCUSS IT AT SOME LENGTH WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET WHEN LATTER VISITS APRIL 1-3. MORE PAROCHIAALLY, KONG SAID FRANCOIS-PONCET HAS ALREADY WARNED THAT THE POLISH SITUATION MAY CAUSE HIM TO SHORTEN HIS STAY, IMPLYING ROKG IS CONCERNED VISIT MIGHT BE CANCELLED ALTOGETHER. GLEYSTEN

SEOUL 3917

DTG:300908Z MAR 81 PSN: 002787
TOR: 089/1100Z

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~~*****SECRET*****~~

NLRR FOL-048 #39704

BY CIS NARA DATE 3/27/08

34705

-3 APR 81Z 06 21

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

LDX# 000920 FE WUC

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~~SECRET~~ N00441

PAGE 01 SEUL 04147 030527Z
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COPY 10 OF 20 COPIES

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P 030450Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2764

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NLR #06-048 #34705

BY CU NARA DATE 8/27/08

~~SECRET~~ SEUL 04147

NODS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/3/01 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) DR-M
TAGS: ESTC, PARM, BTIO, TECH, KS, US
SUBJECT: ADVANCED COMPUTER FOR AGENCY FOR DEFENSE
- DEVELOPMENT:

REF: (A) SEUL 4112, (B) SEUL 3255

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ROK AGENCY FOR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT (ADD) HAS BEEN TRYING FOR MANY YEARS TO ACQUIRE SOPHISTICATED COMPUTERS WHICH WE FEAR MIGHT BE USED IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THE MOST RECENT EFFORT BEGAN WITH OUR NEGATIVE REACTION TO AN INQUIRY FROM CONTROL DATA KOREA (CDK) ABOUT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO AUTHORIZE THE SALE OR RENTAL OF THE CYBER 175. LEARNING THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, CDK HAS CONVINCED ADD TO CONSIDER THE PURCHASE OF THE LESS SOPHISTICATED, LESS POWERFUL CYBER 170-740 MODEL. FACOM OF JAPAN HAS ALSO BEEN IN THE HIDDING AND COULD PROVE AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE (REF A).

3. PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF INDICATIONS THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS IN THE ROKG MAY BE CONSIDERING REACTIVATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM (REF B), WE FAVOR AN EFFORT TO

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 04147 030527Z

BLOCK KOREAN ACQUISITION OF ADVANCED COMPUTERS--FROM JAPANESE AND GERMAN AS WELL AS U.S. SOURCES. THUS, IF WE DECIDE TO DENY THE SALE OF A U.S. COMPUTER, WE RECOMMEND A PRIOR CONFIDENTIAL REPRESENTATION TO THE GOJ AND FRG TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN DENYING KOREAN PURCHASE OF COMPARABLE EQUIPMENT FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. SHOULD SUCH APPROACHES PROVE INFEASIBLE OR TURN OUT TO BE INEFFECTIVE, A FALL-BACK PROPOSAL

[REDACTED] MIGHT ALLOW US TO BENEFIT FROM THE SUBSTANTIAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION INVOLVED WHILE MONITORING ADD'S COMPUTER ACTIVITIES.

4. IF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MORE THAN EVER IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE THE REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT CHUN RECOMMENDED IN REF B CONCERNING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. GLEYSTEN

B1

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SECRET

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: GREGG
WHSR COMMENT:

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NLRR F06-048 #34706
BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #4470 0900907
O 090905Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2934

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 04470

RODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/9/01 (GLEYSTEN, W. H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, KS, US
SUBJECT: ROK SUMMITRY WITH ASEAN AND JAPAN

1. ~~(2)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS DURING OUR PRIVATE LUNCH APRIL 9, FONMIN SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) INFORMED ME CONFIDENTIALLY (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) WILL VISIT INDONESIA AND PROBABLY ALL THE OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES DURING A TWO-WEEK SWING IN THE SECOND HALF OF JUNE OR EARLY JULY. THE INITIATIVE CAME FROM THE INDONESIANS, ALTHOUGH THE KOREANS HAD BEEN THINKING OF A MEETING WITH SUHARTO THIS YEAR. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED WITH THE INDONESIANS, AND TALKS WITH ALL THE OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES ARE GOING WELL.

3. LHO MENTIONED THAT IN ADDITION TO PRIME MINISTER MULDOON'S VISIT HERE LATER THIS MONTH, THE ROK EXPECTS JAPANESE PRIMIN SUZUKI AND THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA TO VISIT KOREA THIS YEAR.

4. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AS DESIRED. GLEYSTEN

SEOUL 4470

DTG:090905Z APR 81 PSN: 017622
TOR: 099/1110Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

22

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

SEOUL 4470

DTG:090905Z APR 81 PSN: 017622
TOR: 099/1110Z

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NSC/S PROFILE

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ID 8101898

RECEIVED 09 APR 81 17

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TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 09 APR 81

2/27/87

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

JAPAN

SUBJECT: KOREAN POLICY INITIATIVES & RELATIONSHIP W/ JAPAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

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(M *B*)

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	<i>C 4/14</i>	<i>Noted by Allen</i>		<i>DE/JL</i>

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(C)

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JANET COLSON

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DICK ALLEN

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IRENE DERUS

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JANET COLSON

Jc 14/0739

BUD NANCE

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KAY

CY TO VP

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CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEEVER

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RVA H...

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

April 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT:

ROK Policy Initiatives

In their usual ebullient fashion, the Koreans are dashing off in various directions, still very much buoyed by the February 2 meeting between Chun and the President. They are placing great stress on the following:

-- Gaining UN membership for both North and South Korea. This seems to be a non-starter, particularly since the ROKs are counting on PRC help. The U.S. will make sympathetic noises but does not plan to do much to help, particularly re the PRC. (C)

-- Trying to bully Japan into "having better relations." The ROKs are still in a snit over Ito's visit, and are opposed to the newly named Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Maeda, because of his ties to Japan's occupation of Korea. Koreans are strongly opposed to Japan's making any new economic moves toward North Korea and are trying to get concrete Japanese recognition of Korea's contribution to Japanese security by being given favorable loans or grants. I feel they are trying to do too much too soon and that a certain amount of stormy weather lies ahead. (C)

-- The ROKs are extremely interested in arranging a meeting between President Chun and Kim Il-song and will be counting on our support to help bring this about. There may be some hope in this area, but much preparation is needed. (C) *attn not!*

-- The ROK has high hopes for the 29-30 April SCM in San Francisco. In particular, they want improved FMS credit arrangements, OPCON of U.S. forces to the Combined Forces Command and U.S. support for third country arms sales. None of these are easy issues, and at this point prospects for a successful SCM are somewhat clouded. (C)

No action from you is needed. My purpose in this paper is to alert you to areas of possible future concern. (U)

cc: Jim Lilley

*Thanks
me
4-14-81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 9, 1987

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NLRR FOI-048 #34707

BY CN NARA DATE 3/27/08

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

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NLRR F06-048 #34708

BY AW NARA DATE 3/27/08

0 090909Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2936
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SEUL 04472

EXDIS
DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND JCS CHAIRMAN JONES
FROM GLEYSSTEEN
STATE FOR UNDERSECRETARY BUCKLEY AND AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE
STATE PLEASE PASS TREASURY
STATE PLEASE PASS CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL LONG (SPECAT)
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/8/01 (GLEYSSTEEN, W.H.) DR-M
TAGS: MASS, KS, US
SUBJECT: SCM

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: GENERAL WICKHAM AND I HAVE WORKED HARD TO CAUTION KOREAN MILITARY LEADERS AGAINST EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS AT THE FORTHCOMING SCM REGARDING FMS CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS, OPCON OF U.S. FORCES TO THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND THIRD COUNTRY ARMS SALES. HOWEVER, UNLESS WE CAN BE MORE RESPONSIVE THAN NOW SEEMS THE CASE, WE FORESEE A DANGER THAT THE SCM WILL LEAD TO DISAPPOINTMENT AND DAMAGE TO THE HARMONY GENERATED BY THE REAGAN/CHUN SUMMIT. ABOVE ALL, WE URGE A MAJOR EFFORT FOR FY 81 AND 82 TO EXTEND THE ROK'S FMS REPAYMENT TERMS TO 11 YEARS AND, IF POSSIBLE, LOWER RATES OF INTEREST. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THE MOST FORTHCOMING POSSIBLE POSITION ON OPCON OF U.S. FORCES TO THE CFC UNDER ARRANGEMENTS ENSURING NATIONAL CONTROL. WHILE STRONGLY ENDORSING EFFORTS TO FACILITATE THE ROK'S THIRD COUNTRY DEFENSE SALES, I FEAR SOME OF THE ROK'S GRANDIOSE IDEAS WILL PERSIST PAST THE SCM. HOPEFULLY THE SCM CAN BE USED TO FOCUS OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ROK DEFENSE

***** WSKR COMMENTS *****

RVA NAN COL VP
EA,DEPOL

PSN:017848

DTG:090909

TOR:0991508

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ESTABLISHMENT IN WAYS CONSISTENT WITH OUR CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. BECAUSE OF PROSPECTIVE CHANGES INVOLVING ME, MY DEPUTY WILL REPRESENT ME AT THE SCM. THE MEETING IS NEVERTHELESS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, AND I WISH TO EXPLAIN WHY I AM RATHER UNEASY ABOUT THIS FIRST EVENT IN OUR RENEWED ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE KOREANS.

4. THE VERY ACT OF HOLDING THE SCM WILL BE SYMBOLICALLY BENEFICIAL TO THE ROK EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO DRAMATIC NEWS FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IN TERMS OF RAPPORT WITH PRESIDENT CHUN AND HIS DEFENSE OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THE SCM WILL FALL FAR SHORT OF THEIR EXPECTATIONS AND DAMAGE THE HARMONIOUS ATMOSPHERE OF RECENT MONTHS. IN ESSENCE, THE KOREANS HAVE EXAGGERATED WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN, YOU, AND OTHERS MEANT WHEN YOU EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF KOREA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND SECURITY CONCERNS, WHEREAS WE HAVE BEEN CONSTRAINED BY KNOWING THE LIMITS ON WHAT THE USG COULD DO TO HELP. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH MINISTER CHOO AND CHAIRMAN LEW, WE HAVE TRIED HARD TO CAUTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS. WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS, AND WE WILL KEEP GRINDING AWAY.

5. GIVEN THE SITUATION HERE, BOTH GENERAL WICKHAM AND I ARE CONVINCED A SUCCESSFUL SCM WILL REQUIRE SOME RESPONSIVE (#) ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE ROKG. FIRST IS THE AMOUNT, TERMS, AND INTEREST OF OUR FMS CREDITS. IN VIEW OF OUR PAST TARGET OF DOLS 275 MILLION AND THE VERY LARGE PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH FACE NO GREATER SECURITY THREAT THAN KOREA, ROKG LEADERS SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS HELD FMS TO THE DOLS 167 MILLION LEVEL. MORE IMPORTANT, THEY DO NOT SEE WHY WE CANNOT SOFTEN THE TERMS FOR KOREA--LENGTHENING THE GRACE AND REPAYMENT PERIODS AS WELL AS LOWERING THE INTEREST. THE KOREANS ARE FULLY AWARE THAT WE ARE OFFERING FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO OTHERS, AND THEY INEVITABLY WONDER WHETHER WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR MAJOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SUPPORT OF U.S. FORCES HERE (DOLS 700 MILLION OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS).

6. SECOND IS PEACETIME OPCON OF ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES TO THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC). WITH VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR COMBAT FORCES UNDER THE CFC, THE KOREANS FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE CFC A GREATER APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SCHEMES ENSURING NATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL U.S. FORCES (WITH INACTIVATION OF THE 38TH AIR

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DEFENSE BRIGADE, ONLY TWO U.S. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL BE
OPCON TO CFC). THE PROBLEM INVOLVES THE SENSIBILITIES
OF ROK MILITARY LEADERS, SOUTH KOREAN NATIONALISM, AND
THE ROK'S STANDING IN THIRD COUNTRIES. THE SOUTH KOREAN
GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FORTHRIGHT IN STANDING UP TO
NORTH KOREAN CHARGES ABOUT HAVING FOREIGN TROOPS ON ITS

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

0 090909Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2937
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 04472

EXDIS
SOIL, BUT THE ROKG'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN ITS INTERNATIONAL STATUS ARE HANDICAPPED BY THE OPTICS OF COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH (TO PUT IT BLUNTLY) STILL HAVE A COLONIAL AURA.

7. THIRD IS THE PROBLEM OF THIRD COUNTRY ARMS SALES WHERE THE KOREAN CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY AUTHORITIES PERSIST IN UNDERESTIMATING PRACTICAL OBSTACLES AND OVERESTIMATING POTENTIAL BENEFITS IN THEIR DESPERATION TO FIND WAYS OF MAKING THEIR HEAVY INVESTMENT IN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES LESS UNPROFITABLE. ALTHOUGH WE SUPPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME OF THESE INDUSTRIES, THEIR USE FOR EXPORT PURPOSES IS SEVERELY ENCUMBERED BY OUR LAWS AND COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

8. RECOGNIZING THE CONSTRAINTS ON US IN DEALING WITH EACH OF THESE ISSUES, I NEVERTHELESS WANT TO HIGHLIGHT KOREAN CONCERNS SO THAT YOU CAN GO TO THE SCN ARMED WITH OUR BEST POSSIBLE POSITION. IT IS GENERAL WICKHAM'S AND MY IMPRESSION THAT A SIGNIFICANT SOFTENING OF OUR FMS ARRANGEMENTS (AT LEAST 11-YEAR PAY-BACK TERMS AND, IF POSSIBLE, LOWER INTEREST RATES) IS NOT ONLY THE MOST FEASIBLE BUT THE MOST BENEFICIAL THING WE COULD DO FOR THE KOREANS AT THIS SCN. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE VERY HELPFUL IF WE COULD REFLECT AN OPEN MIND ABOUT GREATER AMOUNTS OF FMS IN FY 83, BUT AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN KOREA IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE BE MORE GENEROUS ON TERMS AND INTEREST IN FY 81 AND 82. OBVIOUSLY I MUST DEFER TO YOU AND YOUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES

PSN:017850

DTG:090909

TOR:0991510

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ON THE SENSITIVITIES OF COMMAND CHANGES. AS OUR SENIOR CIVILIAN IN SEOUL, HOWEVER, I STRONGLY URGE THAT WE (A) BEGIN NOW TO WORK TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF PUTTING MORE U.S. FORCES UNDER CFC, AND (B) ADOPT A POSITIVE POSITION AT THE SCM. WHILE THE CFC WILL NOT COME UNSTUCK OVER THIS ISSUE, I SEE THE POTENTIAL IN FUTURE YEARS FOR NASTY DIFFICULTIES IN ROK/U.S. WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DANGER OF A "GO IT ALONE" ATTITUDE DEVELOPING AMONG NEW ROK LEADERS. A LITTLE MORE EQUALITY NOW IS, I THINK, THE BEST ANTIDOTE. IN THE CASE OF THIRD COUNTRY SALES, I FEEL OUR TASK IS PRIMARILY TO KEEP THE KOREANS SOBER WHILE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EXPEDITE OUR BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS. I FEAR IT WILL TAKE MORE THAN ONE SCM TO DISABUSE THE ROKS OF SOME OF THEIR GRANDIOSE IDEAS.

9. IN ADDITION TO THESE THREE MATTERS WHERE SOME EASING OF OUR POSITION WOULD BE SO HELPFUL, THERE IS ONE WHERE I SUGGEST WE LEAN THE OTHER WAY. ON THE BASIS OF WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS, THE KOREANS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE DEFENSE AREA. I URGE THAT WE BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT ENCOURAGING THIS KIND OF THING UNTIL WE DECIDE AMONGST OURSELVES WHAT WE REALLY WANT. IN THE PAST WE HAVE DONE A CREDITABLE JOB OF GIVING THE KOREANS MOST OF THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY THEY REALLY NEED, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR ABILITY TO ABSORB AND OUR POLICY INTERESTS. AT THE SAME TIME, OVERLY GENEROUS TALK HAS OCCASIONALLY COMPLICATED OUR ONGOING NEED TO DISCOURAGE THE KOREANS FROM CERTAIN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. GENERAL WICKHAM AND I FAVOR YOUR TELLING MINISTER CHOO TORP EWUX

PAST
PRACTICE OF EXTENDING TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IN THE DEFENSE AREA CONSISTENT WITH ROK CAPABILITIES AND MUTUALLY AGREED OBJECTIVES. IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR OWN PEOPLE IN DEFENSE, STATE, AND HERE UNDERSTAND OUR POLICY IN THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AREA.

10. THE KOREANS ARE DETERMINED TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL SCM. IF YOU CAN ORCHESTRATE ENOUGH RESPONSIVENESS ALONG THE LINES OF THE PARAGRAPHS ABOVE, I AM SURE WE WILL BE OFF TO A VERY GOOD START.

11. GENERAL WICKHAM CONCURS WITH THIS MESSAGE.
GLEYSTEN

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR Feb 048 #34709

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

BY As NARADATE 3/21/08

O 150355Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3036

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7576

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 04713

EXDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS DEFENSE AND CINCPAC (SPECAT)
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/15/01 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) DR-M
TAGS: MASS, KS, US
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL LONG'S APRIL 13 CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHUN

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ADMIRAL LONG HAD A GOOD 75-MINUTE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN APRIL 13. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE SCM COULD NOT RESOLVE ALL ISSUES, CHUN NEVERTHELESS URGED THAT WE EXTEND FMS TERMS TO 10 YEARS GRACE AND 20 YEARS REPAYMENT, AND ASKED THAT WE AGREE TO FACILITATE KOREAN MILITARY EXPORTS AS WELL AS STRENGTHEN CFC. IN A POINTED AND ALL BUT EXPLICIT COMMENT ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE PRESIDENT STATED FLATLY THAT THE ROK WOULD NOT DEVELOP OR PRODUCE WEAPONS OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH WERE NOT CONSONANT WITH U.S. STRATEGIC ISSUES AND DEFENSE PLANNING. SO LONG AS THE U.S. PLAYED ITS STRONG DETERRENT ROLE, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR KOREA TO "GO IT ALONE". CHUN ALSO SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS ABOUT KOREA'S PROBLEMS WITH JAPAN. ADMIRAL LONG PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT WITH AN EXCELLENT OVERVIEW OF OUR SECURITY POSTURE IN THE AREA AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS TO IMPROVE OUR SITUATION. HE REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR THE ROK BUT CAUTIONED THAT THE ROKG SHOULD NOT EXPECT ALL ISSUES TO BE SOLVED AT THE SCM. END SUMMARY.
3. ADMIRAL LONG MET WITH PRESIDENT CHUN ODO HWAN (M-R:

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN CCL VP
EA,ASIMET

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TOR:1050630

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHON TU-HWAN) FOR ABOUT 75 MINUTES APRIL 13. DEFENSE MINISTER CHOD YOUNG BOCK (M-R; CHU YONG-PDK), JCS CHAIRMAN LEW BYONG HION (M-R; YU PYONG-HYON), GENERAL WICKHAM, AND I WERE PRESENT. THE PRESIDENT CONGRATULATED LONG FOR HIS GOOD, TIMELY INTERVIEW WITH ASAHI SHIMBUN WHICH EXPLAINED SO CLEARLY TO THE JAPANESE THE NATURE OF SECURITY THREATS IN THE EAST ASIAN AREA. THE ADMIRAL MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING PRIMIN SUZUKI AND FONMIN ITO LATER THIS WEEK AND WOULD REVIEW WITH THEM THE CURRENT SECURITY SCENE IN THE EA REGION AS WELL AS WHAT ROLE WE SAW FOR JAPAN. HE WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN WHY WE BELIEVED THE NORTH KOREANS CONTINUE TO POSE A MOST SERIOUS THREAT. THE NORTH KOREANS HAD THE CAPACITY, HE SAID, TO ATTACK THE SOUTH, AND WE NEEDED THEREFORE TO DETER THAT OFFENSIVE CAPACITY. ALTHOUGH AN ATTACK WAS NOT A HIGH PROBABILITY AT THIS TIME, CONDITIONS COULD CHANGE AND PROVE TEMPTING TO THE NORTH KOREANS. LONG WENT ON TO PROVIDE A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW, IN WHICH HE STRESSED THAT BOTH GLOBALLY AND REGIONALLY ONLY THE SOVIETS POSED A REAL THREAT. HE CONCLUDED WITH AN AFFIRMATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S WILL AND RESOLVE TO STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY POSITION AND TO STAND BY OUR ALLIES THROUGH MEASURES WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR MANPOWER, READINESS, AND FORCE LEVELS AS WELL AS STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES.

4. FOCUSING ON THE FORTHCOMING SCM, THE ADMIRAL NOTED THAT MINISTER CHOD HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF VERY FORCEFULLY EARLIER IN THE DAY ON KOREAN EXPECTATIONS. HE SAID WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO MAKE THE SCM SUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE THE FIRST SESSION WITH THE NEW U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIALS AND WE HOPED VIEWS WOULD BE EXCHANGED FREELY. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, SOME OF THE KOREAN REQUESTS WOULD REQUIRE TIME FOR SOLUTION AND THE ROKG SHOULD NOT EXPECT ALL MATTERS TO BE SOLVED AT THIS TIME. LONG CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE U.S./ROK RELATIONSHIP WAS AS STRONG AS HE HAD EVER SEEN IT.

5. PRESIDENT CHUN COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. DETERRENT ROLE IN KOREA WAS IMPORTANT TO THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD AND HE HOPED THAT THE ADMIRAL WOULD MAKE THIS POINT WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE INCREASE IN SOVIET FORCES IN THE EAST ASIAN AREA IN A SENSE REFLECTED THE PRESENCE OF THE U.S./ROK MILITARY FORCES. (WHILE PRESUMABLY RECOGNIZING THAT THE ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED IN THE AREA WERE TARGETED ON THE PRC); CHUN NOTED THAT EFFECTIVE U.S. AND ROK FORCES IN EAST ASIA REQUIRED OFFSETTING SOVIET FORCES AND DIVERSION OF SOVIET POWER FROM OTHER TASKS. SHIFTING TO THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE PRO-

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BLEMS, CHUN WELCOMED THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. ITC REGARDING QUOTAS ON KOREAN FOOTWEAR AS A TOKEN OF THE POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE ROK'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ADOPTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN DURING THE RECENT SUMMIT. CHUN SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SCM COULD NOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS OVERNIGHT, BUT HE HOPED THAT WE COULD AT LEAST AGREE TO EASE THE PRESSURE ON THE ROKG BY EXTENDING FMS REPAYMENT TERMS FROM THE PRESENT TWO YEARS GRACE AND SIX AND ONE-HALF YEARS REPAYMENT TO THE 10-20 FORMULA USED FOR CERTAIN

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 150355Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3037

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7577

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 04713

OTHER COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, HE URGED THAT THE SCM AGREE TO SIMPLIFY U.S. PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING ROK DEFENSE SALES TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND.

6. IN WHAT CLEARLY APPEARED TO BE A REFERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, PRESIDENT CHUN INTERJECTED THAT THE ROK WOULD NOT DEVELOP OR PRODUCE WEAPONS OR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH WERE NOT CONSONANT WITH U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND DEFENSE PLANNING. THE U.S. DETERRENT ROLE AND SECURITY SUPPORT FOR KOREA WERE AS STRONG AS EVER AND HENCE IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE ROK TO "GO IT ALONE". THE PRESIDENT UNDERScoreD THE POINTEDNESS OF HIS REMARKS BY STATING HE WANTED TO MENTION THIS MATTER AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO THE U.S. ADMIRAL LONG ASSURED HIM WE WERE INDEED MOST INTERESTED.

7. PRESIDENT CHUN COMPLAINED THAT WITH AN ECONOMY OF ROUGHLY 60 BILLION IN GNP THE ROK WAS SPENDING SIX PERCENT ON DEFENSE, WHEREAS WITH AN ECONOMY OF MORE THAN ONE TRILLION IN GNP THE JAPANESE WERE SPENDING LESS THAN ONE PERCENT. SEVEN YEARS FROM NOW, AT THE END OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, PRESIDENT CHUN SAID HE HOPED THE ROK'S GNP WOULD BE MORE THAN 100 BILLION, AT WHICH POINT THE UNFAIRNESS OF THIS SITUATION WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT. LONG SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEM; JAPAN COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE. WE WERE NOT TELLING THE JAPANESE WHAT TO DO; WE WERE NOT TELLING THEM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA REMAINED FOR THEIR PRO-

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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TECTION AS WELL AS KOREA'S; NOR WERE WE ASKING THE JAPANESE TO DEVELOP OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. WE WISHED INSTEAD TO POINT OUT THE MANY DEFICIENCIES OF JAPANESE DEFENSE AND TO URGE THAT JAPAN DO MORE TO OVERCOME THEM.

8. THE ADMIRAL ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER ROK AND JAPANESE COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY AREA, EMPHASIZING HIS AWARENESS THAT THIS WAS A DELICATE SUBJECT WHICH HAD TO BE APPROACHED CAUTIOUSLY STEP BY STEP. EITHER MIS-UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION OR CHOOSING TO MISUNDERSTAND IT, CHUN ONCE AGAIN VENTED NEGATIVE VIEWS ON JAPAN. FIRST, ASSERTING THE ABSENCE OF ANY ILL WILL AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR A GREATER JAPANESE DEFENSE ROLE IN EAST ASIA, CHUN ARGUED THAT JAPAN WAS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER AND SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMENSURATE DEFENSE BURDEN. SECOND, JAPANESE AND ROK LEADERS SHOULD SHARE THE SAME APPRAISAL OF THE THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY. THIRD, SINCE THE ROK WAS ALREADY DOING ITS BEST TO HELP STRENGTHEN JAPAN'S SECURITY, JAPAN SHOULD IN TURN HELP THE ROK. PRESIDENT CHUN EXPLAINED THAT THE ROKG WAS NOT SEEKING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM JAPAN, BUT HE FELT JAPAN SHOULD HELP KOREA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THUS EASING KOREA'S DEFENSE BURDEN.

9. COMMENT: ADMIRAL LONG'S OVERVIEW, WHICH IS ABBREVIATED IN THE ABOVE ACCOUNT, WAS AN EXCELLENT MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT CHUN TO HEAR, AND HIS BACK-TO-BACK DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KOREANS AND JAPANESE THIS WEEK MAY HELP DAMPEN THE UNHELPFUL PUBLIC ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THERE IS OR IS NOT A NORTH KOREAN "THREAT" IN NORTHEAST ASIA. CHUN'S RATHER VISCERAL DISSERTATION ON JAPAN'S SHORTSIGHTEDNESS DOES NOT SUGGEST MUCH SOPHISTICATION IN THE ROK SEARCH FOR JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. HOPEFULLY WITH MORE TIME AND MORE KNOWLEDGE OF PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES, WE MAY HEAR LESS CHEST THUMPING AND SEE SOME SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

10. WITHOUT DOUBT, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINT CHUN MADE DURING THE MEETING WAS HIS IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HIS COMMENTS DO NOT OBLIATE THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE, BUT THEY SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER. GLEYSTEN

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~~***** C O N F I D E N T I A L *****~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL VP
EOS: ECON, EA
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

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NLRR 106-048 34710

BY CW NARADATE 3/27/08

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #5143 1130936
O 230932Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3194

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7636
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 05143

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/23/81 (GLEYSTEN, W. H.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, KS, JA, US, MILI
SUBJECT: ROKG REQUEST FOR GOJ ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
REF: SEOUL 4490

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CONSISTENT WITH OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION (REFTEL), FONMIN SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) CALLED IN JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUNOBE APRIL 22 TO INFORM HIM THAT DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FONMIN ITO IN JUNE LHO WISHES TO DISCUSS THE ROK'S DESIRE FOR A LARGE AMOUNT OF JAPANESE CREDIT TO HELP OFFSET THE ROK'S HEAVY DEFENSE BURDEN. LATER IN THE DAY LHO TOLD ME WHAT HE HAD DONE AND OFFICIALLY ASKED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN REINFORCE THE ROKG'S REQUEST DURING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIMIN SUZUKI. I PROMISED TO PASS THE REQUEST ALONG, STATING THAT I PRESUMED WE COULD MAKE A GENERALIZED STATEMENT OF SUPPORT BUT COULD NOT APPROPRIATELY TALK ABOUT AMOUNTS OR KINDS OF JAPANESE ASSISTANCE.

3. I TALKED SUBSEQUENTLY TO SUNOBE, WHO SAID THAT LHO

SEOUL 5143

DTG: 230932Z APR 81 PSN: 035647
TOR: 113/1049Z

~~***** C O N F I D E N T I A L *****~~

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASKED FOR DOLS 6 BILLION WORTH OF JAPANESE ODA CREDITS AT THE RATE OF DOLS 1.2 BILLION FOR FIVE YEARS. IN ADDITION, LHO MENTIONED DOLS 800 MILLION JAPANESE EXIM FUNDING AT LEAST FOR THE FIRST YEAR. ACCORDING TO SUNOBE LHO PRESENTED THE ISSUE AS A MATTER OF OBLIGATION FOR JAPAN -- I.E. PAYMENT OF A DEBT OWED THE KOREANS FOR DOING SO MUCH FOR JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE. SUNOBE COMMENTED THAT, WHILE HE DID NOT COMPLETELY REJECT THIS CONCEPT, IT WAS HARDLY THE BEST WAY TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE REACTION IN TOKYO. HENCE HE FORWARDED LHO'S REQUEST IN ROUNDED LANGUAGE.

4. SUNOBE BELIEVES THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE GOJ WILL AGREE TO ANY HUGE CREDIT FOR THE KOREANS, PARTICULARLY IF THE KOREANS FAIL TO SPECIFY IN ADVANCE WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND DOING WITH IT. HE DOES NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN JAPANESE CREDITS IF THE ROKG IDENTIFIES MAJOR PROJECTS FOR WHICH IT WANTS JAPANESE HELP. THE JAPANESE ARE, FOR EXAMPLE, QUITE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN KOREA'S SECOND STEEL MILL AND IN THE MODERNIZATION OF THE KOREA RAILWAY SYSTEM. SUNOBE HAS DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING THIS TO THE KOREANS BECAUSE HE THINKS HIS SUCCESSOR SHOULD DO SO.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRIMIN SUZUKI, I URGE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MAKE A STRONG GENERALIZED PITCH FOR A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HELP EASE THE KOREAN DEFENSE BURDEN, ESPECIALLY DURING THIS PERIOD OF SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE ROK. GLEYSTEN

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